THE TEACHING OF VIMALAKIRTI

(VIMALAKĪRTINIRDEŚA)

from the French translation with Introduction and Notes (L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti)

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gāmin nor sakṛdāgāmin fruit; neither anāgāmin nor anāgāmin fruit; neither arhat nor arhat fruit; neither solitary Buddha nor solitary bodhi; neither Buddha nor bodhi".

Pañcavimsati, p. 261,8-13: asti prāptir asty abhisamayo na punar dvayam. api tu khalu punar lokavyavahārena prāptis cābhisamayas ca prajñapyate lokavyavahārena srotaāpanno vā sakrdāgāmī vā anāgāmī vā arhan vā pratyekabuddho vā bodhisattvo vā buddho vā prajñapyate na punah paramārthena prāptir nābhisamayo na srotaāpanno na sakrdāgāmī nānāgāmī nārhan na pratyekabuddho na bodhisattvo na buddah: "There is obtainment and understanding (of the truths), but not duality. Besides, it is in mundane language that there exists the question of obtainment and understanding of the truths; it is in mundane language that there exists the question of srotaāpanna, sakrdāgāmin, anāgāmin, arhat, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva or Buddha. In the true sense, there is nothing of all that".

Ratnakūta, T 310, ch. 39, p. 227 a 14: "Bodhi is not verified by the body $(k\bar{a}ya)$ or by the mind (citta). And why? The body is naturally without knowledge (iñāna) and without activity (caritra), like a grass (trna), a piece of wood (kāstha), a wall (bhitti), a reflection in a polished stone. It is the same with the mind, like an illusion (māvā), a mirage (marīci), the moon reflected in the water (udakacandra). To understand the body and the mind in this way is what is called bodhi. It is only in mundane language (lokavyavahāra) that there is a question of bodhi, but the true nature of bodhi is inexpressible (anirvācya). It cannot be obtained (prāpta) either by the body or by the mind, either by the dharma or the adharma, either by the real (bhūta) or the false (abhūta), either by truth (satva) or by falsehood (mṛṣā). And why? Because bodhi rejects discourse (vvavahāra) and rejects every real mark (dharmalaksana). Moreover, bodhi is without shape (samsthāna), without use (pravojana) and without discourse (vyayahāra). The same as space (ākāśasama) and without shape, it is inexpressible (anirvācva). To examine all dharmas correctly, is to say nothing of them. And why? Because in dharmas there is no discourse, and in discourse there are no dharmas. Beings do not understand the true principle (bhūtanava) of dharmas. The Tathāgata feels great compassion (mahākarunā) for them: that is why I am now teaching them the true principle of dharmas so that they can understand it clearly, for this is the truth (satya) and the true meaning (bhūtārtha)".

Ibid., p. 227 b 11: "Bodhi is synonymous with emptiness (śūnyatā). It is because emptiness is empty that bodhi is also empty. Because

bodhi is empty, all dharmas are empty. The Tathāgata understands all dharmas according to this emptiness. It is not by reason of the emptiness that he understands the emptiness of dharmas; it is through knowledge of the single true principle (ekabhūtanaya) that he understands that the nature of dharmas is empty. Emptiness and bodhi are not two distinct natures; and since there is no duality, it cannot be said: "This is bodhi, that is emptiness (śūnyatā)". If there were duality, it could be said: "This is bodhi, that is emptiness". But dharmas are without duality and without a mark of duality; without a name, without mark and without activity; absolutely inactive and without purpose (samudācāra). Thus the emptiness in question avoids all belief (grāha) and attachment (abhiniveśa). In absolute truth (paramārthasatyena), no dharma exists (upalabhyate): It is because they are empty of self-nature (svabhāvaśūnya) that they are called empty".

After a similar explanation, the Gayāśīrṣa, T 464, p. 482 a 8, concludes: "The mark of bodhi transcends the triple world, goes beyond convention (saṃvṛti) and the path of language (vyavahāramārga). It is by extinguishing all production that the thought of bodhi is produced. The production of bodhi is non-production".

NOTE VII: GOTRA AND TATHĀGATAGOTRA (Cf. Ch. VII, § 2).

Gotra "race, family", implies certain mental tendencies, permanent or acquired, which enable someone to obtain Nirvāṇa. Gotrabhū (Majjhima, III, p. 256,7; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 373,7; V, p. 23,7) is the name given to the man who will obtain the Ārya state which assures him of Nirvāṇa; agotraka is he who does not have this quality.

In the Anguttara, V, p. 193-195, the Buddha places among the fourteen restricted points (avyākrtavastu: cf. Nāgārjuna, Traité, p. 154-155) the question of knowing whether all beings will reach Nirvāṇa. But all those who will reach it will do so by the Path: the town of existence has only one way out. However Nāgasena answers the same question in the negative: na kho mahārāja sabbe va labhanti nibbānam (Milindapañha, p. 69,17; P. Demiéville, Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha, p. 151).

The early sources (Dīgha, III, p. 217) and the Abhidharma (Dhammasangani, p. 186; Kośa, III, p. 137) distinguish three categories (rāśi): 1. samyaktvaniyatarāśi, those who have entered the Path and

will rapidly attain Nirvāṇa; 2. mithyātvaniyatarāśi, those who, having committed serious offences, will certainly go to bad destinies, and who, once having left these bad destinies, will pass into the third rāśi; 3. aniyatarāśi, those who do not come under either the first or second rāśi, and can enter either.

In the course of time and the formation of various Vehicles of salvation, the problem of *gotra* became more complicated: cf. Sūtrālaṃ-kāra, p. 10-11; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 3-11; Siddhi, p. 103, 115, 562.

These sources distinguish: 1. prakṛtiṣṭha gotra or "original", innate, without a beginning. possessed through the very nature of things (paramparāgato 'nādikāliko dharmatāpratilabdhaḥ); 2. samudānīta gotra "acquired" through the previous practice of good roots (pūrvakuśalamūlābhyāsāt pratilabdhaḥ).

The Siddhi, l.c., posits five categories of people: 1-3. three niyatagotra "of determined family": Śrāvakagotra, Pratyekagotra and Tathāgatagotra. They will inevitably attain Nirvana, the first through the Śrāvaka Vehicle, the second through the Pratyekabuddha Vehicle and the third through the Great Vehicle; 4. aniyatagotra "of undetermined family": they will certainly attain Nirvana, but they can enter either the Śrāvaka Vehicle or the Pratyekabuddha one and, from there, either before or after having acquired righteousness (samyaktva), pass into the Great Vehicle; 5. the agotraka "without family", in whom are lacking, from the beginning and forever, the germs of Nirvāna. These last are also called icchantika, in Tibetan hdod chen po, "people of great desires". These are either those doomed through predestination, condemned to remain forever below in Samsāra for want of the roots of Nirvana, or Bodhisattvas who for the welfare of beings, will never become Buddhas and will always remain in Samsāra (Lankāvatāra, p. 27,5; 65,17; Mahāvyutpatti, No. 2210, 2223; Siddhi, Appendice, p. 724).

It is implied (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 4,10-12) that the three Vehicles lead respectively to Śrāvakabodhi, Pratyekabodhi and Anuttarā samyaksambodhih, that the first two only purify from the obstacle of the passions (kleśāvaraṇa) while the third supresses both the obstacle of the passions and the obstacle to knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa).

However, the question arises of knowing if the three Vehicles really do ensure Nirvāṇa.

1. The great scholars (Nāgārjuna, Asanga) accept, it seems, that Nirvāṇa can be reached through the three Vehicles.

Upadeśa, T 1509, ch. 74, p. 581 c 24 sq.: Among people of the [first]

two Vehicles, when their minds are pure $(an\bar{a}srava)$, their passions $(kle\dot{s}a)$ are exhausted $(k\dot{s}ina)$: thus, for them, no more fruition, no more merit... Moreover, those of the two Vehicles achieve the $bh\bar{u}takoti$: this is why they burn out all the qualities (guna).

Ibidem, ch. 28, p. 266 c 3 sq.: The knowledge (jñāna) of a Bodhisattva and the knowledge of a Śrāvaka are but one and the same knowledge. But the latter has no upāya, is not adorned with the mahāpraṇidhāna, does not possess either mahāmaitrī or mahākaruṇā, does not seek all the buddhaguṇa, does not seek the sarvākārajñāna so as to know all dharmas. He is averse only to jāti, jarā, maraṇa and severs the bonds of thirst (tṛṣṇābandhana). He goes directly to Nirvāṇa: that is the difference.

Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 68,15: Asaṅga submits the theory of the oneness of the Vehicles, identical on several points, particularly when concerned with the element of the Law (dharmadhātu), impersonality (nairātmya) and deliverance (vimukti), i.e. Nirvāṇa.

Samgraha, p. 256, in the notes: "For the Śrāvakas, etc., who dwell in the nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu, the body (kāya) and knowledge (jñāna) are extinguished like the flame of a lamp that goes out. Conversely, when Bodhisattvas have become Buddhas, the Law-body (dharmakāya) which they achieved (sākṣātkṛta) goes right on to the end of the round of rebirth (āsaṃsārakoṭeḥ) without undergoing extinction". Here the author is showing the superiority of the apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa of a Buddha over the nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa of a Śrāvaka. This implicitly admits that the Śrāvaka Vehicle does indeed lead to Nirvāna.

Ibidem, p. 326 in the notes: "The three Vehicles, in that they deliver from the obstacle of the passions (*kleśāvaraṇavimukti*), are identical. Also the Bhagavat has said: Between deliverance and deliverance, there is no difference".

Buddhabhūmiśāstra of Bandhuprabha, T 1530, ch. 5, p. 312 b 2-4: "People of determined family (niyatagotra) obtain Release (niḥsaraṇa) by relying on their own Vehicle. The aniyatagotra obtain Release, some by relying on the Great Vehicle, others by relying on the other Vehicles. Here by Release (niḥsaraṇa) we mean Nirvāṇa".

The Siddhi, p. 671-672, asserts that the Aśaikṣas of the Small and Great Vehicles possess the *sopadhiśeṣa* and *nirupadhiśeṣa* Nirvāṇa.

2. However several Mahāyānasūtras are diametrically opposed to this. According to them, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are mistaken in thinking they have attained Nirvāṇa: in fact they are far

from it. There is only one efficacious Vehicle: that of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, also called Great Vehicle. The Vehicles of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have been taught intentionally (samdhāya) so as to ripen beings. These, at a certain moment, will abandon their provisional Vehicle to enter the true Vehicle.

So therefore the term ekayāna can cover very different conceptions: for the scholars quoted above, there is a single Vehicle because the three Vehicles culminate in the same deliverance (vimukti), Nirvāna; for the Mahāyānasūtras from which we will quote extracts, there is a single Vehicle because only the third, the Great Vehicle, is efficacious.

Ratnakūta, T 310, ch. 119, p. 675 a 27: "Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas still have the remains of birth dharmas, they have not practised [to the end] the religious life (brahmacarya), they have not done what they had to do (akṛtam karaṇiyam), what they had to cut off (prahātavya) has not reached completion; they are far from Nirvāṇa. And why? Only Tathagatas, holy ones, fully and perfectly enlightened, achieve (sākṣātkurvanti) Nirvāna, are endowed with all the immense and inconceivable virtues (apramānācintyaguna); that which they had to cut off has been completely cut off; they are absolutely pure; they are esteemed by all beings; they have gone beyond the [first] two Vehicles and the realm (visaya) of the Bodhisattvas. But for Arhats, it is not so. To say that they obtain Nirvāṇa is skill in means (upāva) on the part of the Buddha. That is why Arhats are far from Nirvāna.

Ibidem, ch. 119, p. 676 b 6: Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas all enter the Great Vehicle, and this Great Vehicle is the Vehicle of the Buddhas. That is why the three Vehicles are a single Vehicle (ekayāna). To achieve the single Vehicle is to obtain anuttarā samyaksambodhih; and anuttarā samyaksambodhih is Nirvāna. Nirvāna is the pure Law-body (viśuddhadharmakāya) of the Tathāgatas. That which achieves this Law-body is the single Vehicle. There is no separate Tathagata, or separate Law-body: it is said that the Tathagata is the Law-body. That which achieves the definitive Law-body (atyantadharmakāya) is the definitive Single Vehicle (atyantaikayāna). The definitive single Vehicle is the cutting off of the series (samtānoccheda).

Saddharmapund., references above, VI, § 11, note 32. — In the same text, p. 210,1-4, five hundred Arhats themselves admit that they do not possess Nirvāṇa: atyayam vayam bhagavan deśayāmo yair asmābhir bhagavann evam satatasamitam cittam paribhāvitam idam asmākam parinirvānam parinirvrtā vayam iti yathāpīdam bhagavann avyaktā

akuśalā avidhijñāh. tat kasva hetoh. vair nāmāsmābhir bhagavams tathāgatajñane 'bhisamboddhavya evamrūpena parittena jñanena paritosam gatāh sma: "We confess our fault, O Blessed One, we ceaselessly nourished the thought that this was our Nirvana and that we had reached complete Nirvana; it is, O Blessed One, that we are not informed, we are not skilled, we are not instructed as we should be. And why? It is that when we should have reached the enlightenment of the Buddhas in the knowledge of the Tathagata, we contented ourselves with this limited knowledge of ours".

- 3. Vimalakīrti takes all these considerations to their furthest extremes:
- a. The distinction between the gotra of the Śrāvakas and the Tathagatagotra does not hold true, for "there is neither Bodhisattva mind nor Śrāvaka mind" (VIII, § 5), and as for bodhi, "no-one can draw near or away from it" (III, § 52).
- b. There is neither a right or wrong Path to Nirvāna (VIII, § 30), nor any Vehicle to traverse it, for "bodhi is already acquired by all beings and there is not a single being who is not already in Parinirvana" (III, § 51).
- c. Equally empty, Samsāra and Nirvāņa are the same (IV, § 12; VIII, § 13 and 29).
- d. In consequence, it is in Samsāra that Nirvāna should be sought. The holy one (ārya), certain of the supreme Good (avakrāntaniyāma), and who has seen the truths (drstasatva) "is not capable of producing anuttarasamyaksambodhi" (VII, § 3).

Thus, then, "the Tathagatagotra is the family of the sixty-two kinds of false views (drstigata), of all the passions (kleśa) and of all the bad dharmas [that prevail in Samsāra]" (VII, § 2).

NOTE VIII: PERFUMED AMRTA AND THE SACRED MEAL (Cf. Ch. IX, § 1, n. 1).

The title of Chapter IX in Tibetan is Sprul pas zal zas blans pa, "Obtaining of food by the imaginary (bodhisattva)" (nirmitena bhojanādānam). This food, in Ch. IX, § 11, is designated as ambrosia (Sanskrit amrta, Tibetan bdud-rtsi, Chinese kan-lu 世書).

In Sanskrit, amrta, taken substantively, has two main meanings: 1. immortality, 2. ambrosia (food or potion of immortality, antidote). Buddhist texts use it principally in the first meaning and make it a synonym of Nirvāṇa. For the benefit of beings, the Buddha

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as it is said the former three kinds (of pratyaya-sargas) are checks to siddhi (siddheh pūrvo'nkuśas trividhah). 'Pratyaya-sargas', as stated above, are divided into four (i. e. viparyaya, aśakti, tusti and siddhi), and these fours are subdivided into five, twentyeight, nine and eight respectively. Subdivisions, therefore, amount to fifty in all, and in these fifty three divisions (viparyaya, aśakti and tusti) and fourtytwo subdivisions (which belong to these threes) except siddhi (which has eight subdivisions) should be all rejected. Only siddhi should be obtained. Because the knowledge which is the right way to emancipation (mokṣa) is gained only by siddhi. In the above investigation we can see the contents of 'pratyaya-sarga' and critical summary to it.

"Gotra" in Haribhadra's Theory

Ryūkai Mano

1. "Gotra" and "Bodhisattva"

Haribhadra completed his Abhisamayālmkār' ālokā Prajñāpārmitāvyākhvā (ed. by Wogihara) (W.), by annotating Maitreya's Abhisamayālamkāraśāstra-kārikā (A.), which is a summary of the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sātra (P.), referring it to the Astasāhasrikā-p. (As.), the source of the (P.). Consequently, the theories developed in Haribhadra's book are based on the "sūtra", the P. and the As. His nomenclature corresponds to a certain extent with that used in the books written by Maitreya, Asanga and their school such as the Uttaratantra (U.) the Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra (M.) and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, though some of the terms are used in a different sense from that of the Yogācāra school. I would like to clarify the characteristics of his "gotra" theory, which is introduced in his above-mentioned book through his annotations, comparing it with the "sātra" which is its source, with theories of the Yogācara school, with his teacher, Bhadanta-Vimuktisena (The Tibetan Tripitaka, Pekin Ed. Mdo'hgrel, Kha 1-207) (B. V.), and further with Ārya-Vimuktisena, (ibid. Ka. 15-249) (Ā. V.), B. V. 's teacher.

If we trace the historical change of the meaning of "gotra", we find that it originally meant "what protects the cow or the earth." Then it came to mean "the cow tribe", "the tribe", "the family" and "lineage." In Buddhism, this word came to have a special meaning, that is "the fundamental element of bodhisattva's activities and the properties of a "buddha", and "gotra" theory develoed.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Cf. Kārikās, 47f. and n. 12.

^{(18) 1} ūha (reasoning), 2 śabda (oral instruction), 3 adhyayana (study), 4—6 duḥkha-vighāta-traya (three-fold suppression of pain), 7 suhṛt-prāpti (acquisition of friends), 8 dāna (purity). These are surely jñāna-mārga (way of knowledge or wisdom) in Sāmkhya aiming at mokṣa (extinction of pain). Cf. Kārikās, 1; 2; 37; 64ff.

⁽¹⁹⁾ In this paper at first I intend to describe, in detail, the critical attitude of the theory of nimitta-naimittika (=pratyaya-sarga) in four divisions of 'pratyaya-sarga'. But due to the limitation of space, to my great regret, I can not analyse completely each of four divisions and can only suggest, at any rate, the critical attitude of the theory of 'pratyaya-sarga'. The theory of 'pratyaya-sarga' corresponds, in a whole, to the theory of four noble truths (satya)—pain, the cause (of pain), the extinction (of pain) and the way to the extinction—, which clarifies every fallacy (asatya). This theory clarifies pain and the cause (of pain) which are in the causality of delusion in the world, and the extinction (of pain) and the way to the extinction which are in the causality of enlightenment. Viparyaya, aśakti and tusti correspond to pain and the cause (of pain), and siddhi to the extinction (of pain) and the way to the extinction. One has regrettably failed to point it out that Sāmkhya and Buddhism can be clearly compared one another as a philosophy aiming at jñāna-phala-mokṣa.

⁽¹⁾ Unrai Wogihara, Abhisamayālamkār'ālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā (The Work of Haribhadra), vols. I-VII (Tokyo, 1932-1935).

⁽²⁾ W. p. 76, I. 1 ~ p. 77, I. 31.

Haribhadra explains "gotra" in the following way. "Gotra" should be considered from two different points of view: the ultimate truth ("tattva"), and the worldly truth ("samvṛti"). We find no such clear-cut treatment in the B. V. or the Ā. V. or the A., on this explanation.

Harribhadra, in the W., expounds the idea on pp. 76-77. We may sum it up in one sentence: "gotra is 'bodhisattva'." Let me explain his argument further on three points.

(a) "Gotra" is a being who undertakes the activities of the "bodhi-sattva" ("pratipatter adhara") or the man who has the absolute within him. There is no similar remark in the A., while the \bar{A} . V. and the B. V. have only one sentence: "chos kyi dbyins rigs ñid yin" (the absolute is "gotra")

(b) From the point of the ultimate truth, because the "bodhisattva", upon whom Buddhism depends, has the absolute, as stated above, he has no support from, or adherence to, worldly existence. In this sense "bodhisavttva" may be called "a-gotra". Generally "a-gotra" signifies the last of five "gotras" of the Yogācāra school: a man who is unable to attain enlightenment. But in Haribhadra the word indicates the condition after a complete removal of the differences among all the concepts of "gotras."

This theory is based on the expression "apadārthah Subhute bodhisattva-padārthah" (nothing is real is meant by the word "bodhisattva") in a corresponding chapter in the "sūtra." "padārthah in the "sūtra" has the significance: "the meaning of the word"; and the "apadārtha" means "beyond expression," or "inexplicable." The word, however, has other meanings, such as "object," "thing," "category." Haribhadra replaced "padārtha" by "gotra", and through a negative explanation of the "Prajūāpāramitā", interpreted "a-padārtha" as meaning "a-gotra."

This theory of "a-padartha" or "a-gotra" is not found in the A. or the B. V. or the \bar{A} . V.. Being the annotation of the same book, they all

have similar structures and contents, often even almost the same expressions. Yet it is a remarkable fact that "apadartha" is not mentioned in any of them, except the W., while the Chinese translation expends a whole chapter on it.

Haribhadra's theory may have been a conscious refutation of the "prakṛtistha gotra" of the Yogācāra school.

(c) Though the "bodhisattva" is one who has the absolute within him, from the viewpoint of the worldly truth, there are thirteen aspects of "gotras" according to the difference among the dharmas in the activities of the "bodhisattva". They are the six paths to enlightenment (i. e. four "nirvedha-bhagiya", "darśanamārga", "bhāvanā-marga") (i-vi), the practice of the antidotes against illusions ("pratipipakṣôtpāda") (vii), the removing of illusions ("vipakaṣa-nirodha")(viii), the detachment from the prejudice accompanying both of them ("apagama") (ix), the possession of wisdom and pity (x), being different from "śrāvaka" ("asādhārarana") (xi), the continuous benefiting of others ("parārthānukrama") (xii), and the wisdom which works for others, without fixed idea and any effort (xiii).

Haribhadra gives these thirteen aspects of "bodhisattva" as the bearer ("adhara") of the truth following his teachers. It is important that he regards them not as kinds of "gotra" but as its different aspects.

Haribhadra also gives the following etymological explanation("nirukti") to "gotra", similar to that in the \bar{A} . $\stackrel{(7)}{V}$, B. $\stackrel{(8)}{V}$, and the $\stackrel{(9)}{M}$.

"niruktam tu gunottāranārthena dharma-dhātur gotram, tasmād dhi te gunā rohanti prabhavantīty arthah". (Etymologically, "go-tra", meaning the birth of virtue ("guna"), is "dharma-dhātu"; for out of it virtue increases and grows.)

The \bar{A} . V. and the B. V. are the same, except for Haribhadra's addition of "dharma-dhātur", while with the M. the underlined words are the same as in Haribhadra and rest is more or less alike. Yet the word "dharma-

^{(3) 68} b1.

^{(4) 43} a6.

⁽⁵⁾ W. p. 76, I. 9.

⁽⁶⁾ E. Conze, The large Satra on Perfect Wisdom, London, 1961. p. 96.

^{(7) 68} b7.

^{(8) 43} b5.

⁽⁹⁾ Sylvain Levi: mahāyāna-sūtrālamkārā, Paris, 1907, p. 11.

dhatu" is not found in the M. Both the \bar{A} . \bar{V} . and the B. \bar{V} . declare its identity of "gotra" and " $dharma-dh\bar{a}tu$ " in other places. Haribhadra's insertion of the word here may no more than an additional explanation. Yet as it is meant to be an etymologial explanation, I think that he meant " $guna-utt\bar{a}rana$ " to be " $dharma-dh\bar{a}tu$ " (meaning the 'truth-bearer' in this particular case)

If one emphasizes, as the Vijñānaschool does, a "non-dual wisdom" which is always pure, how can one maintain the idea of approaching purity step by step ("uttarottara") through exercises? Haribhadra, like the \bar{A} . V. and the B. V., declares that it is impossible, since the wisdom is always pure. In this conception, "guna-uttāra" is "guna-uttarottāra" and the "bodhisattva" gradually achieves greater virtue through his nevertiring exercises.

The Bodhisattva-bhūmi gives as synonyms, "ādhāra.", "niśraya", "up-astambha", "hetu", "pūrvaṃgama", "nilaya", "bīja" "dhātu", "prakṛti", etc.. "gotra, dhātu", are used as synonyms for "tathāgata-garbha" in the U.. Among these meanings, Haribhadra accepts "ādhāra" and "dhātu" but rejects "bīja". It is because "bīja" is often limited to a single fixed category, and also because it is a term characterizing the Yogācāra school. He accepts "dhātu" because it is the absolute, and "ādhāra" because it means one who possesses or who acts and does not mean individualty, and such conceptions agree with the ideas of non-substantiality ("sūnyatā") "prajāāramitā", and "bodhisattva".

2. Refutation of the Theory of the Inherent Purity of Human Nature.

As stated above, Vijñāna-vādin insists, concerning "gotra", that human beings are pure by nature. Haribhadra, as successor to B. V. and Ā. V., followed their doctrines and refuted Vijñāna-vādin's theory by saying that if men are born pure, there can be no gradual improvement culminating in high purity ("uttarottara-viśuddhi-viśeṣāgamana"). He thinks that there is no need for people pure by nature to undergo the practices of the "bodhisattva" and that "the path" will become unnecessary.

The Vijnāna school may refute this opinion by saying that purity is like that of water, gold or the void, which are pure, but can be soiled by dust, and, therefore, an effort to remove the dust will mean an increase of purity. Again, Haribhadra refutes Vijnāna-vādin's opinion as follows.

To take away the dust presupposes some virtue which takes away ("prati-pakṣa") and something to be taken away ("vipakṣa"). Therefore, as long as we retain these contrastive thoughts, we are led into the absurd conclusion of restricted purity ("pradeśikaśuddhi"). This kind of conflict is contained to a considerable extent in Haribhadra's own notes, but he treats this conflict from the viewpoint of the worldly truth and not from the essential concept of the ultimate truth. Since, in his commentary, he deals mainly with the "prajūaramitā-sūtra" which is a criticism of "Abhidharma-buddhism", he is apt to use technical terms of "Abhidharma-buddhism" which deals with contrastive ideas; and comparisons and analyses of individual terms are employed to rearrange them. These analyses, however, seem to be used for convenience sake.

Haribhadra states further, concerning one passage in the "sūtra": "There may be a kind of 'bhikṣu', like a poor mute goat, who pursues neither practice nor 'śīla' in future. Such monks advocate sham teachings,

^{(10) 68} b1.

^{(11) 43} a7.

⁽¹²⁾ W. p9, I. 10.

^{(13) 70} a.

^{(14) 44} b.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Taisho Shinshū Daizokyo, vol. XXX, 478, C; Unrai Wogihara, Bodhisattva-bhūmi, Tokyo, 1930, p. 2.

⁽¹⁶⁾ W. p. 79, I. 9~14; E. Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamayālamkāra, London, 1933, pp. 98~99.

⁽¹⁷⁾ \bar{A} . V. 68 b1; B. V. 43 a7~.

⁽¹⁸⁾ W. p. 79. I. 11: "ab-dhātu-kanak'akāsa-suddhivac chuddhir isyate"; Susumu Yamaguch, Madhyānta Vibhāga-tikā, Tokyo, 1934, p. 52. I. 8 (I~16); Taisho Shinshā Daizokyo, vol. XXXI, p. 452, C.

M. p. 58. I. 18 (IX~13)"Yasyākāśa-suvarna-vārisadršī kleśādviśuddhirmatā //; Taisho Shinshū Daizokyo, vol. XXXI, p. 611b: 謂空金水。

⁽¹⁹⁾ W. p. 298.

'prativarnika', believing that they are explaining 'prajāāpāramitā' to others." The "bhikṣu", mentioned in this passage, is understood to mean a Vijñāna-vādin who belongs to Mahāyana, since he never practises concentrated meditation through the negation of a real essence ("nihsvabhāvatva") removing himself from the nature of one and many ("ekāneka-svabhāva"), such as the six consciousnesses. Therefore, Haribhadra denies Vijñānavādin's theory which admits, in man's nature. and in "gotra", individual consciousness and the differentiation of the subject and the object.

3. On Discrimination and Indiscrimination of "Gotra" (Notes on the 39th $K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$)

Distinction between the subclasses of "gotra", especially between "prakrtistha-gotra" (the primordial "gotra") and "samudānīta-gotra" (the attained "gotra"), and between "niyata-gotra" (the definite "gotra") and "aniyata-gotra" (the indefinite "gotra") are refuted by Haribhadra as being absurd.

As "dharma-dhātu", the absolute, is the cause of the cognition of the sacred doctrine, "bodhisattva" who has the absolute as a basis is the "gotra" of the supreme Buddhism which exists by nature ("prakṛtistha"). Because the absolute is universal, the restriction. ("niyata") which takes "gotra" to be "bodhisattva" alone is absurd. Wherever the absolute exists is "bodhisattva", and there is no discrimination of "gotras".

The reason why Haribhra sets up his theory of "gotra" under such basic considerations is as follows. According to the order of the cognition of "śrāvaka", etc., the sacred doctrine is made the object of their cognition in different degrees. And at each level of cognition the absolute is the fundamental element for the attainment of the sacred doctrine. The term "gotra" is merely given to each rank of the "śrāvaka", etc. That is, it is an undenible fact that the saint should show proofs of attainment according to his ability and the order of the path. Haribhadra explains "gotra" as comprising activities and the progressive steps of the path.

In the *M*. (III-(2)), it is stated that the existence of the "gotra" is rationalized by the distinctions among the element ("dhatu"), the belief ("adhimkti"), the activity ("pravrtti"), and the result (phala"). Because of the existence of the distinctions, a foundation to support them must exist, and such distinctions have existed from the beginning ("prathamatas"). Though Haribhadra quotes many kārikas from the *M*., his standpoint is basically different from that of the *M*.

Haribhadra explains such distinctions as the three "yānas" through the following comparison. His explanation is based on the fact that "adhāra", a synonym of "gotra", has another meaning, that of "a vessel" or "a jar." Just as jars ("ghata"), which are a kind of utensil ("adhāra") made of the same clay and by the same fire, are differentiated by the things contained ("adhēya") such as honey or sugar, there are differences among the bearers of activities (("pravṛtti-)adhāra") because there are distinctions in the "dhārma" which may be held, or attained, or founded ("adhēya") on it, although the "gotra" itself is essentially the same. Thus, Haribhadra insists, there are no inconsistencies in his argument

4. On the "Kārikas," Quoted in the Uttaratantra

"Kārik," (V-21) is also quoted in the explication of the U. (I-154). Let us consider the differences in the interpretation of the "kārika". It is a remarkable fact that while the A. has never been translated into Chinese, the "kārika", which is a part of the A., alone should have been included in the U. in translation. The following are the "kārika", the corresponding "sātra", and I shall also give the kārika of Aśvaghoṣa, which is the source of "kārika" (V-21).

⁽²⁰⁾ W. p. 77.

⁻⁻⁻Kārika----

a- b- -b -a
"nāpaneyam atah kimcit prakṣeptavyam na kim cana |
draṣṭavyam bhūtato bhūtam, bhūta-darśī vimucyate| |" (V-21)

⁽²¹⁾ E. Conze, The Prajāāpāramitā Literature, London, 1960, p. 102; Seiren Matsunami, "Aśvaghośa", One of the Promoters to the Yogācāra-school Doctrines, 133 Memoirs of Taishō University, vol.XXXIX (1954), p. 191. (22) W. p. 885, I. 17~18.

"Gotra" in Harbhadra's Theory (R. Mano)

(31)

(a-a. 不相捨離相 不增減法, b-b. "upaneyam" (U.))

(There is nothing to be detracted from it nor anything to add.

The truth is to be regarded as the truth. One who sees the truth is liberated from the ties of the world. //)

----Sūtra----

"ahetukam utpadyamānam na kaściddharmam samanupaśyati" vā śāntam vā aśāntam vā śubham va aśubham....na samanupaśyati"

知是<u>觀察緣起法時</u>不見有法無因生 不見有法無因滅……不見有法……若不淨若寂靜 活不寂靜

觀十二因緣時 不見法無因緣生不見法……不見寂滅若非寂滅

—Kārikā of Aśvaghosa——

"nāpaneyam tatah kimcitprakṣepyam nāpi kimcana | draṣtavyam bhūtato bhūtam yādrṣ́am ca yathā ca yat ||' (X111-44)

Although "atah" originally means "from that", so that the word means, in the "kārika", "from 'bhāta'," Haribhadra insists that it means "for the reason that adherence to worldly existence makes deliverence impossible". "Constancy" here means constancy in the truth. "Bhūta" signifies "pratītyasamutpanna", therefore, "from 'bhūta'" means from "rapadinihsvābhāva." This explanation is given in connection with the interpretation of the underlined part of the "sūtra" quoted above.

In the *U*. the concept of decrease and increase is naturally considered in relation to "tathāgatagarbha." As "tathāgatagarbha" is pure by nature, there is no defilement to be removed, nor any purity to be added.

As for the "kārika", Haribhadra bases his ideas on the "sūtra" and the doctrnie of "prajnāpāramitā", while the U. is based on the "tathāgatagarbha." Haribhadra regards the "bodhisattva", who experiences "prajnāpāramitā", as the practicer of the exercise and a whole person. In other

words, in my opinion, his analytic and systematic explanation of the defilement and purity by nature is incomplete, compared with the "tathagatagarbha" theory.

Concluciusion

The ideas regarding the "gotra" and the foundation of the path developed by Haribhadra who follows his teachers may be summed up as follows:

- 1) In comparison with the Vijnāna-school and the "tathāgatagarbha" theory which give an analytic explanation to man's psychology, Haribhadra insists that the "bodhisattva" as a whole man is "gotra."
 - 2) Bodhisattva's essential nature is the absolute ("dharmadhātu").
- 3) Etymologically, "gotra" means "gunottara." But in Haribhadra's interpretation, "gotra" signifies further a step-by-step increase of virtue ("gunottarottara"), indicating both the path and the steps on it. In other words, the path is the steps.
- 4) "Gotra" has no inherent distinctions. The various differences of "gotra" are due to the particular sacred doctrine held and practised.
- 5) Since "gotra" owes its existence to the experience of enlightenment, Haribhadra's concept of the gotra is incomplete in its logical structure.

(昭和41年度,文部省科学研究費(総合研究)による研究成果の一部)

⁽²³⁾ Taisho Shinshū Daizokyo, vol. XXXI, 840a.

⁽²⁴⁾ P. Ms. Tokyo, No. 29, 361a 4.

⁽²⁵⁾ ibid., vol. VII. 315a.

⁽²⁶⁾ ibid., vol. VIII, 364c.

⁽²⁷⁾ E. H. Johnston, M. A., The Saundarananda of Aśvaghoşa, London, 1928, p. 24.

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KOMMISSIONSVERLAG E. J. BRILL, LEIDEN — KÖLN KOMMISSIONSVERLAG GEROLD & CO., WIEN Das ist eine ausgesprochen metaphysische Denkweise. Der Materialist Uddālaka aber mit seiner Auffassung der sich ständig wandelnden Materie und mit seiner Zurückführung des Denkens auf Materie verkörpert uns die damalige noch sehr unentwickelte dialektische Denkweise. Es gab also in Indien um etwa 600 v. u. Z. bereits wirkliche Philosophie mit ihren beiden Denkrichtungen des Materialismus und Idealismus und ihren beiden Denkweisen, der dialektischen und metaphysischen. ¹⁰

ĀRYA AND BHADANTA VIMUKTISENA ON THE GOTRA-THEORY OF THE PRAJ \widetilde{N} ĀPĀRAMITĀ

By David Seyfort Ruegg, Leiden

While occasionally alluded to in the Pāli Nikāyas and well known to the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and Theravādins it is in some Sūtras and above all in certain Śāstras of the Mahāyāna that the gotra-theory dealing with the 'spiritual Lineage' figures as a topic of prime importance. In these treatises the theory underwent development along the lines of evolution being followed by the Mahāyānist schools; and especially noteworthy references to the gotra are to be found in four of the five treatises usually attributed by the Indo-Tibetan traditions to Maitreya(nātha), viz. the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Madhyāntavibhāga — which are classified as Vijñānavāda works —, the Abhisamayālaṃkāra — a manual on the Prajñāpāramitā philosophy which is considered to be a Mādhyamika work conforming in general with the Svātantrika viewpoint —, and the Ratnagotravibhāga — which some authorities held to be a Vijñānavāda work while others, rather more convincingly, consider it to be a Mādhyamika one (belonging to a proto-Prāsaṅgika tendency).

The term gotra has often been rendered by the word (spiritual) Lineage, and provided that the somewhat conventional character of this translation is kept in mind it is appropriate since the gotra-theory was evidently derived in part from the idea of the spiritual family of the buddha. This rendering is moreover supported by the Tibetan technical equivalent rigs, a word denoting the family or lineage. On the other hand, the Chinese equivalent hsing brings out another meaning of the term which is based on the conception of the gotra as a kind of 'nature' and original principle 1.

¹⁰ So etwa möchte ich heute einen meiner frühesten Aufsätze: Indische und griechische Metaphysik, ZII 8, 1931, pp. 147ff. neu formulieren.

¹ In his excellent anthology: Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin, 1956), E. Frauwallner has adopted the translation 'Keim' (pp. 258, 260), which he also uses for the second part of the compound tathāgatagarbha (p. 261); this rendering is certainly justifiable especially in view of the fact that, in his interpretation of the Sautrāntika bija-theory, Yaśomitra equates a 'germ' or 'seed' (bijam), a 'capacity' (sāmarthyam) and the gotra and also in view of the fact that the gotra and tathāgatagarbha have often been assimilated. In the case of the Mahāyāna texts however there is a difficulty in this rendering, namely that the gotra is usually represented less as a contained essence than as a container or support (see below). The multiple values of the term gotra make it in any case practically impossible to translate without stressing onesidedly one or the other of its meanings; in the Mahāyānist texts with which we are concerned here the term combines the values of lineage and mine (in the sense of matrix or source); some aspects of the twin origins and dual value of the gotra are treated in the present writer's forth-

In the Abhisamayālamkāra (AA) the gotra (= rigs) has been mentioned several times. The basic passage bearing on the soteriological and metaphysical significance of this principle is found in the first chapter where it is presented as the ground or basis (pratisthā = $\bar{a}dh\bar{a}rah$, 'support', AA 1.5) of the thirteen forms of the Practice (pratipattih = sgrub pa; cf. 1.5) of the bodhisattva and where it is explained that because of the indivisibility — or non-differentiation — of the dharmadhātu there can be no real division in the gotra (1.38d-39ab):

..... pratișțhā gotram ucyate ||

dharmadhātor asambhedād gotrabhedo na yujyate

The AA however observes that if, despite this close interrelation between the gotra and the dharmadhātu, the scriptures have nevertheless referred to different gotras, this is due not to the real nature of the gotra itself but merely to the difference in that which is supported by, or contained in, the gotra, i. e. the Vehicles (yānāni) corresponding to the paths of the different types of sentient beings (sattvāḥ) and in particular the Auditor (śrāvakaḥ), the follower of the path of the Pratyekabuddha and the Bodhisattva (1.39 cd):

ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tadbhedaḥ parigīyate ||

Owing to the highly technical, condensed and often synoptical character of the verses of the AA it is usually necessary to turn to the commentators when attempting to establish the meaning(s) and philosophical import of a term occuring in this treatise. The oldest extant commentary on the AA is the Vṛtti by Ārya-Vimuktisena which explains the AA by correlating its topics with the subject matter of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā ². It is true that Haribhadra (end of the 8th centruy) refers to two earlier works, a Bhāṣya by Asaṅga and a Paddhati by Vasubandhu, which expound the doctrine of the AA³; but although commentaries on other Prajñāpāramitā texts attributed to these two doctors have been preserved ⁴, neither the Bhāṣya nor the Paddhati has come down to us ⁵. Consequently Ārya-Vimuk-

coming study on the theory of the gotra and tathāgatagarbha. — On the gotra see also E. Lamotte, L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Louvain, 1962), p. 425f.

tisena's is the oldest available commentary on the AA. It was followed in time — and to a certain extent in wording also — by Bhadanta-Vimuktisena's Vārttika, which is referred to in the AAĀ immediately after the Vrtti 6.

Little is unfortunately known about these two early masters of the Prajñā-pāramitā who are both known by the name Vimuktisena and are usually distinguished by their respective titles of Ārya (an epithet applied to a person who has reached a stage of spiritual 'nobility' on the parth of the Bodhisattva) and Bhadanta (a lower title) b. The colophon of the Vṛtti contained in the Nepalese manuscript as well as in Tibetan translation in the bsTan gyur merely states that Ārya-Vimuktisena was the nephew of a certain Buddhadāsa, a master of many Vihāras of the Kaurukulla-Āryasammatīya school b. Bu ston (1290—1364) in his Chos 'byun reproduces the information contained in this colophon according to which he was the nephew (dbon po = napta) of Buddhadāsa, adding only that he was a pupil of Vasubandhu 10. In his rGya gar chos byun Tāranātha (born in 1575) on the other hand provides a considerable

² The Sanskrit text of this work procured by G. Tucci has just been published up to the end of the first section by C. Pensa in the Serie Orientale Roma XXXVII (Rome, 1967). The whole of the work is also available in the Tibetan translation made by Go mi chi med and (rNog) Blo ldan ses rab (1059—1109) contained in the bsTan cgyur with the Sanskrit title Āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛttiḥ.

Abhisamayālamkārālokā-prajňāpāramitāvyākhyā (AAĀ), introductory verses.
 See G. Tucci, Minor Tibetan Texts I (Roma, 1956); E. Conze, Prajňāpāramitā Literature ('s-Gravenhage, 1960), pp. 67-68.

⁵ Haribhadra does not appear to quote directly from them in his AAĀ, and it is possible that he knew of them only by name. (In his Vṛttiḥ, f. 1b, Haribhadra remarks besides that even Bhadanta-Vimuktisena had not received the whole of the relevant Sāstra.)

In his Vṛtti Haribhadra refers to Asaṅga's commentary as a rnam béad (f. 1b3; see also Tāranātha, rGya gar chos cbyun, ed. Schiefner, p. 88.8). In his Chos cbyun (f. 105a) Bu ston calls this work, which is said to have correlated the AA

and the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra's meaning, the De ñid rnam nes = Tattvaviniścaya (cf. dPac bo gTsug lag phren ba, mKhas paci dgac ston, tsa, f. 17b), a name taken from the second of the introductory verses of Haribhadra's AAĀ, where the word tattvaviniścaya however need not be understood as the title of a book.

E. OBERMILLER (History of Buddhism by Bu ston, p. 140, note) and E. Conze (op. cit., p. 94) have stated that Asanga's authorship of this commentary has been questioned by Tson kha pa. Their statement is however based on a misunderstanding; indeed, since the work in question does not exist in Tibetan translation and since Tson kha pa had not seen it, he would scarcely have ventured to make such a categorical statement. What he does say is that the commentary on the Samdhinirmocanasūtra attributed to Asanga (P. Cordier, Catalogue III, p. 491—492) which refers to a Viniścaya cannot really be Asanga's (Legs bśad snin po, f. 20a—b; cf. f. 16b of Khon ston Dpal cbyor lhun grub's dKac cgrel on the Legs bśad snin po). Moreover, Tson kha pa mentions elsewhere the possibility that Asanga's commentary might be a Ni khri de nid rnam nes (Legs bśad gser phren, I, f. 16b).

⁶ Translated at the time of King Byan chub cod by Śāntibhadra and Śākya cod with the Sanskrit title Ārya-Pancavimsatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadesasāstrābhisamayālamkārakārikāvārttikam.

⁷ It is to be noted that the word ārya 'noble, saint(ly)' has (like gotram) been taken over from the social sphere; with its new meaning it is used as a technical term to denote the Saint, i. e. the spiritual noble who has reached at least the darśanamārga. In the case of Ārya-Vimuktisena this is the first bhūmi of the Bodhisattva, the pramuditā, according to the majority of our sources (cf. however Tāranātha, rGya gar chos cbyun, p. 109).

⁸ On the precise significance of these titles see Haribhadra's commentaries (in his Vṛtti the Bhadanta is said to have reached the dad pa'i sa = śraddhābhūmiḥ) and the Legs bśad gser phren.

⁹ The Tibetan version of the Sanskrit colophon (quoted by C. Pensa on p. 1 note 1 of his edition; cf. also E. Conze, IIJ 7 [1964], p. 230) reads: ^cphags pa man pos bkur ba ku ru ku la^ci sde pa gtsug lag khan rgya chen po du ma^ci bdag po | slob dpon san rgyas ^cbans kyi tsha bo.

On the Kaurukullakas (or Kurukul[l]ikas) — a branch of the Sammatiya school — see A. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule (Saigon, 1955), pp. 19, 21, 25—26, 40, 122; G. Tucci, EW 14 (1963), pp. 150—151.

¹⁰ Bu ston Chos cbyun, f. 111a.

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amount of information which it is however not easy for us to assess 11. He states (p. 99) that the Ārya was a younger contemporary of Buddhapālita (c. 500?) and also a contemporary of Bhavya (Legs ldan; cf. p. 113); but like Bu ston Tāranātha also holds him (p. 108) to have been a pupil of Ācārva Vasubandhu, from whom he is indeed said to have heard the Prajñāpāramitā. Tāranātha also writes that the Ārya, who had not asked Vasubandhu for the Upadeśa (man nag) of the Prajnaparamita, received it from a certain *Samgharakşa (dGe cdun bsrun ba, p. 108) 12. At the same time this historiographer records the opinion of some Indian authorities who considered that the Ārva never studied under Vasubandhu, that he was the pupil of Dignāga (c. 440-520), and that he received the Abhisamaya from Ācārya Dharmadāsa (Chos cbans) and the Upadeśa from Bhavya. But Tāranātha himself accepts the tradition according to which the Ārya was Vasubandhu's last disciple (p. 108) 13. He is in fact commonly included in a group of four disciples of Vasubandhu each of whom became especially famous in one particular subject: Sthiramati in Abhidharma, Dignāga in logic, Vimuktisena in Prajñāpāramitā, and Gunaprabha in Vinaya 14.

These statements are difficult for us to evaluate for not only is the name of Vasubandhu surrounded by a number of complex historical problems but also many of the above mentioned persons are virtually unknown; Vasubandhu (II) is usually placed in the 5th century, while Buddhapālita and Bhavya ¹⁵ are placed respectively at the beginning and in the middle of the 6th century. However, as regards this relatively early dating of Ārya-Vimuktisena, it can at least be said that if the AA was in fact written down at the time of Asanga (as tradition has it), it would not be surprising to find that such an extensive and important commentary as the Vṛtti was written on it at a fairly early time.

Ārya-Vimuktisena's doctrinal position has been defined by Haribhadra as that of a Mādhyamika ¹⁶, and this description accords with the usual

11 Tāranātha's information is perhaps not quite as unreliable as has sometimes been thought; it is however difficult for us to assess until we know how to read, analyze and use it.

13 Arya-Vimuktisena quotes Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa (e. g. 6.24; see below).

14 See for example mKhas grub rje (1385-1438), rGyud sde spyi rnam, f. 24a.
15 Reference is no doubt made to the famous Svātantrika-Mādhyamika doctor.

classification of the AA as a treatise the tenor of which generally agrees with the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika theory. It is perhaps for this reason that the second Indian tradition recorded by Tāranātha makes the Ārya a pupil not only of Dignāga but also of the renowned Svātantrika-Mādhyamika master Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka). The Ārya is moreover stated to have been a younger contemporary of Buddhapālita, and this could also account for Mādhyamika influence in his work. Tāranātha relates besides that he received a prophetic indication (vyākaraṇam) from Ārya-Maitreya, who said that he should proceed to the Vihāra of Vārāṇasī; there he met the Upāsaka *Śāntavarman (Ži ba °i go cha) and found the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā in eight chapters (Ñi khri le brgyad ma) 17 which had been brought there from the South and with which he correlated the topics of the AA, commenting jointly on these two works for the first time in the sense of the Madhyamaka of the Niḥsvabhāvavādins (p. 108).

With regard to the Ārya's doctrinal position the Tibetan doxographers are even more precise when they describe him, together with Haribhadra, as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (rnal byor spyod pa i dbu ma ran rgyud pa); like the Vijnānavādins he is in fact held to have accepted the theory of the non-existence of an external object (bāhyārthaḥ). Ārya-Vimuktisena would thus be an early forerunner of Śāntarakṣita (8th century), whose Madhyamakālamkāra is considered to be the basic source for this school 18.

It should however be noted that these doxographers at the same time consider that the section of the AA dealing with the gotra agrees with the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika theory (see below).

Even less seems to have been known to our authorities about the life of the Ārya's namesake Bhadanta-Vimuktisena. While Bu ston merely remarks that some authorities held him to be a pupil of Ārya-Vimuktisena (Chos cbyun, f. 111a 3) 19, Tāranātha makes him a contemporary of Candrakīrti (7th

¹² A slob dpon dGe cdun bsrun ba (Ācārya Samgharaks[it]a?) is mentioned by cJam dbyans bźad pa in the chapter of his Grub mthac chen mo devoted to the Sautrāntikas (ga, f. 8a1); and from this source Wassiliew took the name (Der Buddhismus, p. 279-307). On him L. de La Vallée Poussin wrote (L'Abhidharmakośa VI, Introduction, p. XLIX): ,Nous ne connaissons pas ce docteur'. He cannot be identified with Samgharakṣa, the author of a Yogācārabhūmi who lived in about the 2nd century A. D. (see P. Demiéville, BEFEO 1954, p. 3394).

On a different Bhavya (7th cent.?) v. J. NAGASAWA, IBK 10/1 (1962), p. 40 n. l.

16 Sphutärthä Vṛttih, introductory verses: cphags paci khons su gtugs pa yi ||
rnam par grol ba žes byas kyan || des byas byas pa min mthon nas || dbu mar gnas
paci blos rnam phye || — Cf. Legs béad gser phren, I, f. 18a.

 $^{^{17}\,\}rm This$ is of course not the Le brgyad ma associated with Haribhadra and included in the bsTan $^{\rm c}{\rm gyur}.$

¹⁸Cf. ^cJam dbyans bźad pa, Grub mtha^c chen mo, ca, f. 10a-b; Phar phyin mtha^c dpyod, I, f. 11a (= p. 22 of the Banāras reprint); Gun than dKon mchog bstan pa^ci sgron me, Phar phyin mchan (kha/1), f. 7a.

To resolve the historico-systematic problem arising from the difficulty of considering Sāntarakṣita to be the 'way-maker' (sin rta srol cbyed) of the Yogā-cāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school if Ārya-Vimuktisena had already taught the same doctrine before him some authorities have made the Ārya as well as Haribhadra the pupil of Sāntarakṣita; see e. g. mKhas grub rje, op. cit., f. 26a (and E. Ober-Miller, Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, AO 11 [1932], p. 90 n. 2). The hypothesis that the Ārya was a contemporary of Haribhadra is rejected by Tāranātha (op. cit. p. 153.16).

More specifically, Śāntarakṣita is said to be a sākāravādin and Haribhadra a samala-nirākāravādin. Cf. cJam dbyans bźad pa, Phar phyin mthac dpyod, I,

¹⁹ Cf. Legs báad gser phren, I, f. 19a5; dPac bo gTsug lag phren ba, op. cit., tsa, f. 18-19a.

century) and a devotee of Maitreyanātha but adds that he had been unable to see his history (lo rgyus; rGya gar chos cbyun, p. 123) 20.

Notwithstanding the obscurity surrounding their lives it is at all events clear that both these masters of the Prajñāpāpramitā were predecessors of Haribhadra (a contemporary of Śrī-Dharmapāla, who reigned at the end of the 8th century) since they are referred to in both the Sphuṭārthā-Vṛṭtiḥ and the Abhisamayālamkārālokā. Moreover, the Vṛṭti and the Vārṭtika differ from the AAĀ in their treatment of the topics of the AA, and while this may be due in part to the fact that they follow the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā while the AAĀ follows the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā, Haribhadra's theory of the gotra for example appears to be more developed; at all events his treatment of it is much fuller.

According to the verse quoted above from the AA, the gotra is so closely linked with the dharmadhātu that from the non-differentiation of the dharmadhātu it must follow that there can be no real difference in the gotra, but only in that which it supports or contains. Now, as the commentators observe, since we cannot therefore speak of ultimately separate gotras of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva, the corrollary of this non-differentiation is that the Vehicle (yānam) carrying one to liberation is itself in the last analysis also one and unique (ekayānam), that the institution of three Vehicles (triyānavyavasthānam) corresponding to the conditionally (gnas skabs) distinct gotras of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva accordingly does not correspond to an ultimate distinction, and that the teaching concerning three distinct yānas is intentional (ābhiprāyika) and of indirect meaning (neyārtha). Many Tibetan commentators conclude then that the doctrine of the AA and its commentaries on these points is in agreement not with the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika theory but with the Prāsangika-Mādhyamika, who will in fact accept that not only the Arya-Bodhisattva but also the Saints (āryāh) amongst the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have an understanding of the Insubstantiality of all things (dharmanairātmyam) as well as of the Insubstantiality of the individual (pudgalanairātmyam).

The Vrtti of Arya-Vimuktisena

Ārya-Vimuktisena begins his commentary on AA 1. 37—39 in conjunction with the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā by identifying the Support of Practice with the gotra (pratipattyādhāro vaktavyah | gotram ity arthah |; p. 73). By corre-

lating the thirteen forms or conditions (avasthā) of this Support enumerated in the AA (1. 37—38) with the parallel passages of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā he then brings out the meaning of the gotra on the soteriological plane as the support for the different factors of the bodhisattva's path beginning with the factors conducive to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīyāni). The passage in question of the Sūtra insists in particular on the fact that the bodhisattva is not to be taken as a 'real thing' (padārthah) or a substantive entity (dravyam) 21.

Before turning to the metaphysical implications of the gotra-theory Ārya-Vimuktisena first takes up the question of the definition (lakṣaṇam, p. 76) of the gotra which has been variously given by the Vijñānavādins and Ābhidhar-mikas. He begins by quoting the Sūtra (p. 76): 'O Subhūti, the great bodhisattva must learn and practise (śikṣ-) non-attachement (asaktatā) to all dharmas and their not-coming-into-existence (asadbhūtatā = yod par ma gyur pa ñid, i. e. to the fact that they do not truly exist), and this with reference to (upādāya) non-imagination (akalpanatā = rtog pa med pa) and non-conceptualization (anavakalpanatā = rnam par rtog pa med pa).' He then explains that imagination and conceptualization are notional attachment (abhiniveśaḥ) to things (vastu) and their objective marks (nimittam); on the other hand from the absence of these two comes non-attachment (asaktiḥ), and non-coming-into-existence (asadbhūtatā) is the Thusness (tathatā) of all dharmas. Consequently, the dharmadhātu being the cause (rgyu: hetuḥ) of the 'noble' dharmas (āryadharmāḥ), the gotra existing by nature (prakṛtistham) is the Support of Practice 22.

Now if such a principle as the prakṛtisthagotra exists it may be asked why it is that even now there can exist a living being (prāṇī) possessing this prakṛtisthagotra who has nevertheless still not attained nirvāṇa— and this despite the fact that in the cycle of existences (saṃsāraḥ) without a beginning (ādivarjitaḥ) buddhas as numerous as the sands of the Gaṅgā have reached parinirvāṇa.— This difficulty is set aside by reference to the fact that living beings are impeded by a fourfold evil (ādīnavaḥ), viz. Affects (kleśāḥ), evil friends (durmitrāḥ), lack (vighātaḥ) 23, and dependence (paratantratā). It is therefore stated here that the absence of interruption (bar chad med pa: *nirantaram) is the prakṛtisthagotra 24.

Others have held that the gotra is a particularity of the six Bases (sadāyata-

³⁰ Haribhadra seems to have considered that the Bhadanta's interpretation of the AA is not complete (cf. Legs béad geer phren, I, f. 18b); and Tson kha pa appears to think that he explained it from the Vijñānavādin point of view (id., f. 19b2).

²¹ Compare the version of the Pañcaviméatisāhasrikā published by N. Dutt, p. 160ff. (and E. Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom [London, 1961], p. 96f.).

²² The dGe lugs pas have relied on this passage amongst others to establish that the Saint of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha categories can also comprehend the *dharmanairātmya*. Cf. e. g. rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, rNam bśad sňiň po^ci rgyan, f. 110 bf. (translated in the work announced above, n. 1).

²³ See Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra 3.7, where vighātah is translated as cphone (pa), destitution', i. e. upakaranavighātah, ,lack of the necessaries'.

²⁴ This becomes rgyun mi ^cchad pa in the Tibetan translation of the Vārttika (see below).

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naviśeṣaḥ ²⁵) and that it is of two kinds, viz. the gotra acquired (samudānītam = yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa) through conditions (pratyayāḥ) and the gotra existing by nature (prakṛtyavasthitam) ²⁶. Now if when explaining the meaning of the word prakṛti in the compound prakṛtisthagotra they hold it to be an equivalent (paryāyaḥ) of (productive) cause (kāraṇam), this definition would apply properly to the gotra acquired by conditions (pratyayasamudānītam). And what then would be the difference between the two gotras? ²⁷ But if we assume on the contrary an equivalence with dharmatā there will be no fault. It can then be said that the [prakṛtistha-]gotra of which the Vijñānavādins speak is a nominal (prajñaptikam) one whereas the one in question here [i. e. the one equivalent to the dharmatā] is the real one (lākṣaṇikam); and consequently the two are not assimilable ²⁸.

If the dharmadhātu consists in being the gotra the undesirable consequence would arise that all would be established in the gotra (sarvo gotrasthah) because of the fact that it is universally present (sāmānyavartitvāt). — Ārya-Vimuktisena answers: To the extert that the dharmadhātu is objectivized (ālambyamānah) it is the cause (hetuh) of the āryadharmas; and if this is what we say the gotra is, how can there be any absurdity due to over-extension (atiprasangah, in our definition of it)?

Even so, seeing that the dharmadhātu is undifferentiated (asambhedaḥ), it will not be possible to divide the gotra and say this is the śrāvakagotra, this the pratyekabudhagotra and this the budhagotra. For it is stated in a scripture: 'If, Mañjuśrī, the dharmadhātu is one — and also the tathatā and the bhūtakoṭi — how can we speak of [one which is] a receptacle and of [one which is] not a receptacle?' (AA 1. 39 a b). — This is true; but by means of the example of the jars containing honey, candied sugar, etc., which are all produced from a single lump of clay and baked in one fire it has been

Compare the second definition of the gotra given by Yaśomitra: pṛthagjanāvasthām ārabhyendriyabhedo gotram iti (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā 6.58, p. 584.1). Cf. the indriyakṛtaviśesah mentioned in the Bodhisattvabhūmi § 1.1 (p. 3-4)?

shown that this $[gotra/dharmadh\bar{a}tu]$ is differentiated in accordance with what it contains $(\bar{a}dheyadharmah)$ (AA 1. 39 c d) ³⁰.

Moreover, as has been stated in a scripture, that in which there are no $samsk\bar{a}ras$ whatsoever is uncomposed (asamskrtam); and the uncomposed is the gotra of the Saints ($\bar{a}ry\bar{a}h$). The gotra is equal by virtue of equality with empty space; the gotra is without differentiation by virtue of being of one value with the dharma; the gotra is permanent by virtue always of the Thusness of the dharmas 31.

Concerning the hermeneutical explanation (niruktam) of the word gotra, Ārya-Vimuktisena records the following interpretations. go-tra- may be the realization of qualities (guṇottāraṇam), the meaning being that guṇas arise and are born from it 32 ; in this way all Saintly persons (āryapudgalāħ) are 'constituted' (prabhāvitāħ) by the asaṃskṛta 33 . Others again have said that go- may mean 'earth' ($bh\bar{u}h = sa$), and earth being a place of residence (pratiṣṭhā = gnas) living beings who reside there in common (sahacaryāt) receive the name (upacaryante) go-; the go-tra- is then so called because it protects (trāyate) those included in this 'earth' (gosaṃgṛhītāħ). Or again, because by go- the regions of space (diśaħ) may be understood, living beings residing in such 'regions' receive the name (upacaryante) go-; and consequently, because it protects them, the go-tra-is so called 34 .

²⁵ Cf. Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 3: prakṛtistham gotram yad bodhisattvānām ṣaḍā-yatanaviśeṣah | sa tādṛśah paramparāgato 'nādikāliko dharmatāpratilabdhaḥ | The source of this definition is quoted in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga 1.86. — The exact sense of this definition has been much discussed by the commentators, some of whom conclude that the inner Bases must be meant.

²⁶ This is roughly the doctrine of the Śrāvaka- and Bodhisattvabhūmi.

²⁷ This samudānītagotra is strictly speaking the immediate cause of the attainment of liberation.

²⁸ The two are the *prakṛṭisthagotra* as it has been defined by the Vijñānavādins and the *prakṛṭisthagotra* as defined by the AA (= dharmadhātuḥ, dharmatā). See Legs báad geer phren, I, f. 208b—209a (cf. rGyal tshab rje, op. cit., f. 103a).

¹⁰ The AAA explains that this objectivization results from progressive comprehension (adhigamakramah) through the three yānas of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva; see below.

³⁰ Thus the *gotra* is not differentiated in itself, and it is an ādhāra rather than a cause in the strict sense of the term. Cf. AAĀ 1.39 (p. 77; infra, p. 316).

Although the metaphor of the lump of clay may not seem altogether suitable as an analogue to the *dharmadhātu*, it may be recalled that at least from the time of the Chāndogyopaniṣad (6.1.4) clay has served as an example for the original, the true (satyam), from which the phenomenal is somehow derived.

³¹ Compare Kāsyapaparivarta §§ 102—104: tatra na kecit saṃskārāh, yatra na kecit saṃskārāh tad asaṃskṛtaṃ tad āryāṇāṃ gotra[m] ... samaṃ tad gotram ākā-sasamatayā | nirviseṣaṃ tad gotraṃ sarvadharmaikarasatayā | ... nityaṃ tad gotraṃ sadā dharmatathatayā | The quotation in the Vṛtti thus corresponds almost word for word with v. Staël -Holstein's text of the Kāsyapaparivarta. The Tibetan translation of the Vṛtti in the Peking edition however differs somewhat. — Cf. also the commentary on the Ratnagotrayibhāga 1.86.

³² yon tan sgrol baci don gyis na rigs te | de las yon tan de dag skye žin cbyun ba žes bya baci don to. See Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra 3.4 with Bhāsya: gunottāranārthena gotram veditavyam gunā uttaranty asmād udbhavantīti; AAĀ 1.39 (p. 77): niruktam tu gunottāranārthena dharmadhātur gotram | tasmād dhi te gunā rohanti prabhavantīty arthah | evam ca krtvocyate: asamskrtaprabhāvitāh sarvāryapudgalāti | The Tibetan translation of uttārana by sgrol ba in the Vrtti is not quite accurate since this word and the corresponding verb uttārayati mean 'carry out, fulfil' (cf. F. Edgerton, BHSD); a better rendering is found in the Tibetan version of the Vārttika (see below, p. 313).

³³ The statement asamskrtaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāh is found in the Vajracchedikā, p. 33; see also Astasāhasrikā-prajňāpāramitā 2, p. 36. prabhāvita is a difficult term to translate and requires further investigation; see Conze's note to his translation of the Vajracchedikā, p. 98—99. In the Tibetan version of the Bhadanta's Vārttika prabhāvita is translated simply by byun ba, and not by the usual rab tu phye ba; see below. p. 313.

³⁴ These last two *niruktas* are not found in the Bhāṣya on the Mahāyānasūtrā-laṃkāra and the subcommentaries by Sthiramati and *Asvabhāva, nor do they appear in the Bodhisattvabhūmi and its commentary by *Sāgaramegha. However,

Should the gotra not have been explained first in the AA before the cittotpāda (AA 1. 18—20) and the moksa- and nirvedha-bhāgīyas (1. 25—36) in view of the fact that they presuppose it? — That would indeed be the real sequence (arthānupūrvī); but in this place preference is given to the expository sequence (pratipādanānupūrvī) because we learn from it the cause of the result (phalakāraṇam — the bodhicitta, mokṣabhāgīyas and nirvedhabhāgīyas being viewed here as the results of a cause, i. e. the gotra) 35.

Thus it is that even a mutation ($vyabhic\bar{a}rah$) of the gotra in the $nirvedha-bh\bar{a}g\bar{\imath}yas$ is seen ³⁶. According to the statement of the philosophers ($l\bar{a}k;anik\bar{a}h$, in the Abhidharmakośa 6. 23 c d):

śisyagotrād vivartya 37 dve buddhah syāt, trīny apītarah ||

'By reversing [the first] two [nirvedhabhāgīyas, viz. the uṣmagata and the mūrdhagata] from the gotra of the Disciples [: śrāvakāh] he will become a buddha; [and by reversing the first] three [nirvedhabhāgīyas of the śrāvaka, he will become] the other [i. e. a Pratyekabuddha]' 38.

Thus we have explained how the gotra is the Support of Practice.

The Vārttika of Bhadanta-Vimuktisena

The Bhadanta also considers that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra clearly shows that the gotra is a support, the dharmadhātu

both of these uses of the word go are well known from the Indian Kośas; and in addition to the Epic, Kālidāsa's Raghuvamśa (1.26), for instance, attests the meaning 'earth'. Moreover, the Nighantu (1.1) lists go (and also gotrā) as meaning 'earth' (cf. Nirukta 2.5), and the classical lexicographers also assign the meaning 'field' to gotra. — On the background of this semantic development cf. L. Renou, Les éléments védiques dans le sanskrit classique, JA 1939, p. 355f.

³⁵ The Peking edition of the bsTan cgyur reads: cbras bus rgyu rtogs par byed pa yin pa cdi ni rtogs paci go rim yin no (cf. the Vārttika, infra, p. 314).

V. AAĀ 1.39 (p. 77): adhigamānukramād iyam anupūrvī; on p. 78 pratipāda-

nānupūrvī is opposed to arthānupūrvī.

st rigs ni nes par c'byed paci cha dan mthun pa rnams la c'hrul par mthon ba yin no The Tibetan text is not quite clear here, and the Vārttika reads: de yan rigs dan | nes par c'byed paci cha dan mthun pa géan du gyur pa dag snan ste (f. 44 a 2), it emerges that the gotra and the nirvedhabhāgiyas are changed [between the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva].

37 In his edition of the Vrtti C. Pensa, who does not refer to the Abhidharma-

kośa, reads (p. 78) śisyagotran nivartya.

38 The nirvedhabhāgiyas are uşman, mūrdhagata, kṣānti and laukikāgradharma (Abhidharmakośa 6.20ab).

If the Śrāvaka changes the first two of them in his conscious stream directed towards the goal of the Śrāvaka's liberation he can still alter this goal and become a buddha; but once he has acquired the third he can no longer become a buddha, for one who has attained the stage of kṣānti can no longer enter into bad existences (durgatih) as a Bodhisattva must be able to do (6.23b). — On the other hand, by changing the first three he can still become a Pratyekabuddha, since the latter does not have to practise the Bodhisattva's path. Having once obtained the Śrāvaka's laukikāgradharmāh however one can no longer change his gotra. — The gotrabhū is the possessor of the ariyadhamma according to the Puggalapaññatti (p. 12).

being a cause (hetuḥ) of the āryadharmas (f. 42 b). This gotra exists by nature, which means that it is not acquired through conditions (pratyayāh: ran bźin guis gnas pa cdi yan rigs yin gui rkuen las buun ba ni ma uin no. f. 43 a l).

He then mentions that some authorities have explained that it is because of the four ādīnavas, mentioned above, that living beings have not all attained nirvāna despite the fact that they possess the prakṛtisthagotra; instead of the word phons pa (vighātaḥ) the Tibetan translation of the Vārttika has tshar chad 'cutting off'. According to this view the gotra is non-interruption (rgyun mi chad pa, instead of bar chad med pa found in the Vṛtti) (f. 43 a 3).

Like the Ārya, Bhadanta-Vimuktisena next mentions the opinion that it is the $sad\bar{a}yatanaviśeṣa$ which constitutes the gotra. He then proceeds to explain that it must in that case either be produced through the totality of necessary conditions $(rkyen\ tshogs:\ pratyaya-s\bar{a}magr\bar{\imath})$ or be existent by nature $(ran\ bźin\ gyis\ gnas\ pa)$. However, like his predecessor, he adds that if it be held that the latter is equivalent to a (productive) cause $(rgyu^ci\ rnam\ grans = k\bar{a}ranapary\bar{a}yah)$ there would be no difference between the two forms of the gotra; he therefore explains it as equivalent to the $dharmat\bar{a}$. He also distinguishes between a nominal and the real $(l\bar{a}ksanikam)\ gotra$.

The Bhadanta then mentions the objection that the definition of the gotra as the dharmadhātu would be too wide since it implies its universality (spyir khyab pa ñid: sāmānyavartitvam), and he sets aside the resulting difficulty in the same way as his predecessor by saying that there is in fact no atiprasanga because the dharmadhātu becomes the (motivating) cause (hetuḥ) of the āryadharmas to the extent that it is objectivized (ālambyamānaḥ).

With respect to the further objection that it will no longer be possible to speak of distinct *gotras* since the *dharmadhātu* is stated to be undifferentiated, he also quotes the example of the jars all made from the same clay but nevertheless distinguished by virtue of their contents (f. 43 b).

The gotra is then without differentiation (by brag med pa = nirvisesam) and all-pervading (kun tu khyab $pa: vy\bar{a}pakam$) like the $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$ since it is of one value with the dharmadhātu; and it is permanent (nityam) because it is the dharma-tattva (chos kyi de kho na $\tilde{n}id$), which is permanent 39 .

Next the familiar hermeneutical explanations (niruktam) of the word gotra are mentioned (the Tibetan translation of the Vārttika being somewhat more accurate because it renders gunottāranam by yon tan bskyed pa); the meaning is that gunas are born and produced from it, and that the āryapudgalas are all produced from the uncomposed (cdus ma byas pa las byun ba; cf. asamskṛtaprabhāvitāḥ).

³⁹ See Kāśyapaparivarta quoted above, p. 311, n. 31.

As regards the order in which the AA treats the gotra and the mokṣabhā-gīyas etc., the gotra is stated to be the cause revealed by the mokṣabhāgīyas etc., which are its effects (cdi ni cbras bus rgyu bśad pa yin pas, f. 44a).

Bhadanta-Vimuktisena also concludes his discussion of the gotra by referring to the doctrine of the Abhidharmakośa according to which the gotra can be changed through a reversal of the nirvedhabhāgīyas (de yan rigs dan nes par byed pa i cha dan nthun pa gźan du gyur pa dag snan ste, f. 44a). The Tibetan term gźan du gyur pa can translate parāvṛtti (or parivṛtti) 'transmutation', anyathābhāva 'alteration', etc.

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The Arya and the Bhadanta thus agree in explaining the (prakrtistha-) gotra as being the dharmadhātu. They refer besides to the theory implied in the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra (chapter 3) according to which it is non-obstruction by the four adinavas; but they do not accept the definition of the Śrāvakabhūmi and Bodhisattvabhūmi according to which it is the sadāyatanavišesa. However, in his explanation of the passage of the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra which teaches that the bodhisattva as the support of Practice is not to be conceived as a substantive padartha, Ārya-Vimuktisena notes that the aotra — that particularity of the six perfections having as its characteristic the dharmatā — is the 'cause of application' — the "meaning" — of the word 'bodhisattva' (sannām pāramitānām dharmatālaksano višeso gotram bodhisattvaśabdapravrttinimittam na tu vastubhūtah padārtha iti vedayati; p. 73) 40. A few lines further on, in his explanation of the gotra as the support of the $m\bar{u}rdhagata$ phase, he states that it has been expressed by such terms as bhūtakotih, tathatā, dharmatā, dharmadhātuḥ, dharmasthititā, dharmaniyamātā, etc. (p. 74); a similar explanation is given also by Bhadanta-Vimuktisena (f. 40b-41a) 41. The gotra is thus assimilated with such supreme principles in Buddhist thought

41 Cf. Pañcavimsatisāhasrikā, Durr's ed., p. 161.

as the pratītyasamutpādaḥ and the tathāgatagarbhaḥ, which are also described by the terms dharmasthititā, dharmaniyamatā, dharmatā, etc. 42.

In some of the Sastras of the Vijñanavada, which are quite closely linked with Abhidharma traditions, the gotra is known chiefly as a nature or original principle - a gene so to speak - at the foundation of the classification of the main spiritual types or 'lineages' amongst sentient beings in terms of the paths leading to their respective goals; and these Sastras even admit of the existence of persons who are either temporarily deprived of the gotra or are absolutely and permanently devoid of this factor which makes it possible to obtain parinirvana. On the contrary, in the AA and its commentaries the gotra is universal and omnipresent; and while it appears as the support for Practice leading to liberation, thus functioning as a kind of ground which makes possible the liberation of all sattvas, it assumes metaphysical and gnoseological significance by reason of its equivalence with undifferentiated Reality (dharmadhātuh, etc.). This shift in emphasis from the purely soteriological to the metaphysical and gnoseological aspect of the problem was not to remain without incidence on the religious side, for it brought with it the theory of the ekayāna which is of the greatest importance for the understanding of Buddhism. Thus once again the indissoluble bond between the religious, soteriological, metaphysical and gnoseological levels in Buddhism becomes evident.

Despite certain differences in the treatment of individual points in the gotra-theory and also in the manner and technique of philosophical exposition between the Vṛtti on the one hand and the later commentaries beginning with Haribhadra's AAĀ on the other, the Ārya's explanation of the significance of the gotra as the support of the non-substantial bodhisattva's spiritual Practice leading to the attainment of the omnimodal Gnosis (sarvā-kārajñatā) of the buddha is generally accepted in its broad outline by Haribhadra and his successors as an authoritative interpretation of the three verses of the AA with which we are concerned here. This point is explained by Haribhadra in the AAĀ as follows (p. 76): 'Since there is no possibility of comprehension (adhigamah) unless there is non-attachment resulting from the absence of notional attachment to an entity (vastu) and its objective marks with respect to all dharmas, [the bodhisattva, who is apadārthah,] trains himself, like a man created by magic (māyāpuruṣaḥ), with a view to comprehending the buddhadharmas; consequently how can there really (tattva-

of the grammarians and Naiyāyikas according to whom it is the universal etc. (cf. Jhalakikar's Nyāyakośaḥ, and the references in L. Renou's Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit, s. v.). This assumption is however not borne out by an examination of the idea set forth here, which is clarified for example by what Candrakirti writes in his Prasannapadā ad Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18.7: yadi cittasya kaścid gocaraḥ [: viṣayaḥ, ārambaṇam] syāt tatra kiṃcid nimittam adhyāropya syād vācāṃ pravṛttiḥ | yadā tu cittasya viṣaya evānupapannas tadā kva nimittādhyāropo yena vācāṃ pravṛttiḥ syāt | ... cittasyāpravṛttau tu kuto nimittādhyāropaḥ | tadabhāvāt kuto vācāṃ pravṛttiḥ. It may be noted that this passage also throws light on the idea of vācārambaṇam.

It thus appears that the *nimittam* is the objective 'mark' superimposed on the mental objects (cf. above, p. 309), this superimposition presupposing both the presence of an object of mind and the activity (pravrttih) of mind; and the pravrttinimittam is then this objective mark serving as the basis for verbal activity or 'application'. It may then be understood as the referent of a word. See also AAA 1.36 (p. 71).

⁴² Compare the principle of impermanence (e. g. Ańguttaranikāya I, p. 286); the pratītyasamutpāda (Saṃyuttanikāya II, p. 25; cf. Dīghanikāya I, p. 190; Saṃyutta⁰ II, p. 60, 119—128 [especially p. 124]; Śālistambasūtra, p. 47 [ed. Atyasvami Sastri], quoted by Yaśomitra in his Abhidharmakośavyākhyā 3, p. 48); the tathāgatagarbha (Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, quoted in the comm. on the Ratnagotravibhāga 1.149—152). See also Lankāvatārasūtra 3, p. 143—144; 5, p. 218.

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tah) be a support (pratisthā)? But relatively (samvṛtyā), by virtue of the differentiation due to the various conditions (avasthā) of the dharma of Practice, the bodhisattva who is the support of the buddhadharmas and has the dharmadhātu as his Own-being has thirteen forms; and he has been explained as 'gotra'.'

The explanation given in the Vrtti and Varttika of the gotra as Support (ādhārah, etc.) in relation to the dharmadhātu as (motivating) cause (hetuh, as opposed to a productive cause, kāraṇam) is especially to be noted. The AAĀ has the following to say on this subject (p. 77): 'Because it is the dharmadhātu that is the cause (hetuh) of the comprehension of the aryadharmas, the bodhisattva has it as his nature and the gotra of the supreme buddhadharmas which exists by nature (prakrtistham) is termed the dharmatā; if this is the case, then, because of the universality (sāmānyavartitvam) of the dharmadhātu, it will not be possible to divide the gotra saying this is the gotra existing by nature which comes from beginningless time and is obtained through the dharmatā, this the [gotra] which is acquired (samudānītam) and obtained through effort, this the [gotra] of the Auditor, Pratyekabuddha or Tathāgata which is fixed (nivatam) since it is not to be removed even by powerful conditions, and this the [gotra] of the Auditor etc. which is not fixed (aniyatam) since it can be removed by conditions 43. The conclusion (disposing of this objection, samādhih) is as follows: Inasmuch as it is objectivized by the progressive comprehension of the śrāvakayāna and the other [yānas], the dharmadhātu is instituted as the hetu of the comprehension of the āryadharmas and is therefore spoken of as being the gotra. — Or again there is no fault, for the multiplicity of the container/support (ādhārah) has been set forth owing to the multiplicity of the things contained/supported (ādheyadharmāḥ) to be comprehended as embraced by the three yanas, just as containers such as jars produced from a single clay substance and baked in a single fire are distinguished according as they are the receptacle of different contents, such as honey or candied sugar.' Haribhadra's second alternative thus follows the solution proposed by the Arya and the Bhadanta.

Ārya-Vimuktisena and Bhadanta-Vimuktisena stand towards the beginning of a very long line of commentators which reached its culmination in Prajñāpāramitā commentaries such as those of cJam dbyans bžad pa Nag dban brtson cgrus (1648—1722) and Gun than dKon mchog bstan paci sgron me (1762—1823), although these later works are usually based more directly on Haribhadra's two commentaries than on the Vṛtti and Vārttika. The contributions of these later writers are also of the greatest value to us when we seek to understand fully the implications of the doctrine despite — or, indeed, perhaps rather because of — the philosophical subtlety with which

they seek to synthesize a Sūtra and Śāstra tradition characterized by its great number of intuitions and interpretations. The whole commentatorial tradition thus merits the serious attention of the student of the Prajñāpāramitā as one of the seminal forces in Buddhist thought; such a study may be expected to reveal both the richness and variety contained in an exegetical tradition based on a particular group of texts and also the continuing influence of the ideas adumbrated by these two early Indian masters on their successors in Central Asia as well as in India.

As regards the topic with which we have been concerned here, this line of development culminated in an attempt to synthesize the gotra-doctrine of the AA and its commentaries with the doctrine of the Ratnagotravibhāga bearing on this subject and on the tathāgatagarbha, and to demarcate it with respect to the parallel doctrines of the Vijñānavāda. This attempt was characterized by an effort to interpret the AA and the Ratnagotravibhāga along with the Sūtras on which they are based as texts of certain and explicit meaning (nītārtha) without having undue recourse to the idea of an intentional (ābhi-prāyika) expression of indirect meaning (neyārtha); and it must therefore command the attention of the philosopher and historian 44.

⁴³ Cf. for example Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra 3.6.

⁴⁴ An attempt to trace some of these developments has been made in the present writer's forthcoming study on the theory of the *gotra* and the *tathāgata-garbha*. — I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. L. Schmithausen for his interesting and valuable comments on the subject treated in this article.



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- D. SEYFORT RUEGG
- PĀLI GOTTA/GOTRA AND THE TERM $GOTRABH\bar{U}$ IN PĀLI AND BUDDHIST SANSKRIT

Two distinct forms of the vocable appearing in Old Indo-Aryan as gotra-'family, clan, lineage' are attested in the Middle Indo-Aryan of the Pali literature. The form gotta-, with assimilation of the Old Indo-Arvan consonant cluster -tr- to -tt-, is the normal Pali development of OI gotra-; and in the literature it is frequently met with in the well-known meanings of 'family. lineage, ancestry' (PTSD), It appears for example in collocation with, or in the proximity of, nama 'name' (e.g. Vinaya I, pp. 93, 127; II, p. 239; IV, p. 12; Dighanikāya I, p. 92); jāti 'birth, descent' (e.g. Suttanipāta vv. 104, 423, 1004), and kula 'family' (e.g. Suttanipāta v. 423; Jātaka II, p. 3). When the Buddha is represented in the Pabbajjāsutta of the Suttanipāta (v. 423) as saying: adicca nama gottena sakiya nama fatiya tamha kula pabbajito 'mhi, this means that he entered the religious life leaving a family that is solar by lineage (gotta) and Śākvan by descent. The Pāli texts also present such compounds as gottatthaddha 'conceited as to lineage' (Suttanipata 104, together with jatitthaddha 'conceited as to descent'), gottapanha 'enquiry regarding lineage' (Suttanipāta v. 456), gottapatisāri(n) 'relying on lineage' (Dīghanikāya I, p. 99; Anguttaranikāya V, p. 327), gottarakkhita 'protected by lineage' (Suttanipāta v. 315), and ñātigottabandhava 'related through kinsmen and lineage' (Cullaniddesa, p. 455, quoted in PTSD).

The second form gotra, which the dictionaries quote only as occurring in the compound $gotrabh\bar{u}^2$ (n. masc.) and in composite words derived from it such as $gotrabh\bar{u}n\bar{a}na$ and $gotrabh\bar{u}dhamma$, is phonologically irregular in $P\bar{a}li^3$; and the question arises as to the origin and use of this form in the $P\bar{a}li$ texts.

An explanation of this for Pali anomalous form may be provided by a consideration of the philosophical and religious connotations of the terms in which it appears, and by comparison with the etymologically equivalent Sanskrit term *gotra* in the usage of the Buddhist schools that employed Sanskrit as their canonical language.

The term gotrabhū occurs first, apparently towards the end of the Nikāya period, in the Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅgasutta of the Majjhimanikāya, and also in two lists of persons found in the final portion of the Aṅguttaranikāya.

The first of these lists contains an enumeration of persons to be honoured (puggalā āhuneyyā pāhuneyyā dakkhineyyā añjalikaraniyā) of whom the

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- 9 See Christian Topography of Cosmas, Hakluyt Society I, 98, London 1897, p. 364. 10 See Voyage du marchand arabe Sulayman (tr. by G. Ferrand), Paris 1922, pp. 31-33. 11 A. Gray, 'The Maldive Islands: with a Vocabulary', JRAS (1878) 179. Bell, in 'Excerpta Maldiviana 9', JRAS (Ceylon Branch) 83 (1930) 555, points out that the word Lankā, which he takes as equivalent to Lakkā, is used of the Maldives in Maldivian copperplate grants of the fourteenth century.
- 12 Monograph, p. 7n.
- 13 See W. Geiger, 'Mäldivische Studien I', Sitzungsberichte der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München (1900), philos.-philol. Classe, p. 642.
- 14 W. Geiger, 'Etymological Vocabulary of the Maldivian Language', JRAS (1902) 990.
- 15 W. Geiger, 'Māldivische Studien III', SKBAW (1902), philos.-philol. Classe, p. 114. The complete series of three 'Māldivische Studien' were printed together in an English translation as vol. XXVII of the Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (1919); but it seems erroneous to assume, as I formerly did, that we have there the author's views of any later date than 1902.
- 16 In Ran Tari, however, yaru is not English for 'yard', but Persian for 'friend',
- 17 The name Bodufenvaluge is unlikely to be connected with Sinhalese -vadu; it appears to mean 'House of the Large Well'.
- 18 P.B.F. Wijeratne, 'Phonology of the Sinhalese Inscriptions', BSOAS XIV, 297.
- 19 It is not, however, concessive.
- 20 BSOAS XII, 175.

Arhat is the chief while the $gotrabh\bar{u}$ is the last following the other degrees of Saints (ariya) (Ariguttaranikāya IV, p. 373). A person is so considered, according to the Sutta, because he is a most excellent field of merit (anuttaram puññakhettam). In the second list of the Ariguttara the gotrabhū is the last of ten types of religious persons, the first of whom is the $Tath\bar{a}gato$ Araham Sammāsambuddho himself while the ninth is the saddhānusārī or person who follows the way of faith (Ariguttāranikāya V, p. 23). In these two passages the term thus designates a person of an elevated spiritual condition, the $gotrabh\bar{u}$ being a person leaving the condition of the worldling (puthujjana = Skt. prthagjana) to become an ariya (Skt. arya) or Saint.

On the other hand in the Majjhimanikāya it is said that in the future there will exist ill-disciplined and evil gotrabhūs clad in the yellow robe of the monk who will receive gifts destined for the community of genuine monks (bhavissanti kho pan' Ānanda anāgatam addhānam gotrabhuno kāsāvakanthā dussīlā pāpadhammā, III, p. 256.) This reference to evil gotrabhūs seems, however, to be isolated in the Pāli canon.

In the Puggalapaññatti, an Abhidhamma text dealing with the different types of persons (puggala) recognized in Buddhist soteriology, the gotrabhū is defined as one possessing certain factors immediately subsequent to which the saintly factor becomes established (katamo ca puggalo gotrabhū / yesaṃ dhammānaṃ samanatarā ariyadhammassa avakkanti hoti tehi dhammehi samannāgato puggalo ayaṃ vuccati 'gotrabhū', §1.10, pp. 12-13).8

On the other hand, according to the *Patisambhidāmagga*, a text of the *Khuddakanikāya*, and Mahānāma's commentary, the *Saddhammappakāsinī*, the term *gotrabhū* designates what might perhaps better be called a state of consciousness, which results from mastery or victory (abhibhavana) over the worldling's 'lineage' (puthujjanagotta) and its conditions, and from realization (bhāvana) of the saintly 'lineage' (ariyagotta).

In the section of the Paţisambhidāmagga devoted to gotrabhū-knowledge (gotrabhūnāṇa) — which immediately precedes the magganāṇa and is defined as transcending understanding relating to emergence and turning away with respect to the external (bahiddhā vuṭṭhānavivaṭṭane paṇnā)¹⁰ — the question arises as to what constitutes the gotrabhū. This question is answered by means of an enumeration of the sixteen factors which the gotrabhū overcomes (abhibhū), from which he/it emerges (vuṭṭhāti) and from which he/it disengages (vivaṭṭati), as well as of the further factors to which he/it takes in joy (pakkhandati). The gotrabhū first overcomes origination (uppāda), saṃsāric process (pavatta), phenomenal sign (nimitta), effort accumulating karman (āyūhana), reconnection in birth (paṭisaṃdhi), conditions of existence in the stream of saṃsāra (gati), generation (nibbatti), arising (upapatti),

birth (jati), growing old (jara), illness (vyadhi), death (marana), pain (soka), lamentation (paridevana), affliction (upayasa), and the conditioning sign with respect to the external (bahiddha sankharanimittam) 11a; and the gotrabhū then takes to the absence of these factors (viz. anuppāda, appavatta, etc., with nirodha and nibbana as the opposite of the bahiddha sankharanimittam). The $gotrabh\bar{u}$ likewise emerges from these sixteen factors and takes to their absence culminating in nirodha and nibbana. And finally the gotrabhu disengages from these sixteen factors and takes to the latter factors (§1.1.10, I, pp. 66-67). The question next arises as to which factors (dhamma) of the gotrabhū are produced by tranquillity (samatha) and which are produced by insight (vipassana). The Patisambhidhamagga answers it by enumerating eight factors produced by samatha, namely (i) the overcoming of the hindrances (nīvarana)11b to attain the first stage of meditation(jhāna),(ii) the overcoming of mental quest and deliberation (vitakkavicāra) to attain the second ihāna. (iii) the overcoming of pleasure (piti) to attain the third jhana, (iv) the overcoming of happiness and pain (sukhadukkha) to attain the fourth jhana, (v) the overcoming of the apperceptive notions (sañña) of material form (rūpa), resistance (patigha) and multiplicity to attain the concentration of the domain of the infinity of empty space (ākāsānancāyatanasamāpatti), (vi) the overcoming of the apperceptive notion of the latter to attain the concentration of the domain of the infinity of consciousness (viññananañcavatanasamāpatti), (vii) the overcoming of the apperceptive notion of the latter to attain the concentration of the domain of nothingness (ākiñcaññā yatanasamāpatti), and (viii) the overcoming of the apperceptive notion of the latter to attain the concentration of the domain of neither apperceptive notion nor non-apperceptive notion (nevasaññanasaññayatanasamapatti). The text then continues by enumerating the ten factors produced by virtue of insight, namely (i) the overcoming of the first list of sixteen factors. beginning with production 11c and ending with the conditioning sign with respect to the external, to attain the path of entry into the Stream (sotapattimagga), (ii) the overcoming of them to achieve the fruit of entry into the Stream, as well as (iii-vii) the overcoming of them to attain the path and to achieve the fruit of the once-returner (sakadagamio), the non-returner (anagamio), and the path of the Arhat; overcoming is likewise necessary to achieve (viii) the fruit of the Arhat, (ix) Void abiding (sunnatavihāra), and (x) signless abiding (animittavihāra). As for the nature of these gotrabhūdhammas, fifteen are defined as wholesome (kusala) and three as neutral (abyākata), none of them being unwholesome (akusala). 12 Eight of them are conditioning supports (paccaya) for samādhi, while ten are conditioning supports for nana, all eighteen being conditioning supports of the three Gates

of Deliverance (vimokkhamukha, i.e. suññata, animitta and appanihita) (§ 1.1.10,I, pp. 66-68). In this text, as already mentioned, the gotrabhūñana figures immediately before path-knowledge (maggañana, § 1.1.11). In a later section it is explained that while transcending understanding with respect to the external (bahiddhā vutthānavivattane pañña) and the gotrabhūdhammas are different in name, they are one in meaning (§ 1.5.21, II, p. 64).

In his commentary on the Patisambhidamagga, Mahanama gives a number of further explanations some of which may be mentioned here. Thus, according to certain authorities, the first inflection (abhoga) towards nibbana, the first attention (samannāhāra), is called gotrabh \bar{u} ; ¹⁴ this name is then not suitable when the final realized state called 'fruit' (phala) is intended (p.276). Mahānāma distinguishes between two types of gotrabhū and the corresponding gotrabhūñāna according to the levels of tranquillity (samatha) and insight (vipassana), and he also refers to a phalagotrabhu. Because of the influence of passions (kilesa) the samathagotrabhūñāna (which is of eight kinds as seen above) is associated with desire (nikanti), while the vipassanāgotrabhūñāna (which is of ten kinds) is free from desire since Arivas do not have any desire for the gotrabhū; this distinction corresponds to that between sāmisa and nirāmisa in the Patisambhidāmagga. Thus only the vipassanāgotrabhūñāna is said to have 'emerged' (vutthita) since desire has been cut off. Moreover, whereas the samathago trabhū corresponds to the pakatūpanissayapaccaya's of the three vimokkha's, the vipassanāgotrabhū corresponds to their anantarūpanissayapaccayas. As for the term phalagotrabhū, it refers to overwhelming, emergence and disengagement when one is turned towards nibbana owing to inclination to it. Reference is also made to authorities who speak of eight samāpattigo trabhūs of wholesome (kusala) nature with regard to the eight samāpattis mentioned above (p. 276). Finally, since the gotrabhūñāna is, because of its connexion with emergence, the name for transcending understanding relating to emergence and turning away with respect to the external, what are called the gotrabhūdhammas are this gotrabhūñāna ('bahiddhā vutthanavivattane pañña' ti vutthanasambandhena gotrabhuñanam vuttam / 'gotrabhūdhammā' ti gotrabhūñānam eva /; p. 567).

The early fifth century commentator Buddhaghosa has also devoted several paragraphs of his great Summa of the Pāli canonical tradition, the Visuddhimagga, to the gotrabhū and the gotrabhūñāna. ¹⁵ According to his chapter on meditation, the culminating point in the series of conscious 'impulsions' (javana) is called gotrabhū because it triumphs over the sensory domain belonging to the level of desire (kāmāvacāra), and the limited 'lineage', ¹⁷ and because it realizes the great 'lineage' (yañ c'ettha sabbantimam tam parittagottābhibhavanato mahaggata gottabhāvanato ca 'gotrabhū'

ti pi vuccati, §4.74). 18 It establishes (appeti) absorption (appanacitta), the fifth and final conscious moment which immediately follows it (§4.74). And it is the immediately preceding condition for determining thought (adhitthanacitta) relating to the fourth stage of meditation (ihana) on the level of form (rūpāvacara) (§§12.58, 13.5). Preliminary training (pubbavoga) with a view to transcendent understanding (pañña) consists in the application of insight (vipassana), through penetration of the Buddha's Teaching, until one approaches Conformity (anuloma, the conscious 'impulse' preceding the gotrabhū in the series of javanas, 19 and then the gotrabhū itself (§ 14.28). By virtue of vipassanā ten gotrabhūdhammas occur, namely the paths and their fruits on each of the four levels of the Saints plus Void abiding (suñnatavihara) and signless abiding (animittavihara) (§ 23.7).²⁰ The gotrabhū furthermore functions as a kind of objective support (arammanupanissaya) for the Disciples (sekha, as opposed to the worldlings on the one hand, and the asekha on the other) (§17.80-81).²¹ As an object (ārammanavasena) impurities (āsava) persist only up to the gotrabhū (§ 22.56). The gotrabhū then has as its object (ārammana) Nibbāna, which is without phenomenal sign (animit ta) (§21.126).

As for the gotrabhūñāna, it constitutes the end (pariyosāna) for vipassanā conducive to emergence (vutthanagamini) (§21.134; cf. §14.28). The gotrabhūnāna is discussed in some detail in the first part of Chapter XXII treating of purification by knowledge and vision (nanadassanavisuddhi). There it is stated that it cannot be reckoned as either the way (patipada. treated in Chapter XXI) or the result (treated in Chapter XXII) since it is placed between them; it can nevertheless be called vipassanā since it falls in its stream (§22.1). By it one attains the saintly lineage (arivagotta, or arivasankhā or ariyabhūmi), which is opposed to the lineage of the worldling (puthujjanagotta, or puthujjanasankhā or puthujjanabhūmi) (§22.5). Since it has Nibbana as its object, the gotrabhūñana emerges (vutthāti) from the phenomenal sign (nimitta) in one respect, even though it does not wholly emerge from the samsaric process (pavatta) because it does not comprise the cutting off of origination (samudaya):²² this is what the Patisambhidamagga has referred to as 'pañña relating to emergence and turning away with respect to the external' and as 'taking in joy to non-origination after disengaging from origination' (§ 22.44). The gotrabhūnāna also sets in train, so to speak, the path-knowledge (maggañana) which has Nibbana as its object; and on the level of entry into the Stream (sotapatti) this path makes one attain the filial state (orasaputtabhāva) in relation to the Sammāsambuddha, as well as the seven saintly treasures (ariyadhana) (§ 22,12-14).²⁴

Thus in the Visuddhimagga also the term gotrabhū evidently designates

an elevated state of consciousness at the very outset of the saintly path, rather than to a person as such, as in the passages studied earlier. These two uses of the term, one for a puggala and the other for a state of consciousness, are, however, not contradictory or exclusive; for in Buddhist psychology and soteriology it is the mental aspect that normally predominates, and the psychological types which Buddhism recognizes are then defined precisely with regard to their mental states.^{2 3a}

It thus appears that there exists a fairly clear semantic differentiation between the vocables gotta and gotra^O paralleling the difference in their forms.^{23b} While the vocable gotta designates basically, and quite regularly from the point of view of the development of Indo-Aryan, a lineage or clan in the sociological sphere, the vocable gotra^O refers specifically to a spiritual 'lineage' on the preliminary stage of the ariya 'saint', thus paralleling the Buddhist semantic development of the social term $\bar{a}rya/ariya$.

Yet, beside its usual sociological use, and very possibly under the influence of its cognate gotra as employed in Pali (and perhaps Sanskrit) religious and philosophical contexts, the word gotta occasionally has also in Pali the meaning of a spiritual lineage, as in the compound ariyagotta which is opposed to puthujjanagotta and appears beside ariyabhūmi and ariyasankhā in the above quoted passage of the Visuddhimagga (§22.5) which also mentions the gotrabhū. The religious connotation is also implicit in the terms parittagotta and mahaggatagotta alluded to above. And the fact that the Visuddhimagga equates the ariyagotta and the ariyabhumi 'spiritual stage of the saint' furthermore suggests that gotta/gotra and bhūmi can in certain contexts designate notions that are equivalent or at least very closely associated. In this connexion it may be recalled that the Saddhammappakāsinī states that gotta and bija 'germ, seed' have the same meaning (pp. 275-276); this identification is of special interest since the equivalence of the Sanskrit terms gotra and bija is maintained by both a Śrāvakayānist Abhidharmika school and by the Mahayanist Yogacarins.25

For purposes of hermeneutic etymologizing (nirukta) a Pāli tradition connects the word gotta with the root gup- 'to protect'. According to Mahānāma's Saddhammappakāsini, entering the eight concentrations — i.e. the four jhānas and the four samāpattis of the Patisambhidāmagga (§ 1.1.10 quoted above) which are called gottas because they are protected from the hindrances — is called gotrabhū by virtue of samatha; then, by virtue of vipassanā, the gotrabhū has as object the fruits (phala) of the four paths — namely of the sotāpattio, the sakadāgāmīo, the anāgāmīo and the arahatta-magga. Similarly, according to a Pakaraṇa quoted by Mahānāma, Nibbāna is a gotta

because it also is protected ($guttat\bar{a}$) from hindrances; and having Nibbāna as a definite goal receives the name of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ ($Saddhammappak\bar{a}sin\bar{i}$, pp. 275-276). — Alternatively, we find also an explanation according to which the gotta is so called because of its function of protecting ($t\bar{a}yati$, root $tr\bar{a}$ -);²⁶ this etymology of course recalls the familiar explanation of Sanskrit gotra as go- + $tr\bar{a}$ -.²⁷

As for the Pali term gotrabhu, it has been rendered in various ways by modern translators. In his pioneer and still very valuable Dictionary of the Pali language published a century ago (London, 1875), R.C. Childers translates: "One who is in a fit state to receive sanctification; a priest." Childers distinguishes between $gotrabh\bar{u}$ as referring to Arhatship. for example in the Puggalapaññatti, and gotrabhū as referring more generally to the śramanagotra, as in the above quoted passage of the Majjhimanikaya where he takes it to denote the fraternity of monks. And he adds that in its first sense it means "one whose mind is in that state of strong illumination which immediately brings about the attainment of sotapattimagga". In the Pali Text Society's Puli-English-Dictionary (1921-1925) T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede write: "'become of the lineage'; a technical term used from the end of the Nikāya period to designate one, whether layman or bhikkhu who, as converted, was no longer of the worldlings (puthujiana), but of the Ariyas, having Nibbana as his aim." S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids have rendered the term in their translation of the Abhidhammatthasangaha by 'adoption' and 'evolving²⁸ the lineage' (Compendium of philosophy, London, 1910, pp. 67-68, 129, n. 3). Nanatiloka translated the term by 'geadelt, reif; Gereifter: Reife-Moment' (Visuddhimagga (tr.), Der Weg zur Reinheit, Konstanz, 1952, pp. 163, 628, 804, 808, 841), and also by 'Anwarter auf Heiligkeit' (Puggalapaññatti (tr.) p. 6).²⁹ And recently in his translation of the Visuddhimagga, Nanamoli has used the rendering 'change of lineage' (The Path of Purification, Colombo, 1964). F. Edgerton in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. New Haven, 1953, has translated 'a member of the religious community'.

It is clear that the translations offered by Childers, Rhys Davids-Stede and Edgerton are applicable to $gotrabh\bar{u}$ as used with reference to a puggala in the Nikāyas and the Puggalapaññatti, but hardly to the meaning attested in the later scholastic literature which is covered by the renderings given by Aung-Mrs. Rhys Davids, and Nāṇatiloka. Edgerton's 'a member of the religious community' indeed does not even cover the first meaning completely, and seems suitable only for the $Maijhimanik\bar{a}ya$ passage, which had in fact been interpreted in a similar way already by Childers. As for Nāṇamoli's 'change of lineage', the justification for rendering $^{O}bh\bar{u}$ - by 'change' is hardly

clear, since the Pali tradition³⁰ explains it either by abhibhavana 'overcoming' or by bhāvana 'realization' (whence no doubt Aung's and Mrs. Rhys Davids's 'evolving').

In the Buddhist literature in Sanskrit a vocable $gotrabh\bar{u}$ appears — as a feminine noun rather than, as in Pāli, a masculine — in the $Lank\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ras\bar{u}$ -tra (Sagāthaka, v. 15):

āśritā sarvabhūteşu gotrabhūs tarkavarjitā | nivartate kriyāmuktā jñānajñeyavivarjitā |

On the basis of this passage F. Edgerton explains: "Apparently a fem. collective or abstract, the 'communion of saints', corresponding to the Pali masc. which refers to an individual person." - However, the question arises as to whether in this verse-passage the reference may not be rather to the gotrabhumi. At all events the Tibetan translators, who render rigs kyi sa (the normal equivalent of gotrabhūmi), seem to have taken the word as an Arsa form or as a metrically determined form of gotrabhumi; and that their interpretation is not without foundation is shown by the fact that in verse 6.11 of the Abhidharmakośa, daśabhū clearly stands for daśabhūmi. 32 On this assumption the verse would mean: "The gotra-stage present in all living beings³³ and free from ratiocinative thought ceases when liberated from activity and separated from knowledge and the knowable." Indeed, the splitting of vijnana into the polar dichotomy of knowledge and the known is considered a source of bondage; but when one frees oneself from this dichotomy as well as from samsaric activity one passes from the preliminary gotrabhumi to the advanced stages (bhumi) of the Arya-Bodhisattva and finally to the buddhabhumi. - In the vocabulary of many of the Mahayana Śāstras the gotra existing by nature (prakristhagotra) is said to become developed (samudanitagotra) and fortified (paripustagotra); and in the terminology of the texts expounding the tathagatagarbha doctrine the Tathagataembryonic-essence present in all living beings (sarvasattva, compare sarvabhūta in the Lankāvatāra passage) is to be freed from the adventitious impurities (kleśa) and the state of the tathagata is then achieved. (If it is thought that gotrabhū in the passage of the Lankavatarasūtra cannot for linguistic reasons stand for gotrabhumi in spite of the doctrinal suitability and the linguistic parallel from the verse of the Abhidharmakośa, gotrabhū can be understood as gotra-state rather than as gotra-stage.) It is therefore not certain whether the Sanskrit literature of Buddhism has a word that is the precise reflex of Pāli gotrabhū. But in either case Edgerton's translation 'Community of saints' for Skt. gotrabhū seems unlikely.

In sum, Pali gotrabhu can be understood as '[one] having the state of the

lineage', ³¹ and Sanskrit gotrabhū in the Lankāvatāra passage can be understood as 'lineage-stage' (= gotrabhūmi) (or as 'lineage-state').

The existence of the Pāli doublet gotta/gotra⁰ is of significance not only lingusitically but also from the doctrinal point of view. The idea mentioned by Buddhaghosa that the magga(nāna), founded on the gotrabhūnāna having Nibbāna as its aim, allows a person to attain the state of a son (orasaputta-bhāva) of the Buddha is especially noteworthy;³⁴ it in fact recalls the Mahāyānist concept of a spiritual 'lineage' (gotra) or 'clan' (kula) in which one takes birth and which makes one belong to the Buddha's own 'family'. The parallelism between the gotrabhū as an ārammanupanissaya as well as the concept of the upanissaya in Pāli and the use in the Mahāyānist literature of the term niśraya as an equivalent of gotra also seem to point in the direction of common doctrinal developments reflected in a terminology that is closely related if not altogether identical.³⁵

The above noted evidence, which is of both a linguistic and a doctrinal character, would then tend to show that the Theravāda school and its Pāli texts are not as isolated as has sometimes been made out from the currents of thought represented in the Sanskrit works not only of the other Śrāvakayānist schools but even of the Mahāyāna. Many trends in the Theravāda were no doubt conservative and even fundamentalist, protestant and exclusive; but there is enough evidence available to show that the Theravāda, and accordingly the monastic communities of Sri Lanka, participated to a not inconsiderable degree in certain of the developments of Buddhist thought in South Asia as a whole.

In the face of the doctrinal parallels and similarities discussed above it could of course be supposed that the developed 'Pāli' and 'Sanskrit' traditions in Buddhism both go back to an early common source without the one having borrowed directly from the other at some more recent period. This is surely the case in certain instances (for example the notion of the transfer of merit which is indeed characteristic of the Mahāyāna but which is also certainly not unknown in the Pāli tradition, ancient and mediaeval, where the terminology used by the different Buddhist traditions is, however, not identical).³⁷ In the case of the term gotra, however, the use in Pali of a linguistic form that is phonologically not properly Pāli would suggest that the theory of the gotrabhū, the gotrabhūñāṇa and the gotrabhūdhamma's has a link with a 'Sanskrit' tradition.³⁶

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NOTES

1 Cf. W. Geiger, Pali, Literatur und Sprache, Strassburg, 1916, § § 53, 62; M. Mayrhofer, Handbuch des Pali I. Heidelberg, 1951, § 167.

2 On the masculine form gotrabhū see for example Aggavamsa. Saddanīti (ed. bv H. Smith.) pp. 70, 77-8, 86, 234.

3 V. Saddanīti, p. 870: pāvacanasmim hi na kadāci pi chatram gotram icc ādini dissanti.

gotrahhtī ti pade pana samāse vattamānattā takāro trakāram pappoti vā

In addition to the masculine form gotrabhū the Saddaniti quotes the neuter form gotrabhu (pp. 86, 234, 646), explaining that the masculine form has reference to a person (puggala) while the neuter form has reference to figna or citta (pp. 63, 86-7, 234, 646). Thus Aggavamsa writes (pp. 86-7): gotrabhū ti, pahhattārammanam mahaggatārammanam ya gotrabhu: cittam, tam hi kamavacaragottam abhibhavati mahaggatagottan ca bhaveti nibbatteti ti gotrabhu ti vuccati, api ca gotrabhu ti nibbanarammanam maggavithiyam navattam gotrabhu hanam va. samkhararammanam va phalasamapattivithiyam navattam gotrabhu nanam tesu hi pathamam puthujjanagottam abhibhavati ariyagottan ca bhaveti gottabhidhana ca nibbanato arammanakaranavasena bhavati ti gotrabhu ti vuccati: dutivam pana samkhārārammanam pi samānam asevanapaccayabhāvena sasampavattāni phalacittāni gottābhidhāne nibbānamhi bhāvetī ti gotrabhū ti vuccati idam pāli vavatthānam:

gotrabhu iti rassattavasena kathitam padam | napumsakan ti vinnevvam hanacittadipekkhakam || gotrabhū iti dighattavasena kathitam pana pullingam iti vinneyyam puggaladikapekkhakham ||

In this context the term gotta is explained as equivalent to nibbana on p. 70. See also below, pp. 204-5.

The printed texts quoted below in the present article, however, read gotrabhūñāna ('knowledge of the gotrabhū', i.e. a puggala), rather than gotrabhu hānam 'knowledge which is gotrabhu' (i.e. which 'overcomes' - abhibhavati - the gotta of the realm of desire, 'cultivates' - bhaveti - and 'develops' - nibbatteti - the great gotta while taking Nirvāna [gotta = nibbāna] as its object). But as will be seen below (p. 200), the reference indeed seems often to be in fact to a state of consciousness rather than to a puggala as such.

4 Elsewhere the word ahuneyya is also used of a sacred fire (aggi; v. Dighanikaya III, pp. 5, 217; Anguttaranikaya IV, p. 41). In the Visuddhimagga (§7.95) it is defined as āhavanīya 'worthy of receiving offerings' (āhavanam arahati).

⁵ Cf. Saddaniti, p. 870, with p. 622.

6 It is to be noted that arya/ariya is another word taken from the social sphere to designate a spiritual type, an Aryan as a 'noble' of the spirit.

7 Such monks are perhaps referred to as gotrabhū because they take gifts, and it is

stated that the gotrabhū is a person to be honoured with offerings.

To account for this second view of the gotrabhū R.C. Childers distinguishes between gotrabhū as referring to Arhatship, and gotrabhū as referring to the śramanagotra when it designates the fraternity of monks (Dictionary of the Pali language, s.v.).

- 8 The gotrabhū is also mentioned in another Abhidhamma text, the Kathāvatthu (247 and 309).
- 9 Cf. Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga § 4.74 (see below).
- 10 On vutthana 'emergence' cf. S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Compendium of Philosophy, London, 1910, p. 67f., 215 n. 4.
- 11 (a) V. Saddhammappakāsini, p. 275; lokikasamkhārā hi kilesānam nimittattā nimittākārena upatthānato vā 'nimittan' ti vuccanti, 'for mundane conditionings are called nimitta since they are conditions for passions or occur in the form of conditions for theml'. (b) V. Saddhammappakāsini, p. 275: nivaranādigottābhibhavanato 'gotrabhū' ti

(where gotta is said to have the same meaning as bija 'germ'). (c) V. Saddhammapakāsini. p. 275: uppādādigottābhibhavanato gotrabhū' ti.

12 This classification might seem to exclude the idea of an evil gotrabhū, as mentioned in the Maiihimanikā va.

- 13 On the vimokkhamukha's as preliminaries to the gotrabhū see Atthasālinī § 3.654; S.Z. Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 67-68.
- 14 Cf. Visuddhimagga § 22.5.44 (see below).
- 15 On the relation between Buddhaghosa and the author of the Saddhammappakāsini see Nanamoli, The Path of Purification, Colombo, 1964, p. xxx.

The gotrabhū is also mentioned in the Atthasālini (pp. 43, 231, 290 etc.).

- 17 paritta is here taken as paritta 1 'limited' (instead of paritta 2 'protection') because it is opposed to mahaggata. (But see Saddaniti, pp. 479-480, where paritta used beside gotta has the meaning of protection: tānam parittam gottam ... tatra parittan ti mahātejayantatā va samantato sattānam bha yam upaddayam upasaggan ca tāyati rakkhatī ti parittam)
- 18 Cf. Saddhammappakāsini, p. 275, on abhibhavana and bhāvana as explanations of the element bhū-.
- 19 On anuloma v. Visuddhimagga § § 4.74, 21.128-134, 22.5; Atthasālinī § 3.507. Aung translates the term by 'adaptation' (Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 66, 68). 20 Here Buddhaghosa refers to Patisambhidāmagga I, p. 68 (see above).
- 21 V. Patthāna I, p. 165. (On the upanissaya as a condition qualifying one for Arhatship see Jataka I, p. 235; Atthasalini § 5.34. Childers explains the term as 'predestination to salvation'. The Pali Text Society's Dictionary compares the gotrabhū and the upanissaya.)

22 Cf. Atthasālinī, p. 231.

23 (a) In the Atthasālinī (which refers back to the Visuddhimagga) the term go trabhū may, however, be understood as referring to a person. In this work it is described how the gotrabh \bar{u} is still distant from the goal (nibb \bar{a} na) so long as the passions (kilesa) have not been removed (p. 43; cf. pp. 356-357).

There it is also said that the gotrabhū emerges from the nimitta and is preceded by two, three or four anuloma moments according to whether one is highly intelligent (mahāpaħħa), moderately intelligent or only slightly intelligent (the one of moderate intelligence being taken as a standard for the purpose of discussing the appearance in the series of the gotrabhū and the maggacitta) (p. 231). As for the gotrabhūñāna, it has nib bana as object, and the preceding anumola moments serve to clear away the darkness of the three grades of passion (kilesa); hence, by way of analogy, nib bana may be compared to the moon and the anuloma's to winds progressively blowing away the clouds of darkness, the gotrabhūñāna being then likened to a man with eves (looking for the moon), so that the objectivation of pure nibbana by the gotrabhana is comparable to the seeing of the moon in a cloudless sky. In another analogy concerning the relation between path-knowledge and gotrabhūfiāna, the latter is said to be a factor that permits the maggañana to aim at nibbana in the way a blindfolded archer seated on a moving platform would shoot his arrows at targets as soon as he receives from a companion a sign to the effect that the platform on which he is seated has brought him into a position where he faces the target. The function of the gotrabhūñāna is then to provide a sannā to the magganāna (pp. 232-233), (b) The etymological – and conceptual – relationship between the two continues, however, to be clearly felt in Pali: see for example Saddhammappakāsinī, p. 275; Saddanīti, p. 70 (gotrabhū ti padass' attham vadantehi garūhi tu 'gottam vuccati nihbānam' iti gottan ti bhāsitam) and p. 86 (quoted above, p. 206, note 3).

24 Anguttaranikāya IV, pp. 4-6 enumerates them as: saddhā-dhana, sila⁰, hirī⁰, ottappao, sutao, cagao, and pañña,

25 See D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra, Paris, 1969.

26 Paramatthamanjūsā Visuddhimagga-Atthakathā, p. 134 (quoted by Nānamoli, Path of Purification, p.143, note 18); Saddanīti, pp. 479-480 with p. 359.

- 27 Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Ārya Vimuktisena ...', WZKSO 12-13, 1968, Festschrift E. Frauwallner, p. 311; Théorie, pp. 78, 132, 143-144, See J. Wackernagel A. Debrunner, Altindische Grammatik II/2², pp. 79, 701.
- 28 'Evolving' apparently renders obhū, understood as bhāvana (see above).
- 29 These two distinct renderings given by Nanatiloka correspond to the two meanings of gotrabha noted above.
- 30 See above.
- 31 Cf. Saddanīti, p. 77: gotrabhū ti, gottasamkhātam amatamahānibbānam ārammanam katvā bhūto ti gotrabhū. sotāpattimaggassa anantarapaccayena sikhappattabalavavipassanācittena samannāgato puggalo, vuttam h'etam bhagavatā: 'katamo ca puggalo gotrabhū ...' [Puggalapañnatti, p. 12]. Here then Obhū is explained as bhūto (and not as equivalent in meaning to abhibhavati or bhāveti as on p. 86, quoted above, p. 206, note 3, and elsewhere in the Pali literature quoted above).
- 32 In the Bodhisattvabhūmi the gotrabhūmi precedes the adhimukticaryāo which in its turn precedes the śuddhādhyāśáya (§ 3.3), just as the gotravihāra precedes the adhimukticaryāo which in its turn precedes the pramuditao (§ 2.4). (Neither is counted in the list of ten bhūmis in the Daśabhūmikasūtra, which lists the pramuditā as the first bhūmi) Cf. N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Chap. IV; Theorie, pp. 91-92.
- 33 Cf. the tathagatagarbha possessed by all sentient beings (sarvasattva)?
- 34 Visuddhimagga § 22.13-14. On the putto oraso (and the dhammadāyada) see Dīghanikāya III, p. 84; Majjhimanikāya I, p. 12; III, p. 29; Samyuttanikāya II, p. 221; Itivuttaka, p. 101. On the same notion as developed by the Mahāyāna, cf. Śrīmālādevisimhanādasūtra f. 447b, quoted in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga 1.36.

 The concept has been discussed in the Hōbōgirin s.v. Busshi (p. 172) and by P. Mus, Barabudur, Hanoi 1935, pp. *12, *124, *255 and Chapters X-XV.
- 35 V. Bodhisattvabhūmi § 1.1 (p. 2) on the gotra as niśraya, etc.
- 36 In Sinhalese the form gota is derived from Paligotta (see W. Geiger, Etymological glossary of the Sinhalese language [Colombo, 1941], s.v., and R.L. Turner, Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages). In addition Sinhalese dictionaries list the form gotra, presumably a Sanskritic borrowing (rather than from Paligotrao discussed above). In Sinhalese the consonant cluster -tr- is not unusual, whereas in Pali a cluster consisting of a stop + r is quite rare, though certainly not unknown.
- 37 In connection with a gift (dakkhinā) and the merit accruing therefrom the Pali canon speaks of a dedication(ādis—e.g. Mahāparinibbānasutta in Dīghanikāya II, p. 88), to which dakṣinādeśanā corresponds in the canon of the Sarvāstivādins. The scholastic Pāli term is patti, which appears also in the compounds pattidāna, pattidhamma and pattānumodanā; and the expression dakkhinam ādise of the Mahāparinibbānasutta is glossed as pattim dadeyya (Sumargalavilāsini II, p. 542). (The most usual Mahāyānist term seems to be (punya-)parināmanā.)

Some modern Sinhalese scholars seem to discount the existence of such an idea in the genuine Pāli tradition; but see the present writer's remarks in his review of N.A. Jayawickrama's translation of the *Jinakālamāli* (The Sheaf of Garlands of the Epochs of the Conquerer, Pali Text Society Translation Series No. 36, London 1968) in JAOS 92 (1972) 180-181. On the subject see also G.P. Malalasekera, 'Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism', Philosophy East and West 17 (1967) 85-90; R. Gombrich, 'Merit Transference in Sinhalese Buddhism', History of Religions 11 (1971) 203-219 (who attempts an interpretation of the concept of anumodanā).

PALI LITERATURE OF THAILAND *

I. BACKGROUND TO THE PALITRADITION

The Buddhism enunciated in the Pāli Canon, better known as the Theravāda (or 'Teaching of the Elders'), spread beyond the confines of its native land during the reign of Emperor Asoka in the third century B.C.

As a direct result of the third Buddhist Council, convened by him, monk-teachers were despatched to the neighbouring countries. Very little definite information is recorded of the fate of those missions with the supreme exception of that to Ceylon where no less a person than the emperor's own son, Mahinda, was chosen to promulgate the Dhamma.

Although Buddhism was soon well established in Ceylon, there are very few historical references to Buddhist contact with mainland South-East Asia. In fact it was the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism that first penetrated the mainland kingdoms direct from India. However, the first contact with the Theravāda was made before 1000 A.C. The powerful Burmese dominion of Anuruddha had been converted to the Theravāda through contacts with Ceylon and, as a result, northern Thailand, which formed part of his kingdom, was similarly influenced.

Two centuries later the independent kingdom of Lānnā was established in the north with the southern half of the Thai country forming the expansionist kingdom of Ayodhya (1350-1767). The capital of Lānnā was founded in 1296 in Chiengmai which much later gave its name to the whole province.

In 1423, twenty-five monks from Chiengmai, eight from Cambodia and six from the Burmese Mon kingdom received the *upasampadā* ordination in Ceylon. They returned two years later, those from Chiengmai finally arriving in the Lānnā capital in 1430. The monks established themselves in the Pā Deng temple, two miles west of Chiengmai, and soon embarked on a *Dhammadūta* tour of the towns of Chiengrai, Lampoon, Lampāng and Chiengsen.

Thus was founded the Sihala (Ceylon) sect or the Lankāvaṃsa (Ceylon tradition) which gave rise to a great revival of Pāli literature and learning. This movement was accentuated in 1442 with the accession of Tilok, one of the most renowned kings of Lānnā, who, in 1475, convened a Council for the revision of the canonical texts.¹



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date of Kaniska). Rather, quite on the contrary, it provides the signal confirmation of those views. Mature study and reflection, which will naturally include the hoped-for decipherment by appropriate specialists of the mysterious third 'unknown language' version, will, it is confidently expected, endorse this opinion.

THE MEANINGS OF THE TERM GOTRA AND THE TEXTUAL HISTORY OF THE RATNAGOTRAVIBHĀGA¹

By D. SEYFORT RUEGG

1

The word gotra is frequently used in the literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism to denote categories of persons classified according to their psychological, intellectual, and spiritual types. The chief types usually mentioned in this kind of classification are the Auditors making up the śrāvaka-gotra, the Individual Buddhas making up the pratyekabuddha-gotra, and the Bodhisattvas making up the bodhisattva-gotra.2 In the Sandhinirmocanasūtra these three types constitute altogether different gotras, which thus coincide with the three separate Vehicles (yāna) as recognized by the Yogācārin/Vijñaptimātratā school.3 To these three some sources add the further category of the undetermined (aniyatagotra), which is made up of persons not yet definitively attached to one of the three preceding classes; and the non-gotra (agotra), that is the category made up of persons who cannot be assigned to any spiritual class.4 Each of the first three categories is thus comprised of persons capable of achieving a particular kind of maturity and spiritual perfection in accordance with their specific type or class, the Auditor then attaining the Awakening (bodhi) characteristic of the Śrāvaka and so on.5 Especially remarkable in this connexion, and somewhat anomalous as a gotra, is the non-gotra, i.e. that category of persons who seem to have been considered, at least by certain Yogācārin authorities, as spiritual 'outcastes' lacking the capacity for attaining spiritual perfection or Awakening of any kind; since they therefore achieve neither bodhi nor nirvāna, they represent the same type as the icchantikas to the extent that the latter also are considered to lack this capacity.6

The three gotras mentioned first together with the aniyatagotra and the agotra are discussed chiefly in the Śāstras of the Yogācārins 7 and in the commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.8

In addition, the gotra functions so to speak as a spiritual or psychological 'gene' determining the classification of living beings into the above-mentioned categories, which may be either absolutely or temporarily different according to whether one accepts the theory that the three Vehicles (yāna) are ultimately and absolutely separate because they lead to the three quite different kinds of Awakening of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva—namely the extreme triyāna doctrine—or, on the contrary, the theory that the Vehicles are ultimately one because all sentient beings are finally to attain Awakening and buddhahood which are essentially one—in other words the characterized Mādhyamika version of the ekayāna theory.

The word gotra thus either designates extensionally a (soteriological and gnoseological) category or class; or it designates intensionally the spiritual

factor or capacity that determines classification in such a category or class. In these meanings the term gotra is evidently related to the concept of a lineage, clan, or family, or of a genus; and its meanings are then associated with a socio-biological metaphor (gotra = kula, vamsa 'family', etc.) and a biological or botanical metaphor $(gotra = b\bar{i}ja,$ 'seed, germ').

A comparable concept is that of the Tathāgata-lineage (tathāgatavaṃśa) in which a Bodhisattva takes birth.¹¹ In Mahāyānist thought the Bodhisattva is in fact represented as born in the family of the Tathāgata (tathāgatakula) and hence as the son of the Jina (jinātmaja), the very son (aurasaḥ putraḥ) of the Buddha; this birth is considered to take place on the level of the Bodhisattva's first spiritual stage (bhūmi).¹² (And in the Vajrayāna a person belongs, according to his nature, either to the tathāgatakula presided over by Vairocana or to one of the other 'families', each of which is presided over by one of the other Jinas.) In the Avataṃsaka we find as the name of a Bodhisattva the appellation De·bžin·gšegs·pa'i·rigs·su·byun·ba'i·dpal = Tathāgatagotrotpattiśrī ¹³; and in another section of the same collection, the Gandavyūha, the Śreṣṭhīdāraka-Bodhisattva and spiritual wayfarer Sudhana is referred to as born in the family of the Dharmarāja and as born of the Tathāgata.¹⁴

This use of the terms (tathāgata- or buddha-)gotra and 'kula to designate the Buddha-lineage thus recalls the word tathāgatagarbha used in certain Mahāyānist texts to characterize sentient beings (sattva) as all essentially 'embryos' of the tathāgata and as all carrying in themselves the certain capacity of attaining Awakening and becoming Buddhas in accordance with the ekayāna theory; and in each case a biological metaphor is suggested.

Besides these well-established uses of the term gotra to be found in both the scriptural and commentarial literature of the Mahāyāna we meet with another very characteristic use of the term which, though perhaps rarer than the above-mentioned ones, is well attested in both the Sūtras and Sāstras, that of 'mine' or 'matrix'. 15

In the Daśabhūmikasūtra there is a parable that speaks of a precious substance (mahāmaniratna) which, after having been extracted from ten mines or matrixes of precious substance (ratnagotra), is heated by an expert smith (karmāra), well shaped, cleaned, and polished, and then pierced and strung on a cord, and finally mounted on the top of a standard the shaft of which is of precious material, where it shines forth and is acknowledged by the king. This parable has reference to the production of the Thought of All-knowledge (sarvajñatāratnacittotpāda), which is 'extracted' from the 'mine' (or 'matrix') of the ten spiritual stages (bhūmi) of the Bodhisattva, 'heated' by his discipline, ascetic practices, and vows, 'shaped' by meditation, concentration, and spiritual attainment, 'cleansed' by the component members of the Path, 'polished' by means and the super-sciences (abhijñā), 'pierced' by origination in dependence (pratītyasamutpāda), 'strung' on the precious cords of means and transcending discriminative understanding (upāya-prajñā), 'mounted' on the standard of the spiritual powers (vaśitā), endowed with the brightness of

knowledge proceeding from learning, and provided with the consecration (abhişeka) of the Gnosis of the Tathāgata-Dharmarāja Samyaksambuddha.¹⁷

Another parable that is especially relevant to the present investigation is found in the Dhāranīśvararājasūtra. There it is said 18: 'O son of good family, for example an expert jeweller (manikāra) knows well how to clean gems (mani). After having extracted uncleaned gems from their mine (or matrix, manigotra), and having washed them in a sharp and salty liquid, 19 he [first] polishes them with a coarse black cloth. But he does not stop at this point. Next, having washed them in a sharp detergent liquid,20 he polishes them with a fine (woollen) cloth. But he does not stop at this point. Next, having washed them in a great medicinal elixir, he polishes them with a fine cloth. And when [the gem] is polished and freed from impurity ($k\bar{a}ca$) one speaks of a noble precious material (abhijātavaidūrya) '.21 This parable of the jeweller and gem is then applied to the 'Element' of sentient beings (sattvadhātu) which is accidentally sullied but is progressively purified by means of the Buddha's graded teaching. This teaching first agitates beings who take pleasure in the round of existence (samsāra) by means of an agitating discourse on the impermanent, the painful, the non-self, and the impure; and it thus establishes these beings in Dharma and Vinaya. Next, in its second cycle, the teaching awakens the 'Tathāgata-Guide' (tathāgatanetrī) 22 by means of a discourse on Emptiness (śūnyatā), the Signless (animitta), and the Uncommitted (apraņihita).23 And finally, in its third cycle, the teaching establishes these beings in the Object of the Tathagata (tathagataviṣaya) by means of a discourse dealing with purity respecting the three aspects.24

Similarly, in the Sāgaramatipariprechā a gem (vaidūrya-maṇi) is used as an example for the natural luminosity (prakrtiprabhāsvaratā) of the Mind (citta) of sentient beings which is, however, accidentally encased in adventitious impurities (āgantuka-kleśa) resulting from unreal imagination (abhūtaparikalpita, abhūtaparikalpasamutthita). In the Ratnagotravibhāga and the related literature this natural luminosity of Mind figures as an equivalent of the tathāgatagarbha, the tathāgatadhātu, and hence, according to one interpretation, of the prakṛtistha-gotra. In the prakṛtistha-gotra.

In a similar vein, the mine or matrix of purity (viśuddhigotra), otherwise known as the buddhadhātu or tathāgatadhātu and also as the sattvadhātu (as in the passage just quoted from the Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra), is alluded to in the verse

yathā pattharacuṇṇamhi jātarūpaṃ na dissati | parikammena tad diṭṭhaṃ evaṃ loke tathāgatā || 27

'Just as gold is not visible in stone-dust [but] becomes visible through a purifying process, so the Tathāgata [is seen] in the world (of living beings)'. 28 The commentary on this passage glosses viśuddhigotra by tathāgatadhātu (RGVV 1.2; compare buddhadhātu in RGVV 1.40).29

In the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra we find furthermore the idea of a mine or

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matrix of precious substance: gold (suvarnagotra, 3.9) or a gem (suratnagotra, 3.10). According to the Bhāsya, they serve as upamānas to exemplify the bodhisattvagotra. The interpretation as mine or matrix is supported by the explanation of the Bhāsya (which is quite similar in idea to the passage quoted above from the Daśabhūmikasūtra): 'For a great gold-mine is the ground of gold with four qualities: produced in abundance (prabhūta), brilliant (prabhūsvara), spotless (nirmala), and workable (karmanya). Similarly, the bodhisattvagotra is the ground of immeasurable roots of good (kuśalamūla), of knowledge (jñāna), of the attainment of a state unsullied by impurities (kleśa), and of power consisting in the super-sciences (abhij $\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$) and so forth . . . (3.9). For a great mine of gems is the ground of a gem with four qualities: noble (jātya. i.e. genuine), endowed with (good) colour, endowed with (good) shape, and endowed with (good) dimensions. The bodhisattvagotra is comparable, for it is the cause (nimitta) of the great Awakening (mahābodhi), the cause of great knowledge, the cause of Saintly concentration (āryasamādhi) because samādhi is Conformation of the Mind (citta), and the cause of great maturing of sentient beings since it makes many sentient beings mature ' (3.10).

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The reference here is then clearly to the gotra of the Bodhisattva as his Element (dhātu) and cause (nimitta).30 And the metaphor is not, as above, a biological or botanical one, but rather a mineral one.

The meanings 'lineage' etc. as well as 'mine, matrix' are attested, explicitly or implicitly, for the term gotra in several passages of the Ratnagotravibhāga; indeed, in at least one passage (1.149) the context shows that both meanings have to be assumed side by side. But an analysis of this treatise also shows that, despite a certain ambiguity or overlapping of meanings, reference to the metaphors used to exemplify the ideas the term expresses can help to distinguish its meanings.

RGV 1.149-52 states:

gotram tad dvividham jñeyam nidhānaphalavṛkṣavat | anādiprakṛtistham ca samudānītam uttaram || buddhakāyatrayāvāptir asmād gotradvayān matā prathamāt prathamah kāyo dvitīyād dvau tu paścimau || ratnavigrahavaj jñeyah kāyah svābhāvikah śubhah | akṛtrimatvāt prakṛter guṇaratnāśrayatvatah || mahādharmādhirājatvāt sāmbhogaś cakravartivat | pratibimbasvabhāvatvān nirmānam hemabimbavat ||

' This 31 matrix-germ 32 is to be known as twofold, being like a deposited treasure and a tree bearing fruit 33: [namely] the beginningless natural one (prakṛtistha) and the superior (or: subsequent, uttara) one that is acquired (samudānīta).34 It is held that the three Buddha-Bodies are obtained from these two gotras: from the former the first Body [is obtained], and from the latter the last two

[Bodies are obtained]. The pure Essential Body is to be known as being like a precious icon because it is the ground of the precious qualities by virtue of non-artificiality of nature 35; the [Body] of Enjoyment is like a Universal Monarch because of sovereignty over the great Law 36; and the [Body of] Artifice is like a golden image because it has the nature of a reflected image '. 37

In the use of the vocable qotra in this passage the meanings 'mine, matrix', 'germ', and 'lineage' clearly overlap, for the gotra is here both a 'mineral' precious and shining substance and a 'biological' source of the Buddha-Body; and it is compared both with a precious mineral deposit or substance and with a tree bearing fruit and thus reproducing its own kind.

This conception of the gotra is introduced first in RGV 1.27-8 and then taken up in 1.144. In these three verses the gotra figures alongside the dharmakāya (: sambuddhakāya and buddhajñāna) and the tathatā as one of the factors underlying the canonical statement sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāh 'All sentient beings are tathāgatagarbha(s)'.38 And the verse 1.27 specifies that when the tathagatagarbha doctrine is propounded with reference to the gotra this involves metonymous transfer (upacāra) since, in this case, the cause (i.e. the gotra) receives the name of the result (i.e. the tathāgata).39 Similarly, the prose-commentary on RGV 1.149-52 explains that this third factor underlying the teaching of the tathāgatagarbha consists in the fact that the 'Embryoessence ' (garbha) of all sentient beings is the tathāgata-Element with regard to the fact that the nature (? of this Element) is the gotra of the origination of the three Buddha-Bodies.40 For here, according to the commentary, dhātu 'Element' means 'cause' (hetu) of the tathāgata-state (tathāgatatva), which is 'constituted' or 'informed' (prabhāvita) by these three Buddha-Bodies.

The prose-commentary observes 41 that in this sense the gotra has been exemplified, in the tathāgatagarbha doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, by the last five of the famous nine examples employed in that Sutra.

Example V: a precious treasure hidden beneath the hut of a poor man (TGS 10b-12a, RGV 1.112-14) (referring to the prakrtistha, RGV 1.149).

Example VI: a seed or sprout hidden in its sheaf (TGS 12a-13a, RGV 1.115-17) (referring to the samudānītagotra, RGV 1.149).

Example VII: a precious icon enveloped in a dirty cloth (TGS 13a-14a, RGV 1.118-20) (referring to the gotra as the source of the svābhāvika-kāya, RGV 1.150-1).

Example VIII: an embryo of the future Universal Monarch (cakravartin) in the womb of a poor and distressed woman (TGS 14a-15b, RGV 1.121-3) (referring to the gotra as the source of the sāmbhoga-kāya, RGV 1.150, 152ab).

Example IX: a golden image, shining and reflecting, buried in mud and filth (TGS 15b, RGV 1.124-6) (referring to the gotra as the source of the nirmanakāya, RGV 1.150, 152cd).

In this enumeration we straightaway observe that in addition to the abovementioned overlapping of meanings there is a curious medley of examples with their associated metaphors. Thus, together with a biological metaphor (example VIII) and a parallel botanical one (example VI), we find three forms of the (hidden) treasure or precious substance variety of mineral metaphor. This mineral metaphor is of course, as stated in the RGVV, ⁴² closely bound up with the concept of the $(tath\bar{a}gata)dh\bar{a}tu$ 'Buddha-Element' (interpreted as Buddha-deposit, and Buddha-cause $[dh\bar{a}tu=hetu]$), which frequently figures as an equivalent of the $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ (in which the metaphor is, however, basically biological).

But it is important to note that in the context of the *gotra* as one of the three factors underlying the *tathāgatagarbha* theory and as the source of the Buddha-Bodies there is apparently no trace at all of the precious substance/mine metaphor discussed in the first part of this paper (pp. 342-4).

Ch. 1 of the RGV contains four other verses—27-8, 41, and 86—in which reference is made to the gotra.

In 1.41 we read:

bhavanirvāṇatadduḥkhasukhadoṣagunekṣaṇam | gotre sati bhavaty etad agotrāṇāṃ na vidyate || 43

'Given the existence of the gotra, becoming and extinction, together with their respective suffering and bliss, faults and qualities, are perceived; for this is not so (na tad yatah) with regard to those without gotra'. Following as it does on RGV 1.40 which speaks of the buddhadhātu as the Element which makes possible both aversion to Pain and seeking for Nirvāṇa (nirvṛti), it can be assumed that here too the reference is to that gotra which is equivalent to the buddha- or tathāgata-dhātu, viz. the prakṛtisthagotra. The RGVV in fact mentions the prakṛtiviśuddhigotra, 44 as well as the certain capacity for spiritual purity (viśuddhibhavyatā) 45 present in all sentient beings; and it then quotes a verse which compares this certain capacity to a concealed golden image (suvarna-bimbam paricchāditam). (This example seems, however, not to correspond exactly with examples V and VII of the TGS and RGV serving to exemplify the prakṛtisthagotra, but rather with example IX which pertains to the samudānītagotra as the source of the nirmāna-kāya.46)

As for RGV 1.86, it refers to the gotra as one in a series of four factors that are said to correspond to four equivalents (paryāya; RGVV: nāmaparyāya) of the dharmakāya on the level of the Immaculate Element (anāsravo dhātuḥ) or tathāgatagarbha. These four factors (artha) are inseparability of the Buddha-Qualities (buddhadharmāvinirbhāga), the 'thus coming'—i.e. perfection—of the gotra (tadgotrasya tathāgamaḥ),⁴⁷ possession of the true and non-deceptive properties (amṛṣāmoṣadharmitva), and original tranquillity by nature (ādiprakṛtiṣāntatā). Corresponding to these four factors are the four equivalent expressions listed in 1.84: dharmakāya, tathāgata, āryasatya, and paramārthanirvṛti. Under the tenth rubric of the RGV (1.29, 84 f.)—the category of non-separation (asambhedārtha)—the preceding four factors are found to relate to the tathāgatagarbha in so far as it is characterized by achievement of the final goal (niṣṭhāgamanalakṣaṇa, RGVV 1.84 avatāranikā). It is thus clear from

the parallelism of 1.84 and 1.86 that the expression tathāgata pertains, on the level of the fruit or goal, to tathagama of gotra. And with reference to the attainment in inconceivable modes of the nature of the gotra 48 the RGVV indeed quotes a definition of the gotra phrased in the following terms: 'The particularity of the six [internal] Bases (sadāyatanaviśeṣa) 49 is such (tādrśa), come in a continuous series, without beginning in time, and acquired through nature (dharmatāpratilabdha)'. As for this connexion between tathāgama of gotra (1.86) and the tathāgata (1.84), it is reminiscent of the terminology used in the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra where it is said that the tathatā, though without differentiation for all sentient beings, is the tathāgata-state once it has reached purity, so that it is declared that all embodied beings have this tathaqatatva as their embryo-essence.50 The link between this aspect of the gotra and the tathāgata is brought out not only by the allusion to tathāgama—in other words to an etymology of the word tathagata—but perhaps also by the presence in the definition quoted in the RGVV of the epithet tadrśa 'such'; for this adjective may also involve an implicit allusion to the etymology of tathāgata: the Tathagata is in fact regularly referred to as $t\bar{a}yi(n)$ ($t\bar{a}di(n)$ in Pali).⁵¹

In sum, it therefore appears that the gotra of RGV 1.86 also refers to the prakṛtistha-gotra (: tathāgatadhātu) just as did the (viśuddhi)gotra of 1.41.⁵² That the term gotra in 1.27-8 similarly pertains to the double gotra of RGV 1.149 is confirmed by the relation of these two verses with RGV 1.144 and 149-52. (The question then is to which component of this double gotra—the prakṛtistha or the samudānīta—it pertains.⁵³)

On the contrary, the *gotra* mentioned in the first part of ch. 1 of the RGV differs from the *gotra* of the second part by being not twofold—prakrtistha and $samud\bar{a}n\bar{\imath}ta$ ⁵⁴—but fourfold. And it is clearly associated with the precious substance/mine metaphor, rather than with either the other varieties of mineral metaphor or the biological metaphor with which the twofold gotra has been seen to be associated, for it is explicitly said to be the 'mine' or 'matrix' of the Triple Jewel (ratnatraya = triratna, viz. buddha, dharma, and samgha) (RGV 1.24):

gotram ratnatrayasyâsya vişayah sarvadarsinām | caturvidhah sa câcintyas caturbhih kāraṇaih kramāt ||

'The matrix of the Triple Jewel is the object of Those who see all; it is four-fold, and it is also inconceivable for four reasons taken in order'.

The four factors comprising this quadripartite gotra are enumerated in the verse 1.23:

samalā tathatātha nirmalā vimalā buddhaguņā jinakriyā | viṣayaḥ paramārthadarśināṃ śubharatnatrayasargako yataḥ ||

'The impure Thusness (tathatā) (i), as well as the pure one (ii), the spotless Buddha-Qualities (iii), and the action of the Jina (iv) constitute the object of

Those who see the supreme truth; for it is productive of the three pure Jewels'.⁵⁵ A parallel enumeration of four factors is then found in the extant text of the RGV in what looks like a commentary-verse (1.26):

bodhyam bodhis tadangāni bodhanêti yathākramam | hetur ekam padam trīni pratyayas tadviśuddhaye ||

'Among [the factors] known as what is to be known (i), Awakening (ii), its members (iii), and the action of making known (iv), respectively one "station" is the cause and the [other] three ["stations"] are the condition for its purification.' 57

These four factors then make up the subject-matter of the four main chapters of the RGV, called in the RGVV the $Tath\bar{a}gatagarbh\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$, the $Bodhyadhik\bar{a}ra$, the $Gun\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$, and the $Tath\bar{a}gatakrtyakriy\bar{a}dhik\bar{a}ra$. It is true that the first chapter of the RGV only takes up in detail the $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ as such with verse 1.27, the preceding verses of the extant Sanskrit version being devoted mainly to the three Jewels (1.4 f., 9 f., and 13) and their fourfold Matrix (1.23-6), of which the $samal\bar{a}$ tathat \bar{a} or $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ is, as has just been seen, the first component; but this $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ is none the less without doubt the main topic of ch. 1. And ch. 2-4 are then devoted to the three following components of the fourfold gotra. According to RGV 1.1, which provides a table of contents of the whole Sastra as we have it, these four factors making up the Matrix of the Triple Jewel together with the Three Jewels themselves then constitute seven adamantine factors (vajrapada). 58

In view of the preceding considerations it seems clear that the gotra to which reference is made in the title Ratnagotravibhāga must therefore be the fourfold mine or matrix associated with the precious substance/mine metaphor, and not the twofold gotra of the second part of ch. 1 comprising the prakrtisthagotra (: tathāgatadhātu, tathāgatagarbha) and the samudānītagotra which, as seen above, are associated respectively with varieties of the treasure metaphor and a botanical metaphor. And it follows that the title of the work must be understood as meaning literally 'Opening up of the Matrix of the (Triple) Jewel'. The structure and contents of the extant text of the RGV consequently lend no support to the translation of gotra in either the title or the first part of ch. 1 as 'lineage' or 'germ' (in the strict biological or botanical sense), these two meanings being applicable only to the gotra set forth in the second part of ch. 1 and the associated metaphors of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, rather than to the precious substance and its associated metaphors in the first part of ch. 1 taken from the Dhāranīśvararājasūtra and related sources.

The semantic differentiation noticed above between distinct uses of the word gotra associated with different metaphors has implications not only for the history of the gotra doctrine and the closely related $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ and $tath\bar{a}gatadh\bar{a}tu$ theory, but also for the problem of the history of the text of the RGV and the question of the original form of this work (the 'Ur-RGV').

III

The prose-commentary on the extant Sanskrit text of the RGV uses terms such as śloka, $ud\bar{a}na$, and $ud\bar{a}harana$ to introduce verses of the original text on which it comments; and it seems likely that when a verse is introduced as a 'Śloka'—a term that need not in this case refer to the metrical structure of the verse in question, which may in fact be composed in another metre—this indicates that it belongs to the basic core of the work rather than either to a commentary-verse that has become incorporated into the RGV as we have it or, as a summary-verse or quotation, to the prose-commentary (the RGVV). 61

With respect to the question of the original extent of the basic text of the RGV, the Chinese translation (contained in the $Taish\bar{o}$ $Daiz\bar{o}ky\bar{o}$, no. 1611 and attributed to Ratnamati and Bodhiruci) raises a number of problems. To begin with, since there are to be found there two Chinese versions of the Sāstra, one of which consists of only some 300 verses of the RGV while the second comprises most of these verses with some commentary-verses in addition as well as the prose-commentary (the RGVV), the two Chinese versions do not agree completely with regard to the original verse-text. Secondly, the Chinese versions of the verse-text do not correspond to the text of the extant RGV as edited by E. H. Johnston, or to the Tibetan translation of the bsTan-'gyur which in this respect closely follows the Sanskrit text. Finally, provided at least the first 18 verses of ch. 1 are not counted, the Chinese verse-text of this chapter is more closely comparable to what can be called the Sanskrit 'Slokatext', that is to a text of the RGV consisting of the verses that the prose-commentary has introduced as 'Slokas'. Slokas'.

Now RGV 1.23 which, as seen above, enumerates the four factors making up the quadripartite gotra of the first part of ch. 1 is in fact introduced in the prose-commentary as a 'Sloka'; and on the formal level there therefore exists an at least $prima\ facie$ case for considering it to belong to the basic text of the RGV. This view is furthermore supported by the structure of the extant Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan versions of the text, for all of them include this verse and, accordingly, comprise chapters dealing with these four factors.

However, in his discussion of the original form of the RGV in which he has set up two basic criteria intended to establish whether a given verse of the RGV belongs to the 'basic original' text—namely its occurrence in the Chinese verse-text and its presentation as a 'Sloka' in the Sanskrit prose-commentary—Takasaki has excluded RGV 1.23 from his 27-verse 'basic original' Ratnagotra-wibhāga ('Sloka-grantha'). And he has done so despite the fact that the verse fulfils his two requirements for establishing the authenticity of a verse, not on internal philological grounds but because it contains references not only to the samalā tathatā—in other words to the tathāgatagarbha which is the subject of the main portion of ch. 1—but also to the other three factors constituting the subjects of ch. 2, 3, and 4 of the RGV; for in Takasaki's opinion the 'original basic' text consisted only of 27 verses drawn exclusively from

the first chapter, and 'denial of the originality of chapters other than ch. 1 consequently means the denial of the idea of the 4 aspects of the ratnagotra'.65

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Since RGV 1.41, 86, 144, and 149-52 are neither introduced by the prose-commentary as 'Slokas' nor are they included in the Chinese verse-text, the only explicit reference to the gotra remaining in Takasaki's 'original basic' text is the one found in RGV 1.27.66 And notwithstanding the fact that this verse is not introduced as a 'Sloka' by the Sanskrit prose-commentary and that it therefore violates one of his two basic criteria of authenticity, Takasaki has included it in his basic text on the ground that 'it expresses the fundamental idea of the Ratna. and is so important that we cannot imagine the contents of this text without this verse'.67

This waiving of the criteria he has himself established both to exclude 1.23 and to include 1.27 on the basis of their content alone raises serious questions since it tends to involve Takasaki in a circular argument. Furthermore, it is clear that a text from which are excluded not only the verse referring to the gotra of the ratnatraya (1.24 excluded, no doubt properly, as a commentaryverse) but also the 'Sloka' 1.23 which enumerates the four factors making up this gotra could hardly merit the title of Ratnagotravibhāga, which Takasaki nevertheless still gives it. For even a proto- or Ur-RGV would presumably have had to include some reference to that topic in order to justify this title.68 That this function cannot be filled by RGV 1.27, which only mentions the gotra as one of the three factors underlying the tathāgatagarbha doctrine in accordance with 1.144 and 1.149-52 dealing with the twofold gotra, should be clear from the foregoing discussion; for as we have seen the concept of the ratnagotraa mineral 'matrix' of jewels—is propounded only in the first part of ch. 1 of the RGV, and it does not reappear explicitly in the second part of this chapter beginning with RGV 1.27.

The question then arises as to whether the 'original basic' RGV as reconstructed by Takasaki (or any text closely resembling it) ever circulated independently as a literary composition; and, if so, what the title of such a composition lacking verses 1.23-6 might have been in view of the fact that it could scarcely have been the title $Ratnagotravibh\bar{a}ga$. Theoretically no doubt the sub-title $(Mah\bar{a}y\bar{a}na)Uttaratantra(s\bar{a}stra)$ is a possibility, since the subject-matter would correspond to what is termed uttaratantra in the $Mah\bar{a}parinirv\bar{a}nas\bar{u}tra$ ⁶⁹; but such a hypothesis is quite uncertain, the more so as the only verse of ch. 1 of the RGV referring to a tantre... uttare (1.160) is not regarded by Takasaki as part of the original basic text. The question of the precise extent of the original RGV thus proves to be a problem that is still only partially resolved, though Takasaki's valuable book constitutes an important contribution to the study of this and other problems surrounding the RGV.

In sum, it is no doubt possible that parts of the extant RGV circulated independently, for the text as we have it is evidently composite 71 ; but it is highly unlikely that such a text could have been entitled $Ratnagotravibh\bar{a}ga$ if it did not somehow include the matter referred to in RGV 1.23-6.

The preceding considerations thus tend to support the thesis that RGV 1.23 formed an integral part of any text known as $Ratnagotravibh\bar{a}ga$, and hence that such a text was articulated round the four factors enumerated in that verse, and elaborated in 1.24–6, as the four matrix-sources of the Triple Jewel. In addition, these considerations help to show that it may still be appropriate to take the extant Sanskrit text of ch. 1 of the RGV, however composite it may be, also as a basis for doctrinal study and analysis of the gotra and $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ theories.

Finally, there can be no question of the ratnagotra of RGV 1.23-4 being simply a synonym of $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$, 72 for the $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha = samal\bar{a}$ $tathat\bar{a}$ is only one of four components of the ratnagotra. The only gotra identifiable with the $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ is then the prakrtistha-gotra, or perhaps more loosely the double gotra of the second part of ch. 1 of the RGV. 73

IV

To return now to the distribution of the meanings of the word gotra in the extant Sanskrit text of the RGV, the references to the 'technical' metaphors regularly associated with the ideas and meanings expressed by this word can be of help. This is indeed not unexpected since it is well known that metaphors and parables play a very prominent part in the didactic technique of the Buddhist Sūtras as well as of some Sāstras, this being especially true of the tathāgatagarbha and related doctrines which have been explained by means of them in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the Mahāyānist Mahāparinirvānasūtra, the Mahābherīsūtra, and elsewhere, and also in the Ratnagotravibhāga.

It is nevertheless clear from the foregoing that the gotra and tathāgatagarbha doctrines are associated with and exemplified by a remarkably wide variety of metaphors drawn from quite different spheres. And the at least partial overlapping noticed for the meanings of the word gotra along with the curious mixture of metaphors applied to the concepts involved clearly raise problems of interpretation.⁷⁴

Concerning the distribution of the metaphors associated in particular with the meanings of gotra in the extant RGV, in the first part of ch. 1 (which serves as an over-all frame for the entire Sastra and also as an introduction to the tathāgatagarbha doctrine expounded in 1.27 ff., as already mentioned above) only the precious substance/mine metaphor is found. And since this aspect of the gotra is stated to be the source of the Triple Jewel, only the meaning 'mine' or 'matrix'—or the more general one of 'source'—would be appropriate, to the exclusion of the meanings 'germ' and 'lineage' with the associated biological and botanical metaphors.

In the second part of ch. 1 on the other hand the picture is somewhat less clear, the metaphors used in the verses (which, except for 1.27, seem to be commentary-verses) and in the prose-commentary being very mixed indeed. Of course, 1.144 and 1.149-52 speak basically of the same aspect of the gotra,

namely the twofold one consisting of the original and beginningless prakṛtistha and the acquired (samudānīta) one, the first being exemplified in itself by example V and as the source of the svābhāvika-kāya by example VII, and the second being exemplified in itself by example VI and as the source of the other two Buddha-Bodies by examples VIII and IX. But in connexion with the gotra of 1.41 and 1.86 none of the familiar metaphors is mentioned; and the meaning has therefore to be established in these two passages on doctrinal grounds as well as, in the case of 1.86, on the basis of the parallel verses 1.84-5 and the canonical text quoted in the commentary. Taken together, the evidence for 1.86 points to the gotra called in 1.149 and elsewhere the prakṛtistha.⁷⁵

As for the gotra mentioned in 1.27-8, there is every reason to suppose that the reference also is to the gotra of the second part of ch. 1 (1.144, 149-52) especially closely associated with the tathāgatadhātu/tathāgatagarbha, and not to the quadripartite gotra of the first part of that chapter in which the tathāgatagarbha (= samalā tathatā) is only one of four component parts. But, as already mentioned, there may be some uncertainty as to whether the bauddhagotra of 1.27 is more specifically the prakṛtistha or the samudānīta; for the mention of metonymous transfer (of the result on to its cause) in that verse could be interpreted as supporting the idea that the bauddha-gotra corresponds to the result- (or Fruit-) level of the acquired (samudānīta) or developed (paripuṣṭa) gotra. 76

Now, of the five examples taken from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra used in the RGV to illustrate the gotra, only one—viz. example VIII relating to the future Cakravartin in the womb of a destitute woman and exemplifying the samudānītagotra as the source of the sāmbhoga-kāya—is associated with a biological metaphor, so that it may be thought to reinforce the biological meaning 'lineage'. And the example of the seed or sprout in the sheaf (no. VI) is basically a botanical one, so that it could be held to be related to the meaning 'germ' or even 'genus; species'. The other three metaphors, those in examples V, VII, and IX, are all varieties of what may be termed a mineral metaphor, since the first two pertain in some way to a (hidden) treasure while the last one involves a reflecting gold image; but as such they differ significantly from the precious substance/mine metaphor which, as has been seen above, represents a distinct variety of mineral metaphor.

These five examples are to be found in the *udāharana*-verses 1.96 ff.—that is, in what are presumably commentary-verses of the *RGV* (Takasaki's 'B' and 'C' classes)—while the metaphor of the (commentary-)verse 1.24, based on the Śloka 1.23, is as already seen above not to be found in the second part of ch. 1.

Overlapping of meanings and associated metaphors is found not only in the case of the word gotra but also in the words tathāgatadhātu and buddhadhātu. For although this term, meaning literally 'Element of the tathāgata (or buddha)', seems to be exemplifiable by the precious substance metaphor, a biological—or more precisely a medical—connotation is also present in it,

dhātu having the meaning of 'humour' in Indian medical theory. This biomedical metaphor becomes especially significant in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.⁷⁷ And in terms of this usage, the expression sattvadhātu, meaning literally 'Element of the sentient being', can refer also to the spiritual 'constitution' of the sentient being.⁷⁸

Only in the case of the word $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ to the extent that it is interpreted etymologically do we then find an exclusively biological metaphor: 'embryo (essence) of the $tath\bar{a}gata$ '. This meaning appears when the word is understood as a possessive ($bahuvr\bar{i}hi$) compound meaning 'having the $tath\bar{a}gata$ as embryo (essence)'. On the other hand, when interpreted as a genitive determinative compound ($sasth\bar{s}sam\bar{a}sa$) meaning 'embryo (essence) of the $tath\bar{a}gata$ ', the biological connotation is more likely to recede into the background; garbha can then be understood completely figuratively as meaning simply 'essence' ($garbha = Tib. s\bar{n}in po$), and it thus more closely approaches its frequent equivalent $dh\bar{a}tu$ (Tib. $khams \sim dbyins$) 'Element' etc. Now, according to the commentary on the $Ratnagotravibh\bar{a}ga$, it is to the extent that it refers to having the $dharmak\bar{a}ya$ as nature that the term $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ is to be understood as a determinative compound; but when it refers to having Thusness ($tathat\bar{a}$) as nature it is to be interpreted as a possessive compound, and such is evidently also the case when it refers to having the gotra as nature. On the case when it refers to having the gotra as nature.

In accordance with what has been observed above it might a priori seem natural to expect the socio-biological metaphor to be more in evidence in connexion with the latter usages, and the hidden treasure metaphor to prevail in the former one, that is in connexion with the reference to the dharmakāya. This is not the case, however. It is no doubt true, as seen above, that the biological metaphor is most explicit in the example relating to the samudānītagotra as the source of the sāmbhoga-kāya (example VIII). But botanical metaphors, which might be considered close to the biological one, appear in connexion with the dharmakāya (examples II and III, and to a lesser extent in example I where a tathāgata-figure is seen as seated in the heart of a lotus, unaffected by its surrounding faded and decomposing petals). And in the series of nine examples taken from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the hidden treasure metaphor is in fact applied only to the tathatā (example IV) and the prakṛtisthagotra (examples V and VII), and not to the dharmakāya.

The interrelationship between the connotations of gotra, tathāgatadhātu, and tathāgatagarbha and their associated metaphors drawn from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as employed in the Ratnagotravibhāga is thus a complex one; and this complexity is compounded when we consider the metaphors employed in other Sūtras to exemplify the same set of doctrines. This complex situation does not, however, seem to make futile a consideration of the senses and associations of the term gotra in the Ratnagotravibhāga; and a close reading of this work indeed makes it possible to determine these meanings somewhat more accurately by referring to the distribution of the metaphors.

V

In his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary F. Edgerton has listed the following four meanings of gotra in Buddhist usage: (1) 'family' etc.; (2) 'mine'; (3) 'origin' (like ākara), 'basis, source, cause, seed'; and (4) 'kind, class, category' (like jāti).81 It would, however, seem possible to reorganize Edgerton's entry and regard meaning (3a) 'origin' as related either to (1) 'family' or, more probably, to (2) 'mine' (as is indeed implicitly suggested by Edgerton himself, who compares ākara 'mine'); the meaning 'cause' also appears connected with the meaning 'mine', especially since gotra has been seen above to approach the meaning of dhātu 'element' which is used in the meaning of 'cause' (hetu, nimitta).82 As for the meaning 'seed, germ', it seems to be a distinct one.83 Meaning (4) 'kind, class, category', although it is perhaps not all that clearly established by the two quotations from the Lankāvatārasūtra provided by Edgerton,84 is supported by other passages, as well as by the Tibetan equivalent rigs 'kind, class' (also the regular equivalent of jāti) and perhaps to a certain extent also by the Chinese equivalent hsing 14 'nature'; it would seem possible to connect it either with (2) 'mine' 85 or, more probably, with (1) 'family' etc. since Skt. jāti and Tib. rigs both have the meaning of 'family, lineage' and 'kind, class' while in Chinese these two meanings are assigned to two (homophonic) characters.86 In Buddhist usage we then find the following main meanings:

I. 'mine, matrix',
II. 'family, clan, lineage',
III. 'germ, seed',

all of which are in some way a 'source'. The meaning (IV) 'class, category' could be derived from any one of these three meanings; logically it appears to represent an extensional value in relation to the meaning 'germ' determining classification in a class, and historically in the texts studied above it seems most closely connected with the spiritual and psychological 'germ' (representing an intensional value of the word), 87 and also with 'lineage', but a connexion with a 'mine' (of homogeneous elements) cannot be excluded. 88

Now the semantic and lexicographical problems raised by the various meanings attested for gotra in Indo-Aryan in Buddhist usage are paralleled in an interesting way by those posed by the Iranian vocables which could be regarded as cognates: Middle Persian $g\bar{o}har$ 'substance, nature, essence, jewel, stock, lineage' (cf. Modern Persian $g\bar{o}har$ 'gem, pearl, nature, substance') and Sogdian $\gamma w\check{s}$ 'substance, metal' (cf. Henning, Sogdica, 17, 20; Gershevitch, Grammar of Manichean Sogdian, 47). The Iranian meanings indeed correspond largely to the range of meanings attested for OIA gotra, except that they have the meanings 'jewel, pearl, substance' instead of 'mine, matrix (of metals or gems)' as in Indo-Aryan and that they differ from the earliest OIA by not attesting the meaning 'cattle-pen' (RV +) while they do attest the meaning

'lineage' (late Vedic +). Therefore, contrary to what has often been assumed, so the meanings attested in Iranian do not diverge so radically from those in Indo-Aryan, and there consequently seems to be no semantic ground for rejecting the assumption that the Iranian forms quoted are cognates of OIA gotra, as suggested by their phonetic shape.

As for the etymology of OIA gotra taken by itself, whereas the remarkable polyvalence of gó- 'cow' in Vedic usage 90 might perhaps make it possible conceptually to derive many of the attested Indo-Aryan meanings in addition to 'cattle-pen' from $g\dot{o}$ - 'cow' + $tr\bar{a}$ - 'to protect' (cf. Wackernagel-Debrunner, Altindische Grammatik, 11, 2, pp. 79, 701), such a possibility does not appear to exist for Iranian. H. W. Bailey then proposed deriving the Iranian vocables in question from *gauθra, remarking that OIA gotrá- 'family' is probably the same word and that it was perhaps originally distinct from gotrá-'cattle-stall' (JRAS, 1953, 3-4, p. 115); and he has furthermore suggested that this $*gau\theta ra$ may be derived from *gau-: *gu- 'to grow' (Khotanese texts, VI, Prolexis to the book of Zambasta, 1967, 33). It is true that Bailey's suggestion that OIA gotrá- 'cattle-stall' is perhaps not identical with gotrá-'family' was rejected by M. Mayrhofer (Vergl. etymol. Wörterbuch des Altindischen, 346); but Mayrhofer himself neither attempted to trace in detail the history of the meanings attached in OIA to the form gotra-, nor did he even explicitly propose a complete etymology but merely noted: 'Zu gáuh. S. auch Wack. II/2, 79'. Since it is not clear how the meaning 'cattle-pen' is to be fitted in with the other Indo-Iranian evidence, the merits of Bailey's suggestion cannot be dismissed out of hand. In his review of Mayrhofer's dictionary E. Benveniste has also pointed to the need to dissociate OIA gotrá- from gó-'cow' if a connexion is to be maintained with the Iranian forms. 91

However, it might still be possible to derive the meanings attested in Indo-Iranian inclusive of Vedic 'cattle-pen' from the same etymon if we posit as the logically basic meaning something like 'place of growth or origin (cf. Bailey's etymology quoted above); source '. And if this 'source ' is thought of as a container (cf. 'mine, matrix' as well as 'cattle-pen'), one could then suppose that, in Iranian, what is contained—i.e. what 'originates', viz. a substance, jewel, metal, etc.—received the name of its container or source by metonymy. The same process could be thought to have taken place in OIA to make the meaning 'family, lineage' derive from 'cattle-pen' 92; or one could suppose more simply that the meaning 'family, clan, lineage' derives directly from the logically basic meaning 'source', since a clan or lineage is both biologically and sociologically a place of origin or source for an individual. It would then seem possible to account in this way for all the attested meanings within the framework of a logical semantic tree with the inclusive 'root' meaning 'origin, source', from which the specialized 'branch' meanings derive.

Again, if the meanings 'nature' and 'kind' also attested for this group of words in Indo-Iranian (and incidentally also for the Tibetan equivalent rigs

'kind, class' as well as 'family', and for Chinese hsing 性 'nature'/hsing 姓 'surname, clan') were not deemed too abstract, such could be considered the logically primary meaning, which could then have been specialized in either a socio-biological or a mineralogical direction.

Neither of the meanings indicated above—'origin, source' and 'nature, kind'—as a possible primary meaning in the framework of a logical semantic tree is of course chronologically speaking the earliest attested meaning in OIA; and each of these meanings may perhaps appear more inclusive than minimal.⁹³ But the possibility that a primary and original meaning is only actually attested for us in a chronologically later text cannot be overlooked in principle; and in the last analysis, despite a certain abstractness, either meaning (and especially the first) may be after all sufficiently minimal. But clearly the semantic history and etymology of this group of words require more investigation from the philological point of view of the entire corpus of Indo-Aryan and Iranian materials than it has been possible to provide in this paper the purpose of which is limited to only one aspect of the problem.

At all events, the partial if not total identity of the semantic range of gotra in OIA (inclusive of Buddhist Sanskrit) and the apparently cognate forms in Iranian goes against Edgerton's assignment of the meanings 'mine', 'source' and 'kind, class, category' to his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit which, according to his own definition, would imply that these meanings are exclusively Buddhist and, in addition, probably basically Middle Indian. For in view of the Iranian evidence the meanings 'mine (of a precious substance)' and 'kind' etc. can hardly be regarded as developments peculiar to Buddhist Sanskrit.

VI

To sum up, the meaning 'mine, matrix' is central in several Buddhist Sūtras as well as in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. In view of the totality of the Indo-Iranian evidence this meaning does not seem to be peculiar to Buddhist Sanskrit; nor does it seem likely that this meaning can be derived from the meaning 'mountain' which the word *gotra* developed secondarily in OIA.

The very title of the treatise known as Ratnagotravibhāga goes against the view that its verse 1.23, which sets forth the idea of the ratnagotra or Mine of the Triple Jewel of the buddha, dharma, and saṃgha, is not part of the basic text of any treatise so named.

An analysis of the doctrine of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* as we have it along with its commentary (*RGVV*) excludes the hypothesis that the *ratnagotra* of the treatise is simply identical with the *tathāgatagarbha* which is, in fact, only one of its four component parts: samalā tathatā (= tathāgatagarbha), bodhi, the Buddha-Qualities, and the Buddha-action.

¹ A shortened version of this paper was read before the Indological section of the twentyninth International Congress of Orientalists in Paris in July 1973.

The following abbreviations are used.

IBK Indogaku-Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū 印度學佛教學研究.

MSA Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra (ed. Lévi).

RGV Ratnagotravibhāga (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).

RGVV Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).

TGS Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (Tibetan translation in the lHa·sa ed. of the bKa'·'gyur).

Théorie D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra (Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, LXX, Paris, 1969).

 2 v. $Lank\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ras\bar{u}tra$, ed. Nanjō, 2, pp. 63–6, and the other sources quoted in Ruegg, Théorie, 74 f.

- ³ Samdhinirmocanasūtra 7.15, 24; of. Théorie, 73-4.
- 4 Lankāvatārasūtra 2, p. 63.
- ⁵ v. Lankāvatārasūtra 2, pp. 63-5; MSABh. 3.2.
- ⁶ Lankāvatārasūtra 2, pp. 65-6; MSABh. 3.11: aparinirvāṇadharmaka. There are two categories of persons not attaining nirvāṇa, those who do not attain it for a certain length of time (tatkālāparinirvāṇadharman) and those who never do so (atyantāparinirvāṇadharman). The theory that some persons are destined never to attain nirvāṇa and buddhahood is considered characteristic of the Yogācārin school, which does not admit the doctrine of universal buddhahood implied by the usual interpretation of the ekayāṇa theory (see Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 7.24) and the theory of the tathāgatagarbha present in all sentient beings. (MSA 9.37 does not, it seems, refer to the fully developed tathāgatagarbha theory which is based on three factors—the irradiation of the dharmakāya, the non-differentiation of the tathatā, and the presence of the gotra [see RGV 1.27 f.]—and concerns only the non-differentiation of the tathatā, and the tathāgatatva, which all beings possess as their embryonic essence. Cf. below, n. 50.)

The agotra doctrine to the extent that it assumes a class of spiritual 'outcastes' being evidently incompatible with the tathāgatagarbha theory, the question arises as to the significance of the allusion to persons without a gotra in RGV 1.41. The reference there seems to be to a hypothetical case (opposed to the author's own view expressed before in RGV 1.40-41c), which is not, however, admitted by the author; and the revised reading of pāda 1.41d agotrānām na tad yatah (cf. L. Schmithausen, WZKS, xv, 1971, 145) 'since this is not so for those without gotra' makes this interpretation easier (see p. 346). Indeed, according to RGVV 1.41, any allusion to an icchantika who does not attain nirvāna is to be interpreted as referring to a certain interval of time (kālāntarābhiprāya) only, and not to a permanent incapacity. On the icchantika cf. D. S. Ruegg, Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub, Paris, 1973, p. 12, n. 1. The aparinirvānagotra is also mentioned in RGVV 1.32-3, 1.38, and 1.41, and the aparinirvānadharman in 1.41.

- 7 cf. MSA, ch. 3; Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and °ţīkā, 2.1, 4.15-16.
- 8 cf. Théorie, 123 f.
- 9 v. Théorie, 177 f.; MSA 11.53-9; Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā 3.1a, 22. On the equivalence of nirvāṇa and buddhahood, see RGV 1.87.
- ¹⁰ The meanings 'family 'and 'seed 'have been radically separated by F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary*, New Haven, 1953, under his headings (1) and (3) respectively (see above, p. 354).
 - ¹¹ Bodhisattvabhūmi 2.4 (pp. 326-7). Cf. triratnavamśa in RGVV 1.26.
 - ¹² Daśabhūmikasūtra 1U (= p. 16). Cf. MSABh. 5.4-5.
- ¹³ Buddhāvataṃsaka, ch. 43, fol. 76 a 7 (Peking ed.). (Cf. J. Takasaki, IBK, vп, 1, 1958, 48-53.)
- 14 Gandavyūha, ch. 31, p. 221: ayam sa tathāgatagarbha āgacchati, yah sarvasattvānām avidyāndakośam nirbhetsyati/ ayam sa dharmarājakulodita āgacchati, yo 'sangavaravimaladharma-rājapaṭṭam ābandhisyati/. Here tathāgatagarbha is translated into Tibetan as de bžin gšegs pa'i sñin po can; and since the particle can often renders a bahuvrīhi compound, the meaning may be 'born from the Tathāgata' which answers to dharmarājakulodita 'arisen in the family of the Dharmarāja (= Tathāgata)'. Cf. buddhagarbha (p. 482, l. 26) = sans rgyas sras. See now Takasaki Jikidō 高崎直道, Nyōraizō shishō no keisei如宋灏思想《见形成, Tokyo, 1974, 17 f.

 16 It is to be noted that the Abhidharmakośabhāsya associates $gotra = dhātu = \bar{a}kara$ and $gotra:j\bar{a}ti$ in 1.20: $gotr\bar{a}rtho$ $dh\bar{a}tvarthah/$ yathaikasmin parvate bahūny ayastāmrarūpyasuvarnādigotrāni dhātava ucyante evam ekasminn āśraye samtāne vā aṣṭādaśa gotrāni, aṣṭādaśa dhātava ucyante/ ākarās tatra gotrāny ucyante/ ta ime cakṣurādayah kasyâkarāh/ svasyā jāteh/ sabhāgahetutvāt/. And Yaśomitra comments (Wogihara, p. 45): ākara iti prakṛtam/...ākaro dhātuh, yato hi suvarnādyutpattis te teṣām ākarāh/.

Thus gotra has the meaning of element/cause ($dh\bar{a}tu$; cf. below, n. 30; RGVV 1.149-52) or source ($\bar{a}kara$ 'mine'), and it is then the source of its class ($j\bar{a}ti$) by reason of being a homogeneous cause.

Compare also the dhātugotra 'mine of mineral elements' in the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (ed. N. Dutt, Gilgit manuscripts, III, pt. I, p. 106) and in the Divyāvadāna (8, pp. 111-12)

Concerning the philosophical and soteriological use of the word gotra, the Gandavyūha contains some especially revealing passages. Thus, in the expressions (prajāā-)ākaragotra (-sambhava) (p. 40, l. 6) and (sarvaratnasambhavotpatti-)gotrākara(-mūlajāāna) (p. 451, l. 2), the words gotra and ākara seem to reinforce each other (cf. below, n. 78). In the same text is found the collocation of the expressions gotra and ākara (p. 495: ... sarvabodhipakṣyadharma-ratnākaratayā gotrabhūtam sarvaśukladharmasambhāvatayā ākārabhūtam [read ākarabhūtam ?]... bodhicittam). We also meet in it the parallel expressions (sarvatathāgatasambhava-)jūānākaragarbha (p. 282, l. 25), jūānagarbha (p. 483, ll. 1-2), and jūānadhātu (p. 484, l. 16). Cf. also sarvatathāgatakulagotrasambhavagarbha (p. 366, l. 19, pp. 368-9) and kulagotrasambhava (p. 503, l. 26). On the Ganḍavyūha as a forerunner of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine see now Takasaki, Nyōraizō shishō no keisei, ch. iii. And on the use of dhātu in the Akṣarāśisūtra see Ruegg, Théorie, 145.

- ¹⁶ On 'cat's eye' as the meaning of vaidūrya see L. Finot, Les lapidaires indiens, Paris, 1896, pp. xlv-xlvii; C. Vogel, IIJ, 1x, 4, 1966, 270.
- ¹⁷ Dašabhūmikasūtra 11D (= p. 204): tadyathāpi nāma bho jinaputra mahāmaṇiratnam yadā daša ratnagotrāny atikramydbhyutkṣiptam ca bhavati kušalakarmārasuparitāpitam ca . . . , evam eva bho jinaputra yadā bodhisattvānām sarvajňatāratnacittotpādo dašāryagotrāny atikramyotpanno bhavati dhutagunasamlekhašīlavratatapahsuparitāpitaš ca . . ./.

The meaning of the word ratnagotra is here clearly established by the context. (However, in the Lankāvatārasūtra [p. 1, 1. 7], in the expression nānāratnagotrapuṣpapratimanḍita, ratnagotra seems to mean not 'mine of jewels' but 'various kinds of jewels', as translated by Edgerton s.v. gotra (4), gotra here being then equivalent to jāti. But even there it would perhaps be possible to understand the expression also as 'adorned with flowers made of jewels'.)

For the idea set out in the Daśabhūmikasūtra compare the parable of the (bodhisattvacittotpāda-sarvajagadvyūhagarbha- and sarvajňatācittotpādandranīla-)mahāmaniratna in the Gandavyūha (53, p. 499), where the term gotra however does not appear; there the sarvajňatācittotpādātyanta-vimalavišuddhaprabha-maniratna also surpasses the ratnākāras (read: ratnākara 'jewel-mine'?) of qualities of the worldlings, disciples (śaikṣa, presumably the Śrāvakas) and Pratyekabuddhas.

- 18 Dhāranīśvararājasūtra (= Tathāgatamahākaruņānirdešasūtra in the bKa'·'gyur, fols. 176b—177a of the Peking ed.) quoted in RGVV 1.2: tadyathā kulaputra kuśalo manikāro maniśuddhisuvidhijňah/ sa manigotrād aparyavadāpitāni maniratnāni grhītvā tīkṣnena khārodakenotkṣūlya kṛṣnena keśakambalaparyavadāpanena paryavadāpayati/ na ca tāvanmātrena vīryam praśrambhayati/ tatah paścāt tīkṣnenâmiṣarasenotkṣūlya khandikāparyavadāpanena paryavadāpayati/ na ca tāvanmātrena vīryam praśrambhayati/ tatah sa paścān mahābhaiṣajyarasenotkṣūlya sūkṣmavastraparyavadāpanena paryavadāpayati/ paryavadāpitam capagatakācam abhijātavaidūryam ity ucyate/ evam eva kulaputra tathāgato 'py apariṣuddham sattvadhātum viditvanityaduhkhānātmāṣubhodvegakathayā saṃsārābhiratān sattvān udvejayati/ ... tatah paścād avvartyadharmacakrakathayā trimanḍalapariṣuddhikathayā ca tathāgataviṣaye tūn sattvān avatārayati nānāprakṛtihetukān/. utkṣūlya is Johnston's emendation for unmīlya of the MS.
- 19 For khārodaka the bKa'.'gyur translation has bul thog gi chu 'soda solution', while rNog·Blo·ldan ses rab in his translation of the RGVV has lan tshva'i chu rnon po 'sharp salt solution'. khāra is Prakritic for ksāra 'caustic', etc.
- ²⁰ For $\bar{a}misarasa$ the bKa'·'gyur translation has $dnul\ chu$ 'mercury', while the Tibetan translation of the RGVV has two different readings: $zans\ kyi\ khu\ ba$ in the sDe·dge ed. and $zas\ kyi\ khu\ ba$ in the Peking ed. The reading zas corresponds to $\bar{a}misa$ in Johnston's ed. of the Sanskrit, but zans could be based on arista (?).
- ²¹ Compare the mahāvaidūryamaniratna recognized by the king in the passage quoted above from the Daśabhūmikasūtra.

- ²² The tathāgatanetrī (de bžin gšegs pa'i tshul) or buddhanetrī is the prajňāpāramitā. Cf. Haribhadra, Abhisamayālamkārālokā, pp. 218, 267, 939.
- ²³ These are the three *vimokṣamukhas*, which are thus characteristic of the second stage of the teaching of the Buddha.
- 24 trimandala parisuddhikathā. On the meaning of trimandala (which usually refers to the three aspects of the action, the agent and the beneficiary of the action, as in RGV 5.14) see $Tath\bar{a}gatamah\bar{a}karun\bar{a}nirdesa$, fol. 137b.
- ²⁵ Sāgaramatipariprechā quoted in RGVV 1.68. This parable is to be found also in the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra according to Paramārtha's version of the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (pp. 259c-260a; cf. Takasaki Jikidō, A study on the Ratnagotravibhāga, Rome, 1966, p. 249, n. 379).
 - 26 v. Ruegg, Théorie, 411 f.
 - 27 Read probably tathāgato.
- 28 This verse is quoted in RGVV 1.2, immediately after the passage from the <code>Dhāranīśvara-rājasūtra</code> cited above.
- ²⁹ The reading visuddhagotram tathāgatadhātum abhisamdhāya is presumably to be corrected to visuddhigotram ... in accordance with RGVV 1.40 buddhadhātuvisuddhigotra (cf. 1.41: āgantukamalavisuddhigotra). See below, n. 44.
- ³⁰ On gotra: dhātu: hetu: nimitta see RGVV 1.149-52; Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya 1.15; Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 1.20 (above, n. 15).
- Cf. also the use of $dh\bar{a}tu$ in MSA 3.2 (where the Bhāsya refers to the Akṣarāśisūtra; cf. Ruegg, Théorie, p. 145, n. 3) and $n\bar{a}n\bar{a}prakrtihetuk\bar{a}h$ sattvāh in the Dhāranīśvararājasūtra quoted in RGVV 1.2 (p. 6, l. 6).
 - 31 The pronoun tad refers back to what is said in RGV 1.144.
- ³² The translation 'lineage' is also applicable here because in RGV 1.151-2 the reference is to the production of 'Bodies', and the biological connotation thus coexists with the mineral and botanical images of 1.149 which are developed in the sequel.
- 33 These two similes are based on examples V and VI of the TGS (cf. RGV 1.112-17 and above, p. 345).
- 34 v. Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1. These verses are probably commentary-verses (cf. Takasaki, Study, introduction; Schmithausen, WZKS, xv, 1971, 125). The epithet uttara can also refer to the fact that the samudānīta is 'subsequent' to the prakṛtistha-gotra.
- 85 Or: 'by nature' (ran bžin gyis). This comparison is based on example VII of the TGS (cf. RGV 1.118-20).
 - ³⁶ This comparison is based on example VIII of the TGS (cf. RGV 1.121-3).
 - ⁸⁷ This comparison is based on example IX of the TGS (cf. RGV 1.124-6).
- 38 On the two possible interpretations of the compound tathāgata-garbha, either as an adjectival (bahuvrīhi) compound—'all sentient beings have the tathāgata as their embryo-essence'—or as a noun (tatpuruṣa compound)—'all sentient beings are essential embryos of the tathāgata', see above, p. 353.
 - 39 RGV 1.27-8: buddhajñānāntargamāt sattvarāšes tannairmalyasyâdvayatvāt prakrtyā |
 bauddhe gotre tatphalasyôpacārād uktāh sarve dehino buddhagarbhāḥ ||
 sambuddhakāyaspharanāt tathatāvyatibhedataḥ |
 gotrataš ca sadā sarve buddhagarbhāḥ śarīrinah ||

It is no doubt partly on the basis of 1.27c that $\operatorname{Bu} \cdot \operatorname{ston}$ distinguished between the *gotra* as the causal level and the $\operatorname{tath\bar{a}gatagarbha}$ as the resultant level. Moreover, according to some authorities, the term $\operatorname{buddha-gotra}$ (: $\operatorname{bauddha-gotra}$) refers to the $\operatorname{samud\bar{a}n\bar{i}tagotra}$ rather than to the $\operatorname{prakytistha}$, and this would also place it on the resultant level. V. Ruegg, Le $\operatorname{trait\acute{e}}$ du $\operatorname{tath\bar{a}gatagarbha}$ de Bu ston, pp. 33-4, note.

**attvānām (sans rgyas kyi sku rnam pa gsum bskyed pa'i rigs yod pa'i dban du byas te/ de bžin gšegs pa'i khams sems can 'di dag thams cad kyi snīn por bstan pa yin no//). On the basis of the reading of MS B, gotrasadbhāvārtham (corresponding to the Tibetan translation), Schmithausen proposes emending Johnston's text (v. WZKS, xv, 1971, 157), as well as the reading gotrasambhavārthena in RGVV 1.27-8 (p. 26, l. 9)(?). (RGVV 1.144, however, reads gotrasvabhāva [p. 70, l. 1] parallel to dharmakāyasvabhāva and tathatāsvabhāva, as does RGVV 1.149-52 [p. 73, l. 10]. Svabhāva is also found in RGV 1.144.)

- 41 RGVV 1.144, 149-52.
- 42 RGVV 1.149-52 (on garbha = dhātu = hetu of the tathāgata, the state of tathāgata being the state constituted or informed by the three Buddha-Bodies: trividhabuddhakāyaprabhāvitatvam hi tathāgatatvam).
 - 43 Read probably na tad yatah (see above, n. 6).
- 44 RGV V 1.41 (p. 37, l. 3) reads prakrtiviśuddhagotra in Johnston's edition, but the MS reads prakrtiviśuddhigotra according to Schmithausen (WZKS, xv, 1971, 146); the Tibetan translation has ran bžin gyis rnam par dag pa'i rigs. Cf. above, n. 29.
 - 45 Tib. rnam par dag par run ba ñid.
 - 46 Or, perhaps, to example IV, which relates not to the gotra but to the tathatā.
 - 47 Tib. de rigs de bžin thob pa.
- 48 RGVV 1.86: tadgotrasya prakṛter acintyaprakārasamudāgamārthah = de'i rigs ran bžin gyis bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i rnam pa thob pa'i don.
- ⁴⁹ This definition corresponds to the definition of the (prakrtistha) gotra found in the Śrāva-kayānist literature, and occasionally quoted in the Māhāyānist sources; v. Śrāvakabhūmi, fol. 2b (and Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1, p. 2: yad bodhisattvānām ṣadāyatanavišeṣah); cf. Yaśomitra ad Abhidharmakośa 6.58-9, p. 583: pṛthagjanāvasthām ārabhyêndriyabhedah; Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā 4.15d-16: indriyabhedo gotram.
 - 50 MSA 9.37:

sarveṣām aviśiṣṭâpi tathatā śuddhim āgatā |

tathāgatatvam tasmāc ca tadgarbhāh sarvadehinah ||

'Though without differentiation for all, when Thusness has come to purity it is tathāgata-hood. And hence all embodied beings have this [tathatā:tathāgatatva] as their embryonic essence'. The MSABh. explains: sarveṣām nirviśiṣṭā tathatā tadviśuddhisvabhāvaś ca tathāgatah/ atah sarve sattvās tathāgatagarbhā ity ucyate/. Cf. above, n. 6.

- 51 For the term $t\bar{u}di(n)$ see $Suttanip\bar{u}ta$ 522 f., which establishes the connexion with tathatta. And for $t\bar{u}diso$ as an epithet of the Sage cf. $Anguttaranik\bar{u}ya$, I, p. 150. On the use of words derived from demonstrative pronouns and from words meaning 'thus' to designate a sage, cf. D. S. Ruegg, 'Védique $addh\bar{u}$ et quelques expressions parallèles à $tath\bar{u}gata$ ', JA, CCLIII, 2, 1955, 163-70; G. Roth, $Sr\bar{i}$ $Mah\bar{u}v\bar{i}ra$ Jaina $Vidy\bar{u}laya$ suvarnamahotsava grantha, Bombay, 1968.
 - ⁵² Cf. RGVV 1.40: buddhadhātu-viśuddhigotra, and RGVV 1.2 viśuddhigotra tathāgatadhātu.
- ⁵³ That the bauddha-gotra of RGV 1.27 refers in particular to the samudānītagotra is at least possible in view of the fact that emphasis is placed on its being only metonymously identifiable with the phala = tathāgata; while the prakṛtisthagotra (and the tathāgatadhātu = tathāgatagarbha) is at least essentially identical with the phala (cf. above, n. 39). Compare Bu·ston's position on the status of the gotra in relation to the tathāgatagarbha mentioned above, n. 39.

The suvarnabimba example in RGVV 1.41 may also be connected with the $samud\bar{a}n\bar{\imath}tagotra$ (see above, p. 346).

- ⁵⁴ Or perhaps threefold in so far as it is the source of the three Buddha-Bodies (although these in their turn correspond to a twofold scheme $dharmak\bar{a}ya/r\bar{u}pak\bar{u}ya$).
- 55 These four factors are also mentioned in the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra (Taishō, no. 669), ch. 2-5, a text which Takasaki considers to be based on the RGV (Study, 49 f., p. 186, n. 3).
 - ⁵⁶ pada. Cf. vajrapada in RGV 1.1-2.
 - 57 Other enumerations of these four components are found elsewhere in the RGV.
 - 1.1: dhātuḥ, bodhiḥ, guṇāḥ, bauddham karma.
 - 1.3: garbhah, agrabodhih, dharmāh, sarvasattvārthakṛt.
 - 5.1: buddhadhātuh, buddhabodhih, buddhadharmāh, buddhakrtyam.
 - [5.7: āśrayam, tatparāvrttih (parīvrttih ?)...]
 - 5.25: vyavadānadhātuh, bodhih, gunāh, karma.
 - 58 The seven vajrapadas are found in the Dhāranīśvararājasūtra; see RGV 1.2.
 - 59 v. Ruegg, Théorie, 113, 283.
- ⁶⁰ E. Obermiller has translated Tib. rigs = gotra in the RGV and RGVV as 'Lineage', 'germ' (1.27-8, 41, 86) or 'source' (1.24) ('The sublime science of Maitreya', Acta Or., IX, 2-3, 1931, 81 f.). E. Frauwallner has translated gotra as 'Keim', and Ratnagotravibhāga as 'Erläuterung des Keimes der (drei) Juwelen' (Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, second ed., Berlin, 1958, 255-6; he has also used 'Keim' to translate garbha in MSA 9.37 on p. 318 of this same work). Takasaki has translated the title as 'Analysis of the Germ of the Jewels' (Study, 141), and he regularly uses 'Germ' to translate gotra. A. K. Warder has pointed out that the gotra 'is the "clan" (...1.24, 28 etc., which might also be translated in this context as "mine"

- or "quarry")' (Indian Buddhism, Delhi, 1970, 405). Thus no clear distinction has been made between the uses of the term in the different sections of the RGV and commentary.
 - 61 cf. Takasaki, Study, 11 f.; Schmithausen, WZKS, xv, 1971, 123 f.
- ⁶² Taishō, no. 1611, was translated by Ratnamati in about 511. This Chinese text consists of two parts: (1) the 'Kārikā text', a collection of 300 verses (including 18 not found in the Sanskrit text of the RGV), and (2) the verses of the RGV (excluding, however, some found in the Chinese 'Kārikā text') together with the prose-commentary. See. Z. Nakamura, introduction to his edition of the Sanskrit and Chinese texts of the RGV (Tokyo, 1960); Takasaki, Study, 9 f. (The Chinese verse-text thus differs from the Tibetan verse-text handed down separately in the bsTan·'gyur.)

Although it is not possible here to go into the question of the authorship of the RGV, it may at least be noted that the division between the basic verses (as preserved in the first part of Taishō, no. 1611), the verse-commentary and the prose-commentary would make it possible to assign the basic verses to one author, and the verse and prose commentary to another author or other authors. Thus, Nakamura assigns (pp. xxiv-xxvi) the basic verses to *Sāramati (So-lo-mo-ti) and both the verse and prose commentaries to Vasubandhu, while Tsukinowa had earlier suggested that the basic verses are *Sāramati's, the verse commentary Maitreya's, and the prose-commentary Asanga's. More recently, Takasaki has suggested that the basic verses are Maitreya's (Study, 9 and 62) and the commentary is *Sāramati's (pp. 46, 62), thus in a way reconciling the Tibetan tradition attributing the RGV to Maitreya and the Chinese tradition on *Sāramati going back to Devaprajāa, the translator of the *Dharmadhātunirvišesašāstra (Taishō, nos. 1626-7) also attributed to *Sāramati, and handed down by Fa-tsang (643-712) and Yüan-ts'ê (613-96). However ingenious these attempts to interpret the tradition handed down by Fa-tsang and Yüan-ts'ê may be, the differences in the results these three scholars have reached only serve to underline the obscurity of that tradition.

- 63 v. Takasaki, Study, 10-19.
- 64 Study, 18, 393.
- 65 Study, 18.
- ⁶⁶ Takasaki also includes in his basic text RGV 1.30, which implicitly refers to the gotra.
- 67 Study, 14.
- ⁶⁸ In its treatment of the *gotra* the *Fo hsing lun* (Taishō, no. 1610) does not make use of the four aspects mentioned above (v. Takasaki, Study, 47-8), and it is therefore questionable whether fo hsing (= buddha-gotra) in the title can have a meaning similar to ratnagotra in the title of the RGV.

As mentioned above, the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra (Taishō, no. 669) does refer to the four aspects of the gotra, which are treated in its oh. 2-5 (cf. Study, 49 f.).

- 69 Mahāparinirvānasūtra translated from Sanskrit, lHa sa ed., fol. 195 a 6, and colophon, fol. 222b.
- 70 The original form of the text known as the RGV has also been recently discussed briefly by L. Schmithausen ('Philologische Bemerkungen zum $Ratnagotravibh\bar{a}ga$ ', WZKS, xv, 1971, 123–30). Following Takasaki he has included RGV 1.23 in the second or 'B' category of verses as an 'Inhaltsangabe-Vers' (pp. 126–7). And he then proceeds to show that Takasaki's basic text of 27 verses can be further reduced by excluding further verses. But the resulting fragment he rightly considers to be only one of the elements composing the original RGV. He concludes that the original RGV was essentially identical with the separately preserved Chinese verse-text (p. 129).
 - 71 cf. Ruegg, Théorie, 13.
 - ⁷² As supposed by Takasaki, Study, 22; cf. p. 18 and p. 141, n. 1.
- 73 cf. RGV 1.149 and 1.86. This identification, however, would not be accepted by a commentator who holds the $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ to be the Fruit ('bras bu = phala) when the gotra is, according to RGV 1.27, the cause on to which the name of the Fruit is metonymously transferred (cf. RGVV 1.149-52). See above, n. 39, and n. 53.
- 74 These difficulties were indeed not without their consequences in the later period when the Buddhist doctors came to attempt a systematic exegesis of the gotra and tathāgatagarbha doctrines.
- ⁷⁵ However, if the reference in RGV 1.41 to agotra were to be taken as an indication that the author accepted such a category in his own system, the reference could only be, in the framework of the tathāgatagarbha theory as presented elsewhere in the RGV, to the acquired (samudānīta) or developed (paripusta) gotra. However, the reference seems to be to the agotra concept of

other schools, which is purely hypothetical for the author of the RGV or which is to be understood as alluding to a temporary incapacity only (cf. kālāntarābhiprāya of RGVV 1.41). See above, n. 6.

- ⁷⁶ See above.
- 77 cf. in general Hōbōgirin s.v. Byō. See also Ruegg, Théorie, 516.
- 78 For sattvadhātu referring to the 'constitution' of sentient beings cf. Gandavyūha 45, pp. 450-1: sattvadhātucikitsābhaisajyasamyogajñānesu dhātutantrasamyogaprayogesu suvarna $manimukt \bar{a}vaid \bar{u}rya \acute{s}ankha \acute{s}il\bar{a}prav\bar{a}dalohitak \bar{a}mus \bar{a}ragalvake \acute{s}ara\acute{s}r\bar{i}garbh\bar{a}\acute{s}magarbha sarvaratna$ sambhavot pattigotrākara mūlyaj ñānesu....

In addition, the concept of the tathāgatadhātu seems at a certain stage of its history to have also been closely linked with the ideas associated with the precious relic-deposit (dhātu) in the stūpa, which of course is not necessarily a mineral.

- 79 Also: 'containing the tathagata'. This meaning appears also of course when it means 'born of the Tathagata', as it seems to do in the passage of the Gandavyūha where it is parallel to dharmarājakulodita and serves to describe Sudhana as a Bodhisattva who, by definition, is a jinātmaja 'son of the Victor' and an aurasah putrah 'bodily' son of the Buddha. See above, p. 342.
- 80 v. RGVV 1.146-7 (dharmak $ar{a}ya$, in which case the tatpurusa interpretation is given); 1.148 (tathatā, in which case the bahuvrihi interpretation is given); 1.149-52 (gotra; for the interpreta. tion given in the RGVV see above, n. 40).
 - 81 F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary, New Haven, 1953, s.v. gotra.
 - 82 See above, n. 15, and n. 30.
 - 83 See above, pp. 341-2.
- 84 Lankāvatārasūtra, p. 17: samudramalayasikhare ... nānāratnagotrapuspapratimandite; p. 269, l. 12 ('probably'): vijňaptigotrasamcchannam,
 - 85 See above, n. 15.
- 86 As the Chinese equivalent of gotra in Buddhist usage P. Demiéville considers that hsing 14 'nature' is a faulty though current variant of hsing to 'family, clan' etc.; v. Le concile de Lhasa, I, Paris, 1952, p. 63, n. 4.
 - ⁸⁷ See above, pp. 341-2.
- 88 In his review of Edgerton's dictionary V. Raghavan has maintained that the meaning 'mine' is merely an extension of 'mountain': 'In classical Skt. gotra is well-known as mountain' (Indian Linguistics, xvi, 1955, 322). However, the meaning 'mountain' is likely to be only a secondary development in Sanskrit based on the Vedic word gotrabhid. Cf. L. Renou, JA, ccxxxi, juillet-septembre 1939, 358-9. For this reason Raghavan's explanation is in itself unlikely, and it seems to be completely excluded by the other Indo-Iranian evidence discussed below.
- 89 cf. H. Hübschmann, Persische Studien, p. 96, n. 948, quoted by Benveniste, $OLZ,\, {\scriptscriptstyle LV},\, 1-2,\,$ 1960, col. 7.
- 90 cf. Renou, JA, coxxxI, juillet-septembre 1939, 353 f., and Études védiques et pāninéennes, I, Paris, 1955, 10; J. Gonda, Old Indian (Handbuch der Orientalistik, Abt. II, Bd. I, Abschn. 1), Leiden, 1971, 163.
- ⁹¹ OLZ, Lv, 1-2, 1960, col. 7 f.: 'Déjà Hübschmann, Persische Stud. p. 96 n. 948, jugeait "bedenklich" le rapport entre skr. gotrá- et pers. gōhar.... En moyen-perse gōhr signifie "substance fondamentale, essence propre"; c'est par spécialisation qu'il désigne aussi le "métal", la "pierre précieuse", comme des variétés ou des espèces de la "matière par excellence". Il peut aussi s'appliquer à la "nature fondamentale" du caractère humain. En tout cas, nous n'atteignons dans $g\bar{o}hr$ qu'un sens abstrait; et rien, ici non plus, n'établit un lien avec gav-. En principe, la forme $g\bar{o}hr$ peut remonter à * $gau\theta ra$, mais aussi bien à * $gava\theta ra$ (cf. Bailey, Zoroastrian problems, p. 83[but see JRAS, 1953, 3-4, p. 115, n. 1]). S'il faut l'analyser en iranien même, on la prendra comme dérivé nominal en $-\theta ra$ - de la racine gav- "procurer", sans le moindre rapport avec gav- "boeuf". Que reste-t-il alors de l'équation skr. gotrá- = mp. göhr? A notre avis deux possibilités sont à envisager. Ou skr. gotrá-" famille" est identique à gotrá- "étable" (ce qui n'est pas démontré), en ce cas mp. gōhr n'a plus rien à faire ici; ou bien mp. gohr "matière" correspond à gotrá- au sens de "essence constitutive, caractère fondamental"; alors skr. gotrá-"étable" est un mot différent, qui restera d'affleurs difficile à analyser'.

- 92 of. Renou, 'Eléments védiques dans le sanskrit classique ', JA, ccxxxi, juillet-septembre 1939, p. 359, n. 1: 'Quant à gotra "famille, nom de famille "depuis le véd. récent (le sens est-il déjà postulé par gotrabhit-, déformation de gotrabhid- dans un mantra de MS, Edgerton, Studies Collitz, p. 34 ?), c'est la notion sociale du lieu de réunion de la famille, englobant l'étable ou le pare, notion qu'on retrouve sous un aspect plus général dans qosthi "conversation" (aussi "connexions familiales ou collégiales" MhBh), en regard de véd. gostha "étable".
- ⁹³ For these semantic and lexicographical concepts, cf. B. Schlerath, ZDMG, CXXII, 1972, 409-11.
- 94 F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit grammar, New Haven, 1953, §1.57: 'In principle, I have excluded from my grammar and dictionary all forms which are standard Sanskrit, and all words which are used in standard Sanskrit with the same meanings'; cf. §1.53: 'The hallmark which distinguishes it [the BHS tradition] is the vocabulary On the Middle Indian basis of 'BHS', see \$1.4.

I wish to thank Professor M. Dresden for assistance with some of the Iranian materials. The responsibility for the interpretations offered above is, of course, mine alone.



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BERKELEY BUDDHIST STUDIES SERIES

The gotra, ekayāna and tathāgatagarbha theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta

D. Seyfort Ruegg

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In the course of his monumental work on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras E. Conze has written: 'It is quite a problem how the Dharma-element which is common to all can be regarded as the source of a variety of "lineages" [gotra]'. It has been the endeavour of the present writer in a series of publications starting in 1968 to shed light on this very fundamental and interesting question. An article in the Festschrift dedicated to the late E. Frauwallner was devoted to the interconnexion between the single, unique and undifferentiated dharmadhātu, the naturally existent spiritual element or germ (prakrtistham gotram) and the variously conditioned psycho-spiritual categories (gotra)2 recognized by the Buddhist texts as explained by Arya Vimuktisena (ca. 500?) and his successor Bhadanta Vimuktisena in their commentaries on the Abhisamayālamkāra (i. 37-39), which they correlate with the topics of the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñā pāramitā.³ And shortly afterwards there followed a more detailed study of this question as it relates to the notion of the tathāgatagarbha or buddha-nature in La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur la sotériologie et la gnoséologie du bouddhisme (Paris, 1969) and Le traité du tathagatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973). In the last publications Haribhadra's commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā were discussed, and the importance of the doctrine of the One Vehicle (ekayāna), was taken up at some length not only from the point of view of soteriology but also from that of gnoseology.

Between the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra (fl. c. 750-800) on the one side and the Tibetan exegetes on the other there lived a number of important Indian commentators whose work could be only briefly touched on in the *Théorie*. Amongst the most important of these later Indian masters of the Prajñāpāramitā are Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, both of whom have been reckoned by Buddhist doxographers as being, for certain systematic reasons, close to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, and Ratnākaraśānti (first half of the 11th century),

a Vijñānavādin (of the Alīkākāravāda branch) who appears to have undertaken a harmonization of the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka in the manner of the synthesizing movements especially characteristic of later Buddhist thought in India.

One of Ratnākaraśānti's main works on the Prajñāpāramitā—the Sārottamā (or Sāratamā?), a Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, which until recently was known only by its Tibetan version in the Bstan 'gyur—has now been recovered in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. Since the promised publication of this text is awaited with keenest interest by students of this literature, his work must be left for another occasion. The present paper will therefore consider the discussions by Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta of the relation between the gotra, the dharmadhātu, the ekayāna, and the tathāgatagarbha.

Little reliable information is now available on the life of Dharmamitra. In the colophon of the Tibetan translation of his **Prasphuṭapadā** he is referred to as an Ācārya of the Madhyamaka born in Bañ·la (Baṅgala ?). Tāranātha, who makes him a contemporary of Dharmottara (fl. ca. 800), Vimalamitra and Dharmākara, places him in the reign of the Pāla king Dharmapāla (rg. ca. 770–810), who was a patron of Haribhadra. Dharmamitra's only extant work, included in the Bstan 'gyur, is the **Prasphuṭapadā**, the full title of which is **Abhisamayālaṃkārakāri-kāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā**; it takes the form of a commentary on Haribhadra's shorter commentary ('grel chuṅ), the **Śāstravṛtti** known as 'Grel pa don gsal (*Sphuṭārthā) which is also available now only in a Tibetan translation.

More is known about Abhayākaragupta, who was a scholar of the Vikramaśīlā seminary and a prolific polymath. He flourished at the time of King Rāmapāla (rg. ca. 1077–1130), in the thirtieth year of whose reign he composed his *Munimatālaṃkāra*. He is thus one of the last of the great Indian Buddhist masters whose works we possess; and his principal independent philosophical work, the *Munimatālaṃkāra*, is an extensive treatise of somewhat encyclopaedic character in which he expounds Mahāyāna thought with special reference to the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine and with copious references to the basic sources of the Madhyamaka and Vijñānavāda. The commentary on the *Aṣṭa* entitled *Marmakaumudī* is the second of Abhayākara's works to be considered here. In addition, he wrote a number of important works on ritual and iconology (the *Vajrāvalī* and *Niṣpannayogāvalī*), several Tantrik cycles and astronomical calculation (gaṇana, in his Kālacakrāvatāra).

Dharmamitra's **Prasphutapadā** is of interest to the student of the Prajñāparamitā literature from many points of view. For our present purpose suffice it to say that Dharmamitra attributes to the Yogācārins (Vijñānavādins) the theory that there exists a category of persons whose gotra is cut off (fol. 56a). This tenet is considered a major point of difference between them, especially as their doctrines came to be codified by many of the Tibetan doxographers, and the Mādhyamikas who on the contrary maintain the theory of the One Vehicle (ekayāna) and hold that all sentient beings are certain to attain supreme Awakening or buddhahood, an attainment that necessarily presupposes that the naturally existent (prakrtistha) gotra can never be totally cut off. In accordance with this Mādhyamika view Dharmamitra explains the scriptural allusions to a cut-off gotra or agotra as referring simply to the great difficulty some experience in attaining liberation. 10

In this regard Dharmamitra quotes both the (Samādhirāja-)Candra-pradīpasūtra and the Adhyardhaśatikā, a Sūtra that explicitly mentions, evidently for the first time in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the doctrine that all sentient beings are tathāgatagarbha.¹¹ And his Prasphuṭapadā is the first known commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra to introduce the tathāgatagarbha notion into the discussion of the prakṛtistha-gotra. This doctrinal elaboration was prepared for example by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740-795), and it was continued by a host of later writers such as Abhayākaragupta.

Dharmamitra also refers to three characteristics (lakṣaṇa) taught in certain Sūtras, namely the imaginarily constructed (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra) and the perfect (pariniṣpanna). These lakṣaṇas, otherwise known as natures (svabhāva), as such are of course special features of the school of the Yogācārins/Vijñānavādins, whose philosophical system is largely articulated round them. And they are mentioned in the context of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy by Dignāga in his Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha. But on the basis of this evidence alone it cannot be concluded that Dharmamitra was himself a Vijñānavādin in the strict sense. A parallel set of categories, termed kalpita, vikalpita and dharmatārūpa, is to be found in the Maitreya-chapter of two of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā; and they are also evidently referred to by Haribhadra in his commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā. Dignāga's and Haribhadra's explanations of the kalpita and vikalpita differ somewhat from Dhar-

mamitra's interpretation of the first two laksanas.

It has also to be noted that Dharmamitra, like many other later masters who follow the synthetic Yogācāra-Madhyamaka established by Śāntarakṣita, makes abundant use of texts ascribed to Bhaṭṭāraka Maitreya(nātha), such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*.

As one of the last of the great masters of Indian Buddhism, Abhayā-karagupta deserves particular attention, and his theory of the *gotra* is certainly of very considerable interest.

He clearly supports the assimilation of the prakrtistha-gotra and the tathāgatagarbha. 15 And he points out that the tathāgatagarbha permeates the living (jangama, i.e. sentient beings, sattva) only, to the exclusion of the insentient (sthāvara) world (which, according to certain East Asian Buddhist schools, is also destined to attain buddhahood since it too possesses the buddha-nature). 16 Unlike Dharmamitra, but like Haribhadra and the latter's predecessor Kamalasīla, Abhavākara also devotes special attention to the doctrine of the ekavāna, the gnoseosoteriological corollary of the theory of the prakrtistha-gotra and of the tathagatagarbha according to which all sentient beings as potential Buddhas are certain to achieve supreme and perfect Awakening (anuttarasamvaksambodhi). 17 With regard to the ekayāna he quotes the Saddharmapundarīka and the Lankāvatārasūtra as well as Nāgārjuna's Niraupamyastava. 18 Concerning the contrary view that postulates three ultimately separate and distinct vehicles, and which is associated with the Vijñānavāda and Maitreyanātha, Abhayākara explains it as based simply on the consideration that the doctrine of the trivana serves to introduce beginning disciples to the teaching in conformity with their respective abilities, at which point it would not yet be appropriate to state that this doctrine is not absolutely and ultimately true and that only the ekayana doctrine corresponds to the soteriological and gnoseological theory actually intended by the Buddha.19

Abhayākara furthermore clearly reveals how it is that the *ekayāna* is neither a mere polemical device serving to establish the claims of the Mahāyāna against the Hīnayāna nor even an exclusively soteriological concept, for philosophically it is the necessary corollary of the principle of the non-differentiation of the *prakṛtistha-gotra*. The *ekayāna* theory is in fact founded gnoseologically on the oneness of the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*), which has as its 'object' the single undifferentiated reality (*tattva*) or *dharmadhātu*.²⁰ And it is of course intimately bound up with the non-differentiation of the *prakṛtistha-gotra* since this factor has

the nature of the single dharmadhātu according to the Abhisamayālam- $k\bar{a}ra$ (i. 5).²¹

Concerning the tathāgatagarbha Abhayākara refers to verse ix. 37 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra quoted in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga (i. 148), a passage which deals with the universal presence of Thusness (tathatā) in all incarnate beings, saying that by his use of the expression tathāgata the author of the verse accepts the naturally luminous dharmadhātu which has as its characteristic the nonsubstantiality of both the individual (pudgalanairātmya) and the factors of existence (dharmanairātmya).²²

In this way Abhayākara links together in a remarkable manner the scriptural teachings on the prakṛtistha-gotra, the ekayāna, the dharma-dhātu, and the tathāgatagarbha, as well as on nairātmya (:śūnyatā) and nihsvabhāvatā.²³

But it is to be noted that *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* ix. 37 concerns only one single aspect of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, i.e. that form of it that is founded on the universal presence of *tathatā.*²⁴ Now, to the extent that the *tathāgatagarbha* theory is connected with this aspect only, it does not necessarily commit its advocates to the doctrine that *all* sentient beings are certain to achieve Awakening and hence to the basic principle of the *ekayāna* doctrine.²⁵ It is for this reason that a Vijñānavādin remains free, even while maintaining the theory in the particular form set out in this verse, to hold that some *sattvas* are without *gotra* (*agotra*) or that their *gotra* is cut off, and also that there are three distinct and ultimately separate vehicles only one of which actually culminates in supreme and perfect Awakening or buddhahood.²⁶

The aspect of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine based on tathatā found in Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra ix. 37 presupposes an interpretation in which the compound tathāgata-garbha is to be analysed as an adjectival compound (bahuvrīhi) meaning 'having as embryonic essence the tathāgata, containing the tathāgata'. 27 The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra's statement sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāh then means 'All sentient beings contain the tathāgata' (as a spiritual potentiality within them). 28 A corresponding interpretation of the term is found in the explanation of tathatā as one of the three meanings intended by the scriptural statement sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāh given in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga (i. 148, where we find the analysis tathāgatah tathataiṣām garbhah sarvasattvānām), and also seemingly in the explanation of the gotra in the same commentary (i. 149–152, where we read tathāgatadhātur eṣām gar-

bhah sarvasattvānām, where dhātu has the meaning of element29).

This formulation of the tathagatagarbha doctrine based on an interpretation of the term as an exocentric compound is parallel to, and in fact it may have been influenced by, a statement like the following one in the Astasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā where dhātu in the expression tathāgatadhātu refers to a relic contained in a stūpa (iii, p. 62): yaḥ kaścit kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tathāgatasyârhatah samyaksambuddhasya parinirvrtasya pūjāyai kotišah saptaratnamayāms tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān kārayet, kārayitvā ca tān yāvajjīvam . . . divyābhih pūjābhih satkuryād . . . tat kim manyase, Kauśika, api nu sa kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tato nidānam bahupunyam prasavet/ Śakra āha: bahu, Bhagavan, bahu, Sugata . . . 'If a son or daughter of family constructed by tens of millions stūpas made of the seven precious substances30 and containing the relic (dhātu) of the Tathāgata31 for the sake of worshipping the Tathāgata-Arhat-Samyaksambuddha who has passed into Nirvāṇa, and if they honoured these stūpas as long as they lived by all kinds of divine worship . . . , do you think, Kauśika [i.e. Śakra], that this son or daughter of family would accordingly produce much merit?—Sakra replied: Much, Lord, much, Sugata . . . 'Inasmuch as this notion of the stūpa as tathāgatadhātugarbha is thus found in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, it could indeed be supposed that at least one forerunner of the classical tathāgatagarbha theory is attested in this body of texts. But, as already observed, the tathāgatagarbha doctrine in the more strict sense actually appears explicitly in this literature only in an apparently later work, the Adhyardhaśatikā prajñā pāramitā,

According to the parallel and alternative interpretation, tathāgata-garbha is to be analysed as an endocentric nominal compound the first member of which has the value of a genitive (sasṭhīsamāsa) and which therefore means 'embryonic essence of the tathāgata'. This value is found for example when the theory refers to the dharmakāya, as explained in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga i. 146-147 (tathāgatasyeme garbhāh sarvasattvāh) and also in a number of Sūtra-texts.³²

It is interesting to observe that the same multivalence, due to the fact that a compound word can properly be interpreted either as a bahuvrīhi or as a tatpuruṣa, is also to be found in the case of the word $dh\bar{a}$ -tugarbha, which may be either an epithet of the $st\bar{u}pa$ ('containing the relic') or a noun designating the $st\bar{u}pa$ (cf. also Sinhalese $d\bar{a}gaba/d\bar{a}g\bar{a}ba/d\bar{a}gaba/d\bar{a$

This dhātu of the Buddha is frequently regarded as being strictly equi-

valent to him and offerings made to a $st\bar{u}pa$ containing such a $dh\bar{a}tu$ are then effective.³⁴ Harm intentionally done to a $st\bar{u}pa$ is correspondingly a most heinous act.³⁵

Concerning the doctrinal background of the link between the gotra, ekayāna and tathāgatagarbha theories, it is to be observed that the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika master Kamalaśīla, who maintains that the ekayāna is of explicit and certain meaning (nītārtha), at the same time expounds both the gotra and tathāgatagarbha doctrines and holds that all sentient beings without exception are certain to attain Awakening. While we have no commentary by him on any of the larger Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras or on the Abhisamayālamkāra to which we could turn for an exposition of these points, Kamalaśīla's fundamental Madhyamakāloka provides very important observations on this complex of topics. 36

Dharmamitra's and Abhayākaragupta's expositions of the subject are given below. It is to be noted that, unlike his predecessor Haribhadra (in his Abhisamayālamkārālokā) as well as his successor Abhayākaragupta, Dharmamitra in his explanation of the second chapter of the Abhisamayālamkāra (following Haribhadra's *Sphuṭārthā) has not gone into the question of the ekayāna in detail, although he has treated related topics.

DHARMAMITRA, *Prasphuṭapadā* [T.T. vol. 91 (Ña: fol. 52b-56a)]

The teaching concerning the factors of penetration ($nirvedhabh\bar{a}g\bar{\imath}ya$) having been analysed [53a],³⁷ the gotra which is the ground ($\bar{a}dh\bar{a}ra$) for practice (pratipatti) is now to be investigated.

[54a4] If the gotra is accordingly the ground for all [practice of the paths], why is it not taught at the very beginning? This [sequence which discusses the gotra after its effects, was adopted] so that the result might be known through its cause [i.e. the gotra], in accordance with the statement: 'By reason of the cause of the cittotpāda [indicated in Abhisama-yālamkāra i.18] and the other factors [indicated in the following verses], both sambhāramārgas are practised and the prayogamārga is then attained, and this is reckoned as being resident in gotra (gotrastha)'. [But] others explain: Since this procedure has reference to the gotra that is effected (abhisamskṛta), whereas it would have been correct to speak at the very beginning of the gotra with respect to that gotra which is exist-

ent by nature (prakṛtistha), what has been taught here serves to make it known that there are two gotras.³⁹

If these practices (pratipatti) have been indicated first because the gotra is the support (pratiṣṭhā) for practice, what is meant by saying that the gotra is the support for practice? What is termed gotra is therefore to be understood under the rubrics of (i) proof of its existence, (ii) nature, (iii) varieties, (iv) inferential mark, [53b] (v) good qualities, (vi) disadvantages, and (vii) the hermeneutic etymology.

- (i) There are the elemental natures (dhātu), convinced adhesion (adhimukti), objectification of various practices, objectification of various results (phala), and exposition of the existence (astitva) of the gotra.⁴⁰
- (ii) Concerning the nature of the *gotra* it has somewhere been stated to be the *dharmadhātu* [as in the following scriptural statement]: 'O Jinaputras, what is termed the *gotra* of the *bodhisattva* assumes the *dharmadhātu*, it is as extensive as space $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa)$, and it is naturally luminous $(prakrtiprabh\bar{a}svara)$; the *bodhisattvas* residing in it are born in the family of the Buddha-Bhagavats of the past...future...and present'.⁴¹

An objection [against the doctrine of the varieties of the gotra] has been raised since it has been stated that, because there is no differentiation in the $dharmadh\bar{a}tu$, the gotra cannot contain differences.⁴² It has also been stated: 'O Mañjuśrī, if the $dharmadh\bar{a}tu$ is one and if the $bh\bar{u}takoti$ is one, how can one suppose that there are recipients ($bh\bar{a}jana$) and non-recipients?'⁴³

Moreover, it is known that what is termed gotra has been considered by some to be certainly a particularity of the sense-bases (āyatanaviše-sa).⁴⁴ In the Abhidharma it has been stated: 'Some [Arhats, vi. 56a] are of their gotra from the outset, while others become so by a process of perfection'.⁴⁵

Also, with regard to the Mahāyāna, it is stated in the **Daśadharmaka-sūtra**: 'Just as one knows [the presence of] fire [by inferring it] from smoke and [the presence of] water [by inferring it] from aquatic birds, similarly one knows [the presence of] the gotra of the intelligent bodhi-sattva⁴⁶ by means of [its] inferential mark (linga)'.⁴⁷ Concerning the inferential mark in this context, [54a] this refers to the fact that there are certain particular natural marks in a case where there exists some person possessing a particular sense-base (āyatana). But it is not correct to speak of an inferential mark in this case where there is existence of the

- dharmadhātu, because the dharmadhātu is universal (sāmānyavartin).⁴⁸ Hence the Lord (bhaṭṭāraka, viz. Maitreyanātha) has stated that here the gotra has the dharmadhātu as its nature.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it is not the case that there are [therefore] no varieties [of the gotra]; although it is settled that in reality the gotra is one, still what the comparison has indicated to be the intended meaning is that the postulation of difference as such depends on people's special āyatanas due to nature or to the process of perfection.⁵⁰
- (iii) As for these varieties, it has indeed been already stated in principle in the Lankāvatārasūtra [ii, p. 63] that they are the Mahāyāna [i.e. the Bodhisattva], the Pratyekabuddha, the Ārya-Śrāvaka, the undetermined (aniyata), and the non-gotra (agotra). However, this allusion to a cut-off gotra refers simply to the difficulty of attaining liberation. Otherwise how does one interpret the scriptural statements in the Adhyardhaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, 'Bodhisattva Samantabhadra, all sentient beings are tathāgatagarbha(s)'51 and the (Samādhirāja-) Candrapradīpasūtra, 'There exists here no sentient being who is not a recipient (bhājana): all these living beings without exception will become Awakened'?52
- (iv) With respect to the inferential marks (linga), a verse mentions compassion ($k\bar{a}runya$), convinced adhesion (adhimukti), constancy ($k\bar{s}anti$), and the realization of the wholesome ($\hat{s}ubha$) as the marks of the $gotra.^{53}$
- (v-vi) [The advantages (anuśaṃsa) of the gotra are furthermore mentioned in verse iii. 8 and the disadvantages (ādīnava) in verse iii. 7 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.]⁵⁴
- (vii) [54b2] With regard to the hermeneutic etymology (nirukta), the word go- has the sense of protecting a region or the earth; this is because it has been stated that the scholar is to know that the word go- has the meanings of mountain, light, earth, vajra, heaven, cow, and water. 55 Also, the word kula derives from the fact that [the Bodhisattva born in the kula 'family' of the Buddha] descends (lī-) into evil (ku) forms of existence, such as hell, in his compassion. Others follow the explanation on linguistic roots, where it has been said that a kula is so called because it is the support of an assemblage of qualities. 56 As to the meaning of the term, gotra is so called because it realizes qualities (gunottāraṇa), 57 for it has the meaning of 'germ' (bīja) and 'capacity'. 58

[Haribhadra's] statement '[The gotra] has the nature of the dharma- $dh\bar{a}tu'^{59}$ has in mind the fact that in the initial summary it was stated that

[the gotra] is the ground for practice and has the nature of the *dharma-dhātu* [Abhisamayālamkāra i. 5]. The *dharma* thus explained comprises the fourfold practice (pratipatti), etc.⁶⁰

As for being a ground (\$\bar{a}dh\bar{a}ra\$), the \$dharmadh\bar{a}tu\$, it has been stated that what is termed \$gotra\$ indicates the thirteenfold \$bodhisattva\$ whose nature is connected with this by comprehension (\$adhigama\$).\(^{61}\$ Concerning the \$bodhisattva\$, the path leading to attainment of the Immortal (\$amrta\$) is not this [\$bodhisattva per se\$]; but by being made to eschew evil ways and to adopt the superior way, sentient beings understand the bad opinions after having seen [it]. For this reason one speaks of a \$bodhisattva\$; and hence, because the \$sattva\$ is for the sake of establishment in Awakening (\$bodhi\$), the \$bodhi-sattva\$ is so named [55a].

Concerning what is termed the thirteenfold [bodhisattva], the thirteen are counted in the following manner. First there are the four [nirvedhabhāgīyas] comprised in the prayogamārga; the fifth is the darśanamārga; the sixth is the bhāvanāmārga; the seventh and ninth are disconnexion and the attainment of disconnexion; the eighth is from the [third] Prabhākarī stage (bhūmi) to the sixth [stage]; the tenth is the seventh [stage]; the eleventh is from the Acalā [or eighth stage] to the Dharmameghā [or tenth stage]; the twelfth is the one having only one more birth (ekajātipratibaddha) and the one in his final existence (caramabhavika); and the thirteenth is the višeṣamārga, the vajropamasamādhi.⁶²

Since the [bodhisattva] on the stage involving only one more birth assists living beings by the Buddha-activity, ordinary disciples (vineya) are established in the teaching ($\delta \bar{a}sana$), so that it is stated: 'Thereafter, by means of [four kinds of] oblique expressions (abhisaṃdhi) such as introduction to the teaching (avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi) in accordance with one's disposition . . . '63 In this connexion, in order to introduce some living beings to this teaching, [the Blessed One] has spoken concerning the parikalpita, the paratantra and the parinispanna-lakṣaṇa, 64 [teaching] first that there exists a self (ātman), an individual (pudgala) and an element (khams = dhātu) as a means for eliminating the obstacles (āvaraṇa) of these [living beings], [next] that all dharmas are nonexistent (med pa) and that they originate in dependence, and [then] that all dharmas are free from error (viparyāsa) and are naturally luminous (prakṛtiprabhāsvara). . . 65

[Dharmamitra then goes on to mention other teachings that are intentional ($\bar{a}bhipr\bar{a}yika$) inasmuch as they refer to a certain meaning without expressing it directly and explicitly (fol. 55a8-56a4).]

[56a4] Saving: 'In accordance with objectification in graded stages of comprehension belonging to the Vehicle of the Auditors (śrāvakayāna) and the other Vehicles. ... ',66 [Haribhadra] gives the stated teaching, namely that since the Auditors (śrāvaka) do not maintain, as do the Yogācārins, that there are different gotras and that there is a cut-off gotra, they therefore hold that all sentient beings are of undetermined (anivata) gotra.⁶⁷ Following this doctrine, the gotra of your [Śrāvaka] system is of one nature; but the gotras may still be different simply because of the different comprehensions (adhigama) brought about by conditions. Similarly, while we also hold that the nature of the gotra is in accord with the exclusively single dharmadhātu, we still hold the differentiated gotras to be thirteen consequent on the graded stages of comprehension of this [dharmadhātu]. This is what is meant by the wellknown example mentioned in the treatise. 68—'As a simple teaching' (sla chos ñid du). 69 namely the example well-known in common usage that is simple to set forth and understand.⁷⁰

ABHAYĀKARAGUPTA, *Marmakaumudī* [T.T. Vol. 92 (da: fol 54a-57a)]

In his commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, the Marmakaumudī, Abhayākaragupta takes up the theme of the gotra when commenting on the first chapter, the Sarvākāra-jñatācaryā-parivarta. On the subject of the non-differentiation of the bodhisattvagotra in particular he has the following to say (fol. 56b1-57a3).

The bodhisattvagotra is pure by nature (prakṛtiviśuddha) [although] hidden in adventitious impurities (āgantukamala). The tathāgatagarbha, the dispersal of the darkness of factors such as ignorance, termed naturally existent, is the support (pratiṣṭhā) of the twenty-two progressive productions (utpāda) of the thought (citta) [of Awakening]. And accordingly Ārya Vimuktisena has interpreted it as relating to the four factors of penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya), etc., with respect to the cittotpāda, etc. As a consequence, that Haribhadra's nirvedhabhāgīyas are the support of the dharmadhātu is incorrect.

Concerning this [prakṛtisthagotra of the bodhisattva], the absence of own being (nihsvabhāvatā) of all dharmas, since [its] characteristic is the series of āryadharmas, it is the dharmadhātu.⁷⁴ And that this is being taught here is shown by the treatise which states: 'Because of the non-

differentiation of the dharmadhātu the gotra cannot be differentiated'. 75—Objection: How can one then differentiate, saying that this is the buddhagotra, this the pratyekabuddhagotra, and this the śrāvakagotra? 76—The treatise has given the following answer: 'By virtue of the differentiation of the supported factors (ādheyadharma) one speaks of its differentiation', 77 i.e. because of possession of the supported factors of the buddha and so forth. 78 This dharma is [indeed] without differentiation; yet there is differentiation of the gotra here owing to differentiation of the [supported factors]—'just as in the undifferentiated sky (ākāśa) there are all those proceeding along [various] ways such as the way of the sun, that of a bird, that of a butterfly'... 79

'What is the support-object?'⁸⁰—because of what sort of gotra does one objectively speak of existence [of the bodhisattva]?—'There is no support-object'⁸¹—i.e. a gotra of the [bodhisattva] does not exist as a thing.⁸² And such is the meaning of dharmadhātu.

[57a] Whatever group (skandha), etc., may be the object (viṣaya) of the customary expression Bodhisattva, there is absence of own being (niḥsvabhāvatā), Emptiness (śūnyatā), and dharmatā; perfected in pure nature in its dharmadhātu this will be comprehended, and the name "bodhi" is given to this. What is gotra consequently is no thing. This śūnyatā is due to the characteristic of no thing. Or again, with regard to Awakening, there is no support in what is gotra. By surface convention (saṃvṛti) and by mutual non-differentiation there is no [real] differentiation into a support and a supported (ādhārādheyabhāva), for this [differentiation] is fabricated by designation (prajñapti) [only].

'How so?'88—how being dharmadhātu is it precisely bodhi-gotra?'84—All factors (sarvadharma) have been set out with reference to the six adhigamadharmas.'85

Abhayākaragupta then goes on to comment on the Aṣṭa's statement (i, p. 18): 'The Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva exercises himself in non-attachment (asaktatāyāṃ śikṣate)', and he next turns to explain the object (ālambana, Abhisamayālaṃkāra i. 40) as 'all dharmas' (fol. 57bl sq.).

ABHAYĀKARAGUPTA, Munimatālamkāra [T.T. Vol. 101(Ha)]

In Abhayākaragupta's independent treatise entitled the "Ornament of the Sage's Doctrine" we find a more detailed discussion of the gotra in connexion with the question of the *ekayāna*, both in Chapters i and ii which treat of the *bodhicitta* and its realization (*bhāvanā*) and in Chapter iii which deals with the eight *abhisamayas* under the first of which, the *sarvākārajñatā*, the *gotra* theory is explained by the commentators, as has already been noticed above.

Chapter i of the *Munimatālaṃkāra* contains the following observations on these interrelated topics (fol. 182b6-183a8).

The Prajñāpāramitā itself, the Bhagavatī, is the essence of the Mahāyana, the ekayana precisely. The system postulating (three)86 different vehicles (yāna) was set out by the Blessed One (bhagavat) in order to introduce the childish ($b\bar{a}la$) (progressively to the teaching); it is not of certain meaning (nītārtha).87 This is what has been stated in the Lañkāvatārasūtra: 'No system postulating (different) vehicles indeed exists (in certain meaning): I teach that the vehicle is one (ultimately). [But] in order to attract the childish I speak of different vehicles'.88 [183a] Although [a difference is] postulated according to whether one has little preparation (sambhāra) or immeasurable preparation, the vāna is not different [in reality]; for the dharmadhātu is without differentiation. This (difference of vehicles) is taught [then merely] as a gate of entry (to the Mahāyāna). And the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] has declared: 'O Lord, because of the non-differentiation of the dharmadhātu there is no difference of vehicles; you have spoken of these vehicles in order to introduce sentient beings' (progressively to the teaching).89

Consequently (it is objected), it is the teaching concerning the one vehicle that is intentional (ābhiprāyika), and [only] because of the equivalence (which [the teacher] has in mind) of the vehicle having the characteristic of the dharmadhātu (the intended foundation, dgons gźi), etc., has the oneness (of the vehicle) been taught. 90—[Reply:] As for this objection, it has been expressly stated in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra: 40 Śāriputra, in the future you will be the Samyaksambuddha named Padmaprabha 191 And [an interpretation which postulates several ultimately different vehicles] is not in accordance with this explicit canonical statement (of certain meaning).

In the **Daśadharmakasūtra** it is stated that, in order to indicate the teaching of the three vehicles as (being) an expedient $(up\bar{a}ya)$, the Blessed One taught the *ekayāna* intentionally to beings to be trained (*vineya*) (as an indirect meaning);⁹² for (if it be asked why three vehicles were taught) it would have been impossible to introduce these disciples

saying that this teaching of three vehicles is [nothing but] an expedient employed by the Blessed One, and that it is not true. It is [then simply] in accordance with this [consideration] that Ārya Maitreya has taught in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (in the *Dharmaparyeṣti* chapter) that the teaching of the *ekayāna* is intentional (ābhiprāyika).⁹³

Abhayākaragupta next proceeds to discuss the gnoseo-soteriological questions that arise with respect to the *bodhi* of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, the 'conversion' of their two vehicles into the Bodhisattvayāna or Buddhayāna, and their final attainment of buddhahood. He then writes the following (fol. 186a7–186b7).

In the Prajñāpāramitā the [Blessed One] has stated: 'If they were to produce the thoughts (citta) directed toward complete and perfect Awakening, I place no obstacle in the way of the [resulting] wholesome root'.94 And in the Samādhirā jasūtra it is stated: 'All these living beings will become Awakened: [186b] there exists here no sentient being who is not a recipient (bhājana)'. 95 Owing to the adventitiousness of the impurities and because of the natural luminosity of the citta (since it is śūnya) (because it is exempt from the unitary and multiple, the nature of citta which is unborn in own being is luminous, and it is stated that all the darkness of mental construction is illuminated), there indeed exists in all living beings the capacity96 for Buddhahood, as has been correctly explained to be the intended meaning. Thus, by saying in the Sūtra 'All sentient beings are tathāgatagarbha(s)',97 the Blessed One has fully set out the capacity that all have for comprehending (or: attaining) the level (pada) of supreme Awakening. (According to the above mentioned scripture, whereas the tathāgatagarbha does not permeate (vyāp-) all the insensible (sthāvara) as well as the living (jangama), it permeates the conscious series (cittasamtāna) of the living.)98 For in the Ratnagotravibhāga(-Commentary), where it is said [i. 148] (quoting the Bodhichapter of the Mahāyānasutrālamkāra):99 'Although in all without differentiation, Thusness (tathata) once it has reached purity (from adventitious impurities) (is) this tathāgata-ness; all living beings therefore have this (tathāgata) as embryonic essence' etc., (teaching that all living beings possess the buddhagarbha), Ārya Maitreya too has, by using the expression tathagata (in this text), accepted the statement that the dharmadhātu, having the characteristic of non-substantiality (nairātmya) of the individual (pudgala) and the dharmas, is naturally luminous

(prakṛtiprabhāsvara).100

Abhayākaragupta then takes up the question of the gnoseological foundation of the ekayāna theory (fol. 186b7–187a6).

Moreover, the word vāna denotes the path (mārga) leading to the place of nirvāna, i.e. the nature of knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna) (the means of progression), and nirvāna (the goal of progression). . . 101 [187a] For liberation (viz. nirvāna) is attained by knowledge of reality only, and not otherwise. Now this reality (tattva) (comprehended by transcending discriminating knowledge [prajñā]) is only (eva) one; although theory (drsti) is differentiated (in virtue of this or that theory), the real (vastu) [i.e. the 'object' of tattva-jñāna] is not objectified as diverse realities, for this would involve over-extension (atiprasanga). Therefore, (there being no multiplicity in reality.) gnosis (iñāna) that has as its object reality having a single nature is also only one in (the mode of) nature. It being in fact gnosis consisting of the buddha's and bodhisattva's exact knowledge of reality, it has reality as its object: for it is the counteragent against confusion (sammoha) in all its forms. Partial (prādeśika) knowledge (of the Śrāvaka and the other) [on the contrary] will not comprehend reality; for this (namely understanding reality through partial knowledge) would involve over-extension, and thus (by comprehension through partial knowledge) everybody would see reality. Therefore, (the yana being the marga and this being established as one.) that very gnosis which directly knows (sāksātkr-) reality consisting in non-substantiality (nairātmya) of pudgala and dharmas is the exact path allowing nirvāna to be attained, and there is no other [such path]. In view of the preceding, the vehicle is only (eva) one.

After having discussed the three natures (svabhāva) and non-substantiality (nairātmya) in connexion with the parinispannasvabhāva (fol. 187b-188a), Abhayākaragupta concludes his first chapter with the following observation (fol. 188b4-6):

Thus (or: therefore) the nature of the Mahāyāna is established as being only the one vehicle (ekayāna) and the absolute (paramārtha) absence of own being (niḥsvabhāvatā) of all dharmas. This (the Great Vehicle) is the Bhagavatī Prajñāpāramitā. This (Prajñāpāramitā) is to

be known as the absolutely real (pāramārthika) bodhicitta, which consists of the non-differentiation of the Empty (comprehension of śūnyatā) and compassion.

Chapter ii of the *Munimatālaṃkāra* begins explaining the process of realization ($bh\bar{a}van\bar{a}$) of the *bodhicitta* by recalling that all living beings are endowed with the certain capacity¹⁰² to eliminate the obstructions, viz. the *kleśāvaraṇa* and the *jñeyāvarana* (fol. 188b7).

[188a8] Furthermore, the teaching concerning the ekavāna being thus quite certain, it has been established that apart from the dharmadhātu having the nature of the non-dual gnosis (advayajñāna) of transcending discriminative knowledge (prajñā) and means (upāya), 103 [189b] there exists no other vehicle of liberation. Therefore (if it be asked why different forms of bhavana have nevertheless been taught), when the Blessed One teaches bhāvanā by introducing divisions in the true (satva) (and the Prajñāpāramitā and Mantra), this involves differentiation in name only (nāmamātra) in accordance with the different convictions (adhimukti) of beings to be trained (vineya); and this serves as an introduction. Consequently, while reality (tattva) itself is without differentiation, in order to conform to the spiritual propensities of sentient beings toward one thing or another (e.g. the impermanent) with this or that term (nāman) (e.g. impermanent) in the Sūtras and Abhidharma, the Buddha-Bhagavats have given instructions while proceeding as if there were differentiations.

Abhayākaragupta explains that this procedure involves teaching impermanence to persons whose faculties are weak (hīnendriya) by eradicating any imputation (samāropa) of reality, only self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) to persons with middling faculties by eradicating the imputation of [a real duality between] object and subject (grāhya-grāhaka), and śūnyatā or absence of discursive development (prapañca) to persons with sharp faculties by eradicating all imputation whatsoever. This is what Dharmakīrti was referring to when he wrote in his **Pramā-pavārttika** (ii. 253cd): 'But release results from the theory of śūnyatā, and the realization of the remainder [viz. anitya, duḥkha and anātman] has that purpose' (fol. 189b). 104 Also, the postulating of a single cause such as a creator (īśvara), the Sāṃkhya's pradhāna, or the philosophergrammarian's śabdabrahman rests on names only, which have then to be

surmounted by certain teachings serving as counteragents (pratipaksa) (fol. 190a).

In his treatment of sarvākārajñatā, the first of the eight abhisamayas which are the subject of Chapter iii of the Munimatālaṃkāra, Abhayākaragupta provides a fuller statement of his theory of the gotra (fol. 217b2-219a5).

[217b2] Because (according to the commentary on the Pañca) the dharmadhātu, which has precisely as its characteristic the absence of own being (nihsvabhāvatā) of all dharmas, is the [motivating] cause (hetu) of the arvadharmas, 105 use is made of the verbal equivalents (parvava) gotra existent by nature (prakṛtistham gotram), ground ($g\acute{z}i = \bar{a}dh\bar{a}ra$) base ($\lceil \tilde{n}e \ bar \rceil rton \ pa = upastambha$), [motivating] cause (rgvu = hetu), foundation (rten = niśraya), upanisad (ñe bar gnas pa), precursor (snon du 'gro ba = $p\bar{u}rvamgama$), residence (gnas = nilaya), germ (sa bon = $b\bar{i}ia$). 106 element (khams = dhātu), and nature (ran bźin = prakrti). 107 It is thus that this gotra, which is very pure by nature (prakrtiviśuddha) [although] concealed by adventitious impurities (āgantukamala), once it has become freed from all impurities (owing to the absence of the hindrances, viz. repetition of passions, evil friends, lack, and dependence¹⁰⁸) shines forth; it is then like the ore of iron, copper, silver and gold in rocks (as is said in the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra). 109 This very dharmatā, the ātma-gotra (bdag ñid kvi rigs) (existing in the śūnvatā [of] the conscious series of the sentient being) is termed (in the Sūtra) tathāgatagarbha. 110 Although this gotra of nature (prakṛti) exists, living beings so long as they are covered by adventitious impurities such as ignorance $(avidv\bar{a})$ are not completely Awakened. [But] once they are freed from all the impurities of dichotomizing conceptualization (vikalpa) (by constant practice of the path), there is achieved Awakening wherein the very pure dharmadhātu (because of freedom from the adventitious impurities) shines forth. Therefore (buddhahood not being achieved in virtue of the bare existence of the dharmadhātu), [218a] the saint (ārva) in particular (free from the four disadvantages)¹¹¹ (is) gotra;¹¹² and as the 'cause of application' (prayrttinimitta) of the word 'bodhisattva', 113 (the gotra) is referred to as the ground (ādhāra) for the twentytwo bodhicittotpādas¹¹⁴ and of the practices (pratipatti) of the outfit (samnāha) connected with wish (chanda) as the particularity of this (viz. the cittotpāda). 115 So the gotra is to be known as the support (pratisthā)

of the six factors of comprehension (adhigamadharma, nos. 1-6).116 the counteragent (pratipaksa, no. 7) and elimination (prahāna, no. 8), surmounting (yon's su gtugs pa = paryupayoga, no. 9) the preceding, prajñā accompanied by compassion (no. 10), superiority over the Auditors (śisya [= $śr\bar{a}vaka$], no. 11), progressive action for the benefit of others (parārthānukrama, no. 12), and effortless action (ayatnavrtti) of gnosis (no. 13). This is what has been stated in the relevant verses of the Abhisamayālamkāra [i. 37-38], as well as by Ārya Vimuktisena in his commentary on the text of the Pañca. Consequently, concerning the cittotpāda, with respect to the four nirvedhabhāgīvas of the pravogamārga], the darśanamārga and the bhāvanāmārga [i.e. nos. 1-6] the bodhisattva in each case has been called 'bodhisattva' by the Blessed One. 117 The counteragent [no. 7] is the Prajñāpāramitā; elimination [no. 8], namely (elimination) of the obstacles (vipaksa), is the dharmadhātu, the characteristic of complete purity (from any adventitious impurities). (According to the Śuddhimatī, 118) paryupayoga 'surmounting' [no. 9] of both counteragent and elimination is progression to the ultimate limit, i.e. ultimate perfection of the perfect counteragent and ultimate exhaustion of the obstacle. Haribhadra indeed explains parvupavoga as the condition of elimination of dichotomizing conceptualization connected with origination (of the counteragent) and stoppage (elimination).119

Now the prakrtistha-gotra comes from beginningless time (anādikālāgata) and is attained in virtue of dharmatā (dharmatāpratilabdha) [218b]. The developed (samudānīta) [gotra on the other hand] is attained by the continual practice of the previous wholesome roots. The temporarily determined (nivata) (not ultimately determined) [gotra] is the gotra of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha. The permanently determined (niyata) one is the tathāgata-gotra. The gotra of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Tathagata may be (temporarily) undetermined since it is removable (hārya) through conditions (pratyaya). But that the gotra is by reason of this statement [really] differentiated is not correct. 120 For the Blessed One also has stated: 121 'O Mañjuśrī, if the dharmadhātu is one, if the tathatā is one and if the bhūtakoti is one, how is it that one speaks of one who is a recipient and one who is not a recipient?' (such a designation is not correct). This is true. 122 And thus, because of difference in the factors of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, the supported (ādheya), the gotras of the Śrāvakas and the others (the Pratyekabuddhas) are differentiated in customary usage; for example, in the case of the

sky (ākāśa) which is without differentiation, with respect to the different [entities] who have their [various] ways [in it] one speaks of the way of a being, the way of the birds, and the way of the sun.¹²³ Hence, when the comprehension (adhigama) of great Awakening is preceded by the comprehensions of the Awakenings of the Śrāvakas and the others (the Pratyekabuddhas) these [the two latter] have been indicated as temporary, as a consequence of which it has been taught that they are connected with the gotra of the Śrāvakas and the others (the Pratyekabuddhas). According to customary usage, those persons who progressively cultivate supreme bodhi attaining the Pramuditā and the other [stages of the Bodhisattva] to start with (without depending on another [path]) are said to have the mahāyāna-gotra. A differentiation of the gotra is therefore not [in fact] inconsistent [with the theory of the undifferentiated gotra and the ekayāna]; but this (differentiation of the gotra) is not real (tattvataḥ).

As has been stated (concerning the non-differentiation of the *gotra*): 'Where there are no conditionings ($samsk\bar{a}ra$) whatsoever, there is the unconditioned (asamskrta). It is equal to the gotra of the $\bar{A}ryas$; this gotra is without differentiation in virtue of equality ($samat\bar{a}$) with space ($\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$); this gotra [219a] is permanent (nitya) in virtue of the fact that all dharmas are of one value (ekarasa); and because this gotra is always $dharmat\bar{a}$, it is knowledge, etc.'¹²⁴

Concerning the hermeneutic etymology (nirukta), because the good qualities are realized—produced—from it, 125 it is gotra. Again, because they go (gam-) sentient beings are go-; and because of protecting them (trā-) it is go-tra-. Again (according to the Śuddhimatī), 126 here gam-(the root of go-) is used in the sense of being present; for example, the $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$ is universally present, and accordingly go-meaning 'to go, be present' [is] the supported factor ($\bar{a}dheyadharma$). And because of protection, holding unshakeably (indestructibly), one speaks of a go-tra, viz. (what is termed) support. 127

Question: Now how is the dharmadhātu, which is without own being (svabhāva), the support (pratiṣṭhā) of the cittotpāda?¹²⁸—[Reply:] For example, (it having been stated by Ārya Nāgārjuna in his Vigrahavyāvartanī that 'All things prevail for somebody for whom this śūnyatā prevails, [but] nothing prevails for somebody for whom śūnyatā does not prevail'),¹²⁹ this is like (being the support of) the removal of darkness by the rays of moon and sun [in] the sky (ākāśa) which is [nevertheless] without own being.¹³⁰

CONCLUSION

With Dharmamitra the tathāgatagarbha doctrine enters clearly and definitively into the commentarial literature on the Abhisamayālamkāra in connexion with the explication of the theory of the undifferentiated prakṛtisthagotra. These two theories were of course already associated in the Ratnagotravibhāga. And in the canonical literature of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras the tathāgatagarbha theory is attested in the Adhyardhaśatikā, evidently a later Prajñāpāramitā text showing certain Tantrik influences. Previous to Dharmamitra, a synthesis of the prajñāpāramitā and the tathāgatagarbha was elaborated by Kamalaśīla.

The tathāgatagarbha notion may well be linked with the concept of the stūpa or caitya as tathāgatadhātugarbha which is to be found also in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, but the connexion has not been made altogether explicit in our sources.

Emphasis on the ekayāna (which is lacking in Dharmamitra's Prasphuṭapadā) is to be found in both Haribhadra's great commentary and, earlier, in Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakāloka. Its significance as a gnoseosoteriological principle was worked out in a final form for Indian Buddhism by Abhayākaragupta in the context of the theory of the prakṛtisthagotra and tathāgatagarbha. The association between the ekayāna and the tathāgatagarbha theories goes back at least as far as the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra. 132

In Abhayākaragupta's comments it is especially interesting to find the assimilation of the tathagatagarbha with the prakrtisthagotra whose nature is dharmadhātu, in other words non-substantiality (nairātmya) of both pudgala and dharmas, absence of own being (nihsvabhāvatā) and Emptiness. The Marmakaumudī thus mentions absence of own being and sūnyatā in connexion with the prakṛtisthagotra, which has the nature of dharmadhātu.133 The Munimatālamkāra explains that the dharmadhātu has the characteristic of non-substantiality of pudgala and dharmas, and that it is naturally luminous. 134 The ekayana also is linked with absolute absence of own being. 135 (And a note in small letters in the Peking edition of the Tibetan translation of the Munimatalamkara specifies that there is natural luminosity of citta since it is empty (sūnya) of all impurities. 136) Abhayākaragupta's comments accordingly support the connextion of the prakrtisthagotra of the Prajñāpāramita literature not only with the tathāgatagarbha and ekayāna, but also with nonsubstantiality, absence of own being and śūnyatā. 137

Apart from the 'Tathāgatagarbha School' represented by certain Mahāyāna sūtras (such as the *Tathāgatagarbha*, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa*) and the *Ratnagotravibhaga* together with its commentary, this complex of problems seems to have come to the fore in India above all in the synthetic Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school which was firmly established in the eighth century by Śāntarakṣita, and whose masters were responsible for several important commentaries on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*.

It is probably due at least in part to the great influence of the Yogā-cāra-Mādhyamika school in Tibet from the time of Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla that the gotra and ekayāna (as connected in particular with the Prajñāpāramitā literature) and the tathāgatagarbha (connected earlier with a distinct corpus of Sūtras and Śāstras) came together to play such a prominent and important part in Tibetan Buddhist thought.¹³⁸ This theory evidently had a deep influence on the later Prāsangika-Mādhyamikas too, in particular on the Tibetan representatives of this school who lay special emphasis on these three concepts which they explicate in the framework of the śūnyatā theory as elaborated by them.

NOTES

- ¹ E. Conze, *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom* (London 1961), p. 105 note 2. References hereunder to the folios of Tibetan translations of Indian texts contained in the Bstan 'gyur relate to the Peking edition as reproduced in the Japanese reprint published by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute (Tokyo and Kyoto). Prints of other editions of the Bstan 'gyur were unfortunately unavailable during the writing of the present paper.
- ² On the meanings of the term *gotra*, and in particular on the two meanings '(spiritual) element, germ, capacity' and '(spiritual) lineage, class, category' which might be described respectively as the intensional and extensional meanings of the word when the *gotra* as germ determines the classification of persons possessing it in a *gotra* as category, see the present writer's article in *BSOAS* 39 (1976) p. 341sq.
- ³ "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the gotra-theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens (Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner), WZKSO 12-13 (1968/1969), pp. 303-317.
- ⁴ Ratnākarašānti's other work on the subject, a commentary on the AA entitled **Suddhimatī**, (or: **Suddhamatī**) will be referred to below.
- ⁵ Tāranātha, *Rgya gar chos'byuh* (ed. A. Schiefner), p. 171. Dharmākara(datta) was the religious name of Arcaṭa (ca. 730-790?) (cf. Durvekamiśra, *Arcaṭāloka* [GOS ed.], p. 233).

Tāranātha accordingly distinguishes our Dharmamitra from another master having the same name whom he describes as a Vaibhāṣika, and who wrote a commentary $(Tik\bar{a})$ on Guṇaprabha's $Vinayas\bar{u}tra$. This earlier Dharmamitra is in fact reported to have been a pupil of Guṇaprabha (see Bu-ston, *Chos 'byan* II, p. 161), which would make him approximately a contemporary of Ārya Vimuktisena.

- 6 Cf. Bu·ston, Chos 'byun II, p. 140; Tāranātha, Rgya gar chos 'byun, p. 153.
- ⁷ According to the colophon of the Tibetan translation in the Bstan•'gyur. Cf. Tāranātha, op. cit., pp. 189 sq., 198–199.
- ⁸ Exceptions to this classification were for example Na·dbon·Kun·dga'·dpal (cf. *Théorie*, p. 140) and other masters of the so-called Great Madhyamaka (*dbu ma chen po*) who undertook a harmonization of the Madhyamaka and the Vijñaptimātra.
- ⁹ See e.g. Ña·dbon·Kun·dga'·dpal's Yid kyi mun sel, fol. 237a (translated in Théorie, p. 140).
- ¹⁰ T.T. Fol. 54a.—Cf. for example Tson·kha·pa, Legs biad gser phren. fol. 210a Théorie, p. 122).
- ¹¹ On the meanings of this statement see below, pp. 287-8.
- 12 Dignāga, Prajāāpāramitāpiņdārtha 27-29:
 prajāāpāramitāyām hi trīn samāśritya deśanā |
 kalpitam paratantram ca pariniṣpannam eva ca ||
 nâstityādipadaiḥ sarvam kalpitam vinivāryate |
 māyopamādidṛṣṭāntaiḥ paratantrasya deśanā ||
 caturdhā vyavadānena pariniṣpannakīrtanam |
 prajāāpāramitāyām hi nânyā buddhasya deśanā ||
- ¹³ Chapter 83 of the Tibetan version. Cf. E. Conze and S. Iida, in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou* (Paris 1968), p. 238.

These three aspects cannot, however, according to many commentators be simply equated with the three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas* of the Vijñānavāda. Cf. *Théorie*, pp. 325–327, 343, 147–148.

- 14 AAĀ 1.28–30 (p. 47): tat punas trividham rūpam | kalpitam rūpam grāhyagrāhakarūpena kalpitatvāt| vikalpitam rūpam asadbhūtaparikalpena jñānam eva tathā pratibhāsate iti vikalpitatvāt| dharmatārūpam tattvato 'rūpam eva śūnyatārūpena parinispannatvāt|
 - 15 Marmakaumudi, T.T. fol. 56b.
 - 16 See Munimatālamkāra, T. T. fol. 186b. On this point see Théorie, p. 152 note.
- ¹⁷ On the link between the *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines see also the Śrīmālādevīsimhanādasūtra (Théorie, p. 182 sq.; Le traité du tathāgatagarbha, (Publications de l'École française d'Extrême Orient Vol. LXXXVIII, Paris. 1973) p.142 sq.).
 - 18 Munimatālamkāra, T. T. fol. 183a.
 - 19 Munimatālamkāra, T. T. fol. 183a.
 - ²⁰ Munimatālamkāra, T. T. fol. 186b-187a. Cf. Théorie, pp. 180, 185.
 - ²¹ Marmakaumudi T. T. fol. 56b; Munimatālamkāra, fol. 182b sq.; 218b-219a.
 - ²² Munimatālamkāra, T. T. fol. 186b.
- 23 The connexion between the *ekayāna*, the *prakṛtistha-gotra* and the *tathāgata-garbha* on the one side and *nairātmya*, *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *śūnyatā* on the other is especially noteworthy. The question of the relationship between the *tathāgatagarbha* and *śūnyatā* is taken up in the *RGV* (J) i. 154 sq., as well as in some of the relevant Sūtras. Cf. *Théorie*, p. 313 sq.; *Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha* Index. s. v. *śūnya* ($t\bar{a}$).
- ²⁴ See *RGV* (J) i. 148.

The other two aspects on which the theory is based are (the irradiation, spharaṇa, of) the dharmakāya and the prakṛtistha-gotra. See RGV (J) 1.27-28; 148-152; Théorie, pp. 34, 275 sq., 424; Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha, pp. 10, 96 sq.

- ²⁵ This was already observed by Kamalaśila, *Madhyamakāloka* T. T. fol. 159b. Cf. *Théorie*, pp. 34, 276–277; *Traité du tathāgatagarbha*, p. 99.
 - ²⁶ See MSA chapters iii and xi; Théorie, pp. 179 sq.; 185 sq.
 - 27 See MSABh ix. 37.
- ²⁸ This meaning of the compound *tathāgata-garbha* can be rendered in Tibetan by means of the particle *can*, which serves *inter alia* to translate Sanskrit *bahuvrīhi* compounds; the same particle also translates the Sanskrit suffixes-*mant*-/-vant-, etc.
 - ²⁹ Rather than of 'relic' (see below).
- ³⁰ Cf. for example SP chapter xi, which enumerates at the beginning suvarṇa, rū-pya, vaiḍūrya, musāragalva, aśmagarbha, lohitamukti and karketana.
- ³¹ Haribhadra glosses ($AA\overline{A}$ ii. 18, p. 218): $tath\overline{a}gatadh\overline{a}tumadhy\overline{a}n$ 'having in their core the Tath $\overline{a}gata$ -relic'.

For the idea compare e.g. the word aṅgārastūpa (in the Mahūparinirvāṇasūtra, ed. E. Waldschmidt, § 51.20) and the phrase stūpaḥ...aṅgāragarbhaḥ 'stūpa containing carbonised [relics]' (in E. Waldschmidt, Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden I, 931bAd). See also Samādhirājasūtra 33, p. 456.6; Divyāvadāna 26, p. 369 1

³² On these two senses of the compound tathāgata-garbha see **Théorie**, p. 507sq.;

Le Traité du tathagatagvarbha p. 52 sq.

- ³³ Cf. angārastūpa mentioned above, note 31.
- ³⁴ See Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,iv. 73 (but cf. iv. 121); compare e.g. Mahāvaṃsa xvii. 65. Cf. A. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule (Paris 1955), pp. 154 (Mūlasarvāstivādins), 192 (Dharmaguptakas) (the thesis that this cult of the stūpa can produce good fruit was combatted by other schools such as the Caitīyas, Pūrva-śailas, the later Mahīśāsakas, and the Aparaśailas); E. Lamotte, Histoire du boudhisme indien (Louvain 1958), p. 702-703.
 - 35 Abhidharmakośa iv. 107.
 - ³⁶ Madhyamakāloka T. T. fol. 159b, 267a, 271b-272b.
- ³⁷ The four *nirvedhabhāgīyas* are *ūṣman* (*ūṣmagata*), *mūrdhan*, *kṣānti*, and *lauki-kāgradharma*, all of them being assigned to the *prayogamārga*. Together with the following *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga* they constitute the six *adhigamadharmas* (see below, p. 297). See *AA* i. 5; 25 sq.; 37; *Abhidharmakoša* yi. 17 sq.
- ³⁸ This point has already been mentioned by \overline{A} rya Vimuktisena, who speaks of a didactic sequence ($pratip\bar{a}dan\bar{a}nup\bar{u}rv\bar{\iota}$) as distinct from the actual sequence ($arth\bar{a}-nup\bar{u}rv\bar{\iota}$); see his Vrtti (ed. C. Pensa p. 78). Similarly, Haribhadra speaks of a sequence founded on the stages of understanding ($adhigam\bar{a}nukrama$) ($AA\bar{A}$ i. 37–38, p. 77).

On the gotra as a motivating cause, as distinct from a productive cause, cf. Théorie, pp. 119 note, 131, with WZKS 12-13 (1968), p. 316. See also below, note 73; p. 308.

- ³⁹ That is, the sequence adopted in the AA indicates that it is the effected or caused (abhisamskṛta) gotra that is in question, rather than the fundamental and universal prakṛtistha-gotra. (The second gotra would then correspond to the samudānīta or paripuṣṭagotra, which may be considered as a productive cause since it is conditioned [saṃskṛta].) This alternative explanation of the sequence adopted in the AA has not been mentioned by the Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra; but Ārya Vimuktisena's Vṛtti (p. 76-77) does mention a gotra that is pratyayasamudānīta and functions as a cause (kāraṇa). See below, p. 300
 - ⁴⁰ See *MSA* iii, 2, 300,
 - ⁴¹ On this see *Théorie*, p. 141 note 5.
 - ⁴² AA i. 39ab: dharmadhātor asambhedād gotrabhedo na yujyate |
- 43 The Sanskrit text of this passage is quoted by Ārya Vimuktisena (p. 77): yadi mañjuśrīr eko dharmadhātur ekā tathatā ekā bhūtakoṭis tat kathaṃ bhājanam abhājanam vā prajñāpayatha (?). Here pra-jñāpay has been translated into Tibetan by brtags; but in Abhayākaragupta's Munimatālaṃkāra it has been written more correctly gdags (see below, p. 300).
- 44 Cf. WZKS 11-12, p. 309-310; Théorie, p. 103.
- 45 Abhidharmakośa vi. 57cd: tadgotrā āditah ke cit, ke cid uttāpanāgatāh ||
- ⁴⁶ When the term *bodhisattva* is used in the sense of a spiritual principle that is no padārtha (see below, p. 292), rather than a (type of) person, it is written here as an italicized technical term. Cf. Ārya Vimuktisena, V_Itti, p. 73.
 - ⁴⁷ Cf. *Théorie*, pp. 109, 89.
- ⁴⁸ Haribhadra, 'Grel pa don gsal, T. T. fol. 105b8; AAĀ 1.39 (p. 77). Cf. Ārya Vimuktisena, p. 77.5.

If the *linga* (or *hetu*) 'logical reason' is present in all cases (as is necessarily the case with the universal *dharmadhātu*), there could be no heterologous examples (*vipakṣa*) in which it would be absent; but this lack of absence (*vyatireka*) makes it impossible to make a valid inference (*anumāna*) following the rules of logic widely accepted by the Buddhists after Dignāga.

- 49 AA i. 5cd: ādhāraḥ pratipattes ca dharmadhātusvabhāvakaḥ ||
- 50 Cf. AA 1.39cd: ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tadbhedaḥ parigīyate || See also below,
- ⁵¹ Adhyardhaśatikā prajñāpāramitā (ed. P. L. Vaidya Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha I, p. 92). Cf. E. Conze, in Studies of Esoteric Buddhism and Tantrism (Koyasan University, Koyasan, 1965), pp. 101–115, and Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts (London, 1973), pp. 184–195, where Conze translates 'tathāgatas in embryo'.
 - 52 Cf. Théorie, p. 209.
 - 53 MSA iii. 5.
 - ⁵⁴ See also Ārya Vimuktisena, Vṛtti, p. 76.
- ⁵⁵ Cf. Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vrtti*, p. 77–78, and *WZKS* 12–13, p. 311 note 34. (On such etymologies see also J. Gonda, *Lingua* 5 [1955–56], p. 61 sq.)
 - ⁵⁶ Cf. *Théorie*, p. 144.
- ⁵⁷ See MSABh iii. 4: guņottāraṇārthena gotraṃ veditavyaṃ guṇā uttaranty asmād udbhavantīti kṛtvā, and the pāssage from the Vṛtti referred to above, note 55; cf. WZKS 12-13, p. 311 note 32.
- ⁵⁸ This definition of the *gotra* is adopted by Ābhidharmikas such as Yasomitra (*Abhidharmakośaryākhyā*, p. 583-584); it is mentioned also by Sthiramati (*Madhyāntaribhāgatīkā* iv. 13).
 - ⁵⁹ 'Grel pa don gsal, T. T. fol. 105b7.
- ⁶⁰ The four pratipattis comprised by the four $m\bar{a}rgas$ (prayoga°, darśana°, bhā-vanā° and višeṣa-mārga) (AAĀ i. 6, 43)?
- 61 'Grel pa don gsal, T. T. fol. 105b6-7. Cf. AA i. 5. On the trayodaśavidho bodhisattvah see also $AA\overline{A}$ i. 37-38: samvṛtyā punah pratipattidharmasyâvasthāntarabhedena dharmadhātusvabhāva eva buddhadharmādhāro bodhisattvas trayodaśavidho gotram iti nirdiśyate; Ārya Vimuktisena, Vṛtti, p. 77. And on the dharmadhātu as the cause of comprehension of the āryadharmas see $AA\overline{A}$ i. 39: yadi dharmadhātor evâryadharmādhigamāya hetutvāt tadātmako bodhisattvah prakṛtistham anuttarabuddhadharmānām gotram dharmatāsamjñakam, tadā . . .; Vṛtti, p. 76.
- ⁶² Here Dharmamitra correlates all thirteen aspects with the stages of the Path, and he thus develops the explanations previously given by the Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra.
- 63 'Grel pa don gsal, T. T. fol. 105b4-5. Cf. AAĀ p. 77: tato yathāśayaṃ avatāraṇā-dyabhisaṃdhidvāreṇa yānatrayapratiṣṭhā panalakṣaṇaparārthānukramasya[ādhāraḥ]. Cf. Théorie, p. 165-166; Le Traité du tathā gatagarbha, p. 83 sq.
 - 64 See above, p. 285.
- 65 Dharmamitra thus clearly distinguishes this teaching—corresponding to that of the tathāgatagarbha—from that of a self (ātman) or dhātu (khams, not dbyins), which he mentions first, in connexion with the parikalpita.
- 66 'Grel pa don gsal, fol. T. T. 106a1-2.
- ⁶⁷ Cf. Théorie, pp. 140, 151, 154-155, where it is noted that this statement of the

Śrāvaka doctrine does not correspond with what is usually regarded as their doctrine.

- 68 AA i. 39cd quoted above, note 50.
- 69 'Grel pa don gsal, T. T. fol. 106a3.
- ⁷⁰ As just observed, AA i. 39cd speaks of different contained factors (ādheyadharma)—the various particularized gotras differentiated in terms of the various conditional paths—instead of the single container/support (ādhāra)—the unparticularized gotra defined in terms of the single and unique dharmadhātu.
 - ⁷¹ The twenty-two *cittotpādas* are enumerated in $AA\bar{A}$ i. 19–20.
- ⁷² Ārya Vimuktisena, Vrtti, p. 73: yata āha: cittotpādād ārabhya nirvedhabhāgīyeşu daṛśanamārge bhāvanāmārge ca . . .
- ren no zes pa ni mi 'thad do. The meaning of this is unclear. Haribhadra has stated that the gotra is the $\bar{a}dh\bar{a}ra$ of the four nirvedhabh $\bar{a}g\bar{i}yas$ etc., and that it receives the designation of dharmat \bar{a} because the dharmadh $\bar{a}tu$ is the cause (hetu) of the comprehension of the $\bar{a}ryadharmas$ ($AA\bar{A}i$. 37–39). Similarly, in the 'Grel pa don gsal (T. T. fol. 105a) also, Haribhadra speaks of the gotra as the support of practice etc., adding (fol. 106a) that the dharmadh $\bar{a}tu$, which is really without differentiation, functions as a cause for the comprehension of the $\bar{a}ryadharmas$.
 - ⁷⁴ AAĀ i. 37-39; Ārya Vimuktisena, Vrtti, p. 76.17-18.
 - ⁷⁵ AA i. 39ab (above, note 42).
 - ⁷⁶ This objection is found also e.g. in $AA\overline{A}$ i. 39.
 - ⁷⁷ AA i. 39cd (above, note 50).
 - ⁷⁸ Viz. the Ārya-Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha.
- ⁷⁹ Pañcaviṃŝatisāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā in the version edited by N. Dutt, p. 160; Cf. infra, p. 300-01.
- ⁸⁰ gźi'i don:padārtha. See Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā i, p. 18: tatra bodhisattva iti bhagavan ka padārthaḥ?
- 81 Astasāhasrikā prajāāpāramitā i, p. 18: apadārthaḥ subhūte bodhisattvapadārthaḥ. Cf. Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, version edited by N. Dutt, p. 160.
- 82 Ārya Vimuktisena, Vrtti, p. 73: na tu vastubhūtah padārthah.
- 83 Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā i, p. 18: tat kasya hetoḥ?
- 84 byan chub kyi rigs. Cf. AAĀ i. 39 (p. 77) prakṛtistham anuttarabuddhadharmāṇāṃ gotraṃ dharmatāsaṃjñakam.
- 85 See AA i. 37. Cf. AAĀ p. 76: yasmāt sarvadharmāṇāṃ vastutannimittābhiniveśābhāvena 'asaktatāyāṃ' satyām anyathâdhigamānupapattyā buddhadharmādhigamāya māyāpuruṣa iva śikṣate, tasmāt kathaṃ tattvataḥ pratiṣṭhārthaḥ iti bhāvaḥ saṃvṛtyā punaḥ pratipattidharmasyâvasthāntarabhedena dharmadhātusvabhāva eva buddhadharmādhāro bodhisattvas trayodaśavidho gotram iti nirdiśyate . . .
- ⁸⁶ Here and in the following extracts the notes printed in small letters in the Peking text of the Tibetan translation of the *Munimatālaṃkāra* have been placed in parentheses in the present English rendering. These notes are not found in the Sdedge edition.
- 87 On the avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi etc. see above, p. 292.
- 88 Lankāvatārasūtra x (Sagāthaka) 445:
- yānavyavasthā naivâsti yānam ekam vadāmy aham

parikarşaṇārthaṃ bālānāṃ yānabhedaṃ vadāmy aham | | Cf. ii. 203.

89 Niraupamyastava 21:

dharmadhātor asambhedād yānabhedo 'sti na prabho | vānatritavam ākhvātam tvavā sattvāvatāratah | |

- ⁹⁰ On tulyatva 'equivalence' of dharma, nairātmya and mukti between the yānas as a justification for the intentional teaching of the ekayāna according to the Vijñānavāda, see MSA xi. 53 and Bhāṣya. This objection reflects then the position of the Vijñānavāda as described by many of the doxographers. Cf. Théorie, pp. 187, 195.
- 91 Saddharmapundarīka, chapter iii (ed. N. Dutt, p. 50). Cf. AAĀ ii, p. 133; Théorie. p. 194.
 - 92 See AAĀ ii, p. 133-134; Théorie, p. 194.
 - 93 MSA xi. 53 sq.
- 94 Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā i, p. 34: sacet te 'py anuttarāyām samyaksambodhau cittāny utpādayeran nâham kuśalamūlasyântarāyam karomi.
 - 95 See above, p. 291.
- 96 run ba; run ba $\bar{n}id = bhavyat \bar{a}$ (cf. commentary on RGV (J.) i. 41). On abhavya 'incapable (of attainment)' see $Astas\bar{a}hasrik\bar{a}$ ii, p. 34, AA viii. 10, and $Bodhisattvabh\bar{u}mi$ § 1.1
- ⁹⁷ Tathā gatagarbhasūtra: sarvasattvās tathā gatagarbhā h. On the interpretation of this statement, in which tathā gatagarbha is a possessive compound meaning 'containing the tathā gata' (as a potentiality within), see above. p. 287-8
 - 98 Cf. Théorie, p. 152.
 - 99 MSA ix. 37:

sarveṣām aviśiṣṭâpi tathatā śuddhim āgatā | tathāgatatvaṃ tasmāc ca tadgarbhāḥ sarvadehinaḥ ||

'Thusness, although without differentiation for all, once it has attained purity is tathā gata-ness; all incarnated beings therefore have it as their embryonic essence [i.e. contain it]'. The notion of the tathā gatagarbha in question here is founded on the interpretation that takes the compound as a bahuvrīhi; see above.

- 100 'phags pa byams pas kyan theg pa chen po rgyud bla mar ('i 'grel par | mdo sde rgyan gyi byan chub kyi skabs su gsun's par dran's pa) | thams cad la ni khyad med kyan || de bźin ñid ni (glo bur gyi dri ma) dag gyur pa || de bźin gśegs ñid (yin pa) de yi phyir || 'gro kun (de bźin gśegs pa) de'i sñin po can || źes pa la sogs pas (kun san's rgyas kyi sñin sems can du bstan pas) so || (gźun de'i) de bźin gśegs pa'i sgras kyan chos kyi dbyin's gan zag dan chos kyi bdag med pa'i mtshan ñid can ran bźin gyis 'od gsal ba brjod par bźed pa ñid kyi phyir ro ||
 - 101 Compare the explanation of the different senses of yāna in MSABh ix. 53.
 - 102 skal pa = bhavva.
- 103 On advayajñāna and the Prajñāpāramitā, see also Dignāga's Prajñāpāramitāpiņḍārtha.
 - 104 Pramāņavārttika ii. 253:

yā ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nairātmyadṛgāśrayā | muktis tu śūnyatādrsteh, tadarthā śesabhāvanā ||

(Cf. the quotation of this verse in Gunaratna's commentary on Haribhadrasūri's **Saddarśanasamuccaya** 11.) The four aspects of the duḥkhasatya are anitya, duḥkha,

anātman and śūnya. (cf. Abhidharmakośa vi. 17, vii.12).

- ¹⁰⁵ See above, note 38, and note 73.
- 106 See Bodhisattvabhumi 1.1; Théorie, p. 87-88.
- ¹⁰⁷ On the *dhātu* see also *Munimatālaṃkāra*, fol. 277b, where it is defined as an *upādānakāraṇa* (cf. *supra*, notes 38 and 39).
- ¹⁰⁸ See MSA iii. 7, and Arya Vimuktisena, Vrtti, p. 76.
- 109 MSA iii. 9. Cf. Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhā gaṭīkā i. 15 (Théorie, p. 97); RGV-commentary i. 2.
- ¹¹⁰ That is, in the $Tath\bar{a}$ gatagarbhas \bar{u} tra. On the use of bdag \bar{n} i $d=\bar{a}$ tman in the $tath\bar{a}$ gatagarbha texts see the indices in La Théorie du $tath\bar{a}$ gatagarbha and $Trait\acute{e}$ under \bar{a} tman.
 - 111 See above, note 108.
- 112 (chos ñid yod tsam gyis sans rgyas mi 'grub pa) de ñid kyi phyir khyad par du 'phags pa (ñes pa bźi dan bral źin sad [?] pa) ni rigs (yin) te. The syntactic construction here is somewhat unclear, the usual expression in Sanskrit being āryagotra.
- 113 The (bodhisattva)gotra is what is referred to by the word 'bodhisattva'. See Ārya Vimuktisena, Vṛtti, p. 73: ṣaṇṇāṃ pāramitānāṃ dharmatālak ṣaṇo viśeṣo gotraṃ bodhisattvapravṛttinimittaṃ na tu vastubhūtaḥ padārthaḥ iti vedayati. Cf. AAĀ 1.35, p. 71.
 - ¹¹⁴ See above, note 71.
 - ¹¹⁵ AA i. 43.
- ¹¹⁶ Viz. ūşman, kṣānti, mūrdhan, laukikā gradharma (all on the prayogamārga), darśanamārga, and bhāvanāmārga.
- ¹¹⁷ Ārya Vimuktisena, Vṛtti, p. 73. 6-8.
- 118 Ratnākaraśānti, Śuddhimati, T. T. fol. 116b5.
- ¹¹⁹ $AA\bar{A}$ i. 37, p. 76: tayor vipakṣapratipakṣayor nirodhotpādayuktavikalpāpagamasya [ādhārah]. See also Ārya Vimuktisena, Vrtti, p. 75. Cf $Pa\bar{n}cavimsatis\bar{a}hasrik\bar{a}$, Dutt, p. 163.
 - 120 AAĀ i. 39, p. 77 (from which the text of the Munimatālamkāra differs slightly).
 - ¹²¹ See above, note 43.
 - 122 Ārya Vimuktisena, Vrtti, p. 77: satyam evam etat . . .
 - 123 Pañcavimsatisāhasrikā, version edited by Dutt, p. 160; cf. supra, p. 294.
- 124 gan 'du byed cun zad kyan med pa de ni 'dus ma byas pa ste de ni 'phags pa rnams kyi rigs su mtshuns la rigs de ni nam mkha' dan mñam pa ñid kyis khyad par med pa'o|| rigs de ni chos thams cad ro gcig pa ñid kyis rtag pa ste| rigs de ni thams cad kyi tshe chos ñid yin pas ses pa la sogs pa'o|| The Sanskrit text quoted in Pensa's ed. of Ārya Vimuktisena's Vrtti (p. 77) differs slightly: yatra na kecit saṃskārās tad asaṃskrtaṃ| yad asaṃskrtam tad āryāṇām gotram| samaṃ tad gotram ākāśasamatayā| nirviśeṣaṃ tad gotraṃ dharmaikarasatayā| nityaṃ tad gotraṃ sadā dharmatathatayā| (This corresponds to what we find in Kāṣyapaparirarta §§102-104; cf. the commentary on the RGV (J) 1. 86). But the Tibetan translation of the Munimatālaṃkāra agrees with the Tibetan translation of Vimuktisena's Vrtti (T. T. fol. 68b) except at the end:
- . . . rigs de ni thams cad kyi tshe chos kyi de bźin ñid yin pas chos kyi ro gcig tu gyur pa ñid kyis rtag pa'o// In these versions of the passage nothing corresponds to śes pa at the end of the Munimatālaṃkāra passage.
 - ¹²⁵ See above, note 55 and note 57.

- 126 Ratnākaraśānti, Śuddhimatī, T. T. fol. 114b1-2: go źes bya ba ni 'gro ba dan gnas pa la 'jug pa'o || 'dir ni gnas pa na 'jug pa ste | rten pa źes bya ba'i don te | dper na nam mkha' ni thams cad du 'gro ba źes bya ba lta bu'o || mi g-yo ba'i tshul gyis 'dzin pas skyob pa ste | des na rigs ni rten no ||
 - 127 See Marmakaumudi, T. T. fol. 57a7-8.
 - 128 See above, pp. 293-2
- ¹²⁹ By this annotator's reference to $Vigrahavy\bar{a}vartani$ 70 in the present context the prakrtistha-gotra, whose nature is $dharmadh\bar{a}tu$ and which is acquired in virtue of $dharmat\bar{a}$, is evidently assimilated with $s\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}$. This assimilation is of importance also for the theory of the $tath\bar{a}gatagarbha$ since the latter has been connected with this gotra.

That the pronouns yasya... tasya in Vigrahavyāvartanī 70, as well as in the parallel Mūlamādhyamikakārikā xxiv. 14, refer not to a thing but to a person is shown both by the context and the commentaries.

130 Cf. Marmakaumudī, T. T. fol. 57a8: nam mkha' ci yan med pa la zla ba dan nī ma'i 'od zer gyis mun pa zad par byed pa. (Compare the **Prajnāpāramitāsūtra** on the pratipakṣādhāra, the prajnākaruṇādhāra and the asādhāraṇaguṇādhāra, e.g. in Dutt's edition of the **Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā**, p. 163-164.)

Like the empty sky, then, the *dharmadhātu* is without own being, yet it serves as a 'support' for certain things.

- ¹³¹ This work is quoted in Candrakīrti's **Prasannapadā**; cf. Haribhadra's $AA\bar{A}$ ii, p. 132.
- 132 Cf. Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha, p. 142 sq.
- 133 Marmakaumudī, T. T. fol. 56b-57a (above, p. 294).
- ¹³⁴ Munimatālaṃkāra, T. T. fol. 186b (above, p. 296). See also Dharmamitra, *Prasphuṭapadā* quoted above (pp. 290, 292).
 - 135 Munimatālamkāra, T. T. fol. 188b (above, p. 297)
- ¹³⁶ Munimatālaṃkāra, T. T. fol. 186b1 (above, p. 296).
- 137 The philosophical links mentioned here by Abhayākaragupta between the tathāgatagarbha theory and nairātmya, nihsvabhāvatā and śūnyatā clearly establish that this idea is not simply a Tibetan development characteristic especially of the Dge·lugs·pas (as has seemingly been argued by L. Schmithausen, WZKS 17 [1973], p. 132 sq.; the question whether such an interpretation is 'schlüssig', raised by Schmitthausen [p. 133], is not at issue here, only whether such interpretations were actually maintained by important Indian Buddhist masters). The connexion referred to with the concept of the luminosity of mind is also remarkable (Schmithausen has reservations also on this subject expressed op. cit., p. 140-141); no doubt the luminosity notion of the Agama/Nikayas (see Anguttaranikaya I, p. 10) was not in its origins connected with the śūnyatā theory (cf. also J. W. de Jong, AM 1971, p. 110: 'The cittam acittam of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is not identical with the śūnyatā of the Madhyamaka'), but that the theories did in fact converge in the development of Indian Buddhist thought is shown also by this section of the Munimatālamkāra. Concerned as he evidently was in his article cited above with the 'original' alone, Schmithausen did not take into account the fact that the interpretations offered by the Dge · lugs · pa school are usually based on an Indian source and that, in any case, the developments of the tatha gatagarbha and gotra doctrines in the

Indo-Tibetan exegetical traditions can be of as much interest to historians of Buddhism as 'original' doctrines. Even if it may be felt that these later interpretations are not 'schlüssig', still what must concern the historian of these traditions is not their 'conclusiveness' but their existence and the question of the influence they had in the history of Buddhist thought in India and elsewhere.

138 Some of these problems have also occupied an important place in the history of Buddhism elsewhere in Central Asia (e.g. Khotan) and in China, where the Yogā-cāra-Mādhyamika school is not known to have been an influential school, so that the significance attached to them must be assumed to have other origins too. (The Chinese documents on the subject in particular are now in urgent need of systematic study.)

Some Aspects of the Ekayāna

Arnold Kunst

A simplistic interpretation of the *ekayāna* would be to identify it with the Mahāyāna, as is partly suggested by D. T. Suzuki¹ and to declare that, in the view of Mahāyānists, the only one vehicle leading to perfection is their own vehicle while other vehicles exist in name and for comparison only. This would be in accord with one of the *Saddharmapuṇ-ḍarīka* pronouncements,² 'na kiṃcic, Chāriputra, dvitīyaṃ vā tṛtīyaṃ vā yānaṃ saṃvidyate,' in the context of Buddha's explanations of the validity of this pronouncement.

Since the time, however, that Mahāyāna studies have attracted the attention of a number of prominent scholars,³ we have come to realize that the concept of *ekayāna* is not just a mere synonym for the Bodhisattva-, Buddha- or Mahāyāna but carries with it wide implications touching upon the fundamentals of Buddha doctrines and revealing much that not only throws light upon Buddhist philosophy and soteriology, but goes straight into its historical development and its polity.

The **Saddharmapuṇḍarīka**, indeed, tells us that the three vehicles are taught by the Buddha as the result of the application of $up\bar{a}ya$, when it says: 'there is, however, one vehicle and one method; there is only one [set of] instructions [propounded] by the leaders'.

What has been perhaps somewhat overlooked in the philosophical analyses of the *ekayāna* concept is the fact that the diverse interpretations of the *ekayāna* in the various texts can serve as samples of degrees of tolerance towards and acceptance of the validity of other vehicles by the schools of Mahāyāna. For the proper gauging of these attitudes, we have to establish the definitions of the *ekayāna* formulated by the texts concerned as well as the extent of recognition allotted to the Śrāvakas and other vehicles, notably those of the Pratyekabuddhas as representing potential aspirants to the aims and ideals construed by the Mahāyānist concerned.

In his La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra⁵ Professor Ruegg has analysed the tenets of the ekayāna concept as expounded on pp. 133-135 of the text of the Lankāvatārasūtra (ed. Bunyiu Nanjio). In this

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The Etymology of Pali Gotrabhū

O.H. de A. WIJESEKERA

The doctrinally important word $gotrabh\bar{u}$ (v. 1, $gottabh\bar{u}$) occurs in several contexts in the Canon in a technical sense. In the P.T.S. Dictionary, which cites most of them, it is analysed as $gotra + bh\bar{u}$, and is taken to mean "become of the lineage", as designating "one, whether layman or bhikkhu, who, as converted, was no longer of the worldlings (puthujjana), but of the Āryas, having Nibbāna as his aim." Accordingly, 'gotra' here would refer to the 'lineage' of the Āryas. Such an implication, however, does not appear to be supported by linguistic considerations. It may be pointed out that the grammatical analysis of the term into ' $gotra + bh\bar{u}$ ' is itself questionable. For, syntactically, it can hardly give the sense "become of the lineage", but must mean "becoming lineage", just as 'brahma- $bh\bar{u}ta$ ' signifies "become Brahma." In view of this difficulty an attempt to find a more satisfactory explanation seems warranted.

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A morphological parallel to the above word occurs in the Jātaka (Fausböll edn., V. 153, verse 93), namely, vatrabhū, as epithet of Sakka, Vedic Indra. That this could be the Pali derivative from Vedic vrtrahan was long ago suspected by Fausböll who suggested emending the reading to vatrahū or vatrahū (Ibid, f.n. 3). Here (vatra)-vā may justifiably be traced to the Vedic root han, on the analogy of Vedic san/sā van/sā etc. (Whitney, Roots, s.v.). But the relevance of Fausböll's alternative suggestion of -hū is not prima facie apparent. Yet it is not altogether an implausible assumption, if we consider the vowel lengthening as secondary, the original form being -hu with a short vowel. The problem then is to derive the form *vatra-hu from Vedic vrtra-han. Students of Indo-European philology are familiar with the hypothetical root *gwhen to which Vedic han is traceable with its weak form gwhn which occurs in the Rgveda itself in vrtra-ha (VI. 48.21), where the final -a stands for the I.E. sonant n. It is a well attested phenomenon in Pali (and Prakrit) that a final -a in such terminal syllables

tends to get weakened and result in -u. Geiger has shown how even in the body of a word -a- becomes -u- in Pali (Pali Language and Literatured § 19). We can straightaway compare the similar Pali form bhūṇahu from earlier bhrūṇahan, 'killer of the embryo' as attested to in the Brāhmaṇas (see Monier-William's Dictionary, s.v.). What remains now is to explain the change of -h- to -bh- in *vatrahu. This can be accounted for as a case of 'false restoration', no doubt, prompted by analogy, euphony and other factors of linguistic change as is observed in Middle Indian languages. The analogy of parallel forms like hoti/bhavati and -hi/- bhi (instr. pl. suffix) etc. in Pali makes it quite possible for the -bh- to appear for -h- by way of 'false restoration.' Thus the form vatrabhū is legitimately derivable from Vedic vrtrahan.

In view of the above considerations, it is perfectly feasible to regard gotrabhū as a development from earlier gotrahan, in which case the meaning of the term would be 'killer (i.e. destroyer) of the gotra', just as vattabhū means the 'killer of Vṛṭra', and bhūnahu 'the killer or destroyer of the embryo'. The evidence of the Pali exegetical literature appears to justify such an interpretation. Explaining the term gotrabhū at Puggalapaññatti p. 13, the Commentary says: "... puthujjana-paññattim atikkamitvā ariyasankham ariyagottam ... okkamanato gotrabhū-puggalo nāma vuccati" (J.P.T.S, 1915-14, p. 184). Similarly, in the Visuddhimagga we have the explanation "... paritta-gottābhibhavanato mahaggatagottabhavanato ca gotrabhū ti pi vuccati" (p.138). In both these glosses what is important is the inclusion of the idea of the need to discard or transcend (atikkamitva abhibhavanato) the worldling status before one can aspire to the higher spiritual stages by which final freedom is won. Hence the meaning of gotrabhū can reasonably be established as 'one who discards his worldly (lit. clan) status'. Textual references to gotrabhū as at Anguttara IV. 373 and V. 23 also seem consistent with such an interpretation.

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- that he himself became a disciple of the Compassionate One, entered the Order and became an arahant.
- 12 A IV 172 foll. Kasībhāradvāja-sutta (Sn p. 12) Vasala-sutta (Sn p. 21) relate similar stories.
- 13 M I 108.
- 14 Daṇḍa-pāṇi, lit. meaning 'Stick-in-hand' or 'Staff-in-hand' is evidently a nickname, and not his real name. He was so referred to because he always carried a stick or a staff. The Commentary says it was a golden staff, suvaṇṇa-daṇḍa (Ps II 73). Such nicknames were not uncommon in ancient India, and they indicate a healthy sense of humour among the people. Huhuṃka-jātika, Dīgha-nakha, (both already mentioned above), Kūṭa-danta 'Pointed-tooth' (D I 127), Dīgha-jānu 'Long-knee' (A IV 281), Anguli-māla 'Finger-garland' (M II 97), Tamba-dāṭhika 'Copper-coloured-beard' (Dhp-a II 35; 203) are some examples.
- 15 See G.P. Malalasekera, DPPN, s.v. Dandapani.
- 16 Ps II 73.
- 17 See D I 90.
- 18 Ps II 73 describes vividly how he planted his stick in front like a 'cow-herd' (gopāla-dāraka), put his palm on it pressing his jaw on the back of his palm.
- 19 M I 108-9.
- 20 Sampasādaniya-sutta, No. 28 of the Dīgha-nikāya.
- 21 Kevatta-sutta, No. 11 of the Dīgha-nikāya.
- 22 Yāvajīvam pi ce bālo paņditam payirupāsati, na so dhammam vijānāti dabbī sūparam yathā.
- 23 Muhuttam api ce viññū panditam payirupāsati, khippam dhammam vijānāti jivhā sūparam yathā.
- 24 D III 81-2.
- 25 Sv III 862.
- 26 Harsh, insulting, offensive words are considered 'weapons of the tongue'. Cf. Sn 657: Purisassa hi jātassa, kuţhārī jāyate mukhe 'Indeed an axe is born in the mouth of any person born'.
- 27 Ud 66-9.
- 28 Dhp-a I 39-43. Mātanga-jātaka (No. 497) also relates a similar episode.
- 29 Dhp-a II 138 foll.
- 30 Sp 1336-7.
- 31 Ariya means 'Noble One', but the term is used in opposition to puthujjana 'worldling'. In this sense, the term ariya refers to any person-monk, nun, layman or laywoman-who has realized one of the eight stages of 'holiness'. For details, see s.v. ariya, Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, Colombo, 1972. But in our story, ariya evidently signifies an arahant.
- 32 Ps I 22,1-8.
- 33 Mp II 347.
- 34 This story is orally transmitted.

A FURTHER NOTE ON PALI GOTRABHŪ

In an interesting article entitled 'Gotrabhū: Die sprachliche Vergeschichte eines philosophischen Terminus', published in 1978, O. von Hinüber has contributed to the discussion of the Pali term $gotrabh\bar{u}$, which usually designates a person achieving the spiritual stage of an Ariya or Saint on the path.\(^1\) And comparing for the etymology the word $vatrabh\bar{u}$ 'Vrtrahan' (i.e. Sakra = Indra) appearing in S I 47 and Ja V 153, he has suggested that the element $bh\bar{u}$ corresponds to han and that $gotrabh\bar{u}$ accordingly meant 'das Geschlecht vernichtend' (p. 331).\(^2\) The same interpretation has also been put forth by O.H. de A. Wijesekera in a short article, published in 1979, entitled 'The etymology of Pali Gotrabh\(\bar{u}\)';\(^3\) there the term is translated as 'killer (i.e. destroyer) of the gotra' (p. 382). Both writers compare also $bh\bar{u}nahu = bhr\bar{u}nahan$ 'embryo-killer'.

The explanation proposed by these two scholars is attractive inasmuch as it could indeed account for the use in M III 256 of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ in an unfavourable context.⁴ As noted in my earlier article, this usage—which diverges from that found elsewhere in the canonical and commentarial Pali literature—is isolated; and it raises a difficulty so long as one supposes the element $bh\bar{u}$ to be related to the root $bh\bar{u}$ 'to be'. Their suggestion appears moreover to find support in the explanation given by a Pali exegetical tradition which interprets $bh\bar{u}$ as equivalent to $abhi-bh\bar{u}$ 'to conquer, overcome'.⁵

However, it is not altogether clear how this proposed explanation can account for the overwhelming majority of attestations of the term in the Pali scriptures and commentaries where the term is on the contrary used in a favourable meaning, and where a Pali exegetical tradition interprets $bh\bar{u}$ also as meaning $bh\bar{a}veti$ 'cultivates' (= nibbatteti 'develops'). Following Wijesekera (op. cit., p. 382), it seems that we are to understand here that the spiritual aspirant by destroying the gotra transcends his worldly—and worldling (puthujjana)—status in order to accede to a higher spiritual status. Yet not only is this clearly not the meaning of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ in the M passage referred to above where the context is

unfavourable, but we cannot even be certain that such destruction is precisely what was intended in the case of the other attestations of the term in the canon. As far as I can see, v. Hinüber's treatment of the matter does not clear up this difficulty either; and I know of no reason for supposing, as suggested by him (op. cit., p. 332), that the $gotrabh\bar{u}$ was mistakenly (aus einem Missverständnis) inserted between the puthujjana and the Ariyan stage of the $sot\bar{a}panna$.

Apart from this problem connected with the explanation 'das Geschlecht vernichtend' and 'killer (i.e. destroyer) of the gotra', it is curious to find beside the (apparently MIA) form $bh\bar{u} = han$ not the usual MIA form gotta, but gotra which is phonetically irregular in terms of the Pali standard (though the cluster tra is of course attested in several other Pali words). In vatrabhū vatra no doubt provides a parallel (though it of course contains the MIA change r > a); and it may thus suffice to set aside any phonological difficulty. But the above-mentioned semantic difficulty in interpreting gotrabh \bar{u} as gotrahan seems not yet to have been fully resolved. In any case, for the purpose of etymology in the strict sense, complete reliance cannot be placed on the Pali exegetical tradition's *nirukta*-type explanation which interprets the element $bh\bar{u}$ as meaning abhibhavati, especially in view of the fact that this same tradition has also given the hermeneutical interpretation by bhāveti. (Nor does the proposed etymology explain the word gotrabhū found in Buddhist Sanskrit.8)

Though ingenious and attractive in the case of the M passage, v. Hinüber's and Wijesekera's proposal hardly accounts then for the majority of attestations of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ in the Pali canon and its commentaries. Could it be that we have here in Pali a trace of the other meaning of gotra found in Sanskrit, namely 'matrix, veinstone, gangue', the Saint at the very outset of the Ariyan Path destroying this gangue and thereby freeing himself for progress on his Path? (This meaning of gotra would not, however, easily fit in the M passage. And although well-attested in Buddhist Sanskrit, it does not seem to have been so far recorded for Pali).

LONDON

D. SEYFORT RUEGG

Notes

- 1 ZDMG 128, 1978, pp. 326-32.
- 2 Another equivalence, $gotrabh\bar{u} = gotrabh\bar{r}t$, has been rejected, no doubt correctly, by v. Hinüber, p. 331.
- 3 In: Studies in Pali and Buddhism (Memorial Volume in honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap), ed. A.K. Narain, Delhi, 1979, pp. 381-2.

The article by v. Hinüber refers back to the discussion by the present writer 'Pāli gotta/gotra and the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit' in: Buddhist studies in honour of I.B. Horner, Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 199-210. Wijesekera, who does not seem to know this article, passes over in silence an important part of the Pali tradition alluded to in it.

- 4 See D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Pāli gotta/gotra . . .', p. 200.
- 5 See *ibid.*, pp. 205-6, 208 note 3.
- 6 See *ibid*. This fact has been left unmentioned by Wijesekera, who refers only to the explanation by *abhibhavati*.
- 7 On p. 329 of his article v. Hinüber appears to imply that gotrabhū if interpreted as 'being in the gotra' is hardly understandable as a designation for a monk on the first stage of the path; if this is in fact what he means, I can see no reason for this statement, which its author does not amplify.
- 8 'Pāli gotta/gotra . . .', pp. 206-7. Evidently v. Hinüber is prepared to accept that gotrabhū may be a Sanskritism in Pali, following the suggestion made by the present writer in the article cited above, and also even that the Theravada doctrine underwent influence from the Mahāyāna (ZDMG 128, 1978, pp. 329, 332).
- 9 Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The meanings of the term *gotra* and the textual history of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*', *BSOAS* 39, 1976, pp. 341-63.

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being preached by the Buddha while he was staying at this shrine. The *Divyāvadāna* (p. 201) mentions a Gautamanyagrodha in a list of noted places in Vesāli and Malalasekera (*DPPN*. s.v.) opines that the reference is to the Gotamakacetiya.

W. G. Weeraratne

GOTRA (Pali, gotta). Original significance of the term. There is no English term that exactly connotes the meaning of the term gotra. Writers in English, therefore, use such words as clan, ancestry, lineage and family in rendering it into English. It should be noted at the outset that the institution of gotra is quite different from the institution of caste (q.v.) which is a much wider social group and which invariably consists of a number of gotras.

The term gotra is derived from the word go (=cattle) and the root tra, to 'protect'. Yet, how it acquired the meaning it connotes at present is not quite clear. Most probably it originally meant a group large enough to protect the cattle ownsed by a vis (a settlement) or number of families.1 Cattle were the most treasured property of the Vedic Indians, and therefore, they did their best to protect them from wild animals, thieves and other dangers. Usually the cattle were driven out for grazing in the morning and driven back to their shelters in the evening. Whether there were specially built shelters or enclosures meant solely for the protection of cattle is doubtful. As the number of cattle owned by the people seems to have been quite large it seems reasonable to hold that a sizeable force was required to guard them from rival clans bent on cattle raids (gavisti).

It is believed that the Vedic Indians built their houses with maximum security in view, and that a number of these houses formed a village. The village was an enclosed settlement fenced from outside providing protection against wild animals and enemies. It is probable that the cattle, too, lived within this enclosure from which they were driven out in the morning for grazing. In the evening they were driven back,² and once they entered the enclosure the entrance to it was closed. During the nights this fenced settlement provided protection for both, the people and the cattle. Though most of the minor items of property may have been divided among individual families cattle were owned by them jointly. This joint right over the cattle was a binding force within the settlement. Subsequently, the community that lived as a cohesive

unit to protect their jointly owned cattle too, came to be denoted by the term gotra. The term is used in this developed meaning in the Chandogya Upanisad (iv, 4, 1). Later this term was used to denote a group of persons descended in the male line of a common ancestor who was often regarded as a holy sage (rsi).

There are eight sages who are regarded as originators of gotras (gotrakārin). They are, Gautama, Bharadvāja, Viśvāmitra, Vaśistha, Jamadagni, Kāśyapa, Atri and Agastya. The eight gotras originating from these sages are sub-divided, generally, into forty-nine. But this number is not fixed. The numbers vary according to divergent traditions. Some think that there are twenty-four or thirty-two gotras (Śabdakalpadruma, s.v. gotra) whereas some others favour the number eighteen (Chentsal Rao, The Principles of Pravara and Gotra, pt. III). However, it is clear that the main eight gotras were later sub-divided into quite a large number of gotras.

Every brahman was proud of his gotra and was obliged by law to know to which particular gotra his family belonged. When consecrating the sacrificial fire (agnihavyavāhana), which is also addressed as ārseya (descendent of the rsi.) a brahman had to invoke his ancestors and show that he being a descendant of worthy ancestors was fit to perform sacred rites. This invocation was called pravara. Each of the gotras had either one, two, three or five sages as its ancestors. As a general rule, persons were called sagotras (of the same gotra) if they had in common even one of the rsis invoked in the pravara. intermarriage between sagotras was prohibited. But it is not quite certain whether this rule existed in the early Vedic period. However, in comparatively early times it was felt necessary to grant exemptions.

Even during the time of the Buddha the term gotra had the same meaning as it was understood by the later compliers of *Dharmasāstras*. The institution of gotra, too, existed though it may not have been as developed as it was in later times. A number of gotras (Pali gotta) such as Opamañña, Kanhāyana, Kassapa, Gotama, Vāsettha, Vessāyana, Bhāradvāja, Kaccāyana, and others, are mentioned in Buddhist texts.³ A large section of the Buddha's disciples, too, came from distinguished gottas. Buddhist texts speak of superior and inferior gottas. They place Vāsettha, Gotama, Moggallāna and Kaccāyana in the former category, and Bhāradvāja along with Kosiya in the latter (see Vin. IV, 6; DA. I, p. 246; but cp. DA. III, p. 860).

The stage of development which the institution of gotta had reached by the time of the Buddha is not quite clear

^{1.} Rgveda viii, 50, 10

^{2.} Rgveda iv, 54, 7, 10

^{3.} See DPPN. I and II under each name. See also D. I, p. 104

from the references found in Buddhist texts. Therefore it is not possible to say for certainty, whether such rules as those which prohibited intermarriage between sagotras were in force at the time. It is not known whether the Sakya clan, which is one of the major clans referred to in Buddhist texts to which also the Buddha belonged, was sub-divided into a number of gottas. Thomas seems to suggest that the whole clan belonged to the Gotama gotta whose members claim to be the descendants of the rsi Gotama.4 This view finds support in the fact that the Buddha, at least on one occasion, is said to have addressed the Sakyans as Gotamas (S. IV. p. 183). If all the Sakyans were of Gotama gotta it is quite evident that the rule which prohibited intermarriage between two persons of the same gotta was either non-existent at the time or if it existed, it was not strictly observed. Besides, king Suddhodana married two Sakyan princesses Maya and Maha-Prajapati Gotami⁵ and prince Siddhattha himself married the daughter of his maternal uncle.6

It is evident from Buddhist texts that even during the Buddha's day people took pride in their gotta. Very often brahmans approached the Buddha and inquired about his gotta. It was customary to address persons by their gotta names and this seems to have been considered as a very respectful way of addressing people of high rank. The Buddha too, followed this custom (M. I, p. 175, pp. 228-50, 497-500; M. II, p. 40; see also Dial. vol. II, pt. I, pp. 194f.). Even the Buddha himself was addressed by his gotta name Gotama.

Though the Buddha followed the custom of addressing people by their gotta names, it is quite clear from the canonical texts that he did not attach any value to the institution of gotta as the brahmans of his time did. Just as he denounced caste distinctions, he denounced gotta distinctions, too. The attitude he adopted with regard to problems connected with caste, gotta and such other social groupings is made clear in the Ambattha Sutta. There he says that it is where the talk is of marrying or giving in marriage, that reference is made to such things as caste (vanna) and gotta. In the supreme perfection of wisdom and in righteousness (anuttaraya vijja-carana sampadaya) there is no reference to the question either of caste or gotta for, whosoever are in bondage to the notion of caste and birth or to the pride of social position or of connection by marriage, they are far from the best wisdom and righteousness. It is by getting rid of all such kinds of bondage that one can realise for oneself that supreme perfection in wisdom and in conduct (D. I, p. 99f.). In the Suttanipata (v. 104) pride of gotta (gottatthaddha) is given as a cause for one's downfall. The Buddha's view was that the problem of gotta was a problem only to the worldings. This does not affect those who are above worldly affairs. When questioned regarding gotta the Buddha replied that he is neither a brahman nor a prince, not even a merchant (vessayāna) or anybody else. But, he said, knowing well the gottas of the worldlings (puthuijana) he wanders the world with no stains (akiñcano: see Sn. v. 455 cf. v. 645). The Buddha's attitude towards the problem of gotta is plainly stated in the Suttanipāta (v. 648) where it is said that the gottas are mere designations (sāmañña) passed by general consent. (see also CASTE).

Special Buddhist usage of the term: The term gotra which denotes a group of persons descended from a common ancestor, was later adopted by the Theravadins as a religious term with a technical meaning. Though the term by itself is not found in Pali texts it occurs in the conjoined term gotra-bhu, (q.v.) which denotes the stage between the ordinary unconverted worldling (puthujjana) and the stream-entrant (sotapanna). The gotra-bhu is described as one, whether layman or bhikkhu, who, as converted, no longer belonged to the worldling but was among the ariyas, having Nibbana as his aim (s.v. PED.). Why this particular Sanskrit term was adopted to designate this category of spiritually advanced persons is not quite clear. On this point Har Dayal's suggestion is quite noteworthy. He is of opinion that, as all Buddhists were considered as belonging to the family or clan of Gautama Buddha, as they were his spiritual sons and heirs, the Theravadins adopted this term to endow all converts, irrespective of caste differences, with a common gotra. Thus, all those who passed the stage of puthujjana by being converted to Buddhism were considered as belonging to the lineage of the Buddha, for, once they became converted they develop a spiritual relationship with the Buddha. This is specially evident in the case of bhikkhus who are often addressed as Buddha-putta (sons of the Buddha) or Sakya-putta (sons of the Sakya).

To become one in the lineage of the Buddha one had to undergo a course of spiritual training and acquire certain virtues. This induced them to develop a predisposition, an aptitude or an inclination for further spiritual advancement. Subsequently the term *gotra* was used to denote this idea of pre-disposition, aptitude or inclination.

Among the converts there were persons of different inclinations. The Mahāyānists categorised them broadly into three groups namely niyata-gotra, aniyata-gotra and agotra.

^{4.} E. J. Thomas: The Life of Buddha as Legend and History, p. 22

^{5.} Her name too suggests that she belonged to the Gotama gotta.

^{6.} Later, even when the institution of gotra was much developed and the rule prohibiting marriage between sagotras was observed more rigidly, the Baudhayana-dharma-sūtra (ed. E. Hultzsch, p. 2) allows a man to marry the daughter of the maternal uncle or paternal aunt.

The niyata-gotras or those who are of fixed inclination are those who by virtue of their previous merits and innate dispositions are destined to belong to either the śrāvakayāna-abhisamaya-gotra or pratyekabuddhayāna-abhisamaya-gotra or tathāgatayāna-abhisamaya-gotra. The aniyata-gotras or those of undetermined inclination are those who are still on the borderline and may become either Hinayānists or Mahāyānists. The agotras or those without an inclination are sub-divided into two groups viz. those who are unable to attain nirvāna at all (atyantam) and those who for the time being (tatkāla) will not attain nirvāna.

It is further said that among the niyata-gotras it is the qualities (dhātu) that settle one's aspiration (adhimukti) and it is the aspiration that determines the attainments (prāpti). The frution becomes high, medium or low according to one's bija (seeds). It is said that the śrāvakas, as they lack the five powers (bala) and five confidences in oneself (vaiśāradya) do not possess powerful merit, and therefore, they are inferior to bodhisattvas. Their merits are not everlasting as they seek anupadhi-śesa-nirvāna (nirvāna without any residue). Neither are their merits capable of producing extremely good results, for, they do not dedicate themselves to the service of others.

The Lankavatara Sūtra (p. 63f.) also speaks of five gotras which it collectively refers to as paficābhisamayagotra. The five gotras referred to here are the same as those mentioned in the Sūtrālankāra. Here, instead of using the term niyata-gotra, the three gotras included in it are treated separately.

The persons who fall into the śravakayana-abhisamaya-gotra are described as those who are enraptured by knowing and realising the teaching of the general and individual qualities of the generic properties of the body (skandha-dhatu-ayatana-svasamanya-laksana); their intellect (buddhi) will leap forth with joy in knowing that things are of mere appearance (laksana-paricaya-jfiana), and not on acquiring an insight into the things pertaining to the casual law (pratityasamutpada-avinirbhaga laksana-paricaya). They having had an insight into their own śravakayana and abiding in the fifth or the sixth stage become free from all forthcoming afflictions (pratyutthana-kleśa). Having reached an inconceivable mode of passing away (acintyacyutigata) they proclaim that they have led holy lives and that they have destroyed birth. Through the realization of the essencelessness of being (pudgalanairatmya) they finally gain the knowledge of nirvana. There are others who believe in such things as ego (atma), being (sattva) vital principle (jiva), nourishment (posa), supreme being (purusa) and personal soul (pudgala-sattva) and seek nirvana in them. There are still others who believe that all things are dependent upon causes (karanadhinan sarva-dharman) and seek the way to nirvana in this belief. Yet, the Lankavatara Sutra adds,

as they lack insight into the essencelessness of all things (dharma-nairātmya) they do not really attain emancipation. It is here that those who are inclined to follow the śrāvakayāna make the mistake of regarding non-deliverance as deliverance.

Those who belong to the pratyekabuddhayāna-abhi-samaya-gotra are enraptured by hearing the accounts regarding the enlightenment of particular individuals (pratyekābhisamaya). They are also enraptured by miracles and by discourses which teach them to keep themselves aloof.

The Tathāgatayāna-abhisamaya-gotra is threefold. Firstly it includes those who are inclined to realise that the true nature of things is their essencelessness (sva-bhāvanihsvabhāva-dharma-abhisamaya-gotra). Secondly, those who are inclined to understand that the realisation of the truth is possible only whithin one's own-self (adhigama-svapratyātma-ārya-abhisamaya-gotra). Thirdly, those who are inclined to realise the greatness of all the external Buddha-fields (bāhya-buddhaksetraudārya-abhisamaya-gotra).

If a person shows no signs of fear when any of the three above mentioned aspects are disclosed or when the inconceivable realm of the alaya-vijfiana, where body, property and abode are seen to be the manifestation of the mind itself (svacitta-drsya-dehalayabhogapratisthacintyavisaya), is disclosed such a person should be regarded as belonging to the tathagatayana-abhisamayagotra.

Those who belong to the aniyata-gotra may take to any one of the above mentioned three gotras namely $sravaka-^{\circ}$, $pratyekabuddha-^{\circ}$ or $tathagata-^{\circ}$. It is merely a preparatory stage (parikarma-bhūmi). A sravaka when his $\bar{a}laya-vij\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ is purged of all klesas and $v\bar{a}san\bar{a}s$ will attain the bliss of meditation by seeing the essencelessness of all things and will finally attain the state of a Buddha.

The Lankavatara does not describe those persons who fall into the category of agotra.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. ERE. VI, pp. 353 ff.; J. H. Hutton, Caste in India; Max Müller History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature pp. 380 ff. See also the Ambattha Sutta (D. I, 87 ff.) and the Aggafffa Sutta (D. III, 80 ff.).

S. K. Nanayakkara

GOTRA-BHU, 'become of the lineage,' a pre-sotapanna stage in the scheme of the spiritual progress of the Theravadins. As a technical term this was used from the

end of the Nikāya period to designate one, whether a layman or a bhikkhu, who, as converted, was no longer of the worldlings (puthuijana) but among the noble ones (ariya). The term occurs also in the Dakkhināvibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (III, p. 256) and in two other suttas of the Anguttara-nikāya (IV, p. 373; V, p. 23; see PED, s.v.).

A worldling (puthujjana), by cultivating noble qualities, becomes a gotra-bhū and thus qualifies to rise still higher in the scheme of spiritual progress that leads to Nibbāna (Pug. pp. 12f.). The Anguttara-nikaya (IV, p. 373) includes the gotra-bhū among the nine persons worthy of salutation and who are an unsurpassed field of merit. The commentary, too, describes the gotra-bhū as one endowed with exceedingly perfect insight and thought, with immediate prospects of attaining the stage of stream-winner and the way (AA. IV, p. 107; but cp. A. IV, p. 292 and Pug. p. 14 which do not consider the gotra-bhū as belonging to the ariya).

The Patisambhidamagga (I, pp. 66 ff.) considers it not only as a pre-sotapanna stage but also as indicating a class of beings who are on the way to arahantship and who may be in possession of one of the paths (magga) and fruits (phala). The Visuddhimagga (Vism. p. 672) describes it as a stage to be reached after maturing in the stage called 'purity by knowledge and vision of the path' (patipada-fianadassana-visuddhi). It further says that the gotra-bhū is only able to have Nibbana as the object but he is unable to dispel the darkness that conceals the truth. This darkness is to be dispelled by the three kinds of adaptation-consciousness (anuloma-citta). In the Compendium of Philosophy (pp. 66 ff.) this stage is described as implying an evolution which transcends the conditioned and has for its objects Nibbana. This stage is follwed by a single moment of path-consciousness by which the first of the Four Noble Truths is discerned, error and doubt got rid of, Nibbana intuited and the constituents of the Noble Eightfold Path are cultivated. See also GOTRA.

S. K. Nanayakkara

GOTRA BHUMI a stage in the spiritual lineage, the second of the seven (sometimes 8 or 10) stages of spiritual development of a Buddha's disciple (śrāvakabhūmi: Mahāvyutpatti, BB. XIII, p. 18). The other six, as given in the Mahāvyutpatti, are śuklavidarśanā, astamaka, darśana, tanu, vitarāga and krtāvin. As they refer to the spiritual progress of a disciple (śrāvaka) and not of a bodhisattva, they are the bhūmis according to Hīnayāna, although they are not mentioned in the Pali texts. The list (of 7) occurs at Śsp. pp. 1562-3 where in a negative

description of Mahāyāna, which is compared to the open space (ākāśa), it is said that just as these bhūmis are not found in the ākāśa, so are they not found in Mahāyāna either.

If a comparison is made between these stages of the śrāvaka's path in Hinayāna with the other stages of srotāpatti, sakrdāgāmi, anāgāmi, and arhatva, the gotra-bhūmi being the stage next to the first śuklavidarśanā-bhūmi, also belongs to the pre-srotapātti stage, when the disciple is about to enter the path of sainthood. (Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to the Hīnayāna, N. Dutt, p. 241). According to E. Obermiller (The Doctrine of Prajfīapāramitā, p. 49) the gotra-bhūmi is so called because the disciple abiding in this stage knows that he belongs to the spiritual lineage (gotra) of the śrāvaka.

However, it is of interest that at Ssp. pp. 1472-3 and 1520 these seven bhumis, with the addition of pratyekabuddha-bhumi, bodhi sattva-bhumi and buddha-bhumi, are given as the ten bhumis of a bodhisattva, whereas the usual list of bodhisattvabhumis is quite different from this one. This grouping may be due to the fact that all the four Hinayanic stages of development (i.e. srotapattietc.) are regarded (by the Mahayanists) as covering only some of the Mahayanic stages, whereas the Mahayanists, aspiring for Buddhahood, go much further for their emancipation than the last stage (arhatva) of the Hinayanists. On this basis it is not strange that the seven Hinayanic stages are expanded into ten by the addition of the three other bhumis and are called bodhisattvabhumi in the Satasahasrikaprajfiaparamita (loc. cit.). See also GOTRA-BHU.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

GOTRA-VIHARA, pre-bhumi stage almost parallel to the gotra-bhū (q.v.) stage of the Theravada scheme of spiritual progress. The Bbh. (see ch. entitled Viharapatala) divides the pre-bhumi stage called Prakrticarya into two stages namely gotra-vihara and adhimukticarya vihāra. It is said that a gotrastha, i.e., one who is established in the noble lineage, is endowed with noble qualities and high aims which are characteristic features of a bodhisattva. As the gotra-vihara is merely a preparatory stage it only indicates the attempts made by an aspirant to develop the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta q.v.). A person who has reached this stage commences to do good deeds of his own accord and he does so wisely and with a feeling of charity. This stage forms the foundation of the other stages (vihāra), for, it enables an aspirant to quality for further spiritual progress.

S. K. Nanayakkara

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ON $GOTRABH\bar{U}$

By Jikido Takasaki, Tokyo

The following is a summary of my works published in Japanese 25 years ago. I am going to publish it here in the thought that it is still worthy to be published even after publications of two remarkable papers of SEYFORT RUEGG and of VON HINUBER¹, both of whom did not refer to my papers. My papers in Japanese are as follows:

1. Gotrabhū to Gotrabhūmi (Gotrabhū and Gobtrabhūmi), Felicitation Volume dedicated to Prof. E. Kanakura on the occasion of his 70th Birthday, Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1966, pp. 313–336.

2. Gotrabhūmi Oboegaki (A Note on Gotrabhūmi), Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu Kenkyukiyo (Memoirs of Faculty of Buddhism, Komazawa University), No. 25, 1967, pp. 1–27.

My papers contain informations on materials given in the works of the so-called Northern tradition written in Sanskrit and Chinese translations equivalent to them, which have mostly escaped the attention of both professors.

In my old papers I started the work with the question – as did other scholars who were interested in this term – where this Pāli word of a unique form originated from. As this term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ used in the Canonical texts is explained in the Pāli commentaries with analogy of family using another form gotta, equivalent to Skt. gotra, such as ariyagotta and putthujanagotta, it seemed clear to me that this term was borrowed from outside. Limited use of this term to certain portions of Canonical texts which are thought to be of later dates will support my assumption. In this point I stand for SEYFORT RUEGG who maintained the term as a sample of Sankritism in Pāli. In the following I will pick up mostly Chinese materials referring to this term.

¹ D. SEYFORT RUEGG, Pali gotta | gotra and the term gotrabhū in Pali in Sanskrit, Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner. Dordrecht 1974, pp. 199–210. OSCAR VON HINÜBER, Gotrabhū: Die sprachliche Vorgeschichte eines philosophischen Terminus. ZDMG 128 (1978), pp. 326–332. The same subject was discussed by Prof. WLIESEKARA, O. H. DE A. WIJESEKARA, The Etymology of Pali gotrabhū, Studies in Pali and Buddhism, ed. by A. K. NARAIN, 34 (1979), pp. 38ff.

Some of them show equivalence to Pāli passages, others are available only in Chinese texts. In addition I will refer to similar concepts in Sanskrit materials.

(1) Mention must be made first of all of the Chih t'o tao lun, the chinese translation of the Vimuttimagga (or Vimuktimarga) which is regarded as a kind of source material for Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga² and is clearly transmitted from Sri Lanka to China. There are two passages in this text referring to gotrabhūñāna, of which parallel passages are found in the Visuddhimagga. Quite interesting is the Chinese translation of gotrabhū into sing ch'u in this text, which literally means "nature removal" (nature for gotra and removal for $bh\bar{u}$). This reminds us of VON HINUBER's theory of *gotrahan.3 Indeed this term is explained in the following way4: "To remove the dhammas of ordinary people is called 'nature removal'; what is not to be removed by dhammas of ordinary people is also called 'nature removal', (in this latter case) nature means nibbana." Further it goes on to say: "Those who bear the seed of nibbana are called [of the] 'nature removal', as is said in the Abhidhamma: 'to remove origination is called 'nature removal', to enter non-origination is called 'nature removal' (uppādam abhibhuyyantīti gotrabhū, anuppādam pakhandatīti gotrabhū)', and so on." This quotation of the Abhidhamma comes from the Patisambhidamagga (I,66). So we came to know that this translator kept importance on the process of removal of the nature of ordinary beings than on becoming a member of the saints. The word $-bh\bar{u}$ is here understood in the sense of abhibhuyyati, 'to be conquered'.

A similar interpretation is given in another passage⁵ where again an Abhidharma passage is quoted. Namely: "As is said in the Abhidhamma: 'to remove origination in order to attain the way to enter the stream is called 'nature removal', to remove origination in order to attain the result of entering the stream is called 'nature removal'. Thus in all cases.'" This passage is identified with the Paṭisambhidāmagga (I,68) which is quoted in the Visuddhimagga⁶: sotāpattimaggapaṭila-

bhattāya uppādam abhibhuyyatīti gotrabh \bar{u} , sotāpattiphalasamāpattattāya uppādam abhibhuyyatīti gotrabh \bar{u} . evam sabbattha.

- (2) Next example of the use of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ in the Chinese equivalent is observed in the Ekottarāgama⁷ which is regarded as belonging to the Mahāsaṅghika or the Dharmaguptaka, the latter being more likely. The term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ is translated into $hsiang\ chung\ sing\ jen$, "one who is (moving) towards the lineage", who is listed just below the one on the 8th stage of the Saint, usually called ' $srota\bar{a}pattim\bar{a}rga$ ', also called 'astamaka' (the eighth) otherwise. This latter name is often referred to along with $gotrabh\bar{u}$, an example being observed in the Kathāvatthu (243–247) where a debate is held between the Theravāda and the Andhakas or the Sammitīyas. So we come to know that the ranking $gotrabh\bar{u}$ as a stage just below astamaka was widely adopted among various sects in the continent.
- (3) In this connection notable is the use of the term in the Shah li fu a p'i t'an lun (Śāriputrābhidharmaprakaraṇa), which is held to belong to the Dharmaguptaka. This text has a passage where, like the Puggalapaññatti, various kinds of persons are arranged according to their rank, among which we find sing jen, "man of gotra". This sing jen is ranked above ordinary beings and those non-ordinary beings who have obtained the five holy faculties, but below Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas and the Samyaksambuddha, and it is explained that if one dwells gradually on the superior dharmas of ordinary beings and when (finally) these dharmas disappeared, he ascends to (the state of) fixation in right way (samyaktvaniyāma|-nyāma), then he is called 'a man of gotra'. It is also explained that if one accomplishes the gotra dharma (sing fa), he is called a man of gotra. This sing jen is most probably a translation of the term gotrabhū⁹.
- (4) Next example in the work belonging probably to the same Dharmaguptaka is that in the P'i ni mu ching (Vinayamātṛkā), where

² On the relation of both texts, see P. V. BAPAT, Vimuttimagga and Visud-dhimagga, a Comparative Study, Poona 1937. A summary of this work was previously published in Indian Culture 1935, pp. 455–59.

³ WIJESEKARA has the same opinion.

⁴ Vimuttimagga, Taisho vol. 32, p. 457a. Cf. BAPAT op. cit. p. 119. Cf. Visuddhimagga p. 672-3 (no definition of gotra as nibbāna).

⁵ Taisho ibid., p. 460c; cf. BAPAT op. cit., p. 125.

⁶ Visuddhimagga, p. 699-700.

 $^{^7}$ Taisho vol. 2, p. 767b–c. This is equivalent to Pāli, AN IX–10 Ahuneyya (vol. 4, p. 373).

⁸ Taisho vol. 28, p. 548c.

⁹ In most cases in Chinese translations, $-bh\bar{u}$ of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ is not translated. So if we apply the same tendency to the case of $sing\ fa$ above, $gotrabh\bar{u}dharma$ is another possible form of rendering. See below.

7 ranks of persons are enumerated by name of stages (bhūmi), gotrabhūmi being one of them. It runs as follows 10: "Because of accomplishment of chung sing ti (gotrabhūmi) it is called ordination $(upasampad\bar{a}).$ The eighth stage $(astamakabh\bar{u}mi)$ of the 4 processes and 4 results (of ariyas, ending with Arhatship), the stage of perceiving (darśanabhūmi), the stage of weakening (of defilements [tanubhūmi]), the stage of removal of desire (vītarāgabhūmi), the stage of those who have done (what is to be done [krtāvibhūmi]), and as far as Pratyekabuddha, all of them are called [of] ordination." And specially commenting on gotrabhūmi, it says 11: "Why is it called gotrabhūmi? If one would be sitting Buddha's vicinity and having listened his teaching, would strive for with body and mind, and would accomplish moment by moment his practice, then he would, due to this mind, suddenly realize the dharma by himself and would attain the state of srotaāpatti (phala). This srotaāpatti is the gotra (i.e. cause or seed) of [transworldly] virtues. (This commentary sounds contradictory to the main text where gotrabhūmi is clearly located before aṣṭamaka which is to be equivalent to srotaāpattimārga)."

What is notable here is the use of the term $gotrabh\bar{u}mi$ instead of $gotrabh\bar{u}$. Also notable is that the same series of stage names are used in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras¹². Sanskrit terms for these stages are actually collected from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra. This would suggest that the Mahāyānists who composed the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra would have had in their origin certain contact with the Dharmaguptakas, from whom they borrowed the stage system as parts of their ten stage theory covering three vehicles. I will refer to this again at the end of this paper.

As for the interrelation between $gotrabh\bar{u}/gotrabh\bar{u}mi$, I will here only indicate that due to equivocality of $-bh\bar{u}$, as a verbal noun in the sense of being, or being born, on the one hand, and as a noun in the sense of earth, being a synonym of $bh\bar{u}mi$, on the other, it is easily replaced by $bh\bar{u}mi$ when $gotrabh\bar{u}$ is interpreted to denote a certain stage or rank of practitioners. This possibly is supported by examples of Tibetan translation of $gotrabh\bar{u}$ into $rigs\ kyi\ sa$ as observed in the Lańkāvatāra v.X.15.

(5) Another example which seems to show the stage relation between $gotrabh\bar{u}$ and astamaka is observed in the Samayabhedopacaraṇacakra,

a book on the division of sectarian Buddhism seen from the eye of the Sarvāstivādin. Namely referring to the doctrines common to all subsects of the Mahāsaṅghika, there is a passage saying ¹³:

brgyad pa (= astamaka) yung ring(s) du gnas par yang byed do shes bya ba nas, rigs kyi chos (= gotra[bhū]dharma) kyi bar las kyang, yongs su nyams par 'gyur ro | shes brjod par bya'o | rgyun du zhugs pa (= srotaāpanna) ni yongs su mi (?) nyams pa'i chos can no | dgra bcom pa (= arhat) ni yongs su mi nyams pa'i chos can no |

Chinese equivalents in Hsuang tsuang's translation 14 of brgyad pa and rigs kyi chos are ti pa ti and sing ti fa, respectively, and suggest the existence of the term $bh\bar{u}mi$ (ti) in the original, but two other Chinese translations literally agree with the Tibetan translation 15 . So it might be an insertion by Hsuang tsuang, but I cannot deny the possibility of the form $gotrabh\bar{u}dharma$ in the original 16 .

Sarvāstivādins, the reporter of the Samayabhedopacaraṇacakra, however, do not use the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ or $gotrabh\bar{u}mi$ as a name of the stage just below $srota\bar{a}pattim\bar{a}rga$. Instead they use the term $laukik\bar{a}gradharma$. This name is explained that it is called so because in this stage there appears the last moment of the mind of ordinary being and that this state of mind has the power to reject the nature of ordinary being (prthagjanagotra) and to obtain the nature of the saints $(\bar{a}ryagotra)^{17}$. It is also said that in the $laukik\bar{a}gradharma$, the $j\bar{n}ana$ called $duhkhadharmaks\bar{a}nti$ is ready to appear, and this point is explained to obtain the $\bar{a}ryagotra$, just like a burnt clothe (the analogy means that even if just a slight part is burnt, it is called so; in the same way a practitioner who partially burnt his fire of klesa by his $j\bar{n}ana$ is worth being called $\bar{a}rya$). ¹⁸

Thus, to denote the state of practitioners situated on the bondary between ordinary being and the saints, Sarvāstivādins use the term expressing their being at the top of the worldly beings in contrast to the Theravāda, the Dharmaguptaka, and the Mahāsaṅghikas who express the same state from the transworldly side.

¹⁰ Taisho vol. 24, p. 801b.

¹¹ Ibid. Possibly an insertion by the translator.

¹² See chart attached below.

¹³ The gShung lugs kyi bye brag bkod pa'i khor lo, Peking Ed. no. 5639, Reprint, vol. 127, p. 250.3.4.

¹⁴ Taisho vol. 49, p. 15c.

¹⁶ Taisho ibid., p. 18b (chung sing fa) and 20c (sing fa), resp. (both translated by Paramartha).

 $^{^{16}}$ An example of the use of the form $gotrabh\bar{u}dharma$ is observed in the Prajňāpāramitā. See the table attached below.

¹⁷ The Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra, Taisho vol. 27, p. 6b. shêng cheh chung sing for āryagotra.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 12b. shêng sing is probably for āryagotra.

(6) There may arise then a new question which term was used earlier, gotrabhū or laukikāgradharma. In my impression laukikāgradharma is a term newly invented by Sarvāstivādins who established a detailed stage theory of practitioners ranked below āryas, i.e. the 4 stages of Nirvedabhāgīya beginning with uṣmagata and ending with laukikāgradharma, and this invention appeared after the use of the term gotrabhū had already prevailed among various sects. 19

A positive proof of their earlier use of the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ is found in a passage of the Chinese translation of the Madhyamāgama²⁰ which is regarded as a work of Sarvāstivādins (not the orthodox group, but a certain branch), the passage being equivalent to Pāli Dakkhināvibhāngasutta of the Majjhimanikāya (no. 142). It runs as follows: "In a future there will be those mendicants who, though being members of the family (ming sing chung, [lit. nāmagotrajāti, but probably for gotrabhū]) are lazy and wearing kaṣāya robes, do not strive for at all. Even to such lazy members, you should donate offerings because of their laziness. Then, because of [donation] for the sake of community, to the community, respecting the community, and based on the community, the donor would, I dare to say, receive immeasurable, innumerable, and uncountable bliss, would receive good fortune and happiness." This passage is in an attached portion to the description of the seven kinds of Sangha worthy to receive donation and refers to the merit of such donation for the Sangha. 21 So ming sing chung or gotrabhū here may mean a member of the community, regardless of his being arya or not. And out of the two kinds of use of the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$, this seems to be original. 22

Now, how shall we understand this fact that $gotrabh\bar{u}$ is used in both powerful sects, Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda? In a way it is possible to regard that the introduction of the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ has taken place before the scism of the community. Circumstances for the introduction would be the Buddhist penetration into Hindu society around Aśoka's reign, on the one hand, and arising of Hindu reaction on the other, both factors having caused Buddhists to feel themselves united not by name of Sakiya clan as did before but by name of Bauddha or analogically a family whose ancestor is the Tathāgata, or having Tathāgata as their gotra. As for the development of this concept, however, neither Sarvāstivāda nor Theravāda could claim their contribution. Most probably it was the Dharmaguptaka who developed the concept to the name of a stage rinked with the astamaka and other 4 stages ending with krtāvin, and transmitted this system to the Mahāyānist who composed the Prajñāpāramitā.

(7) Lastly I will mention the use of the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$ in the Prajñāpāramitās. ²³ For the reference I will present here a table of the tenfold stage theory in the Prajñāpāramitās. ²⁴ From this table we can get a coherent use of terms denoting a set of person, qualities, and the stage qualified. In case of $gotrabh\bar{u}$, it denotes a person who stands below astamaka, and who is endowed with qualities called $gotrabh\bar{u}dharma$. and whose stage is called $gotrabh\bar{u}mi$. ²⁵

of the family dharma (kuladharma, but also possibly gotradharma) for the first kind, and of the laukikāgradharma (i.e. prthagjanagotradharma) in the second kind. The Sarvāstivādins retained the first kind of gotrabhū in the Madhyamāgama, but replaced the second kind use by laukikāgradharma probably because there was no such use in their authorized scriptures.

¹⁹ The Mahāvibhāṣā mentions as an opinion of someone that this is called *chung sing ti fa (gotrabhūdharma*), and should not be called *laukikāgradharma*. (ibid., p. 6a)

Madhyamāgama, no. 180. Ch'u t'an mi ching, Taisho vol. 1, p. 722b.

At a glance, the Madhyamāgama counts this type of donation, i.e. the donation to the Sangha through $gotrabh\bar{u}s$, in between 5th and 7th, but in their contents the passage mostly agrees with the Pāli equivalent, and the Chinese counting seems to be an error by the translator.

worth being considered: "And next, to recommend to become a mendicant means to recommend people to enter the saintly dharma (āryadharma). Therefore the scripture says: there are two kinds of entrance to the saintly dharma. One is worldly (samvrti), the other is of ultimate sense (paramārtha). The former means to abandon the family dharma to enter a state of no home, shaving hairs and wearing the yellow robes, and to accept the pure moral codes with pious mind of faith. The entrance in the ultimate sense is to ascend from the laukikāgradharma to enter the knowledge called duḥkhadharmakṣānti". The parallelism with the two kinds of gotrabhū is visible especially in abandonment of the family

²³ Śatasāhasrikā (ed. by P. GHOSA), p. 1263. But in the equivalent passage, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā uses gotrabhūmi (and aṣṭamakabhūmi).

²⁴ The chart is copied from my old paper no. 2.

²⁵ In this paper I didn't discuss the etymology of the term $gotrabh\bar{u}$. In a question given after presentation of my paper, Prof. A. WAYMAN expressed his opinion that $bh\bar{u}$ in $gotrabh\bar{u}$ meant originally the earth, i.e. a stage $(bh\bar{u}=bh\bar{u}mi,f.)$. I think it unlikely because such meaning is not applicable to the first kind use. But to regard $-bh\bar{u}$ in the compound as a verbal noun is also

A pudgala		B dharma		$\mathrm{C}\ bhar{u}mi$
1. gotrabhū (gotrabhūmi)		$1.\ gotrabhar{u}dharma$		śuşkavipaśyanābh. (śuklavipaśyanābh., śuklavidarśanābh.) gotrabhūmi
2. astamaka		2. astamakadh.		3. astamakabh.
3. srotaāpanna		3. srotaāpannadh.		4. darśanabh.
4. sakṛdāgāmin	(1)	(srotaāpannaphala) 4. sakṛdāgāmidh.	(1)	5. tanubh.
(sakṛdāgāma) 5. anāgāmin	(2)	(sakṛdāgāmiph.) 5. anāgāmidh.	(2)	$6.\ var{\imath} tarar{a}gabh.$
(anāgāma) 6. arhat	(3) (4)	(anāgāmiph.) 6. arhaddharma (arhattva)	(4)	7. kṛtāvibh. 7a.śrāvakabh. (1–7)
7. pratyekabuddha	` '	7. pratyekabuddhadh. (pratyekabodhi) (pratyekabuddhatva	(5)	8. pratyekabuddhabh.
8. bodhisattva	(6)	8. bodhisattvadh. (bodhisattvatva) (mārgākārajñatā)	(6)	$9.\ bodh is attvabh.$
9. buddha (tathāgato'rhan samyaksambudd	, ,	9. buddhadharma (buddhatva) (sarvākārajñatā)	(7)	 buddhabhūmi (samyaksambuddhabh.
I 1-8 III (1)-(7) IV 1-9 XI 1-9		III(1)-(7) Vb(1)-(5), (7) IV1-9		II, III 1-10 Va 1-7, Vc 7a-10 VI 2-7** VII, X 1-10 VIII 1-8 IX 1-8, B8*, B9*

B8* = $m\bar{a}rg\bar{a}k\bar{a}raj\tilde{n}at\bar{a}$; B9* = $sarv\bar{a}k\bar{a}raj\tilde{n}at\bar{a}$; ** ŚsP B1-2, C4-7; prthagjanabh. for C1. in Hsuang tsuang's translation.

I. PvP, p. 169,8–14; ŚsP chap. vii, p. 1263; Chih tu lun, T 25, 383a–b; Nyi khri, P. vol. 18, p. 116.1.2–4;

II. PvP, p. 225, 13-19; ŚsP p. 1472,14-1473,18; Chih tu lun, 411a, 419c; Nyi khri, p. 146.4.4-6;

problematic. It is grammatically difficult to solve this compound into 'to be (or become, be born) in the gotra'. To become gotra is also meaningless. This is one of the reasons why scholars seek for an original form other than $-bh\bar{u}$ as the latter part of the compound, -han being most likely. However, I suppose from the result arrived at in this paper, a wrong Sanskritization, so to say, of -han into $-bh\bar{u}$ took place not in the Pāli tradition but in the outside before its introduction to Sri Lanka.

- III. PvP, p. 230,14-231,10; SsP, p. 1520; Chih tu lun, 421c; Nyi khri, p. 153.3.3-8;
- IV. PvP, p. 233,8-14; ŚsP, p. 1555-1557; Chih tu lun, 423a; Nyi khri, p. 154.5.7-8, p. 156.3.3-6;
- V. PvP, p. 235,18–22; ŚsP, p. 1562–63; Chih tu lun, 424c; Nyi khri, p. 157.4.3–5;
 VI. PvP, p. 238,21–24; ŚsP, p. 1582–83; Chih tu lun, 426a; Nyi khri, p. 163 (Ti 4a6–b8);
- VII. Chih tu lun, 585a (Sūtra), 585c, 586a; Nyi khri, P vol. 19, p. 34 (Thi 178b7-179b1);
- VIII. Chih tu lun, 652b-c (Sūtra); Nyi khri, p. 101 (Di 27a1-a6);
- IX. Chih tu lun, 659b-c (Sūtra); Nyi khri, p. 110-111 (Di 51b8-52b3);
- X. Chih tu lun, 664b-c (Sūtra), 665b; Nyi khri, p. 117 (Di 67b8-68b2);
- XI. Chih tu lun, 718b (Sūtra), 719c; Nyi khri, p. 178.5.6-8.

Abbreviations

PvP = Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. by N. Dutt. Calcutta 1934.

ŚsP = Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. by P. GHOSA. Part I, Calcutta 1902–13

T = Taisho Tripitaka

P = Peking Reprint Edition

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CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING? GOTRA-THEORY IN THE MAHĀYĀNASŪTRĀLAMKĀRA

MARIO D'AMATO

The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that all sentient beings will attain complete awakening, a doctrine which is often linked to some conception of the "embryo of the Tathāgata" (tathāgatagarbha)¹. However, according to an alternate Mahāyāna doctrine, only some sentient beings will attain the complete awakening of a buddha — and some may even be excluded from attaining any form of awakening at all. In this paper, I will examine just such a doctrine, as it is found in an Indian Yogācāra treatise, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra ("Ornament to the Mahāyāna Sūtras"; abbr., MSA), a Sanskrit verse-text, and its prose commentary, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya (MSABh)². Particular Tibetan and Chinese sources attribute the composition of the MSA to the bodhisattva Maitreya³, which gives us some indication of the importance this text was understood to have within certain traditions. Nevertheless, the authorship and date of

¹ A concise introduction to this doctrine, and the Mahāyāna sūtras to which it is related, may be found in Williams 1989, Chapter 5.

³ The colophon of the Derge edition of the MSA states that the verse-text was composed by Maitreya. Bu ston (1290-1364) includes the MSA as one of the five Maitreyatexts; see Obermiller 1987: 53-54. Ui (1928: 221) identifies a Chinese tradition of the "five treatises of Maitreya," which differs from the Tibetan list of texts, but which also includes the MSA. Xuanzang (seventh century CE) writes that Asanga received the MSA and other texts from Maitreya; see Beal 1906, vol. 1: 226.

When referring to both the verse-text and the prose commentary together, I will use the abbreviation MSA/Bh. By the term "the text" I mean the MSA and the MSABh taken together, by "the verse-text" I mean the MSA, and by "the commentary" I mean the MSABh. Throughout this paper, for the Sanskrit I will quote from Lévi's edition of the MSA/Bh (1907); I have also consulted the editions of Bagchi (1970; based on Lévi's edition) and Funahashi (1985; select chapters based on mss. from Nepal). All translations are my own. The Tibetan canon contains the following relevant works: the MSA (verse-text): DT 4020; the MSA/Bh (verse-text along with prose commentary): DT 4026; the MSAVBh (Sthiramati's subcommentary to the text): DT 4034; and the MSAT (Asvabhāva's subcommentary to the text): DT 4029. The MSA/Bh also appears in the Chinese canon (Taishō 1604); although with some differences from the Sanskrit version; on this, see Nagao 1961: vi.

the verse-text and its commentary are not certain; I hypothesize that the MSA/Bh may be dated to the fourth century CE (perhaps c. 350 CE)⁴. It is my hope that an examination of such a source may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective. In the MSA/Bh, one way in which the limits of the Mahāyāna are defined is through the employment of the *gotra*theory, a theory which identifies the soteriological potentialities of individuals through reference to their spiritual "family" or "lineage." So in order to understand this text's discursive construction of the category "Mahāyāna," we must understand its concept of *gotra*.

In the context of discussions of Buddhism, the term *gotra* has been variously translated as "family" (Edgerton 1970, vol. 2: 216), "basis, source, cause, seed" (ibid.), "kind, class, category" (ibid.), "species" (Wayman 1961: 58), or "spiritual lineage" (Ruegg 1968: 303, Griffiths 1990b: 49)⁵. Again, in the MSA/Bh, gotra represents the soteriological category to which a particular sentient being belongs: an individual's gotra is taken to be indicative of that individual's soteriological possibilities, i.e., what type of — or even whether — awakening can be attained. So if a particular being is said to belong to the bodhisattva-gotra, then that being has the potentiality for the awakening of a buddha, and if a particular being is classified as "without gotra" (*agotraka*), this indicates that, at least for the present, that being does not have the "seed" to attain any form of awakening at all.

Given that for the MSA/Bh gotra is indicative of a sentient being's soteriological potentiality, an important issue is whether gotra is able to be acquired by every sentient being or whether there are some beings who are excluded from ever acquiring a gotra; and furthermore if some beings are excluded, in what sense they are excluded⁶. It will be necessary to understand these issues in order to address the question of whether, from the perspective of the MSA/Bh, all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening⁷. And so I will begin by discussing the meanings of the term *gotra* in the MSA/Bh—including its relations to other important terms and concepts. Then I will turn to a presentation of the various categories or subdivisions of gotra according to the text. Following this, I will consider the text's gotra-theory in relation to some related doctrines in the MSA/Bh. I will then conclude with a response to the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening.

Gotra defined

As I stated above, a number of translations have been offered for the term *gotra*. The MSA/Bh itself offers an interesting interpretation of the term. In explaining the use of the phrase *guṇottāraṇatā* ("having the characteristic of increasing virtues") in 3.4, the commentary states:

guņottāraņārthena gotram veditavyam guņā uttaranty asmād udbhavantīti kṛtvā/Gotra should be known as that which increases virtues, since virtues arise and increase because of it⁸.

⁴ My working hypothesis is that earlier strata of the MSA were compiled, redacted, added to, and commented upon by one person, and I take the result of this process to be the received text of the MSA/Bh. An extended introduction to the MSA/Bh — its editions and translations, structure and contents, authorship, date, and relation to a larger corpus of texts — may be found in Chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation (D'Amato 2000).

⁵ Ruegg (1976: 354) offers the following meanings of *gotra* in Buddhist usage: i. "mine, matrix"; ii. "family, clan, lineage"; iii. "germ, seed"; and (iv.) "class, category." He also offers a preliminary discussion of the relation of the term *gotra* to other possible cognate terms in Iranian languages; his provisional hypothesis is that it might be possible to derive the various meanings of the cognate terms — including the Vedic meaning "cattle-pen" — from a root meaning "origin, source" (ibid., 354-356). In the context of the MSA/Bh, the translation "spiritual lineage" is perhaps most appropriate. "Spiritual lineage," however, should not be confused with the notion of a lineage of transmission or tradition (*paramparā*). In any case, in this paper when using the term *gotra*, I will leave it untranslated and unitalicized.

⁶ For example, according to the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* certain beings are excluded in a predetermined sense: "From the beginningless beginning all sentient beings are divided into five kinds of lineages (*gotra*).... the first four of the above will ultimately attain final cessation... But the fifth lineage... will never reach a time of final cessation" (Keenan 1980: 494). For other references to gotra as a predetermined category in Buddhist literature, see Lamotte 1976: 304.

⁷ In my general formulation of this question, I have benefited from Ruegg's work on the gotra-theory, especially 1968, 1969: 73-107, and 1976.

⁸ Mano (1967: 970) points out that this etymological interpretation (nirukta) is also given by Haribhadra (end of the eighth c. CE) in the Abhisamayālamkārālokā (the Abhisamayālamkāra [AA] is considered by Bu ston to be another of the five Maitreya-texts), as well as by both Ārya-Vimuktisena and Bhadanta-Vimuktisena in their earlier commentaries to the AA.

From this we may see that for the MSA/Bh, acquiring a gotra means acquiring the ability to increase virtues. And this ability is of no small importance according to the text, because the development of a number of virtues is understood as necessary for the attainment of particular soteriological goals. More specifically, gotra is posited as the cause of differences in inclination towards a particular vehicle (adhimukti) — that is to say, which soteriological vehicle one will be inclined to follow: religious practice (pratipatti); and awakening itself (bodhi) (MSA 3.2). It is said to be the basis of knowledge (jñāna), purification from the afflictions (kleśa-nairmalya), and the supernormal powers, such as the higher knowledges (abhijñā) (MSABh ad 3.9). It is said to be the cause of great awakening, great knowledge, concentration (samādhi), and the maturation of sentient beings (MSA 3.10). Gotra is also identified as one cause for the production of the thought of awakening (cittotpāda) (MSABh ad 4.7), compassion (ad 17.34), the practice of the perfections (ad 16.16). and the specific perfection of patience (ad 8.6). Indeed at MSA 19.61 gotra is identified as the first of the ten aspects of the Mahāyāna, thus it is understood to be the foundation upon which the practice of the Mahāyāna is based⁹. According to the MSA/Bh, then, having a gotra is foundational to attaining any specific Buddhist soteriological goal.

Having considered the MSA/Bh's explanation of the term *gotra*, we now turn to terms that are used as equivalent to it in the text. One such equivalent term used by the text is *dhātu*. In fact, there are two places in the text in which *gotra* and *dhātu* are used interchangeably¹⁰. The first is at 11.8, where the verse-text uses the term *tridhātuka*. Here the commentary states:

tatra dhātu-niyato yaḥ śrāvakādi-gotra-niyataḥ/

There [in the previous line of the text] a definite $dh\bar{a}tu$ is a definite gotra, such as śrāvaka.

Although the term *dhātu* has a number of meanings in this and other texts, in this instance, "stage" or "level of attainment" seems to be the

most appropriate. In another context (at 11.43) the verse-text uses the term $\bar{a}rya$ -gotra, the "noble gotra," which the commentary glosses with $an\bar{a}srava$ -dhātu, the "undefiled realm" — i.e., the realm or level of attainment in which there is no longer the influx of afflictions which bind one to saṃsāra. Here, then, we may infer that gotra is understood in terms of a spiritual stage or level of attainment¹¹.

The term *gotra* is also used twice in the commentary as a gloss for *prakṛti*, or "nature." The commentary to 8.5 glosses *svaprakṛtyā* — "by one's nature" or "according to one's nature" — with *gotreṇa* — an instrumental form of the term meaning "by gotra" or "according to gotra." Also, the commentary to 18.19-21 glosses the term *prakṛtyā* with *gotrataḥ*, an ablative form of the term meaning "due to one's gotra." So here the term *gotra* refers to one's "nature."

While the term *gotra* has been equated with spiritual stage or level of attainment (*dhātu*) and nature (*prakṛti*)¹³, it is so far unclear whether this stage or nature represents something predetermined or something acquired. That is to say, if the development of certain capacities or virtues is due to one's nature — or due to one's gotra — then does gotra represent a predetermined and predetermining category, or does it represent an acquirable and alterable category of spiritual potentiality? And if it is acquirable, is it acquirable by all? These are questions that I will return to below. In any case, belonging to a certain gotra means having the potentiality for reaching specific soteriological goals. The next step in understanding gotra, then, is understanding the different categories or subdivisions of gotra according to the text.

Categories of gotra

In Indian Buddhist literature, a list of the following five gotras may be found: śrāvaka-gotra, pratyekabuddha-gotra, bodhisattva-gotra, indefinite

⁹ Chapter 19 of the MSA/Bh is specifically devoted to the topic of the *guṇas*; furthermore, at MSA/Bh 19.59-61, all of the virtues referred to in this paragraph are either explicitly mentioned or implicitly contained in the lists that occur there.

¹⁰ Furthermore, as Ruegg (1969: 85) points out, in a number of places the Tibetan text of the MSA/Bh has *rigs* (normally *gotra*) for *khams* (normally *dhātu*).

¹¹ In this connection, according to Ruegg (1974: 204), the *Visuddhimagga* equates ariya-gotta with ariya-bhūmi, which Ruegg translates as "spiritual stage of the saint."

¹² However, note that at neither of these locations does the text posit that one's nature (prakṛti) is to be understood as beginningless or unalterable.

These synonyms for *gotra* are also found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Sanskrit edition, Dutt 1966: 2); a third synonym given in that text is *bīja*, "seed."

gotra (aniyata-gotra), and without gotra (agotraka)¹⁴. Sometimes this list of five is shortened to just the first three members¹⁵, which the MSA/Bh then aligns with the three vehicles: those of the śrāvaka-gotra go by the śrāvakayāna, etc. But such a shortening of the list need not reflect any serious philosophical differences. Only the first three gotras result in particular Buddhist soteriological goals, since only the first three gotras correspond to particular Buddhist soteriological vehicles. Furthermore, being classified under the category of indefinite gotra may be understood as a liminal state: when one's gotra becomes definite, it will be in terms of one of the three standard gotras of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, or bodhisattva. And the category "without gotra," after all, is not properly an element of the list of categories of gotra. Therefore, the lists of five and three gotras may be seen as having different conceptual emphases, rather than different theoretical bases.

While the MSA/Bh offers no specific list of gotras that corresponds to those given above, each member of the list of five is either explicitly mentioned or implicitly referred to¹⁶. Furthermore, it is clear that the

MSA/Bh posits the superiority of the bodhisattva-gotra: in linking gotra to the roots of virtue ($kuśala-m\bar{u}la$), the commentary to 3.3 states that the roots of virtue of the bodhisattva-gotra are far superior to those of the śrāvaka-gotra — those of the śrāvaka-gotra, for example, lack the special powers of a buddha. And in 11.43 the commentary states that the noble gotra of buddhas — i.e., the bodhisattva-gotra¹⁷ — is distinct from those of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha for five reasons: (1) it is purified from the impregnating afflictions ($sav\bar{a}sana-kleśa$), (2) it purifies a buddhafield, and (3-5) it attains the three buddha-bodies.

The MSA/Bh explicitly aligns each of the first three gotras with one of the soteriological vehicles (*yānas*). The commentary to 3.2 states that there is a difference in gotra with respect to the three vehicles — the three vehicles here being the śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna, and bodhisattvayāna¹⁸. The commentary also goes on to distinguish three types of awakening (inferior, middling, or superior), stating that each corresponds to a particular gotra in the way that a fruit corresponds to its seed¹⁹. And at 5.4-5 the commentary states that there are three gotras: again, inferior, middling, or superior. Thus the MSA/Bh posits the following threefold structure:

spiritual category	soteriological vehicle	form of awakening
śrāvaka-gotra	śrāvakayāna	inferior
pratyekabuddha-gotra	pratyekabuddhayāna	middling
bodhisattva-gotra	bodhisattvayāna	superior

It is clear, then, that the category of gotra is of importance to the MSA/Bh's soteriological scheme because different gotras lead to different

¹⁴ For example, the Mahāvyutpatti contains the following fivefold list of gotras (1261-1265): śrāvaka-yānābhisamaya-gotraḥ, pratyekabuddha-yānābhisamaya-gotraḥ, tathāgata-yānābhisamaya-gotraḥ (gotra for the realization of the vehicle of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and tathāgatas, respectively), aniyata-gotraḥ (indefinite gotra), agotrakaḥ (without gotra); see Sakaki 1926. The Mahāvyutpatti is a compilation of lists of Sanskrit Buddhist terms, along with their Tibetan translations, that dates to the early ninth century CE, centuries after the time of the MSA/Bh. Nevertheless, when a particular list is found in the Mahāvyutpatti, this suggests that the list was important to Indian Buddhist thought at the time. The fivefold list of gotras is also significant for our purposes since Sthiramati offers the same one in his subcommentary to the MSA/Bh (DT sems tsam MI 48a3-4).

¹⁵ The three gotras are referred to in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (SNS); Lamotte 1935: 73-74 and 198-199 offers the Tibetan text and French translation, respectively; cf. Powers 1995: 110-115. The SNS is considered to be one of the earliest Yogācāra sūtras (along with the Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra, which is no longer extant). Although the MSABh does not explicitly refer to or quote the SNS, Schmithausen (1976: 240, note 2) makes the convincing point that MSA 19.44ab presupposes SNS 8.20.2 in its discussion of the seven types of thusness (tathatā). The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya ad 6.23cd also identifies the three gotras (Sanskrit edition, Pradhan 1967: 348). Other lists of gotras appear in Indian Buddhist literature. For example, the Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra mentions six different gotras; but even in this case the principal gotras of the Vaibhāṣikas are the standard three identified here; see Davidson 1985: 94-95.

¹⁶ The bodhisattva-gotra is mentioned in various places, e.g., MSABh ad 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, etc.; the verse-text refers to it as the "foremost-gotra" (MSA 3.13: *agra-gotra*) or "noblegotra" (MSA 11.43: *ārya-gotra*). The śrāvaka-gotra is mentioned at MSABh ad 11.8,

^{11.53,} etc. The pratyekabuddha-gotra is implicitly referred to in the phrase śrāvakādi-gotra, "the gotra of śrāvakas, etc." [i.e., pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas] at MSABh ad 11.8. The indefinite gotra is mentioned at MSA 3.6, etc., and the category "without gotra" is mentioned at MSA 1.14, etc. Again, Sthiramati's subcommentary does offer the specific list of five gotras; see note 14.

¹⁷ It is quite clear that *buddha-gotra* is another term for *bodhisattva-gotra*, and not a separate category. MSABh ad 3.2 states there are three forms of awakening, and that each form corresponds to a gotra as a fruit corresponds to its seed: thus the awakening of a buddha corresponds to the bodhisattva-gotra. Then MSABh ad 3.4 states that gotra does not exist along with its fruit; so when the awakening of a buddha is attained, no gotra exists.

¹⁸ While the first two vehicles are specifically mentioned in the text (see, e.g., MSABh ad 19.44), the third is not; the term *mahāyāna* is used rather than *bodhisattvayāna*.

¹⁹ Here we see gotra understood in terms of a seed, as in definition iii. offered by Ruegg; see note 5.

soteriological goals. To trace this out a bit further, we may mention the following points: (1) the first two gotras belong to the Hīnayāna, while the third gotra belongs to the Mahāyāna²⁰; (2) the Hīnayāna is said to bring about the termination of the afflictive obstructions (kleśāvarana), while the Mahāyāna is said to bring about the termination of both the afflictive and the cognitive obstructions (*jñeyāvaraṇa*)²¹; (3) the Hīnayāna leads to lesser forms of awakening, and ultimately to nirvāna without residual conditioning (nirupadhiśesa-nirvāna) — which the text interprets as a form of extinction²²; (4) the Mahāyāna leads to a superior form of awakening — the complete awakening of a buddha, an awareness of all objects of knowledge and all modes of appearance (sarva-jñeya-sarvākāra-jñāna), viz., omniscience — which is a state of being coextensive with reality (thusness, tathatā) itself, since the text posits that ultimately there is no distinction between subject and object²³; furthermore, the Mahāyāna does not lead to the extinction of nirvana without residual conditioning, but rather to non-abiding nirvāṇa (apratisthita-nirvāṇa) — an attainment which allows for continued manifestations in the world in order to aid sentient beings²⁴. So the MSA/Bh's gotra-theory is of central importance to the text's soteriological theory, since the first two gotras lead to lesser forms of awakening which ultimately terminate in extinction (nonexistence), while the third gotra leads to complete awakening which is nothing less than omniscience (coextension with reality itself).

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While the preceding gives us a sense of the MSA/Bh's presentation of the gotras of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva, in order to understand

the text's gotra-theory more fully, we must also consider the latter two gotras in our initial fivefold list: indefinite gotra and without gotra. Regarding the indefinite gotra, we may begin with a consideration of MSA 3.6. where the verse-text introduces a fourfold classification of gotras:

niyatāniyatam gotram ahāryam hāryam eva ca/ pratyayair gotra-bhedo 'yam samāsena catur-vidhah//

Gotra can be definite or indefinite, incapable of being lost or able to be lost. In sum, according to conditions, the distinctions of gotra are fourfold.

While the verse seems to set up a fourfold classification system (definite-incapable of being lost, definite-able to be lost, etc.), the commentary reduces this to a twofold system: "definite" corresponding only to "incapable of being lost," and "indefinite" corresponding only to "able to be lost."25 The commentary's move here is supported by the fact that while the term "indefinite" (aniyata) is again used by the text in connection with the term gotra (at MSA/Bh 11.54), neither term of the pair "incapable of being lost/able to be lost" (ahārya/hārya) is again linked to it. Furthermore, Sthiramati's subcommentary agrees with the MSABh in specifying that "definite" corresponds to "incapable of being lost" and "indefinite" corresponds to "able to be lost."26

Regarding the classification definite/indefinite, it is significant that for the MSA/Bh indefinite gotra does not represent a fourth gotra alongside the three standard gotras. Rather, any sentient being belonging to one of the three specific gotras may be further classified according to whether that specific gotra is definite or indefinite. If the gotra is definite that means it is fixed and will not be lost, but if the gotra is indefinite that means it is not fixed and there is the possibility that it can be lost or changed after it has been acquired.

The text further discusses the indefinite gotra in a section devoted to the analysis of the ekayāna (a doctrine which the MSA/Bh does not

²⁰ MSA 15.4 refers to the "twofold Hīnayāna" (nihīnayāna-dvividha), viz., the śrāvakayāna and pratyekabuddha-yāna. There is further textual evidence for identifying the śrāvaka- and pratyekabuddhayānas with the hīnayāna; on this, see D'Amato 2000: 177-

²¹ See, e.g., MSABh ad 17.4-5 and MSA/Bh 20-21.44.

²² See MSABh ad 3.3, 16.50, etc. In every place where the term *nirupadhiśeṣa*- or anupadhiśesa-nirvāna is used in the text, some form of the term ksaya ("loss, destruction, end, termination") is also used.

²³ While this is by no means the standard account of omniscience offered in Buddhist traditions, it is the one that I believe is most defensible as a reading of the MSA/Bh; see MSA/Bh 20-21.58, Griffiths 1990a: 106-108, and D'Amato 2000: 130-131, 141-146, and 152-154.

²⁴ See MSA/Bh 17.32, 19.61-62, etc. On both forms of nirvāna in the text, see D'Amato 2000, Chapter 5.

²⁵ MSABh ad 3.6: samāsena caturvidham gotram niyatāniyatam tad eva yathā-kramam pratyayair ahāryam hāryam ceti/.

²⁶ MSAVBh ad 3.6 (DT sems tsam MI 45b4-5): de bas na rigs nes pa rnams ni rkyen gyis mi 'phrogs pa źes bya ste/... rigs ma nes pa rnams ni rkyen gyis 'phrog pa źes bya ste/.

consider to be definitive, but rather in need of interpretation). At 11.54, the verse-text states:

ākarşaṇārtham ekeṣām anya-saṃdhāraṇāya ca/deśitāniyatānāṃ hi saṃbuddhair ekayānatā//

For the purpose of attracting some, and for supporting others, the fully awakened ones taught the fact of one vehicle for those who are indefinite.

The commentary goes on to specify that those who are attracted are those with an indefinite śrāvaka-gotra and those who are supported are those with an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra. Also, in discussing the function of buddhahood as a refuge, the commentary to 9.8 states:

hīnayāna-paritrāṇatvam aniyata-gotrāṇām mahāyānaikāyanī-karaṇāt/

[Buddhahood] protects those of an indefinite gotra from the Hīnayāna by constructing the uniform path of the Mahāyāna.

Although this comment refers to the indefinite gotra without linking it to one of the three specific gotras, it seems reasonable to read it in terms of 11.54: buddhas teach the unity of vehicles in order to lure those of an indefinite śrāvaka-gotra away from the Hīnayāna, and in order to keep those of an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra from entering the Hīnayāna. Furthermore, in discussing the ten types of sentient beings towards whom bodhisattvas are compassionate (MSA/Bh 17.29-30), the verse-text refers to one type as those who have gone astray, which the commentary specifies as those who are indefinite in adhering to the Hīnayāna — a reference to the indefinite śrāvaka- and pratyekabuddha-gotras²⁷.

In the commentary to verse 11.53 the MSABh mentions the indefinite śrāvaka-gotra, stating that those of this gotra may attain final liberation through the Mahāyāna²⁸. Thus there is the possibility for one of an indefinite śrāvaka-gotra to acquire the bodhisattva-gotra. Furthermore, if as

11.54 states some bodhisattvas are in need of support, this implies that one of an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra has the possibility of losing that gotra. So for one of an indefinite gotra there is the possibility of losing one's gotra and transferring to another²⁹.

The final classification to consider is that of being without gotra, a category that is the topic of MSA/Bh 3.11. Here, the verse-text and commentary state:

aikāntiko duścarite 'sti kaścit kaścit samudghātita-śukla-dharmā/ amokṣa-bhāgīya-śubho 'sti kaścin nihīna-śuklo 'sty api hetu-hīnah//³0

aparinirvāṇa-dharmaka etasminn agotrastho 'bhipretaḥ/ sa ca samāsato dvividhaḥ/ tat-kālāparinirvāṇa-dharmā atyantaṃ ca/ tat-kālāparinirvāṇa-dharmā caturvidhaḥ/... atyantāparinirvāṇa-dharmā tu hetu-hīno yasya parinirvāṇa-gotram eva nāsti/

Some have solely ill conduct, some have pure qualities that have been destroyed, some have purity that is not associated with liberation, or an inferior purity, and some also lack the cause.

This [verse] refers to those who are without gotra, those who lack the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa. And this is concisely in two ways: lacking the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa at the present time and for ever (or "absolutely"; atyantam). Lacking the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa at the present time can be in four ways.... But those who for ever (or "absolutely"; atyanta) lack the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa — those who lack the cause — simply do not have the parinirvāṇa gotra.

So according to the text, being without gotra means lacking the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa (aparinirvāṇa-dharmaka)³¹. And there are two ways in which this might occur: lacking the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa at the present time (tat- $k\bar{a}la$) and lacking them for ever or absolutely (atyantam). The first option — lacking the qualities at the present time (tat- $k\bar{a}la$) — is explained with reference to the

²⁷ MSABh ad 17.29-30: utpatha-prasthitā hīnayāna-prayuktā aniyatāḥ/. Again, hīnayāna refers to the śrāvakayāna and pratyekabuddhayāna. While the indefinite pratyekabuddhagotra is not specifically mentioned in the MSA/Bh, it is mentioned in Sthiramati's subcommentary. In fact, Sthiramati specifies that each of the three specific gotras may be definite or indefinite; see MSAVBh ad 3.6 (DT sems tsam MI 45a6-7).

²⁸ MSABh ad 11.53: aniyata-śrāvaka-gotrānām mahāyānena niryānād yānti tena yānam iti krtvā/.

²⁹ For a discussion of this issue in the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, see Keenan 1980: 678-684; briefly, those of an indefinite gotra may attain nirvāna either through the Mahāyāna or through one of the other vehicles.

³⁰ Following the commentary, I do not interpret this verse in terms of the standard four *padas*; I read the last *pada* as identifying two elements in a list, rather than one.

³¹ The term aparinirvāṇa-dharmāṇaḥ is used at MSABh ad 17.29-30: it refers to those do not have the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa because they have never put an end to saṃsāra (saṃsāra-vartmāṭyantānupacchedāt). The context here is a discussion of the types of beings towards whom a bodhisattva should be compassionate.

first four reasons stated in the verse: having solely ill conduct, having cut-off roots of virtue (samucchinna-kuśala-mūla)³², having roots of virtue unrelated to liberation (amokṣa-bhāgīya-kuśala-mūla), and having inferior roots of virtue (hīna-kuśala-mūla). So sentient beings belonging to this category are without gotra because of some deficiency in roots of virtue. However, they are understood to be without gotra only for the present, with the implication that they can acquire a gotra at some point in time through accumulating an adequate store of the appropriate roots of virtue.

The second option — lacking the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa for ever or absolutely (atyantam) — makes reference to the fifth reason stated in the verse: lacking the cause, which ostensibly means lacking any roots of virtue whatsoever. So here we see that there is a certain category of sentient beings who are excluded from acquiring a gotra. But there is some difficulty in determining in precisely what sense they are excluded, a difficulty which hinges on the way in which the term atyantam is translated in this context, a term which has a semantic range which includes both "for ever" and "absolutely."³³

Translators have dealt with the term atyantam in different ways in this context. While Ruegg (1969: 80ff.) translates it as absolument, Lévi (1911: 30) suggests indéfiniment (although this is not included as one of the meanings of the term in the standard dictionaries). The Tibetan translation (DT sems tsam PHI, 138b3) gives gtan [du], which Das's dictionary defines as "always, continually, for ever." The Chinese translation (Taishō vol. 31, no. 1604, p. 595a25) renders it as bijing, which according to the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism has the basic meaning of "absolute[ly]," but also has the senses of "finally, in the long run." Hence there has not been a consensus on the meaning of atyantam in this

context. However, since the term is used in MSABh ad 3.11 in opposition to *tat-kāla* (lit., "that time"; "immediately, the present time"), I think there is some reason to understand *atyantam* here in a temporal sense (viz., as "for ever"). Furthermore, there is evidence that the term *atyantam* is used in its temporal sense in other locations in the text. For example, at 8.22 the verse-text states that the bodhisattva instructs beings for as long as the world exists, which the commentary explains as follows:

yāval lokasya bhāvas tat-samānayā gatyā atyantam ity arthah/

For as long as the world exists — with that same duration — means "for ever" (atyantam).

And the commentary to 18.44 states that the practice of bodhisattvas goes on "for ever" (atyantam) because it does not end in nirvāṇa without residual conditioning (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇe 'pi tad-akṣayāt). Furthermore, in the commentary to the Madhyāntavibhāga (a text referred to in the MSABh), the term atyanta is used to gloss sadā ("always")³⁵. Thus it can be seen that the term atyantam does mean "for ever" in certain contexts. In any case, it is clear that sentient beings belonging to this category — those who are atyantāparinirvāṇa-dharmā — are without roots of virtue, without gotra, and hence excluded from attaining any form of awakening.

It should be emphasized that according to 3.11 roots of virtue ($kuśala-m\bar{u}la$) are understood to be the cause of gotra: gotra is acquired through amassing an adequate store of the appropriate roots of virtue. This is not so unusual a claim for the MSA/Bh to make, since obtaining roots of virtue has traditionally been understood as a necessary aspect of the path to awakening³⁶. Furthermore, Sthiramati's subcommentary to the $Mad-hy\bar{a}ntavibh\bar{a}ga$ states that one standard definition of gotra is "roots of

 $^{^{32}}$ See Davidson 1985: 98-99 regarding samucchinna-kuśala-mūla in the Vaibhāṣika tradition.

³³ The standard Sanskrit-English dictionaries include both of these senses of the term *atyantam*. Monier-Williams has "in perpetuity" and "absolutely, completely"; Apte lists "for ever" and "absolutely"; and the Poona dictionary (edited by Ghatage) also gives "for ever" and "absolutely."

³⁴ My thanks to Peter Gregory for providing me with the reference to the Chinese translation of the MSA/Bh. The term *bijing*, according to Muller's *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism*, also includes the senses of "positively, decidedly" and "necessarily."

³⁵ MAV 1.18b states: sadā sattva-hitāya ca/ "And for the benefit of sentient beings always." MAVBh ad 1.18b then glosses with: atyanta-sattva-hitārtham/ "For the sake of the benefit of sentient beings for ever (atyanta)." See Sanskrit ed., Nagao 1964: 25.

³⁶ On the importance of the *kuśala-mūla* to Buddhist conceptions of the path, see Buswell 1992; he identifies one basic classification of the *kuśala-mūla* as nongreed (*alobha*), nonhatred (*adveśa*), and nonignorance (*amoha*). The MSA/Bh is not the only text that links the roots of virtue to gotra; for a discussion of the relation between these two in the context of the *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośa*, see Davidson 1985: 92-100.

virtue."³⁷ But the MSA/Bh also posits that when the bodhisattva-gotra is acquired, it in turn becomes a source of further roots of virtue. At 3.3 the verse-text states that the pre-eminence of the [bodhisattva-]gotra is indicated by the vastness, totality, greatness of purpose, and imperishability of its purity (*śubha*) — and here the commentary identifies purity with the roots of virtue. And in 3.9, when the verse-text compares gotra to a mine of gold³⁸, the commentary states that the bodhisattva-gotra is like a source of abundant gold since it is the basis of unlimited roots of virtue. So for the MSA/Bh, acquiring roots of virtue is a necessary condition for acquiring a gotra (3.11), but when the bodhisattva-gotra is acquired, it becomes a source of unlimited roots of virtue (3.9).

To conclude this section, it is necessary to consider one further characterization of gotra in the text. At 3.4, the verse-text states:

prakṛtyā paripuṣṭam ca āśrayaś cāśritam ca tat/sad asac caiva vijñeyam gunottāranatārthatah//

By nature, nourished, support and supported, existing and not existing, it should truly be known as that which increases virtues.

First we should note that this verse does not offer an addition to the fivefold list of gotras discussed above; rather, it is introduced by the commentary as a verse on the characteristics (lakṣaṇas) of gotras in general. The commentary identifies the following four characteristics of gotra: (1) gotra is natural (prkṛtistha) insofar as it has the nature (svab-hāva) of a support, (2) it is attained (samudānīta, a gloss for paripuṣṭaṃ — "nourished" — in the verse) insofar as it has the nature of being supported, (3) it exists along with its cause (hetu), (4) but it does not exist along with its fruit. From this we can see that gotra can be attained — at least by some sentient beings — and that it has a cause. And again, according to MSA/Bh 3.11, the cause of gotra — the condition for its acquisition — is the roots of virtue: gotra is acquired when adequate roots of virtue of the appropriate kind are accumulated. But we must also remember that, according to MSA/Bh 3.9, when the bodhisattva-gotra is

acquired, it serves as a basis for further roots of virtue. It is in this sense that we should read characteristic (1) according to the verse above: gotra is natural insofar as it is a support or basis for further roots of virtue³⁹.

From all that has been said above, we may summarize the MSA/Bh's gotra-theory as follows: (1) having a gotra is a prerequisite for attaining any form of awakening; (2) there are three specific gotras: the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha-, and bodhisattva-gotras; (3) the first two gotras lead to lesser forms of awakening, and ultimately to the Hīnayāna goal of nirvāṇa without residual conditioning — understood as extinction — while the bodhisattva-gotra leads to complete awakening, the Mahāyāna goal of buddhahood — understood as omniscience; (4) some sentient beings are of an indefinite gotra: they are able to lose their gotra and acquire a different one; (5) some beings are presently without gotra, but can acquire one through amassing roots of virtue; and (6) some beings are excluded from acquiring any gotra. Considering these points we are now in a better position to attempt to address the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening.

³⁷ Sanskrit ed., Yamaguchi 1934: 188.

³⁸ As stated in note 5, one of the meanings of the term *gotra* is "mine" (as in "a mine of gems or ores"; see Edgerton 1970, vol. 2: 216, def. 2), thus here the MSA/Bh is playing off that definition of the term.

³⁹ The Bodhisattvabhūmi ([BBh] the fifteenth section of the first division of the Yogācārabhūmi, which contains in parts some of the oldest Yogācāra materials [Schmithausen 1969]) also makes use of the classification of prakrtistha-gotra and samudānīta-gotra. Yamabe (1997: 195ff.) offers a discussion of the BBh's interpretation of these categories; according to that text, the prakrtistha-gotra is beginningless (anādikālika), while the samudānīta-gotra is acquired through the accumulation of roots of virtue. While the MSA/Bh is closely related to the BBh in the selection and order of topics that it addresses, the two texts do not always address those topics in the same way. For example, the MSA/Bh does not define gotra in terms of the sadāyatana-viśesa ("distinct state of the six sense bases"). Furthermore, the MSA/Bh does not use the term anādikālika ("beginningless") in connection with the topic of gotra at all. Thus the two texts differ in their treatments of gotra. For the BBh, a gotra is prakrtistha if it is beginningless (viz., predetermined in some way), whereas for the MSA/Bh a gotra is prakrtistha only in the sense that it serves as a causal basis for the further accumulation of roots of virtue. [Here note that one meaning of the term prkrti is "cause," so prkrtistha may be interpreted as "existing/operating as a cause."] The MSA/Bh's interpretation of prkrtistha may also be seen at 3.12, where the text states that the bodhisattva-gotra possesses virtues both naturally (prakrtyā) and by nourishment (paripuṣtasya); thus a bodhisattva-gotra is in one sense natural (or causal), and in another sense attained (or caused). Finally, both Ruegg (1969: 476-477) and Davidson (1985: 100) state that the prakrtistha/samudānīta distinction seems to be strikingly similar to two types of roots of virtue in the Vaibhāṣika tradition — those that are congenital (upapattilābhika) and those due to application (prāyogika).

Can all beings potentially attain awakening?

Before responding to this question, we must first consider a few relevant doctrines in the MSA/Bh that have not been addressed thus far. The first, and most significant for our purposes, is that of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the "embryo of the Tathāgata." The MSA contains one reference to the *tathāgatagarbha*, which is found at 9.37. This verse and its commentary state:

sarveṣām aviśiṣṭāpi tathatā śuddhim āgatā/ tathāgatatvam tasmāc ca tad-garbhāḥ sarva-dehinah//

sarveṣām nirviśiṣṭā tathatā tad-viśuddhi-svabhāvaś ca tathāgataḥ/ ataḥ sarve sattvās tathāgata-garbhā ity ucyate/

Although thusness is in all [living beings] without distinction, when it is pure it is the nature of the Tathāgata; thus all living beings have its embryo.

Thusness is in all [living beings] without distinction, and the Tathāgata has the nature of the purity of that. Hence it is said that all sentient beings have the embryo of the Tathāgata.

This verse states that all sentient beings have the embryo of the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha) since all sentient beings have the nature of thusness (tathatā). It should be noted that it is possible to interpret this verse as stating that all beings "are" the embryo of the Tathāgata, rather than all beings "have" the embryo⁴⁰. The former would imply, however, that all sentient beings will attain buddhahood, a claim that the MSA/Bh does not seem inclined to make. In fact, as we have already seen in the material on gotra, the text states quite clearly that different beings belong to different gotras and that different gotras lead to different forms of awakening⁴¹; thus not all sentient beings attain buddhahood. Nevertheless, the text does here claim that all sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining buddhahood, even if this potentiality is not actually realized.

The claim that all sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining buddhahood is not such a strange one for the MSA/Bh to make given its affirmation of mind as fundamentally pure in nature. The first half of 13.19 states:

matam ca cittam prakṛti-prabhāsvaram sadā tad āgantuka-doṣa-dūsitam/

Mind should properly be thought of as always luminous by nature; it is impure due to adventitious defilements.

The commentary further states that mind is like space, or like water that is pure in itself but made impure by pollutants; and like water, mind can be purified through removing the defilements. Thus from the perspective of the text, insofar as sentient beings have (or just *are*) minds, they may attain the state of fundamental purity through the removal of adventitious defilements⁴².

The theme of purity is also discussed at 11.13-14, although here it is the nature of reality that is fundamentally pure. MSA 11.13 states:

tattvam yat satatam dvayena rahitam bhrāntes ca samnisrayah sakyam naiva ca sarvathābhilapitum yac cāprapañcātmakam/ jñeyam heyam atho visodhyam amalam yac ca prakṛtyā matam yasyākāsa-suvarṇa-vāri-sadṛsī klesād visuddhir matā//

Reality — which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely inexpressible — does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, abandoned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water.

As in the commentary to 13.19, the nature of reality — like the nature of mind — is said to be similar to that of space and water: they are naturally pure and defiled only adventitiously. The next verse goes on to state that there is nothing else in the world besides this fundamentally pure reality. Thus at an ontological level the MSA/Bh posits that, even though it serves as the basis of error, reality is fundamentally pure.

This brief excursus into the domain of the MSA/Bh's ontological discourse is to be understood in relation to our original question. The moves towards understanding the MSA/Bh's position on the *tathāgatagarbha*-theory and the MSA/Bh's doctrine of the fundamental purity of mind and reality were, I think, necessary in order to more fully consider a response

⁴⁰ For more on this see Griffiths 1990b: 62-63. Here I am following Griffiths' translation.

⁴¹ Compare this to Haribhadra's theory of gotra as found in the *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā*, where from the ultimate point of view gotra is seen as non-distinct in all sentient beings; see Ruegg 1968, especially: 316-317, and Mano 1967.

⁴² The theme of the fundamental purity of mind and the adventitious nature of defilements may also be found in certain passages in the nikāyas/āgamas; see Keenan (1980: 21-22) on passages from the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* and *Majjhima-nikāya* that posit the fundamental purity of mind.

to the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening. According to the passages discussed here we see that

(1) All sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining complete awakening (i.e., all beings have the embryo of the Tathāgata; MSA/Bh 9.37), and all beings have the potentiality for purifying their minds, since mind — like reality itself — is fundamentally pure by nature (MSA/Bh 13.19 and 11.13).

However, we must also consider this claim in relation to the MSA/Bh's discourse on gotra, according to which

(2) Having a gotra is a prerequisite for attaining any form of awakening, but some beings are excluded from acquiring a gotra (MSA/Bh 3.11).

Considering these claims together, we may note a degree of tension between (1) and (2). More specifically, according to (1) all sentient beings have the potentiality for complete awakening, while the implication of (2) is that some beings are excluded from the attainment of any form of awakening at all, in that they are excluded from acquiring the "seed" (gotra) necessary for awakening. The issue here is in what sense we should understand the state of being excluded — and, more specifically, in what sense we should understand the term atyantam in the commentary to 3.11. Are sentient beings of this category — those who are atyantāparinirvāṇa-dharmā — excluded "absolutely"? "For ever"? Does anything hinge on deciding one way or the other?

I would argue that something does indeed hinge on such a decision, that it is not philosophically insignificant whether *atyantam* is translated as "absolutely" or "for ever" in this context. To say that some beings are "absolutely" without the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa — absolutely without gotra — implies that some beings are "unconditionally" in this state⁴³: it implies that these sentient beings unconditionally lack gotra — hence they simply do not attain any form of awakening, without reference to any other conditions or qualifications. This would pose a problem in interpreting the text consistently, in that we have already seen that gotra is not unconditional: the condition for its acquisition is the

roots of virtue. Furthermore, understanding atyantam here as "absolutely" intensifies the tension between (1) and (2): it would imply the problematic conclusion that although all beings have the potentiality for complete awakening, some beings are absolutely unable to attain any form of awakening at all. On the other hand, saying that some beings are "for ever" without the qualities associated with parinirvāṇa — for ever without gotra — does not imply that any beings are unconditionally in this category. Rather, it implies that some beings simply always remain in this category due to a conditional lack in roots of virtue. And translating atyantam here as "for ever" would significantly reduce the tension between (1) and (2): it would allow that while all beings have the potentiality for complete awakening, some beings simply never actualize this potentiality. In fact, according to the text there is always a surplus or remainder of sentient beings who have not been ripened to awakening, since the world is infinite⁴⁴.

I would propose that a more perspicuous means of clarifying and addressing the tension between (1) and (2) — between a doctrine of universal potentiality for buddhahood and the exclusion of certain sentient beings from attaining awakening — may be found through introducing the modal concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency. It should first be noted that the MSA/Bh does not employ these concepts in this or any other context; in fact, to my knowledge, the concepts of modal logic are not fully articulated anywhere in the history of Indian Buddhist thought. What I propose then is of the nature of a rational reconstruction. Briefly, Haack specifies the distinction between necessary and contingent truths as follows: "a necessary truth is one which could not be otherwise, a contingent truth one which could; or, the negation of a necessary truth is impossible or contradictory, the negation of a contingent truth possible or consistent; or, a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, a contingent truth is true in the actual but not in all possible worlds" (1978: 170). To this we may add that a possible truth is one whose negation is not necessary. I would argue that a reconstruction of (1) and (2) employing modal concepts allows for a clarification of the claims at MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11, and the elimination of the tension between them. Through introducing the

⁴³ The Oxford English Dictionary offers one definition of "absolutely" as "without condition or limitation; unconditionally."

⁴⁴ MSABh ad 9.49: na ca niḥśeṣam lokasyānantatvāt/.

concepts of possibility and contingency, we might restate propositions (1) and (2) in the following terms:

- (1') For all x such that x is a sentient being, it is possible that x will attain complete awakening.
- (2') For some x such that x is a sentient being, it is contingent that x is without gotra, and hence without any form of awakening.

These two propositions are consistent with one another, since there is no contradiction in stating that awakening is possible for all beings even though some beings do not in fact attain it. Note, however, that if we were to translate *atyantam* as "absolutely" at MSABh ad 3.11, then (2') would be restated as follows:

(2") For some x such that x is a sentient being, it is necessary that x is without gotra, and hence without any form of awakening.

Such a proposition would be inconsistent with (1'), since it is contradictory to state that it is possible for all beings to attain awakening but necessary that some do not. Thus my reconstruction of (2) entails interpreting *atyantam* as a term implying contingency rather than necessity⁴⁵. And so I propose that the claims at MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11 be read in terms of propositions (1') and (2'), respectively.

The tension which I raise between (1) and (2) is one which has been noticed by Tibetan and Indian Buddhist traditions. In his study of the theories of tathāgatagarbha and gotra, Ruegg (1969: 82) states that the apparent contradiction between MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11 has divided Tibetan commentators, and that certain Tibetan commentators have argued that the tathāgatagarbha-verse (9.37) is to be understood as having a sens intentionnel in this context — that its claim is not definitive for the MSA/Bh. Also notable is the fact that in the subcommentary to the Madhyāntavibhāga (again, a text cited in the MSABh), Sthiramati offers two rather conflicting interpretations of gotra⁴⁶: according to the first interpretation, different gotras are "inherent" (svābhāvikam) and "beginningless" (anādikālikam) in different individuals — for example, some have the śrāvaka-gotra and

others the buddha-gotra — a view that implies a theory of predetermined and distinct "seeds" of awakening. According to the second interpretation, however, all beings have the tathagata-gotra — a view that implies a theory of universal potentiality for buddhahood. And Sthiramati does not indicate which interpretation is to be understood as definitive. Thus we can see that even in the Indian context there was some debate over whether all beings have the tathāgatagarbha or whether different beings just have different gotras, with some beings excluded from the attainment of complete awakening, and others — those who are inherently without gotra excluded from the attainment of any form of awakening at all. We might speculate that had the modal concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency been developed in a rigorous fashion and employed in the context of a controversy between the theories of tathāgatagarbha and gotra, any inconsistency between the two theories — at least as they occur in the MSA/Bh — could have been resolved. Again, the reconstruction which I propose involves the two steps of interpreting atyantam at MSABh ad 3.11 as "for ever" — a step supported by both internal and external evidence — and interpreting (1) as a statement of possibility and (2) as a statement of contingency.

To conclude, in response to our initial question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening, we may state the following: in the terms of the MSA/Bh itself, while all beings have the embryo of the Tathāgata, some beings are simply for ever without the "seed" (*gotra*) of awakening. And in the terms of my proposed reconstruction: while all sentient beings can potentially attaining awakening, it is contingently the case that some beings will never actually do so⁴⁷.

Abbreviations

AA: Abhisamayālamkāra BBh: Bodhisattvabhūmi

DT: Derge Tanjur (Sde dge bstan 'gyur)

MAV: Madhyāntavibhāga

⁴⁵ My thanks to Jay Garfield for suggesting this way of stating the point to me in conversation.

⁴⁶ See Sanskrit ed., Yamaguchi 1934: 55-56.

⁴⁷ It may be interesting to consider this interpretation in relation to *Aṅguttara-nikāya* V: 193-195, where, after a discussion of the fourteen restricted points, the Buddha remains silent in response to the question of whether the whole world will attain deliverance.

MAVBh: Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāsya

MSA: Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra (verse-text)

MSABh: Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra-bhāsya (commentary)

MSA/Bh: Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra and Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra-bhāsya MSAT: Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra-tīkā (Asvabhāva's subcommentary)

MSAVBh: Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra-vṛtti-bhāsya (Sthiramati's subcommentary)

SNS: Samdhinirmocana-sūtra

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CANDRAKĪRTI ON DIGNĀGA ON SVALAKŞAŅAS

DAN ARNOLD

I. Introduction

Since the publication of Th. Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* in 1932, many scholars have followed the great Russian Buddhologist's lead in looking to the works of Dharmakīrti for help in understanding the works of Dignāga. Among other things, this has meant taking Dignāga to have understood *svalakṣaṇas* in terms of what Stcherbatsky characterized as "point-instants," a translation which perhaps plausibly conveys a sense of Dharmakīrti's understanding of this concept.

It is not surprising that scholars should thus have relied on Dharmakīrti in interpreting Dignāga, since understanding Dignāga's works is a task that presents significant interpretive difficulties. Unlike the case of Dharmakīrti (several of whose works survive in the original Sanskrit), Dignāga's works come down to us only in Tibetan translation¹. Moreover, in the case of the *Pramānasamuccaya*, what we have are in fact *two* often quite divergent Tibetan translations, a state of affairs that reflects Richard Hayes's contention that the available translations "show signs of having been done by translators who were themselves not certain of the meanings of many passages in the original texts..."². The available texts of Dignāga's works are thus more than usually underdetermined. Even more than is typically the case with respect to the characteristically elliptical works of Indian philosophers, then, a full understanding of Dignāga requires recourse to his commentators. In this regard, it is not surprising that a great many modern scholars have tread in Stcherbatsky's footsteps

¹ Randle (1926) has compiled such Sanskrit fragments of Dignāga as can be gleaned from the quotations of him in other extant works of Indian philosophy.

² Hayes (1988), p.6. Note that Hattori's edition and translation of the first chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (1968) gives editions of *both* Tibetan translations (i.e., the one supervised by the Indian *pandita* Vasudhararaksita, and the one supervised by Kanakavarman). Both Hayes and Hattori take the translation of Kanakavarman as their basic text.