

Gujarat University

**The Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā
—A Study**

by

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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure indeed in publishing Dr. (Miss) Esther A. Solomon's book entitled "The Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā—A Study". Dr. Solomon has at the outset given a survey of the contents of what is known as 'Māṭhara Vṛtti,' of Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya and of two hitherto unutilised commentaries edited by her, and of Paramārtha's Version. She has also tried to determine the chronological order of the commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. She has further written two notes on the ten mūlikārthas of the Sāṃkhya system, and the number of kārikās in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. At the end she has given in a tabular form the readings of the kārikās as found in the different commentaries.

I am most thankful to Dr. E. A. Solomon for agreeing to the publication of this work which was undertaken as a research project in the School of Languages, Gujarat University.

I have no doubt that students, teachers and others interested in the study of the Sāṃkhya system of Philosophy will benefit much from this work.

Gujarat University
Ahmedabad-9,
20th July 1974.

K. C. Parikh
University Registrar

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PREFACE

A word about the background of the present study. I had the good fortune of securing photo-enlargements from microfilms in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, of two single palm-leaf manuscripts (from Jesalmere :Bhaṇḍāra) of two unpublished vṛttis on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The name of the author of one (-which I call V₂-) is not found mentioned, but my feeling is that it is the earliest of the commentaries and has the fairest claim to being regarded as the original of the Chinese Version of Paramārtha. The name of the author of the other (which I call V₁) begins with ऋ but the palm-leaf is broken exactly at this point and we find after ऋ only a remnant of what looks like ह or ऋ. I have edited both these commentaries with necessary notes separately.

In this book I have attempted a study of the commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. Much useful work has been done in this direction by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī in his 'Sāṃkhya Darśana-kā Itihāsa' and by Dr. Ādya Prasāda Miśra in his 'Sāṃkhya Darśana-kī Aitihāsika Paramparā'. What prompted me to work on this 'Study' was the possession of two additional commentaries. These have not hitherto been taken into account, and are likely to throw new light on the history of Sāṃkhya literature.

I think I should explain the procedure I have adopted. Because of the claim put forth in favour of what is known as Māthara-vṛtti, and even of Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya being the original on which the Chinese Version was based, I have, for the

sake of clarity, given a survey of the contents of 'Māṭhara-vṛtti', Gaudapāda-Bhāṣya, V₁, V₂ and Paramārtha's Version. I have included V₁ and V₂ here, because V₁ is very much like 'Māṭhara-vṛtti,' and V₂ also is very close in terms of content to Paramārtha's Version. I felt this would make the relevant material immediately accessible to scholars in the field. We find some discussion of this type in 'A Critical Study of the Sāṃkhya System' by V. V. Sovani (Poona Oriental Series, No. 11), but it is not sufficiently exhaustive, and consequently not quite clear at places. While presenting this material I have deliberately in most of the places followed the order M, G, V₁, V₂, P as I did not want to impose my view on the reader at the very outset, but wanted him to judge for himself.

I have also tried to determine the chronological order of the commentaries ranging up to the Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati. I have hazarded certain conclusions, some of them rather bold, and I shall feel amply rewarded even if they are successful in provoking discussion and further inquiry in the direction. I have also shown that what is known as the Māṭhara-vṛtti could not be the commentary as it was written by Māṭhara, whose name occurs in very early works. I have written two Notes on the ten Mūlikārthas of the Sāṃkhya system and the number of kārīkās in the Sāṃkhya Kārīkā. At the end I have given in a tabular form the readings of the kārīkās as found in the different commentaries along with a brief discussion, which also goes to support the chronological order determined earlier.

I express my heart-felt gratitude to the scholars from whose works on Sāṃkhya literature and philosophy I have benefited much, and to my friends who have been of help to me in numerous ways. I am especially indebted to Pt. Shri Dalsukhbhai Malavania for going through the contents of this 'Study'.

E. A. Solomon

10-9-71

I am glad in having this opportunity to express my sense of gratitude to the authorities of the Gujarat University for deciding to publish this work.

I am also thankful to the Manager of the Ramanand Printing Press and all his colleagues for the promptness they have shown in seeing this book through the Press.

E. A. Solomon

33, Nehrunagar,
Ahmedabad, 15,
10th March, 1974.

SOME USEFUL BOOKS

- V₁—A commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā
(edited by E. A. Solomon) (Gujarat Uni., 1973)
- V₂—A commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā
(edited by E. A. Solomon) (Gujarat Uni., 1973)
- M—Māṭhara-vṛtti on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā
(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1922)
- G—Gaudapāda-bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1963)
- Y—Yuktidīpikā (on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā)—(Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1938)
- J—Jayamaṅgalā on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (edited by H. Śarmā, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1926)
- T—Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā
—Ganganatha Jha and H. D. Sharma (Poona Oriental Series, 1934)
- P—Treatise on the Sāṃkhya Philosophy—translated by
Paramārtha—
The Sāṃkhya Kārikā—Studied in the light of its
Chinese Version (M. Takakusu,—Translated in
English by S. S. Suryanarayanan, Madras, 1931).
Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of
Thought—Pulinbehari Chakravarti (Calcutta Sanskrit
Series, 1952)
Sāṃkhya System—A. B. Keith (Heritage of India
Series, Calcutta, 1949)
A Critical Study of the Sāṃkhya System—V. V.
Sovani (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1935)
Sāṃkhya Darśana-kā Itihāsa—Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī
(Sārvadeśika Press—Delhi)

Sāṃkhya Darśana Ki Aitiḥāsika Paramparā—
Dr. Ādyaprasāda Miśra (Om̐kāra Press, Prayāga,
1967)

Alberuni's India—Edward Sachau (S. Chand & Co.,
1964)

The Classical Age (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay,
1962)

The Gupta Empire—Radhakumud Mookerjee (Hind
Kitabs, Ltd., Bombay, 1959)

The Vākātaka—Gupta Age—R. C. Majumdar and A. S.
Altekar (Motilal Banarasidass, 1967)

Travels of Hiouen-Thsang—Samuel Beal (Susil Gupta
Ltd., Calcutta)

On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, Volumes, I & II—
Thomas Watters

A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised
in India and the Malay Archipelago—Itsing—Trans-
lated by J. Takakusu

Dvādaśāranayacakra of Mallavādin with Nyāyāgamā-
nusāriṇī Vyākhyā of Simhasūri (Labdhisūrisvara Jaina
Grantha Mālā)

Pātañjala Yoga-Darśanam—Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra
(Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśana, Vārāṇasī 1971)

Sarūpa Bhāratī—Dr. Lakshman Sarup Memorial
Volume (Vishveshvaranand Institute Publications,
1954)—Dr. Raghavan's article, 'Mādhava, an Early
Unfaithful Exponent of the Sāṃkhya (pp. 162-164)

A Comparison of the Contents of

M, G, V₁, V₂ and P

There was for some time a fierce controversy regarding the original commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā of which Paramārtha's Version is a translation. Now scholars mostly agree that neither Gaudapāda's nor Māthara's commentary was the original of the Chinese Version, though they are not yet unanimous regarding the date of M or even G. There are palm-leaf manuscripts of two hitherto unknown vṛttis on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā in the Jaisālmere Bhandāra, and these vṛttis (—I call them V₁ and V₂—) have been edited by me from the single manuscripts, photo-enlargements of which could be obtained from microfilms in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedābad. V₁ is very much like M and P and so also V₂. Hence the mystery deepens. Scholars have compared M and P, and G and P. We shall attempt a detailed comparison kārikā-wise of the contents of M, G, V₁, V₂ and P and see if any one of these newly edited commentaries can claim to be the original of Paramārtha's Version. Since the date of almost all these commentaries is yet uncertain, we shall consider them here in the order M*, G, V₁, V₂, P, and refer to Yuktidīpikā, Jayamaṅgalā and Tattva-kaumudī only when it is necessary to do so, as these latter do not bear much affinity to the former in point of thought or expression. I have only compared the contents of these commentaries here without making any special attempt to show their dependence or chronology. These will be discussed later.

* M is regarded by many as the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā and G also is known to scholars.

Kārikā 1. At the outset M has three stanzas which serve as namaskāra, (i) सर्वविद्याविधातारम्....., (ii) कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै, (iii) नमस्कृत्य तु तं..... While introducing the kārikā M shows by means of a stanza what an upodghāta signifies. Then it gives an account in a literary style of the birth of Kapila, naturally equipped with dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aiśvarya, and his desire to rescue the world from the mire of ignorance and his inquiries of a reputed Brāhmaṇa who was 'Āsurisagotra' and 'varṣasahasrayājīn' as to his attitude towards the life of a house-holder. M gives stanzas regarding true tapas, etc. and the characteristic of a truly religious man. And then it turns to the duḥkhatraya. It gives only a few illustrations of each of the miseries. Then it raises the question as to how jijñāsā arising out of duḥkha-traya could exterminate it. Answering this it gives the illustrations of karkaṭaka or aśvatara, and āśīviṣa. Explaining 'दृष्टे साधार्था चेत्', it asks why when other easier and more accessible means are available one should go in search of Sāṃkhya-knowledge (अर्के चेन्मयु विन्देत...). Here it quotes the stanzas : (i) पुनर्दाहः समुत्पन्नः..., (ii) पुष्पिताक्षः शलाकी च, (iii) यानि कानि च मूलानि....., (iv) वैद्य वैद्य नमस्तुभ्यं... .

G gives two introductory stanzas of which the obeisance to Kapila (कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै.....) is the same as that in M. Here it quotes a stanza enumerating the seven sons of Brahmā, and also the well known stanza 'पञ्चविंशति-तत्त्वज्ञो.....'. Then it gives a comparatively brief explanation of the kārikā in which it simply lists the duḥkhas and their 'drṣṭa' upāyas.

V₁ starts with the namaskāra to Kapila (कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै.....) which is found in M and G. Then the

episode of Kapila (-with dharma, etc. manifest in him from his birth, and desirous of rescuing the world from ignorance-) and a reputed Brāhmaṇa (Asuri-sagotra and varṣasahasra-yājīn) is straightaway given. While explaining the ādhyātmika śārīra duḥkha, the places of vāta, pitta and śleṣman in the body are mentioned. A detailed and illustrative exposition of mānasa duḥkha is given which is not found in M and G (and even in V₂ and P). V₁ also, like M, raises the question as to whom these duḥkhas belong to, and if they could be got rid of, or have to be borne silently, and also how jijñāsā arising from duḥkhas could exterminate them. Here in answer to the last it gives the illustrations of kīṭaka, rājaputra, and āśīviṣa. The author of V₁ seems to be fond of Āyurveda and quotes stanzas prescribing formulae for the cure of old age, grey hair, etc.. He has also given a long list of diseases. V₁ refers to the 'drṣṭa' upāyas for each of the duḥkhas, and quotes 'punar dāhah'.....and 'puṣpitākṣas tu śalākī.....'. V₁ clearly seems to be very much like M, even much more expository and illustrative at places.

V₁ alone reads the second line as नैकान्तात्यन्ततोभावात्, instead of नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् (न, एकान्ता°).

V₂ does not have any introductory stanza or namaskāra to Kapila. It straightaway starts with the episode of Kapila with his dharma, etc. and the reputed Brāhmaṇa, a varṣasahasrayājīn, whom Kapila addresses as Āsuri. V₂ also refers to the different places of vāta, etc. in the body. It gives a long list of ailments due to the predominance of vāta, but does not mention any particular disease in connection with the others. M, G and V₁ give only a general list of diseases caused by the unbalance of the three humours. V₂ raises the question

as to how *jijñāsā* arising out of *duḥkha* could annihilate it and answering it gives the example of only the *raja-putra*. *V₂* suggests *drṣṭa* *upāyas* for each of the *duḥkhas*, and mentions *īṣṭaviṣaya-sevā* as the *upāya* for *mānasa* *duḥkha*. *V₂* explains very briefly that these means are not definite and final.

P, like *V₂*, does not have any stanza in the beginning. It straightaway starts with the episode of Kapila innately endowed with *dharma*, etc. and *Āsuri*, *brāhmaṇa* by birth, who had sacrificed to heaven regularly for a thousand years, (According to the English translation of *P*, Kapila received the same answer even the third time, which is obviously wrong in view of Kapila's subsequent question. The negative particle in the reply 'I do not enjoy.....' seems to have escaped one of the translators). According to *P*, Kapila did not receive any answer on the first occasion. *P* seems to try to bring some variety here. *P* gives a quotation from a book on medicine showing the places of *vāta*, etc. in the body. It does not refer to any of the physical ailments in particular. Among *ādhibhautika* miseries, it refers also to landslips, the breach of a dam, etc. (—not found in any other commentary—) besides the well known ones. *P* does not touch the question how *jijñāsā* arising out of *duḥkhas* could exterminate them, or to whom these miseries belong or the like. *P* does not refer to the *drṣṭa* *upāyas* for each kind of *duḥ* only says 'The means capable of destroying the three miseries are sufficiently known. First, that which is treated in the eighth section of medical science is capable of destroying the miseries of the body. Secondly, the six objects of sense, wherein

one finds pleasure, are capable of curing the miseries of the soul. When these means (of cure) are already so known, why an extra investigation?"

'*īṣṭaviṣaya-sevā*' of *V₂* comes nearest to 'six objects of sense wherein one finds pleasure' of *P*. *M* and *G* mention '*priyavastu-samyoga*' and the like; *V₁* mentions '*śabda-....gandhādayo viṣayāḥ*'. *P* seems to have given just a gist of the original at places, and so is comparatively brief. *P* does not give any explanation of the means not being definite and final. The commentary of the first *kārikā* is found to be quite detailed except in *G*. *P* seems to have raised only the important queries and mentioned very briefly a few *upāyas*. This cannot help us much; nevertheless the greater affinity to *V₂* cannot escape our notice.

Kārikā 2.—*M* anticipating an objection that certain means prescribed by the *Vedas* are certainly definite and final, quotes '*तरति मृत्युं.....तरति ब्रह्महत्यां योऽश्वमेधेन यजते*,' and gives a detailed exposition of '*अपाम सोमममृता.....अमृतमर्त्यस्य*'. '*अमृतमर्त्यस्य*' is explained as '*अमृतपायिनां मर्त्यानाम्*' ('बहुलं छन्दसि' इति वचनविपरिणामः). *Kā. 2* shows according to *M* the absence of *aikāntikatva*, the impurity, the absence of finality and the lack of excellence even in *vedic* rites. We find quoted here—'*मध्यमपिण्डं पुत्रकामा पत्नी प्राश्नीयात् 'आद्यत्त पितरो गर्भम्' इति मन्त्रेण*,' '*पश्येम शरदः शतं जीवेम शरदः शतम्*,' '*षट् शतानि नियुज्यन्ते.....*,' '*ब्रह्मणे ब्राह्मणमालमेत...*,' '*यथा पङ्केन पङ्काम्भः....*,' '*तद्यथाऽस्मिन् लोके मनुष्याः पशून्श्नन्ति...*,' '*वृक्षान् छित्त्वा पशून् हत्वा...*'. *M* refers to the impurities in *vedic* rites and briefly describes by means of the illustration of celestial beings, surrounded by *apsarases* and sitting in a *vimāna*, the sense of rivalry among those enjoying, in different degrees in the celestial regions,

the fruits of their karma. Then M explains vyakta, avyakta and jñā and shows how their vijñāna yields fruit which is definite and final. M explains 'ānuśravika' as follows :—गुरुणोक्तं पश्चाद् वेदं शृण्वन्ति शिष्या इति अनुश्रवो वेदः, तत्र भवः आनुश्रविकः. M mentions that Nrga, Nahuṣa, Indra and Yayāti came to grief even though they were 'somapāyins'.

G quotes and explains 'अपाम सोमम्....' and also quotes 'सर्वान् लोकान् जयति...ब्रह्महत्यां तरति योऽश्वमेधेन यजते' and while explaining 'अविशुद्धि....' quotes 'षट् शतानि...' and 'बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि ...'. G explains 'atiśaya-yukta' very briefly without giving any illustration. The rest of the exposition also is very brief. Ānuśravika is explained thus :—अनुश्रूयते इति अनुश्रवस्तत्र भवः आनुश्रविकः.

V₁, like M, quotes 'तरति मृत्युं....' and gives an exposition of 'अपाम सोमम्.....' which is very much like that in M though not so detailed, and with a different emphasis in the explanation. The second line is very briefly explained. The roots in 'apāma', 'abhūma', 'aganma' 'avidāma', 'mṛtāh', 'drṣṭa' are shown. Like M, V₁ quotes 'मध्यमपिण्डं...', 'जीवेम शरदः शतं पर्येम शरदः शतम्', 'ब्रह्मणे ब्राह्मणमालमेत...', 'षट् शतानि...', 'वृक्षं छित्त्वा' V₁, like M, refers to a number of impure and immoral practices in the vedic rites and quotes a smṛti stanza 'न ध(न)र्मयुक्मन्तं हिनस्ति...' and also 'बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि...'. Explaining 'atiśaya-yukta', V₁ gives at some length an idea of the sense of rivalry and jealousy among celestial beings by giving the illustration of celestial beings, seated in vimānas and surrounded by a greater or a lesser number of apsaras. The rest of the exposition is mostly as in M. V₁ also refers to Nrga, Nahuṣa, Indra and Yaṭāti who suffered though they were 'somapāyins'. V₁ does not explain

'ānuśravika' but only renders it as 'vedavihita' or the like. V₁ quotes at the end "पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र यत्राश्रमे रतः । प्रकृतिज्ञो विकारज्ञः सर्वैर्दुःखैर्विमुच्यते" । (The second line is different from the well-known one जयते मुण्डो...). V₁, like M, says that the hetu sought after should be 'aikāntika', ātyantika', 'viśuddha', 'akṣaya', 'anantaphala' and 'niratiśaya' (-M says 'ऐकान्तिकः...अक्षयः अनन्तफलः कैवल्याग्निरतिशयो हेतुः.....', though later while explaining these terms it does not say anything about 'anantaphala',—perhaps meant it to explain 'akṣaya'. V₁ later mentions 'akṣayaphala').

V₂, like M and V₁ (more like the latter), gives an exposition of 'अपाम सोमम्...'; it too, like V₁, explains the second line very briefly, and shows the roots in 'apāma', 'abhūma', 'aganma', 'avidāma'. In its own words it says—'पशुवधेन सर्वान् लोकान् जयतीति ऐकान्तिकं फलं श्रूयते. V₂ quotes 'षट् शतानि...' which is found in all the commentaries, and also a stanza 'न तस्य युक्मन्तं हिनस्ति...' a stanza almost the same as the one quoted in V₁. We also find quoted 'बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि...'. In the exposition of 'atiśaya-yukta', the illustration of celestial beings seated in vimānas and surrounded by apsaras is given, but briefly. Here also the aikāntikatva, etc. of the hetu are mentioned but not explained (-so also in G and P-); and 'पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो...' with the well-known second line is quoted at the end. 'Ānuśravika' is explained thus—अनुश्रूयते परम्परया इति आनुश्रविकः (Compare J—अनुश्रूयते पारम्पर्येणेत्यनुश्रवो वेदः । श्रुवः 'ऋदोरप्' । तत्र भवो हेतुरानुश्रविकः ।)

P translates 'अपाम सोमम्...' (RV. VIII.48. 3.) while introducing this kārikā. To show the impurity of vedic rites, P quotes RV. I. 163.13. 'O, thou animal ! thy

father, thy mother and thy kindred all approve of thee. Now thou art to abandon thy present body to be reborn in the heavens.*

‘षट् शतानि... also is found translated. Like V_1 and V_2 , P has “For the case where some one utters a falsehood, some devas or ṛṣis declare in the Vedas that that does not imply a crime”. Corresponding to ‘बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि...’ we have a little differently, “Without reason, Śakra and Indra and the God Asura are extinguished, because of their age, for one does not escape time.” P refers briefly to the envy among celestial beings regarding superiority and inferiority as among the mortals. P says here, “The three defects [aviśuddhi, kṣaya and atīśaya] with the two mentioned higher up [ekāntābhāva, atyanta-bhāva] render the Vedas inefficacious as a means (to the destruction of misery)”. Here P has for the sake of greater consistency reminded us of the two drawbacks mentioned earlier. The others are not so specific. P points out like M, V_1 , and V_2 (especially like V_2) that the means should be definite, final, pure, permanent, universal. Vyakta, avyakta and jñā are explained, and the stanza ‘पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो...’ (as in V_2) is translated.

It can be easily seen that P has greater affinity with V_2 than with G in respect of the exposition of kārīkās 1-2. P seems not to have given the literal translation of the passages that are just explanatory—especially those pertaining to apsarases and the like—but only summarised them. ‘Ānuśravika’ is explained

*Takakusu says this passage is often cited in Buddhist works in China. The RV. stanza is उप प्रागात् परम यत् सधस्थम् अवीं अच्छा पितरं मातरं च । अथा देवाञ्जुष्टतमो हि गम्या अथा शास्ते दाशुषे वार्याणि ॥ (RV. I. 163. 13).

thus : “What we call the revealed means, they are those which one obtains by tradition. They have been taught at the beginning by Brahmā and transmitted to the wise ascetic (the ṛṣi Kapila). One calls them the revealed means, understanding thereby the four Vedas.” (This is really explanatory, yet compare V_2).

Kārīkā 3—It may be noted that introducing this kārīkā, M and V_1 have raised the question as to how vyakta, etc. could be sub-classified (कतिधा प्रविभागः—M; कतिविधः प्रविभागः— V_1). G on the other hand asks : व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां को विशेषः; and V_2 , व्यक्तादीनां कः प्रविभागः. P has ‘How can we distinguish Nature, the produced principles and the knowing subject ?’ This comes nearest to G and to some extent to V_2 .

M says that the eleven organs are produced from vaikṛta ahaṁkāra without giving an idea of the classification of ahaṁkāra. It also simply says that that the five mahābhūtas are produced from the tanmātras, without saying what is produced from what. G explains that each tanmātra is both a vikṛti and a prakṛti inasmuch as śabdatanmātra is produced from ahaṁkāra and produces ākāśa, and so on. It may be noted that M and G say here that ahaṁkāra is a prakṛti because it gives rise to the tanmātras (—though they do maintain that it produces the 11 organs also—), because they intend to point out later that tanmātras are the vikṛtis of ahaṁkāra but are the prakṛtis of the mahābhūtas, while the eleven organs along with the five mahābhūtas are just vikṛtis and not also prakṛtis. V_1 and V_2 mention that ahaṁkāra produces the five tanmātras and the eleven organs; the five tanmātras produce the five mahābhūtas inasmuch as śabda-tanmātra produces ākāśa, and so on.

P makes a curious statement that the five tanmātras produce the five mahābhūtas and the organs of sense. It states that the śabda-tanmātra produces ākāśa and the organ of hearing, the gandha-tanmātra produces prthvi and the organ of smell, and so on. This is different from what the Sāṃkhya commentators have to say. P does not say anything here about the production of the five organs of action and of mind; but later (Kā. 8) it states that they too are produced from the tanmātras.

Kārikā 4.—Introducing the kārikā, M says : एषां व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां प्रमेयाणां साधनाय प्रमाणान्याह; प्रमाण—प्रमेय—प्रमातृ—प्रमितिक्रमेण हि सकृदस्य सिद्धिर्दृष्टा. See : एवमेषां व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां त्रयाणां पदार्थानां कैः क्रियद्भिः प्रमाणैः केन कस्य वा प्रमाणेन सिद्धिर्भवति, इह लोके प्रमेयवस्तु प्रमाणेन साध्यते, यथा प्रस्थादिभिर्व्रीहयस्तुलया चन्दनादि, तस्मात्प्रमाणमभिधेयम्—G; एतेषां व्यक्तादीनां त्रयाणां पदार्थानां केन प्रकारेण समधिगमः, एवमेवं प्रमाणेभ्य एषां समधिगमः करणीय इत्यत्राह—कानि पुनस्तानि प्रमाणानि; तदुच्यते—V₁; एषां व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां त्रयाणां पदार्थानां केन प्रमाणेन सिद्धिर्भवतीति ।—V₂. “One may ask, ‘By what sort of inference can you establish the three categories? For in the world one can know (all) by inference, even as with a balance or a measure we know the weight or the length’.”—G is nearest to P. P brings in the idea of length that is measured, while G mentions quantity (of grain) that is determined by a measure. P wishes to bring in more variety in the explanation. M shows the significance of the words pratyakṣa and anumāna. M refers to anumāna as triśādhana or pañcasādhana, and as tryavayava according to some and pañcāvayava according to others. A valid inference should be free from 33 kinds of fallacies, but M does not give an exposition of these. M defines āptavacana thus—रागद्वेषादिरहिता ब्रह्मसनत्कुमारादयः, श्रुतिर्वेदः, ताभ्यामुप-

दिष्टं तथेति श्रद्धेयमाप्तवचनम्. It includes arthāpatti, sambhava, abhāva, pratibhā, upamāna, aitihiya and cēṣṭā in anumāna. While explaining ‘प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणानि’ M refers to different ways of knowing—by tulā, karṣa or prastha, and says that vyakta, avyakta and jña can be known by one of the three means of proof. G tells us which object is perceived by which particular sense-organ. The explanation of inference is missing. Explaining āptavacana, it quotes ‘आगमो ह्याप्तवचनम्...’ and ‘स्वकर्मण्यभियुक्तो....’ G says that according to Jaimini, pramāṇas are six-fold—arthāpatti, sambhava, abhāva, pratibhā, aitihiya and upamāna. * Arthāpatti is two-fold—dṛṣṭā and śrutā. G illustrates the different pramāṇas and includes arthāpatti in anumāna, and sambhava, abhāva, pratibhā, aitihiya, and upamā (upamāna) in āptavacana. G does not refer to cēṣṭā.

V₁ mentions the objects of the sense-organs. It quotes ‘आगमो ह्याप्तवचनम्.....’ and then says ‘अथ वा यो यस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चित्कर्मणि कुशलो मनसाऽप्यदृष्टदोषस्तेन य उपदेशः क्रियते स आप्तवचनम्’—a liberal definition; and conveys the same idea as ‘स्वकर्मण्यभियुक्तो.....’. V₁ illustrates arthāpatti, sambhava, abhāva, pratibhā, aupamya, cēṣṭā (—all included in anumāna), and aitihiya (included in āptavacana). It

* This is rather strange. The Mīmāṃsakas certainly recognise six pramāṇas, but they are not the ones mentioned here, for sambhava, aitihiya, and pratibhā are expressly negated as pramāṇas by the author of the Śāstradīpikā. Jaimini nowhere mentions the six pramāṇas, but pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva are discussed by Śābara in his Bhāṣya on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā sūtra 1.1.5. Kumārila recognises all these six, whereas Prabhākara does not recognise abhāva. J too quotes a verse :

प्रतिभौषम्यमेतिह्यमभावः संभवस्तथा ।

अर्थापत्तिरितीमानि प्रमाणान्यपरे जगुः ॥

explains aitihiya thus : 'वेदश्रुतेर्यस्मिन् शास्त्रेऽविपरीता । स्मृतिः सा ऐतिह्यमित्युच्यते, धर्मशास्त्राणीत्यर्थः', and quotes 'अन्नादे भ्रूणहा मार्ष्टि....' as an illustration of aptavacana. This is found in V₂ also. V₂ mentions the objects of the different sense-organs. It quotes 'आगमा ह्याप्तवचनम् आप्ति दोषक्षयं विदुः....' (a slightly different reading), but does not give the liberal definition here (though we have a similar idea in V₂ on kā. 6). It illustrates arthāpatti, etc. and includes arthāpatti, (sambhava), abhāva, pratibhā and ceṣṭā in anumāna, and aitihiya and aupamya in aptavacana. It is interesting that it then refers to the pramāṇas as dvividha and explains 'prameyam' and pramāṇam as ekaśeṣa : प्रमाणं च प्रमाणे च प्रमाणानि सरूपाणामेकशेषः, एकविभक्तौ जात्याख्या कृता । यस्मात्प्रमाणात् प्रमेयं सिध्यति । प्रमेयेऽपि जात्याख्या कृता । प्रमेयं च प्रमेये च प्रमेयाणि सरूपाणामेकशेषः एकविभक्तौ व्यक्तं च प्रमेयमव्यक्तं च तत्र प्रमेये तदिदं प्रमेयम् । एवमस्यायं भेदः । Perhaps V₂ means that pramāṇas are two-fold, cognising perceptible things and cognising imperceptible things. Or is it 'trividha', and we are reading too much in what is really a mistake of the scribe ?—though it does not appear so in view of what follows. V₂ explains aitihiya thus—'ऐतिह्यं नाम वेदश्रुतिः(तेः) आद्या अविपरीता श्रुतिः(स्मृतिः) असावैतिह्यमित्युच्यते, धर्मशास्त्राणीत्यर्थः and then quotes 'अन्नादे भ्रूणहा....'.

It may be noted that all the commentators say that of the 25 Sāṃkhya principles some are established by pratyakṣa, some by anumāna and some by āgama; but none has mentioned even later what is established by āgama.

Regarding perception, P says, "The knowledge (of that which ought to be proved) is obtained by the organs of sense and the objects of sense. It cannot be

demonstrated (by inference); (however) it is uncertain and of a double (deceitful ?) character. Such is the proof by perception." This is not quite clear. P refers to anumāna (proof by comparison) as presupposing perception and of three kinds—pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatah (inference by analogy). * P has translated 'आगमो ह्याप्तवचनम्.....'. P does not give the illustration 'svarge'psarasah'. Regarding the other pramāṇas, P simply says—"Even if there were a different method of proof or a different object (of the discussion) they would not be excluded from these three. The six methods of demonstration, that is to say, comparison (upamāna) and others are included in sacred authority". This is somewhat like G, which also includes arthāpatti alone in anumāna. P does not illustrate any of these pramāṇas.

Kārikā 5.—M explains the definition of dṛṣṭa thus : विषयं विषयं प्रति शोऽध्वसायः.... Regarding inference it says—अनुमानं त्रिविधम् । त्रिग्राहकं व्यवयवं पञ्चावयवमित्यपरे. It gives us some idea of the three or five members of the syllogism and a very general idea of fallacies. Inference is three-fold—pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyatōdṛṣṭa. We shall discuss this later. तद्विज्ञानिपूर्वकम् is explained as just establishing the līṅgin from the līṅga—लिङ्गेन त्रिदण्डादिदर्शनेनादृष्टोऽपि लिङ्गी साध्यते नूनमसौ परिव्राजस्ति यस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति, G, V₁ and V₂ and J explain this as inference from līṅga and līṅgin—लिङ्गं दृष्ट्वा लिङ्गी साध्यते and लिङ्गिनं दृष्ट्वा लिङ्गं साध्यते. M, V₁, V₂ employ the terms 'tridaṇḍa' and 'parivrāj', while G employs 'daṇḍa' and 'yati' (J-viruta-kokila). P says—"It implies a characteri-

* In the exposition of logic, P seems to have been influenced by Nyaya-sūtra and Bhāṣya, as can be seen from its exposition of anumāna.

stic mark and that which bears that mark. The mark and that which bears the mark are found united and are not separated one from the other. When one perceives the mark, the proof can be established by inference." It is clear that here P gives the substance of the original commentary in its own words.

V₂ mentions a number of relations that can exist between the *linga* and the *lingin*—*sva-svāmi*, *prakṛti-vikāra*, *kārya-kāraṇa*, *mātrā-mātrika*, *pratidvandvi*, *sahacara*, *nimitta-naimittika*. It does not give illustrations. Compare—संबन्धाश्च सप्त-तत्र स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धो यथा राजपुरुषयोः । कदाचित् पुरुषेण राजा राज्ञा वा पुरुषः । एवं प्रकृतिविकारसंबन्धो यथा यवसक्त्वोः । कार्यकारणसंबन्धो यथा धेनुवत्सयोः । पात्रपात्रिकसंबन्धो यथा परिवृद्ध-त्रिविष्टब्धयोः । साहचर्यसंबन्धो यथा चक्रवाक्योः । प्रतिद्वन्द्वसंबन्धो यथा शोतोष्णयोः । तत्रैकस्य भावेऽन्याभावः प्रतीयते । निमित्तनैमित्तिकसंबन्धो यथा भोज्यभोजकयोरिति ।—J. As Pulinbehari Chakravarti notes in his book "Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought", p. 190, this view of inference on the basis of the seven kinds of relations is refuted in the *Nyāya-Vārttika*, 1-1-5. In elucidating this verse, Vācaspati quotes the following verse.

मात्रा-निमित्त-संयोगि-विरोधि-सहचारिभिः ।
स्वस्वामि-वध्यघाताद्यैः सांख्यानो सप्तधाऽनुमा ॥

Vardhamāna in his *Prakāśa* attributes this verse to a Sāṃkhya-Vārttika.

[See "Inference in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras"—Nancy Schuster, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 4, April 72 (p. 341-395). Edited by Bimal K. Matilal (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland):—

"According to the *Śaṣṭitantra*, "Inference is the establishment of the remainder by means of perception on the basis of a particular connection" (संबन्धाद् एकस्मात्

प्रत्यक्षाच्छेषसिद्धिरनुमानम्). Seven kinds of connections can be used to establish the invisible remainder by means of the visible connected with it : (1) the relation of master to property (स्वस्वामिभावः), as king to servant or soul to primeval matter (*puruṣa* to *prakṛti*); (2) matter to its altered condition (प्रकृतिविकारभावः); as milk to sour milk, or primeval matter to the 'great one' etc (*pradhāna* to *mahadādi*); (3) cause to effect (कार्यकारणभावः), as a cart to its parts, or the good, etc (*sattvādi*); (4) efficient cause to the caused (निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावः), as potter to pot, or soul (*puruṣa*) to the activity of primeval matter (*pradhāna*); (5) matter to form (मात्रामात्रिकभावः), as branch, etc. to the tree, or sound, etc. to the great elements; (6) concurrent occurrence (सहचारिभावः), as with *Cakravāka* ducks, or with the good, etc. (*sattvādi*); (7) hindering to hindered (वध्यघातकभावः), as snake to mongoose, or the good, etc. (*sattvādi*) insofar as they comprise the reciprocal relation of the essential and the accessory matter (*āṅgāṅgibhūtaḥ*) " (p. 346)].

आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनम् च (M has 'तु')—This is explained by M thus—आप्ता ब्रह्मादयः आचार्याः, श्रुतिर्वेदस्तदेतदुभयमाप्तवचनम्. It refers to three śabda-vṛttis and three kinds of lakṣaṇā, and concludes that *āptavacanam* here signifies the view of Kapila. M quotes 'आप्तमो ह्याप्तवचनम्.....' and स्वकर्मण्यभियुक्तो... G explains 'āptaśrutih' like M. V₁ and V₂ explain *āptaśruti* as Veda, the utterances of Hari, Hara, Hiraṇyagarbha, and *āptavacana* as the utterances of Manu, etc., the authors of the *dharmaśāstras*. M and G take *āptaśruti* (*āpta* and *śruti*) as defining *āptavacanam*. P says—"The teaching of a saintly person is called sacred authority. For example, the four Vedas given out by the god Brahman, and the *Dharmaśāstra* of the king

Manu".—This is substantially the same as the interpretation in V₁ and V₂ (though the translation of the kārikā is not quite consistent with this).

While referring to the sense-objects and sense-organs, M starts with rūpa etc. and netra, etc., while G has here 'श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादिविषयेषु...'. V₁ and V₂ mention rūpādi and cākṣurādi. Regarding perception P says—"The ear obtains knowledge by sound.....and the nose by odour. It is only a perception which the organ obtains but not a judgment by comparison (inference). That is what is called proof by perception."

We may now compare the illustrations of pūrvavat, etc. as given in M, G, V₁, V₂ and P.

पूर्ववत् : M—विशिष्टमेवोन्नतिदर्शनात् भवित्री वृष्टि संभावयति । पूर्वमियं दृष्टेति पूर्ववत् । नदीपूरदर्शनादुपरि वृष्टो देव इति वा प्रतीतिः ।

G—पूर्वमस्यास्तीति पूर्ववद् यथा मेघोन्नत्या वृष्टि साधयति पूर्वदृष्टत्वात् ।

V₁—प्रावृद्धकाले मेघमुत्थितं दृष्ट्वा वृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति अनुमानम् । यस्मात् पूर्व मेघः पश्चाद् वृष्टिरित्येतत् पूर्ववन्नामानुमानम् ।

V₂—like V₁.

P—(starting from what precedes)—Men see the black clouds and infer that it is about to rain.

All are alike, except that M regards it as inference from the antecedent to the subsequent or vice-versa, while the others regard it as only inference of the subsequent from the antecedent.

शेषवत्—M—समुद्रोदकविन्दुं प्राश्य शेषस्य लवणभावोऽनुमीयते इति शेषवत् ।

G—समुद्रोदकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति ।

V₁—लवणसमुद्रोदकविन्दुषु प्राश्य शेषस्य लवणभावोऽनुमीयते ।

V₂—शेषोऽर्थाऽस्यास्तीति शेषवत् ; यथा समुद्रोदकविन्दुं प्राश्य शेषस्यापि लवणताऽनुमीयते ।

P—(Starting with what remains)—Seeing the water of a river recently muddled, they know that rain has fallen higher up the river.

It is surprising that P is very much like J here—अतीतार्थसाधनाय शेषवत्—शेषं लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति । यथाऽस्या नद्या उपरि वृष्टिर्भूता यस्याः कलुषोदकं शेषं लिङ्गमिति. Both seem to be guided by the Nyāya-Bhāṣya.

सामान्यतोदृष्टम्—M—पुष्पिताम्रदर्शनात् अन्यत्र पुष्पिता आम्रा इति । पुनर्यथा—बहिरुद्योत इति केनाप्युक्तम् । तत्रापरेणाप्युक्तं चन्द्र उदितो भविष्यतीत्यर्थसंगतिः.

G—देशान्तराद् देशान्तरं प्राप्तं दृष्टं गतिमच्चन्द्रतारकं चैत्रवत् । यथा चैत्रनामानं देशाद् देशान्तरं प्राप्तमवलोक्य गतिमानयमिति तद्वच्चन्द्रतारकमिति । तथा पुष्पिताम्रदर्शनादन्यत्र पुष्पिता आम्रा इति सामान्यतोदृष्टेन साधयति.

V₁—Missing.

V₂—इह तु नगरे आम्रं पुष्पितं दृष्ट्वा वसन्तकाले नूनं कृत्स्नायामपि वसुन्धरायां पुष्पिता आम्रा इति.

P—(By analogy)—They see the mangoes flower at Pataliputra and infer from it that in Kosala too, they are in flower.

J is like G here. P is like V₂, though the former mentions particular regions. Though individual commentators might have explained the significance of some of the names (pūrvavat, etc.) none of these except P has tried to show specifically the distinguishing characteristics of these. P says : 'Starting from what precedes..... The triple knowledge is obtained by perception, and it is capable of distinguishing the three cases (cause, effect and similarity) and the three times (past, present and future).' Compare—वृष्टितन्त्रे व्याख्यातम्, पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति । अतीतानागतवर्तमानास्त्रयः पदार्थाः । तत्र भविष्यदर्थसाधनाय पूर्ववदनुमानम् । पूर्वं लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पूर्ववत्,....; अतीतार्थसाधनाय शेषवत्—शेषं

लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति ।...वर्तमानार्थसाधनाय सामान्यतोदृष्टम्—सामान्येन लिङ्गलिङ्गिदृष्टत्वात् ।
यथा देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विका देशान्तरप्राप्तिर्दृष्टा, तथा सूर्यादीनां सामान्येन देशान्तर-
प्राप्त्या गतिरनुमीयते । J, 5.

These examples and their sources have been discussed later. P and J both seem to be influenced by the Nyāya-bhāṣya 1.1.5 in respect of śeṣavat, perhaps because the example given by earlier Sāṃkhya commentators did not appeal to them as there is hardly any logic in it.

Kārikā 6—Introducing this kārikā, M says : Of the three called vyakta, avyakta, jña, which one is established by which of the three pramāṇas, pratyakṣa, etc. ? G—Thus the three-fold pramāṇa is explained; what is established by which pramāṇa ?

V₁—The three-fold pramāṇa has been defined; now point out the respective object of each—which prameya is established by which pramāṇa.

V₂--Which prameya is established by which anumāna, by which pramāṇa ?

P--You say that there is a three-fold proof by inference. What is the domain of each method of proof ? (Is P trying to put the expression in V₂ properly ?)

M holds that pradhāna and puruṣa though atindriya (supersensuous) are both established by sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference as existent; pradhāna must be existent and triguṇa inasmuch as it is the cause of mahat, etc. which are triguṇa; puruṣa must be existent and sentient so that the activity of the pradhāna, which is unconscious, could be possible. M does not explain cd. G is similar to M; only, the second line is taken note of and illustrated by इन्द्रो देवराजः, उत्तराः कुरवः, स्वर्गेऽप्सरसः. V₁, like M, does not explain

the second line, and explains the inference thus—There is puruṣa for whom pradhāna produces mahat, etc.. V₂ is the same as V₁ except that it explains the second line, gives a brief exposition of āptāgama, and illustrates it by 'इन्द्रो देवराजः, उत्तराः कुरवः'. P is like V₂, only it is a bit more explanatory in respect of the first line. It means the three guṇas when it speaks of joy, anxiety, blindness (that is to say, sukha, duḥkha and moha, these terms being employed in the same sense as sattva, rajas and tamas).

Kārikā 7. This kārikā anticipates an objection that what is not perceived is non-existent. e. g. (M) द्वितीयमनीश्वरशिरः; तृतीयो बाहुः, शशविषाणादयो वा; (G) यथा द्वितीयं शिरस्तृतीयो बाहुः; (V₁) द्वितीयमवनीश्वरस्य शिरस्तृतीयः पाणिः शशविषाणादयो वा; (V₂) द्वितीयमनीश्वरशिरः; (P) second head or the third arm of some one who is not the self-existent Ood.

M does not say at the very outset that even what is 'sat' (existent) may not be perceived due to one of the eight causes mentioned, and the non-perception of an 'asat (non-existent) thing is four-fold, but does so in the course of the explanation of this kārikā. G mentions the 'aṣṭadhā anupalabdhi' of existent things but does not refer to the four-fold non-perception of non-existent things. V₁ introducing the kārikā mentions both. V₂ and P mention the 'aṣṭadhā anupalabdhi' of existent objects and later casually refer to the four-fold non-perception of non-existent things.

Examples for anupalabdhi due to atidūra, etc. as given in the different commentaries are as follows :

अतिदूरात्.—M—देवदत्तविष्णुदत्तयज्ञदत्तानां देशान्तरगतानामतिदूराजोपलब्धिः.

G—देशान्तरस्थानां चैत्रभैत्रविष्णुमित्राणाम्.

V₁—विप्रकृष्टदेशस्थस्य वै शकुनेः.

V₂—यथा विप्रकृष्टेऽध्वनि वर्तमानः शकुनिर्नोपलभ्यते.

P—An object fallen on the other bank is not seen by the man on this bank.

समीप्यात् :—M—चक्षुरतिसमीप्यात् कज्जलं नोपलभते.

G—चक्षुषोऽञ्जनानुपलब्धिः

V₁—स्वचक्षुरचक्षुद्विषिका पक्षमलप्रभृतयश्च (नोपलभ्यन्ते).

V₂—देवदत्तः आत्मचक्षुःस्थमञ्जनं नोपलभते.

P—A particle of dust in the eye cannot be perceived.

इन्द्रियघातात् :—Same in all.

मनोऽनवस्थानात् :—M—अनवस्थितचित्तो राजानमपि यान्तं न पश्यति.

G—व्यग्रचित्तः सम्यक् कथितमपि नावधारयति.

V₁—कस्यचिद् देवदत्तस्य मनोऽनवस्थितस्य नरनार्यादयः सत्त्वास्तस्याप्रतो व्रजितास्तेन नोपलब्धाः.

V₂—अनवस्थितमना हस्तिनं परिक्रामन्तं न पश्यति.

P—Others are obscured by the trouble of the mind, for one is incapable of thinking of a given subject when the mind is elsewhere.

—Different in all; the expansion in P is very general.

सौक्ष्म्यात् :—M—धूमोष्मत्रुटिनीहारपरमाणवो नोपलभ्यन्ते.

G—धूमोष्मजलनीहारपरमाणवो गगनगता नोपलभ्यन्ते.

V₁ does not discuss saukṣmya here, but does so in the context of the next kārīkā, the illustration there being 'त्रुटिनीहाराश्रवत्'.

V₂—धूमोष्मनीहारा आकाशगता नोपलभ्यन्ते.

P—The smoke, the heat, the dust and the vapour dispersed in the atmosphere cannot be seen.

V₂ and P are alike.

व्यवधानात् :—Same in all. M, G, P do not mention any object that is hidden. V₁ and V₂ mention ghaṭādi. All refer to 'kudya' (wall) as the obstructing factor. V₁ mentions in addition 'curtain' (paṭa).

अभिभवात् :—M—सूर्यादितेजसाभिभूतानां ग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादीनामनुपलम्भात्.

G—सूर्यतेजसाभिभूताः ग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादयः नोपलभ्यन्ते.

V₁—आदित्यप्रकाशेन ग्रहनक्षत्रोल्कातारारूपाणि नभसि रवितेजसाभिभूतानि नाभिव्यज्यन्ते.

V₂—यथादित्यप्रकाशे (or ० प्रकाशैः) ग्रहनक्षत्रचन्द्रताराणां प्रकाशा अभिभूतत्वाच्चोपलभ्यन्ते.

P—When the sun rises, the light of the moon and the stars cannot be seen.

V₂ is closest to P.

समानाभिहारात् :—M—मुद्राराशि—कुवलयामलकमौषितककपोतादिनिकुरम्बे क्षिप्तं समानं यदि नोपलभ्यते तदेवमिति.

G—मुद्राराशौ मुद्राः क्षिप्तः कुवलयामलकमध्ये कुवलयामलके क्षिप्ते, कपोतमध्ये कपोतो नोपलभ्यते समानद्रव्यमध्याहृतत्वात्.

V₁—तथा मधराशौ माषाः प्रक्षिप्ताः, मुद्राराशौ मुद्राः, कपोतगणमध्यगो वा कपोतः.

V₂—सामानाः सदृशा इत्यर्थः; तेषां समाहारो राशिः तस्मात् सामानादीनां (माषादीनाम्) अमेयत्वम्.

P—A bean cannot be distinguished in a mass of beans because all the beans are of the same kind.

V₂ is closest to P.

Illustrations of non-perception due to non-existence are almost the same in all; except that P does not mention 'śāśa-viśāṇa' and V₁ has 'अवनीश्वरस्य' instead of 'अनीश्वरस्य'. G does not mention this kind of anupalabdhi at all. G and P just illustrate the anupalabdhi of an existent thing due to different causes and they do not, like the others,

at each stage employ an expression to that effect — e g., यथातिदूरे तत् कस्मान्नोपलभ्यते... किं तच्चास्ति.

Kārikā 8 explains that pradhāna is not perceived, not due to its non-existence but because of its saukṣmya; nevertheless it can be known through its effects, mahat, etc. which are both similar to prakṛti and not similar. M and V₁ explain the saukṣmya of pradhāna by 'शब्दाद्यलक्षणत्वात्'; V₂ by 'अदर्शनलक्षणत्वात्'; G and P do not seem to offer any specific reason. V₂ does not remind us here of the illustrations of non-perception due to saukṣmya that are given in the commentary of the previous kārikā, while the others do. It may be noted that V₁ and V₂ introducing this kārikā ask why pradhāna is not perceived, as kā. 8 pertains to pradhāna alone. The other commentaries including P ask about the cause due to which pradhāna and puruṣa are not perceived.

In the explanation of 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः', the illustrations in the different commentaries are as under :—M—यथा वटधान्यं कारणं वटं कार्यमालोकयानुमीयते; V₁—वटधानावत्; V₂—न्यग्रोधधाना—the wording and way of explaining is different. G and P do not give any illustration, P states—'The existence of Nature can be inferred by analogy from her effects.' (P does not include this in the text of its verse.) M, G, V₁ and V₂ simply mention the twenty-three effects (—of course in their order). P specifically shows the order of evolution. It may be noted that according to P, the eleven organs of sense and action and the five gross elements are produced from the five subtle elements. All the commentaries say that a son is like the father in respect of certain qualities and unlike him in respect

of certain other qualities. Only P says : "A man begets two children, one of whom resembles the father while the other does not resemble him at all. Among the products of one and the same cause, there are some which resemble the original principle and others which resemble it in nothing." This is not what the Sāṃkhya writers meant. P sometimes tries to explain a point in its own way irrespective of what the Sāṃkhya commentator had to say.

The commentators discuss here whether the effect is existent or not in the cause before its production. M—अत्र वैशेषिका विप्रतिपन्ना असत्तः सद्भवतीति मन्यन्ते मृत्पिण्डे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटो नास्तीति व्यवसितास्ते; अस्ति नास्तीति वराका जीवकाः; नैवास्ति न च नास्ति एष बौद्धानां पक्षः (V₁ uses the expression असत्कारणप्रतिषेध also while introducing kā. 9). The other views are summarily set aside in the commentaries, while kā. 9 refutes the Vaiśeṣika stand-point. G is very brief—यतोऽत्र सांख्यदर्शने सत् कार्यम्, बौद्धादीनामसत् कार्यम् सदसन्नं भवत्यथाऽसत् सन्नं भवतीति विप्रतिषेधः. V₁—इह वैशेषिका विप्रतिपन्नाः प्रागुत्पत्तेर्मृत्पिण्डे घटो नास्तीति व्यवसिताः अस्ति च नास्तीत्याहताः नैव नास्ति न वाऽस्तीत्यभ्युपगमपक्ष एष बौद्धानाम्. V₂ is similar.

The expression in P is confused here—"Some one may ask 'There are some wise ones who affirm that a pot and other earthen utensils exist already in the lump of clay which serves to make them. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that at first they do not exist and that later they exist (—that is to say, the effect is not in the cause). According to the disciples of Śākyamuni a pot is neither existent nor non-existent in the lump of clay. We have then three opinions and we prefer the middle one to the others.' Replying to that we shall refute first the opinion of Śākyamuni, later that of the

Vaiśeṣikas. The opinion of Śākyamuni 'neither existent nor non-existent', is inadmissible because it is self-contradictory. To say non-existent that would be to say nothing. To say 'not non-existent', that is to say 'existent'. Existence and non-existence together make a contradiction; it is as if you should say 'that man is neither dead nor living'. As that opinion is self-contradictory, it cannot be maintained. Thus it is with the doctrine of Śākyamuni." Paramārtha notes here :—"This refutation, (that is to say, the last phrase) is false. Why ? Because Śākyamuni had not such an opinion. When Śākyamuni affirms non-existence he does not wish to say (it is) nothing. He does not wish to declare existence either, when he says that it is not non-existent, for he does not insist on either of the two extremes. The refutation then does not affect Buddhism in any way."

Queerly enough Paramārtha explains the refutation in such a way as to keep Buddhism out of the picture altogether. But he forgets that this was the usual method of refutation. M, V₁ and V₂ say that one cannot have a discussion with the Buddhists as they have no view of their own (pakṣaparigrahābhāva). All of them refer to the Vaiśeṣika, Jaina and Buddhist views, briefly refute the last two and then comment on kā. 9 refuting the Vaiśeṣika stand-point and establishing the Sāṃkhya sat-kāryavāda.

Takakusu gives a foot-note here—"There is a reference to these passages in the commentary on the Śataśāstra (translated in 608; it is not included in the editions of the Chinese Tripiṭaka). Here it is : 'In the Golden Seventy' (Sāṃkhya Kārikā) the opinions of two schools are refuted, and the opinion of the Sāṃkhya

school is established. The two schools are : (1) the doctrine of Rṣabha (Le-cha-p'o...) who maintains that the effect is neither existent nor non-existent in the cause; (2) the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, who assert that the effect does not exist in the cause.' This citation informs us that the Chinese text to which the commentator on the Śataśāstra refers, contained here 'Rṣabha' in the place of 'Śākyamuni.' But Rṣabha is the name given to the Saint of the Jainas; the Chinese have explained it by Ni-k'ien-tse.....=Nirgranthika. An Indian version of our text ought to have this variant. It would perhaps be better to read throughout Rṣabha in the place of Śākyamuni." This last comment made by Takakusu has in view Paramārtha's note. But it is not proper because the Jainas would hold that the effect is both existent and non-existent in the cause. As it stands there is no clear reference to the Jaina view in P. Could it be that Paramārtha out of his partiality for Buddhism substituted a refutation of Buddhism in place of that of Jainism because he felt it insulting that the Sāṃkhyas should not even care to refute it and then added a note that it was not proper as it did not correctly present the Buddhist view ? It may be noted that the illustration given in the other commentaries in connection with the Jaina view is that of 'mṛtaka-jīvaka'. P reverses it in relation to Buddhism—"neither dead nor living".

Kārikā 9.—The Vaiśeṣika view is refuted in this kārikā. We shall compare the illustrations given by the commentaries in connection with the reasons adduced.

असदकरणात्:—M—सिकताभ्यस्तैलं, कूर्मरोमभ्यः पटप्रावरणं, वन्ध्यादुहितृवत्, शश-
विषाणं, खपुष्पम्.

G—सिकताभ्यस्तैलनिष्पत्तिः.

V₁—सिकतातैलवत्, कूर्मरोमपटप्रावरणवत्, वन्ध्यादुहितृवत्, शश-
विषाणवत्.

V₂—सिकताभ्यस्तैलनिष्पत्तिः.

P—Oil cannot be produced from sand.....
By pressing sesamum one gets oil.

P is like G and V₂; only, a positive example also is given.

उपादानग्रहणात्:—M—दध्यर्थी क्षीरस्योपादानं कुरुते.....उदकस्योपादानं कुर्यात्.

G—दध्यर्थी क्षीरस्य न तु जलस्य.

V₁ and V₂—like M.

P—A man who thinks that tomorrow a
Brahmin will come to dine in his house
procures milk to make curds. Why does
he not take water ?

P is more elaborate and narrative in method than the others.

सर्वसंभवाभावात्—M—तिलेभ्यस्तैलं, दध्नो घृतं.....ततश्च तृणपांसुवालुकादिभ्यो
रजतसुवर्णमणिमुक्ताप्रवालादयो जायेरन्.

G—सुवर्णस्य रजतादौ तृणपांसुसिकतासु (संभवो नास्ति).

V₁—तिलेभ्यस्तैलं दध्नो घृतम्;.....तृणपांसुवालुकादिभ्यो रजत-
सुवर्णमुक्ताप्रवालादीनि क्रियेरन्.

V₂—तृणपांसुवालुकाभ्यः रजतसुवर्णवज्रादीनि क्रियेरन्.

P—Grass, gravel or stones could then produce
gold or silver.

V₂ is closest to P.

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्:—M—शक्तः कुम्भकारः शक्यादेव मृत्पिण्डात् शक्यदण्डचक्र...
अनलादिभिः संपन्नो घटशरावोदञ्चनादीन्यारभमाणो हृष्टः
न च मणिकादि, अशक्यत्वात् तावता पिण्डेन तस्य.

G—कुलालः शक्तो मृदण्डचक्र.....नोरादिकरणोपकरणं वा
शक्यमेव घटं मृत्पिण्डादुत्पादयति.

V₁—like M.

V₂—शक्तः कुलालः शक्यादेव मृत्पिण्डाद् दण्डचक्र.....
विदलादिभिः शक्यं घटं करोति.

P—A potter with his instruments makes
pitchers and plates from a lump of
clay, but he is not capable of making
these utensils using plants or trees.

P gives a negative example also. This reason (शक्तस्य
शक्यकरणात्) is meant to show that the cause can give
rise to only an effect adequate to it, not just anything.
This is clearly brought out by M and V₁. G and V₂
are not so clear here. P on the contrary shows the
adequacy of the cause in respect of the effect.

कारणभावात् is similarly explained in all. M quotes at
the end 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्.....(Chāndogya Up. 6. 2) in
support of the existence of the effect in the cause. No
other commentary has made any such attempt.

Kārikā 10.—P unlike the others mentions while intro-
ducing the kārikā (and also at the end of the commen-
tary on this kārikā) the number (nine) of dissimilarities
of the effects with Prakṛti. The discussion regarding
sat-kārya or asat-kārya was a sort of a digression; so
V₂ says प्रकृतं वक्ष्यामः.... P has, "Continuing to reply to
the question, I resume the explanation of the preceding
verse; as for the dissimilarity of the effects with Nature
there are nine points to observe." Takakusu notes here
in his foot-note : "The commentary agrees with that
of Gaudapāda almost word for word. These arguments
may be traditional in the Sāṃkhya school, but an

agreement so close is not, however, an act of chance. These lines, even as some others, are found in the commentary on the Chinese text." We have seen that V_2 is closer than G to P in several respects and it is so even here.

In respect of the exposition of 'हेतुमत', M, G, V_1 and V_2 are in complete agreement in respect of the Sāṃkhya tenet of evolution. P maintains against these that the five organs of sense, five organs of action and manas besides the five gross elements have for their cause the five subtle elements (tanmātras). Moreover it does not specifically mention here that ākāśa has śabda-tanmātra as its cause and so on, while the others do. We see at places that P is not fond of always repeating what has been mentioned elsewhere. The synonyms of hetu are given in the commentaries as shown below : हेतुरपदेशो निमित्तं प्रकृतिः कारणमित्यनर्थान्तरम्—M, V_1 ; उपादानं हेतुः कारणं निमित्तमिति पर्यायाः—G; हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं निमित्तं प्रमाणं कारणमिति पर्यायाः— V_2 . M and V_1 further say that hetu is two-fold—kāraṇa (productive) and jñāpaka (cognitive); pradhāna, buddhi, ahaṃkāra and tanmātras are kāraṇa hetus, whereas viparyaya, aśakti, tuṣṭi, siddhi and anugraha are jñāpaka hetus; we are further told : तत् द्विविधेनापि हेतुना युक्तं हेतुमदिदं सिद्धम्. G drops the synonyms अपदेश, लिङ्ग and प्रमाण, perhaps meaning thereby that only the kāraṇa hetu is meant here. J, T also explain हेतुमत similarly, without mentioning the synonyms. Y shows conclusively that only the kāraṇa hetu is meant here. V_2 and P explain 'hetumat' as 'having a cause' without going into further details regarding the kind of hetu meant. This difference

in exposition might prove helpful in determining the chronology of the commentaries. We shall discuss this later.

अनित्यम्—G is very brief here saying that if a thing is produced from something it is anitya, as for example, ghaṭa produced from the mṛt-piṇḍa. M, V_1 and V_2 apply this to the effects of pradhāna and moreover say that each effect is merged at the time of pralaya in its respective cause. P is more elaborate here : "Mahat and the others are produced by Nature. Being products they are not permanent. There are two sorts of impermanence : (a) that which lasts a certain time; (b) that which changes at every moment. So long as a cause of change does not intervene, a thing remains what it is. Thus a forest or other similar things remain what they are so long as fire does not destroy them; but when the calamity of fire befalls them, the five gross elements and the others resolve themselves into the five subtle elements and the others, the five subtle elements in the sentiment of Self....."

अव्यापि—M, G simply say that pradhāna and puruṣa are all-extensive, not so vyakta; while V_1 , V_2 and P say that pradhāna and puruṣa extend everywhere on the earth, in the middle space and in heaven.

P discusses these in the order—हेतुमत, अनित्यम्, अनेकम्, अव्यापि, सक्रियम्, लिङ्गम्, सावयवम्, आश्रितम् and परतन्त्रम्. V_2 also somewhat changes the order. It discusses 'सक्रियम्' after 'आश्रितम्', and 'लिङ्गम्' is not explained. Further while discussing each characteristic of vyakta (mahat, etc.), V_2 and P say there and then that the characteristic of avyakta is the contrary of this. V_2 does not say this in respect of

हेतुमत् and अनित्यम्. The other commentaries give an exposition of the contrary nature of avyakta at the end while specifically explaining 'विपरीतम् अव्यक्तम्'. V₁ alone of these gives two explanations of लिङ्गम्—लयं गच्छति and लीनमर्थं लिङ्गयति इति वा लिङ्गम्. (Later J and T also give this second explanation, J giving the first one also. Y has here लिङ्गं तल्लक्षणोपपन्नम्).

Kārikā 11. त्रिगुणम्—M simply says that the effect is in accordance with the cause, black cloth is made of black thread. The effect has three guṇas so the cause is established as having three guṇas. G first explains these characteristics—triguṇam, etc.—in connection with व्यक्तम् and later while explaining तथा प्रधानम् establishes that pradhāna also is similar in character. It mentions the three guṇas and gives the illustration of black cloth and black threads. V₁ mentions the three guṇas and also enumerates the effects and establishes both positively and negatively that pradhāna is triguṇa. It also gives the example of black thread and cloth. V₂ mentions the three guṇas and the twenty-three tattvas constituting vyakta, and later while explaining तथा प्रधानम् states the argument and the illustrations of black thread and black cloth, and white thread and white cloth. P is elaborate like V₁ and gives the example of black thread and black cloth; only, it does not give the negative argument,—if pradhāna did not have the three guṇas, mahat, etc. also would not have had the three guṇas. V₂ is like G here.

अविवेकि—M is very brief and does not give the illustration 'अयं गौरयमथ इति', while G gives it. V₁, V₂ and P are more explanatory and give the above-mentioned illustration; V₁ and V₂ mention the names of the three

guṇas. All the commentaries except G and V₂ mention in the case of each characteristic that pradhāna also is alike triguṇa, aviveki, etc.. G and V₂ after giving an exposition of the characteristics in respect of vyakta, state while explaining तथा प्रधानम् that pradhāna also can be established as having the said characteristics.

सामान्यम्—M gives the illustration 'गणिकावत् सर्वपुरुषाणाम्'. G—मूल्य(मल्ल ?)दासीवत्; V₁—यथा मल्लदासी सर्वेषामेव मल्लानाम्; V₂—यथा मल्लदासी सर्वेषां सामान्या; P—Even as a servant who has many masters, each one of whom employs her and makes her work.

The commentaries other than M and G have given a point to point explanation of 'तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान्'. M and G are carried away by the idea that in kā. 10 the characteristics showing the contrary character of mahat, etc. and pradhāna are mentioned and puruṣa is unlike mahat, etc. and like pradhāna in these respects, forgetting that in respect of anekatva, puruṣa is like vyakta and unlike avyakta. Or could this betray some other influence? V₂ does not mention this point at all, while V₁ pointedly says—अनेकं व्यक्तम्, एकं प्रधानम्; पुरुषोऽप्यनेकः G has अनेकं व्यक्तमेकमव्यक्तं तथा च पुमानप्येकः. Scholars have tried in different ways to explain how puruṣa could be said to be one. But we are not concerned with that here.

P is brief but clear : "The evolved principles and Nature are similar in these six points, while for Spirit there is not such similarity. There is then the opposite of similarity. The evolved principles and Nature are dissimilar in the nine points (enumerated in v. 10), while in the case of Spirit there is dissimilarity (with the evolving principles) in eight points of the nine; it is

in that that it is said to be dissimilar. Spirit differs from Nature in this point alone that it is multiple". 'तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान्' is rendered as 'Spirit is neither similar nor dissimilar'. It is clear from the above that P does not always give an exact translation of the original; its method, as for example here, is different from that of the ancient Indian commentators. It gives at places a summary, elsewhere it elaborates, and at other places it gives the idea in its own words, as it does here.

Kārikā 12. V_2 and P are very brief in the interpretation of 'प्रोत्यप्रोतिविषादात्मकाः'. P is similar to G as it renders *prīti* by *sukha*, *apṛīti* by *duḥkha* and *viṣāda* by *moha*. V_2 does not do so. G explains *artha* as *sāmarthya*—'capability'. P also has "The first (*sattva*) is capable of shining or illuminating.....". M and V_1 give a long list of qualities resulting from *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; not so the others.

अन्योन्याभिभवाः— V_2 and P give the simile of the light of the sun overpowering the light of the moon and the stars (P, ग्रहनक्षत्रतारागण— V_2). M and V_1 state that when *sattva* dominates over *rajas* and *tamas*, 'शान्ता वृत्तिरुत्पद्यते सत्त्वस्य धर्माद्या'; when *rajas* dominates, 'घोरा वृत्तिरुत्पद्यते अधर्माद्या'; when *tamas* dominates, 'मूढा वृत्तिरुत्पद्यते अज्ञानाद्या'. G puts it differently : When *sattva* dominates, subjugating *rajas* and *tamas*, 'स्वगुणेन प्रीतिप्रकाशात्मकेनावतिष्ठते.....'. V_2 simply states that sometimes *sattva* dominates and subjugates *rajas* and *tamas*, even as the brilliance of the sun subjugates by day the brilliance of 'ग्रहनक्षत्रतारागण'; when *rajas* dominates it subjugates *sattva* and *tamas*.....'. P has a similar wording, only it repeats the same simile thrice. Thus V_2 is closest to P.

अन्योन्याश्रयाः—M and V_1 —Each functions depending on the functions of the other two; 'त्रिदण्डविष्टम्भवदमी वेदितव्याः'. G simply says 'द्वयगुणवद् गुणाः'. V_2 has यथा त्रयो दण्डाः त्रिदण्डभूतमन्योन्याश्रित्य कुण्डिकां धारयन्ति, एवमन्योन्याश्रित्य गुणाः सर्वकार्याणि कुर्वन्ति. Compare P—"The three *guṇas* depending each on the other are capable of performing all things even as the three sticks leaning each on the other can support a basin for ablution." V_2 is like P, and V_1 is exactly like M.

अन्योन्यजननाः—अन्योन्यं जनयन्ति कदाचित् सत्त्वं रजस्तमसी जनयति..... यथा सपरिकरकुम्भकाराधिष्ठितो मृत्पिण्डो घटं जनयति तद्वज्जनयन्ति, अन्योन्यं बोधयन्तीत्येतत् प्रतिगृह्यते । यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ परस्परं बोधयत एवं बुद्धिस्था गुणाः सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि परस्परं बोधयन्ति ।—M. V_1 has the same interpretation. G has simply यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटं जनयति. V_2 —अन्योन्यं जनयन्ति गुणाः.....यथा मृत्पिण्डः घटं जनयति, तन्तवः पटं तद्वत्.....यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्राः परस्परं बोधयन्ति 'उत्थितः सूर्यः, उत्तिष्ठतु भवान्' इति....

After explaining that sometimes *sattva* produces *rajas* and *tamas* and so on, P gives the simile, 'Just as three men dependent on one another perform an act, even so the three *guṇas* residing in the mahat and the others and dependent on one another produce birth and death.' It is clear that P has dropped the well-known similes of *mṛt-piṇḍa* and *tantu* and preferred to have the simile of three men (—P does not mention the names, for it mostly likes to speak in very general terms—), as they correspond to the three *guṇas*. P seems to have explained very briefly on the basis of V_2 or a commentary on the same lines.

अन्योन्यमिथुनाः—A stanza 'रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं.....with slightly different readings is found in all the commentaries. The

prose explanation is the same in M and V₁—अवियोग-धर्मत्वात्; and it is similar in G and V₂—परस्परसहाया इत्यर्थः; G and V₂ give the simile 'यथा स्त्रीपुंसौ'. P assigns the quotation to P'o—so (Vyāsa according to Takakusu); others do not mention the source. Vācaspati calls it 'āgama' in his Tattva Kaumudī, in which, as also in G, the text is as follows :

अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगामिनः ।
रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ।
तमसश्चापि मिथुने ते सत्त्वरजसो उमे ॥
उभयोः सत्त्वरजसोर्मिथुनं तम उच्यते ।
नैषामादिः संप्रयोगो वियोगो वोपलभ्यते ॥

M, V₁, V₂, P, J give only two lines,—the second and fourth of the above lines. J assigns it to Viṣṇugītā which is difficult to identify.

(See—रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ।
उमे ते सत्त्वरजसो तमसो मिथुने विदुः ॥
—Devī Bhāgavata, 3. 50).

We find a similar verse in the Aśvamedha-parvan of the Mahābhārata—

तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ।
रजसश्चापि सत्त्वं स्यात् सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ (36. 3).

अन्योन्यवृत्तयः—M and V₁ give three analogies for sattva, rajas and tamas each performing its own operation as also of the others. In the first, a lady who is beautiful, young and so on and so forth is 'भर्तुः सुखावहा, सपत्नीनां दुःखाय रागिणां मोहाय च'. She represents sattva. In the second, the kṣatriyas attacking the dasyusenā are representative of rajas. They cause sukha to those who have suffered at the hands of the dasyus, and cause duḥkha and

mōha to the dasyus (—the author has become impatient, does not mention two different groups experiencing duḥkha and mōha). In the third, a black thundering cloud is representative of tamas. It causes sukha to the farmers who are well-prepared and equipped, and duḥkha and mōha to the shelterless, to the travellers, to those who have not stored grain, etc. against the rainy day, as also to the proṣitabhartṛkā.

It may be noted that M and V₁ are alike except for a change in expression at places. In both while explaining अन्योन्यवृत्तयः, the analogy of the accomplished lady is very briefly given—here M and V₁ say that she causes prīti to her husband and relations, and she causes duḥkha and mōha to her co-wives. This lady is representative of sattva which performs its own operation as also of the others. This should be construed, with the others also. Then in both, an opponent objects : 'न खलु सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि जात्यन्तरिण' and in support of this the above-mentioned analogies are given. The answer to this is given in kā. 13. Thus the analogies are found in M and V₁ in the prima-facie view in respect of kā. 13. G, V₂ and P do not raise any such question and give the analogies even while explaining 'अन्योन्यवृत्तयः', and simply say while introducing kā. 13 that the 'vailakṣaṇya' of the guṇas is set forth therein.

G—(i) Same illustration of स्त्री in a simple language.

(ii) यथा राजा सदोद्युक्तः प्रजापालने दुष्टनिग्रहे शिष्टानां सुखमुत्पादयति दुष्टानां दुःखं च, एवं रजः..... (iii) तथा तमः..... यथा मेघाः खमावृत्य जगतः सुखमुत्पादयन्ति, ते वृष्ट्या कर्षकाणां कर्षणोद्योगं जनयन्ति, विरहिणां मोहम्.

P—(i) Lady of royal line whose countenance and form are extremely beautiful—she gives pleasure to her

husband and his family; causes envy or suffering in other ladies of equal position. But she also produces indifference—her servants always weary of serving her and not having the means of delivering themselves are of sombre and depressed humour. V_2 gives this very analogy. Compare : “सपत्न्यश्च द्विविधाः दासीसपत्न्यश्च कुलस्त्री-सपत्न्यश्च...”. The expression becomes confused. P seems to have put it properly in its own way. (ii) In P for rajas we have the analogy of a prince mounted on a horse and holding a whip in his hand, who comes to deliver a lady of royal lineage captured by a bandit. The prince causes joy to the lady, misery to the bandit and stupor to the other bandits made motionless like the trunks of trees at the sight of the prince. It is interesting to note that in V_2 too we have almost the same analogy. Bandits attack a village, the ladies start screaming (?) or are manhandled (?). A kṣatriya on horse-back retaliates. Representing rajas, he causes misery to the bandit, and when that bandit is attacked, the other bandits become motionless like the trunk of a tree. The line about him causing joy to the ladies is missing. It is peculiar that after referring to the bandits, V_2 refers to one particular bandit who was overpowered. A line seems to be missing in which the misdeed of one particular bandit was referred to as in P. (iii). In P, a black cloud, thick and vast which produces lightning, etc. is mentioned as representative of tamas. The peasants who sow and plant will rejoice at it; a loving lady separated from her husband will be depressed at the sight of the cloud and the lightning, thinking that her husband will be incapable of returning home. And it will cause vexation

to merchants on the way suffering from humidity and cold, not able to support them. V_2 has almost the same analogy. The farmers are happy because of the cloud; the proṣitabhartṛkā is, says V_2 , unhappy that her husband in a strange land does not return (—a delicate idea has suffered in the process of translation in P—), and merchants dealing in salt loaded in carts are stupefied.

Here V_2 is closest to, nay almost word for word the same as, P.

Kārikā 13—M, G and V_1 in order to illustrate the dominance of sattva which is laghu and prakāśaka give the illustration of Devadatta (—G does not mention any name—) whose organs are light and fit; for rajas which is cala and upaṣṭambhaka they give the illustration of a vṛṣa incited to fight at the sight of an enemy vṛṣa (—found in all—) and of Devadatta or Yajñadatta seeking a quarrel and becoming ‘calacitta’ and thinking of going to a village or a town (M, V_1) or loving a woman and the like (M). In the case of tamas which is guru and varāṇaka, M, G and V_1 just state that the organs become incapable of any operation. V_2 is similar; only it does not mention Devadatta in relation to sattva, mentions only Devadatta in relation to rajas, and mentions ‘Devadatta or Yajñadatta’ in relation to tamas. P does not mention any names, and in relation to rajas, after giving the example of an elephant desiring to fight an enemy—elephant just mentions that when rajas dominates man seeks the fight for his mind is constantly agitated and he cannot keep himself tranquil (i.e. does not refer to his desire to go to a village and the like).

Here, on the whole all are alike; yet V_2 and P are closer; G is very brief in respect of rajas.

Kārikā 14. Introducing this kārikā, M and V₁ simply say that in kā. 11 it has been said that vyakta is 'त्रिगुणमविवेकि.....' and so also avyakta. How could it be known that avyakta also is 'त्रिगुणादियुक्त'. G clarifies that it has been seen that the manifest mahadādi and also pradhāna are triguṇa. But how could it be known that avyakta is aviveki? V₂ and P also adduce this point. M and V₁ argue : 'यत् त्रिगुणं तदविविक्तं, यदविविक्तं तद्विषयं...तस्माद् अविवेक्या-द्विगुणः (०अविवेक्यादिगणः—V₁) त्रैगुण्यादेव सिद्धः. P also says this in respect of vyakta and then argues that if we know that these six characteristics exist in the evolved principle, we know that they exist in Nature too. G does not have this. In V₂ the portion is a bit confused, and the scribe also has not been very careful in copying this portion. V₂ does not take note of त्रैगुण्यात् and seems to straight-away give तद्विषयभावात् as the reason. The scribe might have omitted some words at a very early stage. G is clearly influenced by V₂ here. Like V₂, G feels that only अविवेकित्व, etc. have to be established. G regards तद्विषयभावात् and कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य as two hetus establishing avyakta and also its having these characteristics. M and V₁ admit three hetus here; so also P though it does not say so. According to G, त्रैगुण्यात् establishes अविवेकित्व, etc. in respect of अव्यक्त and महदादि. Y says that in kā. 11, अविवेकित्व, etc. were mentioned in respect of vyakta on the strength of त्रैगुण्य. How is this to be proved? By तद्विषयभावात्, because these characteristics do not exist in puruṣa (गुणविषयः क्षेत्रज्ञः). Then 'कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य' establishes that avyakta also has these characteristics. In the interpretation of 'कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य', M and V₁ give the example of kaṭu and madhura trees yielding kaṭu and

madhura fruits. G and V₂ give the example of kṛṣṇa tantu and kṛṣṇa paṭa; V₂ mentions both śukla tantu—śukla paṭa and kṛṣṇa tantu—kṛṣṇa paṭa (—so also J). P gives the example of red thread and red cloth.

Kārikā 15—Introducing this kārikā, all the commentaries put forth an objection that what is not perceived is generally not existent. M gives many illustrations and G no illustration. V₁—द्वितीयमनीश्वरस्य शिरः, तृतीयः पाणिः, शशिषिषाणादयो वा; V₂—द्वितीयमनीश्वरे शिरः, तृतीयो बाहुः; P—second head (of a man). Similarly, say M and V₁, it may be objected that pradhāna and puruṣa are not perceived so they are non-existent. The answer to this is that हिमवतः उपलग्नपरिमाणम् (—M; हिमवतः शैलाग्रपरिमाणम्—V₁) is not visible but this does not mean that it does not exist. G gives the example of 'पाषाणगन्धादि'; V₂ of हिमवतः उपलग्नपरिमाण, P of the weight of the Himālayas. G, V₂ and P do not here refer to puruṣa, as kā. 15 pertains only to pradhāna.

मेदानां परिमाणात्—M, V₁, V₂, refer to 'परिमित—मृत्पिण्ड' producing a vase of a limited size—प्रत्यग्राहकमाहकग्राहकं वा; G—यत्र कर्ताऽस्ति तस्य परिमाणं दृष्टं यथा कुलालः परिमितैर्मृत्पिण्डैः परिमितानेव घटान् करोति. V₂ gives an additional example—तथैवायं परिमितं पटं करोति तन्तुभिः पञ्चपल्लिकं (पञ्चपल्लिकं ?) वा. P realising that the idea of kartṛ is not very relevant here, puts it differently—In the world, a produced thing has a measure, a dimension, a number; thus with a given quantity of clay, the potter makes vases of a limited number (—again more in agreement with one Mahat, one Ahankāra, etc.). Suppress the original matter (clay) and there will no more be either numerical measure or vase. Seeing that the vases have a numerical measure we know that they have an original matter.

(These two sentences are added here for clarification and application of the general statement to the Sāṃkhya view here). The comparison of the threads constituting a cloth is equally applicable. (Like V₂, P also gives this additional illustration of threads and cloth.)

समन्वयात्—M and V₁ give the example of śakala, etc. and bhūṣaṇa, etc. and G and V₂ of brahmabaṭu. P gives the example of fragments of sandal-wood.

शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेः—M, G, V₁, V₂, and P all give the illustration of the potter capable of making a jar out of a lump of clay. V₂ adds that of a weaver capable of making cloth; P says that a potter can make earthen vessels but not clothes, etc..

कारणकार्यविभागात्—All give the same example and say that jar is capable of holding madhu, udaka, payas, but clay cannot do so. P speaks of utensils keeping water, oil, etc. V₂ and P give in addition the example of threads and cloth. P just says that the difference between cause and effect can be further illustrated by the example of threads and cloth; while V₂ says that threads unlike cloth, cannot protect one against the onslaught of heat, cold and wind.

अविभागाद् वैश्वरूप्यस्य—M quotes 'नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः' from the Gītā and also the śruti 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्', and gives the example of dadhi etc and kṣīra, and ghaṭa and mṛt-piṇḍa; it further says: यथा जलभूम्योरेतद् रसगन्धादिवैश्वरूप्यमविभक्तमस्त्येव स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेषु. V₁ is like M, only it does not quote the śruti or the line from the Gītā. G just gives, at the end of its exposition, the illustration 'क्षीरदधिवत्'. V₂ explaining अविभाग gives the example of kṣīra and dadhi. P does not give any

example. वैश्वरूप्यम् is explained by M and V₁ as बहुरूपम् or बाहुरूप्यम्; G—विश्वे जगत् तस्य रूपं व्यक्तिः, विश्वरूपस्य भावो वैश्वरूप्यम्; P—'By form of the universe it is necessary to understand the three worlds : earth, intermediate space and heaven'. V₂ also says—'वैश्वरूप्यं जगत् ते(त्रयो) लोका इत्यर्थः'. It may be noted nevertheless that the reference to the three worlds is found in all—'The three worlds are merged into the gross elements'. M, G, V₁ give the whole process of dissolution while explaining अविभाग. V₂ says that the worlds are included in the five gross elements, and the five gross elements of the worlds are resolved into the five subtle elements. Then we find in V₂ the example of दधि-क्षीर which is not found in P and finally it says : "[तथा] इदमव्यक्तमिदं व्यक्तमिति न शक्यते वक्तुम्, अन्यदहो अस्ति प्रधानं यस्मिन् महदादि लिङ्गमविभागं गच्छति [इति न शक्यते वक्तुम्]". P has : "In the period of reality (that is to say, general dissolution, pralayakāla), the worlds have no longer any distinction. The five gross elements and the eleven organs resolve themselves into the five subtle elements and have no longer any difference; further, Mahat is re-united to Nature and ceases to be differentiated. We can no longer say which is the evolved and which the non-evolved."—Here P is closer to V₂ than to any other commentary. P raises a further point here, "One may think : 'As at the time of reality [dissolution] there are not evolved principles, there is not Nature either; if there is not Nature, there is neither birth nor death.' That idea is incorrect. The reality of Nature will reproduce the three worlds (after the general dissolution). We know then the existence of Nature." This is hinted at in M—'पश्चाद्विभागश्चाविर्भवति तत् प्रधानम्'. Perhaps both intended to make a further clarification.

Kārikā 16. All the commentators raise the question as to how pradhāna alone could produce the evolved principles. M says that one thread cannot produce cloth. G and V₁ do not give any example; V₂ says : एकस्तन्तुः पटं नोत्पादयति; एको वीरणः कटं नोत्पादयति; and P—A man alone cannot give birth to an infant and a single thread makes not a cloth. त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च—P gives a detailed exposition of त्रिगुणतः as accounting for production. Explaining 'समुदयात्' P gives the example of many threads and cloth; while others give in addition the example of 'गंगा-स्रोतांसि'. V₂ makes it finer by saying that the Ganges originated in the स्रोतस् and fallen on the head of Śiva cannot be borne. Here all except G urge: Production is of two sorts—by transformation (क्षीर-दधि—M, V₁) and without it (सृष्टिण्ड, etc.—घट—M, V₁). V₂ says:—'सहलोके द्विविधा उत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा स्त्रीपुमांसौ पुत्रमुत्पादयतः क्षीरं दध्युत्पादयति । किमेवं प्रधानं स्त्रीपुंसवद् व्यक्तमुत्पादयति आहोस्वित् क्षीरवत्. V₂ does not refer to parināma- or aparināma, though this is certainly meant. P is word for word the same; only it refers to production by transformation and production without it.

सलिलवत् :-M—यथा सलिलमेकं हिमवति हिमभावेन, यथा च इक्षुरसो.....
.....यथा वा क्षीरम्. M further says while explaining 'प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्' : तद् यथा एकरसमन्तरिक्षात् जलं पतितम् ; तच्च मेदिनी प्राप्य नानारसतां याति पृथग्भाजनविशेषात्. So also in the devas, sattva is predominant and so they are happy and so on. G does not give any example in the beginning, but explains 'प्रतिप्रति०' like M. G explains the compound 'प्रतिप्रति०'. V₁ gives almost the same examples as M—यथा सलिलम्....., यथा इक्षुरसः....., यथा क्षीरम्....., but finally says

that avyakta undergoes a three-fold modification—ādhyātmika (buddhi. ahaṁkāra, etc.), ādhibhautika (deva, gandharva, etc.) and ādhidaivika (śīta, uṣṇa, etc.). This is not found elsewhere. The explanation of 'प्रतिप्रति०' is the same as in M. M and V₁ do not seem to have been keen about explaining this expression. V₂—“सर्पोपभुक्तं विषभावेन परिणमति; तदेव गवोपभुक्तं क्षीरभावेन, उष्ट्रोपभुक्तं मूत्रभावेन पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात् (—this is found only in Y—); अथ वा एकरसमन्तरिक्षात् पतति जलं, तच्च मेदिनी प्राप्य नानारसतां प्रतिपद्यते पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात्, आकाशाद् ओन्द्वारण(?)भाजनेन परिगृहीतमम्भः मधुरभावेन परिणमते, एवं त्रया लोका एकस्मादुत्पन्ना गुणवैषम्येण पृथग्भावेन परिणमन्ते”. Apparently V₂ does not seem to have the reading 'pratiprati०'. P—“The water which comes from the atmosphere is, at the beginning, of a single taste. It transforms itself when it arrives on the earth. It becomes of a varied taste according to the different receptacles' (—a verse in Chinese). If it is a vase of gold, its taste is very sweet; if it is in the earth, its taste differs according to the quality of the earth. It is the same with the three worlds.....(Gods are happy, and so on).

In V₂ the kārikā text has परिणमतः...प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्, but the second line as commented upon by the author of V₂ seems to be परिणमतः सलिलवत् पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात्. In P too the kārikā has the former reading (०प्रतिप्रति०) and the pratika also seems to be the same—because the guṇas differ one from another. M, V₁ and P do not seem to have made any attempt to explain carefully the expression प्रतिप्रति०. We can surmise that even the author of V₂ had the same kārikā text (०प्रतिप्रति०), but did not comment on प्रतिप्रति० and straightaway explained the simile by stating the reason पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात्. He

might not have meant पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात् as a part of the pratika, though metrically it is alright.

Kārikā 17—This kārikā establishes the existence of puruṣa. The objection anticipated is that some do not recognise a 'paramātman' over and above the body, sense-organs, etc. M and V₁ reply that there is puruṣa over and above the body' etc. 'असिक्तोऽवत्, मुञ्जेषीकावत्'. (M quotes a stanza here). But since it is subtle it is established by adducing reasons. G says [that in kārikās 15 and 16 the existence of pradhāna is established so the next kārikā (17) establishes the existence of puruṣa. It is said that emancipation is attained by the knowledge of vyakta, avyakta and jñā. After vyakta, the knowledge of avyakta has been arrived at by means of five reasons; puruṣa also is subtle, so its existence is now proved. V₂ is similar; only it says that avyakta is known by means of five reasons. P says : "If one comprehends what Nature and the products are, one obtains deliverance (mokṣa) because one is then that which knows. This has been explained in the first verse. Later, enumerating the five causes we have demonstrated Nature and the evolved principles (XIV). Spirit which is very subtle is to be demonstrated now". This is substantially the same as G and V₂.

संवातपरार्थत्वात्—M and V₁ give the examples of paryāṅka, ratha and gr̥ha which are of the nature of an assemblage and are meant for Devadatta or the like (—M; Devadatta V₁). G gives the example of paryāṅka meant for someone (—G does not mention any name)—so eyes etc are not svārtha nor parasparārtha (M, G, V₁, V₂) nor also

apārtha (V₁), but are meant for someone else, viz. puruṣa. V₂ is generous in giving examples—bed is not svārtha like Brāhmaṇas, nor are such assemblages parasparārtha 'striṇṇsavat'; nor are they nirartha. Therefore there is a man (puruṣa) who lies on the paryāṅka and for whom the khaṭvā is made. V₂ gives the example of a house but not of a chariot. Similarly this body is an assemblage of five gross elements so there is a puruṣa for whom this body-assemblage is meant. P gives the example of beds, chairs etc. assembled together being necessarily for the use of others and not for these objects themselves. P does not mention their not being 'nirartha'. Before saying that the body, an assemblage of five gross elements, does not exist for itself, but for another, viz. Spirit, P says : Reason, etc exist then for others and it is the same with mahat, etc. (This is clearly an addition on the part of the translator-Paramārtha—who felt that all refer to the body-assemblage, but not to mahat, etc.). G, it may be noted, has referred to body as 'भोग्यमहदादिसंघातरूपम्'.

अधिष्ठानात्—M gives the example of a chariot controlled by a charioteer. M quotes Śaṣṭitantra—पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते'. So do G and V₁ which are substantially the same as M. V₂ also gives the example of a chariot drawn by strong horses and controlled by a charioteer, for it would otherwise meet with destruction. It further says—'तत्र चोक्तं पुरुषाधिष्ठितः (त ?) प्रवर्तते,' P says : From the Spirit inhabiting the body, the latter becomes endowed with functions. If Spirit does not reside, then the body is not an agent. As is said in the **Treatise of the Sixty Categories** : 'Nature, it is that in which Spirit resides, and it is because of this that she can produce actions'.

V₂ says after this that by means of these three reasons the existence of puruṣa is known. Then it simply mentions without any exposition 'भोक्तृभावात्' and 'कैवल्यार्थप्रवृत्तेश्च' and concludes that by these five reasons the existence of puruṣa is established.

भोक्तृभावात्—M, G, V₁ and P are alike here. M and V₁ use the expression 'paramātmā puruṣaḥ'.

कैवल्यार्थप्रवृत्तेश्च—M and V₁ are very brief—'Since the activity of pradhāna is for kaivalya'. So is G which adds that there is an ātman since all, whether vidvān or avidvān, seek the extinction of the series of births and deaths. P is very elaborate here :—"If there were only our body, we should not have the need of the final deliverance taught by the sages. In antiquity, a ṛṣi went to some brahmins and spoke thus : 'All of you are rich in [the] Vedas; all of you drink soma; all of you see the face of a child; could you later become bhikṣus ?' Of what good would such an idea be, if we had only the body ? We know then that by the side of the body it is naturally necessary to have a Spirit. If there were no distinct Spirit by the side of the body, religious practices like cremation or the throwing into the water of the remains of dead parents or masters would not have any merit, but might drag in demerit. For that reason we know that Spirit exists. Here are yet other words (in verse) of the sages : 'The nerves and the bones are the cords and the posts, the blood and the flesh are the earth and the plaster; (the body is the house of) impurity, impermanence and suffering. We have to rid ourselves of this aggregate. Reject that which is just and that which is unjust; reject that which is real

and that which is unreal; and the very idea of rejecting reject that. That which is pure will alone remain'. If Spirit did not exist, nothing would remain (after such an elimination). By the words of the sages we know with certainty that Spirit exists".

Kārikā 18—Introducing this kārikā, M and V₁ say that the point at issue is whether there is a puruṣa in each body or one puruṣa in all the bodies. The doubt arises because the ācāryas hold different views. Some hold that there is one puruṣa pervading all bodies like one thread running through the many beads. Or is it like the 'jalacandra' in the river, pond, well, etc. ? The Sāṃkhya answer is that there are a number of puruṣas. G is very brief and gives only one example—मणिरसनात्मकसूत्रवत्. V₂ is very brief; it simply poses the problem and answers it; no illustration is given. Here also P is elaborate. Two examples are given to explain the idea of one spirit filling all bodies—Chaplet of strung pearls and the 16,000 wives of Viṣṇu enjoying at the same moment.

जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात्—M and V₁ are alike here, especially so in respect of janma and maraṇa. They speak of birth in a noble family and the like, and death pertaining individually to each; whereas G, V₂ and P speak of the contingency of simultaneous births and deaths; even here V₂ and P are more alike, except that P refers to pregnant women in different countries, whereas V₂ refers to pregnant women of one adhiṣṭhāna. With regard to karaṇa-niyama, M, V₁ and V₂ say that some are deaf while others are not, and so on; whereas G and P put it differently in agreement with

what has been said earlier in these commentaries—if puruṣa were one, if one becomes deaf, all would become deaf simultaneously, and so on. Besides giving their own interpretation regarding जन्ममरणप्रतिनियम, M and V₁ refer to others according to whom when one is born, simultaneously another dies (जन्ममरणनियमात्), whereas if there were one puruṣa all should be born or should die simultaneously. The argument that birth and death are not possible together being opposed in character is found in Y; and the argument of simultaneous births and deaths is found in V₂, G and J. This shows that this was the traditional interpretation which is referred to by M and V₁ after giving their own. करणप्रतिनियम is explained similarly in all.

अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च—G and V₁ just refer to people of different tendencies and going in for dharma, etc.. V₁ refers in addition to the duty of brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya etc.. M and P do not comment on this. V₂ confusedly says :—इह लोके नानाविधा प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा; तद्यथा एको धर्मः, एकः कामः एकः अर्थः, अन्यः मोक्षः.

त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव—G just says that one is sāttvika and sukhin, another is rājasa and duḥkhin while a third is tāmasa and mohavat. M, V₁, V₂, and P give the example of the three sons of a Brahmin who have the above-mentioned characteristics. P while summing up again refers to the example given by the opponent of strung pearls and the wives of Viṣṇu. No other commentary has such an expression here except V₂—‘दासु (?) दर्शनात्; मणिवृत्तदर्शनाच्च एकः पुरुषः इति तन्न; एवं तावत् पञ्चभिर्हेतुभिः पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्—which is the same as P here.

Kārikā 19—In introducing this kārikā, the question raised is : Is the puruṣa an agent or a non-agent ?

M and V₁ refer to Vedavādins and Vaiśeṣikas who regard the soul as agent. G does not refer to any controversy but straightaway says that puruṣa is akartā; V₂ refers to ‘कपिलासुरिप्रभृतयः आचार्याः’ and ‘कणादाक्षपादप्रभृतयः’; P refers to the Sāṃkhya system and the Vaiśeṣikas. V₂ is closest to P.

M and V₁ do not comment on ‘तस्माच्च विपर्ययात्’, but straightaway refer like the others to the सांख्ययोगाचार्यभिक्षु (M, V₁; परिव्राजक—G, V₂; ascetic mendicant—P). The expression in V₂ and P is alike here.

Kārikā 20—The problem here is : If puruṣa is not an agent to whom does the act of determination belong (M, V₁, V₂, P) or how is it possible (G) ? The determination is : धर्मं करिष्यामि, अधर्मं च (न ?)—M; धर्मं करिष्यामि, अधर्मं [न] करिष्यामि—V₁; धर्मं करिष्यामि, अधर्मं न करिष्यामि—G; धर्मं करिष्यामि, अर्थं साधयिष्यामि—V₂; practice religious duties, renounce evil or realise a vow—P. Here the dilemma is found in P word for word as it is in V₂ and also in V₁ and M. G mentions only the contingency of puruṣa becoming kartṛ, but does not refer to that of guṇas having to be regarded as cetana. The illustration of ‘ghaṭa’ is found in all—अनुष्णशीतो घटः शीताभिरद्भिः संस्पृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्तः उष्णो भवति—M, V₁; यथा लोके घटः शीतसंयुक्तः शीतः, उष्णसंयुक्त उष्णः—G; यथा लोके अनुष्णशीतो घटः शीताभिरद्भिः संयुक्तः शीतो भवति, अथोष्णाभिः संयुक्तः उष्णो भवति—V₂; just as a vase of gold placed in contact with fire becomes hot, and placed in contact with water becomes cold—P. (Gold is not referred to by any other commentary). The illustration of the brigands and the Brāhmaṇa is found in all. G refers to it very briefly—यथाचौरश्चौरैः सह गृहीतश्चौर इत्यवगम्यते.

Kārikā 21—Here the question is for what purpose pradhāna is united with puruṣa. M and V₁ (—so also Y; J gives only two illustrations—) give a brief exposition of different kinds of saṃyoga (ubhaya-karmaja, etc.), but G, V₂ and P have no such exposition.

पङ्क्तवन्धवत्—The example of the lame man and the blind man is found in all the commentaries. G does not refer to any town. M says the caravan which the blind man joined proceeded to Pāṭaliputra; P says it proceeded to Pāṭaliputra. V₁ and V₂ say it proceeded from Ujjayinī to Pāṭaliputra. G and P say that the blind man and the lame man were left behind by the merchants who fled from the brigands, while M, V₁ and V₂ say that the blind man was left behind and seen on the way by a lame man. J is like G but very brief. The dialogue in P is more life-like—“The infirm one asked him, ‘Who are you?’” and so on. Such expressions are not found elsewhere.

तत्कृतः सर्गः—According to M and V₁, तत् refers to pradhāna and puruṣa, and sarga to the production of महदादिविज्ञा brought about by them (तच्छब्देन प्रधानपुरुषौ संबध्यते । ताभ्यां प्रधानपुरुषाभ्यां कृतस्तत्कृतः सर्गः.....). G on the other hand understands तत् to refer to संयोग of प्रधान and पुरुष (तेन संयोगेन कृतस्तत्कृतः । सर्गः सृष्टिः । यथा स्त्रीपुरुषसंयोगात् सुतोत्पत्तिस्तथा प्रधान-पुरुषसंयोगात् सर्गस्तोत्पत्तिः—G). So also J and T; Y—प्रधानपुरुषयोर्हि भोक्तृभोग्यभावापेक्षानिमित्तोऽयं तत्त्वसर्गो महदादिः, भावसर्गश्च धर्मादिः, भूतसर्गश्च ब्रह्मादिः प्रवर्तते; V₂—प्रधानपुरुषयोगः सर्ग उच्यते । यथा स्त्रीपुंसयोः संयोगात् पुत्रोत्पत्तिर्भवति, एवं प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगात् सर्गः उत्पद्यते । स्त्रीपुंससंसर्गः सृष्टिरित्यर्थः । स च त्रिविधः—तत्त्वसर्गः भावसर्गः भूतसर्गः । P—‘Just as a male and a female united together give birth to offspring, even so Spirit and Nature are capable of creating Mahat and others by their union. V₂ is not very clear. It

seems to hold that mutual expectancy (दर्शनार्थम्, कैवल्यार्थम्) of pradhāna and puruṣa is referred to by तत् and that सर्ग signifies their union by figurative usage, as creation is the effect of union. V₂ seems to be the earliest here and seems to have influenced later commentaries.

V₂ at the end of the exposition of kā. 21 says that this brings us to the end of the exposition of the मूलिकार्थs and enumerates them pointing out that वियोग and शेषवृत्ति would be discussed later. M, V₁ and P enumerate these while commenting on kā. 72 which we do not find in V₂. The verse enumerating the मूलिकार्थs is the same in M, V₁ and V₂ except that M has विशेषवृत्तिः instead of ‘च शेषवृत्तिः’. The verses in Y (p. 2), which are quoted in T with the remark ‘तथा च राजवार्तिकम्’ have अकर्तृत्वम् instead of निवृत्तिः. So also J, 51. Paramārtha seems to have read पञ्चार्थ in the place of चारार्थ. This explains the mention of ‘the five reasons by which one establishes the existence of Spirit and Nature’ as the fourth and the fifth of the मूलिकार्थs; and अन्यत्व seems to have been dropped to bring the number to ten.

Kārikā 22—This Kārikā shows the order in which महत्, etc. evolve. M says that प्रकृति signifies प्रधान and mentions the following synonyms :—ब्रह्मन्, अत्यक्त, बहुधात्मक, माया; G—प्रकृतिः प्रधानं ब्रह्माव्यक्तं बहुधात्मकं मायेति पर्यायाः; V₂—प्रकृतिः प्रधानं ब्रह्म बहुधात्मकं पर्यायशब्दाः. V₁ simply says that ‘prakṛti’ refers to pradhāna. P states that Nature is also called the Supreme Cause (प्रधान), or else Brahman or else ‘that which comprehends all’ (बहुधात्मक). P is the same as V₂ here. M gives बुद्धि, मति, प्रज्ञा, संवित्ति, ख्याति, चित्ति, आसुरी, हरि, हर, हिरण्यगर्भ as synonyms of महत्. G—महान् बुद्धिरासुरी मतिः ख्यातिर्ज्ञानमिति प्रज्ञापर्यायैरुपपद्यते; V₁—महान् बुद्धिः प्रज्ञा मतिः संवित् ख्यातिश्चित्तिः स्मृतिः हिरण्यगर्भ इति महतः पर्यायाः; V₂—महान् बुद्धिः

मतिरिति पर्यायाः; P—Mahat is also called Intellect (buddhi) or Intelligence (mati) or universal notoriety (khyāti) or knowledge (jñāna) or wisdom (prajñā). Regarding 'universal notoriety', Takakusu notes, ".....penetrating everywhere, universal'. I am not quite sure that Paramārtha really translates khyāti by this word. It may be that he had read vyāpinī or vyāpti in the place of khyāti." Khyāti means knowledge as also fame and even notoriety. Paramārtha might have taken this latter sense, or the shade of meaning of the Chinese word might have undergone a change with the passage of time. M alone gives a fanciful derivation of the word ahaṁkāra. All mention the paryāyas of ahaṁkāra, viz. bhūtādi, vaikṛta and taijasa; but all except M simply state that the 16 are produced from ahaṁkāra and enumerate them. M alone explains here that the five tanmātras are produced from bhūtādi which is tāmasa, the 11 organs are produced from vaikṛta which is sāttvika, while both are produced from taijasa which is rājasa. Surprisingly, here P also says that the organs of sense, organs of action and manas are produced from ahaṁkāra. Regarding the production of the five gross elements, all except M says that ākāśa is produced from śabda-tanmātra, vāyu from sparśa-tanmātra and so on. Only M says : शब्दतन्मात्राकाशम्, स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः.....इत्यादिक्रमेण पूर्व-पूर्वानुप्रवेशेनैक-द्वित्रि-चतुष्पञ्चगुणानि आकाशादिपृथ्वीपर्यन्तानि महाभूतानि इति सृष्टिक्रमः. M then gives a fanciful derivation of 'bhagavān' and quotes a stanza from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. M, G, V₁ and V₂ quote here 'पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो.....', while P does not though it has it in view. G and V₂ show how vyakta, avyakta and jñā have been discussed in earlier kārikās. M and V₁ do not refer to jñā here, but only to vyakta and avyakta.

Kārikā 23—This kārikā gives the characteristics of mahat. The illustration 'अयं स्थाणुरयं पुरुषः' is given by M, V₁ and P; G has 'अयं घटोऽयं पटः' and V only 'अयं घटः'.

यम-नियम :-M and G follow Patañjali (Yoga-sūtra, 2.30, 32)— अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः; शौचसन्तोषतपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः. V₁—अहिंसास्तेयं ब्रह्मचर्यं सत्यमव्यवहार इति यमाः; अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचमाहारलाघवमप्रमाद इति नियमाः.

V₂—अहिंसा ब्रह्मचर्यं च सत्यमव्यवहारता ।

अस्तेयमिति पञ्चेते यमाः संपरिकीर्तिताः ॥

अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचमाहारलाघवम् ।

अप्रमादश्च पञ्चेते नियमाः परिकीर्तिताः ॥

P—Yama has five sub-divisions—(1) not to put oneself in anger, (2) to respect one's spiritual masters, (3) to possess internal and external purity, (4) to be moderate in eating, and (5) not to become addicted to licence. Niyama too is divided into five : (1) not to kill, (2) not to steal, (3) to speak the truth, (4) to practice continence, (5) not to flatter (The yamas and the niyamas are interchanged in P). M and V₁ explain these yamas and niyamas. M gives a very long exposition with quotations from śruti, smṛti, Gītā, and Yoga-sūtra. But G, V₂ and P simply enumerate them. Of the other commentaries, J gives the same list as M and G saying it is from 'Sāṁkhya-pravacana'; whereas Y says : अहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयमक्रूरता ब्रह्मचर्यमिति पञ्च यमाः; अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचमाहारलाघवमप्रमाद इति पञ्च नियमाः. V₁, V₂, P and Y do not follow the Yoga-sūtra and are very much alike.

The exposition of bāhya-jñāna is similar in M, V₁ and V₂—knowledge of fine arts, mathematics, grammar; G on the other hand explains it thus :—'बाह्यं नाम वेदाः शिक्षा-कल्प-व्याकरण-निरुक्त-छन्दोज्योतिषाख्यषडङ्गसहिताः पुराणानि न्यायमीमांसाधर्म-

शास्त्राणीति.' P—External comprehends the six divisions of the Veda i.e. the Vedāṅgas, (1) the śikṣā treatises..... Aisvarya—eightfold—अणिमा लघिमा गरिमा महिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यम् ईशित्वम् वशित्वम् यत्रकामावसायित्वम् (—nine ?). M, G (—and Y—) say that there are eight but enumerate the above-mentioned nine, though the Chowkhamba edition of G omits garimā and enumerates only eight. V₁, V₂ and P do not mention garimā. All explain these except M (and Y). In the exposition of 'तामसम् अस्माद् विपर्यस्तम्,' V₁ is quite elaborate. M also must have been elaborate, but some portion of the text seems to be missing here. G and P are very brief. So also V₂, only in each case it says something like "knowledge is two-fold, external and internal, its opposite is ajñāna".

Kārikā 24—The text of the second line of this kārikā varies in the different commentaries as can be seen from the table. In P it is translated as : "In the first place, the eleven organs, and in the second place, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements'. 'And the five gross elements' is clearly superfluous, and this is not mentioned in the explanation in P. This kārikā gives the definition of ahaṁkāra. M—रूपे अहं, रसे अहं, गन्धे अहम्, अहं विद्वान्, अहं दर्शनीय इत्येवमाद्यभिमानोऽहङ्कारः. G—The text is missing here. V₁—अहं शब्दे, अहं स्पर्शे, अहं रूपे, अहं रसे, अहं गन्धे, अहं विद्वान्, अहं स्पर्शनीयः; V₂—शब्देऽहं, गन्धेऽहं, सुभगाऽहं, दर्शनीयोऽहम्, अभिजनवानस्मि, अर्चवानहम्; P—This voice is mine, this touch is mine, this form, this taste, this odour are mine, this religious merit is mine and is agreeable to me. P is different here—perhaps to suit the Chinese mode of expression and thought. V₂ and P are very much alike in respect of the interpretation

of the second line. Neither the organs nor the tanmātras are referred to by their technical terms.

Kārikā 25—M, G, V₁, V₂ and P are all alike here.

Kārikā 26—The order of the mention of the sense-organs in the kārikā is as follows according to the texts adopted by the different commentaries :—श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसन- (ना-V₁) नासिकाख्यानि—M, V₁; चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनकानि—G, चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनानि—V₂. The ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose—P (This last is like the text in M and V₁; on the other hand, G and V₂ are alike). This has been discussed later as determining the chronological order of the commentaries. M, V₁ (and T) explain the word इन्द्रिय; M—इन्द्राण्येव तानीन्द्रियाणि; 'इन्' इति विषयाणां नाम; तान् इन्ः विषयान् प्रति द्रवन्तीति इन्द्रियाणि; V₁—इन्द्रदेवतामि(नी)न्द्रियाणि; इन्द्र इति विषयनाम, तत्प्रति द्रवन्तीतीन्द्रियाणि. (T—इन्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रिय-मुच्यते). As regards the function of vāc, M and G simply say वाग्वदति; V₁—पदार्थ(पादपादार्थ ?) लोकावुच्चारयति; V₂—वाक् पादपादार्थलोकावुच्चारयति; P—The organ of speech combined with the organs of sense is capable of articulating names, phrases and letters (of the alphabet). The point that the organs of action act as united with the organs of sense has not been noticed in any other commentary.

Kārikā 27—The text of this kārikā is different in the commentaries. M—उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्, गुणपरिणामविशेषान्मानात्वं ग्राह्यमेदाच्च. So also in G and V₁ except that G has बाह्यमेदाश्च and V₁ बाह्यमेदाच्च. The text in V₂ is different—संकल्पकमत्र मनः तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथा समाख्यातम्; अन्तर्लोक-विषयं तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत्. (Y has this very kārikā). It is interesting to note that V₂ comments very briefly on, in fact restates 'अन्तर्लोकविषयम्.....and then after a discussion as to the kartṛ of the eleven organs gives an

exposition of 'गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वम्' as explaining the origination of the organs. 'गुणपरिणाम.....बाह्यमेदाश्च' can be easily gathered from the exposition in V₂. P—Manas is that which discerns. One says that that organ is of two sorts : it is modified according to the variations of the three guṇas (on the one hand) and according to external differences (on the other hand). Of the other commentaries J and T have the same text as G. But Y has the same text as V₂. Pulinbehari Chakravarti notes that Bhattotpala in his commentary on the Br̥hat Samhitā, p. 7 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series) also adopts this reading, but he wrongly attributes the kārīkā as quoted by him to Kapilācārya. P's reading tallies with the first hemistich of V₂ but in the second hemistich it has the same reading as V₁. I have discussed this later.

उभयात्मकम् or उभयथा समाख्यातम्—The illustrations are given as follows :—यथा देवदत्तो गोपालमध्ये स्थितो गोपालत्वं करोति, मल्लमध्ये स्थितो मल्लत्वं करोति—M. G does not give any illustration. V₁—यथा देवदत्तो गोपालमध्ये स्थितो गोपालत्वं करोति, ब्रह्ममध्ये स्थितो ब्रह्मत्वं करोति, मल्लमध्ये स्थितो मल्लत्वं करोति, V₂—यथा कश्चिद् देवदत्तः मल्लेषु मल्लः गोपालेषु गोपालः; P—It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time (—Could this be Paramārtha's own illustration ?).

The illustrative parable of a boy who hears that there is a feast in another village and resolves to go there is found only in V₂; P gives it a little differently—'Imagine that a man apprehends that in a certain place there is treasure or food; he takes the resolution to proceed to that place in order to obtain an excellent repast and riches'. The stanza 'येन शुक्लीकृता.....' with no difference whatsoever is found quoted only in V₂ and P. Discussing the location and function of the organs, M

mentions चक्षुस्, श्रोत्र, त्वच्, जिह्वा, नासिका, वाच्; G says : उत्तैः प्रदेशे चक्षुरवलोकनाय स्थितं तथा घ्राणं तथा श्रोत्रं तथा जिह्वा स्वदेशे स्वार्थग्रहणाय. एवं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्यपि..... V₁ mentions चक्षुस्, श्रोत्र, त्वच्, नासिका, वाच्, and V₂ चक्षुस्, श्रोत्र, त्वच्, वाच्, हस्तौ, पादौ, पायूपस्थौ. P mentions all the organs and says of the (eleventh) organ manas that it has no definite place and is capable of discernment. Regarding पायूपस्थौ (mentioned here nowhere except in G, V₂ and P), P says—'The two other organs are hidden to view so that no one may see them. They effect excretion and pleasure. Compare V₂—पायूपस्थौ गुह्यप्रदेशे सन्निविष्टौ नित्यं दर्शनपरीहारसमर्थौ'. P mentions manas, while others do not. P has further—'Among the organs there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body.....' This is not found elsewhere.

Kārīkā 28—Explaining the significance of 'मात्रम्', M and G gives the illustration—'यथा भिक्षामात्रं लभ्यते नान्यो विशेष इति'; and V₂—'भिक्षामात्रमस्मिन् ग्रामे लभ्यते नान्यदामन्त्रणादि'. V₁ and P do not give any illustration. M, G, V₁, V₂, P have रूपादिषु in the text of this kārīkā. Y has रूपादिषु. but criticises it, saying it should be शब्दादिषु. J and T have readily accepted this suggestion. This has been discussed later.

Kārīkā 29—Introducing this kārīkā, P says : "We shall pass on to the objects (viṣaya) and the functions (vṛtti) of Mahat (the Intellect), of the Sentiment of self and of the manas." The other commentaries have a similar expression, only they do not refer to the objects. V₂ employs the expression, 'अन्तःकरणस्य वृत्तिः'. The illustration of kulastri and sāmānyā is found in all, only in V₂ and P it is a bit elaborately given.

प्राण—P says—"The statement : 'I hold myself erect, I walk' is the function of the vital air." V_2 alone has मुखेन च नासिकाभ्यां च यो निर्गच्छति बाह्ये च विषये प्रवृत्तः पर्वतमारोक्ष्यामि ग्रामं यास्यामीति स प्राणो मन्तव्यः । The illustration of the parrots and the cage is found in all. G and P speak of 'bird' instead of 'parrots'. P refers to one bird and its illustration obviously has a different emphasis from that of the others. Here P seems to be like G. [P—"Thus, a bird, which bestirs itself in a cage, moves the cage; even so, when the air, prāṇa, bestirs itself, the thirteen organs are put in motion too. There is a function common to all." Compare G—तस्य यत् स्पन्दनं कर्म तत् त्रयोदशविधस्यापि सामान्या वृत्तिः, सति प्राणे यस्मात् करणानामात्मलाभ इति, प्राणोऽपि पञ्जरशकुनिवत् सर्वस्य चलनं करोति.]

Regarding अपान, P speaks in general terms—when that air predominates, man becomes timorous. P does not like the others speak of a man fleeing on seeing a serpent.

व्यान—P : Expands in the body but ends with abandoning the body. When that air predominates it makes Spirit [the soul ?] abandon the body *and feel unhappy. If it goes out gradually each limb becomes as if dead, and if it quits the body entirely, the man dies. (-*word for word 'makes man abandon the other'. I think that **man** designates here **pumān** or **puruṣa** and that the other designates Nature in the corporeal form—Takakusu). This is not exactly what is found in G or M or V_1 or V_2 . M—व्यानबहुलो देवदत्तश्च अत्यन्तमन्येन विना रमते (?); V_1 —व्यानबहुलश्च देवदत्तोऽत्यन्तमन्येन विना न रमति(ते) मृगवत्; V_2 —स व्यानबहुलो देवदत्तः अन्योन्येन विना न रमते मृगवत्. But V_2 has before this : शरीरप्राप्त(व्याप्ति)रत्यन्त(न्ता ?) विनाभावश्च तद्व्यान इत्युच्यते. Could a similar expression be before P when it says 'ends with abandoning the body' ?

समान—When that air predominates, man becomes avaricious and seeks riches and companions—P. Others say only that the man does not like to remain alone and seeks companions. G does not make any such statement in connection with any of the airs.

"The actions of the five vital airs are the common functions of the thirteen organs"—P. This is repeated in the other commentaries in the case of each vital air, while P puts it here at the end. This shows that P has tried to avoid unnecessary repetition.

Kārikā 30. क्रमशश्च—M, G and V_1 give the example of Devadatta (G—कश्चित्) going on a road and having a doubt whether a thing at a distance is a 'sthāṇu' or a man. If he sees a bird on it (M, G, V_1) he concludes that it is a sthāṇu, but if he observes the expanding or contracting of the limbs he concludes that it is a man. P puts it thus : Let us suppose a man who walks along a road; he perceives an erect object, and doubts if it is a man or a wooden post; but when he sees birds alighting on it, or a liana which enlaces it, or a gazelle which approaches it, he concludes that it is a post; on the contrary, if he sees a robe that stirs itself, or (limbs) contracting or expanding themselves, then he knows with certainty that it is a man. V_2 —देवदत्तः पन्थानं गच्छति स्थाणुं पश्यति; तत्रास्य बुद्धिर्भवति स्थाणुरयं पुरुषः स्यादिति; स तस्मिन् स्थाणौ वल्लीं पश्यति; अथ ककुब्धनगमनं सारणशमकमाणि (आकुञ्चनगमनप्रसारणाशनकर्माणि ?) पश्यति अतोऽस्य बुद्धिर्भवति पुरुष इति । The text is not quite clear. V_2 seems to explain दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे in its own way. The स्थाणु is दृष्ट and yet अदृष्ट as it is far off and cannot be positively determined; so there is क्रमशः वृत्तिः. It further speaks of गुणपदवृत्ति of buddhi, ahaṁkāra and manas in respect of even अनागत काल and then says that the vṛtti

of these very three in respect of शब्द is श्रोत्रपूर्विका and so on. M and V₁ explain the second line as a whole. As regards the objects दृष्ट or अदृष्ट, the vṛtti of the three (buddhi, ahaṁkāra and manas) is श्रोत्रादिपूर्विका. They have not clarified this point. With regard to the first line युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य हि वृत्तिः....., M and V₁ have clarified that युगपद्वृत्ति is not possible, but the time between the vṛttis of the sense-organs and manas, etc. is so negligible that the वृत्ति is said to be युगपद्. G, V₂, P and J do not give this explanation. P is very brief here. G holds that in respect of अदृष्ट i.e. future and past things, the vṛtti of buddhi, ahaṁkāra and manas is श्रोत्रादिपूर्विका, but in respect of दृष्ट i.e. present things it may be युगपत् or क्रमशः. G does not explain the earlier part of its statement. Y regards युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः as giving the prima-facie view and क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा as refuting it; there is क्रमशः वृत्ति in respect of both दृष्ट and अदृष्ट things. Y says that others construe this kārikā differently; they take युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य... as referring to the view of the earlier ācāryas and क्रमशश्च ...as referring to the view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Could this be a reference to the interpretation that is found in V₁ (and M)? This will be discussed later. Y explains what अदृष्ट signifies and of what kind its knowledge could be.

In connection with 'अदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः,' P introduces a point here which is not found thus in other commentaries. viz. "Now we pass on to treat the same subject, in the case where the question is about invisible objects. It is said in a verse : At the end of the Yuga, there will be men, who in their error and their perversity, will meditate on the Buddha, the Law and the community. Themselves perverse, they will gain over (to

their perverse ideas) their relatives, their friends and their acquaintances. Themselves opening the road to the four evil ways (durgati : apāya) they will enter therein with the others'. As the past so the future. By the organ of hearing, the three categories (Intellect, Sentiment of self and manas) enter into action, one after another. Thus, their function enters into action, in succession to an external organ." This should be compared with V₂ here. The quotation is Paramārtha's own, it could not have been in the original. M and V₁ are alike here.

Kārikā 31--Introducing this kārikā, V₂ and P ask whether puruṣa or God makes the insentient indriyas act. M, V₁ do not mention puruṣa or God in this connection; they simply ask due to what cause the insentient indriyas, etc. function. G does not say anything by way of introduction here, nor does it give any illustration. M, V₁, V₂ and P all give the illustration of brigands and their leader. But before this V₂ and P have the illustration of a brahmabaṭu. In V₂ the boy goes to attend a feast, while according to P he goes for study. (P is apt to refine illustrations. Or was the original quite a different commentary?). In the latter part of this parable the wording is the same in V₂ and P. [V₂--एवं त्रयस्याकृतं ज्ञात्वा बाह्यान्पि करणानि स्वां स्वां वृत्तिं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । चक्षुः स्थानानि पश्यति, श्रोत्रं प्रतिवचनं शृणोति, हस्तः कुण्डिकादाने प्रतिपद्यते, पादौ विहरणे. P--The external organs, seizing the determination of the manas, acquit themselves of their respective functions, that is to say, the eye sees the road, the ear hears the others talk, the hand holds the water-pot and the feet march.]

‘परस्परकृतहेतुकाम्’ is interpreted by P as ‘without being put into action by another’. Could Paramārtha have understood ‘अपरस्पराम्’, the ‘अ’ being elided by sandhi? This is likely, as explaining this P says, “We have explained higher up that in our school, neither Spirit nor Īśvara is considered an agent. That is why the thirteen organs acquit themselves of their functions by themselves, according to their respective spheres of action, without being put in action by another thing.” P has in view puruṣa or Īśvara as the other thing. The other commentaries explain आकृत as अभिप्राय or संकल्प and say बुद्धेराकृतं ज्ञात्वा अहंकारः अभिमानं प्रतिपद्यते...., अहंकारस्याकृतं ज्ञात्वा मनः संकल्पं प्रतिपद्यते.....or the like—this being found in P also.

Kārikā 32—Introducing this kārikā, P says : “Among the twenty four principles, how many can be called organs ?” This is not exactly what is found elsewhere. All others say something to this effect :—‘न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्’ इत्युक्तम्; अथ कतिविधं करणम्.

M and V₁ assign āharaṇa to the indriyas, dhāraṇa to ahaṁkāra and prakāśakaraṇam to buddhi; but surprisingly later say : “तं दशविधं विषयं बुद्धीन्द्रियैः प्रकाशितमर्थं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहरन्ति धारयन्ति च”—same as in G and V₂. G and V₂ assign āharaṇa and dhāraṇa to the karmendriyas and prakāśakaraṇa to the buddhīndriyas. According to P, among the thirteen organs it is to the internal organs that what is there to draw (āharaṇa) belongs, to the five senses that what is there to manifest (prakāśa-karaṇa) and to the five organs of action that what is there to hold (dhāraṇa) belongs. J and T regard āharaṇa as the function of the karmendriyas, dhāraṇa of the internal organs and prakāśakaraṇa of the budhīndriyas. Y assigns āharaṇa to the karmendriyas, dhāraṇa to the

buddhīndriyas and prakāśakaraṇa to the antahkaraṇa. But Y quotes a view according to which the karmendriyas do the āharaṇa, manas and ahaṁkāra the dhāraṇa, and the buddhīndriyas and buddhi the prakāśana. We shall discuss this later.

Kārikā 33—Regarding the internal organs grasping the objects of the three times, almost all give different examples. M, G, V₁ and P refer to buddhi grasping a present pot. G sums up by saying that it also grasps that of the past and the future. Then it does not give any example in connection with ahaṁkāra and manas. Others give separate examples for past and future. V₂ does not give any illustration anywhere (except a common one in connection with ahaṁkāra-सुखितोऽहं दुःखितोऽहम्). In connection with buddhi having a cognition of a past thing, M and V₁ give the example ‘युधिष्ठिर-भीमसेना-वास्ताम्’; M mention Kalkī as an example of a future thing; V₁ has something interesting here : ‘भविष्यन्ति गुणस्यन्ते गुडं कथा यवासशक्तक्लीबराजा भविष्यति’ which can be emended as भविष्यन्ति गुणस्यान्ते गुडकथा य[था] वा सशक्त [ः] क्लीबराजा भविष्यति’ or ‘भविष्यन्ति.....कथा य[था] वा अशक्तक्लीबराजा भविष्यति’ or भविष्यति.....गुड[ः] कषायवास[ः] सक्तक्लीबराजा भविष्यति,’ this last being very doubtful, but very tempting. We shall discuss this later. P says here—“It (buddhi) represents in the same way an object of the past; for example, it represents to itself the kings of antiquity, Mūrdhātā and the others. It realises. further, the future, for example, when it thinks : ‘All men will perish. (See मान्धातासीत् । कल्की राजा भविष्यति—J). M and V₁ give an illustration for ahaṁkāra also, viz. अहमस्मिन् गृहे स्वामी, आसं भविष्यामि चेति, V₂ has ‘सुखितोऽहं दुःखितोऽहमिति’. P simply says, “So also is the Sentiment of self; it acts on

the objects of the three times saying 'This is mine'. For manas, there are no examples in M, G and V₂; V₁ says : एवं मनोऽपि वर्तमानं विषयं विकल्पयति अयमेव विषय इति, [अतीतमपि आसन् मे विषयाः]; अनागतमपि संकल्पयति भविष्यन्ति मे विषयाः; P—So also the manas; it seizes the objects of the three times; that is to say, it looks in advance on the future and recalls the days past. Here P seems to be more like M and V₁ than V₂, though its examples in connection with buddhi are peculiar.

Kārikā 34—All the commentaries say that the objects in heaven are non-specific as they are 'kevala-sukha-lakṣaṇa'; only P says that they are endowed with sattva and free from rajas and tamas. P as usual is brief in the exposition of शेषाण्यपि पञ्चविषयाणि'.

Kārikā 35—P is quite elaborate here. G is very brief so also V₁ and even M and V₂. Perhaps P has tried to justify the metaphor of dvāra-dvārīn.

सर्वं विषयम् : M—निरवशेषं त्रिष्वपि कालेषु.....; G—त्रिष्वपि कालेषु शब्दादीन् गृह्णाति; V₁—सर्वं निरवशेषमित्यर्थः; त्रिष्वपि कालेषु यो विषयस्तं विषय-समवाहते; V₂—त्रिषु लोकेषु यो विषयः तं.....; P—It is thus capable of seizing the objects of the three regions (earth, sky, space) and of the three times. P has combined the idea of V₂ and one of the others. J also refers to things of all the times; while Y's explanation is very precise and detailed : विशिष्टानविशिष्टान् शब्दादीन् संनिकृष्टविप्रकृष्टव्यवहितान् प्रमाणबलेन स्ववृत्तिविषयीकरोतीत्यर्थः. M, V₁ throughout (see kā. 35, 36, 37) refer to objects of all the three times, while V₂ and P speak of things of all the three worlds. G has nothing specific to say later.

Kārikā 36. Again P is a little more elaborate. P unlike others gives here the simile of the king and his functionaries and the people (—"In the same way as the functionaries and the people of the realm transmit

riches to the king"). V₁, V₂, P explain the simile of the lamp fully; M and G do not. M does not explain 'guṇaviśeṣāḥ', while G, V₂, P do; and V₁ does so while explaining the simile.

Kārikā 37—The other commentaries have nothing introductory to say about this kārikā, while P says : "One may ask : 'Why do the organs, having illumined the objects, not themselves make them seen by Spirit ?' The reply is in this verse." यस्मात्—M and G construe यस्मात् and अतः (M; तस्मात्—G) with the two halves of the kārikā; that is to say, the first line is meant to account for the statement in the second line. V₁ does not take note of this word. V₂ is not very clear, yet seems to understand the whole kārikā as showing why buddhi alone can bring about the worldly attachment as also the emancipation of the puruṣa. P also says at the end : "The Intellect alone then is the true organ of Spirit." P introduces this kārikā by saying that this kārikā explains why the organs having illumined the objects not themselves make them seen by the Spirit. (Y takes यस्मात् as explaining why buddhi serves as the द्वारिन् and there is not direct relation between puruṣa and ahaṁ-kāra, etc. The interpretation in J is similar. T interprets the whole kārikā as showing the supremacy of buddhi among the organs, so that the others bring the information to it, and it does not take it to them).

The simile of rāja-mantrin is given here by M, V₁ and V₂. M is very elaborate here and gives the simile of dāsi-svairiṇī-kāmuka to explain the idea in this kārikā.

M further quotes three verses :

अहंकारो धियं ब्रूते मेनं सुप्तं प्रबोधय ।

प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥

These verses are not quoted in any other commentary. The other commentaries just refer to the enjoyments in the three worlds, while P explains this in view of 'प्रत्युपभोगम्' as follows—"The enjoyment or the activity of Spirit is not the same throughout. The enjoyment of the ten objects.....and that of the eight powers differs according to place, be it in the human world, be it in heaven, be it among the animals." Only V₂ and P quote पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो....'. P seems to read 'जटी मुण्डो शिखी वापि..', while V₂ has 'दण्डी' in the place of 'शिखी'. The stanza 'हस पिब लल.....' is found only in M and V₁. 'सूक्ष्म' is explained by M, G, V₁ and P as 'subtle as it cannot be noticed by men not given to saintly practices'. V₂ simply says 'अनुपलभ्यं दुर्दर्शम्'. V₂ adds here—प्रकृति-पुरुषयोरन्तरमनीश्वरमित्यर्थः; प्रधानपुरुषयोर्नानात्वमिति. After V₂ has once explained 'अन्तरम्' and 'सूक्ष्मम्' this sounds superfluous. Does V₂ want to stress that there is no place for God in the Sāṃkhya and so the difference is that of prakṛti and puruṣa, and not of prakṛti and puruṣa with God as the ultimate entity comprehending both or ruling over both ?

Kārikā 38.—M, V₁ and V₂ explain śānta, ghora and mūḍha in connection with all the five gross elements; G explains these in connection with only ākāśa and vāyu, and P in respect of only ākāśa. G and P remark that this holds good of the other elements also. The expression in respect of ākāśa is very much alike in V₂ and P. V₂—यथा कश्चिद्देवदत्तः गृहे स्त्रीभिः सह क्रीडमानः प्रस्थितः प्रासाद-मारुहः । आकाशं प्राप्य सुखितोऽहम् इति ब्रवीति । एवं तदाकाशं शान्तम् । तदेवाकाशं वायुना शीतेन संयुक्तं दुःखं जनयति । तदा घोर इत्युच्यते । तदेवाकाशं मोहं

जनयति । यथा कश्चिद्देवदत्तः पन्थानं गच्छन् ग्रामान्तरं न पश्यति ततो मूढो भवति । एवमाकाशं कदाचित् सुखं जनयति कदाचिद् दुःखं जनयति कदाचिन्मोहं जनयति । P—"Suppose that a rich man who comes to taste the five sorts of pleasures in his harem, ascends a high pavilion to look on the ethereal space; the element ether will procure him pleasure; then, the ether tranquilises; but suppose that on the high pavilion, he catches a cold; in that case, the ether produces pain (that is to say, is redoubtable); suppose, again, a man who marches in a desert and who sees only ethereal space and not a village where he can stop; in that case the ether oppresses."

Kārikā 39—Two leaves (57, 58) are missing in V₁ so we cannot have any idea of V₂'s exposition of this kārikā. M is very elaborate here and gives quotations from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Pañcāgnividya) and Purāṇas (सोमवृष्टयज्ञरेतांसि...); it also adduces in support of the idea in this kārikā 'देहे मोहाश्रये....' and 'यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ...'. V₁ is mostly like M; only it does not give any quotation. G is quite elaborate but does not give any quotation and does not give the illustration of a tree which is found only in P*, though in other respects P is more like G. The illustration of the royal prince is found in M, V₁ and P, only in P it is given at some length. P gives a very clear exposition of the body in its triple division. Regarding the fate of the gross body on death when the subtle body abandons it, M and

* "In the same way as the root of a tree has openings to absorb the water which refreshes and nourishes the tree, so the taste of the food and the drink coming through the mother refreshes and nourishes the gross body."—P

V₁ say 'पतति', G says—'भरणकाले मातापितृजं शरीरमिहैव निवृत्त्य भूम्यादिषु प्रलीयते यथातत्त्वम्; and P—"is eaten by the birds or is abandoned to putrefaction or is consumed by fire". V₂ also must have been quite elaborate here as 57a-b and 58 a-b are missing and they must have pertained to the commentary on kā. 39 only, as 59a starts with kā. 40.

Kārikā 40—महदादि—All the commentaries except G regard the subtle body as having eighteen constituents (mahat, ahaṁkāra, eleven organs and five tanmātras), whereas according to P it has seven constituents (mahat, ahaṁkāra, five tanmātras); and according to G eight (mahat ahaṁkāra, manas and five tanmātras). According to P, it may be noted, the organs are produced out of the tanmātras. Yet it says, "The subtle body associated with the eleven organs migrates through the three regions, assuming one of the four births."

निरुपभोगम्—The mode of exposition here is the same in V₂ and P; only V₂ says—"तत् सूक्ष्मशरीरं त्रयोदशविधेन करणेन संयुक्तं बाह्येनोपचयेन मातापितृजेन विना विषयग्रहणसमर्थं न भवतीत्यर्थः; and P—If it is separated from the eleven organs or the gross body produced by the parents, it is not capable of seizing the objects (to enjoy them).

भावैरधिवासितम्—M, V₁ explain this as 'influenced by devabhāva, etc.'; G as 'influenced by the bhāvas, viz. dharma, etc. which are explained later on; V₂ says that the bhāvas are explained later on, the subtle body is influenced by these; Y, J, T interpret this as 'influenced by the eight, viz. dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, etc.' P interprets this by saying that the subtle body is influenced by the three states of being explained later on (i.e. in kā. 43), viz. the samsiddhika, prakṛtika and

vaikṛta. This is significant inasmuch as it can serve to some extent as a pointer to the mutual influence amongst the commentaries. G and J change the metaphor and use the term uparañjitam (G) or uparaktam (J)—coloured by dharma, etc..

Kārikā 41—Leaves 60-63 of V₂ are missing, so we cannot compare the explanation of kā. 41-44. M and V₁ give besides the example of स्थाणु-छाया only the example 'यथाग्निना विना प्रकाशो न भवति'; G has 'आदिग्रहणाद्यथा शैत्यं विना नापो भवन्ति शैत्यं वाऽद्भिर्विना, अग्निरुष्णं विना, वायुः स्पर्शं विना, आकाशमवकाशं विना तद्वदेव तेन दृष्टान्तेन न्यायेन, and P—"Without fire there is no light, without water no freshness, without air no touch, without ether no space for movement. [A fragment of a leaf (viz. 60) of V₂ is preserved and in it these words can be read.....'०शेन विना अवकाशो न भवति', so V₂ must have been like G and P here]. (It may be noted that P and V₂ regard fire, etc. as the support (āśraya) and light, etc. as the āśrayin, whereas G seems to attach greater importance to śaitya, etc. Could this be because Gaudapāda under Buddhistic influence recognised what is regarded as dharma as pradhāna, because it is the very nature of the thing ?)

Kārikā 42—M and V₁ do not explain 'नटवत्'. G says : "यथा नटः पटान्तरेण प्रविश्य देवो भूत्वा निर्गच्छति पुनर्मानुषः पुनर्विदूषकः एवं लिङ्गं.....हस्ती स्त्री पुमान् भवति"; and P—"Like an actor who represents now a god, now a king, now a Nāga, now a demon, etc., the subtle body associated with the thirteen (?) (organs), enters now the womb of an elephant, of a horse, etc., now that of a divinity or of a human being, and becomes an animal, a god or a man." We cannot say what V₂ had here.

Kārikā 43 is similarly explained in all; only P is more elaborate in the interpretation of 'करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललायाः'. According to G, 'karaṇa' signifies just buddhi, and 'kārya' body.

Kārikā 44—is similarly explained in all.

Kārikā 45—Only the latter part of the interpretation in V₂ is preserved. All give the illustration of one who has vairāgya but not jñāna. P describes him as 'a brahmin who leaves his family, studies the path, controls his eleven organs, rejects the eleven objects (of sense and of action) and observes the ten laws of yama and niyama; he will be filled with aversion (of the world); by the aversion he will deliver himself of passion.....'. M and V₁ also say : 'कस्यचिद् वैराग्यमस्ति जितेन्द्रियो विषयेभ्यो विरक्तो यमनियमपरः'. The rest of the interpretation is the same in all.

Kārikā 46—The illustrative parable of the four persons with different temperaments is found in all. It is found word for word the same in V₂ and P. P seems to have read 'गुणवैषम्यविमर्शेन'. V₁ seems to refer to the different states of one and the same person at different times or in succession.

Kārikās 47-49—Leaves 66-69 of V₂ are missing and only a fragment of leaf 70 is preserved (-vṛtti on kā. 50), and again leaves 71-74 are missing. Kārikās 47-49 are similarly interpreted in all. Only in kā. 49, P does not mention the names Devadatta and Yajñadatta, but just speaks of two friends; and G does not relate any such parable.

Kārikā 50—उपादान—M, G, V₁ and P mention the objects त्रिदण्ड, etc..M—कृत्स्नं त्रिदण्डकुण्डिकासंज्ञमालङ्कणाजिनोपादानमात्रेणैव

.....; G—त्रिदण्डकण्डलुविविदिषाभ्यो मोक्ष इति (-Note the mention of विविदिषा by G); V₁—त्रिदण्डकुण्डकण्डलुक्रुणाजिनाऽश्मसूत्रादीनाम्....P gives the list of 'necessaries' as follows :—The "necessaries" are the objects of which the ascetics have need when they acquit themselves of their religious tasks. They are to the number of four : (1) the triple staff (tridaṇḍa), (2) the pot of water to wash (kaṇḍalu); (3) the kaṣṭhāya, (4) the five beneficent objects; (a) the pouch of ashes, (b) the solar crystal (perhaps, sūryakānta), (c) the sacred thread, (d) the charms (magical words); (e) a long staff of herb placed on the tuft of hair and called the beneficent herb (auspicious herb, kuśa). These are the five objects necessary for the study of the way. They are called the beneficent objects, because they drive away impurity. With the three other objects, they form the eight necessary (objects).

M and V₁ say at the end of the exposition of each view that he thinks '.....मम मोक्षो भविष्यति,' while P and V₂ (-we have only a few broken lines on leaf 70, a part of which is preserved-) give the illustration in a conversational form and in each case the final sentence is 'And that is why I have left my family' (प्रव्रजितोऽस्मि-V₂).

The names of the tuṣṭis are as follows in the different commentaries :

M—अम्भः, सलिलम्, ओषधः, वृष्टिः, तारम्, सुतारम्, सुनेत्रम्, सुमरीचम्, उत्तमाम्भसिकम् ; M refers to these as संज्ञान्तरः found in another work (ग्रन्थान्तरे).

G—तासां नामानि शास्त्रान्तरे प्रोक्तानि—'अम्भः सलिलं मेघो वृष्टिः सुतमः पारं सुनेत्रं नारीकमनुत्तमाम्भसिकम्' इति.

V₁—आसां तुष्टीनां नवानामिह संज्ञा भवन्ति—अम्भः सलिलं नौषः (औषः), वृष्टिः सुतारं सुगारं सुनेत्रं मराचिकम् अन्धमाम्भसिकमिति.

V₂—इह संज्ञा भवन्ति तद्यथा अम्भः...कमिति । तासां नवानां तुष्टीनामेताः संज्ञाः । किञ्चान्यत्, एतासां नवानां तुष्टीनां या विपरी[ताः]..... रम्, अमुनेत्रम्, अमारीचकः(कम्), अनुत्तमाम्भसिकमिति.

P—"To these nine sorts of contentment the Sages have given nine names. As they are capable of cleaning the dust and the impurity, the epithets of water are given to the nine contentments : (1) lubricating water [अम्भस्], (2) moving water [सलिलम्], (3) running water [ओषः], (4) lake-water [वृष्टिः], (5) water which has well penetrated [सुतमस्] (or could it be सुतारम्?), (6) water easy to cross [पारम्] (सुपारम् would have been better), (7) water which gushes well [सुनेत्रम्], (8) transparent water [नारीचकम्] (or मारीचकम्?), (a) excellent and pure water [अनुत्तमाम्भसिकम्]."

We cannot be sure from the translation and notes of Takakusu who is guided by G, whether Paramārtha really had this list. I have given a few alternative suggestions in () brackets. x

Kārikā 51—Only V₂ and P refer to a परित्राजक. Others speak in general terms (कश्चित्). The parable of चौर-साधु-अनुगामिन्-पथिक is found only in M in order to show the difference of buddhi, etc. and puruṣa. [The exposition of the first four siddhis and a part of that of the fifth siddhi is missing in V₁]. The interpretation of ūha is quite elaborate and peculiar to P in which six kinds of contemplation [-of the defects of the (1) five gross elements, (2) eleven organs, (3) subtle elements,

x The Nyāyāgamānusārinī on the Dvādaśāranayacakra gives the following list : अम्भः, सलिल, ओष, वृष्टि, तार, सुतार, सुनेत्र, सुमरीच, औत्तमाम्भसिक. See pp. 414-415 (Labdhisūrisvara Jaina Grantha-mālā);

(4) Sentiment of self, i.e. ahaṁkāra, (5) intellect, and (6) Nature] are described. Leaves 71-74 of V₂ are missing so we cannot say whether V₂ had this. It may be noted that the few words that we find on 70b are word for word the same as in P on kā. 51, viz. 'कश्चित् किल परित्राजक ...अन्यान्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि अन्यानि पृथग्यदीनि भूतानि....' P on kā.51 is very elaborate and in an expository and narrative style. P has described the process of acquiring knowledge at the house of the teacher. Besides, Paramārtha has appended a sub-commentary at each step to justify the names of the siddhis and the like. M explaining subhṛt-prāpti quotes a verse (एष आतुरचित्तानाम्....) which is not found quoted in any other commentary.

The names of the different siddhis are given in the different commentaries as follows :

M—आसामष्ट्यानां पूर्ववन्नाम्नान्तराणि—तारं सुतारं तारतारं प्रमोदं प्रमुदितं मोहनं रम्यकं सदाप्रमुदितमिति ।

G—आसामष्ट्यानां सिद्धीनां शास्त्रान्तरे संज्ञाः कृताः—तारं सुतारं तारतारं प्रमोदं प्रमुदितं प्रमोदमानं रम्यकं सदाप्रमुदितमिति ।

V₁—आसां सिद्धीनां पूर्वाचार्यैः संज्ञाः कृतास्तारं सुतारं तारयन्तं प्रमोदं प्रमुदितं मोदमानं रम्यकं सदाप्रमुदितमिति ।

V₂—missing.

P—These eight sorts of perfection are also called by the sages of antiquity : (1) crossing by oneself, (2) crossing well, (3) crossing all, (4) crossing with joy, (5) crossing with an excessive joy, (6) crossing with full joy, (7) crossing by love, (8) crossing by universal love.

The Nyāyāgamānusārinī (p. 414) on the Dvādaśāranayacakra mentions the following :—तारं, सुतारं, तारतारं, प्रमोदं प्रमुदितं, मोदमानं, रम्यकं, सदाप्रमुदितम्.

Kārikā 52—P does not give the example of kumārīstana, which M and V₁ give besides the usual one of go-viṣāṇa (—G does not give any example; it is interested in explaining the mutual dependence of bhāva and līṅga according to the bijāṅkura-nyāya;—this explanation is not found in any of the other commentaries we are comparing here. T follows G; while Y brings in the idea of adhikāralakṣaṇa sarga, though it says that this kārikā refers to saṁsāra-cakra). Here also Paramārtha adds a sub-commentary to clarify the idea in the kārikā. M, V₁, J seem to stress the co-presence of both, while Y, G and T are interested in showing their mutual dependence according to the bijāṅkura-nyāya in respect of production.

Kārikā 53—We find the same interpretation in all. Only the remark in other commentaries that bhautika sarga is trividha is put thus in P—“The creation of beings endowed with sentiment is said to be divided into three categories; these three categories are : (1) gods, men and animals; (2) the subtle corporeal form, (3) the states of being.”

Kārikā 54 is similarly interpreted in all. P says, “The way of men is called ‘that of the middle,’ because it is found in the middle of the three creations. Why is the last of all the creations called ‘pillar’ ? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks, etc. support the three worlds; that is why one calls it ‘pillar.’” This is not found in any other commentary.

Kārikā 55 is similarly interpreted in all. Leaves 76–79 of V₂ are missing, so we have only half of the commentary on kā. 55, and then we can compare only from kā. 61.

Kārikā 56 is similarly interpreted in all, except that P is more expository. V₁ gives the first line of the kārikā differently from the rest. As a matter of fact, it is differently read in most of the commentaries (See Table).

Kārikā 57—is similarly interpreted in all, only P makes the simile clearer—“In this case, milk is produced during [the period of] a year. But when the calf is older, capable of browsing on the herbs by itself, the cow, its mother, though absorbing herbs and water, gives no more milk.”

Kārikā 58 is similarly explained in all. Only P in addition explains the term ‘avyakta’ thus :—Non-evolved principle (avyaktam) is another name for Nature, for she is above the domain of the organs of sense. For the same reason, one calls her also ‘the obscure’. If it be thus with her, how does one know that she exists ? We know the real existence of Nature for the five reasons explained higher up; it is said in a preceding verse (XV).....

Kārikā 59 is similarly interpreted in all. Only P has ‘actor’ instead of ‘narttakī’ (‘An actor shows himself to the spectators, in dance and song; when one has seen him and he has finished, he disappears behind the curtain’); and while M and V₁ say that when prakṛti retires, the puruṣa no longer suffers the three-fold misery, that is to say, attains emancipation, P says ‘After having shown herself, she retires and ceases to suffer the three heats (miseries) [tāpa]. That is why it is said : Thus Nature retires after having obliged Spirit to manifest itself.’ Takakusu rightly notes :—The text

has 'having obliged Spirit to be itself manifested'. But it is probable that the translator has not properly understood पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानम् प्रकाशय, 'having shown herself to Spirit'; cf. kā. 42. M further says in connection with the puruṣa : यथा जलवाहकस्य घटाभावे तदाधेयस्योदकस्याभावः तथा दुःखाभावः । ततोऽसौ मोक्षं गच्छति. This simile is not found elsewhere.

Kārikā 60 is similarly explained in all. M alone has at the end—"तत् प्रधानपुंसोः शिखिपिच्छवदेकगक्षचित्रन्यायः".

Kārikā 61—M and V₁ give the example of 'सुषा'. P explains 'सुकुमारतर' thus :—"Thus in the world a man sees a woman endowed with excellent qualities; then he sees another who is most excellent of all; he thinks : 'This is the most excellent and the one who is without rival.' Even so Nature is the (most) delicate of the twenty-four principles. How do you know that ? Because she does not bear the look (is invisible)." P seems to have missed the fine point. Its line of argument seems to be logical and not poetical—"There is nothing besides prakṛti, so prakṛti can be compared in point of delicacy only with the other twenty-three principles.' The author of the kārikā seems to have waxed eloquent and poetical here.

M, G, V₁ and P quote 'अज्ञो जन्तुर्.....' in support of the view that Īśvara is the cause of the world and 'येन शुक्लीकृता हंसा.....' [-the scribe has omitted this stanza in V₂, but it must have been there-] in support of the view that Svabhāva is the cause. M and V₁ refer before this to the view of the Vedavādins who regard Puruṣa as the cause. M actually quotes पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्. V₂ has पुरुष एवेदं जगतः (?).

This discussion starts in connection with the delicacy of Nature, but the other commentaries then do not at

any stage specifically link up each view with the idea of the proof or disproof of the delicacy of Nature. P on the other hand says, "One may say : 'This opinion is not correct, because the isolation of Spirit does not come from [the fact] that it sees Nature. For, the master who considers Īśvara as the cause of the world says 'Spirit, ignorant and separated from Nature contents itself with miseries and with joys; Īśvara can send it into heaven or hell.'" [Could P have a different version of the first line before it ?] Because of that, Nature cannot be liberated, even when Spirit has seen Nature. The delicacy of Nature cannot be proved.....'

P refers to one more view which is not found elsewhere :—Then a master (who adheres to the theory of the Spirit) says : It is not correct to say that in seeing Nature one obtains Deliverance, for Deliverance is effectuated by means of the Spirit; as said in these lines : "The hymns of the four Vedas exalt the souls (puruṣas) of the past and of the future who have power over life and death, whose acts have been accomplished and are not repeated any more. It is by that cause that Deliverance is effectuated and not by the act of seeing Nature." [According to Takakusu, this view is of the Vaiśeṣika school.]

Some portion of V₂ is missing, so we cannot definitely say whether it quoted 'अज्ञो जन्तुर्.....' and how it quoted it and how many different theories it referred to. V₂ has in the beginning of 80a—गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वाऽश्वमेधिकः'. M, G, V₁, V₂ and P all quote 'कालः पचति भूतानि....' with different readings. M and V₁ have "कालः सृजति भूतानि कालः संहर्ते प्रजाः । कालः सुप्तेषु जागर्ति तस्मात् कालस्तु कारणम् ॥" G, V₂ and P have :

“कालः पचति भूतानि कालः संक्षिपते (-V₂; संहरते -G) जगत् । कालः सुप्तेषु आगति कालो हि दुरतिक्रमः ॥”. P explains that Kāla is not included in the Sāṃkhya categories (-all say this much-), but is the modality of a product; “time past, that is a past product, and the present and the future are, even so, present and future products. We know then that ‘time’ is only an epithet of products”. The illustration of ‘kulastrī’ is found in M, V₁, V₂ and P.

Here a doubt arises : With what should ‘मे’ of the kārīkā be construed ? Is it puruṣa that feels that there is nothing ‘सुकुमारतर’ than prakṛti, or is it prakṛti that feels that there is nothing ‘सुकुमारतर’ than herself, or is it the author’s feeling that finds expression here ? M and V₁ are of the view that puruṣa feels that nothing is ‘सुकुमारतर’ than prakṛti. G and T and perhaps also P seem to take it as the author’s view. This portion of V₂ and Y is missing, J takes it as the prakṛti’s feeling, though it construes differently as can be seen from the quotation below. सुकुमारतर is explained as follows :—M and V₁ seem to explain it as bashful (savrīḍa); G—subhogyatara, P—she does not bear the look (invisible). In V₂ the portion actually explaining this term is missing. T—सुकुमारतरता अतिपेशलता परपुरुषदर्शनासहिष्णुता. Sukumāratarata—more delicate or bashful. With what could prakṛti be compared ? M and V₁ are not clear on this point; they take तर्प् as conveying excellence—‘very bashful’.

G—प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदोऽवरादिकारणमस्ति ...।

V₂—एवमोऽवरादीनि कारणानि सुकुमारादीनि (०राणि); सुकुमार इत्यत्रापि सुकुमारः(रं) सुकुमारतरम् । So ईश्वर and the like cannot be the cause, प्रकृतिः alone is the cause.

P seems to compare prakṛti with the other twenty-three principles in respect of delicacy—she does not bear the look, is invisible. J also seems to be of the same view—सुकुमारतरमिति सूक्ष्मतरमितरत् । एतदुक्तं भवति—प्राग्व्यक्तात्मना प्रकाशयति न त्वव्यक्तात्मनापि, येन ज्ञानावस्थायां प्रकृतेर्मतिर्भवति मम सूक्ष्मतरं न किञ्चिदपरमस्ति यत् द्रष्टव्यं पुरुषेण. According to T, Prakṛti surpasses in this respect even the कुलवधू—एवं प्रकृतिरपि कुलवधूतोऽप्यधिका दृष्टा विवेकेन न पुनर्द्रक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः.

Kārīkā 62—Introducing this kārīkā, M and V₁ say : लोके शिष्टा वदन्ति पुरुषो बद्धः, पुरुषो मुक्तः, पुरुषः संसरति, अत्रोच्यते; G says that it is conventionally said that the puruṣa is liberated, or he transmigrates.

V₂—तस्यां निवृत्तायां पुरुषो मोक्षं गच्छति इत्यत्र लोको ब्रवीति शिष्टाश्च ब्रुवन्ते(ते) पुरुषो संसरतीति । एतदयुक्तमिति । अयुक्तं कस्मात् । यस्मादाह. P:—One may say : “The men of the world, even sages, are accustomed to talk thus : “The Spirit is bound, the Spirit is delivered, the Spirit migrates through the existences.’ These words are they correct or false ? We reply : ‘They are false.’ ‘How do you know that ?’ It is said in this verse.

P is clearly indebted to V₂.

Kārīkā 62 is similarly explained in all. G quotes : “प्राकृतेन च बन्धेन तथा वैकारिकेण च । दाक्षिणेन तृतीयेन बद्धो नान्येन मुच्यते ॥” It also says : तत् सूक्ष्मं शरीरं धर्माधर्मसंयुक्तम्. V₂ also names the three-fold bondage, while others just refer to it as ‘त्रिविध बन्ध’. नानाश्रया—This is not explained in G; P also does not translate it, though later we have, ‘That is why it is said that the three worlds act by the support of Nature’, this being like the explanation in M, V₁, V₂. J has ‘नानाश्रयेषुरभिव्यज्यते (?)’ । तत्राश्रयाः भावलङ्गभूताः सर्गाः । ते प्रकृतिपुरुष-

वन्नानाविधाः । T does not explain the word. Y is missing. Explaining that puruṣa cannot be bound and so cannot be liberated as it is inactive, while Prakṛti can, P says "To offer gifts and all other actions are appropriate to Nature." This is not found in others and seems to be expository.

Kārikā 63—This kārikā is missing in P, though it is found in all the others. Some think it is an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546 A.D.). We shall discuss this later.

Kārikā 64. नास्मि—M, V₁—नास्मि तत्त्वानि; G—नाहमेव भवामि; V₂—शरीरमात्रो नु भवामिति (शरीरमात्रं न भवामिति ?) कोऽत्राहमिति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते; J—यदेतत् सूक्ष्मशरीरं भौतिकं च तस्मिन् न भवामि, अपि तु प्रकृतिः. Y is missing; T—'नास्मि' इत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रं निषेधति; or पुरुषोऽस्मि न प्रसवधर्मा. P seems to read नास्ति and regards it as a false idea, viz. 'There is Nothing,' which is strange. On the contrary this should mean that there is really nothing, as in the case of the other two. This is omitted in the translation of the kārikā.

न मे :—M, V₁—न मे तत्त्वानि; G—न मे मम शरीरं तत्, यतोऽहमन्यः शरीरमन्यत; V₂—[न] ममेदं शरीरम्, अन्यदतो भवामि; J—न ममेदमपि तु प्रकृतेः. Y is missing; T—न मे स्वामिता, P—There is no mine.

नाहम् : M, V₁—नाहं तत्त्वानाम्; G—अहंकाररहितः; V₂ does not mention the three separately so it is difficult to point out the explanation in each case. It says : [न] ममेदं शरीरमन्यद् अतो भवामि, प्राधानिकमिदं शरीरमित्यविशेष(?)ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते. J—नाप्यहं प्रकृतिः; Y—कार्यकारणसाक्षी पुरुषः । तस्माद् ये भौतिकाः शिरःपाण्यादयः ये चाहंकारिकाः श्रवणादयो वचनादयः संकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाश्च ते लक्षणविपर्ययात् नाहम्—नाष्टौ प्रकृतयः; T—नाहं कर्ता; P—No me. P says—"Because of that knowledge one destroys the three (false) ideas

completely : 'that there is nothing, that the self [Me] exists, that Mine exists,' and the five doubts (explained in v. 47). All the functions of all corporeal existences are caused by Nature; there is not 'Nothing', there is no Me, there is no Mine; because all pertain to Nature." P seems to read 'nāsti'. The Bombay edition of Wilson's text, Takakusu notes, has 'nāsti' in the place of 'nāsmi', but the act of isolating 'nāsti' and making of it the first false idea is a misconstruction of Paramārtha's.

Kārikā 65—सत्तत्त्वविनिवृत्ताम्—M, G, J, T; सत्तत्त्वविनिवृत्तः—V₁, V₂ (—this portion is missing in Y). This is interpreted as follows : M—अर्थवशात्सत्तत्त्वविनिवृत्तां निर्वर्तितोभयपुरुषप्रयोजनवशात् यैः सत्तमिः रूपैर्धर्मादिभिरात्मानं बध्नाति तेभ्यो रूपेभ्यो विनिवृत्ताम् । यावज्ज्ञानवशुषा दृष्टा प्रकृतिः पुरुषेण तथा(या ?) च पुमान् दृष्टः. G is similar. V₁ and V₂ do not care to explain सत्तत्त्वविनिवृत्तः, perhaps because सत्तत्त्व has occurred before. V₁ and V₂ take सत्तत्त्वविनिवृत्तः as an epithet of पुरुष (who sees प्रकृति) whereas the others have सत्तत्त्वविनिवृत्ताम्, an epithet of Prakṛti. P does not seem to have either of these readings : "By that knowledge (Nature) ceases to produce and finishes **by abandoning her functions** in accordance with the desire of Spirit..." I have discussed this later. निवृत्तप्रसवाम् is explained by both M and G as निवृत्तबुद्धयहङ्कारकार्याम्; V₁ does not take note of this term. V₂ simply says—निवृत्तः प्रसवो यस्यां सेयं निवृत्तप्रसवा ताम्. P quotes here a verse to explain this term : "Just as the decorticated rice sprouts no more in the water or in the earth, so Nature ceases to be prolific when she is mastered by knowledge." This quotation is not found in any of the commentaries we are comparing

here. But Alberuni says that the passage is from the book of Patañjali (Alberuni's India, i, p. 55—E.C Sachau, S. Chand and Co., Delhi, 1964).

Kārikā 66 is similarly explained in all. The illustration 'यथा वृद्धसंयोगादपत्यं नोत्पद्यते' given in M and V₁ is not found in G, V₂ and P. It may be noted that G alone reads रजस्य इत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाऽहमिदमुपरतैका (See Table). (एकः केवलः शुद्धः, पुरुषः.....एकैव प्रकृतिः त्रैलोक्यस्यापि प्रधानकारणभूता, न द्वितीया प्रकृतिरस्ति मूर्तिवधे जातिमेदात्—(G). G seems to have got the hint from V₂—यथा लोके रजस्यः.....प्रकृतिरपि एका.....Introducing kā. 66, V₂ asks : 'दृष्टा ज्ञानेन चक्षुषा प्रकृतिः किं करोतीत्यत्रोच्यते' and ignoring the wording of the kārikā, answers this by 'उपरमते नर्तकीवत् दृष्टाहमनेन रज्जेनेति'. M and V₁ ask what the puruṣa does after seeing prakṛti with the eye of knowledge. P—What does knowledge accomplish between Nature and Spirit ? (Has P combined the idea in both ?)

Kārikā 67—The illustration given by P—"Just as without an umbrella, one has no shade (so without an antecedent cause, there is no corporeal form)"—is found only in V₂ under kā. 68 in connection with absence of body on their being absence of dharma-adharma. Paramārtha does not seem to have followed the second line—"Transmigration is arrested like the body of the wheel (of the potter), the movement of which one interrupts.....Then a man who possesses knowledge and on whom, for that reason, the acts committed in prior existences have no more influence, stops (in transmigration); like the wheel (of the potter), the movement of which one interrupts."

M, V₁, V₂ simply say that saṃskāra signifies dharma and adharma which are responsible for the body,

and even when knowledge has been obtained they do not vanish till they have yielded their fruit (as they are more powerful than knowledge—M, V₁). V₂ refers to these as पूर्वकृत and says that the body is produced due to the dharma and adharma of another birth. J also says 'जन्मान्तरसंस्कारवशाद् धृतशरीरः पुनस्तिष्ठति'. G says that knowledge does not eradicate the dharma and adharma in existence (i. e. present), even because they are present and are going to perish. But it destroys future karma and those which the person does by means of the present body because it is performance of what is ordained. [From G's explanation here we are tempted to say that its author was a Vedāntin, the same as the author of the Gaudapāda Kārikā].

Kārikā 68 is similarly explained in all; only P is elaborate in the exposition of 'ऐकान्तिक' and 'आत्यन्तिक'—'Definitive isolation' means : because of the true knowledge we reject the indefinite remedies and the opinions of the different schools. 'Final isolation' means : for that we abandon the chain of causes and effects taught in the four Vedas (cf. v.1), even the fruits promised for the absence of passion, fruits not caused by true knowledge. Final isolation is 'definitive' because it is not followed by another. 'Final' would be to say 'without end (eternal)'.

Kārikā 69—गुह्यम् : M, V₁—दुर्विज्ञेयम् ; G—रहस्यम् ; V₂—गुह्यमिति अब्रह्मणो यद् अनदेयम्(न देयम् ?) इत्यर्थः ; P—"That which is hidden by all sorts of erroneous opinions, that which is difficult to manifest, can be obtained only by a perfect master. That which is secret is that which can be transmitted to a brahmin endowed with the five qualities but not

to any other; that is why one calls it 'secret'. What are the five qualities ? (1) Good place of birth, (2) good family, (3) good conduct; (4) capacity; (5) desire to obtain that knowledge. Those are the qualities which make [one] fit to receive the Law; no one else is capable of it; that is why one calls that knowledge 'secret.' This is clearly an elaboration on the part of Paramārtha of some remark in the original corresponding to अवज्ञाणो न देयम्' in V₂. J and Y have a similar expansion of गुह्यम्.

स्थिति is explained by M, V₁, and V₂ as स्थान, the eight abodes of the devas, one abode of manuṣyas and five abodes of tairyagyonaś; G is very brief—अवस्थान; P explains स्थिति as duration—"this is all the time [during which] the subtle body, influenced by the states of being, migrates through the three worlds." The interpretation in P and G seems to be the same. One interpretation (M, V₁, V₂) refers to the location and the other to the duration. J combines both these. Y enters into a philosophical discussion. T gives no explanation, referring it to kā. 21.

Pralaya signifies, according to M, V₁ and V₂ the dissolution of the five gross elements into the five subtle elements and so on. G explains it as तिरोभाव; and P explains it thus : "End : by means of the eight perfections (v. LI), (Spirit) rests for ever isolated.' (This is from the point of view of the puruṣa.) P further says : "The conditions of the three (periods) can be manifested by that knowledge; since it manifests nothing outside of these three, one calls it absolute knowledge." This is not found elsewhere.

Kārikā 70—G does not comment on kārikās 70-72. अग्र्यम् : M, V₁—श्रेष्ठ्याद्, as it is superior to even the Vedas, Purāṇas, and Manvādi Dharmaśāstras due to its aikāntikatva and ātyantikātva; V₂—सर्वेषां वेदादीनां ज्ञानानामग्रे वच्च (उत्पन्नम् ?); P— "That knowledge was established for the first time before the four Vedas had appeared. It is by that knowledge that the four Vedas and all the religious schools have been established; that is why one calls it excellent (agrya)." J—सर्वमेदानामग्रे भवत्वादग्र्यम्.

पवित्रम् : M, V₁—यस्मात् नरकप्रेततिर्यग्गोनिषु पतनात् त्रायते तस्मात् पवित्रम्; V₂—तत्पवित्रं करोति । तिर्यग्गोनिवर्तमाना[न्] ब्राह्मणाः पुनन्ति (?). P is quite elaborate—It is by that knowledge that Spirit is delivered from the triple misery, from the principal misery caused by the twenty-four (products), as well as from the triple bondage; by that is obtained isolation of Spirit or its Deliverance. That is why one says that that knowledge is 'beneficent'.

M, V₁ and V₂ remind us here how Kapila took pity on Āsuri [who was वर्षसहस्रयाजिन्—M, V₁; वर्षसहस्रत्रययाजिन्(!) -V₂]. P on the other hand says, "The great sage Kapila possessed at his birth the four qualities, virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power. Having realised that knowledge, he explained it through compassion. Desiring that that knowledge should not be lost and that it should be communicated to another, he taught it through charity to Āsuri, who explained it, in his turn, to Pañcaśikha and to Vindhyavāsa. Pañcaśikha and Vindhyavāsa treated that doctrine at full length, in sixty thousand verses in all." Takakusu says : "Three texts out of four read : 'In his turn, he explained it to Pañcaśikha and to Vindhyavāsa; Pañcaśikha and

Vindhyavāsa have treated this doctrine at full length.' Bu the Korean text reads, 'In his turn, he explained it to Pañcaśikha and Pañcaśikha had treated this doctrine at full length.' The Korean text then does not speak of Vindhyavāsa.' P also says later, "The sage Āsuri, in his turn, explained that knowledge briefly and in identical terms to Pañcaśikha, who explained it at full length in sixty thousand verses; thus the doctrine was transmitted up to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the brahmin whose family-name was Kauśika; that one explained the system in seventy-verses, as is said in this verse [kā. 71]." V₂ in the explanation of the second line says—"एवं संक्षिप्तमिदं ज्ञानमार्थमतिना दत्तमासुरये । तेनापि तदेव ज्ञानं संक्षिप्तं पञ्चशिखाय दत्तम् ।... एवं प्राप्तं कोसलको ब्राह्मणः कथं (?) ईश्वरकृष्णो नाम शिष्यहितार्थं षष्ठितन्त्रं संक्षिप्तवान् ।" This is not found in M and V₁. V₂ describes Īśvarakṛṣṇa as a Brāhmaṇa of the Kosala country, and as 'kaṁyah' (happy, prosperous ?).

तेन बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्—In the explanation of this, the तन्त्र or teaching is given in V₁ as follows :—'तम एव खल्विदमभ्यमासीत् । तस्मिन् तमसि क्षेत्रज्ञः प्रथमोऽभ्यवर्तत' इति । तम इत्युच्यते प्रकृतिः क्षेत्रज्ञः पुरुषः । M also has the same words, only it specifically says in the beginning : तन्त्रमिति व्याख्यायते. It seems that according to M, the term तन्त्र derives its तं from तमस and 'त्र' from क्षेत्रज्ञ, though it also, like V₁, says : षष्ठिपदार्था यस्मिन् शास्त्रे तन्त्र्यन्ते तत् षष्ठितन्त्रम्. In V₂ the copyist seems to have omitted much. We find only संक्षिप्तं ज्ञानं क्षेत्र इत्युच्यते पुरुषः. Of course, the text can be easily emended. But it is interesting to note that V₂ has क्षेत्र and not क्षेत्रज्ञ. This might have been a scribal error. The explanation that Darkness (तमस) signifies Prakṛti is also missing in it. P also does not have this and has 'field' for puruṣa. See "The Sage Kapila explained it briefly to Āsuri as follows : At the

first beginning there was nothing but darkness. In that darkness there was a 'field of knowledge'. The 'field of knowledge' was the puruṣa. The puruṣa existed, but no knowledge existed. That is why one called (the puruṣa) 'field'. Then come evolution and modification; thus was originated primordial creation by evolution, etc. up to final deliverance"—P. P tries to explain why puruṣa is termed 'field'.

Kārikā 71—शिष्यपरंपरा : M, V₁—आसुरि-पञ्चशिख-भार्गव-उल्लूक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवल (—mentioned in M only), etc.—ईश्वरकृष्ण; V₂—आसुरि-पञ्चशिख-गार्ग्य-उल्लूक-चञ्चलि (बाद्धलि ?) and such others (a hundred)—ईश्वरकृष्ण.

P—आसुरि-पञ्चशिख-गार्ग्य-उल्लूक—Po-p'o-li (Vārṣaganya according to Takakusu, but Baddhali according to Pulinbehari Chakravarti—See 'Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought,' pp. 131-132)—Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

J—शिष्यपरंपरया इत्यादि; मुनेरासुरेः पञ्चशिखस्तथा गर्गगौतमप्रभृतिर्णैरामत-ग्रम्या (?) ईश्वरकृष्णनामानं परित्राजकमित्यनया शिष्यपरंपरया.

Y says that Pañcaśikha transmitted the knowledge of Sāṁkhya to Janaka, Vasiṣṭha and such others (बहुभ्यो जनकवसिष्ठादिभ्यः समाख्यातम्—Y, p. 175-kā.70). Y declares that the Śāstra was promulgated by Kapila at the beginning (of creation ?) and hence it is not possible, as in the case of other systems of thought, to trace the line of teachers even in a hundred years. संक्षेपेण तु द्वाव..... हारीतबाद्धलि—कैरात—पौरिकर्षमेधर—पञ्चाधि करण—पतञ्जलि—वर्षाण्य—कौण्डिन्य—मूकादिक (?) शिष्यपरंपरयाऽऽगतम्..... (p. 175, kā. 71) (some names before the name of Hārīta have been left out as there is a lacuna in the manuscript). It may be noted that Baddhali is referred to in the Tattvārtha-Rājavārttika, p. 51, as an advocate of the doctrine of Non-action

(akriyāvāda) along with Kapila, Ulūka, Gārgya, Māṭhara and others (कपिलोल्कगार्ग्यामृतिबाहलिमाठर.....).

The शिष्यपरंपरा in V₂ and P is the same(-if चञ्चलि could be emended as बाहलि).

Kārikā 72 and Kārikā 73 are not found in V₂. Kā. 72 is similarly explained in M, V₁ and P, except that P perhaps read पञ्चाथ्य in the place of पाराथ्य and thereby included here two (4, 5) of the ten items (मूलिकार्य) viz. the five reasons by which one establishes the reality of Nature (kā. 15), and the five reasons by which one establishes the reality of puruṣa (kā. 17). P seems to have omitted 'अन्यत्वम्'. P does not regard this verse (kā. 72) as a part of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā as it refers to it as composed by 'an intelligent man of this school'. And the second line is different :—"it explains (the sorts of) creation which proceed from (eight) causes, up to the fifty categories (relating to the intellect)." But the commentary reproduces the idea in 'आख्यायिकविरहिताः परवाद-विवर्जिताश्चापि'. I have discussed this later.

Kārikā 73 is found only in M and V₁. J and Y and T also do not have this kārikā.

I have not made an attempt here to draw any kind of conclusion. I have only tried to give here as objectively as possible, some idea of the contents or mode of interpretation of M, G, V₁, V₂ and P, because, as said above, M and G have been regarded by different scholars as the original of P. Now that two more commentaries (V₁, V₂) are known, a similar claim can be put forth for them also. This comparative study will have served its purpose even if it enables a scholar to verify for himself what the position actually is.

All that we can say is that if any commentary can claim to be the original of P, V₂ has the fairest right to do so. Where it is found to differ from V₂ this can to some extent be explained by the fact that Paramārtha was influenced by the mode of interpreting the Sāṃkhya-kārikā in Buddhist circles.* His Buddhist bias also might have led him to drop or change what he regarded as indecent expressions and it might have influenced his understanding of the Sāṃkhya principles also to some extent.

*See Kā. 9—उपादानग्रहणात् "A man who thinks that tomorrow a brahmin will come to dine in his house procures milk to make curds"—P. This is not found in this form in any other commentary. But see : Tattvasaṃgraha Pañjikā, 8 and Tattvabodhavidhāyinī which have the same illustration.

Is what is known as 'Māṭhara-Vṛtti' the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā ?

Scholars are divided in their estimate of the date of M. While some assign it to the first century A.D. others hold that it cannot be anterior to 1000 A.D., could be even a little later. Each one of these scholars seems to have very sound reasons in support of his own view. While on the one hand 'Māṭhara' is referred to in the Anuyogadvārasūtra, 41 along with Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, Kapila, Saṣṭitantra, Kanaka-saptati, etc. and so should be earlier than it, on the other hand M has quotations from the Hastāmalaka stotra of Śaṅkarācārya (यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ...—see M, 39) and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (यथा पङ्केन पङ्काम्भः... Bhāgavata, 1. 8. 52 in M, 2; एषा आतुरचित्तानां... Bhāgavata, 1. 6.35 in M, 51) and so should be later than these. Moreover, it is claimed that M is the original of the Chinese version of Paramārtha and so should definitely be earlier than 546 A.D. Such a claim is put forth for Gaudapāda's Bhāṣya also, and Paramārtha's version is as a matter of fact different from both G and M. Again, M seems to be influenced by Vedantic views as can be seen from its concept of mokṣa and the like (See अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मेनं सुप्तं प्रबोधय... quoted in M, 37; also उक्तं च—“देहे मोहाश्रये मरणे युक्तः स परमात्मनि । कुम्भाकाश इवाकाशे लभते चैकरूपताम् ॥” ‘यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ’ इत्यादि—M, 39).

One way of attempting to explain this confusing situation is to hold Māṭhara (referred to in the Anuyogadvāra) and Māṭhara-bhāṣya (referred to in Guṇaratnasūri's commentary on Haribhadrāsūri's Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, p. 109, Asiatic Society, Calcutta. 1905) as

one, but to regard the Māṭhara-vṛtti as we find it now as referred to by the word 'Māṭhara-prānta' used by Guṇaratnasūri (p. 96) (तदुक्तं माठरप्रान्ते—

हस पिब लल खाद मोद नित्यं भुंक्व च भोगान् यथाभिकामम् ।

यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्स्यसि मोक्षसौख्यमचिरेण ॥—

from M, 37). This distinction made by Guṇaratna between 'Māṭhara-bhāṣya' and 'Māṭhara-prānta' shows that in the manuscript which Guṇaratna consulted certain passages like 'हस पिब....' were written in the margin and these later became a part of the text. Thus the Māṭhara-vṛtti, as we have it, is the original commentary with a number of interpolations and this explains the quotations from the Bhāgavata and the Hastāmalaka stotra and the like and the Vedantic influence that appears to be there in M. This is the point made by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri in his learned book 'सांख्यदर्शनका इतिहास,' pp. 407-473. He tries to establish that if these interpolations are removed, there would be no difficulty in accepting what is known as the Māṭhara-vṛtti as the original of the Chinese Version, as the Māṭhara or Māṭhara-bhāṣya referred to in Jaina works, and as a work of the first century A.D..

Dr. Ādyāprasāda Mīśra examines this argument at length in his सांख्यदर्शनकी ऐतिहासिक परम्परा, pp. 236-245, and comes to the conclusion that Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri has been rather over-enthusiastic and that facts do not bear him out; we have to admit that M is a revised version of the original Māṭhara-bhāṣya.

So many attempts were made to prove or disprove M as the original Māṭhara-vṛtti and also as the original of Paramārtha's Version, obviously because this was the only vṛtti ascribed to Māṭhara that was known, it was

of all the known commentaries the closest to P, and G was looked upon by many as scrappy, and almost an abridgement of M. I have, as said above, recently edited two hitherto unknown vṛttis on the Sāṃkhya-saptati; one of them (—I call it V₁—) is very much like M, and the other (V₂) seems to have a greater claim than any other commentary to the status of being the original of P (—though it too is at a few places different from P). Unfortunately a corner of the last leaf of the manuscript of V₁ is broken and lost and this is exactly where we have the author's name. आचार्यम् followed by a remnant of what could have been ह or even घ is all that is left of the author's name. But V₁ is very much like M; and M seems to be a revised and enlarged version of V₁, and much later also.

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī has specifically pointed out certain passages in M which he regards as spurious—they even seem to disturb the consistency of the text (See सांख्यदर्शनका इतिहास, pp. 451–454). We may mention these.

(i) The stanza 'स्थानं निमित्तं...' in the beginning (M, 1). [Not found in V₁].

(ii) The stanza 'इहोपपत्तिर्मम...' (M, 1) [Not in V₁]

(iii) भवन्ति चात्र श्लोकाः 'पुनर्दाहः...', पुष्पिताक्षः...', यानि कानि...', वैद्य वैद्य...कृतान्तः सुखमेधते' (M, 1). [We find the verses पुनर्दाहः... and पुष्पिताक्षस्तु... in V₁.]

(iv) किञ्च 'यथा पङ्केन पङ्काम्भः,वृक्षान् छित्त्वा...नरकः केन गम्यते' (M, 2). Here the author seems to be quoting afresh after having said इत्यादिश्रवणात् (M, 2). [V₁ has वृक्षं छित्त्वा... नरकं केन यास्यसि].

(v) भवति ह्यसौ अवश्यं फलदानादैकान्तिकः...निरतिशयफलमिति वाक्यशेषः (M, 2). Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī argues that this passage does not fit in where it is, though it can very well do so at the end of the exposition of kā. 2, and its style also seems to be different. [This passage is found in V₁ and is even necessary in order to explain how this cause of duḥkha-nivṛtti is superior to the others. But V₁ then simply explains the terms vyakta, avyakta and jñā and quotes 'पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो...while M attempts to justify the postulation of avyakta and jñā. M does not quote पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो....' here.]

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī then gives a list of passages which, according to him, are undoubtedly interpolations :

(vi) 'नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः' इति गोतामु; 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इति श्रुतेश्च (M, 15). Kārikā 15 has been explained in Kamalaśīla's Pañjika, 14 on the Tattva-saṅgraha, and Abhayadeva's commentary (p. 284) on the Sanmatitarka, and these explanations seem to be based, argues Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī, on M and clearly show the above-mentioned passage to be an interpolation. [All that we can say is that V₁ does not have these quotations. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any sound evidence to show that the above mentioned exposition in the Pañjika and the Tattvabodhavidhāyinī is based on M or even V₁.]

(vii) उक्तं च—उत्पत्तिं प्रलयं चैव भूतानामागतिं गतिम् ।

वेत्ति विद्यामविद्यां च स वाच्यो भगवानिति ॥

श्रीविष्णुपुराणे षष्ठे अंशे पराशरवचः । (M, 22).

[This is not found in V₁; nor is found in V₁ the fanciful explanation of 'अहङ्कार' and 'भगवान्' that is given in M.]

(viii) अपरे पुनरित्थङ्कारं वर्णयन्ति... (M, 18). This is the only place where M refers to a different view, and so this passage must be a spurious one, argues Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī. [It may be noted that V₁ also refers to this different explanation of जन्ममरण० given by others. It is true that neither M nor V₁ has discussed the different views of the Sāṃkhya ācāryas regarding the sense-organs and the like. But yet it was within its scope to refer to a different interpretation, given by an earlier commentator or handed down by tradition, of an expression in the kārikā that was being discussed. And this could not be regarded as a proof of the passage being an interpolated one].

(ix) उक्तं च—हस पिब लल मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुरु च मा शङ्काम् ।
यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्त्यसे मोक्षसौख्यं च ॥ (M, 37)

[This is found in V₁ though the text is a little different :

हस पिब लल खाद मोद विषयानुपभोव मा च कुरु शङ्काम् ।
यदि विदितं कपिलमतं प्राप्स्यसि सौख्यं च मोक्षं च ॥

Guṇaratna writes in his commentary (p. 96) on the Saddarsāna-samuccaya : तदुक्तं माठरप्रान्ते—

हस पिब लल खाद मोद नित्यं भुक्ष्व च भोगान् यथाभिकामम् ।
यदि विदितं कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्स्यसि मोक्षसौख्यमचिरेण ॥]

(x) पुराणेष्वपि 'सोमवृष्ट्यन्नरेतांसि पुरुषस्तत्र पञ्चमः । ...' इति (M, 39) [Not found in V₁. Actually the entire passage : वेदान्त-वादिनोऽप्येवमाहुः । प्राणिनः.... 'वेत्थ यथा पञ्चम्यामाहुतावापः पुरुषवचसः (छा. ३. ५. ३. ३.) इत्यारभ्य 'इति तु पञ्चम्यामाहुतावापः' (छा. उप ५. ९. १) इत्याहुः । पुराणेष्वपि 'सोम...भवत् ॥' इति is not to be found in V₁].

(xi) उक्तं च—'देहे मोहाश्रये...', 'यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ' इत्यादि (M, 39) [Not in V₁]

(xii) उक्तं च—एषा आतुरचित्तानां (M, 51) [Not in V₁]

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī argues : Early writers generally do not mention the name of the work they quote from. In M at places we find the name of the work mentioned. For example, the Gītā is mentioned in M, 15 as the source of a quotation, while it is not so mentioned in M, 23. Hence the passage in M, 15 is clearly a spurious one. The quotations from the Bhāgavata (M, 2 and 51) and the Hastāmālaka stotra (M, 39) also are interpolated ones as they do not seem to form a part of the text.

[It may be noted that V₁ does not have any one of these quotations, not even the quotation from the Gītā, given in M, 23. Moreover, V₁'s exposition of yama and niyama (kā. 23) is, unlike M, not based on the Yoga-sūtra].

There are some more passages in M that are not found in V₁. On the other hand, a few passages of V₁ are not found in M. The mode of expression also is different in V₁ from that in M at places, and one feels that the author of M has deliberately changed the construction of the sentence, or made a deliberate change in the original. I have noted such passages in my edition of V₁. We cannot but come to the conclusion that V₁ is earlier than M and that M is a revised and enlarged version of V₁.

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī has tried to establish that M is earlier than Y. Now that we have two hitherto unknown commentaries before us, we may try to see if the arguments of Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī could hold good in the case of V₁ and V₂.

(i) Y refers to M 32, says Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī, when it says : अवर आह-आहरणं कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति धारणं मनोऽहङ्कारश्च प्रकाशनं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि बुद्धिश्चेति.

It is interesting to bear in mind that the style of this passage is different from that of the corresponding passage in both M and V₁. Moreover, both these mention āharaṇa as the function of the indriyas in general, dhāraṇa as that of abhimāna (-Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī gives the expression धारणम् अभिमानमनोक्षणम्, but manas is mentioned neither in M nor in V₁-) and prakāśana as that of buddhi. The passage in Y is here closer in style to V₂ which however assigns the functions differently (-though the copyist seems to have omitted a few words). See : [आहरणं] धारणं [च] कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति, प्रकाशं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति...तं दशविधं विषयं बुद्धीन्द्रियैः प्रकाशितं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहरन्ति धारयन्ति च—V₂, 32. Surprisingly तं दशविधं विषयं...धारयन्ति is found in V₁ and M also though they assign the functions differently.

It can be said that Y has not referred to M or even V₁, but has some other commentary in view. Or it can be said to have attempted to systematically reproduce the view of V₁ and to have used the mode of expression in V₂, which seems to be earlier than V₁. We shall discuss this later.

(ii) The next evidence put forth by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī is on the basis of M, 38; according to him, पञ्च महाभूतानि पूर्वपूर्वानुप्रवेशादेकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चगुणान्युत्पद्यन्ते (M, 38) is refuted in Y—ततश्च यदन्येषामाचार्याणामभिप्रेतम् एकलक्षणेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः परस्परानुप्रवेशात् एकोत्तरा विशेषाः सृज्यन्त इति तत् प्रतिषिद्धं भवति.

In my view, Y does not refer to the author of M here as it refers to some 'ācāryas' and it would not normally use such a word for a mere commentator

(See अपर आह in Y, 32, केचित्तु in Y, 39). It is likely that such a view prevailed among some thinkers of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school, who wanted to justify the increasing number of qualities in the gross substances, which could not be satisfactorily explained in the view that vāyu is produced from sparśa-tanmātra, tejas from rūpatanmātra and so on. The author of M found this view more tenable and explained kā. 38 accordingly. V₁ with which M ordinarily tallies does not admit this. I have discussed this later.

(iii) Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī is of the view that Y after explaining the term प्रभूत (kā. 39) as प्रभूतास्तूद्विज्जाः स्वेदजाश्च, refers to M in 'केचित्तु प्रभूतग्रहणेन बाह्यानामेव विषयाणां ग्रहणमिच्छन्ति'. But V₁ also has here "प्र उपसर्गः पृथिव्यादीनां ग्रहणम्". V₂ is unfortunately missing here.

(iv) Similarly, after explaining दशविधं महामोह (kā. 48) in its own way, Y remarks : दृष्टानुश्रविकेषु वा शब्दादिष्वित्यपरे and Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī claims that this is a reference to M. But V₁ has a similar explanation here. (V₂ is missing).

(v) Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī argues that Māthara has given some exposition of the members of a syllogism in his vṛtti on kā. 5, and Y (p. 3) is referring to this in यद्यपि सूत्रकारेणावयवोपदेशो न कृतस्तथाऽपि भाष्यकारात् केचित् संग्रहं चक्रुः । ते च नः प्रमाणम्. But in that case if Māthara be the 'bhāṣyakāra' there should be some other commentator between Māthara and the author of Y, to whom the latter is referring (केचित्). It is likely that the author of Y wants to say here that some Sāṃkhyas have accepted the Bhāṣyakāra's exposition of the syllogism and there is no

reason why they should not be followed. By Bhāṣyakāra, he might be referring to Vātsyāyana, the Nyāyabhāṣyakāra, meaning thereby that the Nyāya syllogism was acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas. Or he might be referring to some early Sāṃkhya work known as Bhāṣya which was not extant in his own days. The latter is more plausible as can be seen from the force of 'ते च नः प्रमाणम्*'. V₁, it may be noted, does not give any exposition of the syllogism. In any case, Y is certainly not referring to M, which on many grounds is clearly seen to be much later.

(vi) Regarding the similarities of expression in M and Y pointed out by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī we can only say that similar expressions are found in V₁ and V₂ also, and so cannot help us to arrive at any conclusion.

(vii) The text of kārīkās 26 and 28 as found in the different commentaries can prove of some help in determining their chronological order. In M, (V₁ and P) the sense-organs are mentioned in the kārīkā text (26) in the order—श्रोत्र, त्वक्, चक्षुः, रसन, नासिका; in G (and V₂) in the order—चक्षुः श्रोत्र, घ्राण, रसन, स्पर्शन; in Y in the order कर्ण, त्वक्, चक्षुः, रसन, नासिका; and in J and T in the order चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, घ्राण, रसन, त्वक्, (—the same as in V₂ and G). J discusses these in the order चक्षुः श्रोत्र, त्वक्, रसन, नासिका and comments शब्दवशादत्राक्रमः कृतः, कमस्तु श्रोत्र-त्वक्-चक्षुरिति. On the other hand, in the mention of the sense objects in kā. 28, we find the expression रूपादिषु (M, G, V₂, V₁, P, Y), but the author of Y has criticised this and recommended

* See किञ्च तन्त्रान्तरोक्तेः, तन्त्रान्तरेषु हि विन्ध्यवासिप्रभृतिभिराचार्यैरुपदिष्टाः; प्रमाणं नः ते आचार्या इत्यतश्चानुपदेशो जिज्ञासादीनामिति । Y, p. 4.

शब्दादिषु—When the senses were referred to, the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय was mentioned first and there is no reason for violating this order while mentioning their objects. Hence we should read शब्दादिषु, the reading रूपादिषु, being a careless one. J and T seem to have readily accepted this suggestion.

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī is of the view that till the time of M the kārīkā text was fixed, and it was only after the criticism of Y that शब्दादिषु came to be substituted for रूपादिषु in J and T. Hence the order should be M, Y, G, J and T.

Now that we have two more commentaries we can think afresh. V₁ has the same text as M. The text of kā. 26 in V₂ seems to be the original one (— it is followed by G, J and T—) and no special order seems to have been consciously followed. Generally the acceptable order would be श्रोत्र, त्वक्, चक्षुः, रसन and घ्राण in consonance with the order of their objects—शब्द, स्पर्श, रूप, रस, गन्ध in the order of their evolution. Or in agreement with रूप, etc. it would be चक्षुः etc.. रूपादिषु in kā. 28 agrees with the order in V₂. Along with this another reading of kā. 26 came into existence which mentioned the sense-organs in the order श्रोत्र, त्वक्, as we find in V₁ (and P), and which was definitely superior, but not the original one. But रूपादिषु in kā. 28 remained as it was, and this is what Y is criticising. In the light of Y's remark, J substituted शब्दादिषु in kā. 28 and made a comment in respect of the order in kā. 26 that it was not the proper order. M simply follows V₁. I have discussed the readings later.

(viii) M on kā. 43 describes the bhāvas as three-fold—sāmsiddhika, prākṛtika and vaikṛta. So does Y, which according to Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī follows M. But V₁ gives the same explanation. J and T describe them as only two-fold, 'prākṛtika' being regarded as an epithet of 'sāmsiddhika.'

(ix) In M, 18 we find a different interpretation referred to in अपरे पुनरुत्थिङ्कारं वर्णयन्ति..... Besides giving its own explanation, M refers to an explanation of जन्ममरण० put forth by others, according to which when one is born, at the same time another dies, whereas if there were one puruṣa all would be born or would die simultaneously. Now this is the explanation in Y, and since Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī regards M as the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, he is of the view that the passage अपरे पुनर्..... in M is a spurious one.

But as said above, we have this passage in V₁ also and as a matter of fact this view is found in V₂, Y, G and J. Thus, V₁ can be said to be later than V₂ and M is almost a copy of V₁. The author of V₁ besides giving his own explanation refers to the traditional interpretation of the kārikā.

References to Sāṃkhya in 'Alberuni's India'

It is held that Alberuni's references to Sāṃkhya are based on what must have been the original of the Chinese Version and Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī has tried to show that M was this original. But we have seen above that V₂ (or some other commentary very much like it, but not M or V₁) must have been

the original on which Paramārtha's Version was based. Most of the allusions in Alberuni tally with the corresponding passage in V₁, V₂, M or even G, because most of the expositions are the same in all. We shall discuss only a few important references here :

(a) Alberuni says that the book of Sāṃkhya derives action from matter. The task of the soul is to learn the action of matter like a spectator, resembling a traveller who sits down in a village to repose. Each villager is busy with his own particular work, but he looks at them and considers their doings, disliking some, liking others and taking an example from them. In this way he is busy without himself having any share in the business going on, and without being the cause which has brought it about. (See Alberuni's India, i, p. 48—Dr. Edward C. Sachau, S. Chand & Co., 1964).

This parable we find in the commentary on kā. 19 in V₂, V₁ and M. V₁ and M say that the said man staying in the town is कश्चिद्यमनियमरतः सांख्ययोगाचार्यः (—सांख्ययोगाचार्यरतः M—) भिक्षुः, whereas V₂ describes him as a parivrājaka in a village, and P as an ascetic mendicant. We may compare the wording in these :

यथा किल परिव्राजकः, स ग्रामे प्रतिवसति । ते ग्राम्या लोकाः क्षेत्रकर्मणि प्रवर्तन्ते निवर्तन्ते च । स परिव्राजकः केवलः एव मध्यस्थः तेषु प्रवर्तमानेषु न प्रवर्तते यस्मात्तस्मादकर्तेति तेषां कर्मणाम् ।—V₂

यजनयाजनाध्ययनाप्रतिग्रहकृषिवाणिज्यपौरुषाद्यासु क्रियासु वर्तमानानां नागराणां साक्षिमात्रो भवति । ऋतुवशाच्च शीतोष्णादीनागताननुभवति ।.....तद्यथाऽसौ भिक्षुर्नागराणां विवदतां कदाचिद् वक्ता भवति त्वया साधु कृतं त्वयाऽसाध्विति ।—V₁.

स च जनादिषु प्रतिवर्णाश्रमविहितासु क्रियासु प्रवर्तमानानां तन्नगरवासिनां साक्षिमात्रो भवति । ऋतुवशाच्च शीतोष्णादीनागताननुभवति.....यथासौ भिक्षुः कदाचिन्नागराणां विवदतां वक्ता भवति त्वया साधु कृतमिति त्वयाऽसाध्विति ।—M.

"Just as an ascetic mendicant resides at the same place and does not follow the persons who come and go, but contents himself with looking at them go about"—P.

V₂ is closest to P. Alberuni has turned the mendicant into a traveller who sits down in a village to repose. His act of liking or disliking the actions of the residents is not mentioned in V₂ and P; V₁ and M say that he acts as an arbitrator saying 'You have done what is good', 'You have done what is not good.' 'Taking an example' is not mentioned in any of the commentaries. These (liking-disliking-taking an example) might be consistent with the popular concept of a *sākṣin*, but not with the Sāṃkhya concept of *puruṣa* as a *sākṣin* and V₂ and P do not say anything to this effect. This might have been the way in which the parable was explained in some study-circles and this accounts for the wording in V₁, M and also Alberuni.

Alberuni further states : The book of Sāṃkhya brings action into relation with the soul, though the soul has nothing to do with action, only in so far as it resembles a man who happens to get into the company of people whom he does not know—robbers returning from a village they have sacked and destroyed. They are overtaken by the avengers. The whole party are taken prisoners, and together with them the innocent man is dragged off and treated precisely as they are, without having taken part in their action (Alberuni's India, i, pp. 48-49).

V₂, V₁ and M (kā 20) also give this parable. A *śrotriya brāhmaṇa* is said to accompany the robbers. P also says that a brahmin got in by error into the

company of brigands. Alberuni's description is a little more detailed.

Further, it is stated that people say that the soul resembles rain-water which comes down from heaven, always the same, and of the same nature; but it acquires different appearance, taste and smell according as it is gathered in vessels of different materials (gold, silver, glass, earthen ware or clay or bittersalt earth) (Alberuni's India, i, p. 49).

Actually this parable is meant to explain the diversity in the three worlds even when they have all evolved out of one *pradhāna*. V₁ and M do not state what the different receptacles could be. But V₂, 16 says : एकरस-मन्तरिक्षात्पतति जलं तच्च मेदिनीं प्राप्य नानारसतां प्रतिपद्यते पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात् । आकाशादोन्धारणभाजनेन (आकाशादुन्धारणभाजनेन or आकाशात् सुवर्णभाजनेन ?) परिगृहीतमम्भः मधुरभावेन परिणमते । The comparison is evidently not fully expanded here. P has here : "The water which comes from the atmosphere, is at the beginning of a single taste. It transforms itself when it arrives on the earth. It becomes of a varied taste, according to the different receptacles'. If it is a vase of gold, its taste is very sweet; if it is in the earth, its taste differs, according to the quality of the earth."

Alberuni seems to have expanded the idea further to clear his point.

(b) Alberuni narrates the parable of a man travelling towards the end of the night with his four pupils—this being meant, as Alberuni also says, to explain ignorance (doubt), incapacity, indolence or complacency and perfection. This is found in V₂, V₁, M, P, (kā. 46). But a close study of these shows that P is based on V₂ and

the style of V_2 and P is more dialogue-like, as also in Alberuni's book; and Alberuni seems to have made the narration more elaborate and clear when he says, "On coming near, he found it was pumpkins on which there lay a tangled mass of something. Now he knew that a living man, endowed with free will, does not stand still in his place until such a tangled mass is formed on his head, and he recognised at once that it was a life-less object standing erect. Further, he could not be sure if it was not a hidden place for some dunghill. So he went quite close to it, struck against it with his foot till it fell to the ground. Thus all doubt having been removed, he returned to his master and gave him the exact account. In this way the master obtained the knowledge through the intermediation of his pupils." (Alberuni's India, i, pp. 84-85).

None of the commentaries mentions that the master obtained the knowledge, as this is not the point at issue. Further with regard to the third pupil, Alberuni writes : "The third says : 'It is useless to examine what it is, for the rising of the day will reveal it. If it is something terrible it will disappear at daybreak; if it is something else, the nature of the thing will anyhow be clear to us.'" This is not what we find in any of the commentaries. According to M the third pupil does not want either to doubt or to know what it is, for he feels this will serve no purpose.

Actually as seen from the text of V_1 , there is a description of the successive states of one and the same person who passes through the condition of doubt, in-

capacity, complacence and perfection. M must have had the same idea. But the editor seems to have emended तृतीयम्, चतुर्थम् as तृतीयः, चतुर्थः respectively.

But V_2 says : स तृतीयो बटुः निरीक्ष्य उपाध्यायं ब्रवीति किमनेनावच्छिन्नेन सूर्य उदिते सार्धेन सह यास्यामः इति । उक्त्वा अज्ञात्वेष्टमसि प्रसुप्तः । एवं तृतीयस्य बटोः तुष्टिरुत्पन्ना । Compare P —"The disciple looks at it and says : 'Great master, of what good is it to examine it now ? At the rise of the sun a great caravan will pass by here, to which we can attach ourselves.' This third one, though he be not sure if it is a man or a post does not worry about it (contentment)."

It can be seen that both Paramārtha and Alberuni have tried to present the original in their own way, the latter trying to bring in the idea of the 'terrible' things popularly associated with darkness.

(c) We may mention one more point here. Alberuni says that the godly (spiritual) beings are enumerated at two places with different names (See Alberuni's India, i, p. 89).

We find the names of the godly beings in the commentaries on kārikās 44 and 53. Let us see how they are given :

Alberuni's list is—(i) Brahman, Indra, Prajāpati, Saumya, Gandharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Piśāca.

(ii) Brahman, Indra, Prajāpati, Gandharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Pitaras, Piśāca.

V_1 and M mention the same names at both the places—Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Aindra, Pitrya, Gāndharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Piśāca.

G—Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Saumya, Aindra, Gāndharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Piśāca (—same at both the places).

P—(i) Brahmā, master of the world (Prajāpati), god
(-Indra), Gandharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Yamarāja, demon.

(ii) King Brahmā, master of the world (Prajāpati),
master of the devas (devānām Indraḥ), Gandharva,
Asura, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Piśāca—This list is different
from that in P, 44.

Unfortunately, in V_2 both the lists are missing.
Scholars have somehow tried to explain away this
difference. But that the two lists were different cannot be
denied, and this is not what we find in V_1 , G and M.
Had V_2 not been missing here, it could have thrown
some light on Alberuni's remark, especially when the list
in G (44) agrees with the first list given by Alberuni. (It
has been shown elsewhere that G agrees with V_2 at a
number of places in respect of expression as also the
contents). Gauḍapāda must have taken care to see that
the two lists were identical. We find the two lists different
in P also, but the Chinese version cannot give us a
clear idea of what was there in the original.

Thus we have seen that from some striking references
we can conclude that V_2 (-or a commentary very
much like it-) was the source-book for Alberuni, as also
for P. And so we feel like agreeing with Aiyaswami
Sastri to this extent that the Chinese Version and
Alberuni's references to the Sāṃkhya doctrines have a
common source; and I believe that it was V_2 , though
both might have made some changes to make the
exposition interesting, or due to their peculiar cultural
bias.

References to the Sāṃkhya Kārikā in other works

Scholars have similarly examined the exposition of
some of the kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in Kumārila's Śloka-
vārttika (Anumāna 105), in Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā on the
Tattvasaṅgraha (7, 8, 9, 10, 14) and in the Tattva-
bodhavidhāyinī (pp. 111, 280-284) of Abhayadeva on the
Sanmatitarka-prakaraṇa. Aiyaswami Sastri has come to
the conclusion that these agree with the Chinese Version
and so must have been based on the original of the
Chinese version. Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī on the other hand
holds that they tally with M, and M itself is the original
of the Chinese version (See Sāṃkhya-darśana kā Itihāsa,
pp. 464 ff). I feel that the exposition and even the
wording is, in most cases, close to V_2 , though not the
same. The kārikās might have been explained
here on the basis of V_2 , though the authors have not
attempted to give the original exposition verbatim.
We may note one or two such references.

Explaining 'vaiśvarūpya' of Sāṃkhya Kārikā, 15,
the Tattvabodhavidhāyinī says :—वैश्वरूप्यम् इति त्रयो लोका
उच्यन्ते । एते हि प्रलयकाले क्वचिदविभागं गच्छन्ति । अविभागोऽविवेकः यथा
क्षीरावस्थायाम् 'अन्यत् क्षीरमन्यद् दधि' इति विवेको न शक्योऽभिधातुं तद्वत्
प्रलयकाले इदं व्यक्तम् इदमव्यक्तम् इति विवेकोऽशक्यक्रिय इति मन्यामहे—अस्ति
प्रधानं यत्र महदादि लिङ्गमविभागं गच्छतीति ।

Compare—न विभागः अविभागः तस्माद् अविभागात् । विश्वरूपता विश्वरूपत्व वैश्व-
रूप्यम् इति । वैश्वरूप्यं जगत् । त्रयो लोका इत्यर्थः । ते पञ्चसु भूतेषु अन्तर्भूता हि
तेषां लोकानां पृथिव्याप.....भूतानि तन्मात्रेषु अविभागं गच्छन्ति । अविभागो नाम
यथा अन्यत् क्षीरमन्यद् दधीति इदं तु न शक्यते वक्तुं [तथा] इदमव्यक्तमिदं व्यक्त-
मिति न शक्यते वक्तुम्, अन्यदहो अस्ति प्रधानं यस्मिन् महदादि लिङ्गमविभागं गच्छति
— V_2

न विभागोऽविभागः । विश्वरूपस्य भावो वैश्वरूप्यं बहुरूपमित्यर्थः । तत्र त्रैलोक्यं पञ्चसु महाभूतेष्वविभागं गच्छति ।..... एवं त्रयो लोकाः प्रलयकाले प्रधानेऽविभक्तास्तद्यथा दध्यादयः प्राक् प्रवृत्तेः क्षीरेऽविभक्ताः यथा जलभूम्योरेतद्रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेष्विति । एवं जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति ।
—V₁

न विभागोऽविभागः विश्वरूपस्य भावो वैश्वरूप्यम् । बहुरूपमित्यर्थः । तस्य । त्रैलोक्यं पञ्चसु महाभूतेष्वविभागं गच्छति । इत्थं त्रयो लोकाः प्रलयकाले प्रधानेऽविभक्ताः । प्रकर्षेण धीयते स्थाप्यते अत्राखिलमिति प्रधानम्M.

It can be seen that V₂ is closest to the exposition in the Tattvabodhavidhāyinī.

But explaining the word लिङ्गम् in kā. 10, the Tattvabodhavidhāyinī (p. 282) says : लयं गच्छति इति कृत्वा लिङ्गं च व्यक्तम् । तथा हि प्रलयकाले भूतानि तन्मात्रेषु लीयन्ते.....। लीनं वा अव्यक्त-लक्षणमर्थं गमयति व्यक्तं कार्यत्वाल्लिङ्गम् ; न त्वेवमव्यक्तम्, अकार्यत्वात्तस्य. M has simply लयं गच्छति इति लिङ्गम्. V₂ has not explained लिङ्गम् (or this portion of the text has been omitted by the copyist). P too has the same explanation as in M. But V₁ has : लयं गच्छति, लीनं परतन्त्रं भवति, लीनमर्थं लिङ्गयतीति वा लिङ्गम् । पञ्च महाभूतानि तन्मात्रेषु लयं गच्छन्ति..... एवं महदादि कार्यं लिङ्गम् । Thus we find in V₁ the second explanation of लिङ्गम् given in the Tattvabodhavidhāyinī, though the point is not pursued and the author is more interested in the exposition of लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्.

Y explains the word by लिङ्गं तल्लक्षणोपपन्नम् and J by लिङ्गयतेऽनेनाव्यक्तमिति लिङ्गम् । अथवा लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्.

Surprisingly, the Pañjikā (7) here gives only one interpretation लयं गच्छतीति कृत्वा. Abhayadeva must have been acquainted with V₁ also, though he generally follows V₂—perhaps due to the influence of the Pañjikā which he usually follows. Guṇaratna also says only : लिङ्गमिति यद्यस्मादुत्पन्नं तत्तस्मिन्नेव लयं क्षयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्.—See

his commentary (p. 103) on the Śaddarśanasamuccaya (Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1905).

This point, however small, is significant inasmuch as it shows that V₁ is later than V₂, but earlier than Y, and J. V₁ just ventured to suggest another explanation without pursuing it, while the others found this more acceptable. Nevertheless, the explanation लयं गच्छति was the traditional one.

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī has drawn our attention to some very striking similarities between P and M, which according to him show that P could only have been a translation of M (See 'Sāṃkhya Darśana kā Itihāsa, pp. 467-8).

(a) M has not explained अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च of kā. 18; and so also P. This could be possible only if P be a translation of M. (b) In kā. 11, M first states that ahaṃkāra is produced out of buddhi, and so on and then states that pradhāna also produces mahat (so both are prasavadharmin). P has done the same, though the author could have put it properly by beginning with Prakṛti. This shows, according to Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī, that P is beyond any doubt a translation of M.

In respect of (a), it can be said that it seems to be just an accident. Paramārtha, like the author of M later, thought it was self-explanatory and did not specifically explain it after translating it.

With regard to (b) we can only say that this is what we find in V₂ and V₁ also and this is but natural, as the commentaries remaining faithful to the text of the kārikā explain the characteristics in relation to the vyakta and then say that this is true of avyakta also.

It can be seen from the detailed comparison of the contents of M, G, V₁, V₂, and P that the Chinese version seems to be based on V₂, though Paramārtha might have had knowledge of V₁ (as he adopts certain readings of V₁). But in the face of a number of dissimilarities, and when it is found to tally more with V₂ than with V₁ or M, it is not proper to say that P was intended to be a translation of M or G. It might have been a translation of V₂ or of a commentary very much like V₂ (-if it at all existed). In my view, M is a much later commentary and it seems to be an enlarged and revised version of V₁ and is clearly influenced by Vedantic ideas.

Chronological Order of the Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā

The problem of the chronological order of the commentaries on the Sāṃkhya kārikā is a vexed one as hardly anything is known of their authors, and where the names of the authors are known it is difficult to identify them. Opinions are divided as regards the dates also of the commentaries. Now that we have two hitherto unknown commentaries, V₁ and V₂, with us, we may make a fresh attempt to determine the chronological order of these commentaries. We shall fix our attention mainly on V₁, V₂, M, G, Y, and J, as the date of 'T' is known, and other commentaries like the Candrikā of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha are very late. Instead of entering into a vague discussion we should try to base our conclusions on the original texts.

(A) A careful study of V₁ and V₂ shows that they are very much alike in respect of style and method of exposition. As said above M is obviously a revised copy of V₁. Let us now examine the texts and see what they have to tell us.

(1) Kā. 1. ०चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोभावात्—V₁ explains this thus : किञ्चिद्वयं ब्रूयोऽष्टांग आयुर्वेदे द्वौ दोषौ संभाव्येते नैकान्तभावो नात्यन्तभावश्चेति. So the kārikā should be read according to V₁ as चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोभावात्, where the answer 'No' to the objection raised is understood. According to the other commentaries the kārikā should be construed as ०न, एकान्तात्यन्ततोभावात्. V₂ is very brief here and is clearly the earliest of the commentaries. The expression in the kārikā is a bit peculiar and has to be explained with the use of the words एकान्ताभाव and अत्यन्तभाव (or अत्यन्ततो दुःखनिवृत्तेः अभावः...See T). V₁ is the

only commentary adducing नैकान्तभाव and नात्यन्तभाव as the reasons. No other commentary followed it in this respect.

The following parallel expressions also need some consideration : शारीरस्य तावद् अष्टांगः आयुर्वेदः, तद्यथा कायशल्यशलाको(का)-विषोन्मादक्लीबजराकुमारविचिकित्सितानि—V₂;

शारीरस्य तावदष्टाङ्ग आयुर्वेदः कायशल्यस्य शलाकी(का or को) विषोन्माद-क्लीबजराणां कुमारविचिकित्सितानि—V₁;

अष्टाङ्गायुर्वेदविदः मिषजः कायशल्यशलाकाविषोन्मादक्लीबजराकुमारचिकित्सा-निपुणाः—M. The expression in M is much more compact than in the others. V₁ seems to be consciously bringing in the idea of remedy for different types of ailment. Of course, this is not a very sure evidence; it can only serve to corroborate other proofs.

(2) Kā. 2. न घ(न)र्मयुक्तमृत्तं.....—This stanza is found quoted in only V₁ and V₂. In many other respects, in matter of style and the like, V₂ and V₁ are alike and do not seem to be much separated in time, though V₂ seems to be the earlier of the two.

(3) Kā. 4. A stanza giving the definition of āgama is quoted in V₂, V₁, G and M. In V₂ it is quoted as आगमा ह्याप्तवचनमस्ति दोषक्षयं विदुः.....; in V₁ as आगमो ह्याप्तवचनमाप्तं दोषक्षयं विदुः.....which is obviously not proper. In G and M we find आगमो ह्याप्तवचनमाप्तं दोषक्षयविदुः. Could we say that V₁ was influenced by V₂ and hence this inconsistency could occur? See Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa, pp. 379-380 : तथा चोक्तम्—

आगमो ह्याप्तवचनमस्ति दोषक्षयं विदुः ।

क्षीणदोषोऽस्तु वाक्यं न ब्रूयाद्धेतुसंभवात् ॥ इति (Śaddarśana Prakāśana Pratīṣṭhāna, Vārāṇasī) :

(4) Kā. 5. आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनम्—According to V₁ and V₂, āptaśruti signifies the intuition of āptas like Hari, Hara or the like, viz. the Veda; and āptavacana signifies

the utterances of the authors of the dharmaśāstras, viz. Manu and others. P has the same interpretation. But here the distinction of 'lakṣya-lakṣaṇa is not maintained. G and M explain differently—āpta signifies the ācāryas, Brahmā and the like, and Śruti signifies Veda; both these are meant by āptavacana. M further refers to the three kinds of lakṣaṇā and concludes that āptavacana refers to what is relevant here, viz. the view of Kapila.

Y gives different interpretations so as to comprehend the Vedas, utterances of Manu and such other ācāryas and of all reliable persons versed in the different arts—आप्ता चासौ श्रुतिः, आप्तेभ्यः श्रुतिराप्तश्रुतिः, आप्तश्रुतिश्चाप्तश्रुतिः सरूपाणामित्येकशेषः (Veda, and the teachings of Manu and the like and of experts).

J accepts out of these आप्तेभ्यः श्रुतिः and justifies how āpta-vacana and āpta-śruti could be the same—आप्तेभ्यो या श्रुतिपरम्परया श्रुतिरागता तद् आप्तवचनम्, तैर्दृष्टोऽनुमितो वार्थः परत्र स्वबोव-सदृशबोधान्तरोत्पत्तये शब्देनोपदिश्यते. T is conscious that it needs to be specifically pointed out which expression signifies the definition (लक्षण) and which the thing defined (लक्ष्य). So it says : आप्तवचनमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आप्ता प्राप्ता युक्तेति यावत् । आप्ता चासौ श्रुतिश्चेति आप्तश्रुतिः । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं वाक्यार्थज्ञानम्.

Here V₁ and V₂ are the same. Y accepts this meaning, but explains आप्तश्रुति as an ekaśeṣa-samāśa conveying all this meaning and regards āptavacana as the name of the pramāṇa and contends that thereby the kārīkā refutes the view that śabda can be included in anumāna. The author of J is not keen on including the Veda in particular under āptavacana, so it justifies how āptavacana is āptaśruti. He takes the hint from आप्तेभ्यः

श्रुति: of Y. G and M explain आसृति as a dvandva compound. This suggests the order V₂, V₁, Y, J, T. I refrain from saying anything yet regarding G and M, but M seems to be later than G.

(5) In V₁ and V₂ (and also P) the method adopted at some places is that of a dialogue between the pupil and the teacher. The pupil asks the teacher a question arising from the latter's exposition. V₂ uses the term अनंतरप्रश्न, a question contained in and arising from what has been previously stated. After answering this it is said, 'प्रकृतं वक्ष्यामः, we come to the point.' V₁ uses the term अनन्तरप्रश्न—the teacher asks the pupils to ask the next question (See introductory passage to kā. 9). Or could this be a scribal error?

(6) Kā. 11—अचेतनम् is explained by सुखदुःखमोहाज वेदयतीत्यर्थः in V₁, V₂ and J. G and M use the word चेतयति instead of वेदयति, this being meant to explain the term चेतन and a conscious improvement on वेदयति. Similarly, in the explanation of प्रसववर्त्मि, V₁ and V₂ use the term प्रसवति, whereas the other commentaries change the grammatical construction and employ प्रसूयते or प्रसूयन्ते. And V₁ and V₂ use the expression निःसामान्यः पुरुषः, whereas the others use the term असामान्यः.

Another point worth nothing is that here V₁, P and J specifically mention that puruṣas are many and that in respect of anekatva puruṣa is like vyakta and unlike avyakta. V₂ has failed to mention this point and perhaps V₁ corrects it. G and M on the other hand say that puruṣa is one like avyakta. Could this be due to the Vedantic trend of their authors? Or were they

carried away by the point to point similarity between avyakta and puruṣa?

(7) Kā. 18—V₁ (—and so also M—) has given its own explanation of जन्मनियमात् and मरणनियमात् (Some are born high, others low, and so forth) and then stated that others explain this as जन्ममरणनियमात् (—when one is born, at the same time another dies, whereas if there were one puruṣa all would be born, or would die simultaneously). This latter is the explanation found in V₂, P, G, J and T. The two interpretations are not substantially much different. The emphasis in one is on different creatures having their own birth (at their own time and of their own kind—high or low), as also death. The emphasis in the other is on different creatures having different contrary experiences (which cannot co-exist in one) at the same time. The idea of contrary experience is clearly brought out in Y and also somewhat in the interpretation presented after अग्रे वर्णयन्ति in V₁ (—and after अपरे पुनरित्यङ्कारं वर्णयन्ति in M—), though even in V₂, P, G, J and T the idea is the same that if there were one puruṣa all would be born at the same time and all would die at the same time. It seems that the first interpretation given by V₁ is its author's own while the one referred to is the one handed down by tradition. V₁ seems to have presented the idea in V₂ so as to pointedly show the difference, as also to bring out the contrariness of the experiences of birth and death which cannot co-exist in one. Y has done so even more precisely. V₂ should be prior to V₁ which in its turn should be prior to Y.

(8) Kā. 40—भावैरधिवासितम्—V₁ and M explain this by 'influenced by devabhāva etc.', V₂ says: 'The bhāvas

are explained later on, the subtle body is influenced by these. P interprets this by saying that the subtle body is influenced by the three states of being mentioned later on (i e. in kā. 43), viz. the samsiddhika, prakṛtika and vaikṛta. Y, J and T interpret this as 'influenced by the eight, viz. dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, etc.' G's explanation is 'influenced by the bhāvas, dharma, etc. which are explained later on'. The latter explanation (found in Y, J, T, G) is more precise and this serves to indicate that V₁, V₂ and P are earlier than Y, etc.. Here too V₂ is more faithful to the text of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā which uses the term bhāva for samsiddhika, etc., whereas V₁ gives the details of these bhāvas (-devabhāva, etc.). It may be noted that G and J use the expression उपरञ्जितम् (G) or उपरक्तम् (J), 'coloured' to explain अधिवासितम् ('scented'); that is to say, they change the metaphor. This shows that G and J are related and perhaps G is prior to J (-उपरञ्जितम् is in sound more alike to अधिवासितम् than उपरक्तम् is). Thus G and J seem to be posterior to V₂, V₁ and Y and even here V₁ seems to be posterior to V₂.

Moreover निरुपभोगम् in this kārikā is explained by V₂, G, J and T as conveying that the subtle body is not capable of experiencing anything in the absence of the gross body (-Y is substantially the same); whereas V₁ and M explain thus : शब्दादयो विषया उपभोगास्तैर्विरहितम्. This only shows that V₂, G, J, T mostly constitute one line of influence, whereas V₁, and M belong to another.

(9) A stanza enumerating the ten मूलकार्थs is found in V₂ (kā. 21), V₁, M (kā. 72), J (51). The author of Y seems to have composed his own stanzas on the basis

of these (See Y, pp. 1-2), and T quotes these. No such stanza is found in G. We find अकर्तृत्व (or अकर्तृता or अकर्तृभाव) in Y, J, T and in the commentaries on the Tattvasamāsa in the place of निवृत्ति in the stanza quoted in V₂ and V₁. The same stanza as in V₂ and V₁ is quoted from Devala in Aparāditya's commentary on the Prayāścittādhyāya, 108 of Yājñavalkyasmṛti (See Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī's 'Sāṃkhyadarśana kā Itihāsa,' pp. 399-400). We find on the other hand अकर्तृत्व in the list in the Dvādaśāranayacakra (p. 411) of Mallavādin (Labdhisurishwar Jain Granthamala No. 26)—प्रत्ययसर्गास्तित्वैकत्वा-र्थवत्त्वपाराध्यान्यत्वाकर्तृत्वपुरुषबहुत्वयोगवियोगस्थितिषयस्य शास्त्रस्य.... 'स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः' elsewhere signifies one topic, so here Mallavādin seems to have mentioned only sthiti. See चक्रभ्रमवदिति शेषवृत्तिः सिद्धा—V₁; 'चक्रभ्रमवद् धृताशरीर' इति स्थितिः सिद्धा—M. Y has स्थिति; while J after quoting the above-mentioned stanza, in the course of explanation says स्थिति-मूलसूक्ष्मचिह्नम् । वक्ष्यति 'तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्' इति. The reading विशेषवृत्तिः also seems to have been there (See M).

अथो निवृत्तिः must have been the original reading. But the अकर्तृभाव of पुरुष though an important tenet of Sāṃkhya philosophy is not included here, while निवृत्ति could be included in वियोग also; so another reading stating अकर्तृभाव must have come into existence, and this was readily accepted by those who were interested in the exposition of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Even so, V₂, V₁ seems to be the earliest of the commentaries. Y seems to be the first to include अकर्तृभाव; it might have itself made this innovation, which it was capable of doing.

(10) Kā. 14—V₂ says here अविवेक्यादिर्गणः अचेतनान्तो व्यक्ते सिद्धः—This is not quite proper as प्रसववर्म्मि is not included,

though V_2 has used the word पञ्चक. V_1 seems to correct V_2 when it says योऽयमविवेक्यादिर्गणः प्रसवधर्म्यन्तः स व्यक्ते सिद्धः. Similarly V_1 has सन्निकृष्टे व्यक्तम् for सन्निकृष्टेऽप्रधानम् of V_2 , which is not very precise.

Moreover, V_2 , V_1 G and M explain तद्विपर्ययाभावात् thus : Where threads are seen, cloth also is seen and vice versa; similar is the relation of vyakta and avyakta, there is non-existence of the contrary. The significance of त्रैगुण्यात् is not very clearly brought out by them; only V_1 and M argue यन्निगुणं तदविविक्तं, यदविविक्तं तद्विषयं, यद्विषयं तत्सामान्यं, यत्सामान्यं तदचेतनं, यदचेतनं तत्प्रसवधर्मि. P has "Inseparability and the other (properties) can be established by the (three) gunas, and by the non-existence of the contrary." That is to say, if these properties did not exist in the cause (avyakta), these would not have been there even in the vyakta.

Y says here rather abruptly यस्माद् गुणविपर्ययः क्षेत्रज्ञः । तत्र विषयत्वमचेतनत्वं प्रसवधर्मित्वं च न भवतीति पुरस्तात् प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मात् परिशेषतो व्यक्ते एतेषां धर्माणामविरोधः. J explains : त्रैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादेरभावात्...Where there is absence of traigunya, there is absence of these properties also; puruṣa which is nirguṇa cannot possibly have these characteristics which are established on the strength of traigunya. J and T have taken the hint from Y. (T explains विपर्ययाभावात् as विपर्ययेऽभावात्). According to Y, J and T विपर्ययाभावात् puts forth a vyatireki hetu — 'because in puruṣa, in the absence of avivekitva, etc. there is absence of traigunya.'

V_2 is brief here and lacking in precise expression. G is clearly influenced by V_2 here and is not as clear as the others. G seems to regard विपर्ययाभावात् and कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य as two hetus establishing avyakta and

also its having these properties, while त्रैगुण्यात् establishes avivekitva, etc. in respect of महदादि. V_1 and M admit three hetus here. So also P through it does not say so.

According to Y and J, the second line establishes these characteristics in respect of avyakta, whereas the first line proves the statement in kā. 11, by saying that vyakta is aviveki, etc. as it has the three guṇas. T says that the second line establishes the existence of avyakta. T has tried to improve on Y and J,—if the properties are proved due to त्रैगुण्य they are proved in respect of both vyakta and avyakta, and so in the view of T the second line proves the existence of avyakta in which these properties could exist. Here T has remained faithful to the actual wording of the kārikā, though as V_2 clearly says, the author of the kārikā perhaps only wants to say here that avyakta is established as having these properties.

This shows that G was written on the lines of V_2 ; and it tried to improve on V_2 as much as possible. V_1 also, as seen above, improved on V_2 . J and T were influenced by Y, which for the first time explained precisely the argument in this kārikā.

(11) Kā. 65— V_1 and V_2 have the reading सत्स्वरूप-विनिवृत्तः, (—epithet of puruṣa), whereas G, J, T M, have सत्स्वरूपविनिवृत्ताम् (—epithet of prakṛti) (—This portion is missing in Y). सत्स्वरूपविनिवृत्ताम् is more in consonance with kā. 63, and seems to be a conscious change made later. Paramārtha seems to have read something like सर्वरूपविनिवृत्ता, which would include even jñāna (because he wanted to avoid the term सत्स्वरूप of kā. 63, which he omitted). This also shows that V_1 and V_2 are earlier than the others.

The above discussion enables us to see that V_1 and V_2 are similar in style, V_2 being the earlier of the two. G was written on the lines of V_2 and M is a copy of V_1 . Y explained the *Kārikā* very precisely and systematically for the first time, perhaps reading much more logic in it than even the author meant. J and T were influenced by Y , T being very much on the lines of J .

(B) Now we may see if we can find any influence of V_2 on the other commentaries as this would further help us to determine the order.

(12) The illustrations of पूर्ववत्, शेषवत् and सामान्यतोदृष्ट अनुमानः—

पूर्ववत्—All mention the inference प्रावृद्धकाले मेघमुत्थितं दृष्ट्वा वृष्टिर्भविष्यति इति. Only, M is more precise—विशिष्टमेघोन्नतिदर्शनात् भवित्री वृष्टिर् संभावयति. पूर्ववत् is explained in V_2 and V_1 thus : यस्मात् पूर्व मेघः पश्चाद् वृष्टिः. Y , G and J on the other hand use the expression पूर्वम् (पूर्वं लिङ्गम्— J) अस्यास्ति इति पूर्ववत् (See यत्र कारणेन कार्यमनुमीयते—*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1.1.5). M on the other hand seems to say that *pūrvavat* is based on earlier experience—पूर्वमियं दृष्टेति पूर्ववत्. (Compare अथवा पूर्ववदिति यत्र यथापूर्वं प्रत्यक्षभूतयोरन्यतरदर्शनेनान्यतरस्याप्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानम्—यथा धूमेनाग्निरिति—*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1.1.5) M explains it also as inference of cause from effect—नदीपूरदर्शनादुपरि वृष्टे देव इति वा प्रतीतिः.

For शेषवत्, V_2 , V_1 , G and M give the illustration of tasting a few drops of sea-water and inferring that sea-water is salty. (The Buddhist work *Upāya-hṛdaya* gives this very illustration). P and J give the illustration “Seeing the water of a river recently muddled they know that rain has fallen higher up the river.” (Compare—पूर्वोदकविपरीतमुदकं नद्याः पूर्णत्वं शीघ्रत्वं च दृष्ट्वा स्रोतसोऽनुमीयते भूता वृष्टिरिति—*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1.1.5.). P and J might have introduced this change in view of the

illustration in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* 1.1.5 and the discussion in *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, 2.1.38–39. These clearly seem to be guided by the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.

सामान्यतोदृष्ट is not found explained in V_1 . V_2 , P , G , M give the illustration of seeing the mangoes flower at one place and inferring that they are in flower everywhere. J gives the same illustration as in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and other works—inference of the movement of the Sun from change of place as in the case of Devadatta.

Y has knowledge of all these illustrations that are put forth and gives its own set of illustrations, and is keen on defending these from the attacks of others : पूर्ववत्—मेघोदये भवितव्यता वृष्टेः; शेषवत्—कुमारकं दृष्ट्वा द्वयसमापत्तिं प्रतिपद्यते; सामान्यतोदृष्ट—कचिद् धूमाग्निसंबन्धं दृष्ट्वा कचिद् धूमान्तरेणान्यन्तरस्यास्तित्वं प्रतिपद्यते. This presupposes more serious thinking on the part of logicians and we have parallel discussions in the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila.

It may be noted that when Y refers to समुद्रादेः समुद्रकविन्दुं प्राश्य शेषस्य लवणताऽनुमीयते, it seems to be using the expression of V_2 . V_1 , G and M use the word लवणभावः; and V_1 (—so also M —) employs the expression लवणसमुद्रोदकविप्रुषः; and G , समुद्रोदकं जरुपलम्.

(13) *Kā.* 16— V_1 and M have not attached much importance to the illustration सलिलवत् in this *kārikā*. They simply say : यथा : सलिलमेकं हिमवति हिमभावेन परिणमति and then switch over to यथेक्षुरसो रसिका.... V_2 , Y , G , J and T , on the other hand, explain सलिलवत् properly, though in their own way. V_2 and P say that water from the *antarikṣa* becomes of a varied taste according to the respective receptacles. G , J and T are to the same effect. It is interesting to note that before giving the example

of water from the antarikṣa, V₂ refers to water drunk by serpents, cows and camels turning into poison, milk and urine. Y combines both these : यथान्तरिक्षादविशिष्टस्याम्भसः प्रच्युतिराश्रयाणां गोभुजङ्गोष्ठादीनां विशेषात् क्षीरमूत्रविषादिवैश्वरूप्यं प्रतिपद्यते. This is a summarised form of the explanation in V₂.

Another point worth noting is that the second line as commented upon by V₂ apparently seems to be परिणामतः सलिलवत् पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात्, while according to the others it is परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्. V₁, P, Y and M do not show any special interest in the expression प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्, whereas G, J and T have specifically explained it. In the explanation of this term, V₁, Y, G and M seem to understand this as गुणानामाश्रयाः—they undergo different forms according to the receptacles of the guṇas. J and T on the other hand take guṇas themselves as the āśrayas—the distinctions based on the guṇas. The authors of G, J and T seem to have noted the drawback in the earlier commentaries (V₂, V₁, Y) and specifically explained the term.

It may be noted that the kārikā text of V₂ has प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् and not पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात्. The author of V₂ (—See also P—) might have just omitted to explain the term प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् and not have intended पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात् as a part of the pratīka, though from the point of view of metre it is perfectly alright. Or could there have been an āryā in V₂ containing this expression, as there is a Chinese verse in P containing an expression to the same effect? Or could it be that the author of V₂ thought that the kārikā could have been simpler with पृथक्पृथग्भाजनविशेषात् ?

Moreover, applying the simile सलिलवत्, V₂, P, G and J explain how avyakta is modified as deva, manuṣya and tiryak, and Y and T simply speak of different modifications. V₁ mentions here the ādhyātmika (buddhi, ahaṁkāra, etc.), ādhidaivika (śīta, uṣṇa, etc.) and ādhibhautika (deva, gandharva, etc.) modifications. (The last, ādhibhautika, is missing in M). V₁ tries at many places to give a different interpretation and we find Y, G, J mostly following V₂.

(14) Kārikā 27—This kārikā according to V₂ and Y is : संकल्पकमत्र मनः तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथा समाख्यातम् । अन्तर्लोकालविषयं तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत् ॥ Paramārtha's reading tallies with the first line but the second line is the same as in G, J and T (गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यमेदाश्च, V₁ has °बाह्यमेदाच्च and M °प्राह्यमेदाच्च). The first line in V₁, M, G, J and T is उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्. It is very interesting to note that V₂ comments very briefly on, in fact restates अन्तर्लोकालविषयम्...and then after the discussion as to the kārṭr of the eleven organs gives an exposition of गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वम् as explaining the origin and location of the organs. The kārikā is translated in P thus : "Manas is that which discerns. One says that the organ is of two sorts : it is modified according to the variations of the three guṇas (on the one hand) and according to external differences (on the other hand)." P explaining that the different organs receive their respective places due to the three guṇas, says : "The manas is modified according to the variations of the three guṇas and according to external differences. Among the organs there are those which apprehend objects close by, while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double, (i) to avoid danger; (ii) to protect the

body. 'To avoid danger' (relates to the eyes and ears, which) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. 'To protect the body' (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body according to these objects.' This is not found elsewhere. It may be noted that from एतस्माद् ब्रवीमि गुणपरिणामविशेषादेव इन्द्रियाणां बहिर्भेदादेव निक्षेप इति in V_2 , both बाह्यमेदाच्च and बाह्यमेदाश्च can be gathered. As a matter of fact, even the line उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् can be derived from V_2 , which is unfortunately confused.

From this we can make a surmise. The author of V_2 perhaps had two readings of the *kārikā* before him and incorporated both of them in his exposition. Or, he had only one reading, but gave a detailed exposition regarding the कर्तु and निक्षेप of the indriyas, which did not directly follow from the *kārikā* (-Y does not discuss these points). The later commentators tried to improve on the *kārikā* on the basis of this exposition so that all this could follow from the *kārikā* and so could be relevant. This perhaps accounts for the different readings in the second line as found in others (बाह्यमेदाच्च, बाह्यमेदाश्च). The first line according to P tallies with the first line in V_2 , and the second with that of V_1 . But perhaps Paramārtha wondered how all of a sudden the second line could refer to all the organs when the context required that it should be about manas only. He tried to explain this in his own way, as seen above, and that is why an exposition corresponding to that in P is not found elsewhere. Other commentators, it is likely, changed

the first line also in the light of V_2 so as to avoid repetition. (Y makes a conscious effort to show that the second line explains that mind can be both a बुद्धोन्द्रिय and a कर्मेन्द्रिय because of its distinguishing characteristic, viz. त्रिकालविषयत्व). The first line in these is not quite satisfactory as it should mean : 'Mind is उभयात्मक-संकल्पक and इन्द्रिय', but then साधर्म्यात् hangs somewhat loose. The author of V_1 seems to have made this change in the original *kārikā*.

(15) *Kārikā* 28—आलोचनमात्रम्—The different commentaries explain the significance of मात्र here as follows :

मात्रशब्दोऽविशेषव्यावृत्त्यर्थः— V_2 ; मात्रग्रहणं च [विशेषार्थम्]— V_1 (—Compare मात्रशब्दो विशेषार्थः—M). V_1 tries to put it positively. मात्रशब्दो विशेषनिवृत्त्यर्थः—Y. Could this mean that the term मात्र is meant to exclude the particular operations of other organs? Or should it be मात्रशब्दोऽविशेषनिवृत्त्यर्थः as in V_2 —to exclude the idea that the functions of all are common? G combined the interpretation of both V_2 and V_1 in मात्रशब्दो विशेषार्थः अविशेषनिवृत्त्यर्थः. G seems to be indebted to both V_2 and V_1 . Anyway, V_1 seems to be posterior to V_2 , and Y and G to both V_2 and V_1 .

(16) *Kārikā* 38— V_1 , G and M explain शान्त as signifying सुखलक्षण and J explains it as meaning सुखप्रद. V_2 on the other hand says : शान्ताः सुखलक्षणाः प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गात् । हर्षप्रीतयः प्रसादाः सुखम् ; and Y—शान्तास्तावत् स्वसंस्कारविशेषयोगात् तत्संनिधौ प्रसादादिधर्मोत्पत्तेः ; and T—शान्ताः सुखाः प्रकाशाः लघवः. V_2 and Y are alike here. (V_2 does not say anything about घोर and मूढ.)

(17) *Kārikā* 70— V_2 says here that Kapila imparted this knowledge to Āsuri out of compassion and not for any evil purpose (?) or any evil design (नाप्यधर्मार्थम्). This must originally have been : नापि धर्मार्थम् or नापि

धर्माद्यर्थम्. It is interesting to compare Y which seems to clarify the abrupt statement, or expand the statement, in V₂. See आह—संप्रदानस्याकस्मिकत्वं धर्मादिनिमित्तानुपपत्तेः । न तावत् परमर्वेधमर्थं शास्त्रप्रदानमुपपद्यते फलेनानभिष्वङ्गात् । नार्थकामार्थं शिष्याणामनायासप्रसङ्गात् । न मोक्षार्थम्—सांसिद्धिकेनैव ज्ञानेन तत्प्राप्तेः । तस्माद्विपरीतार्थासम्भवात् परिशेषादकस्मादाचार्यः शास्त्रनिधानं प्रददाविति । उच्यते—नाकस्मात् । किं तर्हि ? अनुकम्पया प्रदर्शय—Y.

We have seen that V₂ is definitely prior to V₁ and Y as these seem to be influenced by V₂. By the bye, we have taken note of the indebtedness of other commentaries also to V₂.

(C) Now we may consider a few points in G in relation to V₂.

(18) Kārikā 9—Explaining असदकरणात्, V₂, P and G give only the example सिकताभ्यः तैलम्. V₁ and M give in addition the examples of कूर्मरोमपटप्रावरण, वन्ध्यादुहितृ (वन्ध्यादुहितृ-भ्रूविलास-M), शशविषाण and खपुष्प (only in M). (Actually these examples change the point at issue. The kāraṇa is regarded as existent by both the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya; only the Vaiśeṣika does not regard the effect as potentially existent in the cause even before it is produced.) This shows M's dependence on V₁ and the latter's desire to add a few examples to the one given by V₂. G has understood V₂ very well here. Similarly the wording in G, 42 clearly shows that it is based on V₂ as M is based on V₁.

(19) Kārikā 3—The expression षोडशक एव विकृतिः in V₂, 3 is not meant to be a pratika (it is just a paraphrase) because V₂ itself says 'तु' शब्दोऽत्रावधारणार्थम् and षोडशकस्तु विकृतिः would make the āryā defective. It is interesting to note that with षोडशक एव विकृतिः, the āryā would be alright. Was

this some loud thinking on the part of the author of V₂ who thought that विकृतिः should preferably be used here in view of the wording of the kārikā as a whole; and when तु is used in the sense of एव? He has paraphrased षोडशकस्तु विकारः of the kārikā. G and J specifically say that विकार signifies विकृति only. This shows that either G and J had V₂ in view or were thinking on the same lines. (J reads षोडशकश्च विकारः and says चकारः एवकारार्थः । विकारो विकृतिरेव. See also एष षोडशको गणो विकृतिरेव । विकारो विकृतिः—G).

(20) Kārikā 6—V₁, M and Y do not comment on the second line of kār. 6. On the other hand, V₂, P and G say that we know इन्द्रो देवराजा, उत्तराः कुरवः from āptavacana and J says we know of svarga and apavarga from it. Actually, there was hardly any need to refer to āgama in respect of the proof of Sāṃkhya principles. G and J seem to be influenced by V₂ here; only, J gives a more relevant explanation. V₂ moreover defines āpta thus : यो यत्र निगुक्तः कर्मणा वा तुष्टः तेन तत्रोपदेशः क्रियते—the same idea as in स्वकर्मण्यभिगुक्तः.....quoted (kār. 4) in G, J and M, only not so precise and well expressed.

It may be noted that G is influenced by V₂ in the interpretation of kār. 14. (see 'Comparison').

(21) Kārikā 36—एते in this kārikā is construed as follows :

एते इति पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन इति—V₁, एते इति बुद्धिकर्मान्तःकरणमेदाः त्रयोदश—M; एते इत्यनेन त्रयमभिसंबन्धाति श्रोत्रादीनामन्यतमं मनोऽहङ्कारश्च—Y; श्रोत्रादयो वागादयो बुद्ध्यादयश्चेत्येते त्रयोदश गुणविशेषाः—J. T understands by एते—बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराः. G construes : यानि करणानि उक्तानि एते गुणविशेषाः. V₂ makes some comment on the use of the masculine in एते. The word विशेष is always of the masculine gender, so it cannot affect the

gender of एतद्, and we should have एतानि referring to the eleven इन्द्रिय and अहङ्कार. G has straightaway construed एते with गुणविशेषाः. G seems to have got the suggestion from V₂.

(22) Kārikā 40—The explanation of पूर्वोक्तम् in V₂ and G is similarly worded and shows that G used the expression of V₂. See यदा लोका नोत्पद्यन्ते तदा प्रधानोत्पन्नं सूक्ष्मशरीरं तस्मादुच्यते पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—V₂; यदा लोका अनुत्पन्नाः प्रधानादिसर्गे तदा सूक्ष्मशरीरमुत्पन्नम्—G. J and T are alike here in point of expression. And J and T seem to have polished the explanation of नियतम् in V₂.

(D). (23) Kārikā 5. तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गपूर्वकम्—V₂, V₁, G and J give examples of लिङ्गं दृष्ट्वा लिङ्गी साध्यते, as also लिङ्गिनं दृष्ट्वा लिङ्गं साध्यते. Y does not comment on this. P just explains how inference is possible : “It implies a characteristic mark and that which bears that mark.....When one perceives the mark, the proof can be established by inference”. M gives only one example—लिङ्गेन त्रिदण्डादिदर्शनेनादृष्टोऽपि लिङ्गी साध्यते नूनमसौ परिव्राजस्ति यस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति. V₂, V₁, and M employ the terms त्रिदण्ड and परिव्राज् whereas G employs दण्ड and गति; and J, विरुत and कोकिल.

V₂ and J mention seven relations that can exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गिन्—स्वस्वामिसम्बन्ध, प्रकृति-विकारः, कार्य-कारणः, मात्रा-मात्रिकः (पात्र-पात्रिकः in J), प्रतिद्वन्द्विः, सहचरः (साहचर्यं in J), निमित्त-नैमित्तिक. V₂ does not illustrate these while J does. It may be noted that inference on the basis of seven kinds of relations is refuted in the Nyāya-Vārttika, 1.1.5 and Vācaspati commenting on this quotes the following verse :

मात्रा-निमित्त-संयोगि-विरोधि-सहचारिभिः ।

स्वस्वामि-वध्यघाताद्यैः सांख्यानं सप्तधाऽनुमा ॥

(Tātparya Tīkā, p. 165)

Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa attributes the verse to a Sāṃkhya-vārttika. We cannot say anything about this. It is surprising that Y does not comment on तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गपूर्वकम्. Or were the leaves irrecoverably lost at a very early stage ? Y's exposition could have thrown much light, especially when it is referred to as Vārttika by Vācaspati and others.

The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra too has defined anumāna as knowledge from a mark or sign (lāṅgikam jñānam). This mark of inference is said to be of two kinds—dr̥ṣṭa (seen) and adr̥ṣṭa (unseen) or sāmānyato-dr̥ṣṭa (seen in general). The līṅga functions on the strength of certain relations in which things stand to each other. These relations are enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 9. 2. 1: The līṅga can be the (i) effect of, (ii) cause of, (iii) conjoined with, (iv) opposed to, (v) inherent in the sādhyā (अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि विरोधि समवायि चेति लैङ्गिकम्). (See also Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 3. 1. 9–13). The Buddhist and the Jaina logicians also mention some such relations by way of illustration. Praśastapāda clarifies that ultimately it is avinābhāva or invariable concomitance that determines the relation of līṅga and sādhyā, those mentioned being merely illustrative. (Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, pp. 103–104). Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and others are of the same view and the Buddhists include all relations in causality (kārya-kāraṇabhāva), identity (svabhāva) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) (See Pramāṇa-Vārttika 3.30, 37, Nyāya-bindu 2. 12 ff).

The Sāṃkhya commentators (esp. V₂) seem to have made use of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. Anyhow this

discussion to some extent explains the mention of the relations in V_2 and J and shows J's indebtedness to V_2 .

(E) From the above it can be seen that V_2 is prior to V_1 , as also to Y, G, J which are influenced by it at a number of places. I have earlier given a detailed comparative study of the commentaries (mainly V_2 , V_1 , P, G, M) and shown that if any commentary can claim to be the original of P it is V_2 . We shall consider only one or two points here.

(24) Kārikā 27- V_1 has not made any attempt to explain how manas could be called संकल्पक. G, J and M simply draw our attention to the fact that the vṛtti of manas is of the form of saṃkalpa. Y as usual explains this at length and so does T. V_2 and P give an example of this sort of function of the mind and this we find referred to in Buddhist and Jaina works (see Tattvasaṃgraha-Pañjikā, 7; Tattvabodha-vidhāyinī, p. 281). As I have pointed out in the 'Comparison,' many parables are narrated in the same way in V_2 and P.

(25) Kā. 12—सपत्नी. Explaining this term (in the example showing how a good lady representing the sattvaguna can cause sukha, duḥkha and moha), V_2 says : सपत्न्यश्च द्विविधाः दासीसपत्न्यश्च कुलस्त्रीसपत्न्यश्च. This is not found elsewhere. Only P refers to ladies of equal position and servants. Similarly the parable of bandits and kulastrī is found only in V_2 and P.

(F) The author of P seems to have knowledge of V_1 also and that is why M (which is a copy of V_1)

has been looked upon as the original of P by scholars (— V_1 , V_2 also being similar in style). We note but one such evidence in point.

(26) Kā. 20. Illustrating adhyavasāya, the commentaries say as follows : धर्मं करिष्यामि, अर्थं साधयिष्यामि- V_2 ; धर्मं करिष्यामि अवर्मं [न ?] करिष्यामि- V_1 (see—वर्मं करिष्यामि अवर्मं च-M—very funny; the न must have been missing in the manuscript of V_1 which the author of M had); or should च be emended as न ?); धर्मं करिष्यामि अवर्मं न करिष्यामि—G; practise religious duties; renounce evil or realise a vow—P. This gives us some idea of V_1 's influence on P and G.

Y also seems at some places to have been indebted to V_1 .

(27) Kā. 13. V_1 has raised the question whether sattva, rajas and tamas are जात्यन्तर or not, and anticipated arguments from an opponent who would not regard them as जात्यन्तर. Answering such an argument, V_1 says : यत्पुनरुक्तं स्त्रीशत्रुमेवेष्टव्यत्र ब्रूमः । सत्त्वं रज आश्रित्य स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गाङ्गिभावं गच्छति । तस्यान्तिके दुःखमुत्पद्यते । एवं रजस्तमसौ योजये. Y has explained this very well : यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं स्त्रीशत्रुमेवेषु स्वभावव्यतिकरोपलम्भादेको गुणस्त्रिरूपः, सर्वे वा सर्वरूपाः, रजस्तमस्य वा सत उत्पत्तिरिति, अत्र ब्रूमः न, गुणभूतस्य भक्ति उपकारात् प्रधानरूपोपपत्तेः, इह गुणभूतस्य भक्तिः प्रधानोपकारित्वे सति भक्तिः तद्वशापत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा—क्षोरादेः । तद्धि मुखादिषु दृष्टप्रतिबन्ध-प्रवृत्तिः पित्तस्य स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गभावं गच्छेत्तस्योपकारात् तिवक्तं संयत्ये । न च तथा सदेव सत्त्वमपि त्रैगुणभूतं सपत्नीरजसः स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गभावं गच्छेत्तस्योपकाराद् दुःखं संयत्ये । तमसो मोहः । एवं क्षात्रं रजः आर्यदारलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य दस्युलक्षणस्य च तमसः । एवं मेघं तनः कार्ष्णिकसत्त्वस्य प्रोषितदयितायाश्च रजतः । तस्मान्नास्ति गुणानां स्वभावव्यतिकरः । किञ्चान्यत् अगुणभूतानां स्वभावप्रशङ्गात् । यदा चैतेऽङ्ग-भावमुपगच्छन्तो मध्यस्थास्तुल्यवैकल्यान्व प्रतिपद्यन्ते तदा स्वरूपेणैव, तस्मादसंकोचं

गुणरूपम् । (Y, 13, p. 71). Here Y clearly seems to be following V₁. Unfortunately the introductory remarks to kā. 13 in Y are missing. But while refuting the argument of the opponent, Y seems to be influenced by V₁.

(28) Kā. 20-21—V₁, M and Y give an exposition of अनेकविध संयोग. The illustration of यादृच्छिक संयोग given by V₁ is श्वभ्रपवनयोः, by Y श्वभ्रतत्प्रातिनोः, and by M सुवर्णयोः. Y seems to have got the suggestion from V₁. V₁ and M do not mention योग्यतालक्षण संयोग, while Y does (अङ्गुष्ठोपानद्द्वययोः). V₁ and M do not initially refer to विषयहेतुक संयोग but later while eliminating the samyogas in respect of pradhāna and puruṣa refer to it also. The author of Y seems to have noticed this inconsistency as also some lack of appropriateness in the exposition in V₁. Y's treatment is more systematic. Y mentions चक्षुरूपयोः as an instance of शक्तिनिमित्त संयोग, whereas V₁ and M mention मत्स्योदकयोः (which according to Y illustrates विषयविषयिनिमित्तसंयोग). Could the text of V₁ have originally been : शक्तिहेतुको यथा चक्षुरूपयोः, विषयविषयिनिमित्तो यथा मत्स्योदकयोः ? The scribe might have omitted the underlined words as his eye wandered from one यथा to the other, and the author of M must have consulted such a manuscript. Anyhow, Y is clearly posterior to V₁.

(29) Kā. 30—It is interesting to examine how this kārikā is explained in the different commentaries. All agree in respect of the first line which says that the four (sense-organ concerned, mind, ahaṁkāra and buddhi) operate simultaneously as also in succession. Only V₁ and M are of the view that युगपद्भूति is not possible, but

the time between the vṛttis of the sense-organ and the mind is so negligible (as in the case of a needle piercing lotus petals one by one) that the vṛtti is said to be yugapat or simultaneous. Where the process is seen to be gradual (—seeing something at a distance and determining from certain signs whether it is a puruṣa or a sthānu—), their functioning is said to be क्रमशः. V₂, P G and J do not give this explanation. Y regards युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः as mentioning a prima-facie view and क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा as refuting it. V₁ (—also M—) perhaps tried to reconcile these views. According to V₁ and M the second line states that both in respect of dṛṣṭa and adṛṣṭa things the functioning of the triad of internal organs is preceded by that of the sense-organ. Y argues that there is क्रमशः वृत्ति in respect of both दृष्ट and अदृष्ट things (—Y discusses what अदृष्ट signifies—) and it takes त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः as explaining how there is क्रमशः वृत्ति in respect of दृष्ट things. Y seems to be referring to the author of V₁ when it says : अन्यैस्त्वन्यथाऽन्वयो दर्शितः । तत् यथा—चतुष्टयस्येति मनोऽहङ्कारबुद्धौनामन्तःकरणानां बाह्येनैकेन करणेन श्रोत्रेण वा चक्षुषा वा सह चतुष्टयस्येत्यर्थः । अस्य दृष्टे वर्तमाने युगपद्भूतिः पूर्वाचार्यैः निर्दिष्टा, आचार्येण तु क्रमेणेत्यर्थः । अदृष्टेऽतोतादावपि क्रमशः क्रमेणैव, यतस्त्रयस्यान्तःकरणस्य तत्पूर्विका बाह्येन्द्रियपूर्विका वृत्तिः यदा यथाऽनुभवस्तथा संस्कारः, यथा च संस्कारस्तथा स्मृतिरित्येवं वृत्तिर्बाह्येन्द्रियपूर्विकेत्यर्थः । (pp. 130-131). (Some explain the line as referring to the view of the पूर्वाचार्य that there is युगपद्भूति, and also to the view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa who recognises क्रमशः वृत्तिः). Of course, Y has made the idea in V₁ explicit. V₁ is thus prior to Y.

(30) Kā. 32—Explaining this kārikā, V₂ and following it G assign आहरण and धारण to the karmendriyas and प्रकाशन to the buddhindriyas, and conclude by saying

बुद्धीन्द्रियैः प्रकाशितं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहरन्ति धारयन्ति चेति. V_1 and M on the other hand say आहारकमिन्द्रियलक्षणम् धारकमभिमानलक्षणम्, प्रकाशकं बुद्धिलक्षणम् and yet later they conclude : तं दशविधं विषयं बुद्धीन्द्रियैः प्रकाशितमर्थं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहरन्ति धारयन्ति च. Here V_1 seems to have blindly accepted the statement in V_2 , which is rather strange. Y regards the karmendriyas as doing आहरण, the buddhīndriyas as doing धारण and antahkaraṇa as doing प्रकाशन. But it quotes another view : अपर आह-आहरणं कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति, धारणं मनोऽहङ्कारश्च, प्रकाशनं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि बुद्धिश्च । एतदभिसंधाय बुद्ध्यादीनां करणत्वमुच्यते इति. Could it be that the author of Y tried to put the view of V_1 more systematically so as to accomodate all the organs ? J and T assign आहरण to the karmendriyas, धारण to buddhi, ahaṁkāra and manas, and प्रकाशन to the buddhīndriyas. This seems to be an improvement on the view quoted by Y.

According to P, "Among the thirteen organs it is to the internal organs that what is there to draw (i.e. आहरण) belongs, to the five senses that what is there to manifest (i.e. प्रकाशन) and to the five organs of action that what is there to hold (i.e. धारण) belongs." It seems that P tries to systematise the view of V_2 . (See Viṣama-padavivecana, p. 391, by Vijaya Labdhīśūri on the Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī commentary of Simhasūragāṇi on the Dvādaśāranayacakra of Mallavādin).

(31) The text of kā. 55 in V_1 , P and Y has •तस्माद् दुःखं समासेन, whereas elsewhere we find स्वभावेन in the place of समासेन. V_1 explains this by संक्षेपेण त्रिषु लोकेषुY on the other hand justifies the employment of the word समासेन thus : समासग्रहणं तु सुखमोहयोरवकाशदानार्थम्, अन्यथा संसारे तयोरभाव एवाभ्युपगतः स्यात्. Y seems to be improving on V_1 , even while it accepts, like P, the reading of V_1 .

Similarly, in kā. 69, V_1 and Y alone have पुरुषार्थं ज्ञानम्, whereas the others have पुरुषार्थज्ञानम्, though everywhere the explanation given is 'knowledge meant for puruṣārtha i.e. mokṣa' (पुरुषार्थार्थं ज्ञानम्).

(32) There is a stanza in Y which seems to be an imitation of kā. 73 which is not found anywhere except in V_1 and M. The stanza in Y is :

अल्पग्रन्थमनल्पार्थं सर्वैस्तन्त्रगुणैर्युतम् ।
पारमर्षस्य तन्त्रस्य बिम्बमादर्शयं यथा ॥ (Y, p. 12, stanza 14).

Compare Sāṁkhya Kārikā, 73:

तस्मात् समासदृष्टं शास्त्रमिदं नार्थतश्च परिहोणम् ।
तन्त्रस्य बृहन्मूर्तेः दर्पणसंक्रान्तमिव बिम्बम् ॥

This shows that V_1 is prior to Y. This has been discussed later.

Now we may examine a few points with regard to V_1 in relation to G and M.

(33) कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै येनाविद्योदघौ जगति मग्ने ।
कारुण्यात् सांख्यमयी नौरिव विहिता प्रतरणाय ॥

-This maṅgala stanza of V_1 is found in G and M, but not in V_2 and P (and of course not in Y, J and T). M has नौरिव विहिता प्रतरणाय. G has after this another verse, viz.

अल्पग्रन्थं स्पष्टं प्रमाणसिद्धान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तम् ।
शास्त्रं शिष्यहिताय समासतोऽहं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥

Compare सप्तत्याख्यं प्रकरणं सकलं शास्त्रमेव वा ।

यस्मात् सर्वदार्शनानामिह व्याख्या करिष्यते ॥९॥—Y, p.1.

The author of G seems to have had this in mind when he composed the above stanza. On the other

hand the following stanza in M is based on the above stanza in G : नमस्कृत्य तु तं तस्य वक्ष्ये ज्ञानस्य कारणम् ।

हिताय सर्वशिष्याणामल्पप्रस्थसमुच्चयम् ॥ (M)

The author of M offers his namaskāra in the first verse, viz.

सर्वविद्याविधातारमादित्यस्थं सनातनम् ।

नतोऽस्मि परया भक्त्या कापिलं ज्योतिरीश्वरम् ॥

Compare Y, p. 1, stanza 2 :

ऋषये परमायार्कमरीचिसमतेजसे ।

संसारगहनध्वान्तसूर्याय गुरवे नमः ॥

This shows that V₁ was the earliest of V₁, Y, G and M and that G was influenced by Y; and M was posterior to both Y and G. M being a copy of V₁, its indebtedness in other respects hardly deserves any attention.

(34) Kā.66-G seems to be acquainted with V₂ and V₁. Of all the commentaries V₂, V₁ and G alone have ०दृष्टाहमित्युपरतैका. V₂ and V₁ do not have anything to say about एका, whereas G says : एका एकैव प्रकृतिः त्रैलोक्यस्यापि प्रधानकारणभूता न द्वितीया प्रकृतिरस्ति....., thus improving on V₂ and V₁. M has accepted अन्या in the place of एका, as the explanation given by G is uncalled for here, and the text had better have अन्या to balance एकः occurring earlier.

(G) I have elsewhere* made a detailed study of V₁ and M and shown that the author of M has mostly employed the expressions of V₁ verbatim and M can be regarded as a copy of V₁. We may consider only a few points here.

*See Sāṃkhya-Saptati-Vṛtti (V₁), Appendices, edited by E. A. Solomon (Gujarat University, 1973).

(35) Kārikā 2—जीवेम शरदः शतं पश्येम शरदः शतम्—This is how we find this mantra in V₁. This mantra occurs in Rgveda VII. 66.16 and we have पश्येम...first. M rectifies this error in V₁.

(36) Introductory remarks on kā. 6—Here V₁ has the statement : त्रिविधस्य प्रमाणस्य लक्षणमुक्तमिदम् । इदानीं ब्रूहि तस्य त्रिविधस्य प्रमेयस्य विषयताम्....Compare M—तदेवं व्यक्तव्यक्तज्ञातृस्य प्रत्यक्षादित्रिविधप्रमाणेषु केन कस्य सिद्धिः स्यात्. M improves on the expression in V₁ and specifically states what the three-fold objects are. Only the expression त्रिविधस्य प्रमेयस्य is missing.

Both V₁ and M do not comment on तस्मादपि चासिद्धम्of kā. 6.

(37) M (kā.2) alone gives the example of loha-cumbaka to establish the existence of puruṣa. The early Sāṃkhya writers are not interested in this simile. We find the simile of loha-cumbaka in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II. 17). M does not derive its inspiration straight from the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (See kā. 17—संज्ञातपरार्थत्वात्).

(38) Introducing kā. 9, V₁ says : वैशेषिकाणामसत्कारण-प्रतिषेधं वक्ष्यामः. Here V₂ has the term असत्कार्यप्रतिषेधम्; and M says वैशेषिकाणां तु असतः सद्भवतीति मतप्रतिषेधाय उच्यते; Y, G and J say that the point under discussion is whether the kārya is (potentially) existent in the kāraṇa or not; and it is established that it is existent(सत्). असत्कारणप्रतिषेध of V is confounding. We would expect असत्कार्यप्रतिषेध or असत्कारणप्रतिषेध (in view of असदकरणात् in kā. 9). V₁ says earlier : इह वैशेषिका विप्रतिपन्ना प्रागुत्पत्तेर्मृत्पिण्डे घटो नास्तीति व्यवसिताः. M also says : अत्र वैशेषिका विप्रतिपन्ना असतः सद्भवतीति मन्यन्ते । मृत्पिण्डे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटो नास्तीति व्यवसितास्ते; and then वैशेषिकाणां तु असतः सद्भवतीति मतप्रतिषेधाय

उच्यते. The problem has not been put forth precisely. The point here is not whether the *kāraṇa* is existent or not, but whether the *kārya* is existent in the *kāraṇa* or not. It is likely that in view of the Upaniṣadic inquiries whether 'sat' was there in the beginning or 'asat', it might have become a practice to put forth philosophical problems in the same way. See सन्ति वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः तथा हि केचिदाहुः 'असतः सत् जायते'...अन्ये तु 'सतः असत् जायते' इति, 'सतः सत् जायते' इति वृद्धाः.....येषामपि कणभक्षाक्षचरणादीनां सत एव कारणादसतो जन्म तेषामपि सदसतोरेकत्वानुगतेर्न कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति न तन्मते प्रवानसिद्धिः ।—T. T. Unlike M steers clear of the difficulty and presents the conclusion precisely.

(39) In the introductory passage to kā. 13, only V_1 and M of all the commentaries anticipate an objection to the Sāṃkhya view to the effect that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are not *जात्यन्तरस* (—the Sāṃkhyas hold that they are *जात्यन्तरस*). The *prima-facie* view is that any one of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* can cause *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha*, so they need not be *जात्यन्तरस* (न खलु सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि जात्यन्तराणि). Now this can be interpreted simply as urging that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are not numerically different, but are different aspects of one entity. Here the word *जाति* cannot be taken in any peculiar sense, but must be taken as signifying simply *स्वरूप*—there is no *स्वरूपभेद* in the *guṇas*; they are not different entities. The Sāṃkhya says that they are different. Or, if importance be attached to the use of the word *जाति*, this would mean that they are not three different *जातिस*. The Sāṃkhya rejoinder would be that they are different *जातिस*. This would mean that there are many *sattvas*, constituting

a *सत्त्वजाति* and so also with the other two. See also *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, pp. 390 ff. (अतस्त्रीण्येकमेव अपृथग्भूतसमवस्थान-स्वरूपभेदात्मकत्वात् वरणादितमस्त्ववत् । अपृथग्भवनसमवस्थानस्वरूपभेदात्मकत्वमसिद्धं सुखदुःखमोहानां जात्यन्तरत्वात् ।...—Mallavādin does not give the illustration of woman, *kṣatriyas* and cloud).

One Mādhava, who is referred to in *Mīmāṃsā* (*-Śloka-vārttika*), *Nyāya* (See *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa* p. 569) and Buddhist works (*Vādanyāya*, *Kaṇakagomin's* comm., and *Jinendrabuddhi's* comm.) as Sāṃkhya-nāśaka or Sāṃkhya-nāyaka, is credited with such a view. Could we connect this Mādhava with V_1 in some capacity or the other? This remains controversial, but one should certainly give some thought to this. We shall come to this later.

(40) *Kārikā* 19—तस्माच्च विपर्ययात् (विपर्ययात्—M) is not explained in V_1 and M. M mentions this as a *pratīka*, but does not explain it. This also shows M's dependence on V_1 .

(41) *Kārikā* 22—At the end of the commentary on kā. 22, V_1 says that the Sāṃkhya *Kārikā* has stated that *mokṣa* can be attained by the knowledge of *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* and points out where instruction has been given of *vyakta* and *avyakta*. V_1 does not mention here that *puruṣa* has been established in kā. 17. M also has this drawback. M is thus a very close copy of V_1 , though the author of M has introduced a few modifications.

(42) *Kārikā* 26— V_1 explains the term *इन्द्रिय* as follows : इन्द्रदेवतानीन्द्रियाणि । इन्द्र इति विषयनाम, तत्प्रति द्रवन्तीतीन्द्रियाणि. M says : इन्द्राण्येव तानीन्द्रियाणि । इन्द्र इति विषयाणां नाम, तानिनः विषयान् प्रति द्रवन्तीति

इन्द्रियाणि. M has obviously improved on V₁. Vācaspati explains thus : इन्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते.

From this we can conclude that M is a close copy of V₁ and that it was posterior to G.

(H) Now we may examine some cases which could perhaps help us to determine the chronological order of the commentaries.

(43) Kārikā 10—लिङ्गम् is explained by V₁, P, G and J (-V₂ does not explain this term-) as लयं गच्छति इति. V₁ gives another explanation also—लीनमर्थं लिङ्गयतीति वा लिङ्गम् though it does not show how this holds good in the case of vyakta. Y explains लिङ्गम् by तल्लक्षणोपपन्नम्. J gives both the explanations, लिङ्गयतेऽनेनाव्यक्तमिति लिङ्गम् being the first one. T gives only this explanation—लिङ्गं प्रधानस्य.... The Tattvabodha-vidhāyini (p. 283) on the Sanmatitarka-prakarana refers to both these explanations. लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम् seems to have been the traditional explanation and V₁ seems to be the first to give the second one. Y readily accepted this one. J gives both, but seems to attach more importance to लिङ्गयतेऽनेनाव्यक्तम्. T following J, as it almost always does, gives this one only. This seems to have appealed to commentators (-authors of Y, T) of a strictly logical bent of mind.

Moreover, the explanation of सावयवम् given by V₂ (शब्दादिभिर्गुणैः) is the crudest of all. G and J (-also V₁, M-) point out that śabdādi are the avayavas and so vyakta is said to be sāvayava. V₁ and M even explain the term 'avayava'—अवयवन्तोऽवयवाः; Y has here अवयूयन्ते इत्यवयवाः—पृथगुपलभ्यन्ते इत्यर्थः, सहावयवैः सावयवम्; this seems to be an improvement on V₁. V₂ further on says : निरवयवं प्रधानं

निराश्रयमित्यर्थः । न हि शब्दादयः प्रधाने विद्यन्ते तस्मान्निरवयवं प्रधानम्. The expression निराश्रयम् in this sense is rather crude.

We can say with confidence that V₂ is the earliest and is followed by V₁ which tries to give a fresh interpretation at a number of places. Y accepts this at places and even improves on it. G and J are posterior to Y.

(44) Kārikā 18—ब्रह्मचन्द्रवत्—V₁ does not seem to pose the philosophical problem properly. Is there one puruṣa in different bodies like the one thread running through many beads; or are there many puruṣas, one for each body, like the many moons in river, well, tank, sea, etc. (-yet earlier it is said that the one moon is seen in different places)? This latter illustration is not a sound one as it cannot prove that the puruṣas are really many. We find this in M also though from M we gather the impression that both these alternatives represent the views of opponents who both recognise only one puruṣa, though one of them tries to explain the apparent plurality by the ब्रह्मचन्द्रन्याय. P and G do not present any simile for puruṣa-bahutva, though they do give the simile of string and beads for explaining how the puruṣa could be one. V₂ and Y do not give any illustration; they simply pose the problem and answer it (-Y mentions that the Aupaniṣadas are of the view that ātman is one, while the Naiyāyikas, Bauddhas and Jainas and others recognise its plurality). J is very precise : एक एवायं सर्व-शरीरेषु स्थितः इत्येके । सर्वे काया उपनतानेकात्मानः सात्मकत्वात्, योगिशरीरवृन्दवत् प्रतिशरीरमनेकः पुरुष इत्यपरे । एक एव पुराणः पुरुषः तस्मादग्नेरिव विस्फुलिङ्गाः तशरी. पुरुषा आविर्भूता इति वेदान्तवादिनः ।

V₂ seems to be the earliest and P and G should be posterior to V₁. Y generally follows V₂ and is more interested in a proper philosophical exposition than in giving illustrations. J seems to be the latest of these. The order seems to be V₂, V₁, P, Y, G, J.

It is interesting to note that P gives one more simile to explain the idea of one ātman in all the bodies—16000 wives of Viṣṇu enjoying at the same moment. This shows that it was not satisfied with the simile of the moon in V₁ and that paurāṇic stories had got properly established by the time of P.

(45) Kārikā 21—The parable of the blind man and the lame man is found in all the commentaries. V₂ and V₁ say that the caravan proceeded from Ujjayinī to Pāṭaliputra. P says it proceeded to Pāṭaliputra. G does not refer to any place. M says a blind man proceeded along with a caravan to Pāṭaliputra. V₂, V₁ and M say that the blind man was left behind and spotted on the way by a lame man. P and G on the other hand say that the blind man and the lame man were left behind by the merchants who fled from the brigands. J is like G here but very compact in expression. Each succeeding commentary seems to have dropped the unnecessary details and tried to make the narrative systematic, though M is, as seen above, just a revised different version of V₁. The order seems to be V₂, V₁, P, G, J, M. The discussion in Y is more technical as is its way of exposition.

(46) Kārikā 21—तत्कृतः सर्गः—Here तत् is explained differently in the commentaries. V₂ is not very clear here. It seems to hold that mutual expectancy (दर्शनार्थम्, कैवल्यार्थम्—)

of pradhāna and puruṣa is referred to by तत् and seems to say that सर्ग signifies their union as creation is the result of union. V₁ and M say that तत् refers to pradhāna and puruṣa and सर्ग to production of महदादि brought about by them. G and J interpret तत् as संयोग. Y is brief and more precise in expression though it does not specifically explain each term—प्रधानपुरुषयोर्हि भोक्तृभोग्य-भावापेक्षानिमित्तोऽयं तत्त्वसर्गो महदादिः भावसर्गश्च धर्मादिः भूतसर्गश्च ब्रह्मादिः प्रवर्तते. Compare—तयोस्तत्कृतः सर्गः and प्रधानपुरुषयोगः सर्ग उच्यते । यथा स्त्रीपुंसयोः संयोगात् पुत्रोत्पत्तिर्भवति एवं प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगात् सर्गः उत्पद्यते । स्त्रीपुंससर्गः सृष्टिरित्यर्थः । स च त्रिविधः—तत्त्वसर्गः भावसर्गः भूतसर्गः—V₂. G also is influenced by V₂ though it has put forth the idea in a simple way. (तेन संयोगेन कृतस्तत्कृतः सर्गः सृष्टिः यथा स्त्रीपुरुष-संयोगात्.....सर्गस्योत्पत्तिः—G). The order seems to be V₂, V₁, Y, G, J, M.

(47) Kārikā 22—In mentioning the synonyms or mahat, the difference in the commentaries is noticeable. V₂ mentions the least number—buddhi, mahat; P adds khyāti, jñāna and prajñā. G has āsurī in addition. J mentions mahān, buddhi, mati, pratyaya and upalabdhi as synonyms of buddhi—all strictly logical terms. Y mention mahān, buddhi, dhṛti, brahmā, pūrṭi, khyāti, īśvara, vikhara; and V₁ mentions mahān, buddhi, prajñā, mati, samvit, khyāti, smṛti, hiraṇyagarbha. M's list is the longest—mahān, buddhi, mati, prajñā, samvittī, khyāti, citi, smṛti, āsurī, harī, hara, hiraṇyagarbha. V₁ is to some extent influenced by Upaniṣadic expressions and M even by Paurāṇic ones. V₂ seems clearly to be the earliest. J being Buddhist in trend gives only logical terms, even though it is not a very early commentary. P seems to have selected khyāti and prajñā out of

the list in V_1 , jñāna being a very common term. See बुद्धिरलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्—Nyāyasūtra I. 1. 15. M seems to be the latest of these commentaries and it can be said with certainty that it was posterior to G.

With regard to prakṛti, V_1 simply says that it signifies pradhāna. V_2 and P mention pradhāna, brahman, bahudhānaka as synonyms of Prakṛti. G adds avyakta and māyā. Y does not mention any synonym of prakṛti and ahaṁkāra. J mentions a few terms which are merely descriptive, viz kārana, guṇasāmya, tamobahula and avyākṛta besides prakṛti, pradhāna, and avyakta (—J seems to be later than G). M after saying, like V, that prakṛti signifies pradhāna goes on to say, like G, that brahman, avyakta, bahudhātma (bahudhānaka ?) and māyā are synonyms. Here also the order seems to be V_2 , V_1 , P, Y, G, J, M.

Similarly V_2 , V_1 and P mention bhūtādi, taijasa and vaikṛta (or vaikṛtaka) as synonyms of ahaṁkāra. G adds abhimāna and M even asmitā. J's list is quite peculiar—अहङ्कारः सुप्तगणितस्तुल्य इत्यहङ्कारपर्यायाः ।

(48) Kā 22—With regard to the production of the gross elements from the tanmātras, V_2 , V_1 , P, Y and G hold that śabdatanmātra produces ākāśa, sparśatanmātra produces vāyu and so on. J, M and T on the other hand hold that the respective tanmātra in association with the earlier mentioned tanmātras produces its effect (ākāśa, vāyu, etc) with a correspondingly increasing number of qualities. V_1 however, unlike V_2 , P, Y and G, mentions the number of properties in each mahābhūta. Here M is found to be different from V_1 , and Y, 38 has criticised a view identical with that held by the authors of J, M and T. But from this alone

we cannot conclude that Y is posterior to any one of these. Y refers to it as the view of 'other ācāryas' When it refers to some commentator of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā it mostly uses the expression अपर आह or the like. We are reminded here of the two views regarding the nature of the tanmātras, that are referred to in Y (p.108)—एक-रूपाणि तन्मात्राणीत्यन्ये । एकोत्तराणीति वार्षगण्यः—Others hold that every tanmātra has only one property (śabda-tanmātra has only sound, sparśa-tanmātra has only touch and so on). But Vārṣaganya is of the view that śabda-tanmātra has only sound, but sparśa-tanmātra has besides touch the property of the previous tanmātra also, that is to say, it has both sound and touch. Similarly rūpa-tanmātra has sound, touch and colour, rasa-tanmātra has sound, touch, colour and taste; and gandha-tanmātra has sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. This view is also accepted by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya who in II. 19 expressly states that the five subtle elements of sound and the like are endowed with one, two, three, four and five properties respectively (एकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चलक्षणाः शब्दादयः). Y, 38, perhaps in the light of both V_1 and the Yoga-Bhāṣya, says : शब्दगुणान्तर-तन्मात्रादाकाशमेकगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शगुणात् स्पर्शतन्मात्रात् द्विगुणो वायुः.... Those who hold that the mahābhūtas are produced from one tanmātra each would necessarily have to accept the tanmātras also as having one, two, three, four, and five qualities, as the effect could inherit only the qualities of the cause. This should be the view acceptable to V_2 , V_1 , Y and G, though only Y specifically says so. But those who hold that a tanmātra can have only one property would necessarily have to admit that a tanmātra is associated with the earlier tanmātras in the pro-

duction of the respective gross elements (—this should be acceptable to J, T and M).

The Yoga-bhāṣya seems to be posterior to V₁ for while V₁ does not follow the Yoga-sūtra and bhāṣya in respect of the yama and the niyamas, some expressions are found to be similar in V₁ and the Yoga-bhāṣya. J seems to be the first among the Sāṃkhya commentators to have preferred the view regarding the origination of the mahābhūtas from the tanmātras, which was rejected by Y and the earlier commentaries T and M followed J.

(49) Kā. 23—In the enumeration of the yamas and the niyamas, V₂, V₁, P and Y do not follow the Yoga-sūtra, whereas G, J and M do. Of the yamas, ahimsā, satya, asteya, and brahmacarya are common to all. The fifth yama is avyavahāra according to V₂ and V₁, akalkatā according to Y and aparigraha according to G, J and M which follow the Yoga-sutra II. 30. Surprisingly M explains aparigraha exactly as V₁ explains avyavahāra. The Yoga-Bhāṣya explains aparigraha on the lines of the exposition of vairāgya in V₁ (विषयाणामर्जनरक्षणक्षयसंगर्हिषादोषदर्शनादस्वीकरणमपरिग्रहः — Yoga-bhāṣya II. 30).

V₂, V₁, P and Y mention the niyamas as akrodha, guru-śūsṛṣā, śauca, āhāra-lāghava and apramāda, whereas G, J and M quote the Yoga-sutra, II. 32—शौचसन्तोष-तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः. The former list is more in accordance with the Sāṃkhya theory and practice as ईश्वरप्रणिधान and स्वाध्याय (of Veda) have hardly any significance in the Sāṃkhya. M though it mentions santoṣa, uses the term 'āhāra-lāghava' to define it and

explains it in almost the same way as V₁. The Yoga-bhāṣya explains santoṣa thus : सन्तोषः संनिहितसाधनादधिकस्यानुपादित्वा. The Yoga-bhāṣya explains ईश्वरप्रणिधान thus : तस्मिन् परमगुरौ सर्वकर्मपरिणम्. M follows it. This explanation of ईश्वरप्रणिधान is surprising unless ईश्वर be regarded as the परमगुरु. Could गुरुश्रुत्या of V₁ have influenced this interpretation ?

Bāhya-jñāna signifies, according to V₂, V₁ and M, the arts, music, etc. also besides grammar, etc.. According to P it signifies the six Vedāṅgas. G says that Vedas, Vedāṅgas, Nyāya, Purāṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra are meant by bāhya-jñāna. According to Y, bāhya-jñāna refers to knowledge attained by perception, inference and verbal testimony. J and T do not make this distinction between bāhya and ābhyantara jñāna. According to them, knowledge of the difference between the guṇas and the puruṣa is jñāna; as J says, all else is ajñāna. V₁ also says while explaining ajñāna that too much attachment to, or obsession for, grammar, etc. without a knowledge of the nature of, prakṛti and puruṣa is ajñāna. Here also the chronological order seems to be V₂, V₁, P, Y, G, J, M. The author of G seems to be one directly involved in the Brahmanical tradition and is even the type of Vedāntin who does not hesitate to say that the Vedas, etc. also are just bāhyajñāna.

(50) Kā. 56—The first line is read differently in the commentaries.

See इत्येष प्रकृतिविकृतः (प्रकृतिकृतः) प्रवर्तते वैकृतः प्रजासर्गः । —V₁;

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतः प्रवर्तते तत्त्वभूतभावाख्यः—Y; इत्येष पृकृतिकृतौ महदादि-विशेषभूतपर्यन्तः—G; इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः—J (also T);

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविषयभूतपर्यन्तः—M (M does not mention विषय in the pratika); “ These are the functions of Nature (explained) from the Intellect up to the five gross elements.”—P. Unfortunately V₂ is missing here. V₁ reads परार्थमारम्भः, while the others read परार्थ आरम्भः. Could there have been successive attempts to improve on the wording of the kārikā ? One cannot be sure. Here V₁ stands by itself.

(51) Kā. 2—आनुश्रविकः is explained in the commentaries as follows : अनुश्रूयते परंपरया इत्यानुश्रविकः—V₂; अनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवः, अनुश्रवे भवः इत्यानुश्रविकः—Y; अनुश्रूयत इत्यनुश्रवस्तत्र भवः आनुश्रविकः—G; अनुश्रूयते पारम्पर्येणेत्यनुश्रवो वेदः, श्रुवः ‘ऋदोरप्’ । तत्र भवो हेतुरानुश्रविकः—J; गुरुपाठादनुश्रूयत इत्यनुश्रवो वेदः । ...तत्र भवः आनुश्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्तो ज्ञात इति यावत् । —T; गुरुणोक्तं पश्चाद्वेदं शृण्वन्ति शिष्या इत्यनुश्रवो वेदः तत्र भवः आनुश्रविकः —M. V₁ simply says स च वेदः. V₂'s explanation seems to be the earliest. The order seems to be V₂, V₁, Y, G, J, T. It is difficult to say anything positively about M; but it could not have been prior to G and even J, perhaps even T.

(52) Kā. 10—हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं निमित्तं प्रमाणं कारणमिति पर्यायाः—V₂. (See हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं प्रमाणं करणम् इत्यनर्थान्तरम्—Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 9. 24). The author of V₂ seems to have in mind the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra here. Only he has added nimitta and kāraṇa and dropped karaṇa. V₁ and M say here : हेतुरपदेशो निमित्तं प्रकृतिः कारणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् (—prakṛti is significant). They further say that hetu is two-fold—kāraṇa (productive) and jñāpaka (cognitive); pradhāna, buddhi, ahaṁkāra and tanmātras are kāraṇa hetus, whereas viparyaya, aśakti, tuṣṭi, siddhi and anugraha are jñāpaka hetus; further तद् द्विविधेनापि हेतुना युक्तं हेतुमदिदं सिद्धम्. V₁ is trying to justify why terms signifying both kāraṇa and jñāpaka hetus are mentioned here. Y argues that

‘hetu’ is a general term and when a ‘sarvasambhavin’ term is used in a particular sense it signifies prakarṣa, and this shows that only kāraṇa hetu is meant here; or due to the association of ‘anityam’ in the kārikā, ‘hetu’ can signify here only ‘kāraṇa hetu’ (हेतुः कारणमित्यनर्थान्तरम्—Y). G says उपादानं हेतुः कारणं निमित्तमिति पर्यायाः, meaning thereby that only the kāraṇa hetu is relevant here. J and T do not enter into any such discussion and straightaway understand ‘hetu’ in the sense of ‘kāraṇa’.

On the strength of this we can say that V₂ is the earliest of the extant commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā. It, following the usual practice of commentaries, gives a list of synonyms, many of them being irrelevant here. V₁ (—so also M—), always fond of something novel, justifies their mention here and tries to account for even the jñāpaka hetu. Y clarifies that only a kāraṇa hetu could be meant here and says that hetu means kāraṇa. G notes this drawback in V₂ and omits the synonyms that are out of place here. J and T straightaway explain ‘hetumat’ as ‘having a cause (kāraṇa)’. The order should be V₂, V₁, Y, G, J, T.

Similarly, explaining that vyakta is āśrita, while avyakta is not so, V₂ says निराश्रयं प्रचानमकारणत्वात् (because of its not having a cause’). अकार्यत्वात् (‘ because of its not being an effect ’) would have been better in this context. We find this in V₁, G, M. T says here अनाश्रितम्, ततोऽन्यस्य कारणस्याभावात् . Y is missing here.

Moreover, V₂ explains सावयवम् by शब्दादिभिर्युक्तम् which sounds very abrupt. G and J seem to rectify this. See अवयवाः शब्दस्पर्शरसरूपगन्धाः तैः सह—G; शब्दादयोऽवयवा उच्यन्ते । तैराध्यात्मिकं बाह्यं च व्यक्तं युक्तम्—J. See on the other hand अवयवन्ती-

त्यवयवाः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धास्तैर्युक्तं महदादि कार्यमित्येवं सावयवम्— V_1 , and अवयवन्तीत्यवयवा यथा -पिण्डस्य हस्तपादाद्याः । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाद्यवयवसंपन्नं व्यक्तम्—M. M tries to make the idea in V_1 clear. V_2 , G, J reveal a direct line of successive influence. Y also belongs to this and is prior to G though posterior to V_2 . Unfortunately Y is missing here.

Pradbāna, unlike vyakta, is niravayava. See the different explanations : निरवयवं प्रधानं निराश्रयमित्यर्थः । न हि शब्दादयः प्रधाने विद्यन्ते तस्मान्निरवयवं प्रधानम्— V_2 . निराश्रयमित्यर्थः sounds very odd. G is better—निरवयवमव्यक्तं न हि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः प्रधाने सन्ति. See also निरवयवममूर्तत्वात्—M.

(53) The text of *kārikās* 26 and 28 as accepted in the different commentaries may prove of some help in determining their chronological order. In V_2 and G the sense organs are mentioned in the *kārikā* text (26) in the order चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, घ्राण, रसन and स्पर्शन; in V_1 , P and M in the order श्रोत्र, त्वक्, चक्षुः, रसन, and नासिका; in Y in the order कर्ण, त्वक्, चक्षुः, रसन and नासिका; and in J and T in the order चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, घ्राण, रसन, and त्वक् (—the same as in V_2 and G). J discusses these in the order : चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, त्वक्, रसन, नासिका and comments : शब्दवशादत्राक्रमः कृतः, कमस्तु श्रोत्र-त्वक्-चक्षुरिति.

On the other hand, in the mention of the sense-objects in *kā. 28* we have the expression *रूपादिषु* (in V_2 , V_1 , P, Y, G, M); but the author of Y has criticised this and recommended *शब्दादिषु*—when the senses were referred to, the *śrotrendriya* was referred to first and there is no reason for violating this order while mentioning their objects. Hence we should read *शब्दादिषु*, the reading *रूपादिषु* being a careless one. J and T seem to have readily accepted this suggestion.

The text of *kā. 26* in V_2 seems to be the earliest and the traditional one as it is followed by G, J, T and no special order seems to have been consciously followed. Generally, the order that should be accepted could be श्रोत्र, त्वक्, चक्षुः, रसन and घ्राण in consonance with the order of their objects—शब्द, स्पर्श, रूप, रस and गन्ध in the order of their evolution. Or it should be चक्षुः etc. and रूप etc. *रूपादिषु* in *kā. 28* agrees with the order in V_2 . Along with this another reading of the *kārikā* text, 26 also came into existence which mentioned the sense-organs in the order श्रोत्र, त्वक्...as we find in V_1 (and P), which was definitely superior, but not the original one. But *रूपादि* in *kā. 28* remained as it was, and this is what Y is criticising. J in the light of the remark in Y substituted *शब्दादिषु* in *kā. 28* and made a comment in respect of the order in *kā. 26* that it was not the proper order. M simply follows V_1 . So the order that is indicated from this is V_2 , V_1 , P, Y, G, J, T, M. My feeling is that it was the author of V_1 who changed the order of the mention of the sense-organs in *kā. 26*.

(J) We have seen above in connection with *kārikās* 3, 16, 27, 36 that the author of V_2 did some loud thinking in respect of the text of the *kārikā*. (See 19, 13, 14, 21), and even suggested an alternative reading, which in two cases—*kārikās* 16 and 27—came to stay. Or these different readings might have been a result of the exposition of that particular *kārikā* in V_2 . We have discussed this at length above. We have also seen that V_2 is the earliest of the commentaries on the *Sāmkhya Kārikā* and that V_1 is the next in succession and that P though based fully on V_2 has knowledge of V_1 . We may hazard a conclusion here that V_2 is a

svopajñavṛtti of Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. Of course, this is slippery ground to tread upon. But its scrappy nature at some places, and careful examination of the text at others, its having influenced Y, G and even V₁, and been the basis of P—all go to support this. See in this connection : “But the researches of Takakusu have definitely established the fact that this commentary [Chinese commentary] differs too greatly from that of Gaudapāda to have been derived from it, and that both it and the commentary of Gāudapāda must go back ultimately to a common source. This conclusion is incidentally confirmed by the evidence of the very full account of the Kārikā given by Alberuni (1030 A.D.) who actually mentions a Gauda as authority. His statements, however, cannot be derived entirely from the work of Gaudapāda, and it is clear that he used two different authorities. Who the author of this older commentary was is uncertain : there is a Chinese tradition that it was Vasubandhu himself, but this suggestion is supported by no evidence, and can be easily expained as a misunderstanding of the fact that Vasubandhu wrote a work to refute the Kārikā. There is therefore plausibility in the suggestion [See Takakusu, “Bulletin de l’Ecole Francaise de l’Extreme Orient, xi, p. 58] that the author was Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself, especially as the nature of the Kārikā is such as urgently to require an interpretation”—The Sāṃkhya System, pp. 85–86—A. B. Keith (Y. M. C. A. Publishing House, Calcutta, 1949). Most of the writers of that period have written svopajña commentaries (—e.g. Vasubandhu, Dīnnāga, Mallavādin) so this seems to be quite acceptable.

We have seen above that V₁ too was prior to P, and this explains why P seems to be based on M at places (due to M being based on V₁ which is prior to P—) and Gaudapāda’s Bhāṣya at others (—due to G being influenced by V₂ which is the base of P). Kā. 72 which is translated in P seems to have been taken from V₁ (—it is not found in V₂ and is said to have come from a wise man). I have discussed this elsewhere. We have also seen that the author of V₁ has at places introduced a discussion that is not found elsewhere (e.g. of sattva, rajas, tamas being jātyantara), or given a slightly different (e.g. kā. 18) or an additional interpretation (e.g. of liṅga, indriya) or tried to change the kārikā text (e.g. kā. 26, kā. 27, kā. 56 etc.) and has been followed mainly by M; its interpretations have been noted mainly by the author of Y and adopted by some Jaina writers. Now, the portion of the leaf bearing the author’s name is broken, and ॠ and a fragment of what looks like ॡ or ॢ is preserved. A letter (or two) seems to be missing and then we have ॠ (genitive singular affix).

A Sāṃkhya thinker is referred to in Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya works as Sāṃkhya-Nāśaka or Sāṃkhya-Nāyaka. This means that he was either an ‘unfaithful exponent’ of Sāṃkhya doctrines to which much harm must have been done by his views, or he was a great Sāṃkhya exponent.¹

1. Dr Raghavan has written an article on ‘Sāṃkhya-Nāśaka Mādhava’. This article is published in Sarūpa Bhārati (1954). See also ‘Sāṃkhya darśana kā Itihāsa,’ pp. 533–6—Udayavīra Śāstri. I am indebted to these contributions already published.

We may note some such references to Mādhava :

(a) In the first chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (with its auto-commentary), Diñnāga criticises the views of a certain Sāṃkhya teacher who was known as the destroyer of the Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya-vaināśika) because of his holding a theory that went beyond the limit of the older Sāṃkhyas. Jinendrabuddhi commenting on this portion quotes lengthy passages from a treatise by Mādhava.

In order to find out in what respect Mādhava violated the Sāṃkhya tenets it is necessary to examine Diñnāga's arguments in this connection.

Diñnāga objects to the Sāṃkhya's recognising five sense-organs for apprehending sounds, tangible objects, colours, tastes and odours and at the same time holding that every thing is constituted of three guṇas. If, as the Sāṃkhya says, a sense does not take for its object those things that are to be apprehended by another sense, and so each sense works only on its object, then the senses should be infinite, or just one sense-organ should suffice as the three guṇas are the same everywhere.

The Sāṃkhya tries to justify the distinctions between sounds and other objects (tangibles etc.) on the basis of the difference of the configuration of sattva and other guṇas. A lengthy argument follows, the main stand of the Sāṃkhya being that there is apprehension by the sense, e.g. the visual sense of one and the same class (jāti) of objects, e.g. colour, variously, in accordance with the difference among the many configurations (of different colours, such as blue, yellow, etc.).

Diñnāga would say that in that case, the conformity of a sense to only one configuration is not experienced. If the Sāṃkhya still urges that the classes of objects are distinguished from each other according to difference of configuration, there would follow the absurd conclusion mentioned before that the senses should be infinite in number.

It is at this stage that Diñnāga refers to a Sāṃkhya Vaināśika, whom Jinendrabuddhi identifies as Mādhava. Mādhava holds that from the three guṇas composing sound (śabda), the three guṇas composing tangibles and other objects are different in kind (jāti). It is unreasonable that there should be apprehension by different senses of that which by reason of the uniformity of its cause is uniform. Thus, we should admit that among the objects of the senses there is a difference in kind among the three component guṇas which are of the nature of sukha, etc.. It is because of this difference that each sense functions only on its own objects.

Diñnāga says that in this theory also there is implied the absurdity that the senses are infinite in number, and so this theory is not different from the standard Sāṃkhya theory so far as the apprehension of the varieties within the class of objects peculiar to each sense is concerned. Yet Diñnāga admits that Mādhava's theory, though not faultless, is better than that of the older Sāṃkhya teachers in explaining the distinctions among the classes of objects. In order to bring out the drawback in Mādhava's theory, Diñnāga reproduces it precisely,—of course, as he understood it.

In Mādhava's view, says Dīnnāga, the atoms differ everywhere (i. e. in different classes of effects, each possessing its respective nature). They are called pradhānas. Sukha, duḥkha and moha, likewise sound, tangibles and other such objects are distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of class (jāti-viśeṣa). The atoms which when combined turn into all of these are called pradhānas (primordial entities). Thus according to combinations which vary from class to class there are different effects, each possessing its own nature but not going beyond the boundary of a particular class and these effects become the objects of the senses.

Here Jinendrabuddhi quotes a passage from a treatise of Mādhava. The gist of it is as follows : Every atom is composed of three guṇas, but some atoms differ qualitatively from other atoms because of the difference of the arrangement of the three guṇas. Thus the sound-atom and the tangible-atom are heterogeneous, and the difference between sounds and tangibles is due to this heterogeneity of atoms. At the time of evolution homogeneous atoms combine and their varying combinations give rise to various things-which, however, are included in the same class inasmuch as the component atoms are homogeneous. Prior to evolution atoms exist dispersedly, and in this state they are called pradhānas.

It may be noted that the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution (pariṇāma) from a primordial matter is substantially changed by Mādhava, who in admitting the plurality of primordial matters, stands closer to the Vaiśeṣikas than to the orthodox Sāṃkhyas. From another

passage quoted by Jinendrabuddhi from Mādhava's treatise we know that Mādhava differs from older Sāṃkhya teachers in holding that pradhāna possesses rūpa, etc., consists of parts and evolves by karman, and that saṃsāra is beginningless.

Mādhava further states that one sound-atom, for example, is in itself constituted of the three guṇas, and therefore has three characters, sukha, duḥkha and moha. Sound being composed of sound-atoms has these three characters, still each particular sound is characterised as sukha, duḥkha or moha, according to whether sattva, rajas or tamas predominates. And so one apprehends a sound as sukha, duḥkha or moha, but not as sound in general possessing three characters.

Dīnnāga argues that the same principle would hold for tangibles and other such objects. That is to say, one would apprehend these objects as sukha, duḥkha or moha, not as tangibles, etc. possessing the three characters. Consequently all kinds of objects would be apprehended by the same sense. Therefore, this theory of Mādhava is inappropriate. Still, says Dīnnāga, from its dethroning the view of the older Sāṃkhya, Mādhava's doctrine of the possession by atoms of each its own nature is excellent. Dīnnāga concedes that the portion of his theory, in which setting aside the view of the renowned older Sāṃkhya teachers, Mādhava explains that the distinction (jāti-viśeṣa) among the effects (i. e. sounds, tangibles etc.) results from the distinction among atoms possessing their respective natures, is excellent. However, the doctrine that the three guṇas form an atom which possesses only one quality is something Dīnnāga cannot accept.

It seems that finding it difficult to explain the evolution from Prakṛti as admitted by the older Sāṃkhya teachers (i.e. one, undifferentiated, and so on), some revolutionaries among the Sāṃkhyas felt it necessary to modify the doctrine. The atom-theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is acknowledged to have been introduced into the Sāṃkhya system of thought at the time of Vindhyavāsin, and in his wake Mādhava tried to make the system perfect by removing glaring anomalies. Jinendrabuddhi very pointedly says that according to Kapila and others, the nature of pleasure, etc. is one everywhere, whereas according to Mādhava, they are different everywhere :

“Kapilādayo manyante sūkhādīnāṃ svarūpam sarvatra ekam eveti; Mādhavas tu sarvatra tāni bhidyanta iti”—Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pratyakṣa, 31 (Mysore Edition—H. R. Iyengar).

This can be clearly understood on the strength of the fore-going discussion*. Mādhava recognised a plurality of atomic primordial entities (pradhānas)—this would mean a thorough change in the concept of the Sāṃkhya system, or even its annihilation, and so Mādhava is regarded as Sāṃkhya-nāśaka, and hailed as such by others.

(b) Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika (Codanā sūtra, 249, pp. 112-113, Madras Univ.) criticises the view of

* This exposition of Diṇnāga's criticism of Mādhava's views is wholly based on 'Diṇnāga, on Perception' (pp. 57-59, 155-157)—Masaaki Hattori. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to this work.

See also 'Geschichte der indischen Philosophie', I, pp. 404-408 (Reihe Wort und Antwort Bd. 6, Salzburg, 1953 (I. Bd.), 1956 (II. Bd.).

a teacher who finds fault with the Mīmāṃsakas for advocating the slaughter of animals for sacrificial purposes. Umbeka in his commentary on the Ślokavārttika states that it is Mādhava, a prominent Sāṃkhya exponent who is referred to and criticised by Kumārila. Keeping aside inference, etc. Mādhava proved the sinfulness of agnīṣomiya, etc. only on the strength of the dependence of dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) on injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (niśedha). 'Mā himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni' prohibits the slaughter of animals, which is therefore sinful irrespective of whether it is done for a sacrifice or otherwise as this does not make any difference.

(Sāṃkhya-nāyaka-Mādhavas tv āha-Vibhāyānumānādīn vidhi-pratiśedhatva-nibandhanatvam eva dharmādharmayor avalambya'gnīṣomiyādiṣv adharmatām āha kvacid iti ślokatrayeṇa.....)

(c) Commenting on 'āgamabhramśakāriṇām āhopuruṣikayā...anyathā racanāsambhavāt' of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika (p. 595), Kaṇvakagomin says that here Dharmakīrti affirms the possibility of the sacred texts being violated and the tradition of the texts disrupted or distorted by persons on account of their sense of ego or the like. They can distort the tradition of the sacred texts by composing differently. As for example, 'Sāṃkhya-nāśaka Mādhava' composed the 'Sāṃkhya-siddhānta' differently due to his ego. (Āgamabhramśa-kāriṇām ityādina Sampradāya-vicchedena racanāntara-sambhavam eṣa samarthayate; āgamabhramśa-kāriṇām punsām anyathā pūrvaracanā-vaiparītyena racanādarśanād iti sambandhaḥ; anyathā-racanāyām kāraṇam āha—āhopuruṣikayetyādi; āhopuruṣikayety ahammānitvena; yathā

Sāṃkhya-nāśaka-Mādhavena Sāṃkhya-siddhāntasya'nyathā racanam kṛtam).

(d) In his commentary, Vipañcitārthā on Dharma-kīrti's Vādanyāya, Śāntarakṣita writes; "yad āha, dharmasya dravyād arthāntaratvaṃ syād iti; athāpy asmadvaiphalye syāt pūrvakān Kāpilān atipatya Sāṃkhyānām śaka-Mādhavavat" (Vipañcitārthā, p. 52, Mahābodhisabha, Benares, 1936 A.C.) 'Sāṃkhyānām Śaka-Mādhavavat' obviously requires to be emended as 'Sāṃkhya-nāśaka-Mādhavavat.' Here Śāntarakṣita is referring to Mādhava's unfaithfulness to the Sāṃkhya tradition.

(e) Refuting Satkāryavāda, Bhāsarvajña says in his auto-commentary Bhūṣana on the Nyāyasāra that if the view of Mādhava were to be accepted, the Sāṃkhya doctrine would surely meet with destruction. If a novel attribute, 'manifestation' or some other, which was non-existent be created the reasons put forth, viz. 'because what is non-existent cannot be produced', and the like, would be ineffectual reasons, and then satkāryavāda not being proved, vaiśvarūpya etc. would not be proved, and so Pradhāna, etc. could not be established. There is no reason for according this differential treatment of holding in the case of the effect, cloth or the like, that it could not be brought out if it were not-existent, and it could not perish if it were existent, and at the same time accepting that this is possible in the case of one of its attributes (viz. manifestation). (Mādhava-matābhyupagame tu Sāṃkhya-nāśa eva syāt; katham ? yadi hy abhivyaktir anyo vā kaścid dharmo'sanneva kriyate tato' sadakaraṇād ity evam ādayo'samarthā hetavaḥ syutataḥ satkāryatvāsiddhau vaiśvarūpyādyasiddheḥ pradhānādyasiddhir iti; na cā'tra viśeṣaḥ kaścid asti yena

paṭādikāryasyaivāsataḥ karaṇam sataś cātmahānam na sambhavati, taddharmasya tu kasyacit sambhavaty eveti —Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p. 569. Benares, 1968).

According to this, Mādhava had no objection to abhivyakti (manifestation) being regarded as a new attribute brought about by the act of production, but being a Sāṃkhya he would not accept that the effect was not there in the cause even before its production. But by this the case of satkāryavāda is actually marred according to Bhāsarvajña.

We find a reference to a 'Sāṃkhya doctor' Mādhava in the description of the travels of Yuan Chwang in India. Mādhava is said to have lived in Magadha in the vicinity of Gaya. He was very much honoured by all and had received vast stretches of land by way of gift. He was challenged by the Buddhist Guṇamati Bodhisattva for a debate and is said to have died on that very occasion. This debate was arranged by the then ruling king at the instance of Guṇamati. According to Yuan Chwang, Mādhava was defeated in this debate and the king being impressed by the Buddhist's learning got a Saṅghārāma constructed at the place where the śāstrārtha took place. Now Guṇamati of Valabhī is said to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, a contemporary of Sthiramati, and teacher of Paramārtha. Paramārtha, a native of Ujjayinī was a disciple of Guṇamati. Paramārtha became proficient in all branches of learning and probably setted down in Pāṭaliputra. At the request of the Chinese emperor, he was sent to China in 546 A. D., where he stayed till his death in 569 A. D. Paramārtha translated into Chinese the Sāṃkhya Kārikā with a commentary in the period 557-567 A. D.. Thus since

Paramārtha's date is 499–569 A. D., Guṇamati could be said to have lived in the period 450–530 A. D. and Mādhava was perhaps his senior contemporary. Mādhava can be said to have lived in the fifth century, and been active in the latter half of it.+ Guṇamati is known to have written a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*,* wherein he refuted the dualistic teaching of the Sāṃkhya school as also the Mādhyamika view of Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka). There was a constant struggle for royal patronage in the times of the Guptas, right up to the times of Pūru Gupta and Narasimha Gupta (–467 A. D. and later–) and it is understandable that Guṇamati should have challenged Mādhava to a debate.

That Mādhava's ego was powerful can be seen from Yuan Chwang's account also. His last wish was that his wife should continue the debate with Guṇamati; and she too concealed by her dress and the like the death of her husband, but the sharp Guṇamati detected it from her sad face and bitterness of speech even at

+ Prof. Hattori too arrives, in a slightly different way, at the following dates :

Dignāga—470–530 A. D. (Hattori)

—480–540 A. D. (Frauwallner)

Guṇamati— a contemporary of Dignāga.

Mādhava was, says Prof. Hattori, not alive when Dignāga composed the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, his last work.

(See 'Dignāga on Perception', Introduction, pp. 4–6–Hattori). According to Frauwallner, the debate between Mādhava and Guṇamati took place in about 500 A. D.

* See Sphuṭārthā *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*—The work of Yaśomitra (pp. 1, 6, 13, 250, 267, 481, where Guṇamati is mentioned)—Parts I and II—Edited by Unrai Woghara (Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, Hongko, Tokyo, Japan, 1971).

the beginning. In Mādhava's own days his fame was great and surpassed that of former teachers, and outweighed all then living. "The king honoured him exceedingly and named him the 'treasure of the country'. He had as his means of subsistence two towns in the district and the surrounding houses paid him for the privilege of building (tenant dues ?)."

It is no wonder that philosophers of other schools mention him with almost a sense of awe, and that Guṇamati should have sought to arrange a debate with him so that the interests of Buddhism in the kingdom should not in any way suffer and the Sāṃkhya school should fall from the high position it occupied in the eyes of the kings and learned circles.×

As said above, the author of *V₁* has a fancy for something good and novel and I have a feeling that Mādhava was the author of this commentary, and that what is known as *Mātharavṛtti* is but a revised and enlarged version of it with a Vedantic tinge. We have seen above for what things in particular teachers of other schools remembered Mādhava. We may see if these could be detected in this *vṛtti*.

(a) *V₁* criticises more than any other commentary (–except *M* which is a copy of it–) vedic rites and ethical recommendations based on them, in its exposition of *kā. 2*.

× See 'Travels of Hiouen Tshang', Vol. III, pp. 336–340–Samuel Beal (Susil Gupta Ltd., Calcutta–12, New Edition 1958); 'On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India', II, p. 108–Thomas Watters (London, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. I, 1904; Vol. II, 1905); Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, pp. 154–155 –Pulinbehari Chakravarti, Calcutta, 1955); Sāṃkhya Darśana Kā Itihāsa, pp. 533–536–Paṇḍita Udayavira Śāstri.

(b) The author of V_1 seems to have made a number of changes in the *kārikā* text in an attempt to improve on the original wording of the *kārikās* concerned. A glance at the table * of the different readings of certain *kārikās*, that can be detected in the several commentaries, enables one to see for oneself that the pioneer in this respect was the author of V_1 and that others (-notably the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, and also *Gaudapāda* and the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā*) attempted to improve even on the text in V_1 .

Moreover *kārikās* 72 and 73 (the latter being found only in V_1 and M) seem to be the composition of the author of V_1 , as *Paramārtha* quotes *kā. 72* saying it is a verse composed by an 'intelligent man of this (school)'. The *Yuktidīpikā* also seems to quote it and in the *Jayamaṅgalā* and the *Tattvakaumudī* we find the *kārikā* included in the original text. The *Yuktidīpikā* (p. 2, v. 14) has a verse which is clearly an imitation of *kā. 73* :

"alpgrantham analpārtham sarvais tantraguṇair yutam;
pāramarṣasya tantrasya bimbam ādarśagamī yathā".

As said above, the author of V_1 interprets *kā. 18* (janma-maraṇa....) in his own way, and then refers to the traditional interpretation. He gives a two-fold interpretation of 'līṅgam' in *kā. 10*, 'līṅgam artham līṅgayatīti vā līṅgam' being found for the first time in V_1 ; it was readily accepted by the later commentators (See Y, J). Similarly 'hetu' in *kā. 10* is explained as both *kāraka* (causal) and *jñāpaka* (cognitive) and the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* makes a special effort to show that it is

* See Table at the end.

not *jñāpaka* here. In V_1 , on *kā. 2* the author quotes the verse :

"Pañcaviṁśati-tattvajño yatra yatrāśrame rataḥ,
prakṛtījño vikārajñaḥ sarvair duḥkhair vimucyate",
in which the second line is different from the one ordinarily found, viz.

'jāti muṇḍī śikhī vāpī mucyate nā'tra saṁśayaḥ'.

It is not in vain that *Kaṇakagomin* holds that *Dharmakīrti* is referring to 'Sāṁkhya-Nāśaka Mādhava', when he says that some out of a sense of ego make alterations in the traditional text handed down uninterruptedly till then.

(c) *Jinendrabuddhi* says that in the view of *Kapila* and others, pleasure etc. are everywhere one and the same, while in the view of *Mādhava* they are different everywhere. Now, in the introductory passage to *kā. 12*, only V_1 and following it M anticipate an objection to the effect that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are not 'jātyantarās' (-na khalu sattvarajastamāṁsi jātyantarāṇi) (-while the *Sāṁkhya* holds that they are 'jātyantarās'). Now, this can be interpreted simply as urging that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are not numerically different, but are different aspects of one entity. Here the word 'jāti' cannot be taken in any peculiar sense, but must be taken as signifying simply 'svarūpa'-there is no *svārūpabheda* in the *guṇas*, they are not different entities. The *Sāṁkhya* says that they are different. Or, if importance be attached to the use of the word 'jāti', this would mean : they are not three different *jātis*. The *Sāṁkhya* rejoinder would be that they are different *jātis*. This would mean that there are many *sattvas* constituting a *jāti*, and so also with the other two. Could *Jinendrabuddhi* be referring to this ?

(d) According to Śāntarakṣita also, Mādhava is a specimen of an 'unfaithful exponent' who violates the tenets of his school and this can, to some extent, be explained by what we have seen above.

(e) In V_1 we do not find anything specific which could explain Bhāsarvajña's criticism that Mādhava recognised abhivyakti (manifestation) as a new attribute brought about by the act of production, though he would not accept that the effect was not there in the cause before its production.

I would also like to draw attention to an unwarranted reference to a 'klībarājā' in V_1 33 : "yathā bhaviṣyanti guṇasyānte gudakathāḥ ya[thā] vā asaktaklībarājā bhaviṣyati" or "yathā....ya[thā] vā sasaktaklībarājā bhaviṣyati" or "bhaviṣyati guṇasyānte gudakathāḥ ya[thā] vā sasaktaklībarājā bhaviṣyati" (The expression in the manuscript is 'yathā bhaviṣyanti guṇasyānte gudakathā ya vā sasaktaklībarājā bhaviṣyanti', which clearly requires to be emended). We have seen above that Mādhava had to enter into a debate with Guṇamati, pupil of Vasubandhu and preceptor of Paramārtha (499-569 A. D.). This Mādhava must have lived in the latter part of the fifth century and been a senior contemporary of Guṇamati.* He died while the discussion was in progress and the ruling king got a Saṅghārāma built to commemorate Guṇamati's victory over Mādhava.

* I have shown later that Mallavādin and his commentator Simhasūri have made use of V_1 in putting forth the Sāṃkhya tenets in the Nayacakra and its commentary (sixth century A. D.) as we find here the expression 'jātyantara' (found only in V_1 and M., kā. 13). and the discussion regarding 'sarvaṃ sarvātmakam' (See V_1 , 15). This also agrees with the date suggested above for Mādhava.

Could the author be referring here to Narasimha Gupta (Bāladitya), who must have been a crown-prince then and shown some leaning towards Buddhism or had a soft corner for the Buddhists for which he is indirectly criticised here. We know that it was moreover in Narasimha Gupta's time that the Gupta empire started tottering and had to face a Hūṇa invasion. This lends some weight to our conjecture that Mādhava was the author of V_1 . Yet there can be no denying the fact that this is just a conjecture meant to provoke further thought and inquiry. It may again be mentioned that what we know as Māṭhara-vṛtti(M) is only a revised and enlarged version of V_1 and contains quotations from the Upaniṣads, Gītā, Purāṇas, Hastāmālakastotra and the like and is perhaps as late as 1,000 A. D..

It may seem a bit surprising that a mere commentator should have attracted the attention of great philosophers like Kumārila, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Bhāsarvajña and the like. But if Māṭhara, also regarded as a commentator on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, could be mentioned, there is no reason why Mādhava also should not be so mentioned. We cannot definitely say what he did to deserve the appellation 'Sāṃkhya-Nāsaka'. The author of V_1 differs in certain respects from other commentators, and the author of Yuktidīpikā and even Paramārtha seems to respect his views and readings and take note of them, or even incorporate them. Mādhava must have been a great teacher in his days as can be seen from Hiouen Thsang's description also. Perhaps his greatness cannot be judged from just his commentary (V_1), if I am right in ascribing it to him. He must have haunted the minds of his rivals notably the Buddhists especially when he is known to have carried on for

six days the debate with Guṇamati and ultimately died on the occasion.

Mādhava must have written some independent work also as can be seen from Jinendrabuddhi's quotations. Perhaps his commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā was one of his early ventures as we do not find here much evidence of his revolutionary spirit, except that he has tried to improve on the text of the kārikās at places—a fact referred to by Dharmakīrti and Kaṇvakagomin.

Another question that occurs is in what way Mādhava could be connected with Māthara, and by whom what is known as the Māthara-vṛtti could have been written in the form of a revised and enlarged version of V₁. Could Mādhava himself have been known as Māthara or Māthara because he had a maṭha (cloister)? He is described by Hiouen-Thsang as having lived in a mountain.

We may make a passing remark regarding the religious atmosphere in the Gupta period. The Gupta kings were religious and broad-minded and lovers of art and learning. Samudragupta (340–380 A.D.) is said to have revived the Aśvamedha sacrifice. There can hardly be any doubt that his reign marked a distinct revival of the influence of the Brahmanical religion which had suffered considerably since Aśoka made Buddhism the dominant religion of India. Perhaps it was under these circumstances that Īśvarakṛṣṇa sought to make Sāṃkhya doctrines well known by writing an epitome in the form of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (—and perhaps also a svopajña vṛtti—) which criticised vedic rites, and Vasubandhu tried to combat this also in the interest of Buddhist faith and doctrines. These activities were in full

force during the reign of Candragupta II (Vikramāditya, 375–414 A.D.), Kumāragupta I (414–455 A.D.), Skandagupta, Vikramāditya (455–467 A.D.), and Pūru Gupta (467–469 A.D.) and his son Narasiṃha Gupta (Bālāditya), that is to say, in the fourth and the fifth centuries A.D., and even the sixth century A.D..

It was in this period that the Paramārtha-saptati was written by Vasubandhu in refutation of the Sāṃkhya-saptati, and Guṇamati challenged the Sāṃhya who died on that occasion only. Guṇamati was a native of Valabhī and was a renowned disciple of Vasubandhu; he even wrote a commentary on the Abhidharma Kośa, wherein he refuted the dualistic teaching of the Sāṃkhya school as also the Mādhya-mika view of Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka. Sthiramati was a contemporary of Guṇamati and the two stayed together at Valabhī. Paramārtha also studied at Valabhī and he translated the Abhidharmakośa into Chinese in 563–567 A.D.. It is understandable that this Guṇamati should have entertained the idea of a debate with Mādhava, a fervent Sāṃkhya with almost a passion for something novel and more rational.

Thus we could roughly assign the following dates:

Paramārtha—499–569 A.D.,

(his teacher) Guṇamati—450–530 A.D.

(—Mādhava being his senior contemporary—),

(his teacher) Vasubandhu—420–500 A.D.,

or Īśvarakṛṣṇa—latter half of the fourth cent. A.D. or beginning of the fifth cent. A.D..

(54) The author of V₁ is, as we have seen above, prior to the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya. (See 49 above

in respect of kā. 23). We have another sure evidence. Commenting on अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य, V₁ says एवं त्रयो लोकाः प्रत्यक्षादे प्रधानेऽविभक्तास्तद्यथा दध्यादयः प्राक् प्रवृत्तेः क्षीरेऽविभक्ताः, यथा जलभूम्योरेतद्वसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेष्विति । एवं आत्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । We have a similar expression in the Yoga-bhāṣya 3.14 of Vyāsa—यत्रोक्तम्—जलभूम्योः पारिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टं तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेषु इति । एवं आत्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । Vyāsa-bhāṣya seems to be quoting V₁ here. Y, 15 has here—इह यद्विश्वरूपं तस्य अविभागो दृष्टः । तद्यथा सलिलादीनां जलभूमौ, विश्वरूपाश्च महदादयस्तस्मादेषामप्यविभागेन भवितव्यम्, योऽसावविभागस्तदव्यक्तम् । This shows that V₁ is prior to the Yoga-bhāṣya as also Y. See also जलभूम्योः पारिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टम्, तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेषु स्थावराणां स्थावरेषु जङ्गमानां जङ्गमेषु, आत्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । —Dvādaśāraṇaya-cakra-Nyāyāgamānusāri-vyākhyā, p. 416 (Labhi-sūriśvara Jaina Grantha Mālā, No. 26).

Mallavādin's date can be fixed in about the fifth-sixth century (earlier than Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti and after Dinnāga) and that of Simhasūrigaṇi (—who commented on the Nayacakra—) in the sixth century A. D.. Mallavādin refers in his Nayacakra (p. 391) to sattva, etc. being ' jātyantara ', so he should have had knowledge of V₁. The date of V₁ seems to be the latter half of the fifth cent A.D.. V₂, perhaps written by Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself, is earlier than, though not much removed from, V₁—not later than the beginning of the fifth cent. A.D.. The date of Yuktidīpikā (Y) seems to be about the fifth-sixth century as there is no quotation in it from the works of Kumārila and Uddyotakara while there are quotations from Śabara, Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. Moreover, Y seems to be

the first among the commentaries to substitute अकर्तृत्व in the place of निवृत्ति in the ten मूलिकार्थs and this is known to Mallavādin (Nayacakra, p.411). So we can say that Y is a little prior to the Nayacakra.

Paramārtha seems to have been acquainted with V₁ also, though he translated V₂ during his literary activity in China which covers a period of twelve years from 557 to 569 A.D.. The slight difference of P from V₂ can be thus accounted for.

(K) Gaudapāda seems to have lived after the author of the Yuktidīpikā. I think that Gaudapāda who commented on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā is not different from the Vedāntin Gaudapāda, the author of the Gaudapāda Kārikā and grand teacher of Śaṅkarācārya, and his Vedantic views are found reflected in his Bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā.

We have seen above (—See 46—) that according to G, bāhyā jñāna signifies Vedas, Vedāṅgas, Nyāya, Purāṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra. Here the author of G seems to be one directly involved in the Brahmanical tradition and to be a Vedāntin who does not hesitate to say that Vedas, etc. also are just bāhyā-jñāna. We may consider a few more points.

(a) The epithet अपरिशेषम् of ज्ञानम् in kā. 64 is explained by V₁, P and M by निरवशेषम् i. e. all-comprehensive. Y, J and T also agree. G alone explains it as अहङ्काररहितम्. This shows Gaudapāda, the Vedāntin peeping in.

(b) In the explanation of kā. 41, G gives some illustrations which show that he attached more importance to the attributes rather than to the substances, or

identified them. Could this be due to Buddhist influence ? See आदिप्रहणाद् यथा शैत्यं विना नापो भवन्ति, शैत्यं वाऽद्भिर्विना, अग्निरुष्णं विना, वायुः स्पर्शं विना, आकाशमवकाशं विना तद्वदेतेन दृष्टान्तेन न्यायेन—G, 41.

Compare प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्विष्यति—Gaudapāda Kārikā 3.21; 4.7; प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वभावं न जहाति या—Ibid, 4.9. Of course, the point of emphasis is different here.

The Vedantic trend in G can be seen from the following also :

(c) एवमेतन्नियतं सूक्ष्मशरीरं संसरति न यावज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, उत्पन्ने ज्ञाने विद्वाच्छरीरं त्यक्त्वा मोक्षं गच्छति, तस्मादेते विशेषाः सूक्ष्माः नित्याः—G, 39.

(d) धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ संस्कारवशाद् धृतशरीरस्तिष्ठति, ज्ञानाद्वर्तमान-धर्माधर्मक्षयः कस्मान्न भवति, वर्तमानत्वादेव, क्षणान्तरे क्षयमप्येति, ज्ञानं त्वनागतं कर्म दहति, वर्तमानशरीरेण च यत्करोति तदपोति, विहितानुष्ठानकरणादिति संस्कार-क्षयाच्छरीरपाते मोक्षः ।—G, 67. The other commentaries do not give these details. V₂, V₁ and M simply say that saṃskāra signifies dharma and adharma which are responsible for the body; and even when knowledge has been obtained these do not vanish till they have yielded their fruit (—as they are more powerful than knowledge—V₁, M). V₂ refers to these as pūrvakṛta, and says that the body is produced due to the dharma and adharma of another birth. J also says : जन्मान्तर-संस्कारवशाद् धृतशरीरः पुनस्तिष्ठति.

(e) We have seen that G. (kā. 11) says that puruṣa is 'eka'-like avyakta and M follows G here.

(f) E. H. Johnston has, in his 'Early Sāṃkhya', p. 68 (Royal Asiatic Society, 1937), drawn our attention, in a different context, to an important point : Moreover the action of svabhāva is recognised by the

classical systems to a modified extent. Gaudapāda on SK. 27, inquires whether, in view of the fact that the pradhāna, buddhi and ahaṃkāra are unconscious (acetana) and that the puruṣa is inactive, the sense faculties, being separate in function and separate in object, are created by a creator (īśvara) or by svabhāva; to this he replies that on this point (iha) the Sāṃkhyas postulate a cause called svabhāva. He then goes on to state that in this text (atra, that is, in contradistinction to the previously mentioned Sāṃkhya view) the difference of the sense and of external objects arises from guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣa. The manner of expression is odd and might imply that Gaudapāda did not share the Sāṃkhya view, but it seems to be a better explanation to understand him to mean that the earlier Sāṃkhya schools believed in the creative power of a principle called svabhāva, but that Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not."

From the repeated rejection (see commentaries on kārikās 27, 31, 61) of svabhāva as a reality or a cause, Johnston concludes that "previous to the Sāṃkhya Kārikā a principle called svabhāva was known to the Sāṃkhyas as exercising a certain creative power and as having some special connection with the guṇas. Īśvarakṛṣṇa rejected this view, substituting the guṇa-pariṇāma theory, which he might have borrowed from the Yoga form of Sāṃkhya. The Yoga-sūtras do not accept any Svabhāva theory, and this in view of their belief, however attenuated, in an īśvara is natural; but the view that the guṇas act by virtue of their inherent nature (svabhāva) is a Yoga tenet as appears from the bhāṣya on iii. 13, guṇa-svābhāvyaṃ tu pravṛttikāraṇam uktam guṇānām. (Early Sāṃkhya, p. 69).

Now G says here :

अथैतानीन्द्रियाणि भिन्नानि भिन्नार्थग्राहकाणि किमीश्वरेण उत स्वभावेन कृतानि, यतः प्रधानबुद्धयहङ्कारा अचेतनाः पुरुषोऽप्यकर्तृत्यत्राह—इह सांख्यानां स्वभावो नाम कश्चित्कारणमस्ति, अत्रोच्यते गुणपरिणामविशेषाज्ञानात् बाह्यमेदाश्च..... अथैतन्नानावं नेश्वरेण नाहङ्कारेण न बुद्ध्या न प्रधानेन न पुरुषेण स्वभावात्कृत-गुणपरिणामेनेति गुणानामचेतनत्वान्न प्रवर्तते ? प्रवर्तते एव । कथम् ? वक्ष्यतीहैव—वत्स-विवृद्धिनिमित्तं.....पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥—G, 27.

Here the argument seems to be as follows : The problem posed is how the organs could be different and how they could grasp different objects when pradhāna, buddhi and ahaṁkāra are insentient and puruṣa is non-doer. Could this be due to God or Svabhāva ? Someone suggests that the Sāṁkhyas admit a certain cause—svabhāva; or asks if they admit such a cause. The Sāṁkhya answer to this is that the nānātva is due to guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣa. The objector again urges that since the guṇas are insentient, if this nānātva were not brought out by God, or ahaṁkāra, or pradhāna or puruṣa who has brought about modification of the guṇas due to svabhāva (in the case of God and puruṣa) or being one in which modification of the guṇas is brought about (—as applicable to ahaṁkāra, buddhi or pradhāna—) by svabhāva, it would not be there. The answer to this is that this is possible as shown in the kārikā वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं.....due to the motivation of bringing about the release of puruṣa.

We cannot fully agree with Johnston here. It seems that G regards the modification of the guṇas as natural, as due to their very inherent nature. V₂, V₁, M specifically deny that there is any such reality or cause as svabhāva in the Sāṁkhya. The author of G perhaps feels in

the light of the Yoga-school that there is no harm if svabhāva be regarded as the inherent nature of the guṇas to undergo modification in the interest of the puruṣa. Compare here the following lines from the Gauḍa-pāda Kārikā :—देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा—I. 9; also प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वभावं न जहाति या— IV. 9. This lends some further support to our view that the author of G is the Vedantin Gauḍapāda.

(L) I have repeatedly shown that G is written on the lines of V₂ rather than V₁ and that at some places M has followed G, though mostly it is based on V₁. G is posterior to Y but is prior to J, and J is seen to follow G at places, as at many others it follows Y. We may note a few such cases :

(55) The term अविवेकि in kā. 11 is explained in the commentaries as follows :—इमानि सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि इदं व्यक्तम् [इति] पृथक् न शक्यते वक्तुम् । यथाऽयं गौरयमश्व इति, एवं तावद् गुणव्यक्तयो-विभागो न शक्यते वक्तुम् । ये गुणास्तद्व्यक्तं तस्मादुच्यते अविवेकीति—V₂. न विवेकि अविवेकि । सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि त्रयो गुणास्तेभ्यो गुणेभ्य इदं महदादि लिङ्गं पृथक् न शक्यते कर्तुम् । यथाऽयं गौरयमश्व इति विभागः क्रियते एवं व्यक्तगुणयोरपि विभागो न शक्यते कर्तुम्, यस्माद्ये गुणास्तद्व्यक्तं यद्व्यक्तं ते गुणा एवमविवेकि व्यक्तम् 1—V₁.

Y is unfortunately missing here.

व्यक्तं न विवेकोऽस्यास्तीति, इदं व्यक्तमिमे गुणा इति न विवेकं कर्तुं याति, अयं गौरयमश्व इति । यथा ये गुणास्तद्व्यक्तं यद्व्यक्तं ते च गुणा इति—G.

अविवेचनशीलं व्यक्तम्, अचेतनत्वात् । यद्वा गुणेभ्यस्तस्य पृथक्त्वाभावाद-विवेकि—J ; अमी गुणा इदं व्यक्तमिति विवेक्तुं न पार्यते—M; Vācaspati's explanation is quite independent—यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवं महदादयोऽपि न प्रधानाद् विविच्यन्ते तदात्मकत्वात् । अथ वा संभूयकारिताऽत्रा-विवेकिता । न हि किञ्चिदेकं पर्याप्तं स्वकार्ये, अपि तु संभूय । तत्र नैकस्मात् यस्य कस्यचित् केनचित्संभव इति ।—T.

It can be seen that the same explanation almost identically worded is found in V_2 , V_1 , G, M and it is difficult to say on which commentary J is based. It seems to have given in यद्वा गुणेभ्यस्तस्य....., just the gist of the explanation in the commentaries prior to it. But it is clear that J is posterior to V_2 , V_1 , G as it wants to give an independent meaning : अविवेचनशीलं व्यक्तमचेतनत्वात् and seems to be more interested in this rather than in the traditional interpretation given in यद्वा..... The expression in M is more compact and well-worded, than that in the preceding commentaries and is clearly based on V_1 and G.

(56) J explains कारणकार्यविभागात् of kār. 15 thus : यत् उत्पद्यते तत्कारणम् यच्चोत्पद्यते तत्कार्यम् । यथा मृत्पिण्डघटयोर्जन्यजनकत्वेन पृथगर्थ-क्रियाकरणाच्च विभागो दृष्टः । अन्यथा घटस्योदकाहरणक्रिया या न सा मृत्पिण्डस्य, या मृत्पिण्डस्य न सा घटस्य । एवं व्यक्तस्य महदादेः कार्यत्वात् पृथगर्थक्रिया-करणाच्च विभागः । तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम् । तच्चाव्यक्तात् किमन्यत् स्यात् इति । A similar explanation of कारणकार्यविभागात् we find in M and so Pt. Udayavīra śāstrī argues here, as in the above case also, that M is prior to J, and is in fact the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. But we find the same explanation in V_1 and in V_2 and G (-very systematically in G), V_2 giving an additional example of threads and cloth-threads cannot counter-act cold; heat, etc whereas cloth can.

Then J finds fault with this explanation saying that what this could establish is already established by कार्य-तस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम् of kār 8 and so this reason would become superfluous. Hence others have explained कारण-कार्य of this kārikā in the sense of उपकारक and उपकार्य (See अस्मिन् व्याख्याने 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैव सिद्धत्वादन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते यदुपकरोति तत्कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, तयोर्विभागात्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः ।—J).

Now, we find this explanation in Y, only put a bit differently : It may be urged that we do not find the relation of kārāṇa and kārya in शब्दासनचरणादि, so we cannot regard this as a reason establishing avyakta. The answer to this is that kārya and kārāṇa signify here upakārya and upakāraka. How the guṇas are mutually upakāraka is explained in kār. 12. (Unfortunately Y on kār. 12 is missing). This clearly shows that J here refers to the interpretation put forth in Y, even while stating the one found in V_2 , V_1 , G (and M).

In the same kārikā commenting on अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य, J says : न विद्यते विभागोऽस्येत्यविभागः । अविभक्तादित्यर्थः । तस्माद्वैश्वरूप्य-स्योपलब्धेरिति शेषः । इह लोकेऽविभक्तादेकस्मादिक्षुद्रव्यादसफणितगुडखण्डशर्करादि-वैश्वरूप्यं नानात्वं दृश्यते, तथैकस्माद् दुग्धादधिमस्तुनवनीतघृतादिवैश्वरूप्यमुप-लभ्यते । एवमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम् । तस्मादेषामविभक्तेनैकेन भवितव्यमिति सामान्यतोदृष्टम् । (Since diverse things are seen to arise out of one, there must be one entity giving rise to these manifold things). The expressions इक्षुद्रव्यादस...and अधिमस्तु are almost the same as those in V_1 (and M) explaining परिणामतः सलिलवत् of kār. 16 (V_2 has a different expression here to which Y seems to be indebted).

J further says अन्यस्तवाह-अविभागे वैश्वरूप्यस्य । अविभागो लयः, वैश्वरूप्यं जगत् नानारूपत्वात् । प्रलयकाले वैश्वरूप्यं क्व लीयते स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रल्याजगतः । न चेऽवरे लयनं संभवति, तस्य निर्गुणत्वेनाभ्युपगमात् । तस्मादन्यथा न उपपत्त्यास्ति तदेकमिति । This is the explanation found in V_2 , V_1 , as also Y (-and of course M). The wording in J is more like that in V_2 , V_1 , (and M), but the negation in न चेऽवरे लयनं संभवति is based on Y which here refers to the views of other schools according to which paramāṇus, puruṣa, īśvara, karma, daiva, svabhāva, kāla,

yadṛcchā and abhāva are the cause of the world, and refutes these. J refers by way of illustration to only the view regarding Īśvara and says that Īśvara being devoid of guṇas, the manifold phenomena cannot be dissolved into it.

That J is clearly indebted to and hence later than Y can be seen also from the following

(57) किञ्चान्यत्-मेघस्तनितादिषु क्रमानुपलब्धेः । यदि हि क्रमेण श्रोत्रादीनामन्तःकरणस्य च बाह्येऽर्थे वृत्तिः स्यादपि तर्हि मेघस्तनितकृष्णसर्पलोकनादिषु अप्युपलभ्येत क्रमः । न तूपलभ्यते । तस्माद्युगपदेव बाह्येऽर्थे चतुष्टयवृत्तिरिति । -Y, 30; यथाऽन्धकारे विद्युत्संपाते कृष्णसर्पसन्दर्शने युगपदालोचनाध्यवसायाभिमानसंकल्पनानि भवन्ति—J, 30.

J seems to have nicely summarised Y here. T on the other hand has used the word व्याघ्र in the place of कृष्णसर्प—यदा सन्तमसान्धकारे विद्युत्संपातमात्राद्व्याघ्रमभिमुखमतिसन्निहितं पश्यति—T, 30.

Now we may compare G and J.

(58) Explaining the term ऐश्वर्य in kā. 23, J says : ऐश्वर्यमष्टगुणम्—अणिमा, महिमा, लघिमा, प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यमोक्षित्वं वशित्वं यत्रकामावशात् (यि?)त्वं चेति । तत्राणिमाऽणुत्वं येन गुणेन सूक्ष्मो भूत्वा विचरति । कार्यकारणोपचारादणिमेत्युच्यते । उत्तरत्राप्येवं योज्यम् । लघिमा लघुत्वं येन वायुबललघुतरो भवति । महिमा महत्त्वम्, येन भुवनेषु धर्मादिप्राप्तिः, [?] येन गुणेनेषितस्य प्रापणम् । प्राकाम्यं प्रचुरकामिता येनैकमतेकं प्राकाम्यतेऽनेकं चैकम् । ईशित्वं प्रभुता येन स्थावरादीनि भूतानि सन्देशकारीणि भवन्ति । वशित्वं वशिता येन स्वतंत्रप्रभुता । यत्रकामावशात् । (कामेनेच्छयावशेत्) शीलं यस्य स यत्रकामावशात् । तस्य भावः यत्रकामावशात् । अनेकार्थत्वद्वातूनां 'शी तिष्ठतो' वर्तते । येन गुणेन दिव्यन्तरिक्षे भूमौ वाऽवस्थावित्वमित्यर्थः । Compare : ऐश्वर्यमोक्षरभावः तच्चाष्टगुणम्—अणिमा महिमा लघिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यमोक्षित्वं वशित्वम् यत्रकामावशात् चेति । अणोर्भावो ऽणिमा, सूक्ष्मो भूत्वा जगति विचरतीति । महिमा महान् भूत्वा विचरतीति । लघिमा मृणालीतूलावयवादि लघुतया पुष्पकेसराग्रेष्वपि

तिष्ठति । प्राप्तिरभिमतं वस्तु यत्र तत्रावस्थितः प्राप्नोति । प्राकाम्यं प्रकामतो यदेवेच्छति तदेव विदधाति । ईशित्वं प्रभुतया त्रैलोक्यमपीष्टे । वशित्वं सर्ववशीभवति । यत्रकामावसायित्वं ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तं यत्र कामस्तत्रैवास्य स्वेच्छया स्थानासनविहारानाचरतीति—G, 23.

It may be noted that all the commentaries say that aiśvarya is eight-fold, but Y and M and even T enumerate nine, mentioning garimā in addition. (V₂, V₁, P, G enumerate eight, though some editions of G also enumerate nine). Further G's explanation of यत्रकामावसायित्व is not in consonance with the term as such, and hence perhaps J has यत्रकामावशायित्वम् where the root in अवसायिन् is शी in the sense of 'तिष्ठति'. J seems to justify the explanation of यत्रकामावशायित्वम् in G.

(59) J's explanation of तद्वद्विनाऽविशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् (kā. 41) seems to be based on G, though the interpretation is similar elsewhere also (अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि । लिङ्गं त्रयोदशविविधं करणमिह गृह्यते—J, 41; अविशेषैस्तन्मात्रैर्विना न तिष्ठति... लिङ्गं त्रयोदशविविधं करणमित्यर्थः । —G, 41).

Thus Gaudapāda seems to have been later than the author of Y, but earlier than the author of J. T is undoubtedly indebted to J, though it has also criticised the latter (See T, 51). So J could be placed in about 800 A. D. and G about the first half of the eighth century and Gaudapāda, the Vedāntin seems to be the author of G.

I am thus inclined to assign dates roughly as follows :

V₂—late fourth century or early fifth century A. D.;

V₁—latter half of the fifth cent.;

Y—fifth-sixth cent.; G—late seventh century or early eighth cent. A, D.;

J—800 A. D.; T—ninth century.

It is difficult to say anything specific regarding the date of M. In any case I am not inclined to regard it as the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. I would rather assign it to about 1000 A. D.. Nevertheless nothing very positive can be said with regard to its priority or otherwise to T, as it is mainly based on V₁, and is indebted in several respects to G, and has not much to offer by way of fresh explanation. Consequently, its indebtedness to other commentaries is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it has a number of quotations from the Purāṇas, gives fanciful derivations and meanings of words like ahaṃkāra and bhagavat, quotes from the Hastāmalaka-stotra, refers to three śabda-vṛttis and three kinds of lakṣaṇā† and mentions Devala in the Sāṃkhya tradition (—Devala is not mentioned in other commentaries). Of course, all this cannot lead us to a definite conclusion; but M on the whole seems to be a commentary as late as 1,000 A.D., though Māṭhara is known from very early times as a Sāṃkhya ācārya. V₁, as said above, is very much like M which appears to be a revised and enlarged version of V₁. It is not also possible to say with confidence that Māṭhara was the author of V₁, as the name is not fully found; only म followed by a fragment of ह or घ can be read. Nalinaksha Dutt says about Guṇamati that he wrote a commentary on the Abhidharmakośa and refuted the dualistic teachings of Madhva as also the Mādhyamika views of Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka). (See 'The Classical Age,' p. 390—Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962). It is not mentioned from where he got this piece

of information, especially that Madhva's (?) dualistic teachings were refuted. This Madhva could only be a Sāṃkhya, and could Madhva and Mādhava have been one? Or is it a misprint for Mādhava? And how could Madhva or Mādhava be connected with Māṭhara? And who could have revised V₁ to give it the form of what is now known as Māṭhara-vṛtti? These are questions still awaiting solution. We would be very happy if anyone could throw some light on this. Could Mādhava himself have been known as Maṭhara or Māṭhara because he lived, according to Hiouen Tshang's records, in a mountain, where perhaps he had his maṭha (cloister)?

† तत्रापि प्रसिद्धिलक्षणागुणयोगात्तिष्ठः शब्दवृत्तयः । तत्र लक्षणात्रैविध्यं—जह-
ल्लक्षणाऽजहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेत्यादि प्रमाणशास्त्रेषु बहुतरः प्रपञ्च आस्ते ।—M, 5.

The ten Mūlikārthas of the Sāṃkhya Darśana

We find stanzas enumerating the ten mūlikārthas at different places.

(i) इमे चान्ये दश मौलिकाः । तथा हि—

[अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं] परार्थ(पारार्थ्य)मन्यत्वमथो निवृत्तिः ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥—V₁, 72

(ii) V₂ mentions these after its exposition of kārīkās 1—21 :—

एतास्ताः मूलिकाः समाप्ताः ।

अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं परार्थ(पारार्थ्य)मन्य[त्व]मथो निवृत्तिः ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

V₂ does not explain where these are treated in the kārīkās, but simply says एवमेते मूलिकार्थाः । वियोगं वि(च ?) शेष-वृत्तिमुत्तरत्र वक्ष्यामि ।—V₂ 21.

(iii) M has the same wording as V₁, except that it has विशेषवृत्तिः in the place of च शेषवृत्तिः । M moreover says 'चक्रभ्रमवद् धृतशरीर' इति स्थितिः सिद्धा, whereas V₁ says चक्र-भ्रमवदिति शेषवृत्तिः सिद्धा' —stṭhiti and śeṣavṛtti signify the same topic.

(iv) अस्तित्वादथश्च दश । ते चास्यामेव सप्तत्यां निर्दिष्टाः । तथा चाह संग्रहकारः —

अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं पारार्थ्यमन्यत्वमकर्तृभावः ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

.....स्थितिर्मूलमुक्षममधिकृत्य । वक्ष्यति—'तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्' इति ।

J mentions these after the exposition of kā. 51, where the exposition of the प्रत्ययसर्ग comes to an end.

Here we have अकर्तृभाव in the place of निवृत्ति.

(v) अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वे पारार्थ्यमन्यत्वमकर्तृकत्वम् ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

—तत्त्वसमासव्याख्या, सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन, on the sūtra 'दश मूलिकार्थाः?.

(vi) इदानीं सांख्यशास्त्रस्य षष्ठितन्त्रत्वप्रतिपादनाय पञ्चाशत्सु बुद्धिसर्गेषु दशान्यान् पूरयति सूत्रेण । दश मूलिकार्थाः ॥१८॥

अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं परार्थमन्यत्वमकर्तृता च ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

—तत्त्वसमासव्याख्या, तत्त्वयाथार्थ्यदीपन, p. 80.

(vii) अत्राह के दश मूलिकार्थाः इति ? अत्रोच्यते—

अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं परार्थमन्यत्वमकर्तृता च ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

—तत्त्वसमाससूत्रवृत्ति-कमदीपिका.

(viii) अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं परार्थमन्यत्वमथो निवृत्तिः ।

योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

इति दश मूलिकार्थाः ।—quoted from Devala in Aparāditya's commentary on Prāyaścittādhyāya, 108 of the Yājñavalkya-smṛti. *

(ix) प्रत्ययसर्गास्तित्वैकत्वार्थवत्त्वपारार्थ्यान्यत्वाकर्तृत्वपुरुषबहुत्वयोगवियोग-स्थितिविषयस्य शास्त्रस्य.....—Dvādaśāranayacakra, Vol. II, p. 411 (Śrī Labdhisūrisvara Jaina Granthamālā, No. 26, 1951).

(x) The author of the Yuktidīpikā has in his introductory stanzas (pp. 1-2) enumerated the sixty topics treated in the Sāṃkhya Kārīkā :

शिष्यैर्दुर्बलगाहास्ते तत्त्वार्थभ्रान्तबुद्धिभिः ।

तस्मादोश्वरकृष्णेन संक्षिप्तार्थमिदं कृतम् ॥८॥

सप्तत्याख्यं प्रकरणं सकलं शास्त्रमेव वा ।

यस्मात् सर्वपदार्थानामिह व्याख्या करिष्यते ॥९॥

प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥१०॥

* See सांख्यदर्शनका इतिहास, pp. 399-400—Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri.

शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मूलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥११॥

करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।

इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥१२॥

(xi) Vācaspati has quoted in his Tattvakaumudī, 72, the stanzas 10-12 given above with the remark : तथा च राजवार्तिकम् .

T-वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य. Compare J.

Y-‘सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात्’ (का. ६७) इति शेषवृत्तिः

The major difference that we find is that at places we have निवृत्तिः (V₂, V₁, P, M) and at others अकर्तृत्वम् or अकर्तृभावः (Y, J, T). Moreover, in the quotation from Devala we find निवृत्तिः, while in the commentaries on the Tattva-samāsa and in the Dvādaśāranayacakra we have अकर्तृत्वम्. Let us see how this is explained : रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वेति निवृत्तिः—V₁ (This is missing in M); तस्माच्च विपर्ययात् इति पुरुषस्याकर्तृत्वम्—Y.

अथो निवृत्तिः must have been the original reading. But the अकर्तृभाव of पुरुष though an important tenet of Sāṃkhya philosophy is not included here, while निवृत्ति could be included in वियोग also; so another reading stating अकर्तृभाव must have come into existence and this was readily accepted by those who were interested in the exposition of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

The stanza अस्तित्व.....is of the उपजाति metre; the author of the Yuktidīpikā has composed his own stanzas enumerating the Sāṃkhya topics, and these are, like the other stanzas in the midst of which they occur, in the Anuṣṭup metre. Among the commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā we find अकर्तृत्व mentioned for the first time in Y. Could we be bold enough to say that it

was the author of Y, a very systematic thinker who was responsible for this change for the better? In that case the Dvādaśāra-nayacakra would have to be regarded as slightly posterior to it.

It may be noted that Paramārtha seems to have पञ्चार्थ्य in the place of पारार्थ्य. This explains the mention of ‘the five reasons by which one establishes the existence of Spirit and Nature’ as the fourth and fifth of the मूलिकार्थः; and अन्यत्वम् seems to have been dropped to bring the number to ten.

The Number of Kārikās in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya Kārikā.

The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is known from very early times by the name of Sāṃkhya-saptati, which definitely conveys that there should be seventy kārikās. But we do not find in any commentary just seventy kārikās. The number is either less or more. Of course it has been argued that 'saptati' need not mean just seventy; it indicates an approximate number, as for example, in the case of the Śatakas. But if an author at all took a fancy for a particular number, he would try to accomodate all he had to say in so many verses, and make the necessary adjustments. Let us examine what light the commentaries of the Sāṃkhya kārikā can throw on the number of the kārikās.

Gauḍapāda has commented on the first 69 kārikās and Tilak has tried to reconstruct one additional kārikā on the strength of G, 61. This kārikā, it is argued, refuted the causality of God, Svabhāva, Puruṣa, Kāla and some dogmatic theist must have seen to it that this kārikā refuting God's causality did not find a place in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā.

V₂ is a commentary on 71 āryās. V₁ and M have the kārikā text of 73 āryās 'the last one (तस्मात् समासदृष्टम्...) not being found anywhere else. Y, J and T comment on 72 āryās. P does not have kā. 73 and it is held that it must have been added after Paramārtha translated the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, that is to say, after 546 A. D.

The last verse (72, but 71 according to P) is :

"This treatise in seventy verses exhausts that of the sixty-thousand verses; it explains (the sorts of) creation which proceed from (eight) causes, up to the fifty categories (relating to the Intellect)."

This verse is introduced thus : 'An intelligent man of this (school) has composed this verse.' The first hemi-stitch of this verse corresponds to सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य, but the second hemi-stitch is different. Nevertheless, the commentary reproduces what the text has omitted when it says : "The traditions of the ancient sages and the refutations of the opinions of others are found in the great (treatise) but not in this one, This is the difference", (Compare आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि-72).

Takakusu accounts for this by saying : "It was, perhaps, impossible for the Chinese traveller to enclose within the twenty characters of his verse the entire sense of the Sanskrit verse. Paramārtha seems to have been obliged to skip in the translation of the text this or that word, free to take it up again in the commentary."

Of course, nothing definite can be said, but Takakusu's explanation is not convincing here. It is likely that Paramārtha omitted this second line in his translation and someone later attempted to supply it on the basis of the commentary. Or, Paramārtha was himself not sure of the text of this verse 'of an intelligent man' and quoted from memory, and explained on the strength of the impression he carried with him. Even this is not quite appealing, but we cannot ignore the fact that the explanation of the second hemistitch is there in the commentary, and that Paramārtha knows what is known as kā. 72 as a verse composed by an 'intelligent man of this (school).'

Scholars have tried in different ways to arrive at the number seventy or to explain it away. These arguments have been discussed by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī and also by Dr. Ādyāprasāda Mīśra and cannot bear repetition. We shall only see how some of the commentators explain the term 'saptati', and find out if anything definite could be said.

V₂ does not have kār. 72 containing the word 'saptati' yet V₂ has the following in the explanation of kār. 71 : -कपिलादासुरिं प्राप्तः(प्राप्तम्).....तेभ्यश्च [ईश्वरकृष्णम्] । ईश्वरकृष्णेन एतत् ज्ञानमार्याभिः [संक्षिप्तम्] । आर्याणां सप्ततिः प्रमाणं 'दुःखत्रयाभिघाताद्' इत्येवमादि 'एतत्पवित्रम्' इत्यन्तम् । एतत्प्रमाणां सप्ततिं कृत्वा आभिरार्याभिः-संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना ।

Thus, according to V₂, the Sāṃkhya Kārikā consists of kārikās 1-70. Kār. 69 states that Paramarṣi (Kapila) was the propounder of this philosophy. Kār. 70 shows how this was handed down—It came down in a condensed form to Pañcaśikha, by whom the tantra was बहुधा कृतम्. V₂ explains this thus : बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रं षष्ठितन्त्राख्यम् . P says : 'Pañcaśikha, who explained it at full length in sixty thousand verses.' Paramārtha thus understands by 'Śaṣṭitantra' a work of 60,000 verses.

V₂ further says that Īśvarakṛṣṇa summarised this Śaṣṭitantra for the benefit of the śiṣyas. Then we find यस्मादाह followed by kār. 71 ('It is said in this verse'-P). We find a similar expression यस्मादाह introducing kār. 62—तस्मान्न बध्यते...Now kār. 62 is regarded as an integral part of the Saptati by all, so यस्मादाह cannot be said to introduce a quotation. Perhaps kār. 71 was meant by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as the concluding remark on his work of seventy-verses.

Regarding kār. 72, P, as we have seen above, says : "An intelligent man of this (school) has composed this verse". V₁ does not say anything by way of introduction to kār. 72. This kārikā has इति at the end, and V₁ says at the end of its explanation of it : परवादेन वर्जिताः परवादवर्जिताश्चेति परिसमाप्तमिति. M also has परेण वादः परवादः तेन वर्जिताश्च इति परिसमाप्तमिति. Y and T (-and kār. text in J-) read ०श्चापि for ०श्चेति and J has in the Vṛtti आख्यायिकविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताः शुद्धाः. J also says in the vṛtti परं बन्धमोक्षोपयोगिनोऽर्थादर्शिता इति तस्मात् संपूर्णेयं सप्ततिरिति.

In Y, before kār. 72 we find आह च. Y generally employs an expression like आह to introduce a quotation, while a kārikā is introduced by उच्यते, कस्मात्, यस्मात् or the like. We do find एवं यथावत् सर्गमुपाख्यायोपसंहरन्नाह introducing kār. 56, but there it is quite clear that Y is speaking of the author of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. Even its own concluding verses are introduced thus : आह च—

अज्ञानध्वान्तशान्त्यर्थमृषिचन्द्रमसश्च्युता ।

मलिनैस्तोर्यजलदैश्छाद्यते ज्ञानचन्द्रिका ॥१॥

इति सद्भिरसंभ्रान्तैः कुदृष्टिर्मिरापहा ।

प्रकाशिकेयं सर्गस्य धार्यतां युक्तिदीपिका ॥२॥

Y has not even explained kār. 72. Could this kārikā have been really just a stanza composed by some learned teacher, in respect of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, but not as a part of it. The kārikā in Y is सप्तम्यां.... विवर्जिताश्चापि'.

J refers to the 'saptati' as starting from 'दुःखत्रयाभिघाताद्...' and ending with एतत्पवित्रम्... (आर्याभिरिति सप्तत्येत्यर्थः । 'दुःखत्रयाभिघातात्' 'एतत् पवित्रम्' इति सप्तत्याभिहितम्-J, 71). It seems that the reading of kār. 72 according to J is 'सप्तम्यां.... परवादविवर्जिताः शुद्धाः', though as seen above it seems to explain इति also.

T has like Y the reading सप्तम्यां....परवादविबर्जिताश्चापि'.

T does not explain the second hemistich.

Could we hazard the conclusion that the author of V₁ was the author of kārīkās 72 and 73 ? Kārīkā 71 was meant to be Īśvarakṛṣṇa's own concluding stanza in respect of the Saptati. The author of V₁ perhaps felt that something was lacking and so he added kārīkās 72 and 73 as his concluding remarks. Paramārtha referred to kā. 72 as the composition of a learned man of the school. The author of the Yuktidīpikā also quoted it, and then it came to be forgotten as a quotation and was included in the text of the Sāṃkhya Kārīkā. This is how kā. 72 came to stay as a part of the Sāṃkhya Kārīkā, and it was not suspected to be spurious as it refers to the topics of discussion in Sāṃkhya thought and the ten mūlikārthas can be specifically pointed out in its explanation along with the five viparyayas, 28 indriya-asāmarthyas, nine tuṣṭis and eight siddhis. The thought of composing this kārīkā occurred to the author of V₁, it may be presumed, because the author of V₂ referred briefly to the ten mūlikārthas after the exposition of kā 21, and there was no kārīkā to draw the reader's attention to the different topics of Sāṃkhya thought. This also explains why P and Y quote it at the end.

Kā. 73 (-also composed by the author of V₁ it appears-) did not get this honour and so is found nowhere except in V₁ and M (which is an enlarged version of V₁). But the author of Y knew this āryā as can be seen from a verse in it which is an imitation of kā. 73.

(अल्पग्रन्थमनल्पार्थं सर्वैस्तन्त्रगुणैर्युतम् ।

पारमर्षस्य तन्त्रस्य बिम्बमादर्शगं यथा ॥१४॥ —Y, p.2.

Compare- तस्मात्समासदृष्टं शास्त्रमिदं नार्थतश्च परिहीनम् ।

तन्त्रस्य च बृहन्मूर्तेर्दर्पणसंक्रान्तमिव बिम्बम् ॥-kā. 73)

J refers to the Saptati just as V₂ does as starting with दुःखत्रयाभिघाताद्.....and ending with एतत्पवित्रम्..., though it includes kārīkā 71 and also kā. 72 (perhaps regarding both of them as Īśvarakṛṣṇa's own concluding remarks). T is based on J, so we have the same position in it also. It is only the earlier commentaries (viz. V₂, V₁, P and Y) that can help us to come to some conclusion, through in the absence of still better evidence we should always have an open mind and be in search of more proof before we come to any definite conclusion.

As said above, P does not have kā. 63 (रूपैः सप्तभि...) and one might be tempted to regard it as an interpolation posterior to Paramārtha (546 A.D.); but then we would have to regard all the commentaries as later than P, as they all, without any exception comment on kā. 63. But it is likely that Paramārtha also tried to see that there were just seventy kārīkās as the name Sāṃkhya-Saptati indicates. In his attempt at screening he discovered that in point of content this kārīkā was very feeble and even expository and could be dispensed with. Then, according to him, the kārīkās would be seventy-one, where in his own view the last is a verse composed by 'an intelligent man of this (school)'.

An examination of P will bear this out. After explaining kā. 62, P says : "If then you say that Spirit is

bound in the worlds or that it is delivered from death and birth, that is not correct. Another verse says'. This verse could be only k̄a. 63 which also says that Nature binds herself. It could not be k̄a. 64. It may be noted that there is a reference to सप्तरूप again in k̄a. 65 and there Paramārtha seems to have a different reading (—a deliberate change in agreement with the omission of k̄a. 63—) as instead of सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् we find in P 'finishes by abandoning her functions'. This emboldens us to say that Paramārtha deliberately omitted k̄a. 63.

Gauḍapāda might have known k̄arikās 1-71, but he commented on only k̄arikās 1-69, as the rest, he thought, were self-explanatory (—Gauḍapāda is primarily interested in philosophical discussions). We cannot say how he viewed k̄a. 72.

Thus the Sāṃkhya K̄arikā can be said to have originally consisted of k̄arikās 1-71, the last k̄arikā serving as the author's concluding remark.

V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
1. तदपघातके नैकान्तात्यन्त- तोऽभावात्	तदपघातके नैकान्तात्यन्ततो- भावात्	तदपघातके Same	तदभिघातके as
2. ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयाति- शययुक्तः	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂
3. षोडशकस्तु विकारः	तु	तु	तु
4. Same	in all	[Order of pādas chang- ed (dcba) because it is in sūtra style]	
5. आप्तवचनं च	आप्तवचनं च	आप्तवचनं तु	आप्तवचनं च
6. प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात्	प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात्	प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात्	प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् (?) (Chowkhambā Ed. gives the text as प्रतीति- but this is not corroborated by the comm.)
सिद्धम्	सिद्धम्	सिद्धम्(vl. साध्यम्)	सिद्धम्
7. Same	in	all	
8. तदुपलब्धिः	तदुपलब्धिः	तदुपलब्धिः	तदुपलब्धिः

J	T	M	Remarks
तदपघातके in	तदपघातके V ₂	तदभिघातके	Same in all except V ₁
As in V ₂	As in V ₂	ह्यविशुद्धः क्षयाति- शययुक्तः	Same in all except M
षोडशकश्च विकारः	तु	तु	Same in all except J
			Same in all
आप्तवचनं च प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात्	आप्तवचनं तु प्रतीतिरनुमानात्	आप्तवचनं तु प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् (?) (Kā. text has प्रतीति०, but this is not corro- borated by the comm.)	
सिद्धम्	सिद्धम्	साध्यम्	Same in all except M
तदुपलब्धेः	तदुपलब्धेः	तदुपलब्धिः	Same in all P seems to be like V ₂ , etc., though this is not included in the Kā. text in P.

	V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂
9-13. Same	in		all	
14. भविवेक्यादिः	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂
सिद्धः				
15. Same	in		all	
16. प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रय-	Same	in		all
विशेषात्				
17. कैवल्यार्थप्रवृत्तेश्च	कैवल्यार्थप्रवृत्तेश्च	कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेश्च	कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेश्च	कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेश्च
18. त्रिगुणादिविपर्यया-	त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव
च्चैव(Kā. text),	(Kā. text)	(Kā. text),		
त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययाच्चैव		
(Comm.)	(Comm.)	(Comm.)		
19. तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्	तस्माच्च विपर्ययात्	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	
20. गुणकर्तृत्वे च	गुणकर्तृत्वे च	गुणकर्तृत्वे च	गुणकर्तृत्वे च	
21. दर्शनार्थम्,	दर्शनार्थम्,	दर्शनार्थः, कैवल्यार्थः	दर्शनार्थम्,	
कैवल्यार्थम्	कैवल्यार्थम्		कैवल्यार्थम्	
22. गणश्च	गणश्च(Kā. text),	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	
	गणस्तु(Comm.)			
23. Same	in		all	

J	T	M	Remarks
As in V ₂	प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च	प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च	Same in all except T Same in all
As in V ₂	अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिः	अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः	Same in all except T Same in all V ₂ has the same second line in the Kā. text; but has ०पृथक्- पृथग्भाजनविशेषात् in the Comm.
कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः च	कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः च	कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः च	
त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव	
As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	Same in all except V ₁ . Could it be a scribal error?
गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि	गुणकर्तृत्वे च	गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि	
Same	Same	Same	Same in all except Y
As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	Same in all except V ₁ Same in all

V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
24. एकादशकश्च गण- ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्त- ऐन्द्रिय एकादशक- एकादशकश्च गण- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव न्मात्रकः पञ्चकश्चैव स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव स्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव			

25. भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः As in V₂ भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः

26. चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राण- श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसन- कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसन- चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसन-
रसनस्पर्शनानि नासिकाख्यानि नासिकाख्यानि स्पर्शनकानि

वाक्.....पस्थाः वाक्.....पस्थाः वाक्.....पस्थाः वाक्.....पस्थान्
27. संकल्पकमत्र मन- उभयात्मकमत्र मनः Same as Same as V₁;
स्तत्त्वेन्द्रियमुभय- संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च Kā.text in V₂ only G
था समाख्यातम् । साधर्म्यात् । गुणपरि- has बाह्यमेदाश्च
भन्तस्त्रिकालविषयं णामविशेषान्नानात्वं
तस्मादुभयप्रचारं बाह्यमेदाच्च
तत् ॥ (Kā.
text). But
गुणपरिणामविशेषा-
ज्ञानात्वं बाह्य-
मेदाश्च (or०त्त्व)
can be de-
rived from
the vṛtti.

J	T	M	Remarks
एकादशकश्च गण- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव (Kā. text), एकादशकश्च गण- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकं च (Comm.)	एकादशकश्च गण- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव (Kā. text), एकादशकश्च गण- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकं च (Comm.)	ऐन्द्रिय एकादशक- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव (Kā. text), ऐन्द्रिय एकादशक- स्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव (Comm.)	Same in all, only Y has तन्मात्रः Different in all
चक्षुःश्रोत्र-घ्राणरसन- त्वगाख्यानि (Kā. text), चक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वग्रसन(न ?)- नासिकाख्यानि (Vṛtti)	चक्षुःश्रोत्र-घ्राणरसन- त्वगाख्यानि (Kā. text), चक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वग्रसन(न ?)- नासिकाख्यानि (Vṛtti)	श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसन- नासिकाख्यानि (Kā. text), श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसन- नासिकाख्यानि (Vṛtti)	In P ₁ the first line is the same as in V ₂ ; and the second line the same as in V ₁ .
वाक्...पस्थान् Same as G	वाक्.....स्थानि Same as G and J	वाक्.....पस्थान् Same as V ₁ ; only M has प्राह्यमेदाच्च	

V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
28. रूपादिषु ०दास्तु	रूपादिषु ०दास्तु	रूपादिषु दाश्च (but comm. expl- ains by means of तु)	रूपादिषु ०दाश्च
29. स्वालक्षण्यं	स्वालक्षण्या (Kā. text) स्वालक्षण्यं (Comm.)	स्वालक्षण्यं	स्वालक्षण्यं (Kā. text) स्वालक्षण्या (Comm.)
30. तु वृत्तिः	As in V ₂	As in V ₂	As in V ₂
31. ०हेतुकां	०हेतुकां (Kā. text), (v1)०हेतुकीं हेतुकीं (Comm.)	०हेतुकां,	०हेतुकां
32-33. Same	in	all	
34. ०विषयाणि शेषाण्यपि पञ्च- विषयाणि	०विषयीणि शेषाण्यपि पञ्च- विषयीणि	०विषयाणि शेषाणि तु पञ्च- विषयाणि(Kā. text), पञ्चविषयाणि शेषाण्यपि पञ्च विषयाणि (Comm.)	०विषयाणि शेषाणि तु
35-36. Same	in	all	
37. पुनः	पुनः	पुनः	पुनः
38-40. Same	in	all	
(39. missing in V ₂)			
41. तद्वद् विनाऽविशेषै- र्न तिष्ठति निरा- श्रयं लिङ्गम्	As in V ₂	तद्वद् विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम्	As in V ₂

J	T	M	Remarks
शब्दादिषु ०दाश्च	शब्दादिषु ०दाश्च	रूपादिषु ०दास्तु	P has रूपादिषु in view
स्वालक्षण्यं	स्वालक्षण्यं	स्वालक्षण्या	
As in V ₂	As in V ₂	हि वृत्तिः	Same in all except M
०हेतुकीं	०हेतुकां	०हेतुकां	Could P have in view अपरस्पराकृतहेतुकां ?
०विषयीणि शेषाणि तु पञ्च- विषयीणि	०विषयाणि शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि	०विषयाणि शेषाण्यपि पञ्चविषयाणि	Same in all
पुनः	पुनः	ततः	Same in all Same in all except M
As in V ₂	As in Y	तद्वद् विनाऽविशेषै- स्तिष्ठति न निराश्रयं लिङ्गम्	Kā 39 is missing in the MS. of V ₂

V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
42. missing	Same	in all	
43. missing	प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च	प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च	प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च (Kā. text) प्राकृताः वैकृताश्च (Comm.)
44. missing	Same	in all	
45. Karikā is missing, but vṛtti has संसारो भवति राजसाद् [रागात्] भवति रागात् (vṛtti)	संसारो भवति राजसाद्	As in V ₂	As in V ₂
46. ०वैषम्यविमर्हेन तस्य मेदास्तु	As in V ₂	०वैषम्यविमर्दात् तस्य च मेदास्तु	As in Y
47. missing	०न्त्यशक्तिश्च	०न्त्यशक्तिश्च	०न्त्यशक्तिस्तु (Kā. text), ०न्त्यशक्तेस्तु (Comm.)
48. missing	Same	in all	
49. missing	बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टि.... or ०विपर्ययास्तुष्टि... ...(?)	बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टि... तुष्टि...	बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टि...
50. missing	आध्यात्मिकाश्च.... भागा.....	आध्यात्मिक्यश्च.... भाग्या....(Kā. text), आध्यात्मिकाश्च ...भाग्या... (vṛtti)	आध्यात्मिक्यश्च.... भाग्या...
	बाह्या...रमाश्च पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽ- भिमताः	बाह्या...रमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः	बाह्या...रमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः

J	T	M	Remarks
			Same in all
प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च	प्राकृतिका वैकृति- काश्च	प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च (Kā. text) (वैकृतिकाः in the Comm.)	
As in V ₂	As in V ₂	संसारो राजसाद्भवति रागात्	Same in all
As in V ₂	As in Y	As in V ₂	P seems to have in view गुणवैषम्यविमर्शेन P like V ₂ , V ₁
०न्त्यशक्तिश्च	०न्त्यशक्तिश्च	०न्त्यशक्तेश्च	
बुद्धेर्विपर्यया- स्तुष्टि...	बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टि...	बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टि...	Same in all P seems to have in view ०विपर्ययात्
आध्यात्मिकाश्च.... भाग्या...	आध्यात्मिकाश्च.... भाग्या....	आध्यात्मिक्यश्च.... भाग्या...	
बाह्या...रमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽ- भिमताः (Kā. text) बाह्या... रमाच्च....(vṛtti)	बाह्या...रमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभि- मताः	बाह्या...रमात् पञ्च नव च तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः	

V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
51. missing	दुःखविघातत्रयम्	दुःखविघाताख्यः	दुःखविघाताख्यः (Kā. text), दुःखविघातत्रयम्
52. missing	... भावनिवृत्तिः .. द्विविधं प्रवर्तते	... भावसंसिद्धिः ... द्विविधः प्रवर्तते भावनिवृत्तिः ... द्विविधः प्रवर्तते
53. missing	तैर्यग्योनश्च	As in V ₁	As in V ₁
54. missing	तमोविशालस्तु	तमोविशालस्तु	तमोविशालश्च
55 तत्र...स्वभावेन	अत्र...समासेन	अत्र....समासेन	तत्र...स्वभावेन
56. missing	इत्येष प्रकृतिविकृतः (कृतः ?) प्रवर्तते वैकृतः प्रजासर्गः	इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतः प्रवर्तते तत्त्वभूत- भावाख्यः	इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ महदादिविशेषभूत- पर्यन्तः
	स्वार्थ इव परार्थ- मारम्भः	स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः	As in Y
57. missing	Same	in	all
58. missing	पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं	पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं	As in Y
59-61. missing	Same in all	[60-61 missing in Y]	
61 (first line is the same as in others)			
62. न बध्यते नापि...	न बध्यते नापि...	missing	As in V ₁
किञ्चित्	कश्चित्		
63. सप्तभिरेव	As in V ₂	missing	सप्तभिरेव तु
सैव च पुरुषस्यार्थम्	सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति	„	As in V ₁
64. Same	in	all	

J	T	M	Remarks
दुःखविघातास्त्रयः (Kā. text), दुःखविघातकास्त्रयः (vṛtti)	दुःखविघातास्त्रयः	दुःखविघातत्रयम्	
... भावनिवृत्तिः द्विविधः प्रवर्तते	... भावनिवृत्तिः ... द्विविधः प्रवर्तते	... भावनिवृत्तिः ... भवति द्विधा सर्गः	
तैर्यग्योन्यश्च	As in V ₁	As in V ₁	
तमोविशालश्च	तमोविशालश्च	तमोविशालश्च	
तत्र...स्वभावेन	तत्र...स्वभावेन	अत्र...समासेन	P, like V ₁ , has in view समासेन
इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूत- पर्यन्तः	इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूत- पर्यन्तः	इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महादिविषयभूत- पर्यन्तः (-M does not have विषय in the pratika) As in Y	
As in Y	As in Y	As in Y	Same in all
As in Y	As in Y	As in Y	
न बध्यतेऽद्वा न...	As in J	As in V ₁	Same in all
कश्चित्			
As in G	As in G	As in V ₂	Kā. 63 is not included in P.
As in V ₁	As in V ₁	पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रति	The āryā is defective in M Same in all P seems to read नास्ति for नास्मि

V ₂	V ₁	Y	G
65. सप्तरूपविनिवृत्तः स्वस्थः	As in V ₂	missing	सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् स्वस्थः
66. दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षकः०त्युपरतैका	...त्युपरतैका	missingत्युपरमत्यन्या (Kā text), रङ्गस्थ इत्युपेक्षक.... त्युपरतैका (Comm.)
67. चक्रभ्रमवद् धृतशरीरः	चक्रभ्रमवद्बुद्धत- शरीरः	As in V ₂	As in V ₂
68. Same	in	all	
69. पुरुषार्थज्ञान....	पुरुषार्थ ज्ञान...	पुरुषार्थ ज्ञान...	पुरुषार्थज्ञान...
70. तेन बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्	तेनेदं बहु विधा (बहुधा ?) कृतं तत्र (तन्त्रम् ?) (Kā. text), तेन बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् (Comm.)	तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्	—
71. Same	in	all	—
72. —	सप्तत्यां...श्चेति	सप्तत्यां...श्चापि	—
73. —	—	—	—

J	T	M	Remarks
As in G	सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् स्वच्छः (vl. सुस्थः)	As in G	P seems to have in view सर्वरूप- विनिवृत्ताम्
०त्युपरमत्यन्या (Kā text), ०त्युपरतान्या (Comm.)	०त्युपरमत्यन्या	०त्युपरतान्या	
As in V ₂	चक्रभ्रमिवद्बुद्धतशरीरः	As in V ₂	
			Same in all
पुरुषार्थज्ञान.... As in Y	पुरुषार्थज्ञान... As in Y	पुरुषार्थज्ञान... तेन च बहुलीकृतं तन्त्रम् (Kā. text), तेन बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् (Comm.)	G does not comment on kārikās 70 ff.
सप्तत्यां....श्चापि (Kā text), सप्तत्यां....शुद्धाः (?) (or ०ञ्चेति ?) (Comm.)	सप्तत्यां...श्चेति	सप्तत्यां....श्चेति	V ₂ has only Kārikās 1-71
—	—	—	Found only in V ₁ and M.

Let us take into consideration some of the *kārikās* where the readings differ considerably according to the different commentaries.

(i) Kā. 24 : 2nd line :

एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव—V₂, J, T;

एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव—G;

ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्तन्मात्रकः पञ्चकश्चैव—V₁;

ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव—Y;

ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव—M.

The line in V₂, J, T is defective (-one mātrā too few). V₁ seems to have altered the line in the interest of the sense to be conveyed—to bring forth that the group of eleven is aindriya, but here the āryā becomes defective (-one mātrā too many). Y tries to bring this in conformity with the line in V₂, by means of the expression तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव, but here there is one mātrā too few. (Or could the reading be तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ?) M has तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव (again one mātrā too few). The āryā in G (which follows V₂), is free from metrical defect, though the expression तन्मात्रः is rather odd (—it is used in kā. 25).

(ii) Kā. 26 First line—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनानि—V₂;

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि—V₁;

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि वर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि—Y;

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनानि—G;

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि—J (kā. text);

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वग्रसना(न)नासिकाख्यानि—J (vṛtti);

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि—Γ

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि—M.

Kā 26—The first line is different in all the commentaries. It is defective in V₂ (—the number of mātrās is adequate, but the ज गण is missing) unless स्पर्शनानि be uttered as स्पर्शनानि. V₁ seems to have modified

it to mention the sense-organs in the proper order. The line even here is metrically defective unless रसना be read as रसन (as M has it) and there be a letter with a single consonant in the place of ओ of श्रोत्र.* Y rectifies this. G follows V₂ but here there is one mātrā too many and the ज गण is disturbed. The line is alright in the kā. text of J, but that as derived from the vṛtti is defective; there should have been रसन in the place of रसना,—though J actually says रसनं येन रस्यते. T has the same line as in the kā. text of J. M has the same line as V₁, only it is not defective as it has रसन in the place of रसना.

(iii) Kā. 43, first line : सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः—

V₁, G(kā. text), T, M (one mātrā too many);

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च धर्माद्याः—Y, J, M(kā. text);

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृता वैकृताश्च धर्माद्याः — G (bhāṣya) (one mātrā too few).

The line is metrically correct in Y, J. and M (kā. text). G seems to have paid more attention to the wording —if there be वैकृत, there should also be प्राकृत.

(iv) Kā. 45, first line : वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्वाणात्—
V₂, V₁ (kā. text), Y, G, J, T;

•संसारो राजसाद्भवति रागात्—V₁(vṛtti), M.

Metrically both are correct; V₁ perhaps improved on V₂ to make the line more effective.

* We find in later literature a number of āryās where the following conjunct consonant with a final र does not make the preceding letter guru.

(v) Kā. 46, Second line : गुणवैषम्यविमर्देन तस्य मेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्—
V₂, V₁, J, M;

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् तस्य च मेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्—Y, G, T.

Y seems to have put गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् in the place of गुणवैषम्यविमर्देन to make the expression grammatically more correct as also to make the portion consist of just 12 mātrās.

(vi) Kā. 50—First line : आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः in all except G, and M which have आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रः, which is metrically wrong, though grammatically an improvement on the former.

Second line : बाह्यविषयोपरमाश्च पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमतः—V₁ (one mātrā too few),

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः—Y,

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमतः—G, J (kā. text),

बाह्यविषयोपरमाच्च पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमतः—J (vṛtti),

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमतः—T,

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव च तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः—M.

The āryā in V₁, Y, G, J is defective (one mātrā too few). T and M rectify this by inserting च. (Y has च according to Pandeya's edition.)

(vii) Kā. 51, First line : ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातत्रयं सुहृत्प्राप्तिः—
V₁, G(bhāṣya), M.

Y, G (kā. text), J (kā. text), and T have दुःखविघातात्त्रयः in the place of दुःखविघातत्रयम्, and J(vṛtti) has दुःखविघातकात्त्रयः (—this latter makes the āryā defective as there is one mātrā too many).

(viii) Kā. 67, Second line : तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमवदुद्धृतशरीरः (V₂ and others). V₁ has चक्रभ्रमवदुद्धृतशरीरः (which makes the line defective as there is one mātrā too many). T has •भ्रमिवदुद्धृतशरीरः, which is an improvement in expression.

(ix) Kā. 69, First line : पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं....—V₂ and others. V₁ and Y have here पुरुषार्थं ज्ञानमिदं which makes no difference metrically.

(x) Kā. 70, second line : आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ।—V₂, V₁(vṛtti), M(vṛtti);

•तेनेदं बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्—V₁(kā. text) (defective);

•तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्—Y, J T (one mātrā too many);

•तेन च बहुलीकृतं तन्त्रम्—M (kā. text) (one mātrā too many);

Actually, it is the first part of this line that is cumbersome as up to पञ्चशिखाय there are 13 mātrās; Y, J, T, M (kā. text) consider the latter part by itself and make it consist of 15 mātrās.

(xi) Kā. 27 is interesting. It is found in V₂ and Y as follows :—

संस्कारकमत्र मनस्तत्त्वेन्द्रियमुभयथा समाख्यातम् ।

अन्तर्लोकविषयं तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत् ॥

It is found in V₁ as उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधम्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषाज्ञानात्वं बाह्यमेदाच्च ॥

G, J, T and M have the same kā. text as V₁; only G, J, and T have बाह्यमेदाश्च instead of बाह्यमेदाच्च, and M has बाह्यमेदाच्च. In P, the first line is the same as in V₂ and the second line the same as in V₁. It is interesting to note that the second line can be derived from V₂ on kā. 27.

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