JOURNAL

OF THE

AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.

ELEVENTH VOLUME.

NEW HAVEN:
FOR THE AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY
Printed by Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, Printers to Yale College.
MDCCCLXXXV.

SOLD BY THE SOCIETY'S AGENTS:
NEW YORK: B. WESTERMANN & CO., 838 BROADWAY;
LONDON: TRÜBNER & CO.; LEIPZIG: F. A. BROCKHAUS;
PARIS: K. LEROUX.
(Susiana), India, Palestine, and Arabia. Most of these are not found earlier than in the time of Herodotus, and have little or no ethnological value. The wildness with which they were invented and employed is illustrated by their explanations of the origin and history of the Jews (cited by Movers, Phoen. ii. 1, 23). The name "Ethiopia" in these stories is a loose geographical designation, absolutely without ethnological significance; it includes peoples, such as the tribes of northern India and of Syria, that we know to be of different races. The name Kephrenes, therefore, by which the Chaldeans are said to have been formerly called (Hellan- cuss), and by which the Egyptians called the Phoenicians (Kupe), is not to be regarded as African Kushite because Kephrenes is represented as king of Ethiopia, for Ethiopia need mean nothing more than southern Babylonia or southern Palestine (Joppa). The alleged historical facts are not more conclusive. The name of the Koezites or Kozaiis of Susiana, the Kashi of the Assyrian inscriptions, resembles Kish, Kasha, Kush; but the resemblance may well be purely accidental, or non-ethnological. The name Puna, belonging to a people living in the Kush region south of Egypt, has been compared with Punci, Punni, Phoenicians; but it has little resemblance to the last, and nothing that we know of the Phenicians connects them with the Puna.

1. Against the hypothesis of an Asiatic Kush are some strong positive grounds. 1. Supposing the old African Kush to be represented by the modern Beja, Galla, Somali (as is generally agreed), there is no trace of their language in Asia, either in Arabia (Himyaritic), or in Mesopotamia (Sumerian-Acadian), or elsewhere; the "Kushite" element is a pure fancy. 2. They had no civilization of their own, according to the best information concerning them; and the supposition of a Kushite civilization in Arabia, formerly held firmly by eminent scholars, now finds no advocates. But it is alleged that they were the bearers of Egyptian culture eastward; the ancient civilization of Babylonia was borrowed from Egypt. A comparison of the two civilizations will show, however, that neither could have been borrowed from the other. They were products of the same period of the world, and of sister-races, but each went its independent way; we cannot speak of borrowing between them than between the languages of the two peoples. 2. There seems to have been no time when African Kushites could have carried civilization eastward. They were themselves barbarians up to B. C. 3000 at earliest, and were not imbued with Egyptian culture before B. C. 2000, when a flourishing civilization had already existed for centuries in the region of the Tigris and Euphrates.

It appears, therefore, that the name Kush belongs properly only to the region lying just south of Egypt. The languages of the group of tribes represented by the Sabo and Beja may with probable correctness be called Kushite or Kushite, but otherwise the term seems to have no scientific value.

3. The Cosmogonic Hymn, Rig-Veda X. 129, by Prof. W. D. Whitney, of New Haven.

The prevailing belief of the Hindus of the Vedic period as to the origin of the world is that it was made by the gods. They have no detailed and generally accepted theory of the creation, and, in the absence of a supreme deity in their Pantheon, and the lack of consistent system among their beliefs, new one and now another of their gods is credited with the production of heaven and earth, of men and animals, and even of the other gods themselves. Here and there, however, are found signs of more advanced thought on these subjects, beginnings of the speculations which rise to greater and greater importance in the Brahmasas, the Upanishads, and the philosophical systems. The most interesting of these, and the most noted, is a hymn in the tenth or supplementary book of the Rig-Veda, evidently to be reckoned among the most modern constituents of that great collection. It has been repeatedly translated, or more or less loosely paraphrased, and accompanied with laudatory comments, often of a greatly exaggerated character. Hence a simple version and brief exposition may seem not superfluous.

The point of view of the author of the hymn is given most plainly in the two concluding verses, which, in the metre of the original, run thus:
6. Who truly knoweth? Who can here proclaim it?
   Whence hither born, whence cometh this creation?
   Eitherwhere are the gods from its creating;
   Who knoweth, then, from whence it came to being?

7. This creation—from whence it came to being,  
   Whether it made itself, or whether not—
   Who is its overseer in highest heaven.
   He surely knoweth: or if he does not know?

One or two points here are questionable. In 6 c, we have the instrumental instead of the more regular ablative; hence Ludwig translates: “the gods have arrived hither by the sending of this one” (the pronoun, namely, may be masculine as well as neuter; it is not feminine, referring directly to svārīṣa, “creation”). But the denial of prior existence to the gods, which is the main point, comes from either interpretation. Again, in 7 b, the subject and meaning of the verb dadhā are unclear; it must be either “it set (or made) itself,” or “he set (or made) it for himself.” i.e. the “overseer” of the next line. I have thought the former more acceptable; but whether the middle can have so pregnant reflexive a sense admits of doubt.

To the apprehension of the poet, as is seen, the gods themselves are only a part of the present order of things, and their existence to be accounted for along with the rest, while no competent knowledge of its origination is to be expected from them. He rejects the old faith and its simple solution of the problem; to be sure, he has not so cast it out of his mind as to deny the existence of a general manager of the universe, located in the old heaven, but even his power to satisfy our curiosity is questioned. The rest of the hymn is the poet’s own solution, which, after all, he is not afraid to venture to put forth, drawn from the depths of his consciousness.

In the first verse and a half, then, he attempts to depict the chaos negatively, by telling what was not then in existence. And he commits the rhetorical fault of beginning with a denial so absolute that what follows in the way of detail can only dilute it and weaken its force. Thus: 1. “Not the non-existent existed, nor did the existent exist, at that time”: i.e. in that indefinable past which preceded the present order of things there was neither existence nor non-existence. Surely, then, there can be nothing more to say about it; yet he goes on: “not the room of air existed, nor the firmament that is beyond.” Then follows in the second line a series of questions (not entirely clear, since kim may either mean ‘what’ or be mere interrogative particle): “what enveloped? where? in whose protection? what was the ocean, the abyss profound?” The next verse proceeds: 2. “Not death existed, nor what is immortal, then”—a very unnecessary amplification; since if there was, as already declared, neither existence nor even non-existence, there evidently could occur no cessation of existence, nor could there be anything that prolonged an existence without cessation. Finally, “there was no distinction of night from day;” and so the negative description ends with a mere denial of the existence of light—a conception that is further enlarged upon in the fourth verse.

Now comes something positive; and it appears that there was in existence, after all, a certain indefinite it, or That, or This (for tād might mean any one of the three; probably “It” is our best rendering): “Breathed, without wind, by inner power; it only: than it, truly, nothing whatever else existed besides.” Of course, if there is a tād, the attribute of existence cannot be denied it; and the poet by this time is content merely to assert that nothing except this existed (daśa: the verb is the same with that used at the beginning of the first verse). He deludes himself with the belief that by first denying absolutely everything, and then denying all but an indefinable something, he has bridged over the abyss between non-existence and existence, and given a start to the development of the universe. And he anthropomorphizes his “it” by making it breathe, as if a living being; though he adds, by way of saving clause, that such breathing occasioned no perceptible motion of air.

The third verse is in good part a repetition of the second, in slightly different terms. It reads thus: 3. “Darkness existed, hidden by darkness, at the begin-
Proceedings at Boston, May, 1882.

ning; an undistinguished sea was this all; the void that was covered with emptiness—that alone was born by the might of fervor." The first half-verse presents a familiar and widely-spread conception; an unillumined ocean is one of the most naturally suggested figures for the Chaos; but its inconsistency with the first verse is manifest. A void covered (literally, a vessel is covered with its lid) with emptiness" is a not particularly unsuccessful attempt to express the inconceivable; about as good as the old popular definition of Chaos, "a great pile of nothing, and nowhere to put it." Whether "fervor" (tapa), in the last quarter-verse, means physical heat or devotional ardor, penance, according to the later prevalent meaning of the word, admits of a question; but it is doubtless to be understood in the latter sense. For no such physical element as heat plays any part in the Hindu cosmogonies, while penance, the practice of religious austerities, is a constant factor in their theories. In the stories of their Brahmans, it is told times innumerable how the Creator, desiring to accomplish or attain something, performed penance (tapa tapayata), and so succeeded. It is a grossly anthropomorphic trait; yet hardly more so than that with which the next verse begins: 4. "Desire arose in the beginning upon It, which was the first seed of mind (thought, intention)." That is, since desire precedes and leads to action in man, it must have done so in the creation likewise; so kāma-vāsa, he felt desire," is the introduction to most of the acts of Prājapati, the Creator, in the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads. The remaining line of the verse is obscure: "The sages (or poets), by devotion, found the tie of the existent in the non-existent, seeking it in the heart." The verb here is in the same tense with those used in describing the processes of creation above; and so the verse seems to project, without any preparation, certain wise persons into the midst of the nonentity or its development; if something later, within our period, were intended, the tense should be the aorist. And wherever sat and caste, 'existence and non-existence,' are brought together, it is a mere juggle of words, an affectation of profundity.

But the next verse is still more unintelligible; no one has ever succeeded in putting any sense into it, and it seems so unconnected with the rest of the hymn that its presence is hardly to be wished. A mechanical translation runs as follows: 5. "Crosswise [was] stretched out the ray (line) of them: was it soothed below? was it soothed above? impregnators were, greatnesses were; stāthā below, offering beyond." The word rendered 'offering' is literally 'forth-reaching,' and has sometimes also, as perhaps here, the signification 'straining, intent-ness;' which of its senses stāthā has in the line, I have not ventured to determine. Who the 'they' are, unless the sages of the preceding verse, it is hard to guess. The second quarter-verse gives an indication of lateness, much more important than any other in the hymn; it has pradaksīna (pradu) of the final syllable of each of the two clauses, signifying a balancing of the mind between two alternatives (mānāsād). There is no other case of it in the Rig-Veda; but half-a-dozen occur in the Atharvan, and it is by no means uncommon in the Brāhmaṇas.

The general character and value of the hymn are very clear. It is of the highest historical interest as the earliest known beginning of such speculation in India, or probably anywhere among Indo-European races. The attitude of its author and the audacity of his attempt are exceedingly noteworthy. But nothing is to be said in absolute commendation of the success of the attempt. On the contrary, it exhibits the characteristic weaknesses of all Hindu theosophy; a disposition to deal with words as if they were things, to put forth paradox and insoluble contradiction as profundity, and to get rid of anthropomorphic divinities by attributing an anthropomorphic personality to the universe itself. The unlimited praises which have been bestowed upon it, as philosophy and as poetry, are well-nigh nauseating.

At this point the Society took an hour's recess, and on assembling again, Prof. Abbot of Cambridge in the chair, continued to listen to communications.


Dr. Butler gave an interesting description of a durbar, held by the Viceroy of India near Delhi, in 1899, of which he was himself a witness. Its object was to