Part 3. Tracing the Cosmogony Account from the Original Purāṇa-saṃhitā

If the “Book of Dzyan” is real, we may wonder why it has been kept secret until H. P. Blavatsky brought out stanzas from it on cosmogenesis and anthropogenesis. In response to this question, it will be instructive to try to trace the cosmogony account from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā. As found in the various purāṇas now extant, this account goes from an impersonal primary substance as the origin of the world and of what people call God, to primary substance being equated with God, to God creating primary substance and the world through His will. Apparently the custodians of the “Book of Dzyan” did not want this to happen to its teachings, and thus preferred to hand down this book in secret. We see that its custodians, now known as the Theosophical Mahatmas, tried to address these very same questions of God and ultimate substance when they allowed some of the teachings from the “Book of Dzyan” to be made public.

Like any busy executive, the Theosophical Mahatmas normally imparted what they wanted to say to their “secretaries,” advanced chelas such as H. P. Blavatsky, who then passed it on to the appropriate party on their behalf. One of the two Englishmen who received “Mahatma letters” in this way in the early 1880s, in attempting to write an exposition of the occult philosophy that he gathered from these letters, had drafted a chapter on “God.” At this point the Mahatma K.H. replied, apparently directly, with one of the clearest and most forceful statements of their teachings that we have. As he said about this elsewhere, “I cannot permit our sacred philosophy to be so disfigured.” This extraordinary reply, known as Mahatma letter #10, is where the Mahatma says that they deny God, and that they believe in matter (or substance) alone. Here are a few highlights from it, starting with its opening sentence:

“Neither our philosophy nor ourselves believe in a God, least of all in one whose pronoun necessitates a capital H. . . . If people are willing to accept and to regard as God our ONE LIFE immutable and unconscious in its eternity they may do so and thus keep to one more gigantic misnomer. . . . When we speak of our One Life we also say that it penetrates, nay is the essence of every atom of matter; and that therefore it not only has correspondence with matter but has all its properties likewise, etc.—hence is material, is matter itself. . . . Matter we know to be eternal, i.e., having had no beginning. . . . As to God—since no one has ever or at any time seen him or it—unless he or it is the very essence and nature of this boundless eternal matter, its energy and motion, we cannot regard him as either eternal or infinite or yet self existing. . . . Then what do we believe in? . . . In other words we believe in MATTER alone, in matter as visible nature and matter in its invisibility as the invisible omnipresent omnipotent Proteus with its unceasing motion which is its life, and which nature draws from herself since she is the great whole outside of which nothing can exist. . . . The existence of matter then is a fact; the existence of motion is another fact, their self existence and eternity or indestructibility is a third fact. And the idea of pure spirit as a Being or an Existence—give it whatever name you will—is a chimera, a gigantic absurdity.”

The idea of ultimate reality as eternal substance rather than a Godhead was so unexpected that it was doubted even by students of Theosophy and followers of the Theosophical Mahatmas. Is this really what the Mahatma meant? Did we understand him correctly? Is the letter authentic? Was it transmitted accurately? The three most advanced chelas of the Theosophical movement, H. P. Blavatsky, T. Subba Row, and Damodar Mavalankar, all agreed that the answer to these questions is “yes.” The teaching was correctly understood. Damodar Mavalankar, when reviewing a book in 1883, reiterated this teaching, and in so doing stressed that it is a central Theosophical teaching. He wrote:

“One point, however, may be noticed, as it is found to be constantly contradicted and picked holes into, by the theists as well as by all the supporters of independent creation—viz., the ‘definition of matter.’

“‘Kapila defines matter to be eternal and co-existent with Spirit. It was never in a state of non-being, but always in a state of constant change, it is subtle and sentient,’ &c., &c., (p. 2.)

“This is what the Editor of this Journal [H. P. Blavatsky] has all along maintained and can hardly repeat too often. The article: ‘What is Matter and what is Force?’ in the Theosophist for September 1882, is sufficiently lucid in reference to this question. It is at the same time pleasant to find that our learned friend and brother, Mr. T. Subba Row Garu, the great Adwaitee scholar, shares entirely with all of us these views, which every intuitional scholar, who comprehends the true spirit of the Sankhya philosophy, will ever maintain. This may be proved by the perusal of a recent work on ‘Yoga Philosophy’ by the learned Sanskritist, Dr. Rajendra Lala Mittra, the Introduction to which has just appeared, showing clearly how every genuine scholar comprehends the Sankhya in the same spirit as we do. The ONE LIFE of the Buddhists, or the Parabrahm of the Vedantins, is omnipresent and eternal. Spirit and matter are but its manifestations. As the energising force—Purush of Kapila—it is Spirit—as undifferentiated cosmic matter, it is Mulaprakriti. As differentiated cosmic matter, the basis of phenomenal evolution, it is Prakriti. In its aspect of being the field of cosmic ideation, it is Chidakasam; as the germ of cosmic ideation it is Chinmatra; while in its characteristic of perception it is Pragna. Whoever presumes to deny these points denies the main basis of Hindu Philosophy and clings but to its exoteric, weather-beaten, fast fading out shell.”

(The Theosophist, vol. 4, no. 12, September 1883, p. 318)

The article that Damodar refers to, “What is Matter and What Is Force?,” also authored by the Mahatma K.H., sums up in its conclusion:

“Therefore, whether it is called Force or Matter, it will ever remain the Omnipresent Proteus of the Universe, the one element—LIFE—Spirit or Force at its negative, Matter at its positive pole; the former the MATERIO-SPIRITUAL, the latter, the MATERIO-PHYSICAL Universe—Nature, Svabhavat or INDESTRUCTIBLE MATTER.”

In Mahatma letter #22, a follow-up to Mahatma letter #10, the Mahatma K.H. says about spirit and matter: “it is one of the elementary and fundamental doctrines of Occultism that the two are one, and are distinct but in their respective manifestations, and only in the limited perceptions of the world of senses.” In letter #10 after saying “we believe in MATTER alone,” he went on, “with its unceasing motion which is its life.” In letter #22 he explained: “Motion is eternal because spirit is eternal. But no modes of motion can ever be conceived unless they be in connection with matter.” That is why he cannot accept spirit as a principle distinct from matter. Spirit, puruṣa, is the motion or life of matter, prakṛti. And that is why he would give matter as primary, saying “we believe in MATTER alone” rather than “we believe in SPIRIT alone.” There can be no motion without something to move.

Thus, understanding “matter alone” to be living matter or substance, endowed with motion or life or spirit, we have a succinct statement of ultimate reality as taught in the Wisdom Tradition now known as Theosophy. As already noted, ultimate reality, the highest (para) brahman, is clearly and unambiguously equated with primary substance (pradhāna) and substance or matter (prakṛti) in the cosmogony account from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā. This makes the cosmogony account from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā to be of particular value for our Book of Dzyan research. It provides, in the oldest form that can be traced, of the most central sourcebooks of Hindu cosmogony, direct agreement with what is understood to be a fundamental teaching of the Wisdom Tradition that the Book of Dzyan comes from.

We may now proceed to try to trace the cosmogony account from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā through its changes in the now extant purāṇas, and try to see how the teaching of primary substance as ultimate reality was displaced by that of God. It is a good lesson in what happens to primeval truths over time in the hands of the public. It illustrates why the custodians of the “Book of Dzyan” preferred to preserve it in secret.

Our oldest sources (the Vāyu and Brahmāṇḍa purāṇas) report only one player here in the first verse of the creation or emanation (sarga) account derived from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā, namely, the unmanifest (avyakta), the cause (kāraṇa), called primary substance (pradhāna), or substance (prakṛti). This same verse is also found with no substantial variants in the Kūrma Purāṇa (4.6) and the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa (1.77.2), and somewhat re-worded in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (1.2.19) and the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa (45.32), but adding only the adjective “subtle” (sūkṣma) to “substance” (prakṛti). Primary substance (unmanifest, and quite non-physical, we recall) is in the following lines of the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā account described as the highest (para) brahman, ultimate reality.

In other than the oldest sources of the creation or emanation (sarga) account derived from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā we find its first verse in more or less modified form. Padma Purāṇa 1.2.8 merely summarizes that everything emanates (sṛjati) from the unmanifest (avyakta), the cause (kāraṇa), what was called primary substance (pradhāna) in the fuller verse. The “Laws of Manu,” Manu-smṛti 1.11, specifies that what emanated from this is the puruṣa (“person, male”) called Brahmā. Brahmā is the creator god (not the neuter absolute brahman). So puruṣa is here not the cosmic principle “spirit,” who would be our second major player. Rather, this Manu-smṛti verse introduces our third main player, the puruṣa (“person” or “male”) who is equivalent to the creator god Brahmā, and who is also called īśvara, “God,” or loka-bhāvana, “creator of the world(s),” in other variations of this verse.

Besides in Manu-smṛti 1.11, puruṣa is also brought into this verse as it is found in Brahma Purāṇa 1.33 or 1.34, Harivaṃśa 1.17, and Śiva Purāṇa 5.29.5. Here things get fuzzy in regard to how puruṣa is meant. Although the Manu-smṛti no doubt underwent modification, it probably did so less than most of the purāṇas did. So we may take its version of this verse as a reasonably reliable guide for comparison on this question. As already noted, its Brahmā, the creator god, or the synonyms īśvara, “God,” and loka-bhāvana, “creator of the world(s),” bring in puruṣa as our third main player, rather than puruṣa as the cosmic principle “spirit.”

In Brahma Purāṇa 1.33 or 1.34, īśvara (“God”) is the puruṣa (“person, male”), and he produces (nirmame) the universe from primary substance (pradhāna). The very same wording also occurs in Harivaṃśa 1.17, except that it has puruṣa in a grammatically different case (puruṣam rather than puruṣas), so that puruṣa is no longer īśvara. Here, if we accept this grammatically problematic reading, puruṣa may be taken as the cosmic principle “spirit” rather than as the “person” or “male.” Then to make sense of the verse we must force its construal, and have it say that īśvara (“God”) produces the universe from primary substance (pradhāna) and spirit (puruṣa). For the Harivaṃśa we have a critical edition, and we see that not all of the manuscripts accepted this reading (puruṣam rather than puruṣas). Indeed, the oldest manuscript says just the opposite, that pradhāna (primary substance) and puruṣa (spirit) produce (nirmame) this creator of the world (loka-bhāvana; i.e., Brahmā, given in the following verse).

This verse as found in Śiva Purāṇa 5.29.5 is even more grammatically problematic. Here is what the “Board of Scholars” who translated it could make of it: “Puruṣa is eternal and he is of the nature of Sat and Asat as Pradhāna and Puruṣa. The creator of the worlds created Pradhāna after becoming Puruṣa.” This would be a reversal, having puruṣa, spirit, create pradhāna, primary substance. This, of course, makes little sense when pradhāna is everywhere said to be eternal, and therefore could never be created.

So of the four sources that bring puruṣa into this verse, puruṣa is clearly the “person” or “male” as Brahmā, the creator god, in Manu-smṛti 1.11, and as īśvara (“God”) in Brahma Purāṇa 1.33 or 1.34. Because of a grammatically questionable reading in Harivaṃśa 1.17, and multiple ones in Śiva Purāṇa 5.29.5, we cannot say that these verses unambiguously bring in puruṣa as the cosmic principle “spirit.” Our second major player, puruṣa as the cosmic principle “spirit,” appears unambiguously only in the fourth verse of this account only as it is found in the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa (1.77.5). This verse may be translated as: “. . . without form, unknowable, they call this the highest (para) puruṣa. By the self (ātman) of this great self (mahātman) all this world is pervaded.” Here puruṣa, like pradhāna in its first verse, is clearly used as a synonym of the absolute brahman. However, the other purāṇas that have this account in full (Vāyu, Brahmāṇḍa, Kūrma, and Liṅga, and also its somewhat re-worded form in the Mārkaṇḍeya) all have brahman here in this verse rather than puruṣa. So it is probable that only brahman, and not puruṣa as “spirit,” is found here in the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā.

Lastly, we get to the first verse of the creation or emanation (sarga) account as found in Liṅga Purāṇa 1.70.3. We have seen that in Manu-smṛti 1.11 puruṣa as the creator god Brahmā emanates from the unmanifest (avyakta), also called primary substance (pradhāna), and that in Brahma Purāṇa 1.33/1.34 puruṣa as īśvara (“God”) produces the universe from primary substance (pradhāna). Now in the Liṅga Purāṇa what had been merely our third player trumps our first player. Here in the preceding verse the great God (mahā-īśvara, maheśvara), also known as Śiva, stands above substance (prakṛti) and spirit (puruṣa), and is equated with the highest self (parama-ātman). From this God (īśvarāt tasmāt) came (abhavat, “became”) the unmanifest (avyakta), the cause (kāraṇa), called primary substance (pradhāna) and substance (prakṛti). Our verses now continue unchanged (except ajara for ajāta), bringing in the highest (para) brahman as a synonym of primary substance (pradhāna). But here the Liṅga Purāṇa adds “impelled by the command of God” (īśvara-ājñā-pracodita). After another unchanged verse (except aprakāśa for asāmprata), the Liṅga Purāṇa account concludes with one more dramatic change: It was “by the will of Śiva” (śiva-icchayā) that “all this [universe] was pervaded by its [brahman’s] self (ātman).” So here in a full reversal, God creates primary substance (pradhāna), rather than God emanates from primary substance.

The idea of a God who can create even primary substance, supposed to be eternal, found its way into this cosmogony account from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā only gradually. In the Liṅga Purāṇa version of it, primary substance is stated to have originated from God or Śiva. The Kūrma Purāṇa version of it is also preceded by a verse bringing in God, stating that the great God (mahā-īśvara, maheśvara), also known as Śiva, is above the unmanifest (avyakta), and is the niyantṛ (regulator, controller, governor) [of the universe]. Here, however, this God may be equated with primary substance rather than being its creator, by way of the relative pronoun, yat, in the first verse of the cosmogony account proper. After the verse that precedes this account, the Kūrma Purāṇa continues with a largely unchanged version of this cosmogony account in comparison with that found in the Vāyu and Brahmāṇḍa purāṇas.

A verse mentioning God and the great God similar to the one preceding the cosmogony account in the Kūrma Purāṇa also found its way into the Vāyu Purāṇa, in a different location (1.42 or 1.48-49), although it is not found in the corresponding Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa. Its construal with the verse that follows it, the same verse that appears in Padma Purāṇa 1.2.8 (mentioned above), is ambiguous. But in yet another location, the Vāyu (2.41.36 or 103.36) and Brahmāṇḍa (3.4.4.35) purāṇas clearly state that the great God (mahā-īśvara, maheśvara) arises from the unmanifest (avyakta), the cause (kāraṇa), from primary substance (pradhāna) and spirit (puruṣa), and this God is also there called Brahmā, the creator god. In other words, the great God (mahā-īśvara, maheśvara) is there equated with our third player.

In the cosmogony account that can be recovered from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā, no God is involved. The impersonal “great” (mahat) principle, also called the principle of intelligence (buddhi), emanates from primary substance, and the world emanates from the “great” principle. The “great” principle then came to be called the creator god Brahmā, or just God (īśvara), or even the great God (mahā-īśvara, maheśvara). Once this happened, God became more and more powerful in human estimation. So as seen above, we go from no God, to God who emanates from primary substance, to God who is equated with primary substance, to God who creates primary substance. As the idea of God moved in, the teaching of ultimate primary substance faded out (see: “God’s Arrival in India”). Yet, ultimate primary substance, endowed with motion or life or spirit, is affirmed to be the original teaching of the Wisdom Tradition, and the evidence from the original Purāṇa-saṃhitā strongly supports this.