The Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā
-A Study

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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure—indeed in publishing Dr. (Miss) Esther A. Solomon’s book entitled “The Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārika—A Study”. Dr. Solomon has at the outset given a survey of the contents of what is known as ‘Māṭhara Vṛtti,’ of Gauḍapāda’s Bhāṣya and of two hitherto unutilised commentaries edited by her, and of Paramārtha’s Version. She has also tried to determine the chronological order of the commentaries of the Sāṃkhya Kārika. She has further written two notes on the ten mülikārthas of the Sāṃkhya system, and the number of kārikās in the Sāṃkhya Kārika. At the end she has given in a tabular form the readings of the kārikās as found in the different commentaries.

I am most thankful to Dr. E. A. Solomon for agreeing to the publication of this work which was undertaken as a research project in the School of Languages, Gujarat University.

I have no doubt that students, teachers and others interested in the study of the Sāṃkhya system of Philosophy will benefit much from this work.

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K. C. Parikh
University Registrar

20th July 1974.
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A word about the background of the present study. I had the good fortune of securing photo-enlargements from microfilms in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, of two single palm-leaf manuscripts (from Jesalmere:Bhandara) of two unpublished vṛtīs on the Sāṁkhya Karīka of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The name of the author of one (which I call V₂) is not found mentioned, but my feeling is that it is the earliest of the commentaries and has the fairest claim to being regarded as the original of the Chinese Version of Paramārtha. The name of the author of the other (which I call V₁) begins with Ṛ but the palm-leaf is broken exactly at this point and we find after Ṛ only a remnant of what looks like Ṛ or Ṛ. I have edited both these commentaries with necessary notes separately.

In this book I have attempted a study of the commentaries of the Sāṁkhya Karīka. Much useful work has been done in this direction by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī in his ‘Sāṁkhya Darśana-kā Itihāsa’ and by Dr. Ādya Prasāda Misra in his ‘Sāṁkhya Darśana-kī Aitihāsika Paramparā’. What prompted me to work on this ‘Study’ was the possession of two additional commentaries. These have not hitherto been taken into account, and are likely to throw new light on the history of Sāṁkhya literature.

I think I should explain the procedure I have adopted. Because of the claim put forth in favour of what is known as Māthara-vṛtti, and even of Gaudapāda Bhāṣya being the original on which the Chinese Version was based, I have, for the
sake of clarity, given a survey of the contents of 'Māthara-vṛtti', Gaudapāda-Bhāṣya, V₁, V₂ and Paramārtha's Version. I have included V₁ and V₂ here, because V₁ is very much like 'Māthara-vṛtti,' and V₂ also is very close in terms of content to Paramārtha's Version. I felt this would make the relevant material immediately accessible to scholars in the field. We find some discussion of this type in 'A Critical Study of the Sāṃkhya System' by V. V. Sovani (Poona Oriental Series, No. 11), but it is not sufficiently exhaustive, and consequently not quite clear at places. While presenting this material I have deliberately in most of the places followed the order M, G, V₁, V₂, P as I did not want to impose my view on the reader at the very outset, but wanted him to judge for himself.

I have also tried to determine the chronological order of the commentaries ranging up to the Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspāti. I have hazarded certain conclusions, some of them rather bold, and I shall feel amply rewarded even if they are successful in provoking discussion and further inquiry in the direction. I have also shown that what is known as the Māthara-vṛtti could not be the commentary as it was written by Māthara, whose name occurs in very early works. I have written two Notes on the ten Mūlikārthas of the Sāṃkhya system and the number of kārikās in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. At the end I have given in a tabular form the readings of the kārikās as found in the different commentaries along with a brief discussion, which also goes to support the chronological order determined earlier.

I express my heart-felt gratitude to the scholars from whose works on Sāṃkhya literature and philosophy I have benefited much, and to my friends who have been of help to me in numerous ways. I am especially indebted to Pt. Shri Dalsukhshai Malavania for going through the contents of this 'Study'.

10-9-71

E. A. Solomon

I am glad in having this opportunity to express my sense of gratitude to the authorities of the Gujarat University for deciding to publish this work.

I am also thankful to the Manager of the Ramanand Printing Press and all his colleagues for the promptness they have shown in seeing this book through the Press.

E. A. Solomon

33, Nehrunagar,
Ahmedabad, 15,
10th March, 1974.
SOME USEFUL BOOKS

V₁—A commentary on the Sāṁkhya Kārika
(edited by E. A. Solomon) (Gujarat Uni., 1973)

V₂—A commentary on the Sāṁkhya Kārika
(edited by E. A. Solomon) (Gujarat Uni., 1973)

M—Maṭhara-vṛtti on the Sāṁkhya Kārika
(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1922)

G—Gaudapāda-bhāṣya on the Sāṁkhya Kārika
(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1963)

Y—Yuktidīpikā (on the Sāṁkhya Kārika)
(Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1938)

J—Jayamangalā on the Sāṁkhya Kārika
(edited by H. Sarmā, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1926)

T—Tattvakaumudi of Vacaspati on the Sāṁkhya Kārika
—Ganganatha Jha and H. D. Sharma (Poona Oriental Series, 1934)

P—Treatise on the Sāṁkhya Philosophy—translated by Paramārtha—
The Sāṁkhya Kārika—Studied in the light of its Chinese Version
(M. Takakusu,—Translated in English by S. S. Suryanarayanan, Madras, 1931).

Origin and Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought—Pulinbehari Chakravarti
(Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1952)

Sāṁkhya System—A. B. Keith (Heritage of India Series, Calcutta, 1949)

A Critical Study of the Sāṁkhya System—V. V. Sovani
(Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1935)

Sāṁkhya Darśana-kā itihāsa—Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri
(Sārvadeśika Press—Delhi)
A Comparison of the Contents of
M, G, V₁, V₂ and P

There was for some time a fierce controversy regarding the original commentary on the Śaṁkhya-kārīka of which Paramārtha's Version is a translation. Now scholars mostly agree that neither Gaudāpāda's nor Māthāra's commentary was the original of the Chinese Version, though they are not yet unanimous regarding the date of M or even G. There are palm-leaf manuscripts of two hitherto unknown vṛttis on the Śaṁkhya-kārīka in the Jaisalmer Bhandāra, and these vṛttis (I call them V₁ and V₂) have been edited by me from the single manuscripts, photo-enlargements of which could be obtained from microfilms in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. V₁ is very much like M and P and so also V₂. Hence the mystery deepens. Scholars have compared M and P, and G and P. We shall attempt a detailed comparison kārīka-wise of the contents of M, G, V₁, V₂ and P and see if any one of these newly edited commentaries can claim to be the original of Paramārtha's Version. Since the date of almost all these commentaries is yet uncertain, we shall consider them here in the order M*, G, V₁, V₂, P, and refer to Yuktidipika, Jayamangala and Tattva-kaumudi only when it is necessary to do so, as these latter do not bear much affinity to the former in point of thought or expression. I have only compared the contents of these commentaries here without making any special attempt to show their dependence or chronology. These will be discussed later.

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* M is regarded by many as the earliest commentary on the Śaṁkhya-kārīka and G also is known to scholars.
Karikā 1. At the outset M has three stanzas which serve as namaskāra, (i) śruti-vāda-vibhāsāram......, (ii) kāvya-namastase....., (iii) namaskāra-hū tam...... While introducing the karikā M shows by means of a stanza what an upodghata signifies. Then it gives an account in a literary style of the birth of Kapila, naturally equipped with dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aśīvarya, and his desire to rescue the world from the mire of ignorance and his inquiries of a reputed Brahmāna who was ‘Āsurisagotra’ and ‘varṣasahasrayājin’ as to his attitude towards the life of a house-holder. M gives stanzas regarding true tapas, etc. and the characteristic of a truly religious man. And then it turns to the duḥkha-traya. It gives only a few illustrations of each of the miseries. Then it raises the question as to how jīvātma arising out of duḥkha-traya could exterminate it. Answering this it gives the illustrations of kārata, rājaputra, and aśīviṣa. Explaining ‘हस्ते सारपाणि ज्वेत’ it asks why when other easier and more accessible means are available one should go in search of Śāṅkhyā-knowledge (केवल चेनकु विन्देति). Here it quotes the stanzas : (i) पुनर्दाहिः समुल्लचि......, (ii) पुनिःतयाष्टि: शास्त्रीय च ......, (iii) यानि काणि च सुल्लचि......, (iv) वैय वैय नमस्तुः.....

G gives two introductory stanzas of which the obeisance to Kapila (कवित्या नमस्तस्मै......) is the same as that in M. Here it quotes a stanza enumerating the seven sons of Brahmā, and also the well known stanza ‘पतिविशिष्ठुतपको......’ Then it gives a comparatively brief explanation of the karikā in which it simply lists the duḥkhas and their ‘drṣṭa’ upāyas.

V₁ starts with the namaskāra to Kapila (कवित्याय नमस्तस्मै......) which is found in M and G. Then the episode of Kapila (-with dharma, etc. manifest in him from his birth, and desirous of rescuing the world from ignorance-) and a reputed Brahmāna (Asuri-sagotra and varṣasahasrayājin) is straightaway given. While explaining the adhyātmika sārira duḥkha, the places of vātā, pitta and ślesman in the body are mentioned. A detailed and illustrative exposition of mānasā duḥkha is given which is not found in M and G (and even in V₉ and P). V₁ also, like M, raises the question as to whom these duḥkhas belong to, and if they could be got rid of, or have to be borne silently, and also how jīvātma arising from duḥkhas could exterminate them. Here in answer to the last it gives the illustrations of kārata, rājaputra, and aśīviṣa. The author of V₁ seems to be fond of Ayurveda and quotes stanzas prescribing formulae for the cure of old age, grey hair, etc.. He has also given a long list of diseases. V₁ refers to the ‘drṣṭa’ upāyas for each of the duḥkhas, and quotes ‘पुनर्दाहिः’......and ‘पुष्पितक्षय सुल्लकि......’. V₁ clearly seems to be very much like M, even much more expository and illustrative at places.

V₁ alone reads the second line as १००१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०१०
as to how jñāna arising out of duḥkha could annihilate it and answering it gives the example of only the rajāputras. V₂ suggests drṣṭa upāyas for each of the duḥkhas, and mentions ‘īstāviṣaya-śeṇa’ as the upāya for manṣasa duḥkha. V₂ explains very briefly that these means are not definite and final.

P, like V₂, does not have any stanza in the beginning. It straightaway starts with the episode of Kapila innately endowed with dharma, etc. and Āsuri, brāhmaṇa by birth, who had sacrificed to heaven regularly for a thousand years. (According to the English translation of P, Kapila received the same answer even the third time, which is obviously wrong in view of Kapila’s subsequent question.) The negative particle in the reply ‘I do not enjoy…’ seems to have escaped one of the translators. According to P, Kapila did not receive any answer on the first occasion. P seems to try to bring some variety here: P gives a quotation from a book on medicine showing the places of vāta, etc. in the body. It does not refer to any of the physical ailments in particular. Among adhibhautika miseries, it refers also to landslips, the breach of a dam, etc. (not found in any other commentary) besides the well known ones. P does not touch the question how jñāna arising out of duḥkha could exterminate them, or to whom these miseries belong or the like. P does not refer to the drṣṭa upāyas for each kind of duḥkha; only says, ‘The means capable of destroying the three miseries are sufficiently known. First, that which is treated in the eighth section of medical science is capable of destroying the miseries of the body. Secondly, the six objects of sense, wherein one finds pleasure, are capable of curing the miseries of the soul. When these means (of cure) are already so known, why an extra investigation?’

‘Īstāviṣaya-śeṇa’ of V₂ comes nearest to ‘six objects of sense wherein one finds pleasure’ of P, M and G mention ‘priyavastu-śaṃyoṣa’ and the like; V₁ mentions ‘śabdā-….gandhādāyo viṣayāḥ’. P seems to have given just a gist of the original at places, and so is comparatively brief. P does not give any explanation of the means not being definite and final. The commentary of the first kārīka is found to be quite detailed except in G. P seems to have raised only the important queries and mentioned very briefly a few upāyas. This cannot help us much; nevertheless the greater affinity to V₂ cannot escape our notice.

Kārīka 2.—M anticipating an objection that certain means prescribed by the Vedas are certainly definite and final, quotes ‘तर्कत सम्पूर्णत…...तर्कत ब्रह्मायं बोद्धमंथन यथा,’ and gives a detailed exposition of ‘तर्कत सम्पूर्णत…...तर्कत सम्पूर्णत’. ‘तर्कत सम्पूर्णत’ is explained as ‘तर्कत सम्पूर्णत मयोनान’ (‘तर्कत सम्पूर्णत’ इति वैदिकविविषणम). Ka. 2 shows according to M the absence of aikāntikatva, the impurity, the absence of finality and the lack of excellence even in vedic rites. We find quoted here—‘मध्यपिणके पुष्यक्रमे पर्नि प्राणोयादो बहुतं विद्वानो गद्धं इति मन्त्रं,’ ‘प्रेमम शरदः स्त्रां जीवे पर्वण श्रद्धां ‘प्रेमम शरदं निवृत्तमयं,’ ‘श्रद्धा शास्त्रं परस्परं पद्धीमयं…..’, ‘श्रद्धा शास्त्रं परस्परं पद्धीमयं…..’, ‘तत्त्वबद्धिन्तं लोकें मत्त्वम: पद्धीमयितं…’, ‘हृद्यक खिचदा पद्धतं हस्तम…’. M refers to the impurities in vedic rites and briefly describes by means of the illustration of celestial beings, surrounded by apsaras and sitting in a vimāna, the sense of rivalry among those enjoying, in different degrees in the celestial regions,
the fruits of their karma. Then M explains vyakta, avyakta and jña and shows how their vijñāna yields fruit which is definite and final. M explains ‘anuśravika’ as follows:—पुलवरपं पञ्चात्रू, वेदेऽश्वरणिन्त्य सत्तान् ब्रह्मो खेतः। तत्त्वं क्षेत्रं ब्रह्माधिक। M mentions that Nṛga, Nahuṣa, Indra and Yayati came to grief even though they were ‘somapāyins’.

G quotes and explains ‘anuvam’ and ‘jñāna’ and shows how their vijñāna yields fruit which is definite and final. M explains ‘anuśravika’ as follows:—अववामस्ते इतिः भूतविद्यात्मक:। तत्त्वं क्षेत्रं ब्रह्माधिक। M mentions that Nṛga, Nahuṣa, Indra and Yayati came to grief even though they were ‘somapāyins’.

V₁, like M, quotes ‘तत्त्वं खेतः’ and gives an exposition of ‘anuvam’ etc. which is very much like that in M though not so detailed, and with a different emphasis in the explanation. The second line is very briefly explained. The roots in ‘apam’, ‘abhuma’, ‘aganam’, ‘avidam’ are shown. Like M, V₁ refers to a number of impure and immoral practices in the vedic rites and quotes a śruti stanza ‘न च(न)भाग्यमत्वमुख्यतिर्थिः’ and also ‘हस्तवन्ध्यमि’...

V₁ gives at some length an idea of the sense of rivalry and jealousy among celestial beings by giving the illustration of celestial beings, seated in vimānas and surrounded by a greater or a lesser number of apsarases. The rest of the exposition is mostly as in M. V₁ also refers to Nṛga, Nahuṣa, Indra and Yayati who suffered though they were ‘somapāyins’. V₁ does not explain ‘anuśravika’ but only renders it as ‘vedavihita’ or the like. V₁ quotes at the end ‘पञ्चविविधमवश्चैक सत्तान् ब्रह्मो खेतः। प्रकटिः ब्रह्माधिकः।’ (The second line is different from the well-known one ‘अनुरोधः ’). V₁, like M, says that the hetu sought after should be ‘aikāntika’, ‘atyantika’, ‘vīsuddha’, ‘akṣaya’, ‘anantapala’ and ‘niratīsaya’ (-M says ‘एकान्तिकतः...क्षयः अनात्मकः कैलायाचिन्तायेत् हेतुः...’), though later while explaining these terms it does not say anything about ‘anantapala’, perhaps meant it to explain ‘akṣaya’. V₁ later mentions ‘akṣayapala’.

V₂, like M and V₁ (more like the latter), gives an exposition of ‘anuvam’ etc.; it too, like V₁, explains the second line very briefly, and shows the roots in ‘apam’, ‘abhuma’, ‘aganam’, ‘avidam’. In its own words it says—पञ्चविविधमवश्चैक सत्तान् ब्रह्माधिक। In the exposition of ‘aikāntika’, the illustration of celestial beings seated in vimānas and surrounded by apsarases is given, but briefly. Here also the aikāntikatva, etc. of the hetu are mentioned but not explained (so also in G and P—); and ‘विषयविविधमवश्चैकः...’ with the well-known second line is quoted at the end. ‘Anuśravika’ is explained thus—गतिः परम् परमर्चिन्तायेत् हेतुः। (Compare J—सत्तान् ब्रह्मो खेतः। तत्त्वं क्षेत्रं ब्रह्माधिक। I. 163.13. ‘O, thou animal! thy

P translates ‘anuvam’ etc. (RV. VIII.48. 3.) while introducing this kārīka. To show the impurity of vedic rites, P quotes RV. I. 163.13. ‘O, thou animal! thy
father, thy mother and thy kindred all approve of thee. Now thou art to abandon thy present body to be reborn in the heavens.*

'पद भजनि... also is found translated. Like V₁ and V₂, P has "For the case where some one utters a falsehood, some devas or ṛṣis declare in the Vedas that that does not imply a crime". Corresponding to 'बहुनामदसहस्याणि...' we have a little differently, "Without reason, Śakra and Indra and the God Asura are extinguished, because of their age, for one does not escape time." P refers briefly to the envy among celestial beings regarding superiority and inferiority as among the mortals. P says here, 'The three defects [avīśuddhi, kṣaya and atiśaya] with the two mentioned higher up [ekāntabhāva, atyantabhāva] render the Vedas inefficacious as a means (to the destruction of misery)'. Here P has for the sake of greater consistency reminded us of the two drawbacks mentioned earlier. The others are not so specific. P points out like M, V₁, and V₂ (especially like V₂) that the means should be definite, final, pure, permanent, universal. Vyakta, avyakta and jña are explained, and the stanza 'पञ्चविशिष्टितत्वस्फोटः' (as in V₂) is translated.

It can be easily seen that P has greater affinity with V₂ than with G in respect of the exposition of kārikās 1–2. P seems not to have given the literal translation of the passages that are just explanatory—especially those pertaining to apsaras and the like—but only summarised them. 'Anuśravīka' is explained thus: "What we call the revealed means, they are those which one obtains by tradition. They have been taught at the beginning by Brahmā and transmitted to the wise ascetic (the ṛṣi Kapila). One calls them the 'revealed means, understanding thereby the four Vedas.' (This is really explanatory, yet compare V₂).

Kārikā 3—It may be noted that introducing this kārikā, M and V₁ have raised the question as to how vyakta, etc. could be sub-classified (क्षिप्त अविभाज्य:—M; क्षिप्तिधित्र: अविभाज्य:—V₁). G on the other hand asks: व्यक्तावयक्तजनानां के विशेष:; and V₂, व्यक्तिदीनां क: अविभाज्य: P has ‘How can we distinguish Nature, the produced principles and the knowing subject?' This comes nearest to G and to some extent to V₂.

M says that the eleven organs are produced from vaikṛta ahaṁkāra without giving an idea of the classification of ahaṁkāra. It also simply says that the five mahaṁbhūtas are produced from the tanmātras, without saying what is produced from what. G explains that each tanmātra is both a vikṛti and a prakṛti inasmuch as sabdatanmātra is produced from ahaṁkāra and produces a:kāśa, and so on. It may be noted that M and G say here that ahaṁkāra is a prakṛti because it gives rise to the tanmātras (—though they do maintain that it produces the 11 organs also—), because they intend to point out later that tanmātras are the vikṛtis of ahaṁkāra but are the prakṛtis of the mahaṁbhūtas, while the eleven organs along with the five mahaṁbhūtas are just vikṛtis and not also prakṛtis. V₁ and V₂ mention that ahaṁkāra produces the five tanmātras and the eleven organs; the five tanmātras produce the five mahaṁbhūtas inasmuch as sabda-tanmātra produces a:kāśa, and so on.
P makes a curious statement that the five tanmātras produce the five mahābhūtas and the organs of sense. It states that the śabda-tanmātra produces ākāśa and the organ of hearing, the gandha-tanmātra produces prthvī and the organ of smell, and so on. This is different from what the Sāṃkhya commentators have to say. P does not say anything here about the production of the five organs of action and of mind; but later (Ka. 8) it states that they too are produced from the tanmātras.

Kaïkā 4.—Introducing the kārikā, M says : एवं व्यक्तात्मकताँम् प्रम्यायां सावधाय प्रभावाय; प्रमाण—प्रभेद—प्रमाण—प्रभेदित्वं द्वि सङ्कृत्य सिद्धिः प्रेषितः. See : एवें व्यक्तात्मकतांम् प्रम्यायां प्रकरणां हैं: किशिकः प्रमाणेः केन केवल प्रमाणेन सिद्धेभवति, इति लोकेऽप्रमाणवेद प्रमाणेन सच्चिते, यथा प्रश्नानित्यावलीयस्य चन्द्रानादि, तस्मात्प्रभावाकरमा्प्रेषितः—G; एवें व्यक्तात्मकतांम् प्रम्यायां परश्वांम् केन प्रकारेण सम्बिन्यम्; इत्यतः प्राणेन्द्रुं एवं अनुभिवेदः कर्मणेत् इत्यतः केन प्रमाणेन गुरुस्य भगवती—V; एवं व्यक्तात्मकतांम् प्रम्यायां प्रकरणां केन प्रमाणेन सिद्धेभवति—Vg. “One may ask, ‘By what sort of inference can you establish the three categories? For in the world one can know (all) by inference, even as with a balance or a measure we know the weight or the length’.—G is nearest to P. P brings in the idea of length that is measured, while G mentions quantity (of grain) that is determined by a measure. P wishes to bring in more variety in the explanation. M shows the significance of the words pratyakṣa and anumāna. M refers to anumāna as triśādhanā or pañcāsādhanā, and as tryavayava according to some and pañcāvayava according to others. A valid inference should be free from 33 kinds of fallacies, but M does not give an exposition of these. M defines aptavacana thus—रागदेविषिकां तद्व्रतास्मातुपायम्, वृद्धिवित्तेष्वर्धमानं।

It includes arthapatti, sambhava, ābhava, pratibhā, upamāna, aitihiya and ceṣṭā in anumāna. While explaining 'प्रभेदित्वं द्वि सङ्कृत्य सिद्धिः' M refers to different ways of knowing—by tula, karṣa or prastha, and says that vyakta, avyakta and jīva can be known by one of the three means of proof. G tells us which object is perceived by which particular sense-organ. The explanation of inference is missing. Explaining aptavacana, it quotes ‘आमोषा शास्त्रविनन्त्यान्वयं’—सर्वस्रयंसयन्तुस्योऽस्मात्। G says that according to Jaimini, प्रमाणाः are six-fold—arthapatti, sambhava, ābhava, pratibhā, aitihiya and upamāna.* Arthapatti is two-fold—द्रष्टा एवं तत्रता. G illustrates the different प्रमाणाः and includes arthapatti in anumāna, and sambhava, ābhava, pratibhā, aitihiya, and upamā (upamāna) in aptavacana. G does not refer to ceṣṭā.

V₁ mentions the objects of the sense-organs. It quotes ‘आमोषा शास्त्रविनन्त्यान्वयं’—and then says ‘यथा नावे विशिष्ट तत्स्रविनन्त्यान्वयं एव: अपेक्ष: किंतु स आपेक्ष:—a liberal definition; and conveys the same idea as ‘स्वश्रयंसयन्तु स्योऽस्मात्.’ V₁ illustrates arthapatti, sambhava, ābhava, pratibhā, aupaṃya, ceṣṭā—all included in anumāna, and aitihiya (included in aptavacana). It

* This is rather strange. The Mīmāṃsāsakas certainly recognise six प्रमाणाः, but they are not the ones mentioned here, for sambhava, aitihiya, and pratibhā are expressly negated as प्रमाणाः by the author of the Śastradīpikā. Jaimini nowhere mentions the six प्रमाणाः, but pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, aarthapatti and ābhava are discussed by Sabara in his Bhasya on Purva Mīmāṃsā suṭra 1.1.5. Kumārila recognises all these six, whereas Prabhakara does not recognise ābhava. J too quotes a verse:

प्रतिविश्वेषितमात्रम् एवें शयत्वः।

अर्थायतिरितिमात्रम् प्रभावाय प्रेषितः।
explains aitihya thus: ‘बैदुध्येकसिमं शाश्वेदवितरता। स्थिति: च वा
शिविनिमित्युथे तथोऽवसानीयवे च’ and quotes ‘अन्नादेव, श्रद्धा साधितेत्…’
as an illustration of अप्तवचना. This is found in V9 also. V9 mentions the objects of the different sense-organms. It quotes ‘आगाम शाक्तिन्यम् – आर्थिक दोषक्षण विदु…’
(a slightly different reading), but does not give the liberal definition here (though we have a similar idea in V9 on ka. 6). It illustrates arthaपत्ति, etc. and includes arthaपत्ति, (सम्भाव्यa), अभावa, pratibhा and ceśta in अनुमानа, and aitihya and aupāmyna in अप्तवचना. It is interesting that it then refers to the प्रमानाः as dvividha and explains ‘प्रमेयम्’ and प्रमानम् as ekaśeṇa: प्रमाणं च प्रमाणे च प्रमाणानि सहाययकमेकाः, एकाविन्दी जायते।
यथा प्रामाण्यां प्रमेयं सिद्धते । प्रमेयः प्रमाणां जायते। प्रमेये च प्रमेये च प्रमेययमसंगमेकाः: एकाविन्दी। व्यक्तं च प्रमेययमसंगमं
च स्वच्छ प्रमेये तवः प्रमेयं। एवम्भावं मेषः। Perhaps V9 means that प्रमानाः are two-fold, cognising perceptible things and
cognising imperceptible things. Or is it ‘त्रिविधा’, and we are reading too much in what is really a mistake of the scribe ?—though it does not appear so in view of what follows. V9 explains aitihya thus—’दुःखितं नाम
बैदुध्यं (ते) भाव आदित्तया तुल्यं (स्तुतिः) सत्त्वतित्तितिमधुच्चते, यथा प्रामाणीयचन्:
and then quotes ‘अन्नादेव, श्रद्धा साधितेत्…’.

It may be noted that all the commentators say that of the 25 साम्क्य्या principles some are established by pratyakṣa, some by अनुमान and some by अगमा; but none has mentioned even later what is established by अगमा.

Regarding perception, P says, “The knowledge (of that which ought to be proved) is obtained by the organs of sense and the objects of sense. It cannot be
demonstrated (by inference); (however) it is uncertain and of a ‘double’ (deceitful?) character. Such is the proof by perception.” This is not quite clear. P refers to अनुमाना (proof by comparison) as presupposing perception and of three kinds—पुर्ववत, शेरवत and सामान्यतह (inference by analogy). * P has translated ‘आगाम शाक्तिन्यम्…’. P does not give the illustration ‘सवर्गे–
पसरसा’। Regarding the other प्रमाना, P simply says—Even if there were a different method of proof or a different object (of the discussion) they would not be excluded from these three. The six methods of demonstration, that is to say, comparison (अनुमाना) and others are included in sacred authority”. This is somewhat like G, which also includes arthaपत्ति alone in अनुमाना. P does not illustrate any of these प्रमाना.

Kāṇka 5.–M explains the definition of द्रष्टा thus: विक्रमं
विश्रान्तं श्रीलाभसिद्ध…। Regarding inference it says—अनुमानं
विद्यम्। त्रिप्रविश्यं, स्यथम्यं श्रीलाभसिद्धपरे। It gives us some idea of the three or five members of the syllogism and a very general idea of fallacies. Inference is three-fold—पुर्ववत, शेरवत, सामान्यतदोऽह्रा। We shall discuss this later. तत्त्रांश्चविश्वसनम् is explained as just establishing the लिङ्गम from the लिङ्गं—श्रीलाभिः श्रीलाभसिद्धांसत्त्विः श्रीलाभां तथावस्त्रिं
गच्छितां, गच्छितां तथावस्त्रिं तत्। गच्छितां तथावस्त्रिं। गच्छितां तथावस्त्रिं। M, V1, V9 employ the terms ‘त्रिदण्डा’ and ‘परिवर्त’, ‘while G employs ‘दण्डा’ and ‘यति’ (J—विरुद्ध–कोकिला). P says—“It implies a characteri—

* In the exposition of लोकित, P seems to have been influenced by न्यायसुसः and भाष्या, as can be seen from its exposition of अनुमाना.
The mark and that which bears that mark. The mark and that which bears the mark are found united and are not separated one from the other. When one perceives the mark, the proof can be established by inference.” It is clear that here P gives the substance of the original commentary in its own words.

V₂ mentions a number of relations that can exist between the linga and the lingin—sva-svāmi, prakṛti-vikāra, kārya-kāraṇa, mātra-mātrika, pratidvandvi, sahacara, nimitta-naimittika. It does not give illustrations.

As Pulinbehari Chakravarti notes in his book “Origin and Development of the Sāmkhya System of Thought”, p. 190, this view of inference on the basis of the seven kinds of relations is refuted in the Nyāya-Vārttika.

In elucidating this verse, Vācaspati quotes the following verse.

Vardhamāna in is his Prakāśa attributes this verse to a Sāmkhya-Vārttika.


“According to the Saṃśātra, “Inference is the establishment of the remainder by means of perception on the basis of a particular connection” (संशास्त्र-एकमात्र 

Seven kinds of of connections can be used to establish the invisible remainder by means of the visible connected with it: (1) the relation of master to property (स्वस्वामियाः), as king to servant or soul to primeval matter (पुरुषा to prakṛti); (2) matter to its altered condition (प्रकृतिवाक्याः); as milk to sour milk, or primeval matter to the ‘great one’ etc (प्रधानं to mahañādi); (3) cause to effect (कारककार्याः), as a cart to its parts, or the good, etc (sattvādi); (4) efficient cause to the caused (निर्मलकृतिकार्याः), as potter to pot, or soul (पुरुषा) to the activity of primeval matter (प्रधानं); (5) matter to form (साम्यामातिकार्याः), as branch, etc. to the tree, or sound, etc. to the great elements; (6) concurrent occurrence (सहभारिः) as with Cakravāka ducks, or with the good, etc. (sattvādi); (7) hindering to hindered (विवापत्तकामाः), as snake to mongoose, or the good, etc. (sattvādi) insofar as they comprise the reciprocal relation of the essential and the accessory matter (अंगांगिबहतः)” (p. 346).]
Manu.”—This is substantially the same as the interpretation in $V_1$ and $V_2$ (though the translation of the karika is not quite consistent with this).

While referring to the sense-objects and sense-organs, M starts with rūpa etc. and netra, etc., while G has here “भोजन वर्ग” भोजनवर्ग “जिसकालासाधनिति.” $V_1$ and $V_2$ mention rūpādi and caksurādi. Regarding perception P says—“The ear obtains knowledge by sound........and the nose by odour. It is only a perception which the organ obtains but not a judgment by comparison (inference). That is what is called proof by perception.”

We may now compare the illustrations of pūrvavat, etc. as given in M, G, $V_1$, $V_2$ and P.

$V_3$—like $V_1$.

P—(starting from what precedes)—Men see the black clouds and infer that it is about to rain.

All are alike, except that M regards it as inference from the antecedent to the subsequent or vice-versa, while the others regard it as only inference of the subsequent from the antecedent.

P—(Starting with what remains)—Seeing the water of a river recently muddled, they know that rain has fallen higher up the river.

It is surprising that P is very much like J here—अतीताद्वारा क्षेत्रतः—रेखां शैलसाधनातिति. यथासम्भव समावेश वर्ग: कल्याणके क्षेत्रे विश्वासिति. Both seem to be guided by the Nyaya-Bhāṣya.

J is like G here. P is like $V_2$, though the former mentions particular regions. Though individual commentators might have explained the significance of some of the names (pūrvavat, etc.) none of these except P has tried to show specifically the distinguishing characteristics of these. P says : ‘Starting from what precedes........ The triple knowledge is obtained by perception, and it is capable of distinguishing the three cases (cause, effect and similarity) and the three times (past, present and future).’ Compare—प्रश्ननात्वा व्यवहारस्वते, पुरावत, क्षेत्रः, सामान्यतास्पदिः. अतिरिक्तानुवर्तमानमात्रो: पदार्थः:। तथा भविष्यत्साधनान्य पुर्वातुसमानमः। पुर्वी शैलसाधनातिति पुर्ववत........; अतीताद्वारा क्षेत्रतः—रेखां
These examples and their sources have been discussed later. P and J both seem to be influenced by the Nyāya-bhāṣya 1.1.5 in respect of śeṣavat, perhaps because the example given by earlier Sāmkhya commentators did not appeal to them as there is hardly any logic in it.

Kārīka 6—Introducing this kārīka, M says: Of the three called vyākta, avyākta, jīna, which one is established by which of the three pramāṇas, pratyakṣa, etc. ? G—Thus the three-fold pramāna is explained; what is established by which pramāṇa ?

V₁—The three-fold pramāṇa has been defined; now point out the respective object of each—which prameya is established by which pramāṇa.

V₂—Which prameya is established by which anumāṇa, by which pramāṇa?

P—You say that there is a three-fold proof by inference. What is the domain of each method of proof ? (Is P trying to put the expression in V₂ properly?)

M holds that pradhāna and puruṣa though atīndriya (supersensuous) are both established by sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference as existent; pradhāna must be existent and triguṇa inasmuch as it is the cause of mahat, etc. which are triguṇa; puruṣa must be existent and sentient so that the activity of the pradhāna, which is unconscious, could be possible. M does not explain cd. G is similar to M; only, the second line is taken note of and illustrated by Īnḍre ḍhāraṇā, uttarā, śvāmṛṣṭikāra. V₁, like M, does not explain the second line, and explains the inference thus—There is puruṣa for whom pradhāna produces mahat, etc. V₂ is the same as V₁ except that it explains the second line, gives a brief exposition of āptāgama, and illustrates it by ‘Īnḍre ḍhāraṇā, uttarā, śvāmṛṣṭi’. P is like V₂, only it is a bit more explanatory in respect of the first line. It means the three guṇas when it speaks of joy, anxiety, blindness (that is to say, sukha, duḥkha and moha, these terms being employed in the same sense as sattva, rajas and tamas).

Kārīka 7. This kārīka anticipates an objection that what is not perceived is non-existent. e. g. (M) निजीश्चिद्वितीयमणि; तुवीषा बाहु; वस्तिविविधद्रार्थोऽव; (G) बधीतीय विद्विविधद्रार्थोऽव; (V₁) धितिभिन्नविन्योगतयास्तित्वतं पराः भविष्यविविधद्रार्थोऽव; (V₂) धितिभिन्नविन्योगतयास्तित्वतं पराः; (P) second head or the third arm of some one who is not the self-existent God.

M does not say at the very outset that even what is ‘sat’ (existent) may not be perceived due to one of the eight causes mentioned, and the non-perception of an ‘asat (non-existent) thing is four-fold, but does so in the course of the explanation of this kārīka. G mentions the ‘aṣṭadāḥ anupalabdhi’ of existent things but does not refer to the four-fold non-perception of non-existent things. V₁ introducing the kārīka mentions both. V₂ and P mention the ‘aṣṭadāḥ anupalabdhi’ of existent objects and later casually refer to the four-fold non-perception of non-existent things.

Examples for anupalabdhi due to atidūra, etc. as given in the different commentaries are as follows:

M—द्वितीयमणि; तुवीषा बाहु; वस्तिविविधद्रार्थोऽव; (G) बधीतीय विद्विविधद्रार्थोऽव; (V₂) धितिभिन्नविन्योगतयास्तित्वतं पराः; (P) second head or the third arm of some one who is not the self-existent God.
P—An object fallen on the other bank is not seen by the man on this bank.

V₁—বিপ্রক্ষণ্ডেক্ষণ হয় না:
V₂—যা বিপ্রক্ষণ্ডেক্ষণ হয় না তাহলে শক্নিন্দ্রদ্বয়ে।

P—A particle of dust in the eye cannot be perceived.

V₁—শচ্ছদ্রস্বচ্ছদ্রপিকা ফসলপ্রস্তুতযুক্ত (সোপল্পতে)।
V₂—দেখতে নাম চোখপ্রস্তুতনাম নোপল্পতে।

P—Others are obscured by the trouble of the mind, for one is incapable of thinking of a given subject when the mind is elsewhere.

V₁—কঠিন দেখতে নাম চোখপ্রস্তুতনাম নরনারায়ণ: শচ্ছদ্রস্বচ্ছদ্রপিকা ফসলপ্রস্তুতনাম নোপল্পতে।
V₂—কঠিন দেখতে নাম চোখপ্রস্তুতনাম নরনারায়ণ: শচ্ছদ্রস্বচ্ছদ্রপিকা ফসলপ্রস্তুতনাম নোপল্পতে।

P—A bean cannot be distinguished in a mass of beans because all the beans are of the same kind.

V₂ is closest to P.

Illustrations of non-perception due to non-existence are almost the same in all; except that P does not mention ‘শাতলিঙ্গশা’ and V₁ has ‘অহিমাদৃশ্য’ instead of ‘আহিমাদৃশ্য’. G does not mention this kind of anupalabdhi at all. G and P just illustrate the anupalabdhi of an existent thing due to different causes and they do not, like the others,
at each stage employ an expression to that effect — e.g., अन्तर्दृष्टे तत्त्व कसाहोपसर्वस्य।...

Karika 8 explains that pradhana is not perceived, not due to its non-existence but because of its saukṣmya; nevertheless it can be known through its effects, mahat, etc. which are both similar to prakṛti and not similar. M and V₁ explain the saukṣmya of pradhana by 'नात्माकल्पनायास'; V₉ by 'नात्माकल्पनायास'; G and P do not seem to offer any specific reason. V₉ does not remind us here of the illustrations of non-perception due to saukṣmya that are given in the commentary of the previous karika, while the others do. It may be noted that V₁ and V₉ introducing this karika ask why pradhana is not perceived, as कः 8 pertains to pradhana alone. The other commentaries including P ask about the cause due to which pradhana and puruṣa are not perceived.

In the explanation of 'ग्रंथयतुपलविचारा:', the illustrations in the different commentaries are as under: — M—यथा वाद्यायने इत्यां वर्जयायाप्रावृत्तोऽसे; V₁—प्राप्तप्राप्तितत्; V₁—स्वस्तस्वस्तान— the wording and way of explaining is different. G and P do not give any illustration, P states—'The existence of Nature can be inferred by analogy from her effects.' (P does not include this in the text of its verse.) M, G, V₁ and V₉ simply mention the twenty-three effects (—of course in their order). P specifically shows the order of evolution. It may be noted that according to P, the eleven organs of sense and action and the five gross elements are produced from the five subtle elements. All the commentaries say that a son is like the father in respect of certain qualities and unlike him in respect of certain other qualities. Only P says: 'A man begets two children, one of whom resembles the father while the other does not resemble him at all. Among the products of one and the same cause, there are some which resemble the original principle and others which resemble it in nothing.' This is not what the Sāṃkhya writers meant. P sometimes tries to explain a point in its own way irrespective of what the Sāṃkhya commentator had to say.

The commentators discuss here whether the effect is existent or not in the cause before its production. M—यथा वैशेषिका विवर्तिन्यावस्त्र: सद्वैवतिकी मन्यन्ते सूक्तिकः हि आगुण्णेषां च। नात्मान्तिकान्ति व्यवसितान्ति: भवमान्तिकी न च भास्तिः एव बौद्धानां पश्चात्: (V₁ uses the expression अत्साधिकारानेत्रेष्य also while introducing कः 9). The other views are summarily set aside in the commentaries, while कः 9 refutes the Vaiśeṣika stand-point. G is very brief—वत्तोऽस्मिन्यस्ततः सवं कार्यमुः बौद्धानामस्ततः कार्यमुः सद्यन्तं भवस्यात्ततः सन्तं नात्तिकी विकिर्तितेष्य:।

The expression in P is confused here—'Some one may ask......' There are some wise ones who affirm that a pot and other earthen utensils exist already in the lump of clay which serves to make them. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that at first they do not exist and that later they exist (—that is to say, the effect is not in the cause). According to the disciples of Śākyamuni a pot is neither existent nor non-existent in the lump of clay. We have then three opinions and we prefer the middle one to the others.' Replying to that we shall refute first the opinion of Śākyamuni, later that of the
The opinion of Śākyamuni 'neither existent nor non-existent', is inadmissible because it is self-contradictory. To say non-existent that would be to say nothing. To say 'not non-existent', that is to say 'existent'. Existence and non-existence together make a contradiction; it is as if you should say 'that man is neither dead nor living'. As that opinion is self-contradictory, it cannot be maintained. Thus it is with the doctrine of Śākyamuni.' Paramārtha notes here:—'This refutation, (that is to say, the last phrase) is false. Why? Because Śākyamuni had not such an opinion. When Śākyamuni affirms non-existence he does not wish to say (it is) nothing. He does not wish to declare existence either, when he says that it is not non-existent, for he does not insist on either of the two extremes. The refutation then does not affect Buddhism in any way.'

QuerelY enough Paramārtha explains the refutation in such a way as to keep Buddhism out of the picture altogether. But he forgets that this was the usual method of refutation. M. V₁ and V₉ say that one cannot have a discussion with the Buddhists as they have no view of their own (pakṣaparigrahābhāva). All of them refer to the Vaiṣeṣika, Jaina and Buddhist views, briefly refute the last two and then comment on kā. 9 refuting the Vaiṣeṣika stand-point and establishing the Śāmkhya sat-kāryavāda.

Takakusu gives a foot-note here—'There is a reference to these passages in the commentary on the Śatasāstra (translated in 608; it is not included in the editions of the Chinese Tripitaka). Here it is: 'In the Golden Seventy' (Śāmkhya Kārikā) the opinions of two schools are refuted, and the opinion of the Śāmkhya school is established. The two schools are: (1) the doctrine of Rṣabha (Le-cha-p’o...) who maintains that the effect is neither existent nor non-existent in the cause; (2) the doctrine of the Vaiṣeṣikas, who assert that the effect does not exist in the cause.' This citation informs us that the Chinese text to which the commentator on the Śatasāstra refers, contained here 'Rṣabha' in the place of 'Śākyamuni.' But Rṣabha is the name given to the Saint of the Jainas; the Chinese have explained it by Ni-k’ien-tse......=Nirgranthika. An Indian version of our text ought to have this variant. It would perhaps be better to read throughout Rṣabha in the place of Śākyamuni.’ This last comment made by Takakusu has in view Paramārtha’s note. But it is not proper because the Jainas would hold that the effect is both existent and non-existent in the cause. As it stands there is no clear reference to the Jaina view in P. Could it be that Paramārtha out of his partiality for Buddhism substituted a refutation of Buddhism in place of that of Jainism because he felt it insulting that the Śāmkhyas should not even care to refute it and then added a note that it was not proper as it did not correctly present the Buddhist view? It may be noted that the illustration given in the other commentaries in connection with the Jaina view is that of ‘mṛtaka-jīvaka’. P reverses it in relation to Buddhism—‘neither dead nor living’.

Kārikā 9.—The Vaiṣeṣika view is refuted in this kārika. We shall compare the illustrations given by the commentaries in connection with the reasons adduced.
Oil cannot be produced from sand.

By pressing sesamum one gets oil.

A man who thinks that tomorrow a Brahmin will come to dine in his house procures milk to make curds. Why does he not take water?

A potter with his instruments makes pitchers and plates from a lump of clay, but he is not capable of making these utensils using plants or trees.

P gives a negative example also. This reason (वः ज्ञातः प्रक्षेपण) is meant to show that the cause can give rise to only an effect adequate to it, not just anything. This is clearly brought out by M and V₁. G and V₉ are not so clear here. P on the contrary shows the adequacy of the cause in respect of the effect.

Karika 10.—P unlike the others mentions while introducing the karika (and also at the end of the commentary on this karika) the number (nine) of dissimilarities of the effects with Prakrti. The discussion regarding sat-karya or asat-karya was a sort of a digression; so V₉ says प्रकृतः वैविकः... P has, “Continuing to reply to the question, I resume the explanation of the preceding verse; as for the dissimilarity of the effects with Nature there are nine points to observe.” Takakusu notes here in his foot-note: “The commentary agrees with that of Gauḍapāda almost word for word. These arguments may be traditional in the Sāṃkhya school, but an
agreement so close is not, however, an act of chance. These lines, even as some others, are found in the commentary on the Chinese text." We have seen that $V_2$ is closer than $G$ to $P$ in several respects and it is so even here.

In respect of the exposition of 'हेतुमय', $M$, $G$, $V_1$ and $V_2$ are in complete agreement in respect of the Sāṅkhya tenet of evolution. $P$ maintains against these that the five organs of sense, five organs of action and manas besides the five gross elements have for their cause the five subtle elements (तन्मात्राः). Moreover it does not specifically mention here that शक्ति has शब्दतन्मात्रा as its cause and so on, while the others do.

We see at places that $P$ is not fond of always repeating what has been mentioned elsewhere. The synonyms of hetu are given in the commentaries as shown below:

$M$, $V_1$; ध्वनिन्तु हेतु: कारणमिश्रणंतरस्य—$M$, $V_1$; ध्वनिन्तु हेतु: कारणमिश्रणंतरस्य—$G$; हेतुरपेशे विग्नं निर्मितं प्रमाणं कारणमिश्रणं पर्यायं—$V_2$.

$M$ and $V_1$ further say that hetu is two-fold—कारक (productive) and ज्ञापक (cognitive); pradhāna, buddhi, अहांकार and तन्मात्राः are कारक hetus, whereas विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तुष्टि, गौरव and अनुग्रह are ज्ञापक hetus; we are further told: तदुद्विधेनानि हेतुत्व।$M$ and $V_1$ explain 'संक्षिप्तमय' similarly, without mentioning the synonyms. $Y$ shows conclusively that only the कारक hetu is meant here. $J$, $T$ also explain हेतुमय similarly, without mentioning the synonyms. $Y$ shows conclusively that only the कारक hetu is meant here. $V_2$ and $P$ explain 'हेतुमय' as 'having a cause' without going into further details regarding the kind of hetu meant. This difference in exposition might prove helpful in determining the chronology of the commentaries. We shall discuss this later.

अनिश्चय—$G$ is very brief here saying that if a thing is produced from something it is anitya, as for example, ghaṭa produced from the मृतपिन्दा. $M$, $V_1$ and $V_2$ apply this to the effects of pradhāna and moreover say that each effect is merged at the time of pralaya in its respective cause. $P$ is more elaborate here: "Mahat and the others are produced by Nature. Being products they are not permanent. There are two sorts of impermanence: (a) that which lasts a certain time; (b) that which changes at every moment. So long as a cause of change does not intervene, a thing remains what it is. Thus a forest or other similar things remain what they are so long as fire does not destroy them; but when the calamity of fire befalls them, the five gross elements and the others resolve themselves into the five subtle elements and the others, the five subtle elements in the sentiment of Self..."
The other commentaries give an exposition of the contrary nature of avyakta at the end while specifically explaining ‘विपरीतम् अव्यक्तम्’. V₁ alone of these gives two explanations of विद्यम्-स्वं मायेनि and लोकसंसार विद्यमानि हैं न विद्यम्. (Later J and T also give this second explanation, J giving the first one also. Y has here निबन्ध तक्षाकोपन्नम्.)

Karikā 11. बिनुष्टत्-M simply says that the effect is in accordance with the cause, black cloth is made of black thread. The effect has three gunas so the cause is established as having three gunas. G first explains these characteristics—triguna, etc.—in connection with व्यक्तम् and later while explaining तथा प्राणम् establishes that pradhāna also is similar in character. It mentions the three gunas and gives the illustration of black cloth and black threads. V₁ mentions the three gunas and also enumerates the effects and establishes both positively and negatively that pradhāna is triguna. It also gives the example of black thread and cloth. V₉ mentions the three gunas and the twenty-three tattvas constituting vyakta, and later while explaining तथा प्राणम् states the argument and the illustrations of black thread and black cloth, and white thread and white cloth. P is elaborate like V₁ and gives the example of black thread and black cloth; only, it does not give the negative argument,—if pradhāna did not have the three gunas, mahat, etc. also would not have had the three gunas. V₉ is like G here.

अन्वितेषिक—M is very brief and does not give the illustration ‘अन्य गौरवम् हैं’, while G gives it. V₁, V₉ and P are more explanatory and give the above-mentioned illustration; V₁ and V₉ mention the names of the three gunas. All the commentaries except G and V₉ mention in the case of each characteristic that pradhāna also is alike triguna, aliveki, etc. G and V₉ after giving an exposition of the characteristics in respect of vyakta, state while explaining तथा प्राणम् that pradhāna also can be established as having the said characteristics.

सामान्यम्—M gives the illustration ‘निशिक्षा, सवंप्रज्ञापनम्’. G—मूलसङ्केत! दाशीवर; V₁—सवं मलन्दशी सवंप्रज्ञापनम् मलन्दशी; V₉—सवं मलन्दशी सवंप्रज्ञापनम् सामान्यम्; P—Even as a servant who has many masters, each one of whom employs her and makes her work.

The commentaries other than M and G have given a point to point explanation of ‘सहिःसर्वसङ्केत स सुमान’. M and G are carried away by the idea that in ka. 10 the characteristics showing the contrary character of mahat, etc. and pradhāna are mentioned and puruṣa is unlike mahat, etc. and like pradhāna in these respects, forgetting that in respect of anekatva, puruṣa is like vyakta and unlike avyakta. Or could this betray some other influence? V₉ does not mention this point at all, while V₁ pointedly says—अनेकं व्यक्तम्, एकं प्राणम्; पुरुषोऽद्यनेकः G has अनेकं व्यक्तम् मलन्दशी तथा स पुरुषोऽद्यनेकः. Scholars have tried in different ways to explain how puruṣa could be said to be one. But we are not concerned with that here.

P is brief but clear: “The evolved principles and Nature are similar in these six points, while for Spirit there is not such similarity. There is then the opposite of similarity. The evolved principles and Nature are dissimilar in the nine points (enumerated in v. 10), while in the case of Spirit there is dissimilarity (with the evolving principles) in eight points of the nine; it is
in that it is said to be dissimilar. Spirit differs from Nature in this point alone that it is multiple.”

Kārika 12. V 9 and P are very brief in the interpretation of ‘शौकोपितिवियातथामका’: P is similar to G as it renders प्रिति by sukha, apriti by dukkha and विषया by moha. V 9 does not do so. G explains artha as सामर्थ्य—‘capability’. P also has “The first (sattva) is capable of shining or illuminating......” M and V 1 give a long list of qualities resulting from sattva, rajas and tamas; not so the others.

अन्योपाखयः—M and V 1—Each functions depending on the functions of the other two; ‘तिरुक्किळवाच: वैदिकं’.

G simply says ‘यथेष्टकः गुणः’. V 9 has the same words: ‘तिरुक्किळवाच: वैदिकं’.

Comparison: P—“The three guṇas depending each on the other are capable of performing all things even as the three sticks leaning each on the other can support a basin for ablution.” V 9 is like P, and V 1 is exactly like M.

अन्योपाखयः—�न्योपाखयः अपव्ययं ज्ञातिः सर्वं रजस्तथा ज्ञातिः......

After explaining that sometimes sattva produces rajas and tamas and so on, P gives the simile, ‘Just as three men dependent on one another perform an act, even so the three guṇas residing in the mahat and the others and dependent on one another produce birth and death.” It is clear that P has dropped the well-known similes of mṛt-piṇḍa and tāntu and preferred to have the simile of three men (—P does not mention the names, for it mostly likes to speak in very general terms—), as they correspond to the three guṇas. P seems to have explained very briefly on the basis of V 9 or a commentary on the same lines.

अन्योपाखयः—A stanza ‘रचयो विवृतं सर्वं......with slightly different readings is found in all the commentaries. The
prose explanation is the same in M and V₁—अवयोग-पक्षालय; and it is similar in G and V₂—परस्रवहार्य इत्यवः; G and V₂ give the simile ‘यथा भूपुर्वी’. P assigns the quotation to Po-so (Vyasa according to Takakusu); others do not mention the source. Vācaspatī calls it ‘गम’ in his Tattva Kaumudī, in which, as also in G, the text is as follows:

अवयोगसिद्धम्: देवेण देवस्वामिनि: । ।
रजसो विवृहं सत्त्वस्व विवृहं रजः ।
तमसवागमि विवृहि ते सत्त्वसहि उभे ॥
श्रमो: सत्त्वस्वागमिनि तस्मि उत्थाते ।
नेमामाति: संयोजो विवृहो नोश्चयये ॥

M, V₁, V₂, P, J give only two lines—the second and fourth of the above lines. J assigns it to Viśṇugītā which is difficult to identify.

(See—रजसो विवृहं सत्त्वस्व विवृहं रजः ।
देवे ते सत्त्वसहि तमसो विवृहि विवृहि: ॥
—Devi Bhāgavata, 3. 50).

We find a similar verse in the Asvamedha-parvan of the Mahābhārata—

तमसो विवृहं सत्त्वस्व विवृहं रजः ।
रजसवागमि सत्त्वस्व विवृहं रजः ॥ (36. 3).

अवयोगसिद्धम्—M and V₁ give three analogies for sattva, rajas and tamas each performing its own operation as also of the others. In the first, a lady who is beautiful, young and so on and so forth is ‘यथा: सुखावहः, सप्तमनी इक्ष्यानि मोहिव ब’. She represents sattva. In the second, the kṣatriyas attacking the dasyusa are representative of rajas. They cause sukha to those who have suffered at the hands of the dasyus, and cause duḥkha and moha to the dasyus (—the author has become impatient, does not mention two different groups experiencing duḥkha and moha). In the third, a black thundering cloud is representative of tamas. It causes sukha to the farmers who are well-prepared and equipped, and duḥkha and moha to the shelterless, to the travellers, to those who have not stored grain, etc. against the rainy day, as also to the proṣītabhartṛkā.

It may be noted that M and V₁ are alike except for a change in expression at places. In both while explaining अवयोगसिद्धम्, the analogy of the accomplished lady is very briefly given—here M and V₁ say that she causes pṛiti to her husband and relations, and she causes duḥkha and moha to her co-wives. This lady is representative of sattva which performs its own operation as also of the others. This should be construed, with the others also. Then in both, an opponent objects: ‘न तेषां सत्त्वस्वागते ज्ञात्यतरणि’ and in support of this the above-mentioned analogies are given. The answer to this is given in ka. 13. Thus the analogies are found in M and V₁ in the prima-facie view in respect of ka. 13. G, V₂ and P do not raise any such question and give the analogies even while explaining ‘अवयोगसिद्धम्’, and simply say while introducing ka. 13 that the ‘vailakṣaṇyā’ of the guṇas is set forth therein.

G—(i) Same illustration of स्वी in a simple language.
(ii) यथा राजा सत्त्वस्वागते: प्रजावधि दुःखाति विद्यनां सुखवाचारयति दुःखाति दुःखाति लोकः ।
(iii) तथा तमः: तथा तमसवागमि तद्भवन्ति, ते दुःखाति क्रिया: क्रियान्तै: क्रियान्तां ज्ञातं, निरहित: मोहयुः.

P—(i) Lady of royal line whose countenance and form are extremely beautiful—she gives pleasure to her
husband and his family; causes envy or suffering in other ladies of equal position. But she also produces indifference—her servants always weary of serving her and not having the means of delivering themselves are of sombre and depressed humour. V₂ gives this very analogy. Compare: ‘सप्ताहं द्विविषा: राजीवपत्नीं कुलसी—सप्ताहं...’

The expression becomes confused. P seems to have put it properly in its own way: (ii) In P for rajas we have the analogy of a prince mounted on a horse and holding a whip in his hand, who comes to deliver a lady of royal lineage captured by a bandit. The prince causes joy to the lady, misery to the bandit and stupor to the other bandits made motionless like the trunks of trees at the sight of the prince. It is interesting to note that in V₂ too we have almost the same analogy. Bandits attack a village, the ladies start screaming (?) or are manhandled (?). A क्षत्रिया on horse-back retaliates. Representing rajas, he causes misery to the bandit, and when that bandit is attacked, the other bandits become motionless like the trunk of a tree. The line about him causing joy to the ladies is missing. It is peculiar that after referring to the bandits, V₂ refers to one particular bandit who was overpowered. A line seems to be missing in which the misdeed of one particular bandit was referred to as in P. (iii) In P, a black cloud, thick and vast which produces lightning, etc. is mentioned as representative of tamas. The peasants who sow and plant will rejoice at it; a loving lady separated from her husband will be depressed at the sight of the cloud and the lightning, thinking that her husband will be incapable of returning home. And it will cause vexation to merchants on the way suffering from humidity and cold, not able to support them. V₂ has almost the same analogy. The farmers are happy because of the cloud; the progitabhartṛka is, says V₂, unhappy that her husband in a strange land does not return—a delicate idea has suffered in the process of translation in P—, and merchants dealing in salt loaded in carts are stupefied.

Here V₂ is closest, nay almost word for word the same as P.

Karika 13—M, G and V₁ in order to illustrate the dominance of sattva which is laghu and prakāśaka give the illustration of Devadatta (G does not mention any name) whose organs are light and fit; for rajas which is cala and upaṣṭambhaka they give the illustration of a व्रषा incited to fight at the sight of an enemy व्रषा (found in all) and of Devadatta or Yajñadatta seeking a quarrel and becoming ‘calacitta’ and thinking of going to a village or a town (M, V₁) or loving a woman and the like (M). In the case of tamas which is guru and varanaka, M, G and V₁ just state that the organs become incapable of any operation. V₂ is similar; only it does not mention Devadatta in relation to sattva, mentions only Devadatta in relation to rajas, and mentions ‘Devadatta or Yajñadatta’ in relation to tamas. P does not mention any names, and in relation to rajas, after giving the example of an elephant desiring to fight an enemy-elephant just mentions that when rajas dominates man seeks the fight for his mind is constantly agitated and he cannot keep himself tranquil (i.e. does not refer to his desire to go to a village and the like).

Here, on the whole all are alike; yet V₂ and P are closer; G is very brief in respect of rajas.
Karika 14. Introducing this karika, M and V simply say that in kā. 11 it has been said that vyakta is "निरुपमविभिन्निर्मिति..." and so also avyakta. How could it be known that avyakta also is "निरुपमविभिन्निर्मिति"? G clarifies that it has been seen that the manifest mahādāni and also-pradhāna are trigunā. But how could it be known that avyakta is aviveki? V and P also adduce this point. M and V argue: "अतः निरुपमनीर्मिति तद्विभिन्निर्मिति..." तस्मात् अविभेदः (अविभेदार्थिणयः-V) त्रिगुणानुसार: किंद्र:। P also says this in respect of vyakta and then argues that if we know that these six characteristics exist in the evolved principle, we know that they exist in Nature too. G does not have this. In V the portion is a bit confused, and the scribe also has not been very careful in copying this portion. V does not take note of त्रिगुणानुसार: and seems to straight-away give त्रिगुणयासाधार: as the reason. The scribe might have omitted some words at a very early stage. G is clearly influenced by V here. Like V, G feels that only अविभेदः, etc. have to be established. G regards त्रिगुणयासाधार: and कारणयासमक्षस्व, कार्यस्य as two hetus establishing avyakta and also its having these characteristics. M and V admit three hetus here; so also P though it does not say so. According to G, त्रिगुणयासाधार: establishes अविभेदः, etc. in respect of अविभेदः and महादामि. Y says that in kā. 11, अविभेदः, etc. were mentioned in respect of vyakta on the strength of त्रिगुण. How is this to be proved? By त्रिगुणयासाधार:, because these characteristics do not exist in पुरुष: (एकत्वस्मृत्: क्लेशः:). Then 'कारणयासमक्षस्व कार्यस्य' establishes that avyakta also has these characteristics. In the interpretation of 'कारणयासमक्षस्व कार्यस्य', M and V give the example of कातु and madhura trees yielding कातु and madhura fruits. G and V give the example of क्र्ष्णa tantu and क्र्ष्णa पाता; V mentions both सुक्लa tantu-सुक्लa पाता and क्र्ष्णa tantu-क्र्ष्णa पाता (so also J). P gives the example of red thread and red cloth.

Karika 15—Introducing this karika, all the commentaries put forth an objection that what is not perceived is generally not existent. M gives many illustrations and G no illustration. V—हितमनोबन्धस्य विरः, तुतां: पाणिनि, शब्दिश्रयान्यो वा; V—हितमनोबन्धस्य विरः, तुतां: बाँहुः; P—second head (of a man). Similarly, say M and V, it may be objected that प्राधान: and पुरुषा are not perceived so they are non-existent. The answer to this is that हिमवतः कल्याणपरामर्शम् (-M; हिमजः: वैद्यप्रारम्भम्—V) is not visible but this does not mean that it does not exist. G gives the example of 'पाषाणमन्विदति'; V of हिमजः: कल्याणपरामर्शम्, P of the weight of the Himalayas. G, V, and P do not here refer to पुरुष:, as kā. 15 pertains only to प्राधान:.

पेत्रान्त परिमाणः—M, V, V, refer to 'परिमीतथृग्धिक्षे' producing a vase of a limited size—स्वभावमाधवस्याहेकं वा; G—यत्र कत्विष्टिन्तथ परिमाण: एवं एवं कुलसः परिमीतिः: परिमीतिः: परिमीतिः प्राधान: करोऽति. V gives an additional example—स्वभावमाधवस्याहेकं वा. P realising that the idea of कार्य is not very relevant here, puts it differently—In the world, a produced thing has a measure, a dimension, a number; thus with a given quantity of clay, the potter makes vases of a limited number (again more in agreement with one Mahat, one Ahamkāra, etc.). Suppress the original matter (clay) and there will no more be either numerical measure or vase. Seeing that the vases have a numerical measure we know that they have an original matter.
(These two sentences are added here for clarification and application of the general statement to the Sāmkhya view here). The comparison of the threads constituting a cloth is equally applicable. (Like V₂, P also gives this additional illustration of threads and cloth.)

M and V₁ give the example of śakala, etc. and bhūṣaṇa, etc. and G and V₂ of brahmabatru. P gives the example of fragments of sandal-wood.

M, G, V₁, V₂, and P all give the illustration of the potter capable of making a jar out of a lump of clay. V₂ adds that of a weaver capable of making cloth; P says that a potter can make earthen vessels but not clothes, etc.

All give the same example and say that jar is capable of holding madhu, udaka, payas, but clay cannot do so. P speaks of utensils keeping water, oil, etc. V₂ and P give in addition the example of threads and cloth. P just says that the difference between cause and effect can be further illustrated by the example of threads and cloth; while V₂ says that threads unlike cloth, cannot protect one against the onslaught of heat, cold and wind.

M quotes ‘nāsaka visayo bhāyu nāsakārī viṣyate sarvatvat’ from the Gita and also the śruti ‘sante sopanemābhaya abhīve’, and gives the example of dadhi etc and kṣīra, and ghata and mṛt-piṇḍa; it further says: ‘yatha jñātānācyatād eva viśvaḥ sambhavante sākhābhāvyatvād śadāsākṣāta jñātānām śaśeṣaḥ. V₂ is like M, only it does not quote the śruti or the line from the Gita. G just gives, at the end of its exposition, the illustration ‘śrīra-aṃghitā’. V₂ explaining abhivyāma gives the example of kṣīra and dadhi. P does not give any example. śadvāhāpyo is explained by M and V₁ as brahmāyu or vāhāyu; G—विभ्रम ज्ञात तथा स्वयं व्यक्तिः, विभ्रमस्य भायो कैलाशवायु; P—‘By form of the universe it is necessary to understand the three worlds: earth, intermediate space and heaven’. V₂ also says—‘कैलाशवर्त्तम ज्ञाते वेदं ज्ञाते श्रवणं’. It may be noted nevertheless that the reference to the three worlds is found in all—‘The three worlds are merged into the gross elements’. M, G, V₁ give the whole process of dissolution while explaining abhivyāma. V₂ says that the worlds are included in the five gross elements, and the five gross elements of the worlds are resolved into the five subtle elements. Then we find in V₂ the example of विश्व-संसार which is not found in P and finally it says: ‘[हथा] इस्तानामेवमिद्य भवतिस्तिनि न अश्वतेव इत्यदेहि भवति प्राणां यथिन्द महदायदि विश्वामिभावं गच्छति [कृति न अश्वतेव इत्यदेहि]’. P has: ‘In the period of reality (that is to say, general dissolution, pralayakāla), the worlds have no longer any distinction. The five gross elements and the eleven organs resolve themselves into the five subtle elements and have no longer any difference; further, Mahat is re-united to Nature and ceases to be differentiated. We can no longer say which is the evolved and which the non-evolved.’—Here P is closer to V₂ than to any other commentary. P raises a further point here, “One may think: ‘As at the time of reality [dissolution] there are not evolved principles, there is not Nature either; if there is not Nature, there is neither birth nor death.’ That idea is incorrect. The reality of Nature will reproduce the three worlds (after the general dissolution). We know then the existence of Nature.” This is hinted at in M—‘प्राक्कातामाक्षात्मेवति तत्र भवति’. Perhaps both intended to make a further clarification.
Karika 16. All the commentators raise the question as to how pradhāna alone could produce the evolved principles. M says that one thread cannot produce cloth. G and V₁ do not give any example; V₂, says: एकस्तन्ते: पर्व नोपयादविति; एको वीरण: कट्ट नोपयादविति; and P—A man alone cannot give birth to an infant and a single thread makes not a cloth. नियुक्तं: समुदायांच—P gives a detailed exposition of नियुक्तं: as accounting for production. Explaining 'समुदायांच' P gives the example of many threads and cloth; while others give in addition the example of 'पंजा—शीरसाति'. V₂ makes it finer by saying that the Ganges originated in the शीरसा and fallen on the head of Śiva cannot be borne. Here all except G urge: Production is of two sorts—by transformation (शीर्ष–पद्म—M, V₁) and without it (युक्तिः, etc.—चद—M, V₁). V₂ says:—'स्वेषोकेहि हिश्वा नातलिह्यं शीरसाती पुष्पमयादविति: शीर्ष: दशकुपादविति: किमेव प्रामाण्यं शीरसाती व्यक्तुपादविति आहोत्तिर्य शीरसाति. V₂ does not refer to parināma- or aparināma, though this is certainly meant. P is word for word the same; only it refers to production by transformation and production without it.

In V₂ the karika text has परिणामत:...प्रतिप्रतिरूपायविशेषात्, but the second line as commented upon by the author of V₂ seems to be परिणामत:...सत्त्ववत: पुष्पकुपायविशेषात्. In P too the karika has the former reading (प्रतिप्रतिरूप) and the pratīka also seems to be the same—because the gunās differ one from another. M, V₁ and P do not seem to have made any attempt to explain carefully the expression प्रतिप्रतिरूप. We can surmise that even the author of V₂ had the same karika text (प्रतिप्रतिरूप), but did not comment on प्रतिप्रतिरूप and straightaway explained the simile by stating the reason पुष्पकुपायविशेषात्. He

that avyakta undergoes a three-fold modification—adhya-ttmika (buddhi, ahamkāra, etc.), adhibhautika (deva, gandharva, etc.) and adhidaivika (śīta, usṇa, etc.). This is not found elsewhere. The explanation of प्रतिप्रतिरूप is the same as in M. M and V₁ do not seem to have been keen about explaining this expression. V₂—'प्रतिप्रतिरूप विशेषात परिणामति; तदेव गंगायुध शीरसाति, गंगायुध सुखमाही विशेषात (–this is found only in Y—); अर्थ वा एकसंभावितां परिणामति अर्थ, ततुच्य मेरव अप्रथ प्रतिप्रतिरूपकुपायविशेषात्, कालकाल औन्नाराणश्?)माही विशेषात्; सुखमाही परिणामति, एवं नया लोका एकसंभाविता शीरसायुधश् पुष्पकुपायविशेषातः'. Apparently V₂ does not seem to have the reading 'प्रतिप्रतिरूप'. P—'The water which comes from the atmosphere is, at the beginning, of a single taste. It transforms itself when it arrives on the earth. It becomes of a varied taste according to the different receptacles' (–a verse in Chinese). If it is a vase of gold, its taste is very sweet; if it is in the earth, its taste differs according to the quality of the earth. It is the same with the three worlds......(Gods are happy, and so on).
might not have meant 'स्वप्रकृतंज्ञानविशेषांत' as a part of the pratīka, though metrically it is alright.

Karika 17—This karika establishes the existence of puruṣa. The objection anticipated is that some do not recognise a ‘paramātmā’ over and above the body, sense-organs, etc. M and V₁ reply that there is puruṣa over and above the body’ etc. ‘अतिशास्वद्य, पुरुषेयोक्त्वत’. (M quotes a stanza here). But since it is subtle it is established by adding reasons. G says that in karikas 15 and 16 the existence of pradhāna is established so the next karika (17) establishes the existence of puruṣa. It is said that emancipation is attained by the knowledge of vyakta, avyakta and jña. After vyakta, the knowledge of avyakta has been arrived at by means of five reasons; puruṣa also is subtle, so its existence is now proved. V₂ is similar; only it says that avyakta is known by means of five reasons. P says: “If one comprehends what Nature and the products are, one obtains deliverance (mokṣa) because one is then that which knows. This has been explained in the first verse. Later, enumerating the five causes we have demonstrated Nature and the evolved principles (XIV). Spirit which is very subtle is to be demonstrated now”. This is substantially the same as G and V₂.

संचालितपरामर्शात्—M and V₁ give the examples of paryāṇka, ratha and grha which are of the nature of an assemblage and are meant for Devadatta or the like (–M; Devadatta V₁). G gives the example of paryāṇka meant for someone (–G does not mention any name)—so eyes etc are not svārtha nor parasparārtha (M, G, V₁, V₂) nor also apārtha (V₁), but are meant for someone else, viz. puruṣa. V₂ is generous in giving examples—bed is not svārtha like Brāhmaṇas, nor are such assemblages parasparārtha ‘strīpuṃsavaṁ’; nor are they nirartha. Therefore there is a man (puruṣa) who lies on the paryāṇka and for whom the khaṭvā is made. V₂ gives the example of a house but not of a chariot. Similarly this body is an assemblage of five gross elements so there is a puruṣa for whom this body—assemblage is meant. P gives the example of beds, chairs etc. assembled together being necessarily for the use of others and not for these objects themselves. P does not mention their not being ‘nirartha’. Before saying that the body, an assemblage of five gross elements, does not exist for itself, but for another, viz. Spirit, P says: Reason, etc exist then for others and it is the same with mahat, etc. (This is clearly an addition on the part of the translator—Paramārtha—who felt that all refer to the body—assemblage, but not to mahat, etc.). G, it may be noted, has referred to body as ‘तोपथस्रविसेवात्’.

अभिज्ञानात्—M gives the example of a chariot controlled by a charioteer. M quotes Śaśṭitārtrā—पुजारित्विधिं प्रवाहं प्रवर्तेत्. So do G and V₁ which are substantially the same as M. V₂ also gives the example of a chariot drawn by strong horses and controlled by a charioteer, for it would otherwise meet with destruction. It further says—‘तत्र च चोरिः पुजारित्विधिः(ति?) प्रवर्तेत्’, P says: From the Spirit inhabiting the body, the latter becomes endowed with functions. If Spirit does not reside, then the body is not an agent. As is said in the Treatise of the Sixty Categories: ‘Nature, it is that in which Spirit resides, and it is because of this that she can produce actions’. 
V_2 says after this that by means of these three reasons the existence of puruṣa is known. Then it simply mentions without any exposition 'भोक्तमावाद' and 'ब्रज्ञावाचलामचयोऽ' and concludes that by these five reasons the existence of puruṣa is established.

भोक्तमावाद—M, G, V_1 and P are alike here. M and V_1 use the expression 'paramātmā puruṣāḥ'.

ब्रज्ञावाचलामचयोऽ—M and V_1 are very brief—"Since the activity of pradhāna is for kaivalya". So is G which adds that there is an ātman since all, whether vidvān or avidvān, seek the extinction of the series of births and deaths. P is very elaborate here:—"If there were only our body, we should not have the need of the final deliverance taught by the sages. In antiquity, a rṣi went to some brahmans and spoke thus: 'All of you are rich in [the] Vedas; all of you drink soma; all of you see the face of a child; could you later become bhikṣus?' Of what good would such an idea be, if we had only the body? We know then that by the side of the body it is naturally necessary to have a Spirit. If there were no distinct Spirit by the side of the body, religious practices like cremation or the throwing into the water of the remains of dead parents or masters would not have any merit, but might drag in demerit. For that reason we know that Spirit exists. Here are yet other words (in verse) of the sages: 'The nerves and the bones are the cords and the posts, the blood and the flesh are the earth and the plaster; (the body is the house of) impurity, impermanence and suffering. We have to rid ourselves of this aggregate. Reject that which is just and that which is unjust; reject that which is real and that which is unreal; and the very idea of rejecting reject that. That which is pure will alone remain. If Spirit did not exist, nothing would remain (after such an elimination). By the words of the sages we know with certainty that Spirit exists".

Karika 18—Introducing this karika, M and V_1 say that the point at issue is whether there is a puruṣa in each body or one puruṣa in all the bodies. The doubt arises because the ācāryas hold different views. Some hold that there is one puruṣa pervading all bodies like one thread running through the many beads. Or is it like the 'jalacandra' in the river, pond, well, etc.? The Sāṅkhya answer is that there are a number of puruṣas. G is very brief and gives only one example—संपर्कनास्मक्कृष्टवं. V_2 is very brief; it simply poses the problem and answers it; no illustration is given. Here also P is elaborate. Two examples are given to explain the idea of one spirit filling all bodies—Chaplet of strung pearls and the 16,000 wives of Viṣṇu enjoying at the same moment.

कारणकरणां प्रतिनिधिः—M and V_1 are alike here, especially so in respect of janma and maraṇa. They speak of birth in a noble family and the like, and death pertaining individually to each; whereas G, V_2 and P speak of the contingency of simultaneous births and deaths; even here V_2 and P are more alike, except that P refers to pregnant women in different countries, whereas V_2 refers to pregnant women of one adhiṣṭhāna. With regard to karaṇa-niyama, M, V_1 and V_2 say that some are deaf while others are not, and so on; whereas G and P put it differently in agreement with
what has been said earlier in these commentaries— if puruśa were one, if one becomes deaf, all would become deaf simultaneously, and so on. Besides giving their own interpretation regarding अन्यांप्रत्यतितिशम्, M and V refer to others according to whom when one is born, simultaneously another dies (अन्यांप्रत्यतितिशम्), whereas if there were one puruśa all should be born or should die simultaneously. The argument that birth and death are not possible together being opposed in character is, found in Y; and the argument of simultaneous births and deaths is found in V. This shows that this was the traditional interpretation which is referred to by M and V after giving their own.

M and V refer to Vedādins and Vaiśeṣikas who regard the soul as agent. G does not refer to any controversy but straightaway says that puruśa is akārtā; V refers to कवितारिस्वस्यत्वं: आवाम्: and कवितारिस्वस्यत्वं:; P refers to the śāṅkhya system and the Vaiśeṣikas. V is closest to P.

M and V do not comment on ‘तस्मात् विवेकायां’, but straightaway refer like the others to the सांख्योपनिषदेषां (M, V; परिवाक्य- G, V; ascetic mendicant—P). The expression in V and P is alike here.

Kārīka 19—In introducing this kārīka, the question raised is: Is the puruśa an agent or a non-agent? M and V refer to Vedādins and Vaiśeṣikas who regard the soul as agent. G does not refer to any controversy but straightaway says that puruśa is akārtā; V refers to ‘कवितारिस्वस्यत्वं: आवाम्:’ and ‘कवितारिस्वस्यत्वं:’; P refers to the śāṅkhya system and the Vaiśeṣikas. V is closest to P.

Kārīka 20—The problem here is: If puruśa is not an agent to whom does the act of determination belong (M, V, V, P) or how is it possible (G)? The determination is: धार्मिक सिद्धांत, वार्ता न (न)?—M; धार्मिक सिद्धांत, छवम न करिष्यांि—V; धार्मिक सिद्धांत, छवम न करिष्यांि—G; धार्मिक सिद्धांत, छवम शास्त्रविश्वास—V: practice religious duties, renounce evil or realise a vow—P. Here the dilemma is found in P word for word as it is in V and also in V and M. G mentions only the contingency of puruśa becoming kārt, but does not refer to that of guṇas having to be regarded as cetana. The illustration of ‘घटा’ is found in all—आदिपरिवेशोऽदयं: श्रीसाहीमिति: संस्कृत: श्रीसाही मधवित्: श्रीसाही छंदुक: दण्डी: मधवित्: M, V; यथा लोके धयं: श्रीलंक्षुः श्रीत्: उण्णसंक्षुः उण्ण:—G; यथा लोके आदिपरिवेशोऽदयं: श्रीसाहीमिति: संस्कृत: श्रीसाही मधवित्: श्रीसाही मधवित्: श्रीसाही मधवित्: M, V; just as a vase of gold placed in contact with fire becomes hot, and placed in contact with water becomes cold—P. (Gold is not referred to by any other commentary). The illustration of the brigands and the Brāhmaṇa is found in all. G refers to it very briefly—वषा ब्रह्मचरीन: सह गुहोत्तप्ति: इत्यहस्यमभि:.

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Kārikā 21—Here the question is for what purpose prādhāna is united with puruṣa, M and V₁ (so also Y; J gives only two illustrations—) give a brief exposition of different kinds of sānyoga (ubhaya-karmaja, etc.), but G, V₉ and P have no such exposition.

प्राधान्य—The example of the lame man and the blind man is found in all the commentaries. G does not refer to any town. M says the caravan which the blind man joined proceeded to Pātaliputra; P says it proceeded to Pātaliputra. V₁ and V₉ say it proceeded from Ujjayini to Pātaliputra. G and P say that the blind man and the lame man were left behind by the merchants who fled from the brigands, while M, V₁ and V₉ say that the blind man was left behind and seen on the way by a lame man. J is like G but very brief. The dialogue in P is more life-like—"The infirm one asked him, 'Who are you?" and so on. Such expressions are not found elsewhere.

तत्त्वार्थ: यद्य—According to M and V₁, तत्त्वार्थ, refers to prādhāna and puruṣa, and sarga to the production of महात्‍मिति brought about by them (तत्त्वार्थ महात्‍मिति संबंधिते) तत्त्वार्थ: महात्‍मिति। G on the other hand understands तत्त्वार्थ to refer to क्रमेय महात्‍मिति पुरुष (तत्त्वार्थ: महात्‍मिति पुरुष) G). So also J and T; Y—प्राधान्य महात्‍मिति पुरुष। The verses in T which we do not find in V₉. The verse enumerating the महात्‍मिति is the same in M, V₁ and V₉ except that M has विशेषार्थिति instead of 'तत्त्वार्थिति'. The verses in Y (p. 2), which are quoted in T with the remark 'तथा च राजस्वार्थिति' have अज्ञात्‍वायु instead of निरुपन. So also J, 51. Paramārtha seems to have read महात्‍मिति in the place of भार्यां. This explains the mention of 'the five reasons by which one establishes the existence of Spirit and Nature' as the fourth and the fifth of the महात्‍मिति; and भार्यां seems to have been dropped to bring the number to ten.

Kārikā 22—This Kārikā shows the order in which महात्‍मिति, etc. evolve. M says that प्रकृति signifies प्राधान्य and mentions the following synonym: — ‘सम्बन्ध, सम्बन्धति, सद्भाष्य, माया; G—प्रकृति: प्राधान्य प्रकृति प्राधान्यकृति माया पायम्; V₂—प्रकृति: प्राधान्य प्रकृति प्राधान्यकृति पायम्। V₁—simply says that 'प्रकृति' refers to prādhāna. P states that Nature is also called the Supreme Cause (प्राधान्य) or else Brahman or else 'that which comprehends all' (बुद्धिः). P is the same as V₂ here. M gives बुद्धि; महात्‍मिति प्राधान्यार्थ: V₁—सम्बन्ध, बुद्धि: प्राधान्यार्थ: संबंधति, बुद्धिः, आयु्त: हरि, हरि, हरि बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः बुद्धिः।
P—Mahat is also called Intellect (buddhi) or Intelligence (mati) or universal notoriety (khyāti) or knowledge (jñāna) or wisdom (prajñā). Regarding ‘universal notoriety’, Takakusu notes, “……penetrating everywhere, universal’. I am not quite sure that Paramārtha really translates khyāti by this word. It may be that he had read vyāpini or vyāpti in the place of khyāti.” Khyāti means knowledge as also fame and even notoriety. Paramārtha might have taken this latter sense, or the shade of meaning of the Chinese word might have undergone a change with the passage of time. M alone gives a fanciful derivation of the word āhamkāra. All mention the paryāyas of āhamkāra, viz. bhiītadi, vaikṛta and taijasa; but all except M simply state that the 16 are produced from āhamkāra and enumerate them. M alone explains here that the five tanmātras are produced from bhiītadi which is tāmasa, the 11 organs are produced from vaikṛta which is sattvika, while both are produced from taijasa which is rājasa. Surprisingly, here P also says that the organs of sense, organs of action and manas are produced from āhamkāra. Regarding the production of the five gross elements, all except M says that ākāsa is produced from śabda-tanmātra, vāyu from sparsa-tanmātra and so on. Only M says: बायकास...॥।॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥ ullamतिः॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥��॥॥॥॥॥॥॥(CharSequences are not to be seen)
External comprehends the six divisions of the Veda i.e. the Vedāṅgas. 1) the śiksā treatises. 2) śrīvaṁśya. 3) sīkṣa: treatises. 4) visheṣham. 5) chakrīvaṁs. 6) visheṣham. Aisvarya eightfold. M, G (and Y) say that there are eight but enumerate the above-mentioned nine, though the Chowkhamba edition of G omits garimā and enumerates only eight. V₁, V₉ and P do not mention garimā. All explain these except M (and Y). In the exposition of 'tāmukṣa: āsādā vinirājas', V₁ is quite elaborate. M also must have been elaborate, but some portion of the text seems to be missing here. G and P are very brief. So also V₉, only in each case it says something like 'knowledge is two-fold, external and internal, its opposite is ajñāna'.

Karīka 24—The text of the second line of this karīka varies in the different commentaries as can be seen from the table. In P it is translated as: 'In the first place, the eleven organs, and in the second place, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements'. 'And the five gross elements' is clearly superfluous, and this is not mentioned in the explanation in P. This karīka gives the definition of āhāmkarā. M—वीर जने रथ जने, जने वाणि, जने दृष्टीय विद्याविद्याभिसंहारः. G—The text is missing here. V₁—हाँ बन्देह, हाँ स्थोऽऽ, हाँ वन्दे, हाँ रक्षे, हाँ गन्धे, हाँ विद्यानि, हाँ तथाके प्रौढ़ंविद्याभिसंहारः; V₉—वन्देह, गन्धे, उवाहास, दृष्टीशास्त्रों, अभिज्ञानविद्याः, अभक्ष्याविद्याहः; P—This voice is mine, this touch is mine, this form, this taste, this odour are mine, this religious merit is mine and is agreeable to me. P is different here—perhaps to suit the Chinese mode of expression and thought. V₉ and P are very much alike in respect of the interpretation of the second line. Neither the organs nor the tanmātras are referred to by their technical terms.

Karīka 25—M, G, V₁, V₉ and P are all alike here.

Karīka 26—The order of the mention of the sense-organs in the karīka is as follows according to the texts adopted by the different commentaries:—G, V₁, V₉, G, V₁, G, V₁—नास्तिकायानि—M, V₁; बछु:—नास्तिकायानि—G, बछु:—नास्तिकायानि—V₉. The ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose—P (This last is like the text in M and V₁; on the other hand, G and V₉ are alike). This has been discussed later as determining the chronological order of the commentaries. M, V₁ (and T) explain the word शृंगस; M—इत्यद्यावेष्ठ तात्त्विकविद्याः; 'हृ' हृति विषयाणि नाम; tatha: इस: विषयां त्रि यस्यीति इत्त्रिविद्याः; V₁—इत्यद्यावेष्ठ नास्तिकायानि; इत्यद्यावेष्ठ नास्तिकायानि; इत्यद्यावेष्ठ तात्त्विकविद्याः. (T—इन्द्रावेष्ठ नास्तिकायानि). As regards the function of वाच, M and G simply say वाचवति; V₁—पाद्यचतुर्दशस्त्रमिति; V₉—पाद्यपादयारोऽऽकोशालस्त्रमिति; P—The organ of speech combined with the organs of sense is capable of articulating names, phrases and letters (of the alphabet). The point that the organs of action act as united with the organs of sense has not been noticed in any other commentary.

Karīka 27—The text of this karīka is different in the commentaries. M—हामेदाध्यानि सन:; श्रीवावेष्ठ श्रीवावेष्ठ श्रीवावेष्ठ श्रीवावेष्ठ साक्षात्कार; रामावेष्ठ रामावेष्ठ रामावेष्ठ रामावेष्ठ साक्षात्कार. So also in G and V₁ except that G has भावेष्ठ and V₁ भावेष्ठ. The text in V₉ is different—संकल्पकामसन:; तच्छेदिन्युपमम च साक्षात; अन्तःचालक: विचारसंकल्पः हस्ताक्षारः च (Y has this very karīka). It is interesting to note that V₉ comments very briefly on, in fact restates 'अन्तःचालक: विचारसंकल्पः...and then after a discussion as to the kartṛ of the eleven organs gives an
exposition of 'गुणपरिवर्तकोसिकानामाकार्यम्' as explaining the origi­nation of the organs. गुणपरिवर्तकोसिकानामाकार्यम् can be easily gathered from the exposition in Vg. P—Manas is that which discerns. One says that that organ is of two sorts: it is modified according to the variations of the three gunas (on the one hand) and according to external differences (on the other hand). Of the other commentaries J and T have the same text as G. But Y has the same text as Vg. Pulinbehari Chakravarti notes that Bhattotpala in his commentary on the Brhat Sanhita, p. 7 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series) also adopts this reading, but he wrongly attributes the कारिका as quoted by him to Kapilacarya. P’s reading tallies with the first hemistich of Vg but in the second hemistich it has the same reading as V1. I have discussed this later.

बम्बामाकार्यम् or बम्बाम लम्बामाकार्यम्—The illustrations are given as follows:—यथा दैवधसों गोपालमये सितो गोपाल्मये करोति, मलमये सितो मलमये करोति—M. G does not give any illustration. V1—यथा दैवधसों गोपालमये सितो गोपालमये करोति, मलमये सितो मलमये करोति, वालमये सितो वालमये करोति, V2—यथा दैवधसों दैवधसों नियमेदु मलमये मलमये गोपालमये गोपालमये; P—It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time (=Could this be Paramarthas own illustration ?).

The illustrative parable of a boy who hears that there is a feast in another village and resolves to go there is found only in Vg; P gives it a little differently—Imagine that a man apprehends that in a certain place there is treasure or food; he takes the resolution to proceed to that place in order to obtain an excellent repast and riches'. The stanza 'जेन दृष्टिकृतः.......' with no difference whatsoever is found quoted only in Vg and P. Discussing the location and function of the organs, M mentions चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, त्वचा, जिह्वा, नामिका, बाण; G says: उच्चे: प्रेदसे सहारापदेभन्या विस्तित तथा प्राण तथा श्रोत्र तथा जिह्वा स्वदेशेव स्वाम्यविशिष्टाय. एवं कोनिष्ठायाति....... V1 mentions चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, त्वचा, नामिका, बाण, and V2 चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, त्वचा, हस्ति, पाय, पापायस्याः. P mentions all the organs and says of the (eleventh) organ manas that it has no definite place and is capable of discernment. Regarding पञ्जुस्वरी (mentioned here nowhere except in G, Vg and P), P says:—The two other organs are hidden to view so that no one may see them. They effect excretion and pleasure. Compare Vg—पञ्जुस्वरी गुप्तदेवे बतविनिही नियं दर्जनप्राहरस्याः. P mentions manas, while others do not. P has further—‘Among the organs there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body.......’ This is not found elsewhere.

Kārikā 28—Explaining the significance of 'पाञ्ज्र', M and G gives the illustration—यथा भिक्षामात्रा समये नान्योऽविशेष इति'; and Vg—'भिक्षामात्रामिहणि प्राप्ते समये नान्यदानमण्डलि'. V1 and P do not give any illustration. M, G, V1, Vg, P have स्थानिष्ठू in the text of this kārikā. Y has स्थानिष्ठू, but criticises it, saying it should be भवान्धिष्ठु. J and T have readily accepted this suggestion. This has been discussed later.

Kārikā 29—Introducing this kārikā, P says:—‘We shall pass on to the objects (vijaya) and the functions (vṛtti) of Mahat (the Intellect), of the Sentiment of self and of the manas.’ The other commentaries have a similar expression, only they do not refer to the objects. Vg employs the expression, ‘अनु-तत्त्वालिकः इति’. The illustration of कुलास्त्री and सामायिकी is found in all, only in Vg and P it is a bit elaborately given.
The statement: ‘I hold myself erect, I walk’ is the function of the vital air.” V₉ alone has got the description: ‘the illustration of the parrots and the cage is found in all. G and P speak of ‘bird’ instead of ‘parrots’. P refers to one bird and its illustration obviously has a different emphasis from that of the others. Here P seems to be like G. [P—“Thus, a bird, which bestirs itself in a cage, moves the cage; even so, when the air, prāṇa, bestirs itself, the thirteen organs are put in motion too. There is a function common to all.”] Compare G—“Thus, a bird, which bestirs itself in a cage, moves the cage; even so, when the air, prāṇa, bestirs itself, the thirteen organs are put in motion too. There is a function common to all.”

Regarding āpana, P speaks in general terms—when that air predominates, man becomes timorous. P does not like the others speak of a man fleeing on seeing a serpent.

When that air predominates, man becomes avaricious and seeks riches and companions—P. Others say only that the man does not like to remain alone and seeks companions. G does not make any such statement in connection with any of the airs.

“The actions of the five vital airs are the common functions of the thirteen organs”—P. This is repeated in the other commentaries in the case of each vital air, while P puts it here at the end. This shows that P has tried to avoid unnecessary repetition.

Karika 30. कमलाकान्त:—M, G and V₁ give the example of Devadatta (G—कल्याण) going on a road and having a doubt whether a thing at a distance is a ‘sthāṇu’ or a man. If he sees a bird on it (M, G, V₁) he concludes that it is a sthāṇu, but if he observes the expanding or contracting of the limbs he concludes that it is a man. P puts it thus: Let us suppose a man who walks along a road; he perceives an erect object, and doubts if it is a man or a wooden post; but when he sees birds alighting on it, or a liana which enlaces it, or a gazelle which approaches it, he concludes that it is a post; on the contrary, if he sees a robe that stirs itself, or (limbs) contracting or expanding themselves, then he knows with certainty that it is a man. V₉—”Let us suppose a man who walks along a road; he perceives an erect object, and doubts if it is a man or a wooden post; but when he sees birds alighting on it, or a liana which enlaces it, or a gazelle which approaches it, he concludes that it is a post; on the contrary, if he sees a robe that stirs itself, or (limbs) contracting or expanding themselves, then he knows with certainty that it is a man.” V₉ seems to explain āpana’s (and yet it is far off and cannot be positively determined; so there is ।

The text is not quite clear. V₉ seems to explain āpana’s (and yet it is far off and cannot be positively determined; so there is ।

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of these very three in respect of अहंकार is अविद्वारिक and so on. M and V₁ explain the second line as a whole. As regards the objects रूप or अभास, the वृत्तi of the three (buddhi, ahamkara and manas) is अविद्वारिक. They have not clarified this point. With regard to the first line उपासनवृत्ति हि द्वितीयोऽति... M and V₁ have clarified that उपासनवृत्ति is not possible, but the time between the वृत्तिः of the sense-organs and manas, etc. is so negligible that the बृहि is said to be भुल्लि. G, V₂, P and J do not give this explanation. P is very brief here. G holds that in respect of भविष्य i.e. future and past things, the वृत्ति of buddhi, ahamkara and manas is वृत्ति करणे, but in respect of रूप i.e. present things it may be भुल्लि or कामसा: G does not explain the earlier part of its statement. Y regards उपासनवृत्ति as giving the prima-facie view and क्रियावि क्रियावि as refuting it; there is कामसा वृत्ति in respect of both रूप and भविष्य things. Y says that others construe this कारिका differently; they take उपासनवृत्ति... as referring to the view of the earlier ācāryas and क्रियावि... as referring to the view of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. Could this be a reference to the interpretation that is found in V₁ (and M)? This will be discussed later. Y explains what भविष्य signifies and of what kind its knowledge could be.

In connection with ‘अहंकार तत्त्वध्रविक बृहि,’ P introduces a point here which is not found thus in other commentaries. viz. “Now we pass on to treat the same subject, in the case where the question is about invisible objects. It is said in a verse: At the end of the Yuga, there will be men, who in their error and their perversity, will meditate on the Buddha, the Law and the community. Themselves perverse, they will gain over (to their perverse ideas) their relatives, their friends and their acquaintances. Themselves opening the road to the four evil ways (durgati : apāya) they will enter therein with the others. As the past so the future. By the organ of hearing, the three categories (Intellect, Sentiment of self and manas) enter into action, one after another. Thus, their function enters into action, in succession to an external organ.” This should be compared with V₉ here. The quotation is Paramārtha’s own, it could not have been in the original. M and V₁ are alike here.

Kārikā 31—Introducing this kārikā, V₉ and P ask whether puruṣa or God makes the insentient indriyas act. M, V₁ do not mention puruṣa or God in this connection; they simply ask due to what cause the insentient indriyas, etc. function. G does not say anything by way of introduction here, nor does it give any illustration. M, V₁, V₂ and P all give the illustration of brigands and their leader. But before this V₂ and P have the illustration of a brahmabata. In V₂ the boy goes to attend a feast, while according to P he goes for study. (P is apt to refine illustrations. Or was the original quite a different commentary?). In the latter part of this parable the wording is the same in V₉ and P.

[V₉—एवं तत्त्वध्रविक ज्ञाता ज्ञातानि करणानि भविष्य स्वात्मा वृत्तिः प्रतिवचनः। चतु: स्वात्मानि परशुरी, तथेऽद्वितिकहि स्योद्ग, हस्त: व्यवहारानि प्रतिवचनः, पवनोऽद्वितिः। P—The external organs, seizing the determination of the manas, acquit themselves of their respective functions, that is to say, the eye sees the road, the ear hears the others talk, the hand holds the water-pot and the feet march.]
'पर्सराकृतेष्वकाम' is interpreted by P as 'without being put into action by another'. Could Paramārtha have understood 'पर्सराकृत', the 'अ' being elided by sandhi? This is likely, as explaining this P says, "We have explained higher up that in our school, neither Spirit nor Isvara is considered an agent. That is why the thirteen organs acquit themselves of their functions by themselves, according to their respective spheres of action, without being put in action by another thing." P has in view puruṣa or Isvara as the other thing. The other commentators explain माृत्ति as माृत्ति or माृत्ति and say माृत्ति-माृत्ति-माृत्ति-माृत्ति or the like—this being found in P also.

Kaṅkārika 33—Regarding the internal organs grasping the objects of the three times, almost all give different examples. M, G, V₁ and P refer to buddhi grasping a present pot. G sums up by saying that it also grasps that of the past and the future. Then it does not give any example in connection with ahamkāra and manas. Others give separate examples for past and future. V₂ does not give any illustration anywhere (except a common one in connection with ahamkāra-कल्की—कल्की). In connection with buddhi having a cognition of a past thing, M and V₁ give the example ‘बुधिस्यो—बुधिस्यो—बुधिस्यो’. In connection with buddhi having a cognition of a past thing, M and V₁ give the example ‘त्र्यूंयम्—त्र्यूंयम्—त्र्यूंयम्’. M mention Kalkī as an example of a future thing; V₁ has something interesting here: 'अभिज्ञानितं गुणस्यं तदैव अभिज्ञानितं गुणस्यं तदैव अभिज्ञानितं गुणस्यं तदैव'. We shall discuss this later.
the objects of the three times saying ‘This is mine’. For manas, there are no examples in M, G and Vg; V1 says: पूर्व तमोगी वर्तमान विषयं विकल्पति अन्येष्व विषयं विषयं हुति, [अन्तःचित्ति श्वास् ने विषया;] अनागततमि विकल्पति अविष्णूति ने विषया; P—So also the manas; it seizes the objects of the three times; that is to say, it looks in advance on the future and recalls the days past. Here P seems to be more like M and V1 than Vg, though its examples in connection with buddhi are peculiar.

Kārika 34—All the commentaries say that the objects in heaven are non-specific as they are ‘kevala-sukhalakṣaṇa;’ only P says that they are endowed with sattva and free from rajas and tamas. P as usual is brief in the exposition of श्रेयाञ्चल विषयानि.

Kārika 35—P is quite elaborate here. G is very brief so also V1 and even M and Vg. Perhaps P has tried to justify the metaphor of द्वितीया—वर्तमान. सर्व विषयानि: M—विषयं विषयं विषयं कलेकु;...; G—विषयं कलेकु श्रव्यावतु सुझाण; V1—सर्व विषयं विषयं विषयं कलेकु यो विषयं मयं विषयं मयं मयं; Vg—विषयं विषयं विषयं...; P—It is thus capable of seizing the objects of the three regions (earth, sky, space) and of the three times. P has combined the idea of Vg and one of the others. J also refers to things of all the times; while J’s explanation is very precise and detailed: विषयमुखिक्रमित्वादि, श्रव्यावतु, संस्कृत्विग्नक्रमित्वादि, प्रमाणवेदन राजाविधिक्रमित्वादि. M, V1 throughout (see kā. 35, 36, 37) refer to objects of all the three times, while Vg and P speak of things of all the three worlds. G has nothing specific to say later.

Kārika 36. Again P is a little more elaborate. P unlike others gives here the simile of the king and his functionaries and the people (‘In the same way as the functionaries and the people of the realm transmit riches to the king’). Vg, V2, P explain the simile of the lamp fully; M and G do not. M does not explain ‘गुणाविशेषाः’, while G, Vg, P do; and Vg does so while explaining the simile.

Kārika 37—The other commentaries have nothing introductory to say about this kārika, while P says: “One may ask: ‘Why do the organs, having illumined the objects, not themselves make them seen by Spirit?’ The reply is in this verse.” M and G construe वस्त्राद: (M; तस्माद:—G) with the two halves of the kārika; that is to say, the first line is meant to account for the statement in the second line. V1 does not take note of this word. Vg is not very clear, yet seems to understand the whole kārika as showing why buddhi alone can bring about the worldly attachment as also the emancipation of the puruṣa. P also says at the end: “The Intellect alone then is the true organ of Spirit.” P introduces this kārika by saying that this kārika explains why the organs having illumined the objects not themselves make them seen by the Spirit. (Y takes वस्त्राद: as explaining why buddhi serves as the द्रव्यम् and there is not direct relation between puruṣa and aham-kāra, etc. The interpretation in J is similar. T interprets the whole kārika as showing the supremacy of buddhi among the organs, so that the others bring the information to it, and it does not take it to them).

The simile of rāja-mantrin is given here by M, V1 and Vg. M is very elaborate here and gives the simile of dasa-svairini-kāmuka to explain the idea in this kārika.
M further quotes three verses:

अहंकोरे विरूः ब्रह्म मैंन जूतं प्राकृत

फुर्ति परमानने न तवां नाहे न तुजमांत

These verses are not quoted in any other commentary. The other commentaries just refer to the enjoyments in the three worlds, while P explains this in view of अरुणाचलम् as follows—"The enjoyment or the activity of Spirit is not the same throughout. The enjoyment of the ten objects... and that of the eight powers differs according to place, be it in the human world, be it in heaven, be it among the animals." Only V9 and P quote पञ्चकोशलत्वातः...

P seems to read 'क्री मण्डी निष्ठी बायि...' while V9 has 'दण्डी' in the place of 'सिपी'. The stanza 'हस सिब व्या...' is found only in M and V1. 'सुस्थ' is explained by M, G, V1 and P as 'subtle as it cannot be noticed by men not given to saintly practices'. V9 simply says 'अरुणाचलं दुःसिद्धि'. V9 adds here—क्रिष्ण-पञ्चकोशलत्वातंस्माद्यत्वम्; अरुणाचलं पञ्चकोशलत्वातं. After V9 has once explained 'क्रिष्णं' and 'सुस्थं' this sounds superfluous. Does V9 want to stress that there is no place for God in the Samkhya and so the difference is that of prakṛti and puruṣa, and not of prakṛti and puruṣa with God as the ultimate entity comprehending both or ruling over both?

Karika 39—Two leaves (57, 58) are missing in V1 so we cannot have any idea of V9's exposition of this karika. M is very elaborate here and gives quotations from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Pañcāgnividya) and Purāṇas (सेवकाक्षस्यस्यसति...); it also adduces in support of the idea in this karika 'रेजेन्द्रभवे....' and 'यथा दर्शानः आङ्गदद्वाने....' V1 is mostly like M; only it does not give any quotation. G is quite elaborate but does not give any quotation and does not give the illustration of a tree which is found only in P*, though in other respects P is more like G. The illustration of the royal prince is found in M, V1 and P, only in P it is given at some length. P gives a very clear exposition of the body in its triple division. Regarding the fate of the gross body on death when the subtle body abandons it, M and

* "In the same way as the root of a tree has openings to absorb the water which refreshes and nourishes the tree, so the taste of the food and the drink coming through the mother refreshes and nourishes the gross body."—P
$V_1$ say ‘वस्तु’, G says—‘सम्पन्नां मातापितृं सरीरविभूषण निक्षय सूत्वादिर्ग प्रलेववे वातावरणम्; and P—‘is eaten by the birds or is abandoned to putrefaction or is consumed by fire’. $V_1$ also must have been quite elaborate here as 57a-b and 58 a-b are missing and they must have pertained to the commentary on का. 39 only, as 59a starts with का 40.

Karika 40—महावरि—All the commentaries except G regard the subtle body as having eighteen constituents (mahat, ahamkāra, eleven organs and five tanmātras), whereas according to P it has seven constituents (mahat, ahamkāra, five tanmātras); and according to G eight (mahat ahamkāra, manas and five tanmātras). According to P, it may be noted, the organs are produced out of the tanmātras. Yet it says, “The subtle body associated with the eleven organs migrates through the three regions, assuming one of the four births.”

विवेचनार्थ—The mode of exposition here is the same in $V_9$ and P; only $V_9$ says—“तद सहस्वरूपं अवेदनाचिन्द्र करणे चुंबकोन्य कालियस्य विन्य स्वभावसमयं न स्वतीत्वायियो; and P—If it is separated from the eleven organs or the gross body produced by the parents, it is not capable of seizing the objects (to enjoy them).

माध्यमस्वाध्यात्मक—M and $V_1$ explain this as ‘influenced by devabhava, etc.; G as ‘influenced by the bhāvas, viz. dharma, etc. which are explained later on;’ $V_9$ says that the bhāvas are explained later on, the subtle body is influenced by these; Y, J, T interpret this as ‘influenced by the eight, viz. dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, etc.’ P interprets this by saying that the subtle body is influenced by the three states of being explained later on (i.e. in का. 43), viz. the sāmsiddhi, prakṛti and vaikṛtta. This is significant inasmuch as it can serve to some extent as a pointer to the mutual influence amongst the commentaries. G and J change the metaphor and use the term uparañjitam (G) or uparaktam (J)—coloured by dharma, etc..

Karika 41—Leaves 60-63 of $V_9$ are missing, so we cannot compare the explanation of का. 41-44. M and $V_1$ give besides the example of स्वाया—ज्ञाता only the example ‘स्थायित्रिना बिना प्रक्षेपो न सर्वत्र’; G has ‘आदिभूताभ्यां त्रिषें बिना नागेय सर्वत्रि त्रिषें वादुविधिना, बिन्यो बिनाः, वातुः यस्य बिना, आदिभूताभ्यां बिना तद्रेष्ण तेन हस्ताक्षरेन न्यायेऽन, and P—“Without fire there is no light, without water no freshness, without air no touch, without ether no space for movement. [A fragment of a leaf (viz. 60) of $V_9$ is preserved and in it these words can be read......‘ौशेन बिना आदिभूतो न सर्वत्र’, so $V_9$ must have been like G and P here]. (It may be noted that P and $V_9$ regard fire, etc. as the support (āśraya) and light, etc. as the āśrayin, whereas G seems to attach greater importance to śaitya, etc. Could this be because Gaudapāda under Buddhistic influence recognised what is regarded as dharma as pradhāna, because it is the very nature of the thing?)

Karika 42—M and $V_1$ do not explain ‘सत्त’; G says: “सत्त न दतः: पदार्थस्तिः प्रविष्ट्य देवश्री भूतस्तिः भिन्नत्वति पुरांमांक: पुरांविधिकः एवं विद्या......हस्ती स्त्री गुणां शर्मिः”; and P—“Like an actor who represents now a god, now a king, now a Nāga, now a demon, etc., the subtle body associated with the thirteen (?) (organs), enters now the womb of an elephant, of a horse, etc., now that of a divinity or of a human being, and becomes an animal, a god or a man.” We cannot say what $V_9$ had here.
Karika 43 is similarly explained in all; only P is more elaborate in the interpretation of 'कपोलविषयः निःशंसा कलुकायः'. According to G, 'कारणा' signifies just buddhi, and 'कर्म' body.

Karika 44—is similarly explained in all.

Karika 45—Only the latter part of the interpretation in V9 is preserved. All give the illustration of one who has varīgya but not jīna. P describes him as 'a brahmin who leaves his family, studies the path, controls his eleven organs, rejects the eleven objects (of sense and of action) and observes the ten laws of yama and niyama; he will be filled with aversion (of the world); by the aversion he will deliver himself of passion......'. M and V1 also say: 'कल्पितेन पैरस्मरः गतिरिविभिन्नो विचक्षो विषयं वयनिर्माणः'. The rest of the interpretation is the same in all.

Karika 46—The illustrative parable of the four persons with different temperaments is found in all. It is found word for word the same in V9 and P. P seems to have read गुप्तवैप्रयास्मिदेही. V1 seems to refer to the different states of one and the same person at different times or in succession.

Karikās 47–49—Leaves 66–69 of V9 are missing and only a fragment of leaf 70 is preserved (~वृत्तिः on ka. 50), and again leaves 71–74 are missing. Karikās 47–49 are similarly interpreted in all. Only in ka. 49, P does not mention the names Devadatta and Yajñadatta, but just speaks of two friends; and G does not relate any such parable.

Karikā 50—कपोलान—M, G, V1 and P mention the objects विपचार, etc.. M—सन्तोष, विपचारकृतिकारणामालाकारणार्थसंदर्भमात्रेयः.

......; G—विपचारकृतिकारणार्थसंदर्भमात्रेयः मोक्ष हति (Note the mention of विपचार by G); V1—विपचारकृतिकारणार्थसंदर्भमात्रेयः मोक्ष हति. P gives the list of 'necessaries' as follows:—The "necessaries" are the objects of which the ascetics have need when they acquit themselves of their religious tasks. They are to the number of four: (1) the triple staff (tridaṇḍa), (2) the pot of water to wash (कामिन्दालु); (3) the kaśāya, (4) the five beneficent objects; (a) the pūcha of ashes, (b) the solar crystal (perhaps, sūryākāṭa), (c) the sacred thread, (d) the charms (magical words); (e) a long staff of herb placed on the tuft of hair and called the beneficent herb (auspicious herb, kuṣa). These are the five objects necessary for the study of the way. They are called the beneficent objects, because they drive away impurity. With the three other objects, they form the eight necessary (objects).

M and V1 say at the end of the exposition of each view that he thinks '......मे मोक्षो भविष्यति,' while P and V9 (~we have only a few broken lines on leaf 70, a part of which is preserved~) give the illustration in a conversation form and in each case the final sentence is 'And that is why I have left my family' (प्रवक्तोऽदिस्ति—V9).

The names of the tuṣṭis are as follows in the different commentaries:

M—अम्ब, सतिमहो, अर्थ, वृद्धिः, वर्षम, घुमो, घुमयु, घुमीयो, घुमीयो, घुमीयो, मुरतामयिः, मुरतामयिः, मुरतामयिः.

G—हितस्वरूपः सतिमहो, अर्थ, वृद्धिः, वर्षम, घुमो, घुमयु, घुमीयो, घुमीयो, घुमीयो, मुरतामयिः, मुरतामयिः, मुरतामयिः.

V1—असां दुष्टोऽन्ने मनोगृहों संस्कारं अर्थं—अम्बः सतिमहो नीष्ठ (अर्थं), वृद्धिः, घुमो, घुमयु, घुमियमयिः, घुमीयो, मुरतामयिः, मुरतामयिः.
V9—these sorts of contentment the Sages have given nine names. As they are capable of cleaning the dust and the impurity, the epithets of water are given to the nine contentments: (1) lubricating water, (2) moving water, (3) running water, (4) lake-water, (5) water which has well penetrated, (6) water easy to cross, (7) water which gushes well, (8) transparent water, (9) excellent and pure water.

We cannot be sure from the translation and notes of Takakusu who is guided by G, whether Paramārtha really had this list. I have given a few alternative suggestions in ( ) brackets.

Kārika 51—Only V9 and P refer to a parājañj. Others speak in general terms (कर्मोच्चिन्ता). The parable of चौर-पार-अवासिन-परिवर्त is found only in M in order to show the difference of buddhi, etc. and puruṣa. [The exposition of the first four siddhis and a part of that of the fifth siddhi is missing in V1]. The interpretation of तुषा is quite elaborate and peculiar to P in which six kinds of contemplation [of the defects of the (1) five gross elements, (2) clever organs, (3) subtle elements, (4) Sentiment of self, i.e. ahamkāra, (5) intellect, and (6) Nature] are described. Leaves 71–74 of V9 are missing so we cannot say whether V9 had this. It may be noted that the few words that we find on 70b are word for word the same as in P on kā. 51, viz. “क्रियात्मक विचाराः परिवर्तितं क्थितम् अन्यथा विराज्ञितां तथापि विद्याध्यायिनम्...” P on kā. 51 is very elaborate and in an expository and narrative style. P has described the process of acquiring knowledge at the house of the teacher. Besides, Paramārtha has appended a sub-commentary at each step to justify the names of the siddhis and the like. M explaining suhṛt-prāpti quotes a verse (एव आदिविद्यातामकम्...) which is not found quoted in any other commentary.

The names of the different siddhis are given in the different commentaries as follows:

M—अन्तराल्पः पूर्वविद्याध्यायिनः—तारां सुतारं तारात्तरं प्रमोदं प्रभुवें रम्यकर लक्ष्याध्यवसितमिति।

G—अन्तराल्पः हिद्वीं शास्त्रान्तरं संक्षेपं: क्रिया—तारां सुतारं तारात्तरं प्रमोदं प्रभुवेन रम्यकर लक्ष्याध्यवसितमिति।

V1—अन्तराल्पः हिद्वीं पूर्वानाचार्यः संक्षेपं: क्रियास्तारं सुतारं तारात्तरं प्रमोदं प्रभुवेन लक्ष्याध्यवसितमिति।

V9—missing.

P—These eight sorts of perfection are also called by the sages of antiquity: (1) crossing by oneself, (2) crossing well, (3) crossing all, (4) crossing with joy, (5) crossing with an excessive joy, (6) crossing with full joy, (7) crossing by love, (8) crossing by universal love.

The Nyāyāgamāṇusārīṇī (p. 414) on the Dvādaśāraṇayacakra mentions the following:—तारां, सुतारं, तारात्तरं, प्रमोदं प्रभुवेन लक्ष्येऽर्ज्ञानं, रम्यकरं लक्ष्याध्यवसितम्.
Kārika 52—P does not give the example of kumārīstāna, which M and V₁ give besides the usual one of go-visāṇa (⁻G does not give any example; it is interested in explaining the mutual dependence of bhāva and linga according to the bijāṅkura-nyāya; this explanation is not found in any of the other commentaries we are comparing here. T follows G; while Y brings in the idea of adhikārālaṅkāra sarga, though it says that this kārika refers to samsāra-cakra). Here also Paramārtha adds a sub-commentary to clarify the idea in the kārika. M, V₁, J seem to stress the co-presence of both, while Y, G and T are interested in showing their mutual dependence according to the bijāṅkura-nyāya in respect of production.

Kārika 53—We find the same interpretation in all. Only the remark in other commentaries that bhautika sarga is trīvidha is put thus in P—"The creation of beings endowed with sentiment is said to be divided into three categories; these three categories are: (1) gods, men and animals; (2) the subtle corporeal form, (3) the states of being."

Kārika 54 is similarly interpreted in all. P says, "The way of men is called 'that of the middle,' because it is found in the middle of the three creations. Why is the last of all the creations called 'pillar'? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks, etc. support the three worlds; that is why one calls it 'pillar.'" This is not found in any other commentary.

Kārika 55 is similarly interpreted in all. Leaves 76–79 of V₂ are missing, so we have only half of the commentary on kā. 55, and then we can compare only from kā. 61.

Kārika 56 is similarly interpreted in all, except that P is more expository. V₁ gives the first line of the kārika differently from the rest. As a matter of fact, it is differently read in most of the commentaries (See Table).

Kārika 57—is similarly interpreted in all, only P makes the simile clearer—"In this case, milk is produced during [the period of] a year. But when the calf is older, capable of browsing on the herbs by itself, the cow, its mother, though absorbing herbs and water, gives no more milk."

Kārika 58 is similarly explained in all. Only P in addition explains the term 'avyakta' thus:—Non-evolved principle (avyaktam) is another name for Nature, for she is above the domain of the organs of sense. For the same reason, one calls her also 'the obscure'. If it be thus with her, how does one know that she exists? We know the real existence of Nature for the five reasons explained higher up; it is said in a preceding verse (XV)......

Kārika 59 is similarly interpreted in all. Only P has 'actor' instead of 'narttakī' ('An actor shows himself to the spectators, in dance and song; when one has seen him and he has finished, he disappears behind the curtain'); and while M and V₁ say that when prakṛti retires, the puruṣa no longer suffers the three-fold misery, that is to say, attains emancipation, P says 'After having shown herself, she retires and ceases to suffer the three heats (miseries) [tāpā]. That is why it is said: Thus Nature retires after having obliged Spirit to manifest itself.' Takakusu rightly notes:—The text
has ‘having obliged Spirit to be itself manifested’. But it is probable that the translator has not properly understood गुरुस्यम तथास्मादन्त्व प्रवर्त्य, ‘having shown herself to Spirit’; cf. ka. 42. M further says in connection with the puruṣa : यथा गुरुस्यम तथास्मादन्त्व वश्याये ; तद्वैतेऽष्टतस्मादन्त्व : तथं हुः; यथागातः। ततो इति भो गृह्यति. This simile is not found elsewhere.

Kārikā 60 is similarly explained in all. M alone has at the end—“तत्र प्रवर्त्य: सिद्धिर्प्राप्तेकान्तिनविग्रहयः’.

Kārikā 61—M and V₁ give the example of ‘स्त्रिया’. P explains ‘दुःस्मार्थतत्’ thus :—“Thus in the world a man sees a woman endowed with excellent qualities; then he sees another who is most excellent of all; he thinks: ‘This is the most excellent and the one who is without rival.’ Even so Nature is the (most) delicate of the twenty-four principles. How do you know that? Because she does not bear the look (is invisible).’ P seems to have missed the fine point. Its line of argument seems to be logical and not poetical—‘There is nothing besides prakṛti, so prakṛti can be compared in point of delicacy only with the other twenty-three principles.’ The author of the kārikā seems to have waxed eloquent and poetical here.

M, G₂ V₁ and P quote ‘भवः जन्मद्…….’ in support of the view that Isvara is the cause of the world and ‘बैनं दुःस्मार्थतत् हुंस:…….’ [–the scribe has omitted this stanza in V₂, but it must have been there–] in support of the view that Svabhāva is the cause. M and V₁ refer before this to the view of the Vedāvādins who regard Puruṣa as the cause. M actually quotes गुरुस्यम तथास्मादन्त्व . V₂ has हुः एवेदं जगं: (?).

This discussion starts in connection with the delicacy of Nature, but the other commentaries then do not at any stage specifically link up each view with the idea of the proof or disproof of the delicacy of Nature. P on the other hand says, “One may say : ‘This opinion is not correct, because the isolation of Spirit does not come from [the fact] that it sees Nature. For, the master who considers Isvara as the cause of the world says ‘Spirit, ignorant and separated from Nature contents itself with miseries and with joys; Isvara can send it into heaven or hell.’ [Could P have a different version of the first line before it ?] Because of that, Nature cannot be liberated, even when Spirit has seen Nature. The delicacy of Nature cannot be proved……’

P refers to one more view which is not found elsewhere :—Then a master (who adheres to the theory of the Spirit) says : It is not correct to say that in seeing Nature one obtains Deliverance, for Deliverance is effectuated by means of the Spirit; as said in these lines : “The hymns of the four Vedas exalt the souls (puruṣas) of the past and of the future who have power over life and death, whose acts have been accomplished and are not repeated any more. It is by that cause that Deliverance is effectuated and not by the act of seeing Nature.” [According to Takakusu, this view is of the Vaiśeṣika school.]

Some portion of V₉ is missing, so we cannot definitely say whether it quoted ‘भवः जन्मद्…….’ and how it quoted it and how many different theories it referred to. V₉ has in the beginning of 80a—पदेस्वस्य वाश्चेवकिक्य:’. M, G, V₁, V₉ and P all quote ‘कालं ज्ञाति स्मृतिः…… with different readings. M and V₁ have “कालं ज्ञाति स्मृतिः कालं स्मृतिः’ with different readings. M and V₁ have :
P seems to compare prakrti with the other twenty-three principles in respect of delicacy—she does not bear the look, is invisible. J also seems to be of the same view—śrūṣāsthitam svābhāvamātār, eva. The term prakṛti—prakṛtavatāmavāprasthitām n svābhāvamātār, viśeṣa prakṛtivātiḥ svābhāvamātār eva śrūṣāsthitam, is a different term. According to T, Prakṛti surpasses in this respect even the kruḍvī—& eva prakṛtā prakṛtvativāpaścikā hasta śākṣeyet no pumādhyātatah.

Kārīka 62—Introducing this kārīka, M and V₁ say: loka kriyā vadhita purohito bart; purohito svataḥ; purohito vandartih, apratitven; G says that it is conventionally said that the puruṣa is liberated, or he transmigrates.

V₉—tattvān evaśidūtavā purohito mārgaḥ gacchitā śravā prakṛtī viśeṣāś ca purohito bart; G—subhogyatātā adhānake ca. J also seems to be of the same view—śrūṣāsthitam deva śrūṣāsthitam. M and V₁ are of the view that purūṣa is liberated, or he transmigrates.

P—one may say: “The men of the world, even sages, are accustomed to talk thus: ‘The Spirit is bound, the Spirit is delivered, the Spirit migrates through the existences.’ These words are they correct or false? We reply: ‘They are false.’ ‘How do you know that?’” It is said in this verse.

P is clearly indebted to V₂.

Kārīka 62 is similarly explained in all. G quotes: “Akrūtā deva śrūṣāsthitam tatah śāraṇīken ca nāmāprasthitāḥ. V₂ also names the three-fold bondage, while others just refer to it as ‘śrūṣāsthitam’. This is not explained in G; P also does not translate it, though later we have, ‘That is why it is said that the three worlds act by the support of Nature’, this being like the explanation in M, V₁, V₂. J has ‘nāmāprasthitāḥ?’. T—nāmāprasthitāḥ: nāmāprasthitāḥ: ca. T eva prakṛtvān...
Explaining that puruṣa cannot be bound and so cannot be liberated as it is inactive, while Prakṛti can, P says “To offer gifts and all other actions are appropriate to Nature.” This is not found in others and seems to be expository.

Karika 63—This karika is missing in P, though it is found in all the others. Some think it is an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546 A.D.). We shall discuss this later.

Karika 64. नासि—M, V₁—नासिः तत्वानि; G— नासिः भवामि; V₂—सहारमयो दुः स्वामीति (सहारमयो न भवामीति ?) कोढाहामिति जानमयन्ते; J—बेदेतुर दुभासोरों भौतिकं व तसीमु न भवामि, अवि हि प्रकृति: Y is missing; T—नासिः दुस्मयनि कियाामानि निषेधावति; or भूसिद्धम न भवामि. P seems to read नासिः and regards it as a false idea, viz. ‘There is Nothing,’ which is strange. On the contrary this should mean that there is really nothing, as in the case of the other two. This is omitted in the translation of the karika.

ते —M, V₁—ते तत्वानि; G—ते सम सहारं तत्वं, बलोऽ-भलमयं: सहारमयन्ति; V₂—[न]नेमसे सहारमयं, अन्यद्वितीय स्वामि; J—ते मेमसेव मुं प्रकृति: Y is missing; T—ते स्वामिता, P—There is no mine.

नामेवः M, V₁—नामेवत्त्वानाम; G—नामेवभार्षितः; V₂ does not mention the three separately so it is difficult to point out the explanation in each case. It says : [न] मेमसे सहारमयमु होती स्वामिः, प्राधान्यिकसे सहारमयंशहीसे(?)जानमयन्ते. J—नामूऽ प्रकृति:; Y—कार्यकारणसाधोरुपः। तस्माद् ते भौतिकः विर: वार्षिकसः ये चार्यकारणसाधोरुपः अन्यद्वितीय स्वामिः संक्षेपितामानययथोपयथ से स्वामित्वप्राप्तविधि मान्याः नामे विन्यस्तः; T—नामेव कतः; P—No me. P says—“Because of that knowledge one destroys the three (false) ideas completely: ‘that there is nothing, that the self [Me] exists, that Mine exists,’ and the five doubts (explained in v. 47). All the functions of all corporeal existences are caused by Nature; there is not ‘Nothing’, there is no Me, there is no Mine; because all pertain to Nature.” P seems to read ‘नस्ति’! The Bombay edition of Wilson’s text, Takakusu notes, has ‘नस्ति’ in the place of ‘नासिः’, but the act of isolating ‘नस्ति’ and making of it the first false idea is a misconstruction of Paramārtha’s.

Karika 65—सत्त्वविनिहिताम्—M, G, J, T; सत्त्वविनिहिताम्—V₁, V₂ (this portion is missing in Y). This is interpreted as follows : M—अर्जुनांलक्ष्यविनिहितां विनिहितान्ति निहितान्ति; V₁—विशेषार्थः विनिहितान्ति जानमयन्ते. P quotes here a verse to explain निहितान्ति: “By that knowledge (Nature) ceases to produce and finishes by abandoning her functions in accordance with the desire of Spirit... ...” I have discussed this later. निहितान्ति is explained by both M and G as निहितान्ति; V₁ does not take note of this term. V₂ simply says—विनिहित: प्रकृती कार्यकारणसाधोरुप: विनिहितान्ति. P quotes here a verse to explain this term: “Just as the decorticated rice sprouts no more in the water or in the earth, so Nature ceases to be prolific when she is mastered by knowledge.” This quotation is not found in any of the commentaries we are comparing
here. But Alberuni says that the passage is from the book of Patanjali (Alberuni's India, i, p. 55–E.G. Sachau, S. Chand and Co., Delhi, 1964).

Kārīka 66 is similarly explained in all. The illustration ‘यथा ईसर्सिमातिर्त्योऽन्न्तस्य’ given in M and V1 is not found in G, V9 and P. It may be noted that G alone reads राश्य 33, पेपक यो दुधारणामयेश्वरका (See Table). (एका केवल: इदं, युक्ता:........एवं प्रक्ष्यति; दूधारणामयेश्वरका प्रतापकारणमुख, न हिंदीय प्रक्ष्यितं मूर्तिपन्य प्रतापकथात्रेषये जाति) (G). G seems to have got the hint from V9—यथा लोके राश्य:........प्रक्ष्यितं एवं ....Introducing का. 66, V9 asks: ‘हेतु ज्ञातेन विद्वता प्रक्ष्यति: कि करोत्स्लोक्यने’ and ignoring the wording of the kārīka, answers this by ‘क्षमते नानीश्वर, दुधारणामेन विद्वते’; M and V1 ask what the puruṣa does after seeing prakṛti with the eye of knowledge. P—What does knowledge accomplish between Nature and Spirit? (Has P combined the idea in both?)

Kārīka 67—The illustration given by P—‘Just as without an umbrella, one has no shade (so without an antecedent cause, there is no corporeal form)’—is found only in V9 under kā. 68 in connection with the absence of body on their being absence of dharma–adharma. Paramārtha does not seem to have followed the second line—‘Transmigration is arrested like the body of the wheel (of the potter), the movement of which one interrupts.......Then a man who possesses knowledge and on whom, for that reason, the acts committed in prior existences have no more influence, stops (in transmigration); like the wheel (of the potter), the movement of which one interrupts.”

M, V1, V9 simply say that samskāra signifies dharma and adharma which are responsible for the body, and even when knowledge has been obtained they do not vanish till they have yielded their fruit (as they are more powerful than knowledge—M, V1). V9 refers to these as पुरुषुक्तयुक्ते and says that the body is produced due to the dharma and adharma of another birth. J also says ‘जन्मात्तसंस्कारद्राक्षदुर्जनवरस्तं व्यस्ततियति’. G says that knowledge does not eradicate the dharma and adharma in existence (i.e. present), even because they are present and are going to perish. But it destroys future karma and those which the person does by means of the present body because it is performance of what is ordained. [From G’s explanation here we are tempted to say that its author was a Vedaṭīntin, the same as the author of the Gaudapāda Kārīka].

Kārīka 68 is similarly explained in all; only P is elaborate in the exposition of ‘रवसकतिक’ and ‘अपसकतिक’—’Definitive isolation’ means: because of the true knowledge we reject the indefinite remedies and the opinions of the different schools. ‘Final isolation’ means: for that we abandon the chain of causes and effects taught in the four Vedas (cf. v.1), even the fruits promised for the absence of passion, fruits not caused by true knowledge. Final isolation is ‘definitive’ because it is not followed by another. ‘Final’ would be to say ‘without end (eternal)’.

Kārīka 69—पुष्प: M, V1—उद्विषयम् ; G—रहस्यम् ; V9—मुखमिति अभ्र्यो यदू अन्नेत्यम्(न भेष्यलि) इत्ययय: ; P—“That which is hidden by all sorts of erroneous opinions, that which is difficult to manifest, can be obtained only by a perfect master. That which is secret is that which can be transmitted to a brahmin endowed with the five qualities but not
to any other; that is why one calls it 'secret'. What are the five qualities? (1) Good place of birth, (2) good family, (3) good conduct; (4) capacity; (5) desire to obtain that knowledge. Those are the qualities which make [one] fit to receive the Law; no one else is capable of it; that is why one calls that knowledge 'secret'." This is clearly an elaboration on the part of Paramārtha of some remark in the original corresponding to अवरुक्षे न वेषम्" in V₃. J and Y have a similar expansion of अन्वयम्.

स्थिति is explained by M, V₁, and V₉ as श्वाम, the eight abodes of the devas, one abode of manuṣyas and five abodes of tairyagyona; G is very brief—अवरुक्षे; P explains स्थिति as duration—"this is all the time [during which] the subtle body, influenced by the states of being, migrates through the three worlds." The interpretation in P and G seems to be the same. One interpretation (M, V₁, V₉) refers to the location and the other to the duration. J combines both these. Y enters into a philosophical discussion. T gives no explanation, referring it to कः. 21.

Pralaya signifies, according to M, V₁ and V₉ the dissolution of the five gross elements into the five subtle elements and so on. G explains it as विकोमान; and P explains it thus : "End : by means of the eight perfections (v. LI), (Spirit) rests for ever isolated." (This is from the point of view of the puruṣa.) P further says : "The conditions of the three (periods) can be manifested by that knowledge; since it manifests nothing outside of these three, one calls it absolute knowledge." This is not found elsewhere.

Kārikā 70—G does not comment on kārikas 70-72. अवरुक्षे : M, V₁—विनादयत्र, as it is superior to even the Vedas, Purāṇas, and Manvādhi Dharmasāstras due to its aikantikatva and atyantikatva; V₉—सधिऔष्च वैद्यराजानां शासनानां व च (संसारम्?); P—'That knowledge was established for the first time before the four Vedas had appeared. It is by that knowledge that the four Vedas and all the religious schools have been established; that is why one calls it excellent (agrya).'; J—वैद्यराजानां चाल्यादायम्.

पवित्रम् : M, V₁—वर्षमात्र नरकप्रेतारिष्टोपतिवृत्ति पतिवृतिः श्रावले तस्मात पवित्रम्; V₉—तत्विविश्व कृतैतिः विश्वाभिनिविवैमात्रनात्र भाषण: पुनिन्ति (!); P is quite elaborate—It is by that knowledge that Spirit is delivered from the triple misery, from the principal misery caused by the twenty-four (products), as well as from the triple bondage; by that is obtained isolation of Spirit or its Deliverance. That is why one says that that knowledge is 'beneficent'.

M, V₁ and V₉ remind us here how Kapila took pity on Āṣuri [who was अष्टीकशिल्लभ—M, V₁; अष्टीकशिल्लभाजन(!) -V₉]. P on the other hand says, "The great sage Kapila possessed at his birth the four qualities, virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power. Having realised that knowledge, he explained it through compassion. Desiring that that knowledge should not be lost and that it should be communicated to another, he taught it through charity to Āṣuri, who explained it, in his turn, to Paṇcaśākha and to Vindhyavāsa. Paṇcaśākha and Vindhyavāsa treated that doctrine at full length, in sixty thousand verses in all." Takakusu says : "Three texts out of four read: 'In his turn, he explained it to Paṇcaśākha and to Vindhyavāsa; Paṇcaśākha and
Vindhyavāsa have treated this doctrine at full length. Bu the Korean text reads, 'In his turn, he explained it to Pañcaśikha and Pañcaśikha had treated this doctrine at full length.' The Korean text then does not speak of Vindhyavāsa. The sage Āsuri, in his turn, explained it to Paficasikha and Paficasikha had treated this doctrine at full length. Then come evolution and modification; thus was originated primordial creation by evolution, etc. up to final deliverance.—P. P also says later, 'The sage Asuri, in his turn, explained that knowledge briefly and in identical terms to Pancasikha, who explained it at full length in sixty thousand verses; thus the doctrine was transmitted up to Isvarakṛṣṇa, the brahmin whose family-name was Kauśika; that one explained the system in seventy-verses, as is said in this verse [ka. 71].'

V 3 in the explanation of the second line says—'एवं बलिमिश्रिय शास्त्रायेति दातामात्रे। तेनवर्त ज्ञान संक्षिप्तं पवित्रिषिव वदन्ति ।... एवं पारसै भाषणं कः? इस्वारकृष्णन्तै नाम ब्रह्मविधितयां पवित्रितं बलिमिताय।' This is not found in M and V 1. V 9 describes Īsvarakṛṣṇa as a Brāhmaṇa of the Kosala country, and as 'kamyaḥ' (happy, prosperous?).

The sage Kapila explained it briefly to Āsuri as follows: 'In the first beginning there was nothing but darkness. In that darkness there was a 'field of knowledge'. The field of knowledge was the puruṣa. The puruṣa existed, but no knowledge existed. That is why one called (the puruṣa) 'field'. Then come evolution and modification; thus was originated primordial creation by evolution, etc. up to final deliverance'—P. P tries to explain why puruṣa is termed 'field'. Kārika 71—विध्यरस्यः: M, V 1—आधुरि-पन्चसिखास्माभ्य-उद्भुक्तवास्मीका-हारतेशवस्त्र—(mentioned in M only), etc.—विध्यरस्यः: V 3—आधुरि-पन्चसिखास्माभ्य-उद्भुक्तवास्मीका (वायवि कृष्णम्) and such others.

P—आधुरि-पन्चसिखास्माभ्य-उद्भुक्त-पौ-पो-ली (वार्षगियम् according to Takakusu, but Badhdali according to Pulinbehari Chakravarti—See ‘Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought,’ pp. 131-132)—Īsvarakṛṣṇa.

J—विध्यरस्यः इस्वारकृष्ण: जुनेश्वर: पवित्रिषिव सांस्कृतिकान्तिरारस्तेन्द्रम्य (कृष्णम्) इस्वारकृष्णानामां पवित्रिषिविभूषनम् विध्यरस्यः.

Y says that Pañcaśikha transmitted the knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Janaka, Vasiṣṭha and such others (वदन्ति जातकाविश्वास्त्रम्—सारविवर्तेऽय, p. 175-का.70). Y declares that the Śāstra was promulgated by Kapila at the beginning (of creation ?) and hence it is not possible, as in the case of other systems of thought, to trace the line of teachers even in a hundred years. संलेखन नः वदन्ति...—हारात्रिक्षितान्तिरारस्तेन्द्रम्य—(कृष्णम्) इस्वारकृष्णानामां पवित्रिषिविभूषनम् आदिरस्यः... (p. 175, का. 71) (some names before the name of Harīta have been left out as there is a lacuna in the manuscript). It may be noted that Baddhali is referred to in the Tattvartha-Ra:javarttika, p. 51, as an advocate of the doctrine of Non-action.
(akriyavāda) along with Kapila, Ulūka, Gārgya, Māthara and others (कपिलद्वंपलस्यानुसारमूलीकांविकारात्)

The विधानमार्यम in $V_9$ and $P$ is the same (—if न्यायमि could be emended as वादसि).

Kārika 72 and Kārika 73 are not found in $V_9$. Ka. 72 is similarly explained in M, $V_1$ and $P$, except that $P$ perhaps read परन्थान्यां in the place of परन्थाय and thereby included here two (4, 5) of the ten items (मूलिकार्थां) viz. the five reasons by which one establishes the reality of Nature (Ka. 15), and the five reasons by which one establishes the reality of puruṣa (Ka. 17). $P$ seems to have omitted 'अन्यवायं'. $P$ does not regard this verse (Ka. 72) as a part of the Sāmkhya-kārika as it refers to it as composed by 'an intelligent man of this school'. And the second line is different :—"it explains (the sorts of) creation which proceed from (eight) causes, up to the fifty categories (relating to the intellect)." But the commentary reproduces the idea in 'आत्मविवाहांनि: पर्याय-विविधताभिः'. I have discussed this later.

Kārika 73 is found only in $M$ and $V_1$. J and Y and T also do not have this kārika.

I have not made an attempt here to draw any kind of conclusion. I have only tried to give here as objectively as possible, some idea of the contents or mode of interpretation of M, G, $V_1$, $V_9$ and $P$, because, as said above, M and G have been regarded by different scholars as the original of $P$. Now that two more commentaries ($V_1$, $V_9$) are known, a similar claim can be put forth for them also. This comparative study will have served its purpose even if it enables a scholar to verify for himself what the position actually is.

All that we can say is that if any commentary can claim to be the original of $P$, $V_9$ has the fairest right to do so. Where it is found to differ from $V_9$ this can to some extent be explained by the fact that Paramārtha was influenced by the mode of interpreting the Sāmkhya-kārika in Buddhist circles. * His Buddhist bias also might have led him to drop or change what he regarded as indecent expressions and it might have influenced his understanding of the Sāmkhya principles also to some extent.

*See Ka. 9—उपादानमहावात् "A man who thinks that tomorrow a brahmin will come to dine in his house procures milk to make curds"—P. This is not found in this form in any other commentary. But see : Tattvasamgraha Pañjika, 8 and Tattvabodhavidhāyini which have the same illustration.
Is what is known as ‘Māthara-Vṛtti’ the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya Karikā?

Scholars are divided in their estimate of the date of M. While some assign it to the first century A.D., others hold that it cannot be anterior to 1000 A.D., could be even a little later. Each one of these scholars seems to have very sound reasons in support of his own view. While on the one hand ‘Māthara’ is referred to in the Anuyogdvārasūtra, 41 along with Rāmañjya, Mahābhārata, Kapila, Saṭṭitantra, Kanakasaptati, etc. and so should be earlier than it, on the other hand M has quotations from the Hastamalaka stotra of Śaṅkarācārya (यथा दर्शान्यां भास्तिनामां)—see M, 39 and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (यथा यद्वैत-पदार्थम्…….. Bhāgavata, 1. 8. 52 in M, 2; यथा अनुविषयतालं…….Bhāgavata, 1. 6.35 in M, 51 ) and so should be later than these. Moreover, it is claimed that M is the original of the Chinese version of Paramārtha and so should definitely be earlier than 546 A.D. Such a claim is put forth for Gauḍapāda’s Bhāṣya also, and Paramārtha’s version is as a matter of fact different from both G and M. Again, M seems to be influenced by Vedantic views as can be seen from its concept of mokṣa and the like (See महाकालो विषयेन वृद्धे मैयः वृद्धे प्राकृतिः……quotet in M, 37; also वृद्धे च—‘देह मोहायेह हस्ते मुक्तः स प्रमाणद्विः कुमारार्थर इत्यादिः चम्बे चैव हतमाम्’॥;’यथा दर्शान्यां भास्तिनामां’इदानि—M, 39).

One way of attempting to explain this confusing situation is to hold Māthara (referred to in the Anuyogdvāra) and Māthara-bhaṣya (referred to in Guṇaratnasūrī’s commentary on Haribhadrasūrī’s Sāddārṣana-saṃuccaya, p. 109, Asiatic Society, Calcutta. 1905) as one, but to regard the Māthara-vṛtti as we find it now as referred to by the word ‘Māthara-prānta’ used by Guṇaratnasūrī (p. 96) (तत्र ज्ञातप्राप्ते—
यथा विद लक्ष बाध नित्यं अस्य च भोगान्य व्यापकम्।
येद विद्यते तेन कथितवतं तत्तप्राप्त्विस्म मोक्षस्वयंविरे�щен॥—from M, 37). This distinction made by Guṇaratna between ‘Māthara-bhaṣya’ and ‘Māthara-prānta’ shows that in the manuscript which Guṇaratna consulted certain passages like ‘यथा विदिता’ were written in the margin and these later became a part of the text. Thus the Māthara-vṛtti, as we have it, is the original commentary with a number of interpolations and this explains the quotations from the Bhāgavata and the Hastamalaka stotra and the like and the Vedantic influence that appears to be there in M. This is the point made by Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri in his learned book ‘सांक्षेपदर्शन इतिहास,’ pp. 407–473. He tries to establish that if these interpolations are removed, there would be no difficulty in accepting what is known as the Māthara-vṛtti as the original of the Chinese version, as the Māthara or Māthara-bhaṣya referred to in Jaina works, and as a work of the first century A.D..

Dr. Ādyāprasāda Miśra examines this argument at length in his सांक्षेपदर्शनी ऐतिहासिक परिपत्र, pp. 236–245, and comes to the conclusion that Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri has been rather over-enthusiastic and that facts do not bear him out; we have to admit that M is a revised version of the original Māthara-bhaṣya.

So many attempts were made to prove or disprove M as the original Māthara-vṛtti and also as the original of Paramārtha’s Version, obviously because this was the only vṛtti ascribed to Māthara that was known, it was
of all the known commentaries the closest to P, and G was looked upon by many as scrappy, and almost an abridgement of M. I have, as said above, recently edited two hitherto unknown vṛtis on the Śāmkhya-saptati; one of them (I call it V₁—) is very much like M, and the other (V₂) seems to have a greater claim than any other commentary to the status of being the original of P (though it too is at a few places different from P). Unfortunately a corner of the last leaf of the manuscript of V₁ is broken and lost and this is exactly where we have the author's name. आव्भेंग Followed by a remnant of what could have been or even is all that is left of the author's name. But V₁ is very much like M; and M seems to be a revised and enlarged version of V₁, and much later also.

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī has specifically pointed out certain passages in M which he regards as spurious—they even seem to disturb the consistency of the text (See सांबड्डक्षका इतिहास, pp. 451-454). We may mention these.

(i) The stanza च्यांति मिलितम्... in the beginning (M,1). [Not found in V₁].

(ii) The stanza ह्योपरिक्षितम्... (M, 1) [Not in V₁]

(iii) भविष्य चाव स्नेतोऽस्मि: ‘पुनर्दाहि...’, पुष्पतालम्... याति ज्ञाति... वेष वेष...हतात्त: सुलभेमेते (M, 1). [We find the verses पुनर्दाहि... and पुष्पतालम्... in V₁.]

(iv) हिज्य ‘चाव पड़ेद पुलम्...’....इक्लुति खिठवा...नरकः केन मन्यते (M, 2). Here the author seems to be quoting afresh after having said ह्या́रिवर्गवात (M, 2). [V₁ has ह्या́रि खिठवा...नरकः केन शास्त्रिति].

(v) भविष्य चाव मन्य्वण्य भविष्याद्विभाविता...निरतिष्यात्मात्मिति साक्षेप: (M, 2). Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī argues that this passage does not fit in where it is, though it can very well do so at the end of the exposition of का. 2, and its style also seems to be different. [This passage is found in V₁ and is even necessary in order to explain how this cause of duḥkha-nivṛtti is superior to the others. But V₁ then simply explains the terms vyakta, āvyakta and jña and quotes ‘परिवर्तितस्यविवर्तितस्यो ज्ञाता...while M attempts to justify the postulation of āvyakta and jña. M does not quote परिवर्तितस्यविवर्तितस्य...’ here.]

Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī then gives a list of passages which, according to him, are undoubtedly interpolations:

(vi) ‘नास्ति वित्ते भोको नामावो वित्ते सत:’ हि गोलाप: ‘सर्वेक तीन्द्रयम आर्यो’ हि उद्वेष (M, 15 ). Karikā 15 has been explained in Kamalasūla’s Pañjikā, 14 on the Tattvasaṅgraha, and Abhayadeva’s commentary (p. 284) on the Sanmatitarka, and these explanations seem to be based, argues Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī, on M and clearly show the above-mentioned passage to be an interpolation. [All that we can say is that V₁ does not have these quotations. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any sound evidence to show that the above mentioned exposition in the Pañjikā and the Tattvabodhāvidhāyini is based on M or even V₁.]

(vii) कर्क्ष: न-उपस्य प्रलयं वै केष भुतानामागति भक्तिः।

ैसिन्द्रियामिव च स दोह्यो स्वाभाविति।

सृष्टिकृत्युपर्वृणि शष्टि अंशे परार्थवचः (M, 22).

[This is not found in V₁; nor is found in V₁ the fanciful explanation of ‘अहंकार’ and ‘सत्यान’ that is given in M.]
(viii) अतः पुनरिस्थितिः वर्णनविविधः *(M, 18). This is the only place where M refers to a different view, and so this passage must be a spurious one, argues Pt. Udayavirā Śāstri. [It may be noted that V₁ also refers to this different explanation of अन्तरस्थितिः given by others. It is true that neither M nor V₁ has discussed the different views of the Sāmkhya ācāryas regarding the senses-organisms and the like. But yet it was within its scope to refer to a different interpretation, given by an earlier commentator or handed down by tradition, of an expression in the kārikā that was being discussed. And this could not be regarded as a proof of the passage being an interpolated one.]

(ix) उसके च-हसि विष्क लघ सददो निर्धेण विषयाचुदमणि कृत च मा श्रव्यामः। 
यदि विदितं ते कवित्मसं तत्त्राप्यस्यो मोहाद्वैभूतम् च। *(M, 37)

[This is found in V₁ though the text is a little different:

हसि विष्क लघ सादो निर्धेण विषयाचुदमणि कृत च मा श्रव्यामः। 
यदि विदितं कवित्मसं तत्त्राप्यस्यो मोहाद्वैभूतम् च।]

Gunaratna writes in his commentary (p. 96) on the Saḍdārśana-samuccaya: तदुक्तं मात्रार्धान्ते—

हसि विष्क लघ सादो निर्धेण शून्यत्वं परमात्मा वासभिन्नतमः। 
यदि विदितं कवित्मसं तत्त्राप्यस्यो मोहर्वक्षोमविधिम्।

(x) पुराणेऽपि ‘सोभासुध्यंग्रंतेतसि पुरावस्तु पन्थम्। ’ ’िति *(M, 39)

[Not found in V₁. Actually the entire passage: भवान्ति-भवान्ति भवान्ति भवान्ति:। प्राणिःः...चैतन्य यथा पन्थम् आत्मायुणामः पुष्करवर्णः। *(M, 37) इत्यादिः। पुराणे ‘सोभासुध्यंग्रंतेतसि पुरावस्तु पन्थम्। ’ ’िति is not to be found in V₁.]

(xi) उसके यत्—रेडेह मोहाप्यः’’ ‘यथा दर्शनाभ्याय आत्मस्वाभावः।’ इत्यादि *(M, 39) [Not in V₁]

(xii) उसके च–एषा भानुर्भविषयः *(M, 51) [Not in V₁]

Pt. Udayavirā Śāstri argues: Early writers generally do not mention the name of the work they quote from. In M at places we find the name of the work mentioned. For example, the Gītā is mentioned in M, 15 as the source of a quotation, while it is not so mentioned in M, 23. Hence the passage in M, 15 in clearly a spurious one. The quotations from the Bhāgavata (M, 2 and 51) and the Hastāmalaka stotra (M, 39) also are interpolated ones as they do not seem to form a part of the text.

[It may be noted that V₁ does not have any one of these quotations, not even the quotation from the Gītā, given in M, 23. Moreover, V₁’s exposition of yama and niyama (kā. 23) is, unlike M, not based on the Yoga-sūtra].

There are some more passages in M that are not found in V₁. On the other hand, a few passages of V₁ are not found in M. The mode of expression also is different in V₁ from that in M at places, and one feels that the author of M has deliberately changed the construction of the sentence, or made a deliberate change in the original. I have noted such passages in my edition of V₁. We cannot but come to the conclusion that V₁ is earlier than M and that M is a revised and enlarged version of V₁.

Pt. Udayavirā Śāstri has tried to establish that M is earlier than Y. Now that we have two hitherto unknown commentaries before us, we may try to see if the arguments of Pt. Udayavirā Śāstri could hold good in the case of V₁ and V₂.
(i) Y refers to M 3, says Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī, when it says: भाष प्रांहायथं कर्म भूलित यद्य सन्निहार भः प्रकाशेण भुददत्तियाणि बुध्वदेचित.

It is interesting to bear in mind that the style of this passage is different from that of the corresponding passage in both M and V1. Moreover, both these mention शारणा as the function of the indriyas in general, द्वारा as that of abhimāna (—Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī gives the expression शारणा अभिमानमोक्षायम्, but manas is mentioned neither in M nor in V1—) and prकाशa as that of buddhi. The passage in Y in here closer in style to V9 which however assigns the functions differently (—though the copyist seems to have omitted a few words). See: [आहरण] भाशा [च] कम्मेदिति भुददतिति, प्रकाश भद्दत्तियाणि कुरैति…ते दशरथपिण्यं बुध्वदेचित: प्रकाशति कम्मेदिति प्रकाशायम् प्रकाशित व—V9, 32. Surprisingly ते दशरथपिण्यं दशरथपिण्यं शारणायति is found in V1 and M also though they assign the functions differently.

It can be said that Y has not referred to M or even V1, but has some other commentary in view. Or it can be said to have attempted to systematically reproduce the view of V1 and to have used the mode of expression in V9, which seems to be earlier than V1. We shall discuss this later.

(ii) The next evidence put forth by Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī is on the basis of M, 38; according to him, पवन महाभुतानि पर्याृतवेदांकूटिनितचलमयानुयायते (M, 38) is refuted in Y—तथा वहनेरायमायागमभित्रितम् एक्षेत्रिण्यस्मस्तापेश्य: परस्परातुतवेदां स्कृतवात एकोत्तरा बिषेषाय: सूक्ष्मत हति ततः प्रतिपितं साधित.

In my view, Y does not refer to the author of M here as it refers to some ‘आचार्याः’ and it would not normally use such a word for a mere commentator (See भाषा भाषा in Y, 32, केकिमन्त्र in Y, 39). It is likely that such a view prevailed among some thinkers of the Śāmkhya-Yoga school, who wanted to justify the increasing number of qualities in the gross substances, which could not be satisfactorily explained in the view that vāyu is produced from sparsa-tanmātra, tejas from rūpamātra and so on. The author of M found this view more tenable and explained ka. 38 accordingly. V1 with which M ordinarily tallies does not admit this. I have discussed this later.

(iii) Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī is of the view that Y after explaining the term स्मृत (का. 39) as स्मृतेकुकुकुकुकु: शेलजाश्च, refers to M in ‘केकिमन्त्र प्रमुखन्त्रेण वाद्यानायेक विषयाणि प्रह्यासित्विति’ But V1 also has here “प्र उदसम: विशेषानि शास्त्रम.” V9 is unfortunately missing here.

(iv) Similarly, after explaining ‘वाद्यवाच्य महाभोज (का. 48) in its own way, Y remarks : हथादुविक्रयो वा कवदिन्दिविन्ययेरे and Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī claims that this is a reference to M. But V1 has a similar explanation here. (V9 is missing).

(v) Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī argues that Māṭhara has given some exposition of the members of a syllogism in his विर्ति on का. 5, and Y (p. 3) is referring to this in यथावित्त वाद्यालेवनसाधारणयो हृदत्तायाव्याख्याति ‘इति तत्र विद्यमानम. But in that case if Māṭhara be the ‘भास्यकारा’ there should be some other commentator between Māṭhara and the author of Y, to whom the latter is referring (कथित). It is likely that the author of Y wants to say here that some Śāmkhyas have accepted the Bhaṣyakāra’s exposition of the syllogism and there is no
reason why they should not be followed. By Bhaṣyakāra, he might be referring to Vatsyāyana, the Nyāyabhāṣyakāra, meaning thereby that the Nyāya syllogism was acceptable to the Sāṅkhya. Or he might be referring to some early Sāṅkhya work known as Bhaṣya which was not extant in his own days. The latter is more plausible as can be seen from the force of ‘ते च म: प्रामाणयः’. V₁, it may be noted, does not give any exposition of the syllogism. In any case, Y is certainly not referring to M, which on many grounds is clearly seen to be much later.

(vi) Regarding the similarities of expression in M and Y pointed out by Pt. Udayavīra Śastraī we can only say that similar expressions are found in V₁ and V₉ also, and so cannot help us to arrive at any conclusion.

(vii) The text of kārikās 26 and 28 as found in the different commentaries can prove of some help in determining their chronological order. In M, (V₁ and P) the sense-organs are mentioned in the kārikā text (26) in the order—आयन, त्वक्, चचु, रसन, मालिक्य; in G (and V₉) in the order—चचु: आयन, त्वक्, रसन, स्तेशी; in Y in the order अयन, त्वक्, चचु; रसन, मालिक्य; and in J and T in the order चचु, आयन, त्वक्, स्तेशी and comments प्रभुवासारा: इत्याच: कमस्तु आयन-त्वक-चचुरिति. On the other hand, in the mention of the sense objects in kā. 28, we find the expression स्वासिद्ध (M, G, V₉, V₁, P, Y), but the author of Y has criticised this and recommended

* See दिवं तन्त्रालंरंतत:; तन्त्रालंरंतत: हि विनिप्रक्षप्रवृत्तितिस्वत्वभवन्तिद्यः; प्रामाण न: ते अचाराऽ इत्यत्थोपेर्यो बिजासारामानिति। Y, p. 4.

शब्दार्थम्—When the senses were referred to, the आयन was mentioned first and there is no reason for violating this order while mentioning their objects. Hence we should read शब्दार्थम्, the reading स्वासिद्ध, being a careless one. J and T seem to have readily accepted this suggestion.

Pt. Udayavīra Śastraī is of the view that till the time of M the kārikā text was fixed, and it was only after the criticism of Y that शब्दार्थम् came to be substituted for स्वासिद्ध in J and T. Hence the order should be M, Y, G, J and T.

Now that we have two more commentaries we can think afresh. V₁ has the same text as M. The text of kā. 26 in V₉ seems to be the original one (—it is followed by G, J and T—) and no special order seems to have been consciously followed. Generally the acceptable order would be आयन, त्वक्, चचु; रसन and प्राण in consonance with the order of their objects—शब्द, त्वक्, चचु, रस, स्तेशी in the order of their evolution. Or in agreement with the reading of kā. 26 came into existence which mentioned the sense-organs in the order आयन, त्वक्, स्तेशी as we find in V₁ (and P), and which was definitely superior, but not the original one. But स्वासिद्ध in kā. 28 remains as it was, and this is what Y is criticising. In the light of Y’s remark, J substituted शब्दार्थम् in kā. 28 and made a comment in respect of the order in kā. 26 that it was not the proper order. M simply follows V₁. I have discussed the readings later.
(viii) M on ka. 43 describes the bhāvas as three-fold—sāmsiddhi, prākṛtika and vaikṛtika. So does Y, which according to Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī follows M. But V₁ gives the same explanation. J and T describe them as only two-fold, ‘prākṛtika’ being regarded as an epithet of ‘sāmsiddhika.’

(ix) In M, 18 we find a different interpretation referred to in अप्रेसा त्वंसितुदारं बर्णमति……Besides giving its own explanation, M refers to an explanation of जन्मसमारणः put forth by others, according to which when one is born, at the same time another dies, whereas if there were one puruṣa all would be born or would die simultaneously. Now this is the explanation in Y, and since Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī regards M as the earliest commentary on the Śāṁkhyā Karika, he is of the view that the passage अपारे पुनः……in M is a spurious one.

But as said above, we have this passage in V₁ also and as a matter of fact this view is found in V₂, Y, G and J. Thus, V₁ can be said to be later than V₂ and M is almost a copy of V₁. The author of V₁ besides giving his own explanation refers to the traditional interpretation of the kārika.

References to Śāṁkhyā in ‘Alberuni’s India’

It is held that Alberuni’s references to Śāṁkhyā are based on what must have been the original of the Chinese Version and Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī has tried to show that M was this original. But we have seen above that V₂ (or some other commentary very much like it, but not M or V₁) must have been the original on which Paramārtha’s Version was based. Most of the allusions in Alberuni tally with the corresponding passage in V₁, V₂, M or even G, because most of the expositions are the same in all. We shall discuss only a few important references here:

(a) Alberuni says that the book of Śāṁkhyā derives action from matter. The task of the soul is to learn the action of matter like a spectator, resembling a traveller who sits down in a village to repose. Each villager is busy with his own particular work, but he looks at them and considers their doings, disliking some, liking others and taking an example from them. In this way he is busy without himself having any share in the business going on, and without being the cause which has brought it about. (See Alberuni’s India, i, p. 48–Dr. Edward C. Sachau, S. Chand & Co., 1964).

This parable we find in the commentary on ka. 19 in V₂, V₁ and M. V₁ and M say that the said man staying in the town is कविब्रमणियमरः सांवेद्योत्पादनम् (—from अवलंबनायांचररः M)—मंदु; whereas V₂ describes him as a parivrajakā in a village, and P as an ascetic mendicant. We may compare the wording in these:

यथा किल परिशारणः, स प्रामे प्रतितपति । ते प्रभाम: लोकः क्षेत्रकमणि प्रयत्नेन निवत्ते च । स परिशारणः केवलः एव मध्यसः तेनु प्रयत्नेन न प्रयत्नेन समालमाकरतेति तेषां कल्पामुः ।—V₂

वजनयात्रामथयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतयवशेषस्मायतayाः—V₁

स च अप्रायां प्रतिवाकोणमविविधतां किमकरे प्रवंशिनां तन्मयाचारिनां साखिनात्रो मयि । कदवालः कोत्योपवादाननुभवति तदाभासर्वसमयाः—तथापि साधु विविधतामन्यत तत्वार्थानुभवति ।—M.
“Just as an ascetic mendicant resides at the same place and does not follow the persons who come and go, but contents himself with looking at them go about”—P.

V₉ is closest to P. Alberuni has turned the mendicant into a traveller who sits down in a village to repose. His act of liking or disliking the actions of the residents is not mentioned in V₉ and P; V₁ and M say that he acts as an arbitrator saying ‘You have done what is good’, ‘You have done what is not good.’ ‘Taking an example’ is not mentioned in any of the commentaries. These (liking-disliking-taking an example) might be consistent with the popular concept of a sākṣīn, but not with the Sāmkhya concept of puruṣa as a sākṣīn and V₉ and P do not say anything to this effect.

This might have been the way in which the parable was explained in some study-circles and this accounts for the wording in V₁, M and also Alberuni.

Alberuni further states: The book of Sāmkhya brings action into relation with the soul, though the soul has nothing to do with action, only in so far as it resembles a man who happens to get into the company of people whom he does not know—robbers returning from a village they have sacked and destroyed. They are overtaken by the avengers. The whole party are taken prisoners, and together with them the innocent man is dragged off and treated precisely as they are, without having taken part in their action (Alberuni’s India, i, pp. 48–49).

V₂, V₁ and M (kā 20) also give this parable. A śrotiṣṭa brāhmana is said to accompany the robbers. P also says that a brahmin got in by error into the company of brigands. Alberuni’s description is a little more detailed.

Further, it is stated that people say that the soul resembles rain—water which comes down from heaven, always the same, and of the same nature; but it acquires different appearance, taste and smell according as it is gathered in vessels of different materials (gold, silver, glass, earthen ware or clay or nittersalt earth) (Alberuni’s India, i, p. 49).

Actually this parable is meant to explain the diversity in the three worlds even when they have all evolved out of one pradhāna. V₁ and M do not state what the different receptacles could be. But V₂, 16 says: एकरस-भूतत्वातास्ति तत्त्व नेदिनी प्राथ्म नाता तत्वातास्ति प्रस्तुत्सर्वत्र भाष्यसम्म्योतिसम्यतः (आक्षाकादे-पाराश्चारिङ्गासम्बन्धी परिणामी भाष्यसम्म्योतिसम्यतः) परिपरिनिर्गच्छन्त: महुत्म्मानम परिणामते। The comparison is evidently not fully expanded here. P has here: ‘The water which comes from the atmosphere, is at the beginning of a single taste. It transforms itself when it arrives on the earth. It becomes of a varied taste, according to the different receptacles’. If it is a vase of gold, its taste is very sweet; if it is in the earth, its taste differs, according to the quality of the earth.”

Alberuni seems to have expanded the idea further to clear his point.

(b) Alberuni narrates the parable of a man travelling towards the end of the night with his four pupils—this being meant, as Alberuni also says, to explain ignorance (doubt), incapacity, indolence or complacence and perfection. This is found in V₂, V₁, M, P, (kā. 46). But a close study of these shows that P is based on V₉ and
the style of $V_2$ and $P$ is more dialogue-like, as also in Alberuni's book; and Alberuni seems to have made the narration more elaborate and clear when he says, "On coming near, he found it was pumpkins on which there lay a tangled mass of something. Now he knew that a living man, endowed with free will, does not stand still in his place until such a tangled mass is formed on his head, and he recognised at once that it was a life-less object standing erect. Further, he could not be sure if it was not a hidden place for some dunghill. So he went quite close to it, struck against it with his foot till it fell to the ground. Thus all doubt having been removed, he returned to his master and gave him the exact account. In this way the master obtained the knowledge through the intermediation of his pupils." (Alberuni's India, i, pp. 84-85).

None of the commentaries mentions that the master obtained the knowledge, as this is not the point at issue. Further with regard to the third pupil, Alberuni writes: "The third says: 'It is useless to examine what it is, for the rising of the day will reveal it. If it is something terrible it will disappear at daybreak; if it is something else, the nature of the thing will anyhow be clear to us.'" This is not what we find in any of the commentaries. According to $M$ the third pupil does not want either to doubt or to know what it is, for he feels this will serve no purpose.

Actually as seen from the text of $V_1$, there is a description of the successive states of one and the same person who passes through the condition of doubt, in-
References to the Sāṃkhya Kārikā in other works

Scholars have similarly examined the exposition of some of the kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (Anumānaṭi 105), in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā on the Tattvasaṅgraha (7, 8, 9, 10, 14) and in the Tattvabodhavidhāyini (pp. 111, 280–284) of Abhayadeva on the Sanmatitarka-prakaraṇa. Aiyaswami Sastri has come to the conclusion that these agree with the Chinese Version and so must have been based on the original of the Chinese version. Pt. Udayavīra Śāstri on the other hand holds that they tally with M, and M itself is the original of the Chinese version (See Sāṃkhya-dārśana kārttīka, pp. 464 ff). I feel that the exposition and even the wording is, in most cases, close to V₂, though not the same. The kārikās might have been explained here on the basis of V₂, though the authors have not attempted to give the original exposition verbatim. We may note one or two such references.

Explaining ‘vaiśvarūpya’ of Sāṃkhya Kārikā, 15, the Tattvabodhavidhāyini says:—

Compare—निबामां संबिधानां तस्मयम् संबिधानां। संबिधानाति संबिधानः तस्मयम् महादिव विष्णुमिष्टक्षयेन।

Thus we have seen that from some striking references we can conclude that V₂ (or a commentary very much like it)—was the source-book for Alberuni, as also for P. And so we feel like agreeing with Aiyaswami Sastri to this extent that the Chinese Version and Alberuni’s references to the Sāṃkhya doctrines have a common source; and I believe that it was V₂, though both might have made some changes to make the exposition interesting, or due to their peculiar cultural bias.

P—(i) Brahmā, master of the world (Prajāpati), god (Indra), Gandharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Yamarāja, demon.

(ii) King Brahmā, master of the world (Prajāpati), master of the devas (devānām Indraḥ), Gandharva, Asura, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Pisāca—This list is different from that in P, 44.
It can be seen that $V_9$ is closest to the exposition in the Tattvabodhavidhayinī.

But explaining the word शिष्यम् in ka. 10, the Tattvabodhavidhayinī (p. 282) says: श्य गच्छति त्रति क्रया जिद्धें च श्यम्र। तथा हि प्रत्ययार्थे मूलानि तत्मात्रेन होऽणे……। तिनं या अन्यक्षणयां गायत्रिः प्रायेकवंशादिः। न तत्स्मिन्ययादी, भावायामस्य मंत्रां सुभास्य स्यादिः। $V_9$ has simply श्य गच्छति त्रति शिष्यम्। But $V_1$ has: श्य गच्छति, तिनं परतत्वं भर्ति, तौसम्य शिष्यतिमि वा शिष्यम्। पथव महाभुटानि तन्नात्रेन श्य गच्छति……। तिनं स्यानि चावे शिष्यम्। Thus we find in $V_1$ the second explanation of शिष्यम् given in the Tattvabodhavidhayinī, though the point is not pursued and the author is more interested in the exposition of श्य गच्छति शिष्यम्।

$Y$ explains the word by जितं शाहोपशाहम् and $J$ by जितं शाहोपशाहम् शिष्यम्। अध्य श्य गच्छति शिष्यम्।

Surprisingly, the Pañjika (7) here gives only one interpretation श्य गच्छति क्रया। Abhayadeva must have been acquainted with $V_1$ also, though he generally follows $V_9$—perhaps due to the influence of the Pañjika which he usually follows. Guṇarāṇa also says only: शिष्यम् यथाशालूर्ध्वं तत्तथास्मु त्यं कर्म गच्छति शिष्यम्।—See his commentary (p. 103) on the Saddarśanasamuccaya ( Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1905).

This point, however small, is significant inasmuch as it shows that $V_1$ is later than $V_9$, but earlier than $Y$, and $J$. $V_1$ just ventured to suggest another explanation without pursuing it, while the others found this more acceptable. Nevertheless, the explanation श्य गच्छति was the traditional one.

Pt. Udayavira Śastri has drawn our attention to some very striking similarities between $P$ and $M$, which according to him show that $P$ could only have been a translation of $M$ (See ‘Śāṅkhya Darśana ka Itihaśa, pp. 467–8).

(a) $M$ has not explained अनुपपत्तिःस्थान of ka. 18; and so also $P$. This could be possible only if $P$ be a translation of $M$. (b) In ka. 11, $M$ first states that ahaṅkāra is produced out of buddhi, and so on and then states that pradhāna also produces mahaṭ (so both are prasavadharmin). $P$ has done the same, though the author could have put it properly by beginning with Prakṛti. This shows, according to Pt. Udayavira Śastri, that $P$ is beyond any doubt a translation of $M$.

In respect of (a), it can be said that it seems to be just an accident. Paramārtha, like the author of $M$ later, thought it was self-explanatory and did not specifically explain it after translating it.

With regard to (b) we can only say that this is what we find in $V_9$ and $V_1$ also and this is but natural, as the commentaries remaining faithful to the text of the karikā explain the characteristics in relation to the vyakta and then say that this is true of avyakta also.
It can be seen from the detailed comparison of the contents of M, G, V₁, V₂, and P that the Chinese version seems to be based on V₂, though Paramārtha might have had knowledge of V₁ (as he adopts certain readings of V₁). But in the face of a number of dissimilarities, and when it is found to tally more with V₂ than with V₁ or M, it is not proper to say that P was intended to be a translation of M or G. It might have been a translation of V₂ or of a commentary very much like V₂ (if it at all existed). In my view, M is a much later commentary and it seems to be an enlarged and revised version of V₁ and is clearly influenced by Vedantic ideas.

Chronological Order of the Commentaries of the Sāmkhya Kārika

The problem of the chronological order of the commentaries on the Sāmkhya kārika is a vexed one as hardly anything is known of their authors, and where the names of the authors are known it is difficult to identify them. Opinions are divided as regards the dates also of the commentaries. Now that we have two hitherto unknown commentaries, V₁ and V₂, with us, we may make a fresh attempt to determine the chronological order of these commentaries. We shall fix our attention mainly on V₁, V₂, M, G, Y, and J, as the date of T is known, and other commentaries like the Candrika of Narāyaṇa Tīrtha are very late. Instead of entering into a vague discussion we should try to base our conclusions on the original texts.

(A) A careful study of V₁ and V₂ shows that they are very much alike in respect of style and method of exposition. As said above M is obviously a revised copy of V₁. Let us now examine the texts and see what they have to tell us.

(1) Ka. 1. 0चन्नेनकालायनवतोभावाद—V₁ explains this thus: किन्निचवद नाशोर्द्धयां आयोवेदी होरी संभाषयते नासम्भाषयो नासम्भाषये। So the kārika should be read according to V₁ as चन्नेनकालायनवतोभावाद, where the answer ‘No’ to the objection raised is understood. According to the other commentaries the kārika should be construed as ोन, एकनात्यन्तरोभावाद. V₂ is very brief here and is clearly the earliest of the commentaries. The expression in the kārika is a bit peculiar and has to be explained with the use of the words एकनात्यन्तर and अस्यन्तर (or अस्यन्तरो हुःकःसिद्धि: अभाव:...See T). V₁ is the
only commentary adducing नैसर्गिकता and नात्यत्वत्त्व as the reasons. No other commentary followed it in this respect.

The following parallel expressions also need some consideration: 

The following parallel expressions also need some consideration:

The expression in M is much more compact than in the others. Vi seems to be consciously bringing in the idea of remedy for different types of ailment. Of course, this is not a very sure evidence; it can only serve to corroborate other proofs.

(2) Ka. 2. น “(n)भूपुप्पत्—This stanza is found quoted in only V1 and V9. In many other respects, in matter of style and the like, V9 and V1 are alike and do not seem to be much separated in time, though V9 seems to be the earlier of the two.

(3) Ka 4. A stanza giving the definition of अगमा is quoted in V8, V1, G and M. In V8 it is quoted as आगमा ज्ञातिवचनमाति दोषाय विदु: ; in V1 as आगमो ज्ञातिवचनमाति दोषाय विदु: ; which is obviously not proper. In G and M we find आगमो ज्ञातिवचनमाति-दोषकान्ति: hihi: . Could we say that V1 was influenced by V8 and hence this inconsistency could occur? See Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa, pp. 379-380: तथा चौकु:—

The utterances of the authors of the dharmaśāstras, viz. Manu and others. P has the same interpretation. But here the distinction of ‘lakṣya-lakṣaṇa is not maintained. G and M explain differently—ाप्ता signifies the आचार्य, भ्रमण and the like, and शर्ती signifies Veda; both these are meant by आप्तावचना. M further refers to the three kinds of लक्षणा and concludes that आप्तावचना refers to what is relevant here, viz. the view of Kapila.

Y gives different interpretations so as to comprehend the Vedas, utterances of Manu and such other आचार्याः and of all reliable persons versed in the different arts—आला चाली सृजतः—आप्तेयः—सृजितः—सृजितः: सक्षणा-सर्ववर्णितः: (Veda, and the teachings of Manu and the like and of experts).

J accepts out of these आप्तेयः—सृजतः: and justifies how आप्तावचना and आप्ताशर्ती could be the same—आप्तेयो या शुचिप्रवर्त्या शुचिप्रवर्त्या तत् आचार्यम्, वैद्योस्मुनिविष्णु: वार्ष: सर्व स्मृत-समासानवर्तयोलते: सर्वोपस्मिनादिभेदे:। T is conscious that it needs to be specifically pointed out which expression signifies the definition (सृजतः) and which the thing defined (केलज). So it says: आचार्यनमितिः सृजितःः, परिशिद्धं तृत्यम्। ताता आला युक्तिः यावत्। आला चाली सृजितः: सृजितः: सृजितः: साक्षयनीतिः भाषयति:।

J accepts this meaning, but explains भाषयति as an ekaśeṣa-samāsa conveying all this meaning and regards आप्तावचना as the name of the pramāṇa and contends that thereby the kārikā refutes the view that śabda can be included in anumāna. The author of J is not keen on including the Veda in particular under आप्तावचना, so it justifies how आप्तावचना is आप्ताशर्ती. He takes the hint from आप्तेयः.
of Y, G and M explain आनुष्ठानिक as a dvandva compound. This suggests the order V2, V1, Y, J, T. I refrain from saying anything yet regarding G and M, but M seems to be later than G.

(5) In V1 and V9 (and also P) the method adopted at some places is that of a dialogue between the pupil and the teacher. The pupil asks the teacher a question arising from the latter’s exposition. V9 uses the term अन्तर्वन्द्व, a question contained in and arising from what has been previously stated. After answering this it is said, ‘अर्थं वषयम्, we come to the point.’ V1 uses the term अन्तर्वन्द्व— the teacher asks the pupils to ask the next question (See introductory passage to का. 9). Or could this be a scribal error?

(6) का. 11—अचेतनम् is explained by सस्युल्लोकोहां बेदाश्च श्वर्येऽऽ in V1, V9 and J. G and M use the word चेतनवति instead of बेदाश्च, this being meant to explain the term अचेतनम् and a conscious improvement on बेदाश्च. Similarly, in the explanation of अश्ववाति, V1 and V9 use the term अश्ववाति, whereas the other commentaries change the grammatical construction and employ मृत्युवेतौ or मृत्युमृत्यु. And V1 and V9 use the expression निःशास्त्राय: पुनः whereas the others use the term अश्वाश्चाय.

Another point worth nothing is that here V1, P and J specifically mention that puruṣas are many and that in respect of anekatva puruṣa is like vyakta and unlike avyakta. V9 has failed to mention this point and perhaps V1 corrects it. G and M on the other hand say that puruṣa is one like avyakta. Could this be due to the Vedantic trend of their authors? Or were they carried away by the point to point similarity between avyakta and puruṣa?

(7) का. 18—V1 (—and so also M—) has given its own explanation of जन्मवत्तात्त्र and मर्यादिष्ठात्त्र (Some are born high, others low, and so forth) and then stated that others explain this as जन्मवत्तात्त्र (—when one is born, at the same time another dies, whereas if there were one puruṣa all would be born, or would die simultaneously). This latter is the explanation found in V9, P, G, J and T. The two interpretations are not substantially much different. The emphasis in one is on different creatures having their own birth (at their own time and of their own kind—high or low), as also death. The emphasis in the other is on different creatures having different contrary experiences (which cannot co-exist in one) at the same time. The idea of contrary experience is clearly brought out in Y and also somewhat in the interpretation presented after अचेरे वर्षेद्विन्ति in V1 (—and after अचेरे पुनर्वद्विन्ति वर्षेद्विन्ति in M—), though even in V9, P, G, J and T the idea is the same that if there were one puruṣa all would be born at the same time and all would die at the same time. It seems that the first interpretation given by V1 is its author’s own while the one referred to is the one handed down by tradition. V1 seems to have presented the idea in V9 so as to pointedly show the difference, as also to bring out the contrariness of the experiences of birth and death which cannot co-exist in one. Y has done so even more precisely. V9 should be prior to V1 which in its turn should be prior to Y.

(8) का. 40—अचेरविवाधित—V1 and M explain this by ‘influenced by devabhāva etc.’, V9 says: ‘The bhāvas
are explained later on, the subtle body is influenced by these. P interprets this by saying that the subtle body is influenced by the three states of being mentioned later on (i.e. in ka. 43), viz. the sāṃsiddhika, prakṛtika and vaikṛtika. Y, J and T interpret this as 'influenced by the eight, viz. dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, etc.' G's explanation is 'influenced by the bhāvas, dharma, etc. which are explained later on'. The latter explanation (found in Y, J, T, G) is more precise and this serves to indicate that V₁, V₂ and P are earlier than Y, etc. Here too V₂ is more faithful to the text of the Sāmkhya Kārīkā which uses the term bhāva for sāṃsiddhika, etc., whereas V₁ gives the details of these bhāvas (devabhāva, etc.). It may be noted that G and J use the expression अपरविज्ञातस्मि (G) or अपरज्ञात (J), 'coloured' to explain अविविशेषतः elsewhere signifies one topic, so here Mallavādins seems to have mentioned only sthiti. See विकल्पसम्बन्धलक्षण:-सिद्धा-V₁; 'वकलबाबु नूतनिगति' ही स्थिति:-सिद्धा-M. Y has स्थिति; while J after quoting the above-mentioned stanza, in the course of explanation says स्थिति:-मूलसूत्रविशेष। वकलति 'विभिन्नतिः संस्कारवृत्त' ही. The reading विशेषप्रवृत्ति: also seems to have been there (See M).

Moreover निःसर्गोऽय in this kārīkā is explained by V₂, G, J and T as conveying that the subtle body is not capable of experiencing anything in the absence of the gross body (Y is substantially the same); whereas V₁ and M explain thus: श्रव्यवेगे विचययो उपोपसत्तेजेद्विम। This only shows that V₂, G, J, T mostly constitute one line of influence, whereas V₁, and M belong to another.

(9) A stanza enumerating the ten मूलविपरेक्षणेऽय is found in V₂ (ka. 21), V₁, M (ka. 72), J (51). The author of Y seems to have composed his own stanzas on the basis of these (See Y, pp. 1–2), and T quotes these. No such stanza is found in G. We find अवकल्प (or अवकल्पयुक्त or अवकल्पयुक्त) in Y, J, T and in the commentaries on the Tattvasamāsa in the place of निःसर्गति in the stanza quoted in V₁ and V₂. The same stanza as in V₂ and V₁ is quoted from Devala in Aparāditya's commentary on the Prāyaścittādhyāya, 108 of Yajñavalkyasmṛti (See Pt. Udayavira Śāstrī's 'Sāmkhyadarsana ka Itihāsa,' pp. 399–400).

We find on the other hand अवकल्प in the list in the Dvādaśāranayacakra (p. 411) of Mallavādin (Labdhisorishwar Jain Granthamala No. 26)—प्रक्षेपणगार्तक्रमाध्यायःतःतवात्सरसद्यवर्षपरस्त्रयायात् विवेकाक्षेत्र: यावनेत्यस्यामस्यामस्य भिक्षु: शास्त्रद्योण प्रवृत्ति:। अवकल्प: 'स्थिति: श्रीरस्वातं दृष्टवृत्तिः' elsewherse signifies one topic, so here Mallavādins seems to have mentioned only sthiti. See चक्रवर्तिक: लक्षण:-सिद्धा-V₁; 'वकलबाबु नूतनिगति' ही स्थिति:-सिद्धा-M. Y has स्थिति; while J after quoting the above-mentioned stanza, in the course of explanation says स्थिति:-मूलसूत्रविशेष। वकलति 'विभिन्नतिः संस्कारवृत्त' ही. The reading विशेषप्रवृत्ति: also seems to have been there (See M).

भोगी निःसर्ग: must have been the original reading. But the अवकल्प of पुष्प though an important tenet of Sāmkhya philosophy is not included here, while निःसर्ग could be included in विवेचन also; so another reading stating अवकल्प must have come into existence, and this was readily accepted by those who were interested in the exposition of Sāmkhya philosophy. Even so, V₂, V₁ seems to be the earliest of the commentaries. Y seems to be the first to include अवकल्प; it might have itself made this innovation, which it was capable of doing.

(10) Ka. 14—V₂ says here अवकल्पस्वक्षेत्रादिनेण: अचेतनात्मको व्यक्ते

बिन्द:-This is not quite proper as प्रवृत्तम: is not included,
though $V_9$ has used the word पन्नक, $V_1$ seems to correct $V_9$ when it says श्रेयसविविकितान्य प्रस्तुतसम्पर्क: स व्रजेष श्रीसां. Similarly $V_1$ has सन्निहितेन व्यक्तम् for सन्निहितेनप्रशास्ति of $V_9$, which is not very precise.

Moreover, $V_9$, $V_1$ G and M explain तद्विपर्ययाबाद्वाद्र thus: Where threads are seen, cloth also is seen and vice versa; similar is the relation of vyakta and avyakta, there is non-existence of the contrary. The significance of श्रेयस्वा is not very clearly brought out by them; only $V_1$ and M argue वस्तुप्रभावते तदविपरिवते, तदविपरिविवे तयारात्रे तस्मात्येन, तद्विपरिविवे तस्माने, द्विपरिविवे तस्मान्ये. P has "Inseparability and the other (properties) can be established by the (three) gunas, and by the non-existence of the contrary." That is to say, if these properties did not exist in the cause (avyakta), these would not have been there even in the vyakta.

$Y$ says here rather abruptly यमादु गुणाविवेकान्ते: श्रेष्ठः। तत्र विपरीतान्य गुणाविवेकान्टे च न भवति पुरुषात्म प्रतिमाद्विवेकः। श्रवणात प्रविष्टमेव च तदमेव भवाणामिति:। $J$ explains: श्रेयसयाम्बाविवेकवेस्य-देरयाराद...Where there is absence of traigunya, there is absence of these properties also; purusa which is nirguna cannot possibly have these characteristics which are established on the strength of traigunya. $J$ and $T$ have taken the hint from $Y$. ($T$ explains विपरीतान्य च as विपरीतान्यान्यासा. According to $Y$, $J$ and $T$ विपरीतान्यान्यासा puts forth a vyatireki hetu — 'because in purusa, in the absence of avivekitva, etc. there is absence of traigunya.'

$V_9$ is brief here and lacking in precise expression. $G$ is clearly influenced by $V_9$ here and is not as clear as the others. $G$ seems to regard विपरीतान्यान्यासा and कारणप्राप्तावर्गि as two hetus establishing avyakta and also its having these properties, while श्रेयस्वा establishes avivekitva, etc. in respect of महावृक्ष. $V_1$ and $M$ admit three hetus here. So also $P$ through it does not say so.

According to $Y$ and $J$, the second line establishes these characteristics in respect of avyakta, whereas the first line proves the statement in ka. 11, by saying that vyakta is aviveki, etc. as it has the three gunas. $T$ says that the second line establishes the existence of avyakta. $T$ has tried to improve on $Y$ and $J$,—if the properties are proved due to श्रेयस्वे they are proved in respect of both vyakta and avyakta, and so in the view of $T$ the second line proves the existence of avyakta in which these properties could exist. Here $T$ has remained faithful to the actual wording of the कारिका, though as $V_9$ clearly says, the author of the कारिका perhaps only wants to say here that avyakta is established as having these properties.

This shows that $G$ was written on the lines of $V_9$; and it tried to improve on $V_9$ as much as possible. $V_1$ also, as seen above, improved on $V_9$. $J$ and $T$ were influenced by $Y$, which for the first time explained precisely the argument in this कारिका.

(11) Ka. 65—$V_1$ and $V_9$ have the reading सत्तविविकितान्य: (epithet of purusa), whereas G, J, T M, have सत्तविविकितान्य: (epithet of prakrti) (-This portion is missing in $Y$). सत्तविविकितान्य: is more in consonance with ka. 63, and seems to be a conscious change made later. Paramārtha seems to have read something like सत्तविविकितान्य, which would include even jñāna (because he wanted to avoid the term शक्ति of ka. 63, which he omitted). This also shows that $V_1$ and $V_9$ are earlier than the others.
The above discussion enables us to see that \( V_1 \) and \( V_9 \) are similar in style, \( V_9 \) being the earlier of the two. \( G \) was written on the lines of \( V_9 \) and \( M \) is a copy of \( V_1 \). \( Y \) explained the \textit{Karika} very precisely and systematically for the first time, perhaps reading much more logic in it than even the author meant. \( J \) and \( T \) were influenced by \( Y \), \( T \) being very much on the lines of \( J \).

(B) Now we may see if we can find any influence of \( V_g \) on the other commentaries as this would further help us to determine the order.

(12) The illustrations of \( \text{V} \), \( \text{V}_g \), and \( \text{V}_9 \) are very precisely and systematically for the first time, perhaps reading much more logic in it than even the author meant. \( J \) and \( T \) were influenced by \( Y \), \( T \) being very much on the lines of \( J \).

(13) Now we may see if we can find any influence of \( V_g \) on the other commentaries as this would further help us to determine the order.

(Y) has knowledge of all these illustrations that are put forth and gives its own set of illustrations, and is keen on defending these from the attacks of others: \( \text{V}_g \), \( \text{V}, \text{G}, \text{M} \) give the illustration of tasting a few drops of sea-water and inferring that sea-water is salty. (The Buddhist work \( \text{Upāya-ḥṛdaya} \) gives this very illustration). \( P \) and \( J \) give the illustration “Seeing the water of a river recently rained higher up the river.” (Compare—\( \text{V}_g \), \( \text{V}, \text{G}, \text{J} \) and \( T \), on the other hand, explain \( \text{V}_g \) \( \text{V}, \text{G}, \text{J}, \text{T} \) properly, though in their own way. \( \text{V}_g \) and \( P \) say that water from the \( \text{antarikṣa} \) becomes of a varied taste according to the respective receptacles. \( G, J \) and \( T \) are to the same effect. It is interesting to note that before giving the example in \( \text{Nyāya-ḥāṣya} \) 1.1.5 and the discussion in \( \text{Nyāya-śūtra} \) and Bhāṣya, 2.1.38–39. These clearly seem to be guided by the \( \text{Nyāya-ḥāṣya} \).

\( \text{Nyāya-ḥāṣya} \) is not found explained in \( V_1 \). \( V_9, P, G, M \) give the illustration of seeing the mangoes flower at one place and inferring that they are in flower everywhere. \( J \) gives the same illustration as in the \( \text{Nyāya-ḥāṣya} \) and other works—infusion of the movement of the Sun from change of place as in the case of Devadatta.
of water from the antarikṣa. V₂ refers to water drunk by serpents, cows and camels turning into poison, milk and urine. Y combines both these: ṣaṃyogavādāpitaḥbhāṣyaniḥ sarvakṣaṁkhaṭāḥ gopathāḥ vāyu-lāṅgāḥ vāyu-bhāṣyaniḥ pratiśāyāḥ. This is a summarised form of the explanation in V₂.

Another point worth noting is that the second line as commented upon by V₂ apparently seems to be परिशिष्ट: सतिलिपतं गृहवृत्तांगविवेकात्, while according to the others it is परिशिष्ट: विलिपतं, प्रतिप्रशिष्टाविवेकात्. V₁, P, Y and M do not show any special interest in the expression प्रतिप्रशिष्टाविवेकात्, whereas G, J and T have specifically explained it. In the explanation of this term, V₁, Y, G and M seem to understand this as गृहवृत्तांगविवेकात्—they undergo different forms according to the receptacles of the gūnas. J and T on the other hand take gūnas themselves as the āśrayas—the distinctions based on the gūnas. The authors of G, J and T seem to have noted the drawback in the earlier commentaries (V₂, V₁, Y) and specifically explained the term.

It may be noted that the kārikā text of V₂ has प्रतिप्रशिष्टाविवेकात् and not गृहवृत्तांगविवेकात्. The author of V₂ (—See also P—) might have just omitted to explain the term प्रतिप्रशिष्टाविवेकात् and not have intended गृहवृत्तांगविवेकात् as a part of the pratikā, though from the point of view of metre it is perfectly alright. Or could there have been an āryā in V₂ containing this expression, as there is a Chinese verse in P containing an expression to the same effect? Or could it be that the author of V₂ thought that the kārikā could have been simpler with गृहवृत्तांगविवेकात्?

Moreover, applying the simile विवेकात्, V₂, P, G and J explain how avyakta is modified as deva, manuṣya and tiryak, and Y and T simply speak of different modifications. V₁ mentions here the ādhyātmika (buddhi, ahaṁkāra, etc.), ādhisāvīkāra (śīta, uṣṇa, etc.) and ādhibhautika (deva, gandharva, etc.) modifications. (The last, ādhibhautika, is missing in M). V₁ tries at many places to give a different interpretation and we find Y, G, J mostly following V₂.

(14) Kārikā 27—This kārikā according to V₂ and Y is: संकेतस्य सं: तत्तचेतनष्टसंमय समासस्यात्। अन्तरख्यातिविषयं तत्तक-हस्तमित्तत्र तत्। Paramārtha's reading tallies with the first line but the second line is the same as in G, J and T (गृह-परिशिष्टाविवेकात् वाभिन्द्रियः, V₁ has वाभिन्द्रियः and M वाभिन्द्रियः). The first line in V₁, M, G, J and T is उमयासमस्यम सं: संकेतस्यमित्रियं च सारणात्। It is very interesting to note that V₂ comments very briefly on, in fact restates अन्तरख्यातिविषयं... and then after the discussion as to the kartr of the eleven organs gives an exposition of गृहपरिशिष्टाविवेकात् as explaining the origin and location of the organs. The kārikā is translated in P thus: “Manas is that which discerns. One says that the organ is of two sorts: it is modified according to the variations of the three gūnas (on the one hand) and according to external differences (on the other hand).” P explaining that the different organs receive their respective places due to the three gūnas, says: “The manas is modified according to the variations of the three gūnas and according to external differences. Among the organs there are those which apprehend objects close by, while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double, (i) to avoid danger; (ii) to protect the
body. ‘To avoid danger’ (relates to the eyes and ears, which) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. ‘To protect the body’ (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body according to these objects.”

This is not found elsewhere. It may be noted that from V2, if it is V2, both \( \text{V} \) and \( \text{V} \) can be gathered. As a matter of fact, even the line \( \text{V} \) can be derived from V2, which is unfortunately confused.

From this we can make a surmise. The author of V9 perhaps had two readings of the kārīkā before him and incorporated both of them in his exposition. Or, he had only one reading, but gave a detailed exposition regarding the क्षेत्र and निषेध of the indriyas, which did not directly follow from the kārīkā (Y does not discuss these points). The later commentators tried to improve on the kārīkā on the basis of this exposition so that all this could follow from the kārīkā and so could be relevant. This perhaps accounts for the different readings in the second line as found in others (वायुमेदिक, वायुमेदिक). The first line according to P tallies with the first line in V9, and the second with that of V1. But perhaps Paramārtha wondered how all of a sudden the second line could refer to all the organs when the context required that it should be about manas only. He tried to explain this in his own way, as seen above, and that is why an exposition corresponding to that in P is not found elsewhere. Other commentators, it is likely, changed the first line also in the light of V2 so as to avoid repetition. (Y makes a conscious effort to show that the second line explains that mind can be both a शृणुनिष्ठित and a मेयोपित because of its distinguishing characteristic, viz. निषद्विद्यालय). The first line in these is not quite satisfactory as it should mean: ‘Mind is दोभानतक-देखनयुक्त and इन्द्रिय’, but then शार्मान्ति holds somewhat loose. The author of V1 seems to have made this change in the original kārīkā.

(15) Karīkā 28—साधारणसाध्यं—The different commentaries explain the significance of मात्र here as follows:

- मात्र कारणविषेयविषेय:—V1
  - मात्रकारण: [विशेषार्थमु्]—V1
  - (Compare मात्रकारण:त्रिविषेयविषेयः:—M).
  - V1 tries to put it positively. मात्रकारण:त्रिविषेयविषेयः:—Y. Could this mean that the term मात्र is meant to exclude the particular operations of other organs? Or should it be मात्रकारण:विषेयित्रिश्यः: as in V9—to exclude the idea that the functions of all are common? G combined the interpretation of both V9 and V1 in मात्रकारण:विषेयित्रिश्यः: अविषेयविषेयः: G seems to be indebted to both V9 and V1. Anyway, V9 seems to be posterior to V9, and Y and G to both V9 and V1.

(16) Karīkā 38—V1, G and M explain शास्त्र as signifying शृणुनिष्ठित and J explains it as meaning शृणुप्रसः. V9 on the other hand says: शास्त्रः शृणुनिष्ठित: प्रसादावधावासिष्ठि:।
  - इत्यतः प्राचारः शृणु:; and Y—मात्रकारण: विषेयित्रिश्यः भूमिपति: प्रसादावधावासिष्ठि:; and T—साधारण: शृणु: प्राचारः लघुः: V9 and Y are alike here. (V9 does not say anything about शृणु and मूद.)

(17) Karīkā 70—V9 says here that Kapila imparted this knowledge to Āsuri out of compassion and not for any evil purpose (?) or any evil design (मात्रकारण:त्रिविषेयविषेयः). This must originally have been: नानानन्यां भवान्यां or नानानन्यां
It is interesting to compare \( Y \) which seems to clarify the abrupt statement, or expand the statement, in \( V_2 \). See also—प्रदर्शनासाधकसिद्धि कथा...कहिये। न तावद् परमेश्वराय: शाखाप्रदर्शनमुथ्ययं ध्यानानविशेषार्थः। न शाखार्थः किसाणार्थः मनायस्यप्रक्रिया, \( \text{।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।} \)

We have seen that \( V_2 \) is definitely prior to \( V_1 \) and \( Y \) as these seem to be influenced by \( V_2 \). By the bye, we have taken note of the indebtedness of other commentaries also to \( V_2 \).

(C) Now we may consider a few points in \( G \) in relation to \( V_2 \).

(18) कारिक 9—Explaining अद्वयसिद्धि, \( V_2 \), \( P \) and \( G \) give only the example शायनात्: तैलम्। \( V_1 \) and \( M \) give in addition the examples of कृत्तिरसमस्यार्थम्, वन्यायुदिता (वन्यायुदिता-वन्यायुदिता-\( M \)), शाखाशयां and खुदयं (only in \( M \)). (Actually these examples change the point at issue. The कारिका is regarded as existent by both the वैशेषिक and the शास्त्रयां; only the वैशेषिक does not regard the effect as potentially existent in the cause even before it is produced.) This shows \( M \)'s dependence on \( V_1 \) and the latter's desire to add a few examples to the one given by \( V_2 \). \( G \) has understood \( V_2 \) very well here. Similarly the wording in \( G \), 42 clearly shows that it is based on \( V_2 \) as \( M \) is based on \( V_1 \).

(19) कारिक 3—The expression घोषवक् एव विख्यति: in \( V_9 \), 3 is not meant to be a pratika (it is just a paraphrase) because \( V_9 \) itself says ‘\( \text{ौ} \)' बायशेनेववर्त्तायथम् and घोषवक् विख्यति: would make the अर्या defective. It is interesting to note that with घोषवक् एव विख्यति:, the अर्या would be alright. Was this some loud thinking on the part of the author of \( V_9 \) who thought that विख्यति: should preferably be used here in view of the wording of the कारिका as a whole; and when \( \text{x} \) is used in the sense of \( \text{ौ} \)? He has paraphrased यस्यकर्मः विख्या: of the कारिका, \( G \) and \( J \) specifically say that विख्या: signifies विख्यति: only. This shows that either \( G \) and \( J \) had \( V_9 \) in view or were thinking on the same lines. (\( J \) reads घोषवक्च्च विख्या: and says चाहार्यः: एव रात्रायः । विख्या: विख्यति:—\( G \)).

(20) कारिका 6—\( V_1 \), \( M \) and \( Y \) do not comment on the second line of कारिका 6. On the other hand, \( V_2 \), \( P \) and \( G \) say that we know एवम् वेषराज्या, बल्कि: उत्त: from अप्तवचना and \( J \) says we know of स्वर्गा and अपवर्गा from it. Actually, there was hardly any need to refer to अगमा in respect of the proof of साम्भ्याय principles. \( G \) and \( J \) seem to be influenced by \( V_9 \) here; only, \( J \) gives a more relevant explanation, \( V_9 \) moreover defines अप्त एव: : \( \text{ो} \) प्रस्तुतः कोष्या वा तुष्ट: वै तत्त्रातिरेष: किंतु:—the same idea as in स्वविशिष्टि:.......quoted (कारिका 4) in \( G \), \( J \) and \( M \), only not so precise and well expressed.

It may be noted that \( G \) is influenced by \( V_2 \) in the interpretation of कारिका 14. (see 'Comparison').

(21) कारिका 36—एते in this कारिका is construed as follows:

\( \text{एते हस्ति पवच्छुद्विदेशियां वच्च कमेंत्रियां वृद्धिहृद्यः} \) मन्त्र हस्ति—\( V_1 \), \( \text{एते हस्ति वृद्धिकर्माः करणेऽपि:} \) अपोदसम्—\( M \)। \( \text{एते हस्ते} \) ज्ञातिस्मिताः न्यायांसिद्धि अपोदान सामनात्तम् समोदशुद्धिः—\( Y \); \( \text{अपोदर्ववार्त्ताः} \) युक्ताद्वारो युक्तायुक्तात्मेऽपि: अपोदक गुप्तविशेषाः—\( J \)। \( T \) understands by \( एते—वृद्धिकर्माः)

G construes: यथा कर्मचारि उपास्य एते गुप्तविशेषाः: \( V_2 \) makes some comment on the use of the masculine in \( \text{एते} \). The word विख्या is always of the masculine gender, so it cannot affect the
gender of एवं०, and we should have एतांि referring to the eleven शिस्यस and आर्य. G has straightaway construed एवे with यथविशेषा. G seems to have got the suggestion from V2.

(22) Karikā 40—The explanation of पूर्णवृत्तम in V2 and G is similarly worded and shows that G used the expression of V2. See वर्ण लोको नोन्यावने तव अनोदितम सूक्ष्मसूरीकुसंगत्ये पूर्णवृत्तम—V2; यद्य लोका अनुपाल सभादितमेऽ तद्व पूर्णसूरीसुमुखनम्—G. J and T are alike here in point of expression. And J and T seem to have polished the explanation of नियमम in V2.

(D). (23) Karikā 5. तत्त्वार्थावलीपापकम—V2, V1, G and J give examples of विश्व द्वा किल्ला साथें, as also निकिल द्वा किल्ला साथें. Y does not comment on this. P just explains how inference is possible: "It implies a characteristic mark and that which bears that mark......When one perceives the mark, the proof can be established by inference". M gives only one example—स्वििन्न निर्णयविद्विशेषाविकोटिनिल्लं साथे नूनसाथे परिवर्तित वस्थे विद्यासिति. V2, V1, and M employ the terms त्रिकं and परिवार whereas G employs द्वा and यथि; and J, विशिष्ट and कोकिल.

V2 and J mention seven relations that can exist between the विश्व and the निकिल—स्वस्ताविकयम्, प्रतिक-विकाशरूप, कार्य-कारण, मात्रा-निर्मिति (पात्र-निर्मिति in J), प्रतिबन्ध, सहस्त्र (साहस्त्रे in J), निमित्त—वैभवसिक. V2 does not illustrate these while J does. It may be noted that inference on the basis of seven kinds of relations is refuted in the Nyāya—Varttika, 1.1.5 and Vācaspati commenting on this quotes the following verse:

सत्त्वात्मक-निमित्त-यथिक-सहस्त्राय विस्तारिते।

(Tatparya Tīkā, p. 165)

Vardhamāna in his Prakāsa attributes the verse to a Śāṅkhya-vārttika. We cannot say anything about this. It is surprising that Y does not comment on तंत्रविशेषि-पूर्णकम्. Or were the leaves irrecoverably lost at a very early stage? Y’s exposition could have thrown much light, especially when it is referred to as Vārttika by Vācaspati and others.

The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra too has defined anumāna as knowledge from a mark or sign (laingikam jīanam). This mark of inference is said to be of two kinds—drṣṭa (seen) or adṛṣṭa (unseen) or sāmānaya—drṣṭa (seen in general). The linga functions on the strength of certain relations in which things stand to each other. These relations are enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 9.2.1: The linga can be the (i) effect of, (ii) cause of, (iii) conjoined with, (iv) opposed to, (v) inherent in the साध्य (कर्त्तव्य कारण संयोग विशेषता समानता केति केति वर्त्तुम). (See also Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 3.1.9–13). The Buddhist and the Jaina logicians also mention some such relations by way of illustration. Praśastapāda clarifies that ultimately it is avinābhava or invariable concomitance that determines the relation of linga and sādhyā, those mentioned being merely illustrative. (Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, pp. 103–104). Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and others are of the same view and the Buddhists include all relations in causality (kārya-karaṇabhāva), identity (svabhāva) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) (See Pramāṇa-Varttika 3.30, 37, Nyāya-bindu 2.12 ff).

The Śāṅkhya commentators (esp. V2) seem to have made use of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. Anyhow this
discussion to some extent explains the mention of the relations in $V_2$ and $J$ and shows $J$'s indebtedness to $V_2$.

(E) From the above it can be seen that $V_2$ is prior to $V_1$, as also to $Y$, $G$, $J$ which are influenced by it at a number of places. I have earlier given a detailed comparative study of the commentaries (mainly $V_2$, $V_1$, $P$, $G$, $M$) and shown that if any commentary can claim to be the original of $P$ it is $V_2$. We shall consider only one or two points here.

(24) Kārika 27–$V_1$ has not made any attempt to explain how manas could be called संकल्पना. $G$, $J$ and $M$ simply draw our attention to the fact that the vṛtti of manas is of the form of samkalpa. $Y$ as usual explains this at length and so does $T$. $V_2$ and $P$ give an example of this sort of function of the mind and this we find referred to in Buddhist and Jaina works (see Tattvasamgraha–Paññika, 7; Tattvabodha–vidhayini, p. 281). As I have pointed out in the ‘Comparison,’ many parables are narrated in the same way in $V_2$ and $P$.

(25) Kā. 12—सप्तनी. Explaining this term (in the example showing how a good lady representing the sattvaguna can cause sukh, dukhka and moha), $V_2$ says: शाश्वस्त्य दिविविष्यः शाश्वस्त्यं कुलश्वस्त्यं। This is not found elsewhere. Only $P$ refers to ladies of equal position and servants. Similarly the parable of bandits and kulastrī is found only in $V_2$ and $P$.

(F) The author of $P$ seems to have knowledge of $V_1$ also and that is why $M$ (which is a copy of $V_1$) has been looked upon as the original of $P$ by scholars ($—V_1$, $V_2$ also being similar in style). We note but one such evidence in point.

(26) Kā. 20. Illustrating adhyavasāya, the commentators say as follows: ध्येय करिकाः अन्यं साक्षिकाः च: ध्येय करिकाः अन्यं च: $V_1$ (see—an करिकाः अन्यं च $M$—very funny; the $n$ must have been missing in the manuscript of $V_1$ which the author of $M$ had) or should $n$ be emended as $n$?; ध्येय करिकाः अन्यं न करिकाः $G$; practise religious duties; renounce evil or realise a vow—$P$. This gives us some idea of $V_1$'s influence on $P$ and $G$.

$Y$ also seems at some places to have been indebted to $V_1$.

(27) Kā. 13. $V_1$ has raised the question whether sattva, rajas and tamas are ज्ञात्व or not, and anticipated arguments from an opponent who would not regard them as ज्ञात्वते. Answering such an argument, $V_1$ says: मयूषेक है जीवानमेवं ज्ञात्वते। तथस्यात्रे कुमुदिके दुःखात्मके। एवं रक्षानमिति रोधे। $Y$ has explained this very well: अथ रक्षाके आकारं ज्ञात्वते। तथस्यात्रे कुमुदिके दुःखात्मके। एवं रक्षानमिति रोधे।

$V_2$ and $Y$ seem to have been indebted to a preceding treatise and illustrate their views from parables and this is not found in $V_1$.
Here Y clearly seems to be following V₁. Unfortunately the introductory remarks to ka. 13 in Y are missing. But while refuting the argument of the opponent, Y seems to be influenced by V₁.

(28) Ka. 20-21—V₁, M and Y give an exposition of शातिक संजीवन. The illustration of शातिक संजीवन given by V₁ is श्रवणयोगः, by Y श्रवणतत्त्वित्वा, and by M श्रवणयोगः. Y seems to have got the suggestion from V₁, V₁ and M do not mention जोखिमाक्षण संजीवन, while Y does (अङ्गोऽनानुद्घवः). V₁ and M do not initially refer to विषविषविषयिक संजीवन, but later while eliminating the samyogas in respect of pradhāna and puruṣa refer to it also. The author of Y seems to have noticed this inconsistency as also some lack of appropriateness in the exposition in V₁. Y’s treatment is more systematic. Y mentions चचुर्योगः as an instance of शातिकसंजीवन, whereas V₁ and M mention अन्योद्योगः (which according to Y illustrates विषविषविषयिकसंजीवन). Could the text of V₁ have originally been: शातिकसंजीवन चचुर्योगः, विषविषविषयिकसंजीवन अन्योद्योगः? The scribe might have omitted the underlined words as his eye wandered from one to the other, and the author of M must have consulted such a manuscript. Anyhow, Y is clearly posterior to V₁.

(29) Ka. 30—It is interesting to examine how this तर्क is explained in the different commentaries. All agree in respect of the first line which says that the four (sense-organ concerned, mind, ahamkāra and buddhi) operate simultaneously as also in succession. Only V₁ and M are of the view that युगपत्ति is not possible, but
Similarly, in kā. 69, V₁ and Y alone have puṇḍarīka śānam, whereas the others have puṇḍarīkaśānam, though everywhere the explanation given is 'knowledge meant for puṣṭārtha i.e. mokṣa' (puṇḍarīka śānam).

(32) There is a stanza in Y which seems to be an imitation of kā. 73 which is not found anywhere except in V₁ and M. The stanza in Y is:

अत्यमभानमनाशयर्थभवेतुष्टः
पारस्परिश्रव्यभावादेवे यथा।

Compare Sāṁkhya Kārikā, 73:

तत्सत्तव समासेऽहार्दिक्यं नाभवं परिङ्गम।
तत्न्यथ नुहं पूणम्।

This shows that V₁ is prior to Y. This has been discussed later.

Now we may examine a few points with regard to V₁ in relation to G and M.

(33) कपिलय समस्तस्य वेदाविविधां भगति भने ।
कालमय वस्मस्य सुरिविचित्तत्त्वातः

--This mangala stanza of V₁ is found in G and M, but not in V₂ and P (and of course not in Y, J and T). M has नीरिन्द्रिय विचित्त प्रतरणाय।

The author of G seems to have had this in mind when he composed the above stanza. On the other
hand the following stanza in M is based on the above stanza in G:

The author of M offers his namaskāra in the first verse, viz.

Compare Y, p. 1, stanza 2:

This shows that V₁ was the earliest of V₁, Y, G, and M was posterior to both Y and G. M being a copy of V₁, its indebtedness in other respects hardly deserves any attention.

(34) Ka.66-G seems to be acquainted with V₉ and V₁. Of all the commentaries V₉, V₁ and G alone have राज्यामिःलुप्तेः। V₉ and V₁ do not have anything to say about एक, whereas G says: एक एकैव प्रकृति: वैदिकसाहित्य प्रामाण्यमूलता न विविधता प्रतिस्थिति... thus improving on V₉ and V₁. M has accepted अन्य in the place of एक, as the explanation given by G is uncalled for here, and the text had better have अन्य to balance एक occurring earlier.

(35) Karikā 2—वैज्ञानिक व्याख्या: वैज्ञानिक व्याख्या: वैज्ञानिक—This is how we find this mantra in V₁. This mantra occurs in Rgveda VII. 66.16 and we have पञ्चेम...first. M rectifies this error in V₁.

(36) Introductory remarks on ka. 6—Here V₁ has the statement: विज्ञान सर्वरूपं व्याधिगमितम्। इत्यादिः श्रुतः तत् विज्ञानस्य प्रमाणस्य विषयानां... Compare M—तदेवं व्यञ्जनस्य व्यञ्जनस्य विज्ञानसंविविधतामाण्य केन कस्य विद्यः स्वातः। M improves on the expression in V₁ and specifically states what the threefold objects are. Only the expression विज्ञानस्य प्रमाणस्य is missing.

Both V₁ and M do not comment on तस्मादपि चासिद्धम...of ka. 6.

(37) M (ka.2) alone gives the example of loha-cumbaka to establish the existence of puruṣa. The early Sāṃkhya writers are not interested in this simile. We find the simile of loha-cumbaka in the Yoga-Bhaṣya (II. 17). M does not derive its inspiration straight from the Sāṃkhya Karikā (See ka. 17—पंचवर्त्ताधिशतच्).

(38) Introducing ka. 9, V₁ says: वैदिकसाहित्यकारण-प्रतिवेदः कर्त्तव्याः। Here V₉ has the term भावकारण-प्रतिवेदः। and M says वैदिकसाहित्यकारण-प्रतिवेदः। V₁ and G and J say that the point under discussion is whether the kārya is (potentially) existent in the kāraṇa or not; and it is established that it is existent(kart). अकर्मकारणप्रतिवेदः of V is confounding. We would expect अकर्मकारणप्रतिवेद or अकर्मकारणप्रतिवेद (in view of भावकारण, in ka. 9). V₁ says earlier: इह वैदिकसाहित्यकारणप्रतिवेदः केवल नासितस्य व्यवस्थितः। M also says: अहिवैदिकसाहित्य्य-प्रतिवेदः केवल नासितस्य व्यवस्थितः; and then वैदिकसाहित्य॥ असतः भवत्तिर्निर्माणाः;
The problem has not been put forth precisely. The point here is not whether the kāraṇa is existent or not, but whether the kārya is existent in the kāraṇa or not. It is likely that in view of the Upaniṣadic inquiries whether ‘sat’ was there in the beginning or ‘asat’, it might have become a practice to put forth philosophical problems in the same way. See śūṅgala kālaṅkānyayaśāstra; तथा हि भेदिततः: ‘अन्तः सत् जायते’…अन्तः ‘सत:’ अन्तः, जायते’ इति, ‘सत: सत् जायते’ इति रुपः……येषामिगि कण्णरङ्गक्षर्यादिरोऽतु सत् एव कारणदस्तो अन्ति तेषांमिगि सत्तप्रक्षणावरुणेऽतैं कारणिकेन कारणप्रति न तत्तते प्रवाहसिद्धः।—T. T unlike M steers clear of the difficulty and presents the conclusion precisely.

(39) In the introductory passage to kā. 13, only V₁ and M of all the commentaries anticipate an objection to the Sāṃkhya view to the effect that sattva, rajas and tamas are not जात्वतेः (—the Sāṃkhyas hold that they are जात्वतः). The prima-facie view is that any one of sattva, rajas and tamas can cause sukha, duṣkha and moha, so they need not be जात्वतेः (स भव सत्षर्यादिरोऽतु जात्वतः). Now this can be interpreted simply as urging that sattva, rajas and tamas are not numerically different, but are different aspects of one entity. Here the word जाति cannot be taken in any peculiar sense, but must be taken as signifying simply लक्षण—there is no लक्षणमेव in the gūṇas; they are not different entities. The Sāṃkhya says that they are different. Or, if importance be attached to the use of the word जाति, this would mean that they are not three different जातिः. The Sāṃkhya rejoinder would be that they are different जातिः. This would mean that there are many sattvas, constituting a स्वत्वातिः and so also with the other two. See also Dvādaśārānakya, pp. 390 ff. (कहलीण्याक्षेत्रेच्छ अर्थमोक्षसाधनात्।। स्वत्त्वातिःदास्यक्षीयेतावरुणेऽतु सत्साधितमस्बायद।। अर्थमोक्षसाधनस्वत्त्वास्तर्यादिविषेण दुःखोऽभूमियाः आक्षणसत्सायाः।।—Mallavādin does not give the illustration of woman, kṣatriya and cloud).

One Mādhava, who is referred to in Mīmāṃsā (Ślokavārttika-), Nyāya (See Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa p. 569) and Buddhist works (Vādanyāya, Karṇakagomin’s comm., and Jinendrabuddhi’s comm.) as Sāṃkhya-nāsaka or Sāṃkhya-nayaka, is credited with such a view. Could we connect this Mādhava with V₁ in some capacity or the other? This remains controversial, but one should certainly give some thought to this. We shall come to this later.

(40) Karīka 19—तत्सत्त्व विवेकमयात (विवेकमयात्—M) is not explained in V₁ and M. M mentions this as a pratīka, but does not explain it. This also shows M’s dependence on V₁.

(41) Karīka 22—At the end of the commentary on kā. 22, V₁ says that the Sāṃkhya Karīka has stated that mokṣa can be attained by the knowledge of vyakta, avyakta and jīva and points out where instruction has been given of vyakta and avyakta. V₁ does not mention here that puruṣa has been established in kā. 17. M also has this drawback. M is thus a very close copy of V₁, though the author of M has introduced a few modifications.

(42) Karīka 26—V₁ explains the term इतिहिषिः as follows: इतिहिषिःतात्त्वितर्विषिः। इति हिषिः विवेकमयात, तत्त्विः इतिहिषिःतिर्विषिः।। M says: इतिहिषिःतात्त्वितर्विषिः। इति हिषिः विवेकमयात् नात्म, तात्त्विः विवेकमयात् प्रति इतिहिषिः।
M has obviously improved on V₁. Vācaspati explains thus: इन्त्रतिपानमविक्षिप्तविविधिविवर्णे. From this we can conclude that M is a close copy of V₁ and that it was posterior to G.

(H) Now we may examine some cases which could perhaps help us to determine the chronological order of the commentaries.

(43) Karika 10—विक्रमि is explained by V₁, P, G and J (−V₂ does not explain this term) as स्म प्रत्यज्ञति हि. V₁ gives another explanation also—केनमयं विज्ञानार्थं वा विक्रमि though it does not show how this holds good in the case of vyakta. Y explains विक्रमि by तत्त्वावलीवच्छ. J gives both the explanations, विक्रमि:तेजेनान्वचक्षुः विक्रमि being the first one. T gives only this explanation—विक्रमि प्राप्तसं... The Tattvabodha-vidhayin (p. 283) on the Sanmatitarka-prakarana refers to both these explanations. कं महत्वार्थी विक्रमि seems to have been the traditional explanation and V₁ seems to be the first to give the second one. Y readily accepted this one. J gives both, but seems to attach more importance to विक्रमि:तेस्तेनान्वचक्षुः. T following J, as it almost always does, gives this one only. This seems to have appealed to commentators (−authors of Y, T) of a strictly logical bent of mind.

Moreover, the explanation of सावयया given by V₂ (सावयया) is the crudest of all. G and J (−also V₁, M−) point out that सावदाई are the avayavas and so vyakta is said to be सावयया. V₁ and M even explain the term ‘avayayā’—ब्रह्मान्तनोलोकयां: तस्य हस वर्गुपस्ते इत्ययां—सूचिकतस्मिन इत्ययं, वर्गुपस्ते: सावयया; this seems to be an improvement on V₁. V₂ further on says: निवर्गयं प्राप्तमं.

We can say with confidence that V₂ is the earliest and is followed by V₁ which tries to give a fresh interpretation at a number of places. Y accepts this at places and even improves on it. G and J are posterior to Y.

(44) Karika 18—वर्गविन्दव—V₁ does not seem to pose the philosophical problem properly. Is there one puruṣa in different bodies like the one thread running through many beads; or are there many puruṣas, one for each body, like the many moons in river, well, tank, sea, etc. (−yet earlier it is said that the one moon is seen in different places) ? This latter illustration is not a sound one as it cannot prove that the puruṣas are really many. We find this in M also though from M we gather the impression that both these alternatives represent the views of opponents who both recognise only one puruṣa, though one of them tries to explain the apparent plurality by the जलविन्दवाय. P and G do not present any simile for puruṣa—bahutva, though they do give the simile of string and beads for explaining how the puruṣa could be one. V₂ and Y do not give any illustration; they simply pose the problem and answer it (−Y mentions that the Aupaniṣadas are of the view that ātman is one, while the Naiyāyikas, Bauddhas and Jainas and others recognise its plurality). J is very precise: एक एवं सर्वस्त्रीरूपरुपस्मिनि इत्यये. सर्वं वा क्रया उपरतात्त्वयां: सावयययान, वैद्यविन्दवयान: प्रतिविरोधानं: पुरुष हि:यये। एक एवं पुरुष: पुरुषं: तत्त्वस्त्रीरूपिन्निविषेण्या: तत्त्वे। पुरुषा आविष्कृत इति बेदवत्तन्वादिनः।
V₂ seems to be the earliest and P and G should be posterior to V₁. Y generally follows V₂ and is more interested in a proper philosophical exposition than in giving illustrations. J seems to be the latest of these. The order seems to be V₂, V₁, P, Y, G, J.

It is interesting to note that P gives one more simile to explain the idea of one man in all the bodies—16000 wives of Viṣṇu enjoying at the same moment. This shows that it was not satisfied with the simile of the moon in V₁ and that Paurāṇic stories had got properly established by the time of P.

(45) Karikā 21—The parable of the blind man and the lame man is found in all the commentaries. V₂ and V₁ say that the caravan proceeded from Ujjayinī to Pātaliputra. P says it proceeded to Pātaliputra. G does not refer to any place. M says a blind man proceeded along with a caravan to Pātaliputra. V₂, V₁ and M say that the blind man was left behind and spotted on the way by a lame man. P and G on the other hand say that the blind man and the lame man were left behind by the merchants who fled from the brigands. J is like G here but very compact in expression. Each succeeding commentary seems to have dropped the unnecessary details and tried to make the narrative systematic, though M is, as seen above, just a revised different version of V₁. The order seems to be V₂, V₁, P, G, J, M. The discussion in Y is more technical as is its way of exposition.

(46) Karikā 21—तथाः: सम्मेव:—Here तथा is explained differently in the commentaries. V₂ is not very clear here. It seems to hold that mutual expectancy (सङ्गमार्प्यम्, केतस्मार्प्यम्) of pradhāna and puruṣa is referred to by तथा and seems to say that सम्म holds signifies their union as creation is the result of union. V₁ and M say that तथा refers to pradhāna and puruṣa and सम्म to production of महाद्वितीय भावसङ्क्यते भावसङ्क्यते महाद्वितीय भावसङ्क्यते भावसङ्क्यते महाद्वितीय भावसङ्क्यते। Compare—तद्यस्तहस्ततः सम्म तद्यस्तहस्ततः सम्म तद्यस्तहस्ततः।

(47) Karikā 22—In mentioning the synonyms of mahat, the difference in the commentaries is noticeable. V₂ mentions the least number—buddhi, mahat; P adds khyāti, jñāna and prajñā. G has asūrī in addition. J mentions mahan, buddhi, mati, pratyaya and upalabdhi as synonyms of buddhi—all strictly logical terms. Y mentions mahan, buddhi, dṛṣṭi, brahma, pūrṇi, khyāti, iśvara, vihara; and V₁ mentions mahan, buddhi, prajñā, mati, saṃvīti, khyāti, śaṅkṛiti, hiranyagarbha. M's list is the longest—mahan, buddhi, mati, prajñā, saṃvīti, khyāti, citi, śaṅkṛiti, asūrī, harī, hara, hiranyagarbha. V₁ is to some extent influenced by Upaniṣadic expressions and M even by Paurāṇic ones. V₂ seems clearly to be the earliest. J being Buddhist in trend gives only logical terms, even though it is not a very early commentary. P seems to have selected khyāti and prajñā out of
the list in $V_1$, jñāna being a very common term. See बुद्धकितिकान्तिनिर्वानस्तथारस-न्यायसूत्रम् l. 1. 15. $M$ seems to be the latest of these commentaries and it can be said with certainty that it was posterior to $G$.

With regard to prakṛti, $V_1$ simply says that it signifies pradhāna. $V_2$ and $P$ mention pradhāna, brahman, bahudhānaka, as synonyms of Prakṛti. $G$ adds avyakta and māyā. $Y$ does not mention any synonym of prakṛti and āhāmākara. $J$ mentions a few terms which are merely descriptive, viz. kāraṇa, guṇasāmya, tamobahula and avyakṛta besides pra'rti, pradhāna, and avyakta (—$J$ seems to be later than $G$). $M$ after saying, like $V$, that prakṛti signifies pradhāna goes on to say, like $G$, that brahman, avyakta, bahudhānaka (bahudhānaka?) and māyā are synonyms. Here also the order seems to be $V$, $V_1$, $P$, $Y$, $G$, $J$, $M$.

Similarly $V_2$, $V_1$ and $P$ mention bhūtādi, tajjas and vaikṛta (or vaikṛtaka) as synonyms of āhāmākara. $G$ adds abhimāna and $M$ even asmitā. $J$'s list is quite peculiar—अहि:कर: सुवैसिद्धिकालकरस्तवसिद्धिर्याय:।

(48) Ka 22—With regard to the production of the gross elements from the tanmātras, $V_2$, $V_1$, $P$, $Y$ and $G$ hold that śabdatanmātra produces ākāśa, spārsa-tanmātra produces vāyu and so on. $J$, $M$ and $T$ on the other hand hold that the respective tanmātras in association with the earlier mentioned tanmātras produces its effect (ākāśa, vāyu, etc) with a correspondingly increasing number of qualities. $V_1$ however, unlike $V_2$, $P$, $Y$ and $G$, mentions the number of properties in each mahābhūta. Here $M$ is found to be different from $V_1$, and $Y$, 38 has criticised a view identical with that held by the authors of $J$, $M$ and $T$. But from this alone we cannot conclude that $Y$ is posterior to any one of these. $Y$ refers to it as the view of ‘other acāryas’ When it refers to some commentator of the Sāṁkhya Kārika it mostly uses the expression अपर आदि or the like. We are reminded here of the two views regarding the nature of the tanmātras, that are referred to in $Y$ (p.108)—एक-मययति ताम्यात्मानीस्थवमे अनललराधातिः वार्षिकम्—Others hold that every tanmātra has only one property (śabdā-tanmātra has only sound, spārsa-tanmātra has only touch and so on). But Vāraśaganya is of the view that śabdatanmātra has only sound, but spārsa-tanmātra has besides touch the property of the previous tanmātra also, that is to say, it has both sound and touch. Similarly rūpa-tanmātra has sound, touch and colour, rasa-tanmātra has sound, touch, colour and taste; and gandha-tanmātra has sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

This view is also accepted by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya who in II. 19 expressly states that the five subtle elements of sound and the like are endowed with one, two, three, four, and five properties respectively (एकौकितिकालकरस्तवसिद्धिर्याय: शब्दातः). $Y$, 38, perhaps in the light of both $V_1$ and the Yoga-bhāṣya, says : स्ववैसिद्धिकालकरस्तवसिद्धिर्याय: स्वसंस्कृतः स्ववैसिद्धिकालकरस्तवसिद्धिरिपुणो वायुः..... Those who hold that the mahābhūtas are produced from one tanmātra each would necessarily have to accept the tanmātras also as having one, two, three, four, and five qualities, as the effect could inherit only the qualities of the cause. This should be the view acceptable to $V_2$, $V_1$, $Y$ and $G$, though only $Y$ specifically says so. But those who hold that a tanmātra can have only one property would necessarily have to admit that a tanmātra is associated with the earlier tanmātras in the pro-
duction of the respective gross elements (—this should be acceptable to J, T and M).

The Yoga-bhāṣya seems to be posterior to V₁ for while V₁ does not follow the Yoga-sūtra and bhāṣya in respect of the yama and the niyamas, some expressions are found to be similar in V₁ and the Yoga-bhāṣya. J seems to the first among the Śāmkhya commentators to have preferred the view regarding the origin of the mahābhūtas from the tānmatras, which was rejected by Y and the earlier commentators T and M followed J.

(49) Ka. 23—In the enumeration of the yamas and the niyamas, V₂, V₁, P and Y do not follow the Yoga-sūtra, whereas G, J and M do. Of the yamas, ahīṃsa, satya, asteya, and brahmācarya are common to all. The fifth yama is avyavahāra according to V₂ and V₁, akalkata according to Y and aparigraha according to G, J and M which follow the Yoga-sūtra II. 30. Surprisingly M explains aparigraha exactly as V₁ explains avyavahāra. The Yoga-Bhāṣya explains aparigraha on the lines of the exposition of vairāgya:in V₁ (विषयायामपैराग्यव्यासितगृहिनीधर्मशक्तिकथादिपी:—Yoga-bhāṣya II. 30).

V₂, V₁, P and Y mention the niyamas as akrodha, guru-sūtrīṇa, sauca, āhāra-lāghava and apramāda, whereas G, J and M quote the Yoga-sūtra, II. 32—शौचनिषिद्धकविश्वासकृत्यव्यासितमा:॥ The former list is more in accordance with the Śāmkhya theory and practice as śiva-prajñāna and śvānya (of Veda) have hardly any significance in the Śāmkhya. M though it mentions santoṣa, uses the term ‘āhārā-āghava’ to define it and explains it in almost the same way as V₁. The Yoga-bhāṣya explains santoṣa thus: सन्तोष: सचिवहितस्यात्मार्थविकाश्या-सुप्राप्तिस्यa. The Yoga-bhāṣya explains śiva-prajñāna thus: तत्त्वज्ञानविद्वै: तत्त्वज्ञानविद्वै: M follows it. This explanation of śiva-prajñāna is surprising unless śiva be regarded as the परम-पुनः. Could युक्तादिक्षेत्र of V₁ have influenced this interpretation?

Bāhya-jñāna signifies, according to V₂, V₁ and M, the arts, music, etc. also besides grammar, etc. According to P it signifies the six Vedāṅgas. G says that Vedas, Vedāṅgas, Nyāya, Purāṇa, Mimāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra are meant by bāhya-jñāna. According to Y, bāhya-jñāna refers to knowledge attained by perception, inference and verbal testimony. J and T do not make this distinction between bāhya and abhyantara jñāna. According to them, knowledge of the difference between the guṇas and the puruṣa is jñāna; as J says, all else is ajñāna. V₁ also says while explaining ajñāna that too much attachment to, or obsession for, grammar, etc. without a knowledge of the nature of, prakṛti and puruṣa is ajñāna. Here also the chronological order seems to be V₂, V₁, P, Y, G, J, M. The author of G seems to be one directly involved in the Brahmanical tradition and is even the type of Vedāntin who does not hesitate to say that the Vedas, etc. also are just bāhya-jñāna.

(50) Ka. 56—The first line is read differently in the commentators.

See यद्येव प्रकटितस्यत्: (प्रकटिताः:) अर्थैतिः वैति: प्राप्तस्य: । —V₁;
यद्येव प्रकटितस्य: अर्थैती: तत्प्रायुक्तमाहायः—Y; यद्येव प्रकटिकां महाविद्या-
विशेषभूतवैश्चेत:—G; यद्येव प्रकटिकां महाविद्विवेशभूतवैश्चेत:—J (also T);
Do not mention in the prati\(\text{ka}\); "These are the functions of Nature (explained) from the Intellect up to the five gross elements."—P. Unfortunately \(V_9\) is missing here. \(V_1\) reads परावर्तितम्, while the others read परावर्तम्. Could there have been successive attempts to improve on the wording of the \(k\text{\text{\'}}r\text{\text{\'}}k\text{\text{\'}}k\) \(?\) One cannot be sure. Here \(V_1\) stands by itself.

The order seems to be \(V_2, V_1, Y, G, J, T\). It is difficult to say anything positively about \(M\) and even \(J\), perhaps even \(T\). The order should be \(V_2, V_1, Y, G, J, T\). Similarly, explaining that vyakta is असृत, while avyakta is not so, \(V_9\) says सृतम् प्रकाशकारणम् (because of its not having a cause'). \(V_1\) (so also \(M\)), always fond of something novel, justifies their mention here and tries to account for even the जी\(\text{\'}\)प\(\text{\'}\)प\(\text{\'}\)का भुत. \(Y\) clarifies that only a \(k\text{\text{\'}}\)र\(\text{\text{\'}}\)का भुत could be meant here and says that भुत means काराणा. 

Moreover, \(V_9\) explains वाक्यम् by वाक्यादिशष्टिम् which sounds very abrupt. \(G\) and \(J\) seem to rectify this. See असृतम्: वाक्यादिशष्टिम् तैः सह—\(G\); शब्दावस्था उपयोगे। \(T\) says the भूतम् तैः असृतम् तैः असृतम्. On the other hand अवस्था-
The text of kā. 26 in V₉ seems to be the earliest and the traditional one as it is followed by G, J, T and no special order seems to have been consciously followed. Generally, the order that should be accepted could be और, ऋषभ, चान्द्र, रसन and प्राण in consonance with the order of their objects—वायु, र्न, र्ष्य, र्ष्य and गन्ध in the order of their evolution. Or it should be चान्द्र etc. and चान्द्र etc.

Pradhāna, unlike vyakta, is निरर्वषय. See the different explanations: निरर्वषय प्रधान्य प्रधान्य-निरर्वषय: n हि शब्रादिः अद्वैत तत्त्वावलयय न हि सवर्वर्वसंहितायाम्: प्राणे संर्वति. See also निरर्वषयसङ्केतात्—M.

(53) The text of kārikās 26 and 28 as accepted in the different commentaries may prove of some help in determining their chronological order. In V₂ and G the sense organs are mentioned in the kārikā text (26) in the order चान्द्र, ऋषभ, प्राण, रसन and शलोक; in V₁, P and M in the order ऋषभ, चान्द्र, रसन, and शलोक; in Y in the order ऋषभ, चान्द्र, रसन and शलोक; and in J and T in the order ऋषभ, रसन, and शलोक (--the same as in V₂ and G). J discusses these in the order: चान्द्र, ऋषभ, चान्द्र, रसन and शलोक and comments: शब्रादिः शब्रादिः कमस्तु ऋषभ-निरर्वषय–निरर्वषय.

On the other hand, in the mention of the sense-objects in kā. 28 we have the expression शब्रादिः (in V₂, V₁, P, Y, G, M); but the author of Y has criticised this and recommended शब्रादिः—when the senses were referred to, the śrotrendriya was referred to first and there is no reason for violating this order while mentioning their objects. Hence we should read शब्रादिः, the reading शब्रादिः being a careless one. J and T seem to have readily accepted this suggestion.
spopajnavrjil of Isvarakršna on the Sāṁkhya Karika. Of course, this is slippery ground to tread upon. But its scrappy nature at some places, and careful examination of the text at others, its having influenced Y, G and even V, and been the basis of P—all go to support this. See in this connection: “But the researches of Takakusu have definitely established the fact that this commentary [Chinese commentary] differs too greatly from that of Gaudapāda to have been derived from it, and that both it and the commentary of Gaudapāda must go back ultimately to a common source. This conclusion is incidentally confirmed by the evidence of the very full account of the Karika given by Alberuni (1030 A·D.) who actually mentions a Gauda as authority. His statements, however, cannot be derived entirely from the work of Gaudapāda, and it is clear that he used two different authorities. Who the author of this older commentary was is uncertain: there is a Chinese tradition that it was Vasubandhu himself, but this suggestion is supported by no evidence, and can be easily explained as a misunderstanding of the fact that Vasubandhu wrote a work to refute the Karika. There is therefore plausibility in the suggestion [See Takakusu, “Bulletin de l’Ecole Francaise de’Extreme Orient, xi, p. 58] that the author was Isvarakršna himself, especially as the nature of the Karika is such as urgently to require an interpretation”—The Sāṁkhya System, pp. 85–86—A. B. Keith (Y. M. C. A. Publishing House, Calcutta, 1949). Most of the writers of that period have written svopajña commentaries (e.g. Vasubandhu, Dīnāga, Mallavādin) so this seems to be quite acceptable.

We have seen above that V, too was prior to P, and this explains why P seems to be based on M at places (due to M being based on V, which is prior to P)—and Gaudapāda’s Bhāṣya at others (due to G being influenced by V, which is the base of P). E.g. Ka. 72 which is translated in P seems to have been taken from V, (it is not found in V, and is said to have come from a wise man). I have discussed this elsewhere. We have also seen that the author of V, has at places introduced a discussion that is not found elsewhere (e.g. of sattva, rajas, tamas being jātyantara), or given a slightly different (e.g. ka. 18) or an additional interpretation (e.g. of linga, indriya) or tried to change the karika text (e.g. ka. 26, ka. 27, ka. 56 etc.) and has been followed mainly by M; its interpretations have been noted mainly by the author of Y and adopted by some Jaina writers. Now, the portion of the leaf bearing the author’s name is broken, and a fragment of what looks like or is preserved. A letter (or two) seems to be missing and then we have s (genitive singular affix).

A Sāṁkhya thinker is referred to in Buddhist, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya works as Sāṁkhya-Nāśaka or Sāṁkhya-Nāyaka. This means that he was either an ‘unfaithful exponent’ of Sāṁkhya doctrines to which much harm must have been done by his views, or he was a great Sāṁkhya exponent.¹

¹ Dr Raghavan has written an article on ‘Sāṁkhya-Nāśaka Mādhava’. This article is published in Sarupa Bhārati (1954). See also ‘Sāṁkhya darśana kā Itihāsa,’ pp. 533–6—Udayavira Šastri. I am indebted to these contributions already published.
We may note some such references to Mādhava:

(a) In the first chapter of the Pramanāsamuccaya (with its auto-commentary), Diinnāga criticises the views of a certain Sāṃkhya teacher who was known as the destroyer of the Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya-vaināsika) because of his holding a theory that went beyond the limit of the older Sāṃkhyas. Jinendrabuddhi commenting on this portion quotes lengthy passages from a treatise by Mādhava.

In order to find out in what respect Mādhava violated the Sāṃkhya tenets it is necessary to examine Diinnāga’s arguments in this connection.

Diinnāga objects to the Sāṃkhya’s recognising five sense-organs for apprehending sounds, tangible objects, colours, tastes and odours and at the same time holding that every thing is constituted of three guṇas. If, as the Sāṃkhya says, a sense does not take for its object those things that are to be apprehended by another sense, and so each sense works only on its object, then the senses should be infinite, or just one sense-organ should suffice as the three guṇas are the same everywhere.

The Sāṃkhya tries to justify the distinctions between sounds and other objects (tangibles etc.) on the basis of the difference of the configuration of sattva and other guṇas. A lengthy argument follows, the main stand of the Sāṃkhya being that there is apprehension by the sense, e.g. the visual sense of one and the same class (jāti) of objects, e.g. colour, variously, in accordance with the difference among the many configurations (of different colours, such as blue, yellow, etc.).

Diinnāga would say that in that case, the conformity of a sense to only one configuration is not experienced. If the Sāṃkhya still urges that the classes of objects are distinguished from each other according to difference of configuration, there would follow the absurd conclusion mentioned before that the senses should be infinite in number.

It is at this stage that Diinnāga refers to a Sāṃkhya Vaināsika, whom Jinendrabuddhi identifies as Mādhava. Mādhava holds that from the three guṇas composing sound (śabda), the three guṇas composing tangibles and other objects are different in kind (jāti). It is unreasonable that there should be apprehension by different senses of that which by reason of the uniformity of its cause is uniform. Thus, we should admit that among the objects of the senses there is a difference in kind among the three component guṇas which are of the nature of sukha, etc.. It is because of this difference that each sense functions only on its own objects.

Diinnāga says that in this theory also there is implied the absurdity that the senses are infinite in number, and so this theory is not different from the standard Sāṃkhya theory so far as the apprehension of the varieties within the class of objects peculiar to each sense is concerned. Yet Diinnāga admits that Mādhava’s theory, though not faultless, is better than that of the older Sāṃkhya teachers in explaining the distinctions among the classes of objects. In order to bring out the drawback in Mādhava’s theory, Diinnāga reproduces it precisely,—of course, as he understood it.
In Mādhava's view, says Diṃnāga, the atoms differ everywhere (i.e. in different classes of effects, each possessing its respective nature). They are called pradhānas. Sukha, duḥkha and moha, likewise sound, tangibles and other such objects are distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of class (jāti-viśeṣa). The atoms which when combined turn into all of these are called pradhānas (primordial entities). Thus according to combinations which vary from class to class there are different effects, each possessing its own nature but not going beyond the boundary of a particular class and these effects become the objects of the senses.

Here Jinendrabuddhi quotes a passage from a treatise of Mādhava. The gist of it is as follows: Every atom is composed of three guṇas, but some atoms differ qualitatively from other atoms because of the difference of the arrangement of the three guṇas. Thus the sound-atom and the tangible-atom are heterogeneous, and the difference between sounds and tangibles is due to this heterogeneity of atoms. At the time of evolution homogeneous atoms combine and their varying combinations give rise to various things—which, however, are included in the same class inasmuch as the component atoms are homogeneous. Prior to evolution atoms exist dispersedly, and in this state they are called pradhānas.

It may be noted that the Sāmkhya theory of evolution (pariṇāma) from a primordial matter is substantially changed by Mādhava, who in admitting the plurality of primordial matters, stands closer to the Vaiśeṣikas than to the orthodox Sāmkhyas. From another passage quoted by Jinendrabuddhi from Mādhava’s treatise we know that Mādhava differs from older Sāmkhya teachers in holding that pradhāna possesses rūpa, etc., consists of parts and evolves by karman, and that samsāra is beginningless.

Mādhava further states that one sound-atom, for example, is in itself constituted of the three guṇas, and therefore has three characters, sukha, duḥkha and moha. Sound being composed of sound-atoms has these three characters, still each particular sound is characterised as sukha, duḥkha or moha, according to whether sattva, rajas or tamas predominates. And so one apprehends a sound as sukha, duḥkha or moha, but not as sound in general possessing three characters.

Diṃnāga argues that the same principle would hold for tangibles and other such objects. That is to say, one would apprehend these objects as sukha, duḥkha or moha, not as tangibles, etc. possessing the three characters. Consequently all kinds of objects would be apprehended by the same sense. Therefore, this theory of Mādhava is inappropriate. Still, says Diṃnāga, from its dethroning the view of the renowned older Sāmkhya, Mādhava’s doctrine of the possession by atoms of each its own nature is excellent. Diṃnāga concedes that the portion of his theory, in which setting aside the view of the renowned older Sāmkhya teachers, Mādhava explains that the distinction (jāti-viśeṣa) among the effects (i.e. sounds, tangibles etc.) results from the distinction among atoms possessing their respective natures, is excellent. However, the doctrine that the three guṇas form an atom which possesses only one quality is something Diṃnāga cannot accept.
It seems that finding it difficult to explain the evolution from Prakṛti as admitted by the older Sāṁkhya teachers (i.e. one, undifferentiated, and so on), some revolutionaries among the Sāṁkhya felt it necessary to modify the doctrine. The atom-theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is acknowledged to have been introduced into the Sāṁkhya system of thought at the time of Vindhyavāsin, and in his wake Mādhava tried to make the system perfect by removing glaring anomalies. Jinendrabuddhi very pointedly says that according to Kapila and others, the nature of pleasure, etc. is one everywhere, whereas according to Mādhava, they are different everywhere:

“Kapilādayo manyante sūkhādinnām svarūpām sarvatra ekam eveti; Mādhavas tu sarvatra tāni bhūtāni iti”—Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pratyakṣa, 31 (Mysore Edition—H. R. Iyengar).

This can be clearly understood on the strength of the fore-going discussion. Mādhava recognised a plurality of atomic primordial entities (pradhānas)—this would mean a thorough change in the concept of the Sāṁkhya system, or even its annihilation, and so Mādhava is regarded as Sāṁkhya-nāśaka, and hailed as such by others.

(b) Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika (Codana sūtra, 249, pp. 112–113, Madras Univ.) criticises the view of a teacher who finds fault with the Māmāṁsakas for advocating the slaughter of animals for sacrificial purposes. Umbeka in his commentary on the Ślokavārttika states that it is Mādhava, a prominent Sāṁkhya exponent who is referred to and criticised by Kumārila. Keeping aside inference, etc. Mādhava proved the sinfulness of agnīṣoṣṣomya, etc. only on the strength of the dependence of dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) on injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (niṣedha). ‘Mā himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni’ prohibits the slaughter of animals, which is therefore sinful irrespective of whether it is done for a sacrifice or otherwise as this does not make any difference.

(Sāṁkhya-nāyaka—Mādhavas tv āha—Vibhayānu-māṇādād vidhi-pratiṣedhatva-nibandhanatvam eva dharma-dharmayor avalambyaśagnīṣoṣṣomādyādīv adharme tām āha kvacid iti ślokātreyena.....)

(c) Commenting on ‘āgamabhramisakāriṇām aho-puruṣikayā...anyathā rācaṇaśambhavāt’ of Dharmaikrīti’s Pramāṇavārttika (p. 595), Kāṇakagomin says that here Dharmaikrīti affirms the possibility of the sacred texts being violated and the tradition of the texts disrupted or distorted by persons on account of their sense of ego or the like. They can distort the tradition of the sacred texts by composing differently. As for example, ‘Sāṁkhya-nāyaka Mādhava’ composed the ‘Sāṁkhya-siddhānta’ differently due to his ego. (Āgambhrāmśa-kāriṇām ity-adina Sampadāya-vicchedena rācaṇāntara-sambhavam eṣa samarhayate; āgambhrāmśa-kāriṇām puṁsām anyathā pūrvaracanā—vaiparītāya rācaṇādarṣaṇād iti sambandhab; anyathā—rācaṇāyām karāṇam āha—aho-puruṣikayādyā; ahpurusikayetvā; ahpurusikayetvām ahammanitvena; yathā

* This exposition of Diṅnāga’s criticism of Mādhava’s views is wholly based on ‘Dignāga, on Perception’ (pp. 57-59, 155-157)–Masaki Hattori. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to this work.

See also ‘Geschichte der indischen Philosophie’, I, pp. 404–408 (Reihe Wort und Antwort Bd. 6, Salzburg, 1953 (I. Bd.), 1956 (II. Bd.).
In his commentary, Vipaṇcitārtha on Dharmakīrti’s Vādaṇyāya, Śaṅtarakṣita writes; “yad aha, dharmaśya dravyād arthāntaraṃ syād iti; athāpy asmada-vai-phalye syāt purvakān Kapilān atityāyā Sāmkhyānāṃ śaka-Madhavavat” (Vipaṇcitārtha, p. 52, Mahābodhi-sāhā, Benares, 1936 A.C.) ‘Sāmkhyānāṃ Śaka-Madhavavat’ obviously requires to be emended as ‘Sāmkhyānasaka-Madhavavat.’ Here Śaṅtarakṣita is referring to Madhava’s unfaithfulness to the Sāmkhya tradition.

Refuting Satkāryavāda, Bhāsarvajña says in his auto-commentary Bhūṣana on the Nyāyāsāra that if the view of Madhava were to be accepted, the Sāmkhya doctrine would surely meet with destruction. If a novel attribute, ‘manifestation’ or some other, which was non-existent be created the reasons put forth, viz. ‘because what is non-existent cannot be produced’, and the like, would be ineffectual reasons, and then satkāryavāda not being proved, vaisvāryāpya etc. would not be proved, and so Pradhāna, etc. could not be established. There is no reason for according this differential treatment of holding in the case of the effect, cloth or the like, that it could not be brought about if it were not-existent, and it could not perish if it were existent, and at the same time accepting that this is possible in the case of one of its attributes (viz. manifestation). (Madhava-mata-bhyupapame tu Sāmkhya-nāśa eva syāt; katham? yadi hy abhivyaktir anyo va kaścid dharmo’asanveva kriyate tato’ sadakaraṇaḥ ity evam adayo’amarthā hetavaḥ syastataḥ satkāryatvasiddhau vaisvāryāpyādyasiddheḥ pradhānādyasiddhir iti; na ca’tra viśeṣaḥ kaścid asti yena paṭādikāryasyaivaśataḥ karaṇam sataś cātmānām na sambhavati, taddharmasya tu kasyacit sambhavat eveti—Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p. 569. Benares, 1968).

According to this, Mādhava had no objection to abhivyakti (manifestation) being regarded as a new attribute brought about by the act of production, but being a Sāmkhya he would not accept that the effect was not there in the cause even before its production. But by this the case of satkāryavāda is actually marred according to Bhāsarvajña. We find a reference to a ‘Sāmkhya doctor’ Mādhava in the description of the travels of Yuan Chwang in India. Mādhava is said to have lived in Magadha in the vicinity of Gaya. He was very much honoured by all and had received vast stretches of land by way of gift. He was challenged by the Buddhist Guṇamati Bodhisattva for a debate and is said to have died on that very occasion. This debate was arranged by the then ruling king at the instance of Guṇamati. According to Yuan Chwang, Mādhava was defeated in this debate and the king being impressed by the Buddhist’s learning got a Saṅghārāma constructed at the place where the Sastrārtha took place. Now Guṇamati of Valabhi is said to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, a contemporary of Sthira-mati, and teacher of Paramārtha. Paramārtha, a native of Ujjayinī was a disciple of Guṇamati. Paramārtha became proficient in all branches of learning and probably settled down in Pāṭaliputra. At the request of the Chinese emperor, he was sent to China in 546 A.D., where he stayed till his death in 569 A.D. Paramārtha translated into Chinese the Sāmkhya Kārikā with a commentary in the period 557–567 A.D. Thus since
Paramārtha's date is 499–569 A.D., Guṇamati could be said to have lived in the period 450–530 A.D. and Mādhava was perhaps his senior contemporary. Mādhava can be said to have lived in the fifth century, and been active in the latter half of it. Guṇamati is known to have written a commentary on the Abhidharmakośa,* wherein he refuted the dualistic teaching of the Sāṅkhya school as also the Mādhyamika view of Bhavya (Bhāva-viveka). There was a constant struggle for royal patronage in the times of the Guptas, right up to the times of Pūru Gupta and Narasimha Gupta (–467 A.D. and later) and it is understandable that Guṇamati should have challenged Mādhava to a debate.

That Mādhava's ego was powerful can be seen from Yuan Chwang's account also. His last wish was that his wife should continue the debate with Guṇamati; and she too concealed by her dress and the like the death of her husband, but the sharp Guṇamati detected it from her sad face and bitterness of speech even at the beginning. In Mādhava's own days his fame was great and surpassed that of former teachers, and outweighed all then living. "The king honoured him exceedingly and named him the 'treasure of the country'. He had as his means of subsistence two towns in the district and the surrounding houses paid him for the privilege of building (tenant dues? )."

It is no wonder that philosophers of other schools mention him with almost a sense of awe, and that Guṇamati should have sought to arrange a debate with him so that the interests of Buddhism in the kingdom should not in any way suffer and the Sāṅkhya school should fall from the high position it occupied in the eyes of the kings and learned circles.x

As said above, the author of $V_1$ has a fancy for something good and novel and I have a feeling that Mādhava was the author of this commentary, and that what is known as Māṭharavṛtti is but a revised and enlarged version of it with a Vedantic tinge. We have seen above for what things in particular teachers of other schools remembered Mādhava. We may see if these could be detected in this vṛtti.

(a) $V_1$ criticises more than any other commentary (except $M$ which is a copy of it--) vedic rites and ethical recommendations based on them, in its exposition of ka. 2.

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(b) The author of $V_1$ seems to have made a number of changes in the kārīka text in an attempt to improve on the original wording of the kārīkas concerned. A glance at the table * of the different readings of certain kārīkas, that can be detected in the several commentaries, enables one to see for oneself that the pioneer in this respect was the author of $V_1$, and that others (notably the author of the Yuktidīpikā, and also Gauḍapāda and the author of the Jayamangala ) attempted to improve even on the text in $V_1$.

Moreover kārīkas 72 and 73 (the latter being found only in $V_1$ and $M$) seem to be the composition of the author of $V_1$, as Paramārtha quotes kā. 72 saying it is a verse composed by an ‘intelligent man of this (school)’. The Yuktidīpikā also seems to quote it and in the Jayamangala and the Tattvakaumudī we find the kārīkā included in the original text. The Yuktidīpikā (p. 2, v. 14) has a verse which is clearly an imitation of kā. 73:

"alpgrantham analpārtham sarvais tantragunāir yutam; pāramarṣasya tantrasya bimbam ādarṣagam yathā".

As said above, the author of $V_1$ interprets kā. 18 (janma-maraṇa....) in his own way, and then refers to the traditional interpretation. He gives a two-fold interpretation of ‘lingam’ in kā. 10, ‘līnam arthaṃ lingayatīḥ va lingam’ being found for the first time in $V_1$; it was readily accepted by the later commentators (See Y, J). Similarly ‘hetu’ in kā. 10 is explained as both kārīka (causal) and jñāpaka (cognitive) and the author of the Yuktidīpikā makes a special effort to show that it is not jñāpaka here. In $V_1$, on kā.2 the author quotes the verse:

"Pāncavimśati-tattvajño yatra yatraśrame rataḥ, prakṛtijño vikārajñāḥ sarvair dubkhair vimucyate", in which the second line is different from the one ordinarily found, viz.

'jāti munḍī sīkhi vāpi mucyate na'atra saṃśayā'

It is not in vain that Karṇakagomin holds that Dharmakīrti is referring to ‘Sāṃkhya–Nāśaka Mādhava’, when he says that some out of a sense of ego make alterations in the traditional text handed down uninterruptedly till then.

(c) Jinendrabuddhi says that in the view of Kapila and others, pleasure etc. are everywhere one and the same, while in the view of Mādhava they are different everywhere. Now, in the introductory passage to kā. 12, only $V_1$ and following it $M$ anticipate an objection to the effect that sattva, rajas and tamas are not ‘jātyantarās’ (–na khalu sattvarajastamāṃsi jātyantarāṇi ) (–while the Sāṃkhya holds that they are ‘jātyantarās’). Now, this can be interpreted simply as urging that sattva, rajas and tamas are not numerically different, but are different aspects of one entity. Here the word ‘jāti’ cannot be taken in any peculiar sense, but must be taken as signifying simply ‘svarūpa’–there is no svārūpabhedā in the guṇas, they are not different entities. The Sāṃkhya says that they are different. Or, if importance be attached to the use of the word ‘jāti’, this would mean: they are not three different jātis. The Sāṃkhya rejoinder would be that they are different jātis. This would mean that there are many sattvas constituting a jāti, and so also with the other two. Could Jinendrabuddhi be referring to this?
According to Śaṅtarakṣita also, Mādhava is a specimen of an 'unfaithful exponent' who violates the tenets of his school and this can, to some extent, be explained by what we have seen above.

In $V_1$ we do not find anything specific which could explain Bhāsarvajña's criticism that Mādhava recognised abhivyakti (manifestation) as a new attribute brought about by the act of production, though he would not accept that the effect was not there in the cause before its production.

I would also like to draw attention to an unwarranted reference to a 'kliṭabaraja' in $V_1$ 33: 'yathā bhaviṣyanti guṇasyante guḍakathāḥ ya[tha] vā asaṭakliṭabarāja bhaviṣyati' or 'yathā...ya[tha] vā sasaktā[kliṭabarāja] bhaviṣyati' or 'bhaviṣyati guṇasyante guḍakāṣāyavāsa[kliṭakliṭabarāja] bhaviṣyati' (The expression in the manuscript is 'yathā bhaviṣyanti guṇasyante guḍakathāḥ ya vā sasaktāliṭabarāja bhaviṣyanti', which clearly requires to be emended). We have seen above that Mādhava had to enter into a debate with Guṇamati, pupil of Vasubandhu and preceptor of Paramārtha (499–569 A.D.). This Mādhava must have lived in the latter part of the fifth century and been a senior contemporary of Guṇamati.* He died while the discussion was in progress and the ruling king got a Saṅgharāma built to commemorate Guṇamati's victory over Mādhava.

Could the author be referring here to Narasimha Gupta (Balāditya), who must have been a crown-prince then and shown some leaning towards Buddhism or had a soft corner for the Buddhists for which he is indirectly criticised here. We know that it was moreover in Narasimha Gupta's time that the Gupta empire started tottering and had to face a Huṇa invasion. This lends some weight to our conjecture that Mādhava was the author of $V_1$. Yet there can be no denying the fact that this is just a conjecture meant to provoke further thought and inquiry. It may again be mentioned that what we know as Māṭhara-vr̥tti(M) is only a revised and enlarged version of $V_1$ and contains quotations from the Upaniṣads, Gītā, Purāṇas, Hastāmalakastotra and the like and is perhaps as late as 1,000 A.D.

It may seem a bit surprising that a mere commentator should have attracted the attention of great philosophers like Kumārila, Dharmakirti, Śaṅtarakṣita, Bhāsarvajña and the like, But if Māṭhara, also regarded as a commentator on the Saṁkhya-kārikā, could be mentioned, there is no reason why Mādhava also should not be so mentioned. We cannot definitely say what he did to deserve the appellation 'Saṁkhya-Nāśaka'. The author of $V_1$ differs in certain respects from other commentators, and the author of Yuktidīpikā and even Paramārtha seems to respect his views and readings and take note of them, or even incorporate them. Mādhava must have been a great teacher in his days as can be seen from Hiouen Thsang's description also. Perhaps his greatness cannot be judged from just his commentary ($V_1$), if I am right in ascribing it to him. He must have haunted the minds of his rivals notably the Buddhists especially when he is known to have carried on for
six days the debate with Guṇamati and ultimately died on the occasion.

Mādhava must have written some independent work also as can be seen from Jīnendrabuddhi’s quotations. Perhaps his commentary on the Saṃkhya-kārikā was one of his early ventures as we do not find here much evidence of his revolutionary spirit, except that he has tried to improve on the text of the kārikās at places—a fact referred to by Dharmakīrti and Karnakagomin.

Another question that occurs is in what way Mādhava could be connected with Māṭhara, and by whom what is known as the Māṭhara-vṛttī could have been written in the form of a revised and enlarged version of V₁. Could Mādhava himself have been known as Māṭhara or Māṭhara because he had a māṭha (cloister)? He is described by Hiouen-Thsang as having lived in a mountain.

We may make a passing remark regarding the religious atmosphere in the Gupta period. The Gupta kings were religious and broad-minded and lovers of art and learning. Samudragupta (340–380 A.D.) is said to have revived the Āsvamedha sacrifice. There can hardly be any doubt that his reign marked a distinct revival of the influence of the Brahmanical religion which had suffered considerably since Aśoka made Buddhism the dominant religion of India. Perhaps it was under these circumstances that Iśvarakṛṣṇa sought to make Saṃkhya doctrines well known by writing an epitome in the form of the Saṃkhya Kārikā (and perhaps also a Vyākhyā vṛttī) which criticised vedic rites, and Vasubandhu tried to combat this also in the interest of Buddhist faith and doctrines. These activities were in full force during the reign of Candra-gupta II (Vikramaḍitya, 375–414 A.D.), Kumāragupta I (414–455 A.D.), Skandagupta - Vikramaḍitya (455–467 A.D.), and Pūru Gupta (467–469 A.D.) and his son Narasimha Gupta (Bhāditya), that is to say, in the fourth and the fifth centuries A.D., and even the sixth century A.D.

It was in this period that the Paramārtha-saptati was written by Vasubandhu in refutation of the Saṃkhya-saptati, and Guṇamati challenged the Saṃkhya who died on that occasion only. Guṇamati was a native of Valabhi and was a renowned disciple of Vasubandhu; he even wrote a commentary on the Abhidharmā Kośa, wherein he refuted the dualistic teaching of the Saṃkhya school as also the Mādhya-mīka view of Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka. Sthiramati was a contemporary of Guṇamati and the two stayed together at Valabhi. Paramārtha also studied at Valabhi and he translated the Abhidharmakośa into Chinese in 563–567 A.D. It is understandable that this Guṇamati should have entertained the idea of a debate with Mādhava, a fervent Saṃkhya with almost a passion for something novel and more rational. Thus we could roughly assign the following dates:

Paramārtha—499–569 A.D.,
( his teacher ) Guṇamati—450–530 A.D.,
(—Mādhava being his senior contemporary—),
( his teacher ) Vasubandhu—420–500 A.D.,
Iśvarakṛṣṇa—latter half of the fourth cent. A.D. or beginning of the fifth cent. A.D.,

(54) The author of V₁ is, as we have seen above, prior to the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya. (See 49 above
in respect of ka. 23. We have another sure evidence. Commenting on आचार्याधिकारपथ, V₁ says in another context, इत्यादि अवस्थाभवन्तनामां विशेषतः प्राकृत अर्थ: धीरेरिवक, वाच्य: असुभ्रेत्यानेतस्यादित्वाय भावार्थाय आहमेव ज्ञातान्य भाववेषमिति. एवं आयुन्तेदेव सर्व स्वरूपमिति. We have a similar expression in the Yoga-bhāṣya 3.14 of Vyāsa—यज्ञोक्तम्—अकृतय: परिमाणिक्य रसादिवेगे स्वार्थस्प एवं भाबस्य आहमेव ज्ञातान्य भाववेषे शृंग । एवं आयुन्तेदेव सर्व स्वरूपमिति. Vyāsa-bhāṣya seems to be quoting V₁ here. Y₅ has here—इह यज्ञोक्तम् तत्व अवभाबां दशम ।

This shows that V₁ is prior to the Yoga-bhāṣya as also Y. See also अकृतय: परिमाणिक्य रसादिवेगे स्वार्थस्प एवं भाबस्य आहमेव ज्ञातान्य भाववेषे शृंग ।

( a ) The epithet आचार्याधिकारम् of शास्त्रम् in ka. 64 is explained by V₁, P and M by अविरेण्यम् i.e. all-comprehensive. Y, J and T also agree. G alone explains it as आचार्याधिकारम्. This shows Gauḍapāda, the Vedāntin peeping in.
identified them. Could this be due to Buddhist influence? See: भाविताभावः यथा क्षेत्र पिना नापो भावस्य, क्षेत्र कार्यिन, अग्निर्गते बिना, वषु: स्वस्य बिना, अथाकामचकार बिना तहसेनेत वर्ग-तेने न्यायेऽ-G, 41.

Compare कृत्यस्यभावायोः कप्ति विभाजित-गौडापादाः कारिका 3.21; 4.7; प्रकृति: कृति विभेदयां सामाध्यं न ज्ञातात् या-Ibid, 4.9. Of course, the point of emphasis is different here.

The Vedantic trend in G can be seen from the following also:

(c) एव स्वविद्यत्स्थूलक्षणस्य सामयति न नावक्षङ्कुणयथे, जयते ज्ञाते निविदाव्यर्थः स्ववेय नक्षतम् निश्चयः: स्वस्याः निश्चयः:-G, 39.

(d) व्यासोदेवानामाध्यमात्रां संस्कृतं सङ्गमभादु चतुर्रितिष्ठति, ज्ञानात्मानं प्रायोगिकं विशेषणः: कस्मानं मृदित, वैभवाकर्षणोऽवैभवाकर्षणं, क्षणात्मरे क्षणेत्रेऽवैभवाकर्षणं, ज्ञान लघुपथे धन्म दृष्टि, व्यासोदेवानारीश्च च शक्षितं तद्वैशी, विश्वतं गुणाध्ययनं विशेषति विकर्षायतिरूपेऽमोऽज्ञा:।-G, 67. The other commentaries do not give these details. V₉, V₁, and M simply say that saṁskāra signifies dharma and adharma which are responsible for the body; and even when knowledge has been obtained these do not vanish till they have yielded their fruit (—as they are more powerful than knowledge—V₁, M). V₉ refers to these as pūrvakṛta, and says that the body is produced due to the dharma and adharma of another birth. J also says: कस्मान्न-सृष्टिकार्यात् पूर्वकृतः।

(e) We have seen that G. (ka. 11) says that puroṣa is 'ekat' like avyakta and M follows G here.

(f) E. H. Johnston has, in his 'Early Sāṅkhya', p. 68 (Royal Asiatic Society, 1937), drawn our attention to a different context, to an important point: Moreover the action of svabhāva is recognised by the classical systems to a modified extent. Gauḍāpāda on SK. 27, inquires whether, in view of the fact that the pradhāna, buddhi and ahamkāra are unconscious (acetana) and that the puruṣa is inactive, the sense faculties, being separate in function and separate in object, are created by a creator (īśvara) or by svabhāva; to this he replies that on this point (iha) the Sāṅkhya postulate a cause called svabhāva. He then goes on to state that in this text (atra, that is, in contradistinction to the previously mentioned Sāṅkhya view) the difference of the sense and of external objects arises from guna-pariṇāmavīśeṣa. The manner of expression is odd and might imply that Gauḍāpāda did not share the Sāṅkhya view, but it seems to be a better explanation to understand him to mean that the earlier Sāṅkhya schools believed in the creative power of a principle called svabhāva, but that Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not.

From the repeated rejection (see commentaries on kārikās 27, 31, 61) of svabhāva as a reality or a cause, Johnston concludes that "previous to the Sāṅkhya Kārikā a principle called svabhāva was known to the Sāṅkhyas as exercising a certain creative power and as having some special connection with the guṇas. Īśvarakṛṣṇa rejected this view, substituting the guṇa-pariṇāma theory, which he might have borrowed from the Yoga form of Sāṅkhya. The Yoga-sūtras do not accept any Svabhāva theory, and this in view of their belief, however attenuated, in an īśvara is natural; but the view that the guṇas act by virtue of their inherent nature (svabhāva) is a Yoga tenet as appears from the bhāṣya on iii. 13, guṇa-svabhāvyam tu pravṛtti-kāraṇam uktam guṇānām. (Early Sāṅkhya, p. 69)."
Now G says here:

The problem posed is how the organs could be different and how they could grasp different objects when pradhāna, buddhi and ahamkāra are insentient and puruṣa is non-doer. Could this be due to God or svabhāva?

Someone suggests that the Sāmkhyas admit a certain cause—svabhāva; or asks if they admit such a cause.

The Sārpaṇkhya answer to this is that the nanatva is due to guṇa-parināma-viśeṣa. The objector again urges that since the guṇas are insentient, if this nanatva were not brought out by God, or ahamkāra, or pradhāna or puruṣa who has brought about modification of the guṇas due to svabhāva (in the case of God and puruṣa) or being one in which modification of the guṇas is brought about (as applicable to ahamkāra, buddhi or pradhāna) by svabhāva, it would not be there.

We cannot fully agree with Johnston here. It seems that G regards the modification of the guṇas as natural, as due to their very inherent nature. V₂, V₁, M specifically deny that there is any such reality or cause as svabhāva in the Sāmkhya. The author of G perhaps feels in the light of the Yoga-school that there is no harm if svabhāva be regarded as the inherent nature of the guṇas to undergo modification in the interest of the puruṣa. Compare here the following lines from the Gaudapāda Karika:—

IV. 9. This lends some further support to our view that the author of G is the Vedantin Gaudapāda.

(L) I have repeatedly shown that G is written on the lines of V₂ rather than V₁ and that at some places M has followed G, though mostly it is based on V₁. G is posterior to Y but is prior to J, and J is seen to follow G at places, as at many others it follows Y. We may note a few such cases:

(55) The term abhīṣeṣa in kā. 11 is explained in the commentaries as follows:—

The term svabhāvamūḍhaḥ śvetāmatāḥ [śvetā] amāvatāḥ, Śvetāmatāḥ śvetāy atiṣṭhī, etc. The prabhāva is due to the motivation of bringing about the release of puruṣa.
It can be seen that the same explanation almost identically worded is found in \(V_2\), \(V_1\), \(G\), \(M\) and it is difficult to say on which commentary \(J\) is based. It seems to have given in \(V_4\) \(V_1\) \(G\) just the gist of the explanation in the commentaries prior to it. But it is clear that \(J\) is posterior to \(V_2\), \(V_1\), \(G\) as it wants to give an independent meaning: अविभाजिताः भवान्वितकारणाः वर्णनम् and seems to be more interested in this rather than in the traditional interpretation given in \(V_4\) \(V_1\) \(G\). The expression in \(M\) is more compact and well-worded, than that in the preceding commentaries and is clearly based on \(V_1\) and \(G\).

\(56\) \(J\) explains कारणाकारणाधिभाषण of \(kā\). 15 thus: यदि उस्तवेत् स्वतंत्रसम्पदेष्ट्वादिवस्मृति तत्कायम्। यथा युगंधर्षकोक्षयजनकाध्यवर्ण्य मूर्तिकारणाधिभाषण्य विवाहोऽहं। अन्यथा सर्वोदयाधारंथानेत्रिणिया या न यथा युगंधर्षकोक्षयजनकाध्यवर्ण्य मूर्तिकारणाधिभाषण्य न स्वतंत्रसम्पदेष्ट्वादिवस्मृति तत्कायम्। एवं व्याख्या महतादेवः कारणाकारणाधिभाषण्य विवाहोऽहं। तत्कायम् कारणेन भविष्यवः। तत्तत्त्वविवेद्यकमिश्रस्वातृविशिष्टिः।

A similar explanation of कारणाकारणाधिभाषण we find in \(M\) and so Pt. Udayavira śāstrī argues here, as in the above case also, that \(M\) is prior to \(J\), and is in fact the earliest commentary on the Sāmkhya Kārikā. But we find the same explanation in \(V_1\) and in \(V_9\) and \(G\) (very systematically in \(G\)), \(V_9\) giving an additional example of threads and cloth-threads cannot counteract cold, heat, etc whereas cloth can.

Then \(J\) finds fault with this explanation saying that what this could establish is already established by कार्याः स्वतंत्रसम्पदेष्ट्वादिवस्मृति तत्कायम् of \(kā\) \(G\) and so this reason would become superfluous. Hence others have explained कार्याः of this कार्याः in the sense of \(G\) उपकर्म उपर्यायांकर्म उपकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मांकर्मাং
That J is clearly indebted to and hence later than Y can be seen also from the following:

(Va, V1, P, G enumerate eight, though some editions of G also enumerate nine). Further G’s explanation of यज्ञार्थाधिकारिण्य is not in consonance with the term as such, and hence perhaps J has यज्ञार्थाधिकारिण्य where the root in श्रवणिक is श्रवणिक in the sense of ‘तिलित्त’. J seems to justify the explanation of यज्ञार्थाधिकारिण्य in G.

Thus Gauḍapāda seems to have been later than the author of Y, but earlier than the author of J. T is undoubtedly indebted to J, though it has also criticised the latter (See T, 51). So J could be placed in about 800 A. D. and G about the first half of the eighth century and Gauḍapāda, the Vedāntin seems to be the author of G.

I am thus inclined to assign dates roughly as follows:

V2—late fourth century or early fifth century A. D.;
V1—latter half of the fifth cent.;
Y—fifth—sixth cent.; G—late seventh century or early eighth cent. A, D.;
J—800 A. D.; T—ninth century.
It is difficult to say anything specific regarding the date of M. In any case I am not inclined to regard it as the earliest commentary on the Sāṃkhya Karika. I would rather assign it to about 1000 A.D. Nevertheless nothing very positive can be said with regard to its priority or otherwise to T, as it is mainly based on V₁, and is indebted in several respects to G, and has not much to offer by way of fresh explanation. Consequently, its indebtedness to other commentaries is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it has a number of quotations from the Purāṇas, gives fanciful derivations and meanings of words like ahāmkāra and bhagavat, quotes from the Hastāmalaka stotra, refers to three śabda-vṛttis and three kinds of lākṣaṇa† and mentions Devala in the Sāṃkhya tradition (—Devala is not mentioned in other commentaries). Of course, all this cannot lead us to a definite conclusion; but M on the whole seems to be a commentary as late as 1,000 A.D., though Māṭhara is known from very early times as a Sāṃkhya ācārya. V₁, as said above, is very much like M which appears to be a revised and enlarged version of V₁. It is not also possible to say with confidence that Māṭhara was the author of V₁, as the name is not fully found; only ṁ followed by a fragment of ḍ or ṅ can be read. Nalinaksha Dutt says about Guṇamati that he wrote a commentary on the Abhidharmakośa and refuted the dualistic teachings of Madhva as also the Mādhyaṃkika views of Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka). (See ‘The Classical Age,’ p. 390—Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962). It is not mentioned from where he got this piece of information, especially that Madhva’s (?) dualistic teachings were refuted. This Madhva could only be a Sāṃkhya, and could Madhva and Mādhava have been one? Or is it a misprint for Mādhava? And how could Madhva or Mādhava be connected with Māṭhara? And who could have revised V₁ to give it the form of what is now known as Māṭhara-vṛtti? These are questions still awaiting solution. We would be very happy if anyone could throw some light on this. Could Mādhva himself have been known as Māṭhara or Māṭhara because he lived, according to Hiouen Thsang’s records, in a mountain, where perhaps he had his maṭḥa (cloister)?

† तत्राथि प्रविष्टिलखण्डयोगोपयोगितिः शव्यतसमः। तत्र शव्यालेविन्धे—नव-शव्यालेजहाणान्यमहालेजहाण जीवाधिकारां समांशाक्षास्त्रेषु बहुतरं प्राप्त आस्ते।—M, 5.
The ten Mulikārthas of the Sāṃkhya Darśana

We find stanzas enumerating the ten Mulikārthas at different places.

(i) इने जाने दस मूलिकाः: । तथा हि—
[असस्तमेकवसार्यवर्चः] पारार्थ(पारार्थ)मन्ययवमो निमित्तः: ।
योगो वियोगो बहुः: पुमांसः स्थितः: सर्वरस्य च शेष्युतः: ॥—V १, ७२
(ii) V २ mentions these after its exposition of kārikās १—२१ ।

एततेता: मूलिकाः समासः ।
असस्तमेकवसार्यवर्चः पारार्थ (पारार्थ)मन्ययवमो निमित्तः: ।
योगो वियोगो बहुः: पुमांसः स्थितः: सर्वरस्य च शेष्युतः: ॥
V २ does not explain where these are treated in the kārikās, but simply says एवमेवे मूलिकाः: । वियोगं विच (च इ) शेष्युतमुलिकाः वस्यामि ॥—V २ २१।

(iii) M has the same wording as V १, except that it has निमित्तः: in the place of च शेष्युतः: । M moreover says 'वर्गययवमव हृदयरी' इति स्थितः: सिद्धा, whereas V १ says वर्गययवमव शेष्युतः: सिद्धा ।—शिष्ठ औ शेषव्यवस्थायिकर्त्वसे सिद्धा: इति।
J mentions these after the exposition of क्र. ५१, where the exposition of the प्रयवस्यपर्वम् comes to an end.

Here we have अनुवादकार in the place of मिन्द्रतः।

(iv) असस्तमेकवसार्यवर्चः पारार्थमन्ययवमकुकुकुकाः: ।
योगो वियोगो बहुः: पुमांसः स्थितः: सर्वरस्य च शेष्युतः: ॥

J mentions these after the exposition of क्र. ५१, where the exposition of the प्रयवस्यपर्वम् comes to an end.

(i) इने जाने दस मूलिकाः: । तथा हि—
[असस्तमेकवसार्यवर्चः] पारार्थ(पारार्थ)मन्ययवमो निमित्तः: ।
योगो वियोगो बहुः: पुमांसः स्थितः: सर्वरस्य च शेष्युतः: ॥—V १, ७२
(ii) V २ mentions these after its exposition of kārikās १—२१ ।

एततेता: मूलिकाः समासः ।
असस्तमेकवसार्यवर्चः पारार्थ (पारार्थ)मन्ययवमो निमित्तः: ।
योगो वियोगो बहुः: पुमांसः स्थितः: सर्वरस्य च शेष्युतः: ॥
V २ does not explain where these are treated in the kārikās, but simply says एवमेवे मूलिकाः: । वियोगं विच (च इ) शेष्युतमुलिकाः वस्यामि ॥—V २ २१।

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J mentions these after the exposition of क्र. ५१, where the exposition of the प्रयवस्यपर्वम् comes to an end.

Here we have अनुवादकार in the place of मिन्द्रतः।

(v) असस्तमेकवसार्यवर्चः पारार्थमन्ययवमकुकुकुकाः: ।
योगो वियोगो बहुः: पुमांसः स्थितः: सर्वरस्य च शेष्युतः: ॥

See संविधानसंस्कृतिः, pp. 399—४००—Pt. Udayavīra Śāstrī.
Vācaspāti has quoted in his Tattvakaumudi, 72, the stanzas 10–12 given above with the remark: तथा े राज्यात्मकम्.

T—इति: स्थितिरिति स्थूलस्माचिन्तयत्. Compare J.

Y—‘सम्प्रज्ञानारिकायात्’ (क्र. ६७) इति देश्वति:

The major difference that we find is that at places we have निष्ठिति: (V₂, V₁, P, M) and at others अस्तृत्वम् or अस्तृत्वम्: (Y, J, T). Moreover, in the quotation from Devala we find निष्ठिति; while in the commentaries on the Tattvasamāsa and in the Dwādaśāranayacakra we have अस्तृत्वम्. Let us see how this is explained: श्रस्य दृष्टियोलक्ष्यि निष्ठिति:—V₁ (This is missing in M); तत्साध्य विपर्यायार्थं इति पुरुषस्वादःस्तृत्वम्—Y.

आयो निष्ठिति: must have been the original reading. But the अस्तृत्वम् of पुरुष though an important tenet of Śāṅkhya philosophy is not included here, while निष्ठिति could be included in भिन्न also; so another reading अस्तृत्वम् must have come into existence and this was readily accepted by those who were interested in the exposition of the Śāṅkhya philosophy.

The stanza अस्तृत्वम् is of the उपज्ञति metre; the author of the Yuktidipika has composed his own stanzas enumerating the Śāṅkhya topics, and these are, like the other stanzas in the midst of which they occur, in the Anuṣṭup metre. Among the commentaries on the Śāṅkhya-Kārikā we find अस्तृत्वम् mentioned for the first time in Y. Could we be bold enough to say that it was the author of Y, a very systematic thinker who was responsible for this change for the better? In that case the Dwādaśāra-nayacakra would have to be regarded as slightly posterior to it.

It may be noted that Paramārtha seems to have प्राचार्य in the place of पारार्य. This explains the mention of ‘the five reasons by which one establishes the existence of Spirit and Nature’ as the fourth and fifth of the पूर्विकार्य; and अन्वयम् seems to have been dropped to bring the number to ten.
The Number of Karikás in Isvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāmkhya Karikā.

The Sāmkhya-Karikā of Isvarakṛṣṇa is known from very early times by the name of Sāmkhya-saptati, which definitely conveys that there should be seventy karikas. But we do not find in any commentary just seventy karikas. The number is either less or more. Of course it has been argued that ‘saptati’ need not mean just seventy; it indicates an approximate number, as for example, in the case of the Satakas. But if an author at all took a fancy for a particular number, he would try to accommodate all he had to say in so many verses, and make the necessary adjustments. Let us examine what light the commentaries of the Sāmkhya karikā can throw on the number of the karikas.

Gauḍapāda has commented on the first 69 karikas and Tilak has tried to reconstruct one additional karika on the strength of G, 61. This karīka, it is argued, refuted the causality of God, Svabhāva, Puruṣa, Kāla and some dogmatic theist must have seen to it that this karika refuting God’s causality did not find a place in the Sāmkhya Karikā.

Vā is a commentary on 71 āryās. V₁ and M have the karīka text of 73 āryās ‘the last one (तत्समाल समालक्षण...) not being found anywhere else. Y, J and T comment on 72 āryās. P does not have ka. 63 and it is held that it must have been added after Paramārtha translated the Sāmkhya Karikā, that is to say, after 546 A. D.

The last verse (72, but 71 according to P) is:

“This treatise in seventy verses exhausts that of the sixty–thousand verses; it explains (the sorts of) creation which proceed from (eight) causes, up to the fifty categories (relating to the Intellect.).”

This verse is introduced thus: ‘An intelligent man of this (school) has composed this verse.’ The first hemistitch of this verse corresponds to सत्तां क्रिक वेदांविवक्षणः ज्ञेनव्रत्स्य परिवर्तनस्य, but the second hemistitch is different. Nevertheless, the commentary reproduces what the text has omitted when it says: “The traditions of the ancient sages and the refutations of the opinions of others are found in the great (treatise) but not in this one, This is the difference”, (Compare आयुष्यविकाविरहिताः परवर्तनविवज्जितावाच—72).

Takakusu accounts for this by saying: “It was, perhaps, impossible for the Chinese traveller to enclose within the twenty characters of his verse the entire sense of the Sanskrit verse. Paramārtha seems to have been obliged to skip in the translation of the text this or that word, free to take it up again in the commentary.”

Of course, nothing definite can be said, but Takakusu’s explanation is not convincing here. It is likely that Paramārtha omitted this second line in his translation and someone later attempted to supply it on the basis of the commentary. Or, Paramārtha was himself not sure of the text of this verse ‘of an intelligent man’ and quoted from memory, and explained on the strength of the impression he carried with him. Even this is not quite appealing, but we cannot ignore the fact that the explanation of the second hemistitch is there in the commentary, and that Paramārtha knows what is known as ka. 72 as a verse composed by an ‘intelligent man of this (school).’
Scholars have tried in different ways to arrive at the number seventy or to explain it away. These arguments have been discussed by Pt. Udayavira Śastrī and also by Dr. Adyaśrī Miśra and cannot bear repetition. We shall only see how some of the commentators explain the term 'saptati', and find out if anything definite could be said.

Vg does not have kā. 72 containing the word 'saptati' yet Vg has the following in the explanation of kā. 71:

V 9.

Thus, according to Vg, the Sāmkhya Karikā consists of karikās 1-70. Kā. 69 states that Paramarśī (Kapila) was the propounder of this philosophy. Kā. 70 shows how this was handed down—It came down in a condensed form to Paṇḍasikha, by whom the tantra was handed down. Vg explains this thus: 'śatamah āte śatamākāryam'. P says: ‘Paṇḍasikha, who explained it at full length in sixty thousand verses.' Paramārtha thus understands by ‘Ṣaṣṭi-tantra' a work of 60,000 verses.

Vg further says that Īśvarakṛṣṇa summarised this Śaṣṭi-tantra for the benefit of the śiṣyā. Then we find śastamsaḥ followed by kā. 71 ( ‘It is said in this verse'-P). We find a similar expression stamsaḥ introducing kā. 62-70 consisting of several verses. Now kā. 62 is regarded as an integral part of the Saptati by all, so stamsaḥ cannot be said to introduce a quotation. Perhaps kā. 71 was meant by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as the concluding remark on his work of seventy-verses.

Regarding kā. 72, P, as we have seen above, says: "An intelligent man of this (school) has composed this verse". V₁ does not say anything by way of introduction to kā. 72. This karikā has śat at the end, and V₁ says at the end of its explanation of it: परमार्थविवेचनंति परस्मार्थविवेचनंति. M also has परं परमार्थविवेचनंति परस्मार्थविवेचनंति. Y and T (-and kā. text in J-) read शत्वा for शत्वा and J has in the vṛtti अश्वासाक्षरित हिंदूः परस्मार्थविवेचनंति. Y also says in the vṛtti अश्वासाक्षरित हिंदूः परस्मार्थविवेचनंति. It seems that the reading of kā. 72 according to J is ‘saptaya....paramārthavivechaḥ: śatamah', though as seen above it seems to explain śat also.
T has like Y the reading शास्त्रम्....परस्तिविषयिताशास्त्रि'.

T does not explain the second hemistich.

Could we hazard the conclusion that the author of \( V_1 \) was the author of \( \text{kārikās} \) 72 and 73? \( \text{Kārika} \) 71 was meant to be Īśvarakṛṣṇa's own concluding stanza in respect of the Saptati. The author of \( V_1 \) perhaps felt that something was lacking and so he added \( \text{kārikās} \) 72 and 73 as his concluding remarks. Paramārtha referred to \( \text{kā} \) 72 as the composition of a learned man of the school. The author of the \( \text{Yuktidīpikā} \) also quoted it, and then it came to be forgotten as a quotation and was included in the text of the Sāṃkhya \( \text{Kārika} \). This is how \( \text{kā} \) 72 came to stay as a part of the Sāṃkhya thought and the ten mūlikārthas can be specifically pointed out in its explanation along with the five viparyayas, 28 indriya-asāmarthyas, nine tuṣṭis and eight siddhis. The thought of composing this \( \text{kārika} \) occurred to the author of \( V_1 \), it may be presumed, because the author of \( V_2 \) referred briefly to the ten mūlikārthas after the exposition of \( \text{kā} \) 21, and there was no \( \text{kārika} \) to draw the reader's attention to the different topics of Sāṃkhya thought. This also explains why \( P \) and \( Y \) quote it at the end.

\( \text{kā} \) 73 (also composed by the author of \( V_1 \) it appears–) did not get this honour and so is found nowhere except in \( V_1 \) and \( M \) (which is an enlarged version of \( V_1 \)). But the author of \( Y \) knew this \( \text{āryā} \) as can be seen from a verse in it which is an imitation of \( \text{kā} \). 73.
bound in the worlds or that it is delivered from death and birth, that is not correct. Another verse says’.

This verse could be only ka. 63 which also says that Nature binds herself. It could not be ka. 64. It may be noted that there is a reference to सम्बन्ध again in ka. 65 and there Paramārtha seems to have a different reading (–a deliberate change in agreement with the omission of ka. 63–) as instead of सप्तसूत्रशैलम् we find in P ‘finishes by abandoning her functions’. This emboldens us to say that Paramārtha deliberately omitted ka. 63.

Gaudapāda might have known kārikās 1–71, but he commented on only kārikās 1–69, as the rest, he thought, were self-explanatory (–Gaudapāda is primarily interested in philosophical discussions). We cannot say how he viewed ka. 72.

Thus the Sāmkhya Kārika can be said to have originally consisted of kārikās 1–71, the last kārika serving as the author’s concluding remark.
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Same in all except M  
Same in all  
P seems to be like V₉, etc., though this is not included in the Ka. text in P.
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V₂ V₁ Y G
प्रतिक्रिया सवध्य असर असर असर असर असर
As in V₉ As in V₉ As in V₉ As in V₉
9-13. Same in all
14. अभिवेदनाभि: As in V₉ As in V₉ As in V₉
सिद्धः
15. Same in all
16. प्रतिक्रियामत्र:- Same in all

17. केवलायाभ्रुक्ष केवलायाभ्रुक्ष केवलायाभ्रुक्ष केवलायाभ्रुक्ष केवलायाभ्रुक्ष
18. सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व-
(का. के.) (का. के.) (का. के.) (का. के.)
सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व- सिद्धामिकपञ्चायत्व-
(Comm.) (Comm.) (Comm.) (Comm.)
19. तस्माद्य विशेषसाधु तस्माद्य विशेषसाधु As in V₉ As in V₉

20. मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च
21. दसायत्म, दसायत्म, दसायत्म, केवलायाभ्रुम, केवलायाभ्रुम, केवलायाभ्रुम
22. गणश्च गणश्च (का. के.) As in V₉ As in V₉
मणश्च (Comm.)
23. Same in all

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J T M Remarks
As in V₉ प्रकृतिघर्षण विषयव असर असर असर असर असर असर प्रकृतिघर्षण विषयव असर असर असर असर असर असर
Same in all except T
Same in all
As in V₉ अविवेदनाभि: सिद्धः अविवेदनाभि: सिद्धः Same in all except T
Same in all except T
Same in all except T
V₂ has the same second line in the Kा. text; but has श्रव-प्रथमकामविशेषार्थ in the Comm.

As in V₉ As in V₉ As in V₉ Same in all
Could it be a scribal error?

मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च मणकृष्णाय च
Same Same Same

As in V₉ As in V₉ As in V₉ Same in all except Y

As in V₉ As in V₉ As in V₉ Same in all except V₁
Same in all
24. 'एकादशक्ति गणः' एकादशक्ति' एकादशक्ति' एकादशक्ति गणः
स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र त्वारः प्रमक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र त्वारः प्रमक्षेत्र

25. भूसावस्तमात्र: As in V₂  भूसावस्तमात्र: भूसावस्तमात्र:

26. 'चक्षु:ध्येया-ध्येया' कर्मकक्षक्षरसमकः कर्मकक्षक्षरसमकः
रसस्वतान्न प्राक्कल्पनानि प्राक्कल्पनानि प्राक्कल्पनानि प्राक्कल्पनानि

बाहु...पस्ताय: बाहु...पस्ताय: बाहु...पस्ताय: बाहु...पस्ताय:

27. 'संक्षेपकामत मनः' उभ्यास्तमात्र मनः: उभ्यास्तमात्र मनः
'संक्षेपकामत मनः' 'संक्षेपकामत मनः' 'संक्षेपकामत मनः' 'संक्षेपकामत मनः'
स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र
स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र स्तम्भात्पन्नक्षेत्र
तत्त्। कः तत्त्। कः तत्त्। कः तत्त्। कः तत्त्।
(Kा. text). But
गुणपरिवर्त्त गुणपरिवर्त्त गुणपरिवर्त गुणपरिवर्त
बाहु-बाहु-बाहु-बाहु (चक्षु:चक्षु) चक्षु:चक्षु:चक्षु:चक्षु
केशराज्य केशराज्य केशराज्य केशराज्य
केशराज्य केशराज्य केशराज्य केशराज्य
केशराज्य केशराज्य केशराज्य केशराज्य

can be derived from the vṛttī.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V₂</th>
<th>V₁</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>त्रयादित्रु</td>
<td>त्रयादित्रु</td>
<td>त्रयादित्रु</td>
<td>कान्दित्रु</td>
<td>कान्दित्रु</td>
<td>कान्दित्रु</td>
<td>P has त्रयादित्रु in view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>होराव</td>
<td>होराव</td>
<td>होराव</td>
<td>होराव</td>
<td>होराव</td>
<td>होराव</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comm. explains by means of त्र</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 29. | साल्क्षण्य | साल्क्षण्य | साल्क्षण्य | (Kā. text) | साल्क्षण्य | साल्क्षण्य |                           |
|     | साल्क्षण्य | साल्क्षण्य | साल्क्षण्य | (Comm.)    | साल्क्षण्य | साल्क्षण्य |                           |

| 30. | दृष्टि: | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | हि हृति: Same in all except M |
|     |        |          |          |          |          |          | Could P have in view       |

| 31. | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं |                           |
|     | (Kā. text), (v) हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं | हेदुकुं |                           |

| 32-33. Same in all |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |
| 34. | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि |                           |
|      | शेषाणि प्रभ- | शेषाणि प्रभ- | शेषाणि प्रभ- | शेषाणि प्रभ- | शेषाणि प्रभ- | शेषाणि प्रभ- |                           |
|      | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि | विषयाणि |                           |
|      | (Kā. text), प्रभ- | प्रभ- | प्रभ- | प्रभ- | प्रभ- | प्रभ- |                           |
|      | विषयाणि (Comm.) |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |

| 35-36. Same in all |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |
| 37. | पुन: | पुन: | पुन: | पुन: | पुन: | पुन: |                           |
| 38-40. Same in all |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |
| (39. missing in V₃) |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |                           |

| 41. | तत्तद विना विशेषे- | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | As in V₂ | As in V₂ |                           |
|      | नर्न तिपनि मिरा- | नर्न तिपनि मिरा- | नर्न तिपनि मिरा- | नर्न तिपनि मिरा- | नर्न तिपनि मिरा- | नर्न तिपनि मिरा- |                           |
|      | अवं विश्राम | अवं विश्राम | अवं विश्राम | अवं विश्राम | अवं विश्राम | अवं विश्राम |                           |
42. missing
43. missing
44. missing
45. Kārika is
46. ओवेयम्यम्यिः
47. missing
48. missing
49. missing
50. missing
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<th>As in M</th>
<th>As in Y</th>
<th>As in Y</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52. missing</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>As in V1</td>
<td>As in V1</td>
<td>As in V1</td>
</tr>
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<td>53. missing</td>
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<td>As in Y</td>
<td>As in Y</td>
<td>As in Y</td>
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<td>As in Y</td>
<td>As in Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>स्वाभाविक</td>
<td>स्वाभाविक</td>
<td>स्वाभाविक</td>
<td>स्वाभाविक</td>
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<td>same in all</td>
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<td>61 (first line)</td>
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<td>same in all</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>P, like V1, has in view स्वाभाविक</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same in all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same in all</td>
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<tr>
<td>Same in all</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<td>As in V1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>T</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>हूःसांधः: हूःसांधः: हूःसांधः: (Ka. text), हूःसांधः: हूःसांधः: हूःसांधः: (वृत्ति)</td>
<td>...सांधः: ...सांधः: ...सांधः:</td>
<td>...सांधः: ...सांधः: ...सांधः:</td>
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<td>तैवसोऽयथः: तैवसोऽयथः:</td>
<td>तैवसोऽयथः: तैवसोऽयथः:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| तैवसोऽयथः | तैवसोऽयथः: तैवसोऽयथः: | तैवसोऽयथः: तैवसोऽयथः: | काः 63 is not included in P. The याया is defective in M. Same in all P seems to read नाशिक नाशिक for नायिक नायिक.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>62. missing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>64. missing</td>
<td>As in V1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>V₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.</td>
<td>सास्रपत्रिविनिश्चत:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.</td>
<td>हृदा मनेयुपेशकः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>चक्रमवधुः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>साम</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69.</td>
<td>पुषपार्थज्ञान</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70.</td>
<td>तेन बहुमं क्रिया</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71.</td>
<td>सामायं</td>
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<tr>
<td>72.</td>
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| 73. | — | — | — | — |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>J</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As in G</td>
<td>सास्रपत्रिविनिश्चत:</td>
<td>As in G</td>
<td>सास्रपत्रिविनिश्चत:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As in V₂</td>
<td>चक्रमवधुः</td>
<td>As in V₂</td>
<td>चक्रमवधुः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same in all</td>
<td>पुषपार्थज्ञान</td>
<td>पुषपार्थज्ञान</td>
<td>पुषपार्थज्ञान</td>
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<tr>
<td>As in Y</td>
<td>As in Y</td>
<td>तेन बहुमं क्रिया</td>
<td>तेन बहुमं क्रिया</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P seems to have in view सास्रपत्रिविनिश्चत: |
●युपरासात्वना | ●युपरासात्वना | ●युपरासात्वना |
(Ka text), रस्मेत दयुपेशकः | (Ka text), रस्मेत दयुपेशकः |
(Comm.) | (Comm.) |
As in V₂ | चक्रमवधुः | As in V₂ | चक्रमवधुः |
Same in all | पुषपार्थज्ञान | पुषपार्थज्ञान | पुषपार्थज्ञान |
As in Y | As in Y | तेन बहुमं क्रिया | तेन बहुमं क्रिया |
(Ka text), तेन बहुमं क्रिया | (Comm.) | करिकास |
70 ff. | |

युपरासात्वना | युपरासात्वना | युपरासात्वना |
(Ka text), (Comm.) |
70 ff. | |

सारीयों...माति | सारीयों...माति | सारीयों...माति |
(Ka text), | (Comm.) |
| V₂ has only करिकास 1-71 |

Found only in V₁ and M.
Let us take into consideration some of the kārikās where the readings differ considerably according to the different commentaries.

(i) Kā. 24: 2nd line:

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<th>T</th>
<th>V1</th>
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<td>V9</td>
<td>J, T</td>
<td>V51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>G</td>
<td>V1</td>
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<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The line in Vg, J, T is defective (-one mātrā too few). V1 seems to have altered the line in the interest of the sense to be conveyed—to bring forth that the group of eleven is aindriya, but here the ārya becomes defective (-one mātrā too many). Y tries to bring this in conformity with the line in V9, but that as derived from the vṛtti is defective; there should have been rōma in the place of rōma,—though J actually says ṛgaḥ vṛnma rasi. T has the same line as in the kā. text of J. M has the same line as V1, only it is not defective as it has ṛgaḥ in the place of ṛgaḥ.

(ii) Kā. 26 First line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentary</th>
<th>Vg</th>
<th>V1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The line is metrically correct in Y, J, and M (kā. text). G seems to have paid more attention to the wording—if there be ेक्त, there should also be नासिक्षण.

(iii) Kā. 43, first line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentary</th>
<th>V1, G(kā. text), T, M (one mātrā too many);</th>
<th>Y, J, M(kā. text);</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V9, G(kā. text), T, M (one mātrā too many);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>Y, J, M(kā. text);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>G (bhāṣya) (one mātrā too few).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The line is metrically correct in Y, J, and M (kā. text). G seems to have paid more attention to the wording—if there be ेक्त, there should also be नासिक्षण.

(iv) Kā. 45, first line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentary</th>
<th>V1, V9 (kā. text), Y, G, J, T;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V1, V9 (kā. text), Y, G, J, T;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasāhasya Gāṇeśacandra bhāṣya</td>
<td>V1 (vṛtti), M.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Metrically both are correct; V1 perhaps improved on V9 to make the line more effective.

* We find in later literature a number of āryās where the following conjunct consonant with a final ष does not make the preceding letter guru.
(v) Kā. 46, Second line: ॠषिभविषयस्मिन्तथा मेठास्य पञ्चास्य:-

V<sub>2</sub>; V<sub>1</sub>, J, M;

Y seems to have put ॠषिभविषयस्मिन्तथा मेठास्य पञ्चास्य in the place of ॠषिभविषयस्मिन्तथा मेठास्य पञ्चास्य to make the expression grammatically more correct as also to make the portion consist of just 12 मात्रास.

(vi) Kā. 50—First line: आर्यासिद्धानितः in all except G, and M which have आर्यासिद्धानितः, which is metrically wrong, though grammatically an improvement on the former.

Second line: वाःविषयोपसामाय पञ्च मय हुष्टोस्मिताः—V<sub>1</sub> (one मात्रात तो फे वही),

वाः विषयोपसामाय पञ्च मय हुष्टोस्मिताः—Y,

वाः विषयोपसामाय पञ्च मय हुष्टोस्मिताः—G, J (कृ. तत्तत्ता),

वाः विषयोपसामाय पञ्च मय हुष्टोस्मिताः—J (वर्त्ती),

वाः विषयोपसामाय पञ्च मय हुष्टोस्मिताः—T,

वाः विषयोपसामाय पञ्च मय हुष्टोस्मिताः—M.

The अर्या in V<sub>1</sub>, Y, G, J is defective (one मात्रात तो फे वही). T and M rectify this by inserting च. (Y has च according to Pandeya's edition.)

(vii) Kā. 51, First line: अहः शब्दोऽस्यम् हुष्टोविचारात् सुझुरणः—

V<sub>1</sub>, G(भास्य), M.

Y, G (कृ. तत्तत्ता), J (कृ. तत्तत्ता), and T have हुष्टोविचारात्:

In the place of हुष्टोविचारात्, and J(वर्त्ती) has हुष्टोविचारात्:

(-this latter makes the अर्या defective as there is one मात्रात तो फे वही too many).

(viii) Kā. 67, Second line: तिरिति संस्कृतशास्त्रसहभागवदृत्तारिः (V<sub>2</sub> and others). V<sub>1</sub> has चक्षसबदुहुद्वतारिः (which makes the line defective as there is one मात्रात तो फे वही too many). T has अभिमुखदुहुद्वतारिः, which is an improvement in expression.

(ix) Kā. 69, First line: पुष्पस्यालामनिंदे....—V<sub>2</sub> and others. V<sub>1</sub> and Y have here पुष्पालव्यालामनिंदे which makes no difference metrically.

(x) Kā. 70, second line: आपुरिवि पञ्चविषयां तेन बहुधा कृते—

V<sub>2</sub>, V<sub>1</sub>(वर्त्ती), M(वर्त्ती);

Y, J T (one मात्रात तो फे वही too many);

Y, J, T have कृते-M (कृ. तत्तत्ता) (one मात्रात तो फे वही too many);

Actually, it is the first part of this line that is cumbersome as up to पञ्चविषयां there are 13 मात्रास; Y, J, T, M (कृ. तत्तत्ता) consider the latter part by itself and make it consist of 15 मात्रास.

(xi) Kā. 27 is interesting. It is found in V<sub>9</sub> and Y as follows:—

संहंकमन मनसंवेशयित्वमयस्य साध्यायतः

अपारिकालकामधों तस्मादाध्यातमः ततः

It is found in V<sub>1</sub> as उपत्यायकमन मन: संकानकमनिन्तं साध्यायतः

गुप्तपरिमाणाविनियोजकं बालेश्वरच्च

G, J, T and M have the same कृ. तत्तत्ता as V<sub>1</sub>; only G, J, and T have बालेश्वरच्च instead of बालेश्वरच्च, and M has बालेश्वरच्च. In P, the first line is the same as in V<sub>9</sub> and the second line the same as in V<sub>1</sub>. It is interesting to note that the second line can be derived from V<sub>9</sub> on कृ. 27.
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