The “Questions of Maitreya” chapter speaks not only of the dharmatā (“true nature”) and svabhāva (“inherent nature”) as mentioned in the first post on this, it also speaks of the dhātu (“element”) itself. The Perfection of Wisdom texts had spoken of the unthinkable or inconceivable element (acintya-dhātu, e.g., Edward Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, pp. 123, 179, 183, 185, 188, 193, 249, 253, 277, 305, 370, 374, 376, 377). This chapter calls it the unspeakable or inexpressible element (nirabhilapya-dhātu, Conze, pp. 646-647, eleven occurrences, translated as “inexpressible realm”). Students of The Secret Doctrine will be reminded of these two adjectives, unthinkable and unspeakable, as applied to the first fundamental proposition of the Secret Doctrine, an omnipresent, eternal, boundless, and immutable principle (vol. 1, p. 14), which, as discussed here before, would be the dhātu, the one element. The “Questions of Maitreya” chapter is one of the most primary documents we have in relation to this fundamental teaching.

A new translation of the three key definitions from the “Questions of Maitreya” is given below. It is followed by “Translation Notes,” explaining how I understood the Sanskrit. These notes are given because Conze said that he and Lamotte have not understood an important phrase in the definition of dharmatā (p. 648, fn. 17). The notes show how I arrived at my translation of it. Also included below is the full Sanskrit text, which Conze and Iida did not give in their edition. They abbreviated what they regarded as repetitive parts of the text, giving only ellipses in their place. The full text is taken from the Sanskrit edition of the complete Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra in 25,000 lines, which only recently became available. It was prepared by Vijay Raj Vajracharya, and published in 3 volumes, 2006-2008 (Sarnath, Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies). Before giving the translation, I must do what Conze did not do, and which led to Thurman’s criticism of his translations. The technical terms used must be briefly explained.

No one expects to understand a science such as physics or chemistry without first learning its technical terms and their framework. The same is true of religio-philosophic systems such as Madhyamaka or Yogācāra Buddhism. All of Buddhism takes for granted a familiarity with the dharmas, the factors of existence that make up its worldview, often translated as “phenomena.” This is primarily a psychological worldview rather than a physical worldview, like we are accustomed to from modern science. So the dharmas are mostly states of our psychological make-up. These have been just as minutely catalogued in the Buddhist science of Abhidharma as have the physical elements in modern science. Indeed, common lists of dharmas include 75 (Abhidharma-kośa) or 100 (Yogācāra) dharmas, much like the periodic table of chemical elements.

The most basic analysis of a person is in terms of the five skandhas, the five “aggregates” that make up a person. This has been an essential feature of Buddhism from the beginning, before the development of the detailed lists of dharmas. The definitions from the “Questions of Maitreya” of the three aspects of dharmas, or ways in which dharmas are to be seen, are given in relation to the five skandhas, then going on to include all dharmas up to the highest with the phrase, “up to buddha-dharmas.” We do not yet have standardized English translations for the five skandhas or “aggregates.” Common translations for them are: (1) rūpa, “form” or “matter”; (2) vedanā, “feeling” or “sensation”; (3) saṃjñā, “perception” or “perception and conception”; (4) saṃskāra, “formations” or “mental formations” or “karma-formations” or “volitional formations” or “volitions” or “dispositions” or “conditioning forces” or “compositional factors”; (5) vijñāna, “consciousness.”

There is wide consensus that, as one of the five aggregates that make up a person, rūpa (“form”) refers to “matter.” Although this is therefore a good translation, there is also wisdom in keeping the same translation term for the same original term wherever it occurs, as we learned from the marvelously consistent Tibetan translations of Sanskrit texts that comprise the Tibetan Buddhist canon. There, rūpa is translated as gzugs throughout. So I will stay with “form” for rūpa. For the second aggregate, vedanā, the translation term “sensation” is not very different from “feeling,” so I will use the more commonly used “feeling.” For the third aggregate, translators have pointed out that when saṃjñā is translated as “perception,” we must also know that “conception” is included in this skandha. The fourth skandha, saṃskārāḥ (plural), is quite the hardest to translate, as may be seen by its many renderings. I will here simply choose one of these, “conditioning forces.” The fifth skandha is translated by most translators as “consciousness” (although a few translate it as “perception” or “cognition”).

The “Questions of Maitreya” chapter begins with Maitreya asking the Buddha how, if the inherent nature (svabhāva) of all dharmas is non-existence (abhāva), should a bodhisattva practicing the Perfection of Wisdom train in the bodhisattva training in regard to “form” (the first aggregate), “feeling” (the second aggregate), etc., etc. That is, if all dharmas are ultimately non-existent, how does a bodhisattva (who wishes to help others) understand the dharmas that make up the people and the world that are to be helped. The Buddha replies that the bodhisattva should understand all dharmas as just names (nāma-mātra).

Maitreya then says: when the name “form,” etc., is perceived as having substance or being real (sa-vastuka), based on it being the outward sign (nimitta) of something that is conditioned (saṃskāra), then how can a bodhisattva train in understanding “form,” etc., to be just a name. That is, since each thing we see is real in that it is produced by causes and conditions, how can we regard it as being merely a name. Maitreya here uses a phrase that is used throughout the “Questions of Maitreya” chapter, saṃskāra-nimitta, translated by Conze as “the sign of something conditioned.” This is a perfectly good translation, but it needs to be explained.

Something conditioned or compounded (saṃskāra) is something that is produced by causes and conditions, and that is put together or made of parts. This means that it is transitory or impermanent, and will not last. Everything in the phenomenal world is something conditioned or compounded (saṃskāra, saṃskṛta). So to speak of something conditioned is a way to refer to everything in the phenomenal or perceptible world. Then, we do not perceive a thing in its entirety, but we see only the outward sign or visible representation of it. This is its sign (nimitta), how we characterize or define it. It is a way to refer to something according to how we see it, which allows us to identify it, name it, etc. The Tibetan translation of nimitta used here, mtshan ma (as opposed to rgyu mtshan or rgyu meaning cause), emphasizes its meaning as something’s defining characteristic. The compound saṃskāra-nimitta, translated by Conze as “the sign of something conditioned,” thus may also be translated as “defined by being conditioned.” It refers to all dharmas except the unconditioned or uncompounded dharmas, namely, nirvāṇa, and sometimes also ākāśa (“space”), and sometimes also tathatā (“suchness”).

Maitreya goes on to point out here: if a thing that is defined by being conditioned, to which we give the name “form,” etc., actually lacked any substance or any reality, if there was really nothing there, then it would not be tenable to give it the name, “form,” etc. There would be nothing to give a name to. The Buddha replies that the name is adventitious (āgantuka), not inherent, projected onto a thing that is defined by being conditioned, such as form, etc. All along, Maitreya has been asking about the inherent nature (svabhāva) of dharmas. This reply, that the name is adventitious, leads to a discussion of whether the inherent nature of form, etc., is actually perceived. If the name is adventitious, then perhaps it is the inherent nature of form, etc., that is perceived. This is denied. If the name is perceived, then perhaps the name is the inherent nature of form, etc. This is denied.

Maitreya then wonders if form, etc., completely do not exist by way of their inherent characteristics (sva-lakṣaṇa), here used as a kind of synonym of inherent nature (svabhāva). The Buddha replies: I do not say that form, etc., completely do not exist by way of their inherent characteristics. Maitreya responds: how do form, etc., exist? The Buddha replies that they exist by worldly convention, not in reality or ultimately (paramārthataḥ).

Maitreya now brings in the inexpressible “element” (dhātu). He says that, as he understands the Buddha’s teachings, the “element” is inexpressible (nirabhilapya) ultimately. The implication is that, ultimately (paramārthataḥ), one cannot say it exists or does not exist. Students of The Secret Doctrine will here be reminded of H. P. Blavatsky’s statement, “It is ‘Be-ness’ rather than Being” (vol. 1, p. 14). Maitreya wonders, then, why the Buddha would say that form, etc., do not exist ultimately. Wouldn’t they be the same as the element, so that one could only say about their existence that it is inexpressible ultimately, rather than that they do not exist ultimately? The Buddha replies: things that are defined by being conditioned, i.e., form, etc., are neither different from the element nor not different from the element. Maitreya asks how, then, should they be understood.

The Buddha says that they should be understood under three aspects: (1) parikalpita (kun brtags), “falsely imagined,” or “imaginary”; (2) vikalpita (rnam par brtags), “conceptualized,” or “constructed by thought”; and (3) dharmatā (chos nyid), “dharma-ness” or “true nature.” Maitreya asks: which is the falsely imagined form, etc.?; which is the thought-constructed form, etc.?; which is the true nature form, etc.? The Buddha then gives the definitions of these three, where the present translation begins.

The Sanskrit text accompanying the translation is from Āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. Vijay Raj Vajracharya, vol. 3, pp. 1328-1329. This corresponds to the Conze and Iida edition, p. 238, nos. 39-41 (attached earlier). The corresponding Tibetan translation from the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra in 18,000 lines is found in the Collated Kangyur, vol. 31, pp. 387-388; the one from the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra in 25,000 lines is found in vol. 28, pp. 775-776. In the revised Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra in 25,000 lines, it is found in the Collated Tengyur, vol. 51, pp. 790-791. As said before, Conze’s English translation of this passage is found in his book, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, p. 648 (attached earlier). Here is the Sanskrit text and new translation:

bhagavān āha | yā maitreya saṃskāra-nimitte vastuni rūpam iti nāma saṃjñā saṃketaḥ prajñaptir vyavahāraḥ niśritya rūpa-svabhāvatayā parikalpanedaṃ parikalpitaṃ rūpam | yan maitreya tasmin saṃskāra-nimitte vastuni vedaneti saṃjñeti saṃskārā iti vijñānam iti yāvad buddha-dharmā iti nāma saṃjñā saṃketaḥ prajñaptir vyavahāraḥ niśritya vedanā-svabhāvatayā saṃjñā-svabhāvatayā saṃskāra-svabhāvatayā vijñāna-svabhāvatayā yāvad buddha-dharma-svabhāvatayā parikalpaneyaṃ parikalpitā vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskārā vijñānaṃ yāvad ime parikalpitā buddha-dharmāḥ |

“The Blessed One said: Maitreya, in regard to a thing that is defined by being conditioned, the false imagination as to the inherent nature of form, based on the name, notion, label, designation, or conventional expression ‘form’, is the falsely imagined form. Maitreya, in regard to this thing that is defined by being conditioned, the false imagination as to the inherent nature of feeling, as to the inherent nature of perception, as to the inherent nature of conditioning forces, as to the inherent nature of consciousness, up to as to the inherent nature of buddha-dharmas, based on the name, notion, label, designation, or conventional expression ‘feeling’, ‘perception’, ‘conditioning forces’, ‘consciousness’, up to ‘buddha-dharmas’, is the falsely imagined feeling, perception, conditioning forces, consciousness, up to the falsely imagined buddha-dharmas.”

yā punas tasya saṃskāra-nimittasya vastuno vikalpa-mātra-dharmatāyām avasthānatā[-]vikalpaṃ pratītyābhilapanatā tatredaṃ nāma saṃjñā saṃketaḥ prajñaptir vyavahāro rūpam iti vedaneti saṃjñeti saṃskārā iti vijñānam iti yāvad buddha-dharmā iti | idaṃ vikalpitaṃ rūpam iyaṃ vikalpitā vedanā iyaṃ vikalpitā saṃjñā ime vikalpitāḥ saṃskārā idaṃ vikalpitaṃ vijñānam ime yāvad vikalpitā buddha-dharmāḥ |

“Next, this thing that is defined by being conditioned is an expression dependent on the thought-construction of [its] status as to the true nature of thought-construction only. What, in regard to this, is the name, notion, label, designation, or conventional expression ‘form’, ‘feeling’, ‘perception’, ‘conditioning forces’, ‘consciousness’, up to ‘buddha-dharmas’, this is the thought-constructed form, this is the thought-constructed feeling, this is the thought-constructed perception, these are the thought-constructed conditioning forces, this is the thought-constructed consciousness, up to these are the thought-constructed buddha-dharmas.”

yā utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sthitaiveyaṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā dharma-sthititā dharma-dhātur yat tena parikalpita-rūpeṇa tasya vikalpita-rūpasya nityaṃ nitya-kālaṃ dhruvaṃ dhruva-kālaṃ niḥsvabhāvatā dharma-nairātmyaṃ tathatā bhūta-koṭir idaṃ dharmatā rūpam iyaṃ dharmatā vedanā saṃjñā saṃskārā vijñānam ime yāvad buddha-dharmāḥ |

“Whether tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this true nature (dharmatā) of dharmas simply remains; [it is] the condition for the abiding of dharmas (dharma-sthititā), the element of dharmas (dharma-dhātu). [It is] the absence of inherent nature (niḥsvabhāva) of this thought-constructed form as [it appears as] this falsely imagined form throughout permanent, permanent time, and constant, constant time; [it is] the absence of self in dharmas (dharma-nairātmya), suchness (tathatā), the reality limit (bhūta-koṭi). This is the true nature form (dharmatā rūpa), this is the true nature feeling, perception, conditioning forces, consciousness, up to these are the [true nature] buddha-dharmas.”

Translation Notes

Before getting to the problem area, a few other translation issues should be clarified. Sanskrit regularly uses what has been called a yat-tat correlative, where the relative pronoun yat, “what, which,” is correlated with the demonstrative pronoun tat, “this, that.” This includes all forms of the Sanskrit pronouns, in any gender or any declension, and not only the forms yat and tat. Such a construction with correlating pronouns is not used in English. In our first definition above, the core sentence is: yā parikalpanā idaṃ parikalpitaṃ rūpam, where the correlating pronouns are yā, “what,” and idam, “this.” It says, literally, “what is false imagination, this is falsely imagined form.” But in English, we merely say, “false imagination is falsely imagined form.” We do not use the correlating pronouns. So my English translation of this definition purposely omits these pronouns. This same core sentence structure is used for all three definitions, beginning with yā, “what,” and ending with the correlative idam, “this.” In the second two definitions, however, the beginning part giving the “what” is lengthy, so the definition requires more than one English sentence. In the second definition, I have not omitted the “what,” but have moved it to the beginning of the third English sentence. Even though it does not make very good English, I have retained it in the translation because the correlating “this” in the ending part of the definition is repeated for each item. In the third definition, I have omitted translating the “what” in the lengthy beginning part of the definition, but I have translated the “this” at the beginning of the English sentence giving the ending part of the definition.

On specific terms: As already said, the word nimitta, often translated as “sign,” is here translated in the compound saṃskāra-nimitta as “defined by,” following the Tibetan translation of it used here, mtshan ma. The word saṃketa is also often translated as “sign.” Conze here translated it as “social agreement.” I have here translated it as “label.”

Then, the compound dharma-sthititā is not easy to understand. Bhikkhu Bodhi translates its Pali equivalent as “the stableness of the Dhamma.” Conze translates it as “the established order of dharmas.” My translation of it as “the condition for the abiding of dharmas” is based on the form of this catechism-like saying as it occurs in the Saṃyuktāgama: utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sthitā eveyaṃ dharmatā dharma-sthitaye dhātuḥ. Here, sthiti is declined in the dative case, “for the abiding of dharmas.” The whole sentence may be translated as: “Whether tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this true nature (dharmatā) simply remains, the element (dhātu) for the abiding of dharmas.” The Sanskrit of this text was discovered among the Turfan finds in the early 1900s. See: Funfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasaṃyukta, edited by Chandrabhāl Tripāṭhī (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, vol. 8. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962, p. 148). The word “condition” in my translation renders the -tā suffix.

The problematic phrase is given by Conze (p. 648) as: “the absence of own-being which is characteristic eternally and through all eternity, constantly and through all time, of that discerned form because of that imagined form.” In a footnote to this, Conze refers to and partially quotes a French translation by Lamotte, concluding: “We have not understood this phrase.” The reference is given as “Lamotte II 1. p. 91.” As happens all too often, this is not listed in the abbreviations, and there is no bibliography. Paging backwards, we find on p. 583 fn. a reference to “E. Lamotte, Le traite,” but this is a different book. The reference, it turns out, is to Lamotte’s 1938 book, La somme du grand vehicule, tome II, fascicule I. There, in a long footnote quoting material from the Chinese translation of the Upanibandhana commentary, this same passage occurs. The phrase in question is: “En raison de cette matiere imaginaire (parikalpitarūpa), la matiere pensee (vikalparūpa) est eternelle et constante.” This is then summed up as: “En raison de ces attributs de Buddha imaginaires (parikalpitabuddhadharma), les attributs de Buddha penses (vikalpabuddhadharma) sont eternels et constants.” Ani Migme translates Lamotte’s French of these phrases as (p. 133): “Because of this imaginary nature (parikalpitarūpa), conceptual form (vikalparūpa) is eternal and constant”; and “Because of these imaginary attributes of the Buddha (parikalpitabuddhadharma), the conceptual attributes of the Buddha (vikalpabuddhadharma) are eternal and constant.”

As may be seen, Conze’s and Lamotte’s translations agree in saying “because of that imagined form/this imaginary nature.” One must wonder why anything eternal and constant would be because of something imagined or imaginary (I have translated this as “falsely imagined,” because the prefix “pari” gives kalpita, “imagined,” the sense of “falsely”). The “because of” is a translation of the instrumental case ending, “-ena,” on parikalpita-rūpeṇa, and its corresponding pronoun declined in the instrumental case, tena. The instrumental case is not always easy to translate, because it has more than one meaning. One of the less-known meanings of the instrumental case is “as.” It is not found in Sanskrit textbooks known to me. But it can be found in this meaning in a related text, Vasubandhu’s commentary on Maitreya’s Madhyānta-vibhāga, 3.2: tat punar daśa-vidhaṃ daśa-vidhātmagrāha-pratipakṣeṇa veditavyam, “Further, this group of ten [principles] should be understood as an antidote (pratipakṣeṇa) to the group of ten graspings of self.” It can also be found in this meaning in another old text, Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, 3.3: ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditaḥ, “The ātman has arisen as individual souls (jīvair, instrumental plural), like space as the space in pots.” Indeed, this text even uses it in this meaning with the cognate verbal, vikalpita, in 2.17 and 2.19. The latter is: prāṇādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitaḥ, “[It] is imagined as prāṇa, etc., as these infinite existing things.” This establishes that the instrumental case can mean “as.” Does it mean “as” here?

In a text by Vasubandhu, the Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa, the corresponding three svabhāvas taught in the Yogācāra school of Buddhism are explained. These are: (1) parikalpita svabhāva, the “falsely imagined nature”; (2) paratantra svabhāva, the “dependent nature”; and (3) pariniṣpanna svabhāva, the “perfect nature.” They are defined in verses 2-4, which I translate as follows:

yat khyāti paratantro ’sau yathā khyāti sa kalpitaḥ |

pratyayādhīna-vṛttitvāt kalpanā-mātra-bhāvataḥ || 2 ||

2. What appears is the dependent, because it functions in dependence on conditions. As it appears is the imagined, because of being imagination only.

tasya khyātur yathā-khyānaṃ yā sadāvidyamānatā |

jñeyaḥ sa pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvo ’nanyathātvataḥ || 3 ||

3. The ever non-existence of what appears, as it appears, is to be known as the perfect nature, because it is changeless.

tatra kiṃ khyāty asatkalpaḥ kathaṃ khyāti dvayātmanā |

tasya kā nāstitā tena yā tatrādvaya-dharmatā || 4 ||

4. Of these, what appears? The imagination of what is unreal. How does it appear? In the form of duality. What is the non-existence of that as that (tena)? Their true nature without duality.

Here in verses 2 and 3, the word yathā, “as” (in the sense of “the way in which”), is twice used to define the (falsely) imagined nature (kalpita used for parikalpita to fit the meter): “as it appears.” Then in verse 4, the pronoun declined in the instrumental case, tena, clearly means “as that/this.” This is also what it means in the problematic phrase from the “Questions of Maitreya” chapter. It does not here mean “because of this/that,” as Lamotte took it in his early work (translated from a Chinese translation rather than the Sanskrit original) that he never had time to go back and revise, and as Conze also gave but responsibly added a note saying, “We have not understood this phrase.” It here means “as this falsely imagined form”; so I have translated this phrase as “the absence of inherent nature (niḥsvabhāva) of this thought-constructed form as [it appears as] this falsely imagined form throughout permanent, permanent time, and constant, constant time.” I added in brackets “[it appears as]” so that “as this falsely imagined form” would not be taken as “as also this falsely imagined form.”

Not a single one of the seven English translations of the Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa now available took tena in verse 4 as “as that/this.” Two translations simply omitted the tena (Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya, The Trisvabhāvanirdeśa of Vasubandhu, 1939; and Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, 1984). Two translations took the tena as “with this/that” (Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, “with this (duality),” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1983, p. 252; and Karl Brunnholzl, “with that [duality],” Straight from the Heart, 2007). Two seem to have taken the tena in the meaning “by this,” and then paraphrased this as “will result from” (Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 1982), or as “is the consequence of” (Jay Garfield, Empty Words, 2002, but the translation is too loose to tell for sure). One seems to have taken the tena as “in virtue of which” and placed it with the last metrical foot of the verse (Thomas E. Wood, Mind Only, 1991). Despite the yathā (“as”) in the definitions in the preceding two verses, the meaning of the instrumental case as “as” is too little known.

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The Chittamatra tradition of the Middle Way teaches, according to the Shentong tradition, that the Dharmadhâtu is the same as the Clear Light and the same as the Buddha Nature (Tathagatagarbha).

From “A Treatise on Buddha Nature” by Rangjung Dorje (excerpt from : “On Buddha Essence by Khenchen Thrangu”)

– p.21 : « The element has no creator, but it is given this name, because it retains its own characteristics. It (the element) is different from all other things in that it possesses its own characteristics, and while being empty and not having any true reality, it also has the nature of luminosity. »

p.47 : « It (the dharmadhâtu) could also be called the union of wisdom and space, where space is the aspect of emptiness and wisdom is the aspect of clarity. »

p.62 : « The aspect of space is emptiness, that is, the absence of any true reality . Since beginningless time, phenomena have been without any reality , and the nature of our mind has also been without any reality. This is the space or emptiness phenomena, or we could say the dharmadhâtu. »

p.76 : « The dharmadhâtu and the buddha nature are the same ; they cannot be separated…When talking about the emptiness aspect we say dharmadhâtu, and when talking about the luminosity aspect we say buddha nature. »

It is confirmed by other scriptures : From “Yoga of the Guhyasamajatantra – Alex Wayman”

p.188 : from the Pancakrama II,29 commentary : The great Science (mahavidyâ) is the Dharmadhâtu, the Clear Light.

p.193 : from Tson-kha-pa commentary on the Caturdevîparipricchâ : « The three vijnânas proceed from the the 18-fold dharmadhâtu which is the Clear Light of Death. »

p.201 : from the school of Buddhajnânapâda – Vitapâda’s Muktitilaka-nâma-vyâkhyâna : « The self-existence of the non-duality of the Profound and the Bright has the nature of pervading all states (bhâva) and is not included in the dharmas of samsâra ; it is called Dharmadhâtu. »

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The “Questions of Maitreya” chapter in the Perfection of Wisdom texts shows us that we may substitute the wider Buddhist term dharmatā for the specifically Yogācāra Buddhist term pariniṣpanna in verse 6 of stanza 1 of the Book of Dzyan. As we see from The Secret Doctrine, we could also substitute the Advaita Vedānta term pāramārthika for it (vol. 1, p. 356): “Says a ‘Gupta Vidya’ Sūtra: ‘In the beginning, a ray issuing from Paramārthika (the one and only true existence), it became manifested in Vyavahārika (conventional existence) which was used as a Vahan to descend into the Universal Mother, and to cause her to expand (swell, brih)’.” In Advaita Vedanta we also have a listing of the three modes of existence that would correspond to the three svabhāvas of Yogācāra Buddhism, and to the three aspects taught in the “Questions of Maitreya.” These are: pāramārthika, “ultimate”; vyāvahārika, “conventional”; and prātibhāsika, “false appearance,” i.e., “illusory.”

We are seeking a Book of Dzyan, which, as said before, must necessarily use some set of terminology. From the indications we have, at least some of its terminology is distinctive Yogācāra Buddhist terms. Nonetheless, other formulations of the same ideas would be possible; and according to the above quotation from a “Gupta Vidya” or “Hidden Knowledge” Sūtra, do in fact exist. This quotation uses distinctive Advaita Vedānta terms. Despite the fact that these systems combat each other exoterically, their teachings are considered identical in the Secret Doctrine. It makes no difference that those who are regarded in the Secret Doctrine as being high initiates, when giving their exoteric teachings, argue against each other. The great Advaita Vedānta teacher Śaṅkarācārya refutes the Buddhists, and the great Tibetan Buddhist teacher Tsongkhapa refutes his fellow Buddhist Jonangpas, precisely because their doctrine is too much like that of Advaita Vedānta! On this issue, see the important paragraph spanning pp. 636-637 of vol. 2 of The Secret Doctrine. So we proceed with bringing in parallel terms and ideas that have historically linked the Yogācāra teachings and the Perfection of Wisdom or Madhyamaka teachings, from Haribhadra to Dolpopa.

The “Questions of Maitreya” chapter of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras in 18,000 and 25,000 lines has been translated into English by Edward Conze in his 1975 book, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, pp. 644-652 (attached as Questions of Maitreya-English-Conze). He and Shotaro Iida had previously edited and published the original Sanskrit text in their 1968 article “‘Maitreya’s Questions’ in the Prajñāpāramitā,” in Melanges D’Indianisme a la Memoire de Louis Renou, pp. 229-242 (attached as Questions of Maitreya-Sanskrit-Conze Iida). The late Edward Conze was practically the sole translator of the massive Perfection of Wisdom texts throughout his lifetime, and every student of these texts in English translation owes him a large debt of gratitude. Conze’s translations have been criticized by Robert Thurman in his Foreword to Lex Hixon’s 1993 Mother of the Buddhas, p. xvi, as follows:

“His translations thus resemble cookbooks full of recipes translated with a dictionary by someone who has no idea what the foods and spices are, who has never cooked or never eaten such a meal. I have assigned his translations to classes of students, decade after decade, with the invariable result that they feel confused, mystified, and shut out of the real message of the text.”

While what he reports about his students being confused by Conze’s translations is no doubt true, the reason he assigns for this is unlikely, and is unfair to Conze. The earlier part of this paragraph associates “basic preconceptions of nihilism” with Conze, says that he “did not himself practice the yoga of transcending wisdom,” and that “He never found the liberating logic of what might superficially appear to be meaningless paradoxes or irreconcilable contradictions.” This is not the impression that I get of Conze from his various journal articles and books, as well as oral information from former students of his. In fact, Conze had a difficult time in academia for the same reason that Thurman did at the beginning: He was a believer in Buddhism at a time when it was thought that scholars could not remain objective if they believed in what they studied.

The difficulty with Conze’s translations is not that they are dictionary translations by someone who does not know what the text is talking about, but rather that he used stock translations of technical terms that are not normal English (such as “own-being” for svabhāva), and never stopped to give notes explaining their meaning. Conze had a huge amount of material to translate, and he did not write extensive explanatory notes like his colleague Etienne Lamotte was famous for. Thurman concludes: “Prajnaparamita still cries out for a completely revised presentation.” I agree, but not because of thinking that Conze seriously misunderstood the material.

I will give a new translation of the definitions of the three ways in which dharmas are to be seen, from the “Questions of Maitreya,” shortly. In the meantime, one can try to understand Conze’s translation of them, found on p. 648 (attached above). He here translates dharmatā as “dharmic nature.” There are several significant misprints in this book, such as “earth” for “death” on p. 644, that further hinder one’s understanding. Although I regard writing in books as a cardinal sin, I have here made an exception and have written in pencil in the margins a few corrections.

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In our investigation of the dhātu (“element, basic space”) and its synonyms as a central idea in the system of the Book of Dzyan, the term dharmatā (“true nature”) has been brought in as the definition of svabhāva (“inherent nature”), when svabhāva is used in its highest meaning. The Yogācāra school of Buddhism speaks of the three svabhāvas: (1) parikalpita svabhāva, the “imagined nature”; (2) paratantra svabhāva, the “dependent nature”; and (3) pariniṣpanna svabhāva, the “perfect nature”. In the Prajñā-pāramitā or Perfection of Wisdom texts, a similar listing is found in the chapter known as the “Questions of Maitreya” (maitreya-paripṛcchā, chapter 72 of the version in 25,000 lines, and chapter 83 of the version in 18,000 lines). There, dharmatā (“true nature”) is the third and highest, corresponding to the pariniṣpanna svabhāva (“perfect nature”).

So verse 6 of stanza 1 of the Book of Dzyan could just as well say that the universe was immersed in dharmatā as in pariniṣpanna. The same is true for verse 1 of stanza 2. It is just a matter of which term is used in which class of texts. The fact that pariniṣpanna (Tibetan yongs grub) is given among the technical terms found in the Book of Dzyan (The Secret Doctrine, vol. 1, p. 23) tells us that this book used Yogācāra terms rather than terms from the Perfection of Wisdom texts.

The Yogācāra texts have formed the basis not only of the Cittamātra or “mind-only” school, but also of the so-called “Great Madhyamaka” school. There they are understood differently than in the Cittamātra school. There they cross over directly to the Perfection of Wisdom texts, the primary sourcebooks of all Madhyamaka schools. This cross-over was made possible by the “Questions of Maitreya” chapter found in two of the large Perfection of Wisdom texts. In this chapter, the Buddha replies to Maitreya’s questions, telling him that all dharmas can be understood as parikalpita (kun brtags), “[falsely] imagined”, vikalpita (rnam par brtags), “conceptualized”, and by way of their dharmatā (chos nyid), “true nature”, obviously corresponding to the three svabhāvas of the Yogācāra texts.

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Jacques has called our attention to what is the single most important text by Nāgārjuna for the so-called “Great Madhyamaka” tradition, the Dharmadhātu-stava. The dharma-dhātu is the “dhātu of dharmas”; i.e., the “element” or “basic space” or “realm” of the dharmas, the “elements of existence” or “phenomena” or “factors” that make up our world. A stava, also called a stotra, is a “hymn” or “song” or “praise.” As might be expected, the stavas by Nāgārjuna are not typical songs of praise; they are full of philosophical ideas. Here he speaks of something that cannot be directly described in words, or reasoned about like the topics of his other writings, so he just sings his praises of it.

The Sanskrit original has not yet been published, and was presumed lost. However, it is reported to have been found among the Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in Tibet, only recently becoming accessible to scholars. In the meantime, until this is edited and published, we have six verses of the original Sanskrit that were quoted in Nāropā’s Kālacakra commentary, the Sekoddeśa-ṭīkā. These are given below, quoted from the excellent 2006 edition prepared by Francesco Sferra (Serie Orientale Roma, vol. XCIX, p. 188). I have also compared the pioneering 1941 edition by Mario E. Carelli (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, vol. XC, p. 66). The only significant difference is the superior reading “agni-śaucaṃ” in verse 20a in the 2006 edition, rather than the reading “agniḥ śaucaṃ” in the 1941 edition.

Also given below is an English translation of these verses made from the Tibetan translation by Donald S. Lopez, Jr., found in the 2004 book he edited, Buddhist Scriptures (Penguin), pp. 467-468. Jacques has already informed us of the 2007 translation by Karl Brunnholzl with full commentary. Another translation by Jeffrey Hopkins of these verses (but not the whole text) may be found in Mountain Doctrine (2006), pp. 102-105, where they were quoted by Dolpopa. Of these, note especially verse 22, which is of much significance. A fairly literal translation of Nāgārjuna’s verse from the original Sanskrit is: “Whichever (ye kecid) sūtras (sūtrāḥ) that bring in (āhārakāḥ) emptiness (śūnyatā) were spoken (bhāṣitāḥ) by the Jinas (jinaiḥ), by all those (sarvais taiḥ) the afflictive emotions are turned back (kleśa-vyāvṛttir). Not at all (naiva) is the dhātu destroyed (dhātu-vināśanam).”

nirmalau candra-sūryau hi āvṛtau pañcabhir malaiḥ |

abhra-nīhāra-dhūmena rāhu-vaktra-rajo-malaiḥ || 18 ||

evaṃ prabhāsvaraṃ cittam āvṛtaṃ pañcabhir malaiḥ |

kāma-vyāpāda-middhena auddhatya-vicikitsayā || 19 ||

agni-śaucaṃ yathā vastraṃ malinaṃ vividhair malaiḥ |

agni-madhye yathāksiptaṃ malaṃ dagdhaṃ na vastratā || 20 ||

evaṃ prabhāsvaraṃ cittaṃ malinaṃ rāgajair malaiḥ |

jñānāgninā malaṃ dagdhaṃ na dagdhaṃ tat-prabhāsvaram || 21 ||

śūnyatāhārakāḥ sūtrā ye kecid bhāṣitā jinaiḥ |

sarvais taiḥ kleśa-vyāvṛttir naiva dhātu-vināśanam || 22 ||

pṛthivy-antarhitaṃ toyaṃ yathā tiṣṭhati nirmalam |

kleśair antarhitaṃ jñānaṃ tathā tiṣṭhati nirmalam || 23 ||

“Although the sun and moon are stainless, they are blocked by the five obstacles, such as clouds, mist, smoke, eclipses and dust. (18)

“In the same way, the mind of clear light becomes blocked by the five obstructions: desire, enmity, laziness, agitation and doubt. (19)

“When a fireproof garment, stained by various stains, is placed in fire, the stains are burned but the garment is not. (20)

“In the same way, the mind of clear light is stained by desire. The stains are burned by the fire of wisdom; just that clear light is not. (21)

“All the sūtras setting forth emptiness spoken by the teacher turn back the afflictions; they do not impair the element. (22)

“Just as the water in the earth remains untainted, wisdom is within the afflictions, yet remains unstained. (23)”

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The Dharmadhâtu in Buddhist Scriptures

Going to the sources for esoteric subjects is always a challenge, as explained many times by David.

The Dharmadathu,  is of such importance for our quest, that all tracks sould be explored, together with the risk of misunderstanding. If we operate as researchers do, we will try to identify as many different sources, together with their environment , when they were taught, written, translated, commented, in order to extract, when possible, a commun understanding.

Nagarjuna wrote a treatise on it – the Dharmadhâtustava – in his collection of praises. It seems a not-very-well-known text with a few commentaries. The most extant is the one written by the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje. These were translated and published recently (2007) by Karl Brunnhölz – In Praise of Dharmadhâtu by Nagarjuna, Commentary by the IIIrd Karmapa – ISBN 1-55939-286-X.

Before that, D. Seyfort Ruegg wrote an article on it, and it can be a good introduction to the subject. Here are the main ideas which can be of interest for our purpose.

First, an overview of Nagarjuna history may help putting the texts in perspective.

According to Bu ston and Târanâtha, Nagarjuna was born 400 years after the Buddha nirvana in the Vidarbha province (Berâr).During the first part of his life, he worked for the goodness of the people. This was called the First Promulgation of the Law (chos kyi sgra chen po). He mainly worked at cleaning the then-current degenerated practices in the monasteries.

Then, he moved to the Naga world where he got the Prajnâpâramitâsûtras, brought them back, and spend the second part of his life writing scolastic works (rigs tshogs) to explain the meaning of the sutras. It is called the Second Promulgation of the Law, dedicated to the teaching of sunyata.

Then he traveled again, to spend years in Uttarakuru. From there, he brought back scriptures like the Mahâbherîsûtra and the Mahâmeghasûtra. To explain these sutras, he then wrote a group of hymns (bstod tshogs). It is called the Third Promulgation of the Law.

The Dharmadhâtustava is considered as one of the most important hymn According to ‘Jam dbyans bzad pa, the author of the Grub mtha’ chen mo, this last Promulgation main theme is the existence of the spiritual Element (khams=dhâtu) of the buddha in all animated beings. ‘Jam dbyans bzad pa considers the Dharmadhâtustava doctrine in conformity with the teachings of the Dhâranisvararâjasûtra and the Ratnagotravibhâga.

At first, the philosophical vocabulary found inside the Dharmadhâtustava is far different from the one used inside the Mûlamadhyamakakârika, as already identified by E. Frauwallner in his « Philosophie des Buddhismus » ; together with some other words like pâramitâ, bodhicitta, etc. But some other texts (Niraupamyastava – 6.21, Acintyastava – fol 90a7, and the Paramârthastava -8 are using the dharmadhâtu and the dharmata words.

Candrakirti quote seven stanzas which are related to the dharmadhâtu in his Madhyamakâvatâra self-commentary :

ZIG PA MED CIN SKYE MED LA/ /CHOS DBYINS DAN MNAM PAR GYUR KYAN//SREG PA’I BSKAL PA BRJOD MDZAD PA/ /’DI NI ‘JIG RTEN MTHUN ‘JUG YIN// DUS GSUM DAG TU SEMS CAN GYI / /RAN BZIN DMIGS PA MA YIN LA// SEMS CAN KHAMS KYAN STON MDZAD PA/ /’DI NI ‘JIG RTEN MTHUN ‘JUG YIN//

in which one can find : « Exempt from destruction and birth, the world is equivalent to the dharmadhâtu… »

Two similar stances can be found inside the Prasannapadâ of Candrakirti (26.2 in La Vallée Poussin translation), and also inside the Niraupamyastava.

The Dharmadhâtustava in Sanskrit is no more available, and there are no indian commentaries known.. A chinese version was written around 980 AD, and a tibetan translation was made by Krishna Pandita and Nag tsho lo tsâ ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba (born in 1011).

This first post was to help substantiating the fact that the dharmadhâtu is an integral part of the Nagarjuna teachings.

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As just seen at the end of the previous quotation, Candrakīrti wonders who would ask if such a svabhāva (“inherent nature”) exists or not. If it did not, what would be the purpose of all the strivings of bodhisattvas? Now we must wonder why Tsongkhapa, followed by his Gelugpa order, is commonly understood to deny all svabhāva (other than that something’s “inherent nature” is that it has no “inherent nature”). With Candrakīrti we are not speaking of some Indian Madhyamaka writer who is only partially accepted by Tsongkhapa; we are speaking of the very one who is fully accepted by Tsongkhapa as giving the authoritative interpretation of the writings of Nāgārjuna. The information necessary to answer this question was given in a quotation from Jeffrey Hopkins posted by Jacques in an earlier discussion of the Stanzas of Dzyan (at Theosophy.Net on October 22, 2010):

“Since in Prāsaṅgika emptiness—the absence of inherent existence (svabhāvasiddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa)—is the nature (svabhāva, rang bzhin) of all phenomena, it should not be thought that svabhāva is refuted in all its meanings. Svabhāva meaning svabhāvasiddhi or ‘inherent existence’ is refuted, but svabhāva as ‘final nature’ or just ‘character’ (such as heat and burning as the character of fire) is not refuted.” (Meditation on Emptiness, 1983, pp. 391-392)

Tsongkhapa agrees with what Candrakīrti says here, as may be seen in his quotation of this passage from Candrakīrti in his Lam rim chen mo. Tsongkhapa specifically says that such a svabhāva exists. But the English translation of the Lam rim chen mo, apparently following the Gelugpa exegesis in the Four Interwoven Annotations, makes it look like what he says exists is some “nature” other than svabhāva, “intrinsic nature”/“inherent nature” (The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, vol. 3, pp. 197-198, attached as Lam rim chen mo on svabhāva). The Tibetan rang bzhin (Sanskrit svabhāva) is normally translated as “intrinsic nature” in this book.* In this section, however, rang bzhin (svabhāva) is translated as “nature” in some places and as “intrinsic nature” in other places, and even as “final nature.” Thus, Nāgārjuna speaks only of a “nature” in the two verses quoted by Candrakīrti, also quoted by Tsongkhapa (p. 195). Candrakīrti is asked only if this “nature” exists, and says it does, and Tsongkhapa agrees (pp. 197-198). Then Tsongkhapa denies only an “intrinsic nature” (p. 198). A concluding quote is added, where Candrakīrti accepts only a “final nature” (p. 198). In all of these places, as may be seen in the Tibetan quoted below, the word being translated is only rang bzhin (Sanskrit svabhāva), “inherent/intrinsic nature.”

Being given Gelugpa interpretations of a Gelugpa text will not be a reason for surprise. Nor would there be much reason for doubting that these interpretations reflect what Tsongkhapa meant. The problem here is that readers are being given interpretations, and not being told that these are interpretations rather than direct translations. Tsongkhapa’s text has many quotations of Sanskrit texts. The interpretative translations occur within these quotations as well. This was never allowed when these Sanskrit texts were translated into Tibetan to form the Tibetan Buddhist canon, the Kangyur and Tengyur. When the Sanskrit original had the term svabhāva, it was translated into Tibetan as rang bzhin or its synonym ngo bo nyid. These are what were allowed. Throughout the whole Kangyur and Tengyur, we do not find interpretive translations of svabhāva such as “nature” in one place, “inherent/intrinsic nature” in another place, and “final nature” in a third place. The texts had to be translated as they were found, and let the interpretations come later.

The meaning “final nature” for svabhāva was mentioned in the paragraph that Jacques quoted from Jeffrey Hopkins’ 1983 book, Meditation on Emptiness. Although that book has a glossary, “final nature” is not in it. However, it is found in the fuller glossary of Elizabeth Napper’s 1989 book, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, which adopted the translation terminology used by Jeffrey Hopkins. There “final nature” is listed as translating rang bzhin mthar thug. In the passage from the Lam rim chen mo under discussion (p. 198), “final nature” is given in a quotation from Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā. But Candrakīrti’s text, and Tsongkhapa’s quotation of it, has only rang bzhin, not rang bzhin mthar thug (quoted below). Its Sanskrit original has only svabhāva, with no qualifiers (Poussin Skt. ed., p. 264, line 2). The “final” (mthar thug) is an interpretation, coming from the Four Interwoven Annotations (see: The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, by William Magee, p. 216, where the Four Interwoven Annotations paraphrase Candrakīrti’s rang bzhin as rang bzhin mthar thug). These Annotations were written by four Gelugpa writers who lived a couple centuries after Tsongkhapa (on Ba-so being a later Ba-so, see Napper’s Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, pp. 219-220).

Earlier in the Lam rim chen mo translation (p. 173), “final nature” again occurs in a quotation from Candrakīrti, from his own commentary on his Madhyamakāvatāra. Again, Candrakīrti’s text, and Tsongkhapa’s quotation of it, has only rang bzhin, not rang bzhin mthar thug (Poussin Tib. ed., p. 107, line 15). In both of these cases, this occurs in a prose commentary by Candrakīrti, where he could have easily added a qualifier such as “final” to svabhāva if he wanted to. He did not add one. Neither did Tsongkhapa when citing it. But the English translators, following the Tibetan annotators, did. The interpretive translation “final nature” completely obscures the fact that Candrakīrti, and Tsongkhapa citing him, has here only svabhāva, elsewhere translated in this book as “intrinsic nature.”

When the English translation of the Lam rim chen mo uses “intrinsic nature” for svabhāva in the passage under discussion (p. 198), in contradistinction to its use of just “nature” for svabhāva in this passage, it refers to “inherent existence” as mentioned in the paragraph that Jacques quoted from Jeffrey Hopkins’ book, Meditation on Emptiness. Jeffrey explains that the meaning “inherent existence” for svabhāva/rang bzhin takes it in the sense of rang bzhin gyis grub pa (p. 438), and Tsongkhapa here adds the qualifier grub pa, “established,” to rang bzhin (quoted below). This means that something’s existence is “established by svabhāva,” i.e., “established by [its] inherent/intrinsic nature.” But no dharmas, no phenomena, have a svabhāva, an inherent/intrinsic nature. Their existence cannot by established by something that they do not have. To say, then, that they are without an “inherent/intrinsic nature” (svabhāva) means that they are without an “inherent existence.” In this way, svabhāva may be used to “establish” (grub pa) something’s ultimate existence or lack thereof.

As alluded to in previous posts, this pertains to how Tsongkhapa narrowed down the meaning of svabhāva, “inherent/intrinsic nature,” to “inherent existence,” and made this the standard meaning in philosophical discourse in Tibet. If something is rang bzhin gyis grub pa, “established by [its] svabhāva,” it truly or inherently exists. This Tibetan phrase would be in Sanskrit svabhāva-siddha, “established by svabhāva,” or svabhāva-siddhi, “establishment by svabhāva.” However, such a term is not used in the Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka texts. They use only svabhāva. The addition of the qualifier “established,” grub pa (hypothetical Sanskrit *siddha or *siddhi), is a Tibetan development. This is not at all to suggest that this meaning does not occur in Indian texts, for it certainly does. It is to say that taking this meaning as “the” meaning is an interpretation, which may not be applicable to texts written prior to the time of Tsongkhapa. This would include the Book of Dzyan. Indian writers on Madhyamaka were not necessarily always thinking “inherent existence” when they used the term svabhāva. They could apply the term svabhāva to ultimates such as the dharmatā, “true nature,” or dhātu, “element, basic space,” without any need to differentiate its meaning (as “nature” or as “inherent/intrinsic nature”) or qualify this svabhāva as “final nature.”

It is when “inherent existence” is taken as “the” meaning of svabhāva that we see the denial of all svabhāva. But this makes it difficult to see or even know that what may be called something’s “final nature” is in fact just the very same word, svabhāva. Moreover, as we have seen, this greatly influences the translations of these texts. I had earlier quoted Candrakīrti’s statement, translated by William Ames, that: “Ultimate reality (don dam pa, paramārtha) for the Buddhas is svabhāva itself.” This same sentence was translated in Jeffrey Hopkins’ valuable 2008 book, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, (p. 254) as: “The ultimate for Buddhas is just the nature.” Who would know that “nature” here is svabhāva?

Candrakīrti is quoted in the passage under discussion from the Lam rim chen mo, asking if such a svabhāva exists. He answers that it is the dharmatā, “dharma-ness” or “true nature,” citing the catechism-like phrase saying that it exists whether the Tathāgatas arise or not. The next question asks what this dharmatā is. The answer given, as translated by William Ames, is: “The svabhāva of these [dharmas], such as the eye.” The answer given, as translated by William Magee (The Nature of Things, p. 185), is: “It is the final mode of abiding of these phenomena, eyes, and so forth.” Here, svabhāva disappears without a trace, behind “final mode of abiding.” There is not even a “nature” to give a clue that svabhāva is the word used here by Candrakīrti. From other sources, we learn that “mode of abiding,” also “mode of subsistence,” translates the Tibetan term gnas lugs. It has no Sanskrit equivalent; it is a technical term found only in Tibetan treatises on Buddhism. Here in this sentence it is a gloss of rang bzhin/svabhāva, coming from the Four Interwoven Annotations.

Magee helpfully translates separately these Annotations on this section of the Lam rim chen mo. Two of its relevant headings here are (pp. 204, 206): “In our system the nature possessing the three attributes is the mode of subsistence, emptiness”; and “Though the nature refuted formerly and the nature which is the mode of subsistence of things have the same name, the meaning is different.” These tell us that the two meanings given to svabhāva (here translated as “nature”), an “inherent existence” and a “final nature” or “mode of subsistence,” are used “in our system,” i.e., in the Gelugpa system. These interpretations of what Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti meant by svabhāva may not be accepted in other systems. Even if they do correctly represent what Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti meant but did not say about svabhāva, readers have the right to know that they are being given interpretations rather than direct translations.

However excellent the English translation of the Lam rim chen mo by the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee is, for questions like this it is still necessary to consult other translations when possible, if not the Tibetan text itself. The passage under discussion should be compared with Alex Wayman’s more literal translation, however faulty it may be in other respects, found in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, pp. 255-256 (also included in the attached “Lam rim chen mo on svabhāva”). Wayman here either retains the term svabhāva (rang bzhin) in his translation, or translates it as “self-existence,” which he gives in his glossary. This makes much clearer what is actually being said in Tsongkhapa’s Tibetan text. Interpretations from the Four Interwoven Annotations (Wayman’s Mchan or Ja, see p. 71) are given only in notes (e.g., note 139 referring to p. 233, corresponding to p. 173 of the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee translation, where occurs the second example of “final nature” that I discussed above). For grub pa, “established,” Wayman uses the translation “accomplished.” So for “established by svabhāva,” Wayman gives “accomplished by self-existence.”

Here follows the Tibetan passage corresponding to the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee’s English translation, vol. 3, p. 197, last six lines, to p. 198, first thirty-one lines (attached above). I have added some English words in blue to help with following the text. As occurring in this translation, I have inserted the words “nature,” “intrinsic nature,” and “final nature” in red after the Tibetan term it translates, also putting these in red. The Tibetan word that these three translate is the same: “rang bzhin,” Sanskrit svabhāva. I have also put in green the qualifier grub pa (“established”), added by Tsongkhapa in one of the paragraphs, since this was not translated separately.

As said above, and now can be seen, the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee here departs from its usual translation of rang bzhin as “intrinsic nature,” and translates it several times as only “nature.” These occur in quotations from Nāgārjuna (p. 195, Tibetan not given here) and Candrakīrti, where we know that the original Sanskrit word is svabhāva, and where in earlier quotations from these writers it was translated as “intrinsic nature” (see footnote below). Then it switches back to “intrinsic nature” when Tsongkhapa added the qualifier grub pa to rang bzhin. Then again, it uses “final nature,” in a quotation from Candrakīrti where we know that he only had svabhāva, and Tsongkhapa’s text citing him has only rang bzhin. This interpretive translation came from the later Four Woven Annotations. Lastly, in following this passage, we must also know that when svabhāva is defined as dharmatā (Tib. chos nyid), dharmatā is here translated as “reality.”

[Question:] ‘O NA SLOB DPON GYIS SNGAR BSHAD PA LTAR MA BCOS PA DANG GZHAN LA LTOS PA MED PA RANG BZHIN “nature” GYI MTSAN NYID DU GSUNGS PA DE BRTAG PA MTHA’ BZUNG GI SGO NAS GSUNGS SAM RANG BZHIN “nature” DE ‘DRA BA ZHIG YOD PA YIN ZHE NA,

[Reply:] ‘DI NI CHOS RNAMS KYI CHOS NYID CES GSUNGS PA DE LA RANG BZHIN “nature” ZHES BZHAG PA YIN TE BCOS MA MIN PA DANG GZHAN LA RAG LAS PA MIN PA’O, ,DE NI YOD DE, ‘JUG ‘GREL LAS,

[beginning of quotation from Candrakīrti’s Explanation of the “Middle Way” Commentary:] KHYAD PAR DU MDZAD PA RNAM PA DE LTA BU’I RANG @416B BZHIN “nature” SLOB DPON GYIS ZHAL GYIS BZHES PA ZHIG YOD DAM ZHE NA, GANG GI DBANG DU MDZAD NAS BCOM LDAN ‘DAS KYIS DE BZHIN GSHEGS PA RNAMS BYUNG YANG RUNG MA BYUNG YANG RUNG CHOS RNAMS KYI CHOS NYID ‘DI NI GNAS PA NYID DO ZHES RGYAS PAR GSUNGS PA CHOS NYID CES BYA BA NI YOD DO, ,CHOS NYID CES BYA BA ‘DI YANG CI ZHIG ,MIG LA SOGS PA ‘DI DAG GI RANG BZHIN “nature” NO, ,DE DAG GI RANG BZHIN “nature” YANG GANG ZHIG CE NA, DE DAG GI BCOS MA MA YIN PA NYID DANG GZHAN LA LTOS PA MED PA GANG YIN PA STE MA RIG PA’I RAB RIB DANG BRAL BA’I SHES PAS RTOGS PAR BYA BA’I RANG GI NGO BO’O, ,JI DE YOD DAM MED DO ZHES DE SKAD SU SMRA, GAL TE MED NA NI CI’I DON DU BYANG CHUB SEMS DPA’ RNAMS PHA ROL TU PHYIN PA’I LAM SGOM PAR ‘GYUR TE, GANG GI PHYIR CHOS NYID RTOGS PAR BYA BA’I PHYIR BYANG CHUB SEMS DPA’ RNAMS DE LTAR DKA’ BA BRGYA PHRAG RTZOM PA YIN NO ZHES MDO’I SHES BYED DANG BCAS PAS BSGRUBS SO,,

[Question:] ‘O NA SNGAR CHOS THAMS CAD LA RANG BZHIN GRUB PA “intrinsic nature” MA BKAG GAM SNYAM NA,

[Reply:] NANG GI BLOS BTAGS PA MIN PA’I CHOS RNAMS LA RANG GI NGO BOS GRUB PA’I RANG BZHIN “intrinsic nature” NI RDUL TZAM YANG MED DO ZHES KHO BO CAG GIS LAN DU MAR MA SMRAS SAM, DES NA DE ‘DRA BA’I RANG BZHIN “nature” DU NI CHOS GZHAN RNAMS LTA CI SMOS, CHOS NYID DON DAM PA’I BDEN PA DE YANG GRUB PA [rang bzhin is only implied in this sentence] “intrinsic nature” CUNG ZAD KYANG MED DE, TSIG GSAL LAS,

[beginning of quotation from Candrakīrti’s Clear Words:] DUS GSUM DU’ANG ME LA MI ‘KHRUL BA GNYUG MA’I NGO BO MA BCOS PA GANG ZHIG SNGAR MA BYUNG BA LAS PHYIS ‘BYUNG BA MA YIN PA GANG ZHIG ,CHU’I TSA BA’AM TSU ROL DANG PHA ROL LAM RING PO DANG THUNG NGU LTAR RGYU DANG RKYEN @417A *, ,LA LTOS PA DANG BCAS PAR MA GYUR PA GANG YIN PA DE RANG BZHIN “final nature” YIN PAR BRJOD DO, ,CI ME’I RANG GI NGO BO “nature” [svarūpa] DE LTA BUR GYUR PA DE YOD DAM ZHE NA DE NI RANG GI NGO BOS YOD PA’ANG MA YIN LA MED PA’ANG MA YIN NO, ,DE LTA YIN MOD KYI ‘ON KYANG NYAN PA PO RNAMS KYI SKRAG PA SPANG BAR BYA BA’I PHYIR SGRO BTAGS NAS KUN RDZOB TU DE YOD DO ZHES BRJOD PAR BYA’O,, [end of quotation]

ZHES RANG BZHIN “nature” DE YANG RANG GI NGO BOS GRUB PA BKAG NAS THA SNYAD DU YOD PAR GSUNGS SO,

*For example, rang bzhin is translated as “intrinsic nature” in these places: pp. 131, 137, 147, 191, quoting Nāgārjuna’s Vigraha-vyāvartanī, verses 1, 22, 26cd, 26, respectively, and pp. 143, 149, quoting Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā 17.30, 24.11, respectively, and p. 157, quoting Catuḥśataka-ṭīkā 13.21 or 321. These Sanskrit texts are extant, and svabhāva can be seen in them.

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In my post titled “Notes on the Denial of Svabhāva in Mahāyāna Buddhism,” Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (chapter 15, verse 2) was quoted saying that svabhāva, “inherent nature,” is ultimately only in the range of the āryas (those who have achieved the “path of seeing”). Candrakīrti had earlier quoted this same verse and the preceding one from Nāgārjuna, in his Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya. Here in his commentary a questioner asks Candrakīrti if the kind of svabhāva accepted by Nāgārjuna exists. He replies that it is the dharmatā, literally, “dharma-ness,” often translated as “true nature.” In giving this reply, Candrakīrti quotes the famous catechism-like phrase, “Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this dharma-ness [dharmatā] of dharmas remains.”

As noted in the introductory post to the “key subject” of dhātu, titled “Basic Space, the One Element, the dhātu,” this phrase more often says that the dhātu remains. But the dharmatā is a common variant. They are used as synonyms in this phrase. So we have this ultimate svabhāva, “inherent nature,” defined as dharmatā, “true nature,” which is here the same as dhātu, “element,” or “basic space.” Here is Candrakīrti’s passage, again as accurately translated by William L. Ames, in “The Notion of Svabhāva in the Thought of Candrakīrti” (previously linked), p. 163. Candrakīrti begins by quoting Nāgārjuna’s two verses:

“The arising of svabhāva through causes and conditions is not right. A svabhāva arisen from causes and conditions would be artificial (kṛtaka). (15-1)

“But how will svabhāva be called artificial? For svabhāva is non-contingent (akṛtrima) and without dependence on another. (15-2)

“[Question:] But does there exist a svabhāva of the sort defined by the ācārya [Nāgārjuna] in the treatise [Mūlamadhyamakakārikās], which is accepted by the ācārya? [Answer:] What is called dharma-ness (chos nyid, dharmatā) exists, regarding which the Blessed One said, “Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this dharma-ness of dharmas remains,” etc. [Question:] But what is this which is called dharma-ness? [Answer:] The svabhāva of these [dharmas], such as the eye. [Question:] But what is their svabhāva? [Answer:] That which these have which is non-contingent and without dependence on another; [it is their] intrinsic nature, which is to be comprehended by cognition free from the ophthalmia of misknowledge. Who [would] ask whether that exists or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Because [it is] in order to comprehend that dharma-ness [that] bodhisattvas undertake hundreds of difficult [actions].”

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