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*Journal of Indian Philosophy* is published bi-monthly.

Publication programme 2005, Volume 33, 6 issues.

Subscriptions should be sent to **Springer, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands**, or at **P.O. Box 358, Accord Station, Hingham, MA 02018-0358, U.S.A.**, or to any subscription agent.

Changes of mailing address should be notified together with our latest label.

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## JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Volume 33 No. 3 June 2005

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*The Journal of Indian Philosophy* publishes articles on various aspects of Indian thought, classical and modern. Articles range from close analysis of individual philosophical texts to detailed annotated translations of texts. The journal also publishes more speculative discussions of philosophical issues based on a close reading of primary sources.

TAO JIANG

ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA AND THE PROBLEMATIC  
OF CONTINUITY IN THE *CHENG WEISHI LUN*

This essay is an attempt to look into the key Yogācāra concept of *ālayavijñāna* in its more developed form as presented in the *Cheng Weishi Lun* (*Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-śāstra*, *The Treatise on the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only*, hereafter *CWSL*).<sup>1</sup> The authorship of the *CWSL* is traditionally attributed to Xuan Zang, the famous 7th century Chinese Buddhist pilgrim and translator. It is composed as an extended commentary on Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā* by incorporating commentaries of *Trīṃśikā* by prominent Indian Yogācāra Buddhists, of which only Sthiramati's survives today in Sanskrit.<sup>2</sup> The text sides with Dharmapāla's commentary and uses it as the ultimate authority in the interpretation of *Trīṃśikā*.<sup>3</sup>

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*Journal of Indian Philosophy* is published bi-monthly.

Publication programme 2005, volume 33, 6 issues.

Periodicals postage paid at Rahway, N.J. USPS No. 491–790.

U.S. Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd., 365 Blair Road, Avenel, NJ 07001, U.S.A.

Published by Springer, Van Godewijckstraat 30, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands and 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

*Postmaster:* Please send all address corrections to: *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd., 365 Blair Road, Avenel, NJ 07001, U.S.A.

*Printed on acid-free paper*

<sup>1</sup> Unless noted otherwise, the *CWSL* texts cited in this essay are my own renditions. The only complete English translation of the *CWSL* is done by Wei Tat, from which I have benefited a great deal. However, Wei Tat's translation, as impressive as it is, has made many interpretative insertions into the text which are helpful for the understanding of the text but might be too liberal as a translation. The paginations of my translations are from the Chinese portion of Wei Tat's translation of the *CWSL* for those readers who might want to check both the original Chinese text and Wei Tat's translation as well as his interpretation. Occasionally Wei Tat's interpretative translations are used due to the terseness, and therefore vagueness, of Xuan Zang's text. In other words, this essay treats Wei Tat's work more as an interpretation rather than a strict translation. Those cases are marked as Wei Tat's work.

<sup>2</sup> Shunkyō Katsumata's *Bukkyō ni okeru Shinshikisetsu no Kenkyū* (*A Study of the Citta-Vijñāna Thought in Buddhism*) offers a detailed comparison between Dharmapāla, as represented by Xuan Zang, and Sthiramati on their interpretations of Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā*.

<sup>3</sup> Scholars have questioned various peculiar nature of the *CWSL*. For example, Shunkyō Katsumata (9–10) laments that a translator as great as Xuan Zang composes the text through a compilation of selective translations of various

In the *CWSL* Xuan Zang sets out to elaborate a key Yogācāra doctrine described in the *Trīṃśikā* that all of our experience is the result of the manifold transformation of consciousness, from Dharmapāla's position. At the core of Xuan Zang's effort is the notion of *ālayavijñāna*, usually translated as the storehouse consciousness. As Lambert Schmithausen (18–19) rightly points out, *ālayavijñāna* was initially postulated to provide the support for a meditator during two deep meditative states wherein all conscious activities are supposed to have stopped. However, once formulated, the development of *ālayavijñāna* took a course of its own, and the concept was expanded to accommodate other doctrinal needs of Buddhism, the most important of which was to account for our sense of self and our cognition of external objects. Given the orthodox Buddhist doctrine of impermanence which applies to both the self and external objects, the Buddhists had to explain away identity. For this purpose, they found an appealing candidate, namely continuity. Accordingly, they argued that the self results from the misidentification of continuity as identity. That is, continuity is mistaken as identity. Now the task that faced the Buddhists was how to account for continuity without appealing to identity. This is precisely the challenge Xuan Zang takes up in the *CWSL*.

There are three ways continuity can be conceived. First, continuity is change of properties of an unchanging substance. Second, continuity is due to an entity within change persisting from one stage into the next – identity in difference. Finally, continuity is nothing but an immediate contiguity, with the immediately preceding moment being the efficient cause of the immediately succeeding moment. All three

(Footnote 3 Continued).

commentaries instead of translating all ten commentaries themselves, thus losing an invaluable source for us to learn more accurately about the works of the ten prominent Indian Yogācārins, even though it is still an important source for their thought. He notes that such a practice is rather inconsistent with Xuan Zang's usual practice of staying overly faithful to the original texts in his translations (9). Traditionally it is believed that the particular style of the *CWSL* was adopted at the request of Xuan Zang's favorite disciple, Gui Ji. Dan Lusthaus goes even further in claiming that "from its inception, the *Ch'eng wei-shih Lun* represents Ku'ei-chi's [Gui Ji] aspirations, not Hsüan-tsang's, and it is Ku'ei-chi who has invested it with catechismic significance" (2002, 399). Here we are not concerned with these questions.

views, with certain nuanced but important modifications, are adopted by Xuan Zang. His strategy consists of three steps. First, he adopts the Madhyamika Buddhist position that all existents are empty of any intrinsic nature,<sup>4</sup> and interprets this to mean that a being does not have any metaphysical identity but is itself a continuum of momentary entities. Second, he attempts to reduce the continuity of external objects to the continuity of conscious activities; this is the culmination of the idealist tendency of Buddhism. Third, once the primacy of consciousness is established, he then moves to the theorization of the possibility of enlightenment as a continuous process from the deluded state of consciousness to the enlightened one. Apparently, the second step holds the key towards a viable account of continuity for the Buddhist and in this essay we will focus on precisely this second step. We will evaluate Xuan Zang's effort to account for continuity vis-à-vis his presentation of *ālayavijñāna*.

*Ālayavijñāna* is conceived as a grounding but evolving consciousness, consisting of ever-changing seeds whose subliminal existence warrants a congruity between successive dharmic moments. The basic argument of this essay is that *ālayavijñāna* in the *CWSL* is a Mahāyāna Buddhist notion of the subliminal consciousness formulated to account for the continuity of our sense of self and the continuity of our experience of the world. Our attention will be focused on this question: does *ālayavijñāna* as it is presented in the *CWSL* eventually solve the problematic of continuity within the parameters of Mahāyāna Buddhist discourse, and if so, how?

#### THE PRIMACY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In order to argue for continuity within the domain of consciousness, Xuan Zang has to establish the primacy of consciousness first. His strategy is to challenge the reification of the two aspects of a cognitive experience, namely, consciousness and its object. That is to say, Xuan Zang considers conscious process and its object<sup>5</sup> to be two aspects of the same cognitive experience; neither one is independent of the other. However, the mutual dependency of conscious activities and external objects alone does not establish the primacy of the former

<sup>4</sup> According to Dan Lusthaus, Xuan Zang's effort to argue for the non-difference of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is due to the influence of Dharmapāla while he was studying at Nālandā (2002, 404).

<sup>5</sup> This is what J.N. Mohanty calls "consciousing" (34).

over the latter. That is, he still has to justify his approach which prioritizes the consciousness-aspect over the object-aspect. Hence, he needs to make the argument that the existence of an object is not independent of the cognitive structure through which it is cognized and verified.

According to Xuan Zang, there are ultimately two kinds of beings, *dharma* and *ātman*,<sup>6</sup> corresponding to the two realms of existences, external and internal. *Dharma* refers to the external and *ātman* the internal. Let us take a look at how he makes the argument that the real existence of the two is irrelevant to our philosophical endeavor. Xuan Zang defines the way the two terms are used this way: “‘*Ātman*’ (Ch: *wo*) means ownership and domination whereas ‘*dharma*’ (Ch: *fa*) means norms and grasping” (8). He contends that *ātman* and *dharma* are the result of the misidentification of a continuum as identity or substance. It is with this observation that Vasubandhu begins his *Triṃśikā*:

*ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate/  
vijñānapariṇāme ‘sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā/  
vipāko mananākhyas ca vijñaptir viśayasya ca*

For the various metaphorical usage of “self” (*ātman*) and “objects” (*dharma*) is used on the basis of the transformation of consciousness. And that transformation is threefold: retribution, intellection, and perception of the sense-field.

There are a number of points worthy of our attention here. First of all, Vasubandhu points out that self (*ātman*) and objects (*dharma*) are nothing but metaphors. As such, they have no reference to real self-contained entities. Then what are the referents

<sup>6</sup> Various Hindu schools have made their own list of metaphysical categories. The most famous one is given by the Vaiśeṣika school which lists seven categories: substance, quality, action, universal, individual, inherence, and absence/negation. *Ātman* is included under the category of substance. The Buddhists in general do not accept the validity of some of these categories, rejecting them as nothing more than the result of intellectual abstraction with no experiential correlates. This is evidenced in the *CWSL* where the Buddhist position is defended. The basic strategy in the *CWSL* in dealing with the opponents’ views on the metaphysical categories is to link the categories to consciousness in arguing that they are perceivable only through sense organs. Hence they do not have a separate existence apart from consciousness. Since the arguments are not directly related to the theme of this essay, they will be filtered out. The Buddhists reduce these categories to two, self (*ātman*) and elements (*dharma*), namely the non-physical/internal and the physical/external, or at least they pick up these two as the representatives of metaphysical categories the treatment of which should lay to rest any lingering concerns regarding other metaphysical categories. This is the way *Triṃśikā* treats metaphysical categories.

of *ātman* and *dharma*? According to Vasubandhu, *ātman* and *dharma* correlate to no reality beyond the realm of consciousness. Instead, our sense of *ātman* and *dharma* are nothing but the result of the transformation of consciousness.<sup>7</sup> This transformation is threefold: the five sense-consciousnesses together with the sixth or sense-centered consciousness (*manovijñāna*) that discriminates and cognizes physical objects; the seventh or thought-centered consciousness (*manas*) that wills and reasons on a self-centered basis; and the eighth or storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).

At first sight, the claim that both *ātman* and *dharma* are the results of the transformation of consciousness easily associates it with the position of a metaphysical idealist, if metaphysical idealism can be roughly understood as a view that holds the ultimate reality to be mental, spiritual, or mind-dependent.<sup>8</sup> Is Xuan Zang’s Yogācāra Buddhism a form of metaphysical idealism? Let us look at how he accounts for the self and the external world by appealing to the transformation of consciousness.

He begins by investigating our cognition. An examination of our cognition would reveal a distinct structure:

When a defiled consciousness itself is born, it is manifested in two apparent characteristics (Sk. *lakṣaṇas*; Ch. *xiang*): as the appropriated (Sk. *ālambana*; Ch. *suo yuan*) and the appropriating (Sk. *sālambana*; Ch. *neng yuan*). ... As an apparent object, the appropriated explains the perceived aspect of consciousness (Sk. *nimittabhāga*; Ch. *xiang feng*). As an apparent subject, the appropriating explains the perceiving aspect (Sk. *darśanabhāga*; Ch. *jian feng*). (Xuan Zang, 138)

To put it simply, there is a dual structure in all of our – obviously defiled – cognitive activities, namely the perceiving aspect, *darśanabhāga*, and the perceived aspect, *nimittabhāga*.

As Shunkyō Katsumata (245) acutely observes, Xuan Zang makes such a case through an adoption of Dharmapāla’s controversial commentary of verse seventeen of Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśikā* since it is

<sup>7</sup> “If such words [as *ātman* and *dharma*s] are metaphorical expressions, on what ground can they be established? They are both metaphorical postulates resulting from the transformations of consciousness” (Xuan Zang, 10).

<sup>8</sup> This is different from subjective idealism which emphasizes the ultimate reality of the knowing subject (and it may either admit the existence of a plurality of such subjects or deny the existence of all save one in which case it becomes solipsism). It will become clear that, to Xuan Zang neither the knowing subject nor the known object is the ultimate reality. Xuan Zang’s Yogācāra idealism is also different from objective idealism which denies that the distinction between subject and object, between knower and known, is ultimate and maintains that all finite knowers and their thoughts are included in an Absolute Thought.



not clear whether *Trimśikā* can be read in such a way if we are to be faithful to the literal meaning of the text.

*vijñānaparināmo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate/  
tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam*||17||

The transformation of this consciousness is imagination.  
That which is imagined does not exist.  
Therefore all is cognition-only.

However, as Katsumata points out (245), in Xuan Zang's commentary which follows Dharmapāla's interpretation, this verse is interpreted as stating that the transformation of consciousness is the result of its being bifurcated into the discriminating and the discriminated. Since neither of the two exists outside of consciousness, there can be nothing but consciousness. This interpretation

argues for the transformation of consciousnesses by pointing to the perceiving and the perceived aspects of the eight consciousnesses and their concomitant mental activities (*citta* and *caittas*), and as a result, the perceiving aspect of the transforming consciousness becomes the discriminating aspect and the perceived aspect the discriminated. Therefore, because the self and entities do not exist apart from the bifurcation of the transforming consciousness, it is said that all is consciousness... (Katsumata, 246)

This is an important departure from Vasubandhu's text and a key development of the Yogācāra teaching by Dharmapāla and Xuan Zang. What is significant is that to Xuan Zang this dual structure is intrinsic to consciousness. That is to say that consciousness has an inherent structure to it, or to use the traditional terminology in Indian philosophical discourse, consciousness is formed (*sākāra*) and it is not formless (*nirākāra*). The *CWSL* defends the position this way:

If the mind and its concomitant mental activities (*citta* and *caittas*) did not have in themselves the characteristics of the appropriated, they would not be able to appropriate their own objects. Otherwise they would be able to appropriate indiscriminately all objects, since they would appropriate their own objects as the objects of others and appropriate the objects of others as their own. (138)

What is being argued here is that if consciousness does not have the perceived aspect within itself, it would be impossible for consciousness either to perceive anything as its own object or to perceive indiscriminately. Two issues are at stake in this connection. First, how is it possible for consciousness to perceive its *own* object? If consciousness

is formless, and all the forms, namely its content, would come from without; since that which external to consciousness is publicly available, it cannot become the private object of consciousness as is required if consciousness is to have its *own* object. If, however, consciousness has an inherent form, such a problem can be easily resolved since in that case the form vis-à-vis the object/content is intrinsic to itself. Second, if consciousness is formless, how can it perceive objects discriminately instead of indiscriminately perceiving all objects? Why does it perceive some objects instead of others at one point or another? This is especially problematic when any apparent external object is absent.

As is well known, the Hindu realists, such as the Nyāya philosophers, argue that consciousness is formless and all distinction is derived from outside of consciousness (Mohanty, 34). But there are at least two difficulties associated with the realist position, namely how to account for misperception and dream experience, since in both of these cases there are no corresponding external objects. Without going into the complexities of the arguments,<sup>9</sup> it should be clear that formlessness or receptivity is at least not sufficient in explaining consciousness.

The realists take the view that consciousness is formless, hence receptive, whereas the Yogācārins think that consciousness has an intrinsic structure to it, hence it is formed. The realist theory of the receptivity of consciousness, such as Nyāya's, has an easier time in explaining the collectivity of experience since according to it, the foundation of the collectivity is from without, therefore independent of consciousness. However, it has a much harder time in explaining misperception, dream and the personal nature of cognitive experience. The idealist theory of formed consciousness, such as Yogācāra's, has just the opposite advantages and disadvantages. It is admittedly more successful in explaining the private aspect of our cognition, but how can an essentially private cognition become publicly available in the Yogācāra theory? We will deal with this issue later in the essay.

<sup>9</sup> In order to solve this problem, the Nyāya philosophers argue that misperception is not misperception of objects but rather misperception of place. In defending such a solution, they resort to rather convoluted arguments as to how that can be the case. I will not go into the details of those arguments which are interesting but unconvincing, or to use Hiriyanna's words, "subtle rather than profound" (228) (although he was not necessarily referring to this particular point when he made the comment about some of the Naiyāika theories).

### On the subjective aspect of consciousness,

If the mind and its concomitant mental activities did not have in themselves the characteristics of the appropriating, they, like space, would not be able to appropriate any object. Otherwise we would have to say that space itself can appropriate objects. (Xuan Zang, 138)

This point is less controversial since, after all, the distinguishing characteristic of consciousness is its subjectivity and cognitive ability. However, what is of special interest to us here is that Xuan Zang takes the subjectivity of consciousness as just one of its components; both subjectivity and objectivity are intrinsic to the structure of consciousness. "Therefore the mind and its concomitant mental activities must have two aspects, the perceived aspect (*nimittabhāga*) and the perceiving aspect (*darśanabhāga*)" (*ibid.*).

However, there is still a problem in this view:

That which *nimittabhāga* and *darśanabhāga* depend on is itself called the 'thing.' This is the 'self-corroboratory' aspect, *svasaṃvittibhāga*. If this *bhāga* did not exist, there would be no recollection of the mind and its concomitant mental activities (*cittacaittas*), just as there is no memory of situations that have never been experienced. (Xuan Zang, 140)

To put it simply, according to Xuan Zang, each conscious moment has to be aware of itself so that memory or recollection of that moment can be possible. In other words, aside from the aspects of the perceiving and the perceived, there has to be an awareness of *this* perception of the perceived so that this perception can be recollected; otherwise, each perceptive moment would be self-contained. If that were the case, successive moments of perceptive experience would be rendered unrelated, resulting in the impossibility of memory and recollection of experiences.

Be this as it may, he has to address the following concern: is this self-corroboratory aspect also contained within each moment of perceptive experience or does it lie without? If it is outside of each moment of perception, it would resemble some notion of an uninvolved self, or to use Bina Gupta's word "the disinterested witness"<sup>10</sup> (*sākṣin*) which is the empirical manifestation of the eternal *ātman*. This would mean that some metaphysical concept of self, already rejected by the Buddhists, would sneak back into the Buddhist

<sup>10</sup> This is the title of her book which is a study of the concept of *sākṣin*, critical to the Advaita Vedānta epistemology. The translation of the term *sākṣin* as "disinterested witness" is attributed to Husserl's idea of the phenomenological ego as "disinterested on-looker" (Gupta, 5).

discourse. On the other hand, if the self-witnessing division is within each cognitive moment, the succession of moments becomes unaccounted for, hence defeating the very purpose of its postulation in explaining the possibility of memory and recollection.

In this connection, we find the following statement in the *CWSL*:

Transformation (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness means that consciousness itself is transformed into two aspects, *nimittabhāga* and *darśanabhāga*. These two aspects originate in dependence upon the self-corroboratory aspect (*svasaṃvittibhāga*). (10)

What interests us in the above passage is that the perceiving and the perceived divisions originate from the self-corroboratory division of consciousness. This means that the two functional divisions of the perceiving and the perceived are within the self-corroboratory division of each conscious moment. Consequently, this third self-corroboratory division is apparently not outside of the two functional divisions. But the question remains: how can the momentary self-witness division warrant the continuity of the cognitive experience in order to account for the possibility of memory and recollection of a particular experience? On the one hand, this self-corroboratory aspect gives rise to the two functional divisions, while on the other hand it retains the effects generated by the cognitive experience of the two functional divisions of each conscious moment. In other words, the self-corroboratory division and the two functional divisions are mutually causal. Apparently, the self-corroboratory division is not simply witnessing the activities of the other two divisions, but is also involved itself. The self-corroboratory division is involved in two ways, according to Xuan Zang: it gives rise to the two divisions and receives the seeds as the effects retained from the function of the two divisions. This means that the continuity of consciousness relies on its self-corroboratory division, not the two functional divisions; even though the two functional divisions can appear to be continuous, their continuity derives from the continuity of the third division as its manifestations.

Hence, the *CWSL* concludes that "it is on the basis of these two aspects that *ātman* and *dharma*s are established, because there is no other basis" (*ibid.*). On the issue of the existence of *dharma*, the external world in this connection, a typical metaphysical idealist position, such as that held by the famous eighteenth century British philosopher George Berkeley, denies the independence of a world apart from our cognition of it. Xuan Zang's claim that *dharma* is the result of the transformation of consciousness appears to be the

quintessential metaphysical idealist position. However, the *CWSL* apparently tries to steer itself clear from the metaphysical question here. Accordingly, after carefully examining the structure of our cognitive experience of an external object, the non-controversial conclusion is that within each cognitive moment there are an experiencing subject and an experienced object, putting aside the self-corroboratory division for the moment. So far this is acceptable to Xuan Zang, and any step further is to him an unacceptable move, since it means to posit the existence of that which is independent of this cognitive structure. Here is how Xuan Zang raises the objection:

How can we tell that there really are no external objects, but only internal consciousness appearing as external objects? It is because the existence of a real *ātman* and real *dharma*s cannot be ascertained. (12)

In fact, Xuan Zang is not denying the possibility of a real *ātman* or real *dharma*s, but is simply pointing out that their reality cannot be ascertained independent of consciousness. This means that the perception of an external world does not, by itself, warrant the existence of such a world, and that there is no *a priori* reason to either affirm or deny, within the parameters of consciousness, the existence of the “real” external world. In fact, Xuan Zang argues that to posit an external world independent of our cognition of it is an unnecessary theoretical complication insofar as the adequacy of explaining our cognition is concerned; and I call this “qualified metaphysical idealism.”<sup>11</sup> It is not simply a reflection of the relationship between consciousness and the world, which would be epistemological, but rather how the realm of consciousness becomes the world as we experience it. Therefore, it is a form of metaphysical idealism in the sense that it holds the view that the

<sup>11</sup> The Yogācāra system dealt with in this essay is along the line of Vasubandhu’s major works and their commentaries compiled by Xuan Zang in the *CWSL*. Regardless of whether Vasubandhu himself was an idealist or not, his teaching has been interpreted along the line of metaphysical idealism in the mainstream Indian Buddhist tradition, represented by Dharmakīrti, with only a few exceptions. As for what Vasubandhu himself advocates in this respect, there are the following positions found in modern Buddhist scholarship: Lusthaus: epistemological idealism; Kochumuttom: realist pluralism; Wood: idealist pluralism; Sharma: absolute idealism; Stecherbatsky: spiritual monism; Murti: idealism *par excellence*; Conze: metaphysical idealism. Amongst them, Lusthaus and Kochumuttom can be grouped together since both of them reject the ontological idealist interpretation of Yogācāra; the others can be viewed as variations on interpreting Yogācāra as advocating metaphysical idealism.

realm of consciousness *is* the world. It is qualified in the sense that any existence outside the realm of consciousness is neither affirmed nor denied.<sup>12</sup>

This qualified metaphysical idealist position is evidenced by the following remark, “In all of the graspings of *dharma*s, there might or might not be *dharma*s exterior to the mind, but there always are *dharma*s interior to the mind” (Xuan Zang, 88). It is revealing to note that Xuan Zang actually starts by conceding that in certain cases our experience of a physical object may indeed have a corresponding object exterior to the mind. The caveat in this connection is the contingent nature of such a correspondence; as he rightly observes, *not all* experience of an external object has its corresponding object external to the mind. A stock example would be dream experience, wherein the experience of an external object does not have any correspondence beyond the realm of the mind. Obviously in some of our experiences of external objects, their externality is not a necessary condition. This amounts to saying that the externality of objects is only a contingent factor in our experience of physical objects, whereas their internal representation within the realm of consciousness is a necessary component of all our experiences of physical objects. Or to be more exact, our experience of objects is real but their external existence is not necessarily so.

The opponents might argue that unless there is a real external world it would be impossible for the sense of externality to arise in the first place, including in dreams. Such an argument is a typical realist line and Xuan Zang, being an idealist, albeit a “qualified metaphysical idealist,” cannot accept the realist presupposition in the argument. In any case, Xuan Zang is simply not interested in tracing the origin of our cognition, which would result in a hopelessly circular inquiry into whether it is the real existence of the external world that

<sup>12</sup> According to Diana Paul, Paramārtha’s interpretation of Yogācāra also falls along the line of qualified metaphysical idealism although she did not use that term: “Although there are philosophical inconsistencies from one text to another, for Paramārtha, at least, Yogācāra is a system in which the world we experience evolves from acts of cognition continually in operation, and no other world is ours to experience (which is not the same thing as saying that no other world exists)” (Paul, 8). Paramārtha, as a prominent translator of Buddhist texts into Chinese during the 6th century, greatly influenced Xuan Zang’s understanding of Yogācāra philosophy (Paul, 4).

gives rise to the sense of externality or the other way around.<sup>13</sup> What fascinates him is this question: why is consciousness able to create an external world in the absence of it? In order to respond to such a question, a thorough inquiry about the nature of consciousness is called for, and this is precisely Xuan Zang's goal. Hence we find the *CWSL* claiming that

On the basis of the manifold activities of inner consciousnesses which serve as conditions for one another, the cause and effect are differentiated. The postulation of external conditions is not of any use. (574)

Put simply, external objects are reduced to cognitions of them in the realm of consciousness and their actual existence is rendered irrelevant within Xuan Zang's Yogācāra paradigm.

To Xuan Zang, the same logic is applicable to both the subject and the object of our experience with regard to the positing of their existence. In other words, if the experience of an external world does not warrant the existence of one, the experiencing of a subject, cannot by the same token, be used to justify the existence of a self, either. Xuan Zang, in keeping his commitment to the Buddhist doctrine of *anātman*, rejects the existence of a self as the owner, as it were, of the experience. The line of defense launched by Xuan Zang is similar to the one against the existence of an external world. That is, the existence of the self cannot be ascertained within the parameters of consciousness. Although he agrees that there is a subject/object structure in our cognitive experience, the subject cannot be translated into a self, *ātman*, independent of the cognitive structure since the subject itself also undergoes changes in the course of experience.

In this way, Xuan Zang has successfully established the primacy of consciousness by rendering irrelevant any speculations of real existence outside the cognitive structure of consciousness. What he needs to do next is to explain the relationship amongst different kinds of consciousnesses and their transformations. The success or failure

<sup>13</sup> Matilal comes up with four possible positions regarding the nature of physical objects. "One is *regressive*: the physical object is there in the first place to give rise to the sense-datum, and thus we have a causal theory or representationalism. The other is *progressive*: the physical object is a construction out of these immediately given data, and thus we have phenomenalism, which says that we build up our world with these bits and pieces of what is given in immediate sensory experience. Moreover, we know that there is also a third position that is possible: physical objects do not exist, and it is a myth to assume that they do. This is the position of Vasubandhu in his *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. . . . The third position may or may not be implied in the second, although the critics of the second assert, more often than not, that it leads to the third position. The fourth position is . . . direct realism. . ." (Matilal, 232–33).

of his effort depends on whether he is able to address this critical question: is consciousness alone sufficient to account for our cognitive experience? To this end, Xuan Zang has engaged in a painstakingly detailed analysis of consciousness, centered around a new form of consciousness, *ālayavijñāna*. The significance of *ālayavijñāna* in the Yogācāra system lies in the fact that until the postulation of this consciousness the Buddhists did not really have a good and convincing explanation of the apparent continuity of our everyday experience, memory and sense of self, given the central Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of non-substantiality of reality, *śūnyatā*. Let us now turn to this concept of *ālayavijñāna* as Xuan Zang presents it in the *CWSL*.

#### ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA: A NEW FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The early Buddhist model of consciousness consists of five senses: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile, and the mind whose object is mental. The Yogācāra theory of consciousness significantly revises and expands this traditional model.<sup>14</sup> It splits the mind in the traditional model into two: *manovijñāna* and *manas*. *Manovijñāna* is called sense-centered consciousness, and it works in conjunction with the five senses. These six, namely *manovijñāna* and the five senses, constitute one kind of consciousness which "appropriates crude objects" (Xuan Zang: 96). This means that the objects of this group of consciousnesses are external objects. Any perception of external objects requires the co-presence of "such factors as the act of attention (*manaskāras*) of *manovijñāna*, the sense-organs (*indriyas*), (whose attention is directed in accordance with *manovijñāna*), the external objects (*viṣayas*) towards which this attention is directed" (Wei Tat, 479). In other words, the role of *manovijñāna* is to direct the attention of sense organs towards their objects in order to produce *clear* perceptions of those objects. *Manovijñāna* also has a cogitative or deliberative function, but such a function is crude and unstable and it might be interrupted in certain states.<sup>15</sup> The uninterrupted mind is called *manas*, which "is related to the view of the existence of self"

<sup>14</sup> "Some *sūtras* say that there are six consciousnesses and we should know that this is only an expedient way of explanation. They pronounce six consciousnesses on the ground of six sense-organs, but the actual categories of consciousnesses are eight" (Xuan Zang, 336).

<sup>15</sup> Xuan Zang lists five states in which *manovijñāna* is lacking: birth among *asaṃjñīdevas*, two meditation states (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti* and *nīrodhasamāpatti*), mindless stupor (*middha*) and unconsciousness (*mūrchā*) (480–92).

(Xuan Zang, 314). This means that *manas* is responsible for the genesis of the idea of personhood, the essence of a person. Its function is intellection and cogitation: "It is called 'cogitation' or 'deliberation' because it cogitates or deliberates at all times without interruption in contradistinction to the sixth consciousness (*manovijñāna*), which is subject to interruption" (Wei Tat, 97). Compared with *manovijñāna*, *manas* is fine and subtle in its activities (Xuan Zang, 478). Hence the delusion it generates, namely the idea of self, is much more resistant to being transformed in order to reach enlightenment. *Manovijñāna* works with the five senses in cognizing external physical objects; *manas* works with another consciousness, which is for the first time postulated by Yogācāra, the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) or the eighth consciousness. *Manas* is attached to *ālayavijñāna* and regards it as the inner self (Xuan Zang, 104).

*Ālayavijñāna* is also known as *vipākavijñāna*, ripening consciousness, or *mūlavijñāna*, root consciousness. "[It] is the eighth consciousness, the maturing or retributive consciousness (Sk. *vipākavijñāna*; Ch. *yishu shi*) because it has many seeds that are of the nature of ripening in varied ways" (Xuan Zang, 96). This consciousness is meant to account for the karmic retribution within the doctrinal boundary of Buddhism in that it stores the karmic seeds till their fruition, and this karmic continuity is one crucial kind of continuity that the Buddhists try to explain without reification. The tactic here is to render this retributive consciousness subtle and subliminal whose activities surface only when conditions allow, that is, when karmic retribution is fulfilled. This is a completely different form of consciousness from those in the traditional model in that the traditional forms of consciousness are strictly causal, meaning they are object-dependent in their cognitive activities. *Ālayavijñāna*, by contrast, does not depend upon any specific object and it grounds the other seven consciousnesses which include *manas* as one kind and *manovijñāna* and the five senses as the other.

These three kinds of consciousness are all called 'consciousnesses that are capable of transformation and manifestation' (*pariṇāmi vijñāna*). The manifestation (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness is of two kinds: manifestation with respect to cause (*hetupariṇāma*) and manifestation with respect to effect (fruit) (*phalapariṇāma*). (Wei Tat, 97)

The manifestation as cause refers to the seeds, *bīja*, stored in *ālayavijñāna*, and the manifestation as effect to the eight consciousnesses. In other words, according to the Yogācāra theory, the

seeds give birth to the eight consciousnesses. It is obvious that the conceptualization of *ālayavijñāna* is premised upon the theory of *bīja*. Therefore, let us continue our study of *ālayavijñāna* with a closer examination of the Yogācāra theory of *bīja*.

#### XUAN ZANG'S YOGĀCĀRA THEORY OF *BĪJA*

Xuan Zang defines *bīja* this way in the *CWSL*: "They are those which, found in the *mūlavijñāna* (root-consciousness), generate their own fruits" (108).<sup>16</sup> One point of interest in the definition of a *bīja* is the stipulation that *bījas* are in *ālayavijñāna*. This has to do with the relationship between *bīja* and *ālayavijñāna* which will be crucial in the Yogācāra effort to account for continuity without reification. We will leave this for later in the essay. What concerns us at this juncture is the point that *bīja* is a potentiality which immediately engenders an actual *dharma*. Being potential, a *bīja* is not actual, compared with the fruit to which it gives birth, a *dharma*, which is actual. Does this mean that a *bīja* does not have a real existence, but only a nominal one? Aware of such possible confusion, Xuan Zang immediately moves to clarify this by stating that "the *bījas* are real entities" and that "those which have only nominal existence are like non-existent entities and cannot be a causal condition, *hetupratyaya*" (*ibid.*). Apparently, Xuan Zang categorizes entities into two kinds, real and nominal. Both actual and potential are regarded as real by Xuan Zang, but nominal is regarded as merely fictional, hence unreal.

When we compare Xuan Zang's definition of *bīja* with William Waldron's interpretation of it – which is based on the Abhidharma literature – it may shed more light on the struggle Xuan Zang has in defining *bīja* as a potentiality. According to Waldron, *bījas* are

not real existents (*dravya*) at all, but simply metaphors for the underlying capacities (*śakti* or *samārthya*), potentials and developments of mind in terms of the life

<sup>16</sup> According to Yokoyama's observation: "The view that all *bījas* were planted by linguistic activities has always been the common understanding in the Yogācāra thought since *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*... Later in the *CWSL* the terminology was simplified to habitual energy of naming (*míng yān xī qì*) or seeds of naming (*míng yān zhōng zǐ*) and it became the general term for *bīja*. However, what is *bīja*? It is the potential energy planted into *ālayavijñāna* through linguistic activities, and conversely the driving force giving rise to our linguistic activities" (142). What is striking is the prominence of linguistic activity in defining *bīja*, in that the linguistic activities plant some potential energy into the storehouse consciousness which in turn generates our linguistic activities. In other words, *bīja* is essentially linguistic. However, Xuan Zang's definition of *bīja* in the *CWSL* is broader than linguistic.

processes of insemination (*paribhāvita*), growth (*vr̥ddha*) and eventual fructification (*vipāka-phala*; “ripened fruit”). (1994, 220)

It is conceivable that Xuan Zang would dispute the wording of Waldron’s interpretation of *bīja* as “not real existents ... but simply metaphors.” Indeed, the *CWSL* tells us that Sthiramati maintains the view that a *bīja* has only a nominal existence. This position is shared by the Sautrāntikas, but it is rejected by Xuan Zang (108). Waldron’s interpretation somewhat echoes Sthiramati’s position on *bīja*. Apparently, Xuan Zang is struggling to give *bīja* a higher sense of reality than simply nominal or metaphorical. Hence, the distinction Xuan Zang makes is between potentiality and actuality, instead of reality and nominality as is the case with Sthiramati. Accordingly, there are entities that are actually real, like *dharmas*, and there are also those that are potentially real, like the *bījas*.

What kinds of potentials does the postulation of *bīja* register? *Bīja* is also called habit energy or perfuming energy (*vāsanā*) and Xuan Zang lists three kinds of *vāsanā*, namely “image (*nimitta*), name (*nāma*), and discriminating influence (*vikalpavāsanā*)” (138). The image (*nimitta*) refers to the dual structure of our perceptual activities, and discriminating influence (*vikalpavāsanā*) to the dual structure of our conceptual activities. *Nāma* refers to the linguistic activities which involve naming and conceptualizing.<sup>17</sup> Xuan Zang sums them up in explaining seeds as the potential proceeding from the two *grāhas* and the potential producing the two *grāhas* (580). The two *grāhas* refer to the grasping (*grāhaka*) and the grasped (*grāhya*). This means that all of our conscious activities, be they perceptual, conceptual or linguistic, share the same dual structure, the grasping and the grasped. Such a discriminatory function of our mental activities is that which produces *bījas*, and the *bījas* thus produced also perpetuate this discriminatory function, dragging us back into the transmigratory realm. Therefore we find the *CWSL* declaring that

The wheel of life and death turns by *karma* and the two *grāhas*. None of them are separate from consciousness, because they are, by nature, *dharmas* of *cittas-caittas*. (582)

<sup>17</sup> The *CWSL* lists two kinds of *nāma*: “One are those which express meanings: they can explain the differences in meanings and sounds; the other are those which reveal their objects: they are the mind and its concomitant activities that perceive their objects” (582).

According to the *CWSL*, *bījas* have six characteristics: they are momentary, constitute a continuous series, belong to a definite moral species, depend on a group of conditions, lead to their own fruits, and are simultaneous with their fruits (126–28). The momentariness of seeds means that they “necessarily vanish right when they are born” (Xuan Zang, 126) which makes them the most active elements capable of generative activity engendering either succeeding seeds or actual *dharmas*. Their generative activities bring about two results. First is the succession of seeds constituting a continuous series, and second is the simultaneous support as the ground for actual *dharmas*. Moreover, a seed can only give rise to a fruit, either a succeeding seed or an actual *dharma*, whose nature is similar to that of the seed itself. Otherwise, if a seed can generate a succeeding seed or an actual *dharma* of a different kind, the world would be haphazardly ordered without any regularity. Therefore, for Xuan Zang, a defiled seed can only give rise to a defiled *dharma* and a pure seed to a pure *dharma*. Hence, seeds belong to a definite moral species: defiled, pure or non-defined. For potential to become actual, there has to be a collaboration of conditions. In addition, “each *bīja* produces its own fruit whose nature is similar to its own. That is, the *bīja* of *rūpa* generates *rūpa*, and the *bīja* of *citta* generates *citta*” (128).

However, what attracts our attention is the characteristic of *bījas* being simultaneous with their fruits.

When the *bīja* engenders the actual *dharma*, the cause is simultaneous with the fruit. When the *bīja* engenders a *bīja* which is similar to it, the cause is anterior to the fruit. But we attribute ‘causal activity’ only to present things, not to future things (not yet born) and past things (already destroyed) which have no specific nature (*svabhāva*, reality). Hence the name of *bīja* is reserved for that *bīja* which engenders the actual *dharma*, not for that which leads to the production of a *bīja* similar to itself. (Wei Tat, 127)

The stipulation that the cause has to be simultaneous with its effect apparently goes against our common sense which assumes that the cause precedes its effect, as Junshō Tanaka acutely points out (275).

Furthermore, when coupled with such mutually contradictory concepts, the simultaneity of cause and effect is not limited to the generation of entities by seeds, nor is it explained merely psychologically with respect to the generation of seeds through the perfuming by entities, even though on a first look it appears to be a psychological phenomenon. This suggests that there has to be a doctrinal explanation. (Tanaka, 275)

In other words, there has to be a doctrinal consideration in Xuan Zang’s counterintuitive stipulation of the simultaneity between cause



and effect. Indeed, in this regard, we find Xuan Zang contending that if the cause precedes its effect, when the effect comes into existence its cause will have been gone. If this were the case, in what sense can we claim that the cause causes the effect since the cause and the causal activity belong to the past, and hence no longer exist? By the same token, if the effect succeeds its cause, when the cause is engaged in the causal activity its effect has not yet emerged. If this were the case, in what sense can we claim that the cause causes the effect since the effect belongs to the future, and hence does not yet exist?

Such a position on causality is unique to Dharmapāla/Xuan Zang's Yogācāra system which is not necessarily accepted by other Yogācārins (Hukaura, vol.1: 353–55). Here Xuan Zang clearly has the Sarvāstivāda position on causality in mind. The Sarvāstivādins advocate that things in the past, present and future all exist. By resorting to this doctrine, the Sarvāstivādins contend that the cause and the effect are simultaneous since an existent *dharma* can always produce an effect as its cause, hence rendering the problematic of continuity irrelevant. There are numerous problems which make it difficult to defend such a position, the most important of which is its abandonment of the orthodox Buddhist teaching of the non-substantiality of *dharma*. Consequently, this view on the existence of *dharma*s in all three stages of time is rejected by the Yogācārins like Xuan Zang. However, Xuan Zang does embrace the Sarvāstivādins' stance that the cause and the effect have to be simultaneous in order for causation to take place, although in his case, the simultaneity of cause and effect is possible only when the cause is a potential and the effect is an actual *dharma*. This means that, to Xuan Zang, causality can take place only in the situation wherein potentiality causes actuality, and the two have to be simultaneous. However, it is no longer causality as we normally understand it, since the conventional understanding of causality does not require the simultaneity of the cause and the effect but their succession, although this is not to say that any succession is necessarily causal.

What, then, is the causality that Xuan Zang talks about here when he stipulates that cause and effect have to be simultaneous? If causality necessarily involves the succession of effect after cause, his insistence on the simultaneity of cause and effect actually transforms causality into grounding, with the *dharma* grounded in the *bīja*, the actual grounded in the potential. Simultaneity of the cause and the effect renders the former the ground for the latter. To quote Tanaka again,

Since the generation of entities (*dharma*) by seeds (*bīja*) does not require time, it surely has to be viewed as indicating the root of possibilities. In other words, we should not interpret it as the cause that generates seed-carrying entities, but rather as the root [or ground] for the generation of entities. (269)

Since one is potential and the other actual, there is no conflict between the two in order for both to exist at the same time and in the same place with the potential grounding the actual.

After dealing with Xuan Zang's presentation of *bīja*, we are in a position to bring in *ālayavijñāna*. Let us see how *ālayavijñāna* is presented in the *CWSL* in the following.

#### ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA IN THE CWSL

What is *ālayavijñāna*? According to the *CWSL*, this concept has three aspects:

1. It is that which stores up *bījas* (Ch. *neng cang*).
2. It is that which is stored (Ch. *suo cang*).
3. It is that which is attached to (Ch. *zhi cang*). (104)

Put simply, *ālayavijñāna* is that which stores up seeds which are perfumed by the defiled *dharma*s and it is the object of attachment by *manas* resulting in the erroneous notion of *ātman*. Here *ālayavijñāna* is granted a sweeping role in accomplishing the objective of explaining everything from within the structure of consciousness without having to appeal to anything outside of that structure. In other words, the formulation of *ālayavijñāna* makes the Yogācāra metaphysical idealist system, albeit in the qualified sense we talked about earlier, complete by rendering consciousness alone sufficient to explain all of our experiences. Let us begin our inquiry of Xuan Zang's presentation of *ālayavijñāna* with its relationship with the *bīja*.

#### *Ālayavijñāna and Bīja*

As the bearer of seeds, *ālayavijñāna* is closely related to *bīja*, but the exact nature of the relationship is difficult to determine. Here Xuan Zang encounters a thorny issue. If *ālayavijñāna* is understood as that which stores up *bījas*, we are faced with this question: even though *bījas* are momentary, as we have discussed, does the postulation of *ālayavijñāna* as their storehouse make it a permanent dwelling place for *bījas*? As Kōitsu Yokoyama rightly observes:

Now, if we only pay attention to the point that various *dharma*s as fruits are stored in this consciousness, this *ālayavijñāna* becomes that which stores in itself the seeds which are the fruits of various *dharma*s. To use a space metaphor, *ālayavijñāna* is the storing place where *bīja*s as goods are stored. However, *ālayavijñāna* and *bīja* are not material things like the storage or stored goods, but rather something spiritual. Consequently, there arises the complex question in their relationship. (148–49)

If *ālayavijñāna* is a permanent dwelling place for *bīja*s, it would be against the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence and defeat the very purpose in the postulation of *ālayavijñāna*; that purpose is to account for continuity without accepting any form of substantialization in line with the general Buddhist position against reification as demonstrated in such core Buddhist concepts like *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination), *anitya* (impermanence), *anātman* (no-self) and *śūnyatā* (emptiness). This is indeed a key conceptual difficulty in the Yogācāra formulation of *ālayavijñāna*. Xuan Zang is well aware of the trap in making *ālayavijñāna* into some kind of permanent entity. In tackling this critical issue regarding the relationship between *bīja* and *ālayavijñāna*, we find the *CWSL* claiming that

The *bīja*s are neither identical with nor different from the root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) and the fruits. This is because only such a relationship, between consciousness itself and its activities and between the cause vis-à-vis *bīja*s and the fruits vis-à-vis *dharma*, is reasonable. (108)

The relationships between *bīja* and *ālayavijñāna* and between the cause (*hetu*) vis-à-vis a *bīja* and the fruit (*phala*) vis-à-vis an actual *dharma* are characterized as neither identical nor different. What is especially interesting to us here is the claim Xuan Zang makes that *bīja* is the activity of *ālayavijñāna*. Moreover, “the *bīja*s depend on the eighth consciousness itself (*svasaṃvittibhāga*), but they are only the perceived aspect (*nimittabhāga*) because the perceiving aspect (*darśanabhāga*) always takes them as its objects” (*ibid.*). *Svasaṃvittibhāga* of the eighth consciousness, namely, the self-witness or self-corroboratory aspect of *ālayavijñāna* that is perfumable, refers to its susceptibility to the influence by other aspects (Wei Tat, 109). This means that *bīja*s depend on the self-corroboratory division of *ālayavijñāna*. Furthermore, *bīja*s are the *nimittabhāga*, the object aspect, of the eighth consciousness since they are always taken by its perception aspect as its object. We have seen in our earlier discussion that the perceiving and the perceived aspects (*nimittabhāga* and *darśanabhāga*) of *ālayavijñāna* arise out of its self-corroboratory division. When this is juxtaposed with Xuan Zang’s claim that *bīja* is the activity of *ālayavijñāna*, the natural conclusion is that

*ālayavijñāna* is more than the collection of *bīja*s and that *bīja* is only one of its aspects, namely the perceived aspect. The other aspects of *ālayavijñāna* are its perceiving aspect and its self-corroboratory aspect. This is how *ālayavijñāna* is formulated as a form of consciousness itself, instead of simply a collection of seeds.<sup>18</sup>

However, when Xuan Zang argues that *ālayavijñāna* is neither identical with nor different from the *bīja*s, as we have seen above, he is clearly in a dilemma which he is keenly aware of. The two are obviously not the same since the latter is only one aspect of the former. However, Xuan Zang cannot make them different either, since that would lead to the substantialization of *ālayavijñāna* against the orthodox Buddhist view that substance is itself the continuum of activities and that there is no substance separate from such a continuum. In order to find his way out of the dilemma, Xuan Zang makes *ālayavijñāna* “neither permanent nor impermanent” (170). The rationale is provided as a commentary to the fourth stanza in Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśikā* – “It is in perpetual transformation like a violent torrent.”

“Perpetual” means that this consciousness has continuously evolved without interruption as a homogeneous series since before the beginning of time, because it is the basis that establishes realms of existence (*dhātu*), directions of reincarnation (*gatis*) and forms of birth (*yoni*), and because it does not lose *bīja*s it holds due to its firm nature.

“Transformation” means that this consciousness arises and perishes instantaneously and mutates from one moment to the next. Due to the constant extinction of cause and generation of fruit, it is never a single entity. Hence it can be perfumed by other consciousnesses to produce *bīja*s.

“Perpetual” states that it is uninterrupted; “transformation” suggests that it is impermanent. (170)

<sup>18</sup> As Schmithausen observes, this seems to be case in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* concerning the relation between *ālayavijñāna* and seeds in the “Initial Passage” identified by him: “It admits of being understood not only in the sense that *ālayavijñāna* possesses or contains the Seeds, implying that it is, itself, something more, but also in the sense that *ālayavijñāna* merely comprises them, being hardly anything else but their sum or totality. In other words: There does not seem to exist, in the Initial Passage, any reliable clue for assuming that it did anything else but hypostatize the Seeds of mind lying hidden in corporeal matter to a new form of mind proper, this new form of mind hardly, or, at best, but dimly, acquiring as yet an essence of its own, not to speak of the character of a veritable *vijñāna*” (30). Xuan Zang seems to be trying to strike a balance between substantializing *ālayavijñāna* and making it simply the collection of *bīja*s. He appears to be cautious in making it an entity of some sort, aware of the risk involved.



Xuan Zang is trying to achieve two objectives here. One is to make *ālayavijñāna* causally connected with other consciousnesses, hence it is said to be perfumable. The other is to make it a continuous series of activities, but not a substance of some sort. The first objective is necessary because otherwise *ālayavijñāna* would be rendered unaffected by activities of the other consciousnesses, resembling the *ātman*. The second objective is needed because otherwise our experience of the world would become chaotic if the foundation of our cognition, *ālayavijñāna*, is discontinuous and haphazard. The first point addresses the self-corroboratory aspect of *ālayavijñāna*. Since it is causally connected with the other two aspects – the perceiving and the perceived aspects – of *ālayavijñāna* as well as the other seven consciousnesses, the self-corroboratory aspect of *ālayavijñāna* would not be regarded as some sort of witnessing consciousness standing apart from and unaffected by the cognitive process, like the Hindu Advaita Vedānta notion of *sākṣin*, which is the empirical manifestation of *ātman*. The second point, on the other hand, makes the activities of *ālayavijñāna* abide by the rule of dependent origination:

Since before the beginning of time this consciousness has been of the nature that the generation of fruit and the extinction of cause take place instantaneously. It is not impermanent due to the generation of fruit; it is not permanent due to the extinction of cause. To be neither impermanent nor permanent this is the principle of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Hence it is said that this consciousness is in perpetual transformation like a torrent. (Xuan Zang, 172)

It is not permanent, in the sense that it is itself an activity, not a substance; it is not impermanent, in the sense that the activity is a continuous and uninterrupted process. Xuan Zang here appeals to the central Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination to account for the law regulating the activities of consciousness. In this way, Xuan Zang proves that *ālayavijñāna* is not some permanent dwelling place for *bījas* or permanent ground for the *dharma*s but rather is itself a continuum of activities.

As Katsumata (225) points out, in the above interpretation Xuan Zang follows Dharmapāla's insertion of the word "perpetual" into Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā*. The original Sanskrit word in Vasubandhu's text that can imply such a meaning is *srotasā* which means "as a stream or torrent" (*ibid.*). Since "perpetual" becomes so important in Dharmapāla/Xuan Zang's commentary, we can clearly see their departure from Vasubandhu wherein their creativity lies:

In Dharmapāla's exposition, the principle of dependent origination is articulated as the successive series of *ālayavijñāna* that is neither impermanent nor permanent and is without interruption. Therefore, here, after the theories of causality held by Sarvāstivādins, Sammatīyas, Sthaviravādins, Sautrāntikas and others are tossed out, we can conclude that "the correct doctrine of dependent origination in Mahāyāna Buddhism which stipulates the succession between cause and effect is rendered credible." (Katsumata, 227)

This is how Xuan Zang uses *ālayavijñāna* to reinterpret dependent origination without having to postulate any entity that continues from one moment to the next. As a result, *pratītyasamutpāda* becomes the law that governs the activities of *ālayavijñāna*.

#### *Ālayavijñāna and the seven consciousnesses*

Since Xuan Zang has established the primacy of consciousness over the objective world, as long as he can demonstrate, first, that the continuum of the conscious activity is the result of its following the causal law and, second, that our experience of externality is the result of the self-externalizing activity of consciousness, he would succeed in explaining continuity within the confinement of the Mahāyāna Buddhist orthodoxy of non-substantiality of reality.

What is at stake in achieving the first goal is to sort out the relationship amongst the various forms of consciousness, namely the eight consciousnesses. That is, Xuan Zang has to explain that the manifestation of consciousness itself follows the causal law. In order to reach the second goal, he has to explain how the self-externalization of consciousness takes place. Let us begin our inquiry with an examination of the first question, namely how the *CWSL* makes the case that the causal law governs the various dynamics of consciousness.

(A) *Causal relationship among consciousnesses*. First, Xuan Zang argues what causality means in his system:

This right principle is profound and mysterious beyond words. Such words as cause (*hetu*) and fruit (*phala*) are mere metaphorical postulates. When the phenomenon that the present *dharma* produces its succeeding *dharma* is observed, the succeeding fruit is postulated so as to explain the present cause. When the phenomenon is observed that the generation of the present *dharma* is due to a preceding *dharma*, the past cause is postulated to account for the present fruit. "Metaphorical postulates" means that it is the present consciousness itself that appears as a future effect or a past cause. Thus the rationale of the causal principle is clear. It is far from the two extreme views of permanence and impermanence and is in accordance with the Middle Path. (174)

What is interesting to us in this passage is that Xuan Zang regards the principle of causality as mysterious and cause and effect as merely metaphorical postulates. He is obviously well aware of the conventional understanding of causality as the succession between cause and effect. However he claims that the cause and the effect can only be understood metaphorically since they are not simultaneous, as we have discussed previously. The true nature of causality is, according to Xuan Zang, that the present consciousness itself appears as the semblance of a future and a past, of cause and fruit.<sup>19</sup> In other words, there is only the activity of consciousness at each present moment, and past/future and cause/effect are nothing but the self-differentiating activities of consciousness at each present moment.

The natural question, then, seems to be: what is this self-differentiating activity of consciousness? This relates to the different manifestations of consciousness in the Yogācāra system. In this connection, we find Xuan Zang saying:

Although consciousness can be transformed into infinite forms, what is capable of such transformations is of three kinds only. The first is the ripening consciousness (Sk: *vipāka*; Ch: *yishu*), namely the eighth consciousness, since it holds *bījas* which are of the nature of ripening in varied ways. The second is the deliberative consciousness, namely the seventh consciousness, since it is always engaged in deliberation and speculation. The third is the consciousness that discriminates spheres of objects, namely the first six consciousnesses, since the spheres of objects are crude. The word "and" in the stanza indicates that the six consciousnesses form one group. The above three kinds are all called consciousness that is capable of transformation. (96)

Put simply, the manifestation of consciousness at each moment is simultaneously a threefold process: retribution process, self-cogitation process and cognitive process of objects other than the self. The three processes are intermingled with each other<sup>20</sup> at each moment:

The consciousness that perfumes (*darśanabhāga* of a *pravṛttivijñāna*) is born of *bījas*: at the moment of its birth, it is a cause capable of increasing and creating *bījas*. Hence three *dharmas* must be considered: the *bījas* that engender the consciousness, the engendered consciousness that perfumes and creates *bījas*, and the *bījas* created or caused to grow by the perfuming influence of the engendered consciousness. These

<sup>19</sup> This is somewhat reminiscent of the Kantian argument that causality is a form of human subjectivity since it is the way human consciousness organizes the world.

<sup>20</sup> In another – somewhat cryptic – passage, Xuan Zang writes, "The eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be definitely one in their nature .... Nor are they definitely different. .... Thus, they are like illusory beings that have no definite nature. What was previously said with regard to the distinct characteristics of consciousnesses is the result of convention, not the ultimate truth. In the ultimate truth, there is neither the mind nor world" (498).

three revolve in a cycle reciprocally and simultaneously functioning as cause and effect, just as a candle-wick engenders the flame and the flame engenders the incandescence of the wick. (Wei Tat, 133)

*Pravṛttivijñāna* refers to the seven consciousnesses, namely, the five senses, *manovijñāna* and *manas*. They are born of *bījas*, but they also perfume *bījas*, resulting in either creating new *bījas* or causing the existing ones to grow. These three processes, namely the birth of the seven consciousnesses by *bījas*, the birth of new *bījas* as the result of perfuming by the seven consciousnesses and the growth of existing *bījas* as the result of perfuming by the seven consciousnesses, move in a cycle, reciprocally and simultaneously functioning as cause and effect.<sup>21</sup> This is what the *CWSL* means when it states that "the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness is of two kinds: the first is its transformation as cause (*hetupariṇāma*) .... and the second is its transformation as effect (*phalapariṇāma*)" (96).

However, if the three processes are going on simultaneously at each present moment, how can they account for the past and the future as Xuan Zang claims? A closer look at the threefold process will reveal to us that even though the three are in a simultaneous process, past and future are contained in each present moment. More specifically, the perfuming of *bījas* by the seven consciousnesses and the engendering of seven consciousnesses by *bījas* are processes wherein the cause and the effect are simultaneous, whereas the engendering of new *bījas* by their predecessors is a process wherein the cause and the effect are successive; as Xuan Zang explicitly points out, "in the *bījas*' generation of similar *bījas*, the cause and the effect are not simultaneous; in the mutual generation of *bījas* and *dharmas*, the cause and the effect are simultaneous" (254). Therefore, both the past and the future are contained within the present; recall Xuan

<sup>21</sup> According to the *CWSL*, *ālayavijñāna* is the perfumable and the seven consciousnesses are the perfumers. Xuan Zang stipulates that the perfumable has to be durable, meaning that it has to be an uninterrupted series; it has to be non-defined, hence able to be perfumed; it has to be perfumable; and it has to be in intimate and harmonious relation with the perfumer. Consequently, "Only *vipākavijñāna* has all four characteristics. *Vipākavijñāna* is perfumable, not its five *caittas*" (130). On the other hand, the perfumer has to have the following characteristics: not eternal, capable of activity and able to create and nourish *bījas*; endowed with eminent activity which rules out the eighth consciousness; capable of increase and decrease, which rules out the fruits of Buddha, in intimate and harmonious relation with the perfumed, which rules out physical bodies of other persons as well as preceding and subsequent moments (130–2): "Only the seven *pravṛttivijñānas*, with their concomitant mental activities, are conspicuous and can increase and decrease. They have these four characteristics and are thus capable of perfuming" (132).

Zang's claim, "it is the present consciousness itself that appears as a future effect or a past cause" (174). Obviously, Xuan Zang's Yogācāra theory incorporates both the Sarvāstivāda position on the simultaneity of cause and effect and the Sautrāntika view on the succession of *bījas*.

However, for Xuan Zang to explain the order in our experience by analyzing the relationship amongst consciousnesses without appealing to the existence of that which is experienced, he has to answer this question: is consciousness alone sufficient in explaining our experience? In order to deal with this, the *CWSL* further elaborates the relationship amongst the eight consciousnesses into four conditioning categories: *hetupratyaya* (condition *qua* cause), *samanantarapratyaya* (condition *qua* antecedent), *ālambanapratyaya* (condition *qua* perceived object), *adhipatipratyaya* (condition *qua* contributory factor). Let us briefly examine them one by one.

First is *hetupratyaya*, condition *qua* cause, defined by Xuan Zang as the condition under which "the conditioned *dharmas* (*saṃkṛtas*) themselves produce their own effects" (534). This refers to two kinds of causal conditions, namely the *bījas* and the *dharmas* (*ibid.*):

The *bījas* with respect to the two following cases are *hetupratyaya*: they can generate succeeding *bījas* of the same kind and can produce *dharmas* of the same nature simultaneous with them. *Dharmas* refer to the seven transforming consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) and their contents... (*ibid.*)

This *hetupratyaya* is basically a reformulation of our earlier discussion of the Yogācāra causality theory. As we pointed out earlier, such a causal theory is unique to Dharmapāla/Xuan Zang's Yogācāra system since it stipulates that cause and effect are simultaneous, except in the case of *bījas* engendering *bījas* wherein there is a succession between cause and effect. Since *bījas* are only potential, not actual, even though there is a succession between *bījas* vis-à-vis cause and *bījas* vis-à-vis effect, it is a succession of potentials, an undetected succession. Nevertheless this still means that true succession can only be succession of *bījas*, albeit an undetected occurrence. Dharmic moments, namely the seven consciousnesses as a group – since there is no succession amongst them – are mediated by their own *bījas*: "the successive transformations of similar *dharmas* are not *hetupratyaya* one for the other, because they are born from their own *bījas* respectively" (534–36). For Xuan Zang, the conventional understanding of causation is a mediated kind of causation, mediated by *bījas*. In other words, causation in Xuan Zang's theory looks like this:

*dharma* perfumes *bīja*, *bīja* creates a succeeding *bīja* of a similar kind, new *bīja* engenders new *dharma* whose nature is similar to the *dharma* of the preceding moment. Our conventional understanding of causation does not heed the mediating role played by *bījas*. Therefore, there is only succession, not direct causation, between *dharmas* mediated by *bījas*. Hukaura Seibun (Vol. 1, 354) compares the generation of *dharmas* by *bījas* to the generation of shadows by objects. Just like the causal relationship between objects and their shadows as well as their simultaneous existence, *bījas* and *dharmas* coexist simultaneously despite the causal relationship between the two.

The *dharma* of the preceding moment is, according to the *CWSL*, *samanantarapratyaya*, condition *qua* antecedent, of *dharma* of the succeeding moment. This is the second condition Xuan Zang lists, meaning that "the eight consciousnesses and their concomitant mental activities form a group in the preceding moment and pass into the succeeding group of similar kinds without any mediation" (536). Apparently "the eight consciousnesses are not *samanantarapratyaya* between themselves, because several species of consciousness coexist" (Wei Tat, 537). In other words, this condition concerns the succession between *dharmas*, not those that are simultaneous with one another, as in the case of *hetupratyaya*, condition *qua* cause. This means that the eight consciousnesses as a group at the present moment are the *samanantarapratyaya* of the eight consciousnesses of the succeeding moment. This is apparently the conventional understanding of causation, in that there is a successive relationship between the cause and the effect.

Interestingly, however, impure *dharmas* can be *samanantarapratyaya* of pure *dharmas* (538); since the impure cannot be the cause of the pure, Xuan Zang needs something else to explain the succession of the pure after the impure, namely the pure *dharma* from the *dharmadhātu*. This line of thought is a clear indication that the theorization definitely has the possibility of enlightenment in mind. He has to maintain the view that the pure can succeed the impure, otherwise there would be no possibility for enlightenment, since we are all currently in the impure state. However, Xuan Zang also wants to maintain the homogeneity between successive dharmic moments, otherwise it would lead to disorder and chaos in our experience, hence the unintelligibility of the world as we experience it, regardless of whether it exists independently of consciousness or not. Consequently, he makes a distinction between succession and causality. Since there is only a relationship of succession between two dharmic

moments, even when they are heterogeneous, the law of causality which guarantees the order of our cognition – hence of the world as we experience it – is not violated, as long as there is a causal relationship between successive *bījas* whose relationship with their respective *dharma* is also causal.

The third condition is *ālambanapratyaya*, condition *qua* perceived object, referring to “the *dharma*s upon which the mind and its concomitant activities, which perceive those *dharma*s as such, depend” (542). This condition apparently accounts for the objective grounding of our cognition and it holds the key to the success or failure of Xuan Zang’s effort to explain the adequacy of cognition by appealing to the transformation of consciousness alone. He distinguishes two kinds of *ālambanapratyaya*, close (Ch. *qin*) and remote (Ch. *shu*):

If a *dharma* is not separated from the appropriating consciousness and it is cogitated by *darśanabhāga* and taken as its inner support, we can tell that it is the close *ālambanapratyaya*. If a *dharma*, though separated from the appropriating consciousness, is the material capable of generating that which *darśanabhāga* cogitates and takes as its inner support, we can tell that it is the remote *ālambanapratyaya*. (542–44)

In Hukaura’s words, “the close *ālambanapratyaya* is that which mental *dharma*s depend on directly” (Vol. 1, 375), and “the remote *ālambanapratyaya*, as the material that mental *dharma*s depend on indirectly, is manifested as the *nimittabhāga* that *darśanabhāga* relies on” (*ibid.*, 376). In other words, the remote *ālambanapratyaya* is an entity that is capable of producing the close *ālambanapratyaya* within that consciousness upon which *darśanabhāga*, the perceiving aspect, finds its support as its *nimittabhāga*, the perceived aspect. The remote *ālambanapratyaya* here refers to a dimension in our perceptual experience of an object which is not personal. Xuan Zang, in differentiating two kinds of *ālambanapratyaya*, recognizes that there are two dimensions of the perceived. The close one is the personal dimension of the perceived whereas the remote one is the non-personal dimension. The remote “generates” the close.

Xuan Zang realizes that a viable idealist theory of cognition has to be able to account for the collectivity of our experience. However, since he is a metaphysical idealist, albeit in the qualified sense which we talked about earlier, his effort to explain the collectivity of our experience has to seek that collective dimension *within* the parameters of consciousness and differentiate it from the personal dimension. There is no meaningful external world within his system to which he can appeal in explaining the collective dimension of our experience.

This is the primary reason for the postulation of the remote *ālambanapratyaya* which can account for the collectivity of our experience without going outside the realm of consciousness.

Within the domain of consciousness, what belongs to the collective dimension and what to the private dimension? In this connection, we find that

One can experience the body and land belonging to another person, because the content of the other’s eighth consciousness resulting from its transformation is the basis of the contents of one’s own consciousness. On the other hand, one’s own *bījas* or *indriyas*<sup>22</sup> are not experienced by others, since the evolving eighth consciousness of the other are not the same as one’s own evolving eighth consciousness. This is because not all sentient beings’ *bījas* are of the same number. Therefore it should be said that we cannot ascertain whether or not the remote *ālambanapratyaya* exists in the eighth consciousness in all cases of existents. (544)

Xuan Zang is making an unequivocal distinction between the personal dimension and the collective dimension of our experience. The first point made in the above passage is that different people share common experiences of bodies and lands (which is the realm of existence in which they are born, namely the world) as the result of the common basis in the transformations of their eighth consciousnesses. The second point is that people’s sense organs are private. If this is juxtaposed with the idea of remote and close *ālambanapratyaya*, it becomes clear that in the two aspects of our cognitive structure, namely the perceiving and the perceived aspects, the perceiving aspect is the sense organ and it is private, but the perceived aspect has both a personal dimension vis-à-vis the close *ālambanapratyaya* and a collective dimension vis-à-vis the remote *ālambanapratyaya*.

However, there appears to be a conflict in Xuan Zang’s discussion of the relationship between the remote and the close *ālambanapratyaya*. In one passage (Xuan Zang, 544), Xuan Zang argues that consciousness may or may not have a remote *ālambanapratyaya* but it necessarily has a close *ālambanapratyaya*, whereas in another passage (*ibid.*) he contends that the remote *ālambanapratyaya* is the cause of the close *ālambanapratyaya*, which means that consciousness cannot have the close one without the remote one. Xuan Zang appears to be struggling between an intentional analysis of consciousness and a causal explanation. Intentional analysis, as Edmund Husserl – the father of phenomenology in the twentieth century – defines it, is to see consciousness as essentially that which is *of* an object; on the other hand

<sup>22</sup> I am taking Wei Tat’s interpretation of “one’s own *bījas*” as “one’s *indriyas*” (545).

causal explanation takes consciousness as that which is *by* an object which means that it is causally connected with things-events in the natural world. When Xuan Zang argues that consciousness may or may not have a remote *ālambanapratyaya*, he is clearly aware of the intentional structure of consciousness within which the remote *ālambanapratyaya*, or real object in Husserl's terminology, is not a necessary component. However, when he contends that the remote *ālambanapratyaya* is that which "produces" the close *ālambanapratyaya* he appears to resort to the causal analysis in explaining the relationship between the remote and the close *ālambanapratyaya*. The causal analysis contradicts the intentional analysis in this particular case since in the former passage the remote object is a necessary condition for the close object whereas in the latter passage the remote object is not a necessary condition for the close object. Nevertheless Xuan Zang clearly privileges the intentional analysis over the causal explanation by virtue of the fact that he devotes much of his *CWSL* to the former while paying little attention to the latter. Such a position can be justified in that the causal explanation presupposes the intentional analysis since only the intentional analysis can locate the cause in the causal explanation. Put differently, in order to locate the remote object as the cause of the correlating close object, there is no way other than an investigation into that very close object through the intentional analysis whereas the causal explanation, without the intentional analysis, falls into an infinite regress. But we are still left with this question: what is the relationship between the remote object and the close object? We will pick this up when we deal with the self-externalization of consciousness later in the essay.

The last condition that Xuan Zang talks about is *adhipatipratyaya*, condition *qua* contributory factor, defined as "a real *dharma* (conditioned or unconditioned, as opposed to imaginary *dharma*s), possessing potent energy and capable of promoting (first nine *hetus*) or counteracting (tenth *hetu*) the evolution of another *dharma*" (Wei Tat, 547).<sup>23</sup> Needless to say, the real *dharma*s here refer to the eight consciousnesses, and this means that the eight consciousnesses are *adhipatipratyaya* to one another (Xuan Zang, 570). This conditioning

<sup>23</sup> The ten *hetus* refer to the following: 1. things, names and ideas which are the bases upon which the speech depends; 2. sensation; 3. the perfuming energy that can attract its own fruit indirectly; 4. direct cause, namely matured *bījas*; 5. complementary cause; 6. adductive cause; 7. special cause: each *dharma* generating its own fruit; 8. a combination of conditions; 9. obstacles to the generation of fruits, 10. non-impeding conditions (Xuan Zang, 552–56).

factor addresses the subjective – hence the private – aspect of conditioning, which involves the support of sense organs as the perceiving aspect in the structure of our cognition. This is the simultaneous support of consciousness. Specifically, the five senses have four supports: five sense organs as the object support, *manovijñāna* as the discriminating support, *manas* as the pure-impure support and *ālayavijñāna* as the root support (Xuan Zang, 266–68). *Manovijñāna*, which normally functions with the five senses in their discriminatory cognitive function of the external world, may be functioning alone while the activities of the five senses have stopped, e.g., in a dream. It has as its support *manas* and *ālayavijñāna*. *Manas* has as its support *ālayavijñāna* while also taking *ālayavijñāna* as its object (Xuan Zang, 280). *Ālayavijñāna* has *manas* as its support. More interestingly, Xuan Zang claims that all three previous conditions are *adhipatipratyaya* (546). This means that all the causes and conditions are essentially activities of the eight consciousnesses. He needs this postulate to complete his idealist system, by bringing all the conditions back to different manifestations of consciousness itself. This is what Xuan Zang means when he states that it is the present consciousness that is manifested as the semblance of cause and effect, past and future.

To sum up,

In the transformations of the eight consciousnesses as a group, there must be *adhipatipratyaya* amongst themselves, but not *hetupratyaya* or *samanantarapratyaya*. There may or may not be *ālambanapratyaya*. (Xuan Zang, 570)

*Hetupratyaya* has to do with the relationship between the eight consciousnesses and *bījas*, an intra-moment relationship, whereas *samanantarapratyaya* deals with the relationship between the eight consciousnesses as a group at one moment and the succeeding moment, an intra-moment relationship. *Ālambanapratyaya* and *adhipatipratyaya*, in explaining our sense of externality, address the internal relationship amongst the eight consciousnesses at each moment, an intra-moment relationship; the former is the perceived/objective aspect and the latter the perceiving/subjective aspect as well as the perceived/objective aspect, as expressed in the following remark: "the same *ni-mittabhāga* is both *ālambanapratyaya* and *adhipatipratyaya* of the *darśanabhāga* whereas the *darśanabhāga* is only *adhipatipratyaya* of the *ni-mittabhāga*" (Xuan Zang, 572).

Through this detailed analysis of the relationship amongst the consciousnesses, Xuan Zang has firmly established the realm of

consciousness as both necessary and sufficient in explaining our experiences, personal as well as collective. The formulation of *ālayavijñāna* as the ground of our experience not only incorporates the three kinds of continuity previously listed but also expands that scheme. As we have seen, Xuan Zang has actually accepted the Sarvāstivādin's position on the simultaneity of cause and effect, except that the Sarvāstivādins fall into the trap of substantialism in its extreme form by maintaining that *dharma*s in the past, present and future all exist simultaneously. Xuan Zang, on the other hand, interprets the simultaneity between cause and effect as the cause grounding the effect, although the ground, *ālayavijñāna*, is itself always in the process of transformation, too. Moreover, since *bīja*s are potential, not actual, their causal succession takes place undetected. Due to the homogeneity between the successive *bīja*s, their succession can be misidentified as some entity persisting through the change. Mediated by *bīja*s, there is a congruity between successive dharmic moments, but not direct causality, as we have seen earlier. This is shared by the Sautrāntikas.

These three scenarios of continuity encapsulate the first two kinds of conditioning discussed in the *CWSL*, namely *hetupratyaya*, condition *qua* cause, and *samanantara-pratyaya*, condition *qua* antecedent. The latter two kinds, namely *ālambanapratyaya*, condition *qua* object, and *adhipatipratyaya*, condition *qua* agent, examine the causal conditioning from both the objective and the subjective sides; they enable Xuan Zang to explain our experience of externality and subject/object duality without appealing to the actual existence of any external objects independent of consciousness.

(B) *The self-externalization of consciousness.* Now that Xuan Zang has established that the relationship between different kinds of consciousness is governed by the causal law, the next step is to explain how an internal process vis-à-vis the mental activities can give rise to the sense of externality, so as to complete his case that the actual existence of an external world is irrelevant.<sup>24</sup> Two issues are at stake

<sup>24</sup> As Xuan Zang explains, there are two theories regarding the manifestation of consciousness: (1) that of Dharmapāla and Sthiramati, which maintains that consciousness manifests itself in two functional divisions, the perceiving and the perceived, out of the self-witness division; and (2) that of Nanda and Bandhusri, which contends that inner consciousness manifests itself in what seems to be an external sphere of objects (Wei Tat, 11). It is clear that Xuan Zang incorporates both views into his scheme in the *CWSL*. It is even conceivable that Xuan Zang's account of the collectivity of our experience might have been influenced by the latter view but since all of their works are now lost there is no way to verify such a hypothesis.

in this effort. First, he needs to make the case that externality is the result of the self-externalizing activities of consciousness. Second, he has to explain how an essentially private self-externalizing activity of an individual can account for the collectivity of our experience of the external world.<sup>25</sup>

On the first issue, we find the following remark in the *CWSL*:

At the moment the perceived is apprehended, it is not grasped as external; only later *manovijñāna*, in its discriminatory function, creates the illusion of the external. Therefore, the domain of the perceived is the result of the transformation of *nimittabhāga* of consciousness itself. In this sense, the perceived exists. However, when it is grasped by *manovijñāna* as externally real objects, it does not exist. Moreover, in the domain of objects, the objects are not objects even though they appear so; they are not external even though they appear so. They are like dream objects which should not be grasped as real and external objects. (520)

According to Xuan Zang, the sense of externality does not arise at the moment when immediate perception takes place. In other words, at the moment of immediate perception, there is no differentiation between the internal and the external. There is perception *only*. The sense of externality only arises as a result of the discriminatory function of *manovijñāna*, the sixth consciousness, which transforms a percept into the image aspect of *manovijñāna*, namely *nimittabhāga*.

<sup>25</sup> There can be two approaches to the question of how consciousness alone can account for the collective dimension of our experience. We can either regard *ālayavijñāna* as a universal consciousness and the individual consciousness as the result of its individuation, or regard *ālayavijñāna* as essentially individualistic but having a universal dimension. Larrabee (4) summarizes the two possibilities well: First, the *ālaya* is one, but "materializes" at many points as individual consciousness which are empirically but erroneously viewed as individual ego-centered persons. Second, the *ālaya* is many, that is, each individual person has an *ālaya* as one of the eight consciousnesses which make up that individual. As we can see, the latter interpretation emphasizes the psychological descriptive aspect of the Yogācāra doctrine, while the former highlights the metaphysical or ontological aspect. Larrabee rightly points out that Xuan Zang takes the view that *ālayavijñāna* is individualistic, which "militates against any monistic tendencies of the doctrine of consciousness-only, which at times seems to posit some single ultimate reality" (*ibid.*, 6). Larrabee chooses the other alternative which interprets *ālayavijñāna* as the ground for the individual ego-centers and, consequently, as a common ground for the consistency of world-experience undergone by the majority of individual human subjects, specifically the continuous yet (for Buddhists) illusory belief engendered by the *manas*-consciousness that a substantial world with substantially enduring ego-subjects exists. (*ibid.*)

Such a monistic interpretation of *ālayavijñāna* betrays a clear Advaitin influence on the part of Larrabee. Xuan Zang's individualistic interpretation of *ālayavijñāna* is more in accord with the general Buddhist tenet. The universalistic interpretation is premised on an understanding of the mind which is too much to assume in a philosophical deliberation. Hence, I will only deal with Xuan Zang's interpretation and its rationale.



Xuan Zang uses a dream as an example to illustrate his point that consciousness itself is capable of creating the sense of externality. In a dream state, even though the five senses have stopped their functions, the continued activities of *manovijñāna* still create the sense of externality (266). This is a clear indication that it is *manovijñāna* that creates the sense of externality, and that the sense of externality does not have to be premised upon the actual existence of external objects independent of consciousness.

However, what is it that *manovijñāna* externalizes which makes us experience the externality of the world? This has to do with the objectification of consciousness. We have seen earlier in this essay that two conditions are responsible for the objective dimension in our cognitive structure, according to Xuan Zang's Yogācāra scheme, namely the *ālambanapratyaya*, condition *qua* object, and *adhipatipratyaya*, condition *qua* agent. According to Xuan Zang, the *ālambana* of *manovijñāna* includes *ālayavijñāna*, *manas* and the five senses (570), and these objects of *manovijñāna* are also themselves consciousnesses, namely *adhipatipratyaya*. What is relevant to our purpose here is *ālayavijñāna*. In this regard, we find Xuan Zang stating that "[w]hen *ālayavijñāna* itself is born through the power of causes and conditions, it is manifested internally as *bījas* and a body with sense-organs and externally as the world" (136). Here Xuan Zang points out that *ālayavijñāna* manifests itself into two realms, internal and external. The internal refers to the *bījas* and the body with sense organs, and the external to the world. When this is juxtaposed with the claim that it is *manovijñāna* that differentiates the external from the internal, it is clear to us that the dual manifestation of *ālayavijñāna* is the result of externalizing activities of *manovijñāna*.

What is even more interesting, however, is that, according to the CWSL, there are common or universal *bījas* in *ālayavijñāna* which provide the objective basis for externality. "The word 'place' (*sthāna*) in the stanza refers to the fact that the ripening consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) manifests as objects in the external world through the ripening of its universal *bījas*" (144). This means that there are two kinds of seeds, private and universal. Private seeds give rise to one's own body with its sense faculties, namely the seven consciousnesses, whereas universal seeds generate non-private *dharma*s, that which appear to be the external major elements and derived matter. As Junshō Tanaka rightly points out, the universal *bīja*

is postulated as the foundation for the possibility of collective experience. Collective experience means that which is manifested as an existing entity in the consciousnesses of the majority [of sentient beings] and is therefore commonly experienced, (Tanaka, 277)

He further differentiates four subcategories of entities in terms of their private and universal seeds. They are the common in the common, the non-common in the common, the non-common in the non-common, and the common in the non-common (278). Accordingly, the common in the common refers to entities like mountains and rivers, the non-common in the common private properties like houses and land, the non-common in the non-common one's own body, and the common in the non-common other people's bodies (*ibid.*).

Moreover,

Even though the consciousnesses of sentient beings are manifested differently, what are manifested are similar, with no difference in terms of locality. This is just like many lamps are lit together such that the lights appear to become one single light. (Xuan Zang, 144)

In this passage, Xuan Zang seems to backpedal from the earlier position that there are private as well as universal *bījas* by saying that the common world is the result of the manifestation of private consciousnesses. The idea of the universal *bījas* does not even appear to be necessary. The message Xuan Zang is trying to convey here, if we look at the two passages together, is that the commonness of the world as we experience it is not a real one but an apparent one. Such a common world is constituted by the manifestation of essentially individual and private conscious processes, whose *apparent* commonness is attributed to the working of the universal *bījas*. In other words, the universal *bījas* do not account for a real common world, but only an apparent one. This is tantamount to claiming that the universal *bījas* themselves do not share the same degree of reality as the private *bījas* in Xuan Zang's Yogācāra system.

If we bring in the close and the remote *ālambanapratyaya* discussed earlier, it becomes obvious that the remote object of consciousness refers to the dharmas generated by the universal *bīja* and the close object by the private *bīja*. Since the remote/universal object is only apparent, not real, its universality is then premised upon its seeming externality resulting from the externalizing activity of *manovijñāna*. In other words, the universality of *bīja* is directly linked to the externalizing activity of *manovijñāna*. This means that the universal

*bīja* correlates with the externalizing activities of *manovijñāna* in that there is a universal structure in what is externalized by *manovijñāna*. The *sense* of the remoteness of an object is the result of such an externalization of *manovijñāna*. Or to be more exact, the sense of the remote object is constituted by the externalizing activity of *manovijñāna* which has a universal structure. As to whether such a remote object actually exists or not, it is not a question that can be explained within Xuan Zang's qualified idealist system. Neither is he interested in such a question. This explains Xuan Zang's claim that while the close object is a necessary condition for consciousness the remote object is not. Therefore, the issue concerning the relationship between the remote and the close objects is resolved by attributing the origin of their *senses* to the operation of *manovijñāna* while shelving the metaphysical question of whether a remote object actually exists or not.

Consequently, for Xuan Zang, there are three different senses of the "world": (1) the apparent common receptacle world which is the result of the operations of all eight consciousnesses of an individual that belong to the community of individuals in the everyday waking state; (2) the private world which results from the operations of *manovijñāna*, *manas*, and *ālayavijñāna* of an individual in dreams; and (3) the world of the enlightened. He uses the second to explain the first while leaving the third out of the explanatory scheme regarding the externality and commonness of the objects of our everyday experience. What distinguishes the first from the second is the cooperation of the five senses.

At this juncture, let us focus our attention on the first sense of the "world" since this is where the issue concerning the experience of a common world is at stake. Xuan Zang enumerates three kinds of non-private *dharma*s, namely, the receptacle world, another person's mind, and another person's body. The receptacle world is what appears to be a common world, the sense of which is constituted by a community of individual consciousness. As for another person's mind, Xuan Zang treats it no differently from any external physical object, as is evident in the following remark,

One's consciousness can comprehend another mind as a seemingly external object like a mirror where what looks like to be an external object appears. However, such a comprehension is not direct. What can be comprehended directly is the transformation of the mind itself, not another mind. (522)

In other words, another person's mind is the unfolding of one's own mental activities; it can be understood within the discriminatory cognitive structure of the grasper and the grasped in one's own conscious process.

With regard to another person's body, Xuan Zang contends that on the one hand sense faculties and their supporting physical body are the result of maturing of private *bījas* (148); on the other hand,

Because of the power of the ripening of the universal *bījas*, this *vipākavijñāna* transforms itself in such a way that it resembles other persons' sense organs in the locus of their bodies. Otherwise, one would not be able to enjoy the sense organs of other persons. (*ibid.*)

Put simply, even though one's sense faculties or body are developed out of one's own particular series of seeds, the operations of the five sense faculties give rise to the sense of collectivity of the human body.

To sum up, in Xuan Zang's Yogācāra system, the private and the collective, the individual and the universal, are identical entities, with different senses attributed to them by the operation of *manovijñāna* and the cooperation of the five sense faculties. Thereby, Xuan Zang has made his case that the *apparent* commonness or collectivity of the world is the result of the externalization of a community of individuals each of which is constituted by eight consciousnesses.

### *Ālayavijñāna and the self*

Finally, we are faced with the question we set out to answer: has Xuan Zang achieved his objective in explaining continuity within the Buddhist orthodoxy through his presentation of *ālayavijñāna*? In order to answer this question, we first have to know what kinds of continuity the Yogācāra Buddhists like Xuan Zang are concerned about. This can be detected in the list of logical arguments<sup>26</sup> Xuan Zang gives in support of the existence of *ālayavijñāna* in the *CWSL*; he states that *ālayavijñāna*

<sup>26</sup> As Lusthaus observes, "Eventually Buddhist epistemology would accept only perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) as valid means for acquiring knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and these changes were only beginning in India while Hsüan-tsang was there. They were not yet institutionalized. Prior to that shift the two acceptable means were scriptural testimony (*śruti*) and reasoning (*yukti*, *anumāna*). It was Vasubandhu's disciple, Dignāga, after all, who firmly established perception and inference as the two valid *pramāṇas*, and undermined the status of scripture" (1989, 321). Since the scriptural support Xuan Zang cites does not have a direct bearing on the philosophical argument, I will not get into it here.



- (1) is *vipākacitta* that holds *bījas*;
- (2) is the uninterrupted retributive mind;
- (3) is the mind in the course of transmigration;
- (4) is that which appropriates the body;
- (5) is the support for life and heat;
- (6) is the mind at conception and death;
- (7) exists by reason of *nāmarūpa*;
- (8) is the substance of consciousness-food on which the other three foods (food in mouthfuls, food by contact and through aspiration) depend;
- (9) is the mind in *nirodhasamāpatti*;
- (10) is the foundation for pure and impure *dharma*s. (202–44)

Obviously Xuan Zang is preoccupied with the continuity of subjectivity, within one lifetime and between lives. In the final analysis, his theoretical effort to explain the continuity of subjectivity is aimed at accounting for the self as a continuum; this is evidenced by the three meanings of *ālayavijñāna* given in the *CWSL*, one of which asserts that *ātman* is the result of attachment to the eighth consciousness (104), as we have seen previously. His explanation of an external object as a continuum is the extension of the continuity of subjectivity, since for him the continuity of subjectivity and the continuity of objectivity are two aspects of the same cognitive process. The former holds primacy over the latter, while the actual existence of external objects independent of consciousness is rendered irrelevant. Let us now take a closer look at how Xuan Zang explains our sense of self as a continuum within the Yogācāra theoretical edifice he has presented. Since he regards *ātman* as the result of attachment and misidentification of the continuum of *ālayavijñāna* as an identity, our effort will focus on examining how such a misidentification takes place.

According to the *CWSL*, attachment to *ātman* has two kinds: that which is innate and that which results from mental discrimination (20). The innate kind is always present in the individual and it operates spontaneously without depending on external false teachings or mental discriminations (*ibid.*). It is itself divided into two kinds:

The first is constant and continuous, and it pertains to the seventh consciousness which arises together with the eighth consciousness and grasps the mental image of the latter as the real self.

The second is sometimes interrupted and it pertains to the sixth consciousness and the five aggregates that are the result of their transformations; the mental image that arises with them individually or as a group is grasped as the real self. (*ibid.*)

Xuan Zang differentiates two senses of self here: one is constant and the other is sometimes interrupted. Such a differentiation is made with an eye on our different senses of the self in the waking state, the dream state,<sup>27</sup> and the deep meditative state, which, it may be recalled, is the primary concern in the initial postulation of *ālayavijñāna*. If our sense of self is limited to the waking and even the dream state, wherein the content of consciousness is recollectable, it would run the risk of being lost during the deep meditative state. This is the reason behind the differentiation made between these two senses of self. In the first case, the sense of self that is constant pertains to the seventh consciousness, *manas*, which adheres to *ālayavijñāna* as the self, since both *manas* and *ālayavijñāna* are constant and never interrupted until enlightenment is reached. In the second case, the sense of self that can be interrupted pertains to the sixth consciousness which operates with the five senses – as in the waking state – or without them – as in the dream state. The second sense of self is interrupted during certain deep meditative states.

In the case of the first sense of self, we have learned that *ālayavijñāna* has three aspects: the perceiving (*darśanabhāga*), the perceived (*nimittabhāga*) and the self-corroboratory (*sva-samvittibhāga*) divisions, which are manifested as the external world on the one hand and the internal *bījas* and sense organs possessed by the body on the other. Which aspect is the one to which *manas* attaches and which is misidentified as the self? In this connection, Xuan Zang says that

*Manas* appropriates only the *darśanabhāga* of the *ālayavijñāna*, not its other *bhāgas*, because *darśanabhāga* has, since before the beginning of time, been a continuous and homogeneous series, as if it were a constant and an identical entity. Since this *bhāga* is the constant support of various *dharma*s, *manas* attaches to it as the inner self. (282)

So it is the perceiving aspect, *darśanabhāga*, of the eighth consciousness that *manas* takes as its object and misidentifies as the self, but *darśanabhāga* is a homogeneous continuum even though it appears as eternal and one. This is how continuity is misconstrued as identity.

The “self” in the second sense of the word is due to the activities of the sixth consciousness, *manovijñāna*, with or without the cooperation of the five senses. However,

<sup>27</sup> The Buddhists do not seem to be interested in the so-called “dreamless” state, as the Hindu philosophers do.

*manovijñāna*, like the visual consciousness etc., must have its own support manifesting its own name. Such a support does not arise from *samanantarapratyaya* ('condition *qua* immediate antecedent'), but from *adhipatipratyaya* ('condition *qua* agent') instead. (Xuan Zang, 328)

As Wei Tat rightly points out, such a support of *manovijñāna* is *manas*, the seventh consciousness (329). Put simply, the sixth consciousness should have its own sense-organ, just as the eye is the sense-organ for visual consciousness. Here *manas* is viewed as the sense-organ for *manovijñāna*. However, as we have previously seen, *manas* is also said to be one of the *ālambanas* of *manovijñāna* (*ibid.*, 570). This means that *manas* is both the support *qua* sense-organ and the support *qua* object of *manovijñāna*. This is in line with Xuan Zang's general position, which treats subject and object as two aspects of the same experiential process. Since one of the functions of *manovijñāna* is its externalizing activities, if all these are juxtaposed side by side, the overall picture we get of the generation of the self involves the following processes: the perceiving aspect, *darśanabhāga*, of *ālayavijñāna* is an ever-evolving continuum, to which *manas* attaches and misidentifies as an identity; this identity is then externalized by the activities of *manovijñāna* as *ātman* standing outside the cognitive structure of subject and object.

There is another sense of self that Xuan Zang talks about, in contradistinction to the above two innate senses of self: it is caused by mental discrimination and derived from the force of external factors including false teachings and discriminations. This sense of self pertains exclusively to *manovijñāna*. This attachment to *ātman* is also of two kinds:

The first, preached by certain heterodox schools, refers to the aggregates that arise out of the mental images in *manovijñāna*. Through discrimination and intellection, *manovijñāna* attaches to those aggregates as a real self.

The second refers to the characteristics of the self, preached by certain heterodox schools, that arise out of the mental images in *manovijñāna*. Through discrimination and intellection, *manovijñāna* attaches to those characteristics as a real self. (22)

In the first case the self is conceived as the object of self-belief. This is the view held by the Vātsīputrīyas. Xuan Zang refutes it by stating that it is the five *skandhas*, not *ātman*, that is the object of self-belief. Since the five *skandhas* are themselves impermanent, the permanence of *ātman* is hence rejected. In the second case the self is the product of various *ātman*-concepts of a false teaching which refers to the Vedic

teaching of *ātman*. Since these typical Buddhist refutations of other views of self in defense of their own position are common knowledge to students of Buddhism, I will not go into them in detail here.

It is worthwhile to take note of Xuan Zang's own violation of suspending the judgment on the existential status of any extra-conscious entities when he declares that *ātman* does not exist, since its existential status is suspended within his philosophy. All he can actually do is to reject the existential question of *ātman* altogether on the ground that it can neither be affirmed nor denied within the structure of consciousness.

To conclude, in this essay I have tried to present the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as well as the rationale behind the Yogācārins' effort in formulating the concept as Xuan Zang presents it in the *CWSL*. Xuan Zang is very conscious of the limitations imposed by Buddhist orthodoxy on his theoretical endeavor. In my opinion, he is largely successful in explaining subjectivity as a continuum as well as the continuity of experience by analyzing consciousness alone without appealing to anything outside and by ably rendering the existential status of external objects irrelevant in his system. His effort underscores a vigorous attempt to fortify the Buddhist doctrine against any form of reification and substantialization. In explaining the self as a subliminal continuum he effectively endorses the view that our sense of self is closely related to some subliminal mental activities of which we are largely unaware in our daily life; this view is echoed by modern psychoanalysts like Freud, Jung, and others. However, *ālayavijñāna* cannot be hastily compared to the unconscious developed in modern psychoanalysis without major qualifications. But such a topic requires a separate effort.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. Jiang (2004).

TSE-FU KUAN

CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST  
DHYĀNA/JHĀNA MEDITATION

There are various schemes of the path to liberation found in the Buddhist canon. The most prominent scheme is probably the one centred on *dhyāna* (Pali *jhāna*) meditation, which consists of four levels of meditative attainment. Rahula (1980: 270) describes the four *dhyānas/jhānas* as 'high mystic or spiritual states of concentration'. These states involve transformation of hedonic and affective experiences. Heiler (1922: 26) says that the *jhānas* are concerned with the reduction of feelings. Other scholars have also discussed feelings in the *dhyānas/jhānas*.<sup>1</sup> They rely mostly or exclusively on the Pali sources of the Theravāda tradition, but there are different interpretations by other traditions, and even some accounts in the canons of different schools disagree with each other. There still remain problems regarding the order in which specific feelings fade away in different levels of *jhāna* meditation and problems about the nature of these feelings and the mental factors of *jhāna* that may be feelings. After discussing the main passages on feelings of *jhāna* in the earliest Buddhist texts, this essay will investigate the interpretations by three Buddhist schools and put forth my personal opinions. Confronted by the divergence among different traditions in their interpretations, this essay will attempt to find out the possibly earliest or authentic teachings on this subject and to elucidate their implications. My research will take account of the plausibility and coherence of doctrinal issues in the earliest texts on the presupposition that these texts are basically, although not totally, the record of the Buddha's teachings.

## ACCOUNTS IN THE EARLIEST TEXTS

The four main *Nikāyas* and some texts in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* of the Theravāda Canon in Pali are mostly attributed by the tradition to the

<sup>1</sup> For example Cousins (1973: 125), Griffiths (1983: 59–61); Gunaratana (1985: 59ff.), Bucknell (1993: 380ff).

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Department of Religion  
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey  
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8525  
USA  
E-mail: tjiang999@hotmail.com

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WILLIAM S. WALDRON\*

## HOW INNOVATIVE IS THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA?

*The ālayavijñāna in the context of  
canonical and Abhidharma vijñāna theory*

### PART I

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#### INTRODUCTION

The *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* and other *Yogācāra* texts claim orthodoxy for the *ālayavijñāna* on the grounds that it had been taught by the Buddha within accepted scriptural sources, and that it was in fact posited by other Abhidharma schools in the guise of more or less synonymous terms.<sup>1</sup> In an ironic reverse appeal, Walpola Rahula has claimed that "although not developed as in the Mahāyāna, the original idea of *ālayavijñāna* was already there in the Pāli Canon."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Schmithausen (1987: 46) has recently suggested that the

conception of the *ālayavijñāna* eventually entailed "redrawing the theory of mind."

In this essay I will examine the relationship between the canonical<sup>3</sup> conception of *vijñāna* (Pali: *viññāṇa*) and the *Yogācāra* concept of the *ālayavijñāna* so as to contextualize these claims. The innovative aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* have so often been emphasized that its vast commonality with its canonical predecessors and Abhidharma contemporaries, the very context in which it most needs to be understood, is all too frequently overlooked.

We shall view the *ālayavijñāna* not simply as a radically new departure, but also as the systematic development of the early concept of *vijñāna* within the more sophisticated context of Abhidharma. From this perspective we shall be able to more fully appreciate both its continuity with the earlier conceptions, as well as the gradual development and elaboration of *vijñāna* theory within Abhidharma and *Yogācāra*, thereby supporting but at the same time qualifying the above-mentioned claims to orthodoxy, origination and innovation.

In the early discourses preserved in the Pāli Canon *vijñāna* was a polyvalent term with diverse epistemological, psychological, and meta-physical dimensions, many of which became marginalized within orthodox Abhidharma discourse. The *ālayavijñāna* is, in crudest outline, this canonical *vijñāna* minus its role within immediate cognitive processes; it encompasses those aspects of *vijñāna* pertaining to the continuity of *samsāric* existence that could not be readily integrated into orthodox Abhidharma discourse, focusing as it does upon the immediacy of transient states of mind. The *ālayavijñāna* system effectively reunited these divergent dimensions in a bifurcated model of the mind which articulated a simultaneous and interactive relationship between the momentary, surface level of sensory cognition and an abiding, subliminal level of sentient existence.

Since the *ālayavijñāna* is presented in terms of the wide range of functions played by the canonical *vijñāna* and the various problematics to which these arrived within Abhidharma, we shall examine these in some detail before we present the gradual systematization of the *ālayavijñāna* itself.

# I. THE CANONICAL CONCEPTIONS

## '*Vijñāna*' as 'Consciousness', '*vijñāna*' as 'Cognition'

In the early Pāli texts, *vijñāna* was considered equally as 'consciousness', an essential factor of animate existence without which there would be no individual life, and as 'cognition', the ordinary sensory and mental models of perception and knowing.<sup>4</sup>

*Vijñāna* as 'consciousness' plays a major role in the early Buddhist explanation of the cycle of birth, death and rebirth, known as *samsāra*. Together with 'life' (*āyu*) and 'heat' (*usmā*), *vijñāna* is one of the essential factors necessary for animate existence and without which one would die.<sup>5</sup> *Vijñāna* enters into the womb at the time of conception,<sup>6</sup> and exits the body at the time of death.<sup>7</sup> As a factor of *samsāric* continuity, it is precisely the advent, the 'stationing' or 'persistence' of *vijñāna* in this world that perpetuates *samsāric* existence.<sup>8</sup>

It is this unbroken stream of *vijñāna* that, proceeding from life to life,<sup>9</sup> is virtually the medium of the accumulated potential effects of past actions, of karma.<sup>10</sup> In this context, *vijñāna*, along with the other four *skandhas*, is said to "attain growth, increase, abundance."<sup>11</sup> The total elimination of this accumulated karmic potential along with the eradication of the afflicting passions is closely equated with liberation, *nirvāṇa*, at which point *vijñāna*, the medium of this accumulation, is also eradicated or at least fundamentally transformed.<sup>12</sup> As we shall see, the *Yogācāra* conception of the *ālayavijñāna* replicates these functions in every one of these respects. This became necessary, I will argue, largely because of the one-sided emphasis Abhidharma put upon *vijñāna*'s second major dimension: the role that *vijñāna*, as simple cognition, plays within ordinary cognitive processes.<sup>13</sup>

As the central element within the perceptual processes, *vijñāna* as 'cognition' occurs in six modes depending upon the type of sensory or mental stimulus and its respective perceptual organ (the five sense organs and the 'mental' organ).<sup>14</sup> In this context, *vijñāna* as cognition occurs upon the contact between the relevant unimpaired sense organ, its respective object and attention.<sup>15</sup>

Both of these aspects of *vijñāna*, first as 'consciousness', the essential principle of animate existence and a continuous medium within *samsāra*, and second, as simple, immediate 'cognition', co-existed

within the mass of transmitted teachings, albeit within different contexts of meaning.<sup>16</sup> The earliest traditions evinced little awareness of discordance between the two, since at the deepest metaphysical level<sup>17</sup> they were so inseparably intertwined as to be virtually causes and effects of one another: Karmic actions, within which *viññāna* as cognition plays a central role, lead to continued existence within *saṃsāra*, the major medium of which is the unbroken stream of consciousness, of *viññāna*. And this unbroken stream creates, in turn, the very preconditions for such cognition to occur at all. But to see just how this is, we must examine the relationship between these two aspects of *viññāna* as they are articulated within the twelve-member formula of the dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*).<sup>18</sup> We should note that the mutual conditionality between these two aspects of *viññāna* constitutes the central insight of the *ālayaviññāna*-based model of mind.

#### 'Viññāna' within the 'Pratītya-samutpāda' Series

*Viññāna* has two essential places within the *pratītya-samutpāda* series, which correspond roughly to the two aspects described above. First, *viññāna* conditions the very development of a sentient body by descending into the mother's womb, thereby securing a foothold or support in a new life, wherein it may grow, increase, and multiply;<sup>19</sup> *viññāna* thus constitutes one of the preconditions for any cognitive activity whatsoever.<sup>20</sup> *Viññāna* at this point is directly conditioned by the *saṃskāras*, the formative forces of the past.<sup>21</sup>

Second, *viññāna* is implicitly yet directly involved in the karmic activities that perpetuate *saṃsāric* life. The terms of the twelve-member *pratītya-samutpāda* series which directly succeed *viññāna* and name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*) delineate all of the essential elements of the cognitive processes and the affective responses to which they give rise: the six sense-spheres (*ṣaḍāyatana*) and sense-impression (*sparśa*) are essential preconditions for cognition to take place,<sup>22</sup> while the next factor, feeling (*vedanā*), is (along with apperception, *saṃjñā*) said to be its virtually inseparable concomitant.<sup>23</sup> Feeling and apperception, moreover, are themselves karmic activities (*saṃskāra*) of mind (*citta*) (M I 301: *saññā ca vedanā cittasaṅkhāro*). Thus, as Johansson (1979: 139) notes, every act of cognition is, or perhaps more precisely,

entails *saṃskāras*, formative karmic activities, and thus leads to further rebirth.<sup>24</sup>

But the affective dimension outlined within the series of dependent co-arising is just as important: feeling gives rise to craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and grasping or 'appropriation' (*upādāna*),<sup>25</sup> affective attitudes or actions which lead directly toward renewed rebirth in the future.<sup>26</sup> These are followed by becoming (*bhava*) and birth (*jāti*), which have long been considered a second process of rebirth within the *pratītya-samutpāda* series by the traditional exegetes. As a link between one life and the next, this juncture will also be cited by the *Yogācārins* to support the existence of a specific type of mind, the same one that is conditioned by the *saṃskārā* earlier in the series in a parallel relationship, viz., the "ālaya" *viññāna*.

The *pratītya-samutpāda* series then depicts *viññāna* as both a principle of animate existence conditioned by the formative forces (*saṃskārā*) and subsisting throughout one's lifetime, and, implicitly, as intrinsically related within the cognitive processes to the complex of activities that perpetuate *saṃsāric* existence.<sup>27</sup> This is implicit in the very structure and sequence of the series. These two dimensions of *viññāna*, moreover, may be considered as causes and effects of one another: 'subsisting' *viññāna*, while itself conditioned by previous karmic activities associated with past perceptual processes, provides the ground or the preconditions for the continued occurrence of those very processes.<sup>28</sup> And for as long as the afflicting predispositions (*anuśaya* or *āśrava*) elicit feeling (*vedanā*), craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*) in conjunction with those processes, they will in turn continue to perpetuate the cycle of rebirth. This reciprocal cause and effect relationship between the two aspects of *viññāna* remains implicit and undefined within the early texts;<sup>29</sup> the *Yogācārins* will later rearticulate this relationship by differentiating two types of *viññāna*, the abiding "ālaya" *viññāna* and the momentary, perceptual *viññānas* (*pravṛtti-viññāna*), and by explicitly describing their simultaneous and reciprocal conditionality.

#### The Latent Dispositions ('anuśaya') in Early Buddhist Thought

The relationship between the perceptual processes and the affective

responses they elicit are, we have seen, central to the karmic activities, the formative forces that perpetuate *saṃsāric* existence. This involves a dispositional substructure which was quite essential to the theory of *saṃsāric* continuity in early Buddhist thought and subsequently to the developments within *Yogācāra* doctrine under consideration here. Although there are several important notions connected with dispositional tendencies in early Buddhism,<sup>30</sup> we will limit ourselves here to the *anuśaya*, the latent dispositions or tendencies,<sup>31</sup> for it was the persistence of these latent tendencies that became the focus of debate during the Abhidharma period and which eventually led *Yogācārins* (for much the same reasons and along the same lines as the *ālayavijñāna*) to postulate a distinct aspect or mode of mind representing them, i.e. the *kliṣṭa manas*.

The latent dispositions are essential to the early Buddhist world view in much the same respects as *vijñāna*: (1) psychologically, they are causally related to the various karmic activities associated with the perceptual processes; and thus, (2) 'psycho-ontologically', they perpetuate further *saṃsāric* existence; whereas (3) soteriologically, their gradual eradication is closely related to progress upon the path toward liberation.

These dispositions are instrumental in instigating the karmic activities connected with perceptual processes. In the standard formula of dependent co-arising the perceptual processes give rise to feeling or sensation (*vedanā*), followed by craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*). This important sequence of affective arousal is usually stated without further elaboration. The close connection between feeling (*vedanā*) and its affective responses, so essential to the perpetuation of *saṃsāra*, demands explication; this lies within the structure and dynamics of the latent dispositions. According to M III 285:

Visual cognition arises dependent on the eye and visual forms, the coming together of the three is sense-impression; dependent on sense-impression a pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feeling arises. Being stimulated by a pleasant feeling, he will be pleased, welcome it and remain attached to it; his latent disposition to desire (*rāgānusaya*) lies latent (*anuseti*).<sup>32</sup>

The same is true for the other sensations: there is a latent disposition to aversion (*paṭigha*) within an unpleasant sensation and to ignorance

(*avijjā*) in a neutral sensation.<sup>33</sup> These dispositions represent the infrastructure, as it were, of the *saṃskārā*, the karmic complexes that feed and interact with *vijñāna*; thus they help to explicate the dynamics underlying these processes within the series of dependent origination.<sup>34</sup>

These dispositions also have the same 'psycho-ontological' consequences as *vijñāna*, that is, they help perpetuate *saṃsāric* existence:

If one does not will, O monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant (*anuseti*), this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support of consciousness. Consciousness being supported and growing, renewed existence takes place in the future. Renewed existence in the future taking place, old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.<sup>35</sup>

It is clear then that these affective latent dispositions or tendencies are central to the various karmic activities and thus help perpetuate the long-term results of continued rebirth.

These dispositions are, moreover, fundamental to the basic psychic structure of human beings. In the *Mahāmāluṅkyasutta*, the Buddha states that even a small baby has various kinds of *anuśaya*:

If, Māluṅkyāputta, an ignorant baby boy lying on his back has no [awareness of] self-existence ([of] *dharmas* . . . rules . . . sensual pleasure . . . persons), how could his view of self-existence (. . . doubt regarding *dharmas* . . . attachment to rules and rituals in rules . . . lust toward sensual pleasure . . . aggression toward persons) ever arise?

That disposition (*anusaya*) of his toward a view of self-existence (. . . doubt . . . attachment to rules and rituals . . . desire for sensual pleasure . . . aggression) lies latent (*anuseti*).<sup>36</sup>

We find here an apparent dichotomy, foreshadowing later developments, between the latent disposition and its actual manifestation: though the unlearned infant possesses only the *disposition* toward a view of self-existence (*sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya*), etc., the ordinary individual "lives with his mind possessed by the view of self-existence" (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi-pariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati*), etc.

In contrast to these, the learned monk, well practiced in the Buddha's teachings and well trained in meditation,

does not live with his mind possessed by the view of self-existence [etc.], nor



overcome by the view of self-existence [etc.], and he understands as it really is the deliverance from the view of self-existence [etc.] which has arisen. That view of self-existence of his is eliminated along with the latent disposition.<sup>37</sup>

These dispositions are present throughout one's lifetime and for as long as one exists within *saṃsāra*.<sup>38</sup> Their gradual destruction reflects stages upon the path toward liberation<sup>39</sup> and only upon full liberation are they completely eliminated.<sup>40</sup>

In sum, the *anuśaya* represent a dispositional substructure which, like *viññāna*, persists throughout the life and lives of individual sentient beings and is central to the karmic activities instrumental in perpetuating *saṃsāric* existence. The *anuśaya* describe the essential connection between ordinary sensations and feelings (*vedanā*) and the ill-fated reactions elicited by them, and as such are, like *viññāna*, crucial to the Buddhist explanation of *saṃsāric* continuity.

## II. MOMENTARINESS AND CONTINUITY IN THE ABHIDHARMA

The two doctrinal contexts we have examined above in which *viññāna*, as well as the latent dispositions, play a central role, viz. in the immediate and discrete processes of cognition and in the very continuity of *saṃsāric* existence, pertain to arguably distinct temporal dimensions.<sup>41</sup> Although this distinction is seldom explicitly addressed within the *sutta-piṭaka*, it became quite central to the doctrines put forth in the newly emerging Abhidharma literature.

Abhidharma literature preserves doctrinal developments from probably shortly after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha up to and succeeding the early *Yogācāra* texts that first depict the *ālayaviññāna*. It was in the context of these developments that early *Yogācāra* and the concept of the *ālayaviññāna* evolved.<sup>42</sup> The similarity of their concerns is obvious at even a cursory glance: the Abhidharmic issues debated, the technical vocabulary with which they were expressed, and the general presuppositions underlying them are the same as those used to discuss, describe and defend the concept of the *ālayaviññāna*. The presentation of Abhidharma doctrine in this section<sup>43</sup> will thus serve to contextualize the *ālayaviññāna*, and the problems toward which it was addressed, within this overarching Abhidharma milieu,

thereby demonstrating both its continuity with and its development of canonical *viññāna* theory.

### *Abhidharma Analysis of Mind: Its Purpose, Methods and Problematics*<sup>44</sup>

Abhidharma represents the efforts to bring about systematic order and consistency within the variegated body of the discourses of the Buddha for the higher purpose, as its name — 'higher doctrine' — suggests, of leading practitioners toward the ultimate goal of liberation.<sup>45</sup>

In an immensely consequential hermeneutical tack, the Ābhidharmikas considered this 'higher doctrine', which was expressed in the precise and technical language of *dharma*s, existential elements discretely distinguishable by their own characteristic,<sup>46</sup> to be 'ultimately' true. Those aspects of the doctrine, however, which were conveyed in the simpler, almost vernacular language of the early discourses, and thus not readily *transposable* into *dharma*ic terms, were considered merely 'conventional', that is, merely nominal designations<sup>47</sup> for aggregations of those *dharma*s which exclusively could be said to truly exist. Since the *dharma*s, moreover, are strictly momentary<sup>48</sup> and wholly constitutive of the animate and inanimate worlds, what appear to be 'individuals' and 'things' are actually only the stream or continuity of these aggregated *dharma*s occurring one after the other in serial fashion. The discernment of these *dharma*s through higher awareness is essential for the Abhidharma's stated purpose of liberation, since, Vasubandhu declares, there is no other way to pacify the afflictions (*kleśa*) than by examining the *dharma*s, which can only be done through the Abhidharma.<sup>49</sup>

Two distinct kinds of problems were created by these developments, belonging roughly to the dimensions of momentariness and continuity we noted above in the canonical contexts of *viññāna*. Dissecting experience into its discrete and momentary elements, it was essential to understand the internal relationships within and between these momentary processes, for it is the presence or absence of certain factors, especially the afflictions (*kleśa*), that make any particular moment *karmically* wholesome or unwholesome; such an analysis is thus both essential to, and only realizes its significance within, the

soteriological project as a whole.<sup>50</sup> I shall call this analysis of momentary *dharmic* factors 'synchronic' or 'dharmic' analysis.

The second problematic was entailed by the first: since each mind-moment is strictly momentary, the continuity of certain characteristics of an individual (or rather, of the mental stream, *citta-santāna*) became problematic, both empirically and in regard to the traditional doctrines of *karma*, *kleśa*, rebirth, and gradual progress on the path. In short, the indispensable relationship between causal conditioning and temporal continuity, of how the past continues to effect the present, became problematic within the new context of momentariness. I shall call this traditional reference to aspects of experience that appear to persist for longer periods, 'diachronic' or 'santāna' discourse.

Both the synchronic, *dharmic* analysis and diachronic discourse of the mental stream are of central importance to Abhidharma as a whole. The presence of the afflictions and the type of actions (*karma*) they instigate can be discerned only through the synchronic, momentary *dharmic* analysis, since they alone are ultimately true, while the continuity of individual *saṃsāric* existence is almost always described in reference to the diachronic level of the mental stream. The exclusive validity that Abhidharma accorded to the analysis of momentary processes of mind threatened to render that very analysis religiously vacuous by negating the legitimacy of its overall soteriological context, that of *saṃsāric* continuity and its ultimate cessation.<sup>51</sup>

We shall briefly examine the developments within the Abhidharma tradition of the synchronic analysis of mind-moments, the diachronic analysis of continuity and the issues elicited by their fateful disjunction. We shall see that here too, as with its multivalence and manifold temporal contexts within the Pāli *suttas*, *viññāna* is central to both of these discourses.

### *The 'Synchronic' Analysis of Mind*

The synchronic analysis focuses primarily upon *citta*, 'thought', or 'mind' (an important term also used in the early canonical texts to denote the central faculty or process of mind<sup>52</sup> which can become either contaminated or purified and liberated<sup>53</sup>) and the mental factors (*caitta* or *cetasika*) which occur with and accompany it.<sup>54</sup> This analysis

of *citta* is an analysis of *viññāna* as well, since *viññāna* is central to nearly every moment of mind and is, in any case, synonymous with *citta* in the Abhidharma.<sup>55</sup>

Although the basic relationship between the *citta* and *caitta* is reciprocal and simultaneous (*sahabhū*),<sup>56</sup> the quality of karmic actions depends upon the specific relationships between particular factors. It is the mental factors (*caitta*) which are 'conjoined' or 'associated' with the mind (*citta-saṃprayukta*)<sup>57</sup> that make their accompanying actions *karmically* effective.<sup>58</sup> Conversely, the formative forces which are unassociated with mind (*citta-viprayukta-saṃskārā*) are less determinative and thus karmically indeterminate (*avyākṛta*).<sup>59</sup>

Since *dharma*s last for only an instant, continuity or change is actually only the incessant arising of succeeding new *dharma*s of a similar or different type.<sup>60</sup> Abhidharma explains the dynamics of their succession through a system of causes (*hetu*), conditions (*pratyaya*) and results (lit.: fruit, *phala*).<sup>61</sup> It was, generally speaking, the difficulty in accounting for diachronic phenomena within the specifics of this system that brought about the problems towards which both certain Abhidharma notions and the concept of *ālayavijñāna* were addressed. We will discuss only those most pertinent to our concerns,<sup>62</sup> foremost among which is the resultant cause and effect (*vipāka-hetu/phala*).

The relationship between the *vipāka-hetu*, the 'resultant, maturational' or 'heterogeneous cause' and its result, the 'ripened' or 'matured fruit' (*vipāka-phala*), is the core of Abhidharma karmic theory since it refers to the functioning of karmic cause and effect over extended periods of time.<sup>63</sup> This relationship stands, however, in some tension with the 'homogeneous and immediate condition' (*saṃantara-pratyaya*),<sup>64</sup> the conditioning influence that *dharma*s bear upon immediately succeeding *dharma*s of a similar nature.<sup>65</sup> While the immediate succession of relatively homogeneous *dharma*s is readily explainable, heterogeneous succession is more problematic since it requires that a wholesome factor, for example, succeed an unwholesome factor, or *vice versa*.<sup>66</sup> But since this succession cannot be the result of homogeneous (by definition) and *immediately* antecedent conditions, it must be conditioned by a causal chain initiated at some earlier time. But how could a cause which is already past, and there-

fore no longer existent, exert a causal influence on the present?<sup>67</sup> In Abhidharmic terms, what *present dharma* constitutes the link between the *vipāka* cause and result necessary for such long-term karma to operate?<sup>68</sup> And how or where *exactly* does it factor into the other momentary processes of mind? For if Abhidharma discourse is truly ultimate, and thus implicitly comprehensive, this must be accounted for within the *dharmic* analysis of purely momentary states.

The problems surrounding the maturational cause and effect, then, involve much more than the mere succession of heterogeneous states, since it entails origination from non-homogeneous or non-immediately antecedent conditions, of which the *potential* for karmic results over extended periods of time is crucial. But much the same problems are posed by the long-term persistence of the latent dispositions as well: if the *anuśaya* are present in any effective sense in each moment, how would wholesome actions ever occur? But if they were entirely absent, from where would they arise? (and why would one not already be an *Aryan*?) Though this will be discussed further below, the latent afflictions, in brief, are also problematic within the analysis of strictly momentary states. And last, the attainments and achievements acquired along the path, but not reaching full fruition until perhaps even lifetimes later, could hardly be explainable by reference to purely momentary states of mind.<sup>69</sup>

In sum, if only momentary processes are real and effective, Abhidharma cannot account for factors that must, for exegetic, systemic and empirical reasons, be conceived as subsisting over the long term. But the very purpose of synchronic analysis was, as stated above, to ascertain the underlying motivations, and thus axiomatically the nature of one's actions, so as to diminish the overpowering influence of the afflictions (*kleśa*), cease accumulating karmic potential and thereby gradually progress along the path toward liberation. Thus the diachronic discourse could not be disregarded without undermining the larger soteriological framework within which the synchronic analysis is ultimately made meaningful and intelligible. And it was the continuing validity, indeed the necessity, of just these traditional doctrines alongside the newer analytic that the various Abhidharma schools, each in their own way, felt compelled to address.

### 'Diachronic' Discourse: Traditional Continuities — Karma, 'Kleśa' and Seeds

The traditional relationship between the dynamics of karma, *kleśa* and *saṃsāric* continuity are also well preserved in the Abhidharma literature:

It is said [AKBh IV 1] that the world in its variety arises from action (*karma*). It is because of the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) that actions accumulate (*upacita*), but without the latent dispositions [they] are not capable of giving rise to a new existence. Thus, the latent dispositions should be known as the root of existence (*mūlaṃ bhava*).<sup>70</sup>

It is this accumulation of actions performed, permeated and influenced by the afflictions (*kleśa*) and their latent counterparts, the *anuśaya*, that increases the mind-stream and so perpetuates the cycle of existence:

In accordance with the projective [cause] (*ākṣepa*-[*hetu*]) the mental stream (*santāna*) increases gradually by the afflictions (*kleśa*) and karma and goes again into the next world . . . Such is the circle of existence without beginning.<sup>71</sup>

The close relationship between karma, its accumulation,<sup>72</sup> and the medium or vehicle of this accumulation is, in contrast to the *Pāli* materials, *explicitly* identified as *viññāna* in *Sautrāntika*-leaning sections of the *AKBh*:

Mental motivation (*manahsañcetanā*) projects (*ākṣepa*) renewed existence; that [existence] which is projected is, in turn, produced from the seed (*bīja*) of *viññāna* which is infused (*paribhāvita*) by karma. Thus, these two are predominant in bringing forth the existence which is not yet arisen.<sup>73</sup>

This much is in substantial agreement with canonical doctrines,<sup>74</sup> except that, it should be stressed, the *Sautrāntikas* developed the traditional metaphor of seeds to *explicitly* stand for the latent potency of both karma and *kleśa*, as we shall see.

The latent dispositions in the *AKBh* constitute a reservoir of ever-present proclivities predisposed to flare up and possess (*paryavasthāna*) the mind<sup>75</sup> in response to specific objects<sup>76</sup> and feelings.<sup>77</sup> This constitutes the vicious *saṃsāric* circle: the fruit of karma occurs *primarily* as feeling,<sup>78</sup> by which the dispositions are expressly pro-

voked (*kāmarāga-paryavasthānīyadharmā*),<sup>79</sup> whereupon they in turn instigate activities that lead to further karmic result, and so on.

As in the Pāli materials, moreover, these dispositions persist until they are eradicated along the path toward liberation<sup>80</sup> as an Aryan.<sup>81</sup> But if these dispositions were constantly present and dynamically unwholesome (*akuśala*) factors associated with mind (*citta-saṃprayukta*), and thus by definition incompatible with wholesome factors,<sup>82</sup> they would prevent wholesome processes of mind from ever arising.<sup>83</sup> But if they were not active and manifest at that very moment,<sup>84</sup> how could they impart any unwholesome influence at all? And finally, how would a momentarily wholesome mind of an ordinary worldling differ from that of the momentary, mundane wholesome mind of an Arhat, since they would be at that time phenomenologically similar, *dharmically* speaking?

The *kleśa/anuśaya* problem thus poses the same question as that of karmic potential: how can dispositional factors, which are diachronic, *santāna*-related elements *par excellence*, be described in terms of the synchronic, *dharmic* analysis? The *Sautrāntikas* again utilize the metaphor of seed, this time to refer to the dispositions:

The affliction (*kleśa*) which is dormant is called a latent disposition (*anuśaya*), that which is awakened, an outburst (*paryavasthāna*).

And what is that [affliction] which is dormant?

It is the continuity (*anubandha*) in a seed-state (*bīja-bhāva*) [of that affliction] which is not manifest.

What is awakening?

It is being present.

What is called a 'seed-state'?

It is the capacity (*śakti*) of that individual (*ātmabhāva*) for an affliction to arise born from a [previous] affliction, as is the capacity for memory to arise born from experiential knowledge (*anubhava-jñāna*), and the capacity for sprouts, etc., to produce a grain (*phala*) of rice bred from a [previous] grain of rice.<sup>85</sup>

The *Sautrāntikas* here, in agreement with the *sutta* materials examined above and in contrast with the *Sarvāstivādins* and the *Theravādins*,<sup>86</sup> clearly distinguish between the latent dispositions and their manifest outbursts.<sup>87</sup> But in so doing they *opt out of the dharma system altogether*: the latent dispositions are neither associated (*citta-saṃprayukta*) nor disassociated with mind (*citta-viprayukta*)<sup>88</sup> since they are not *real existents* (*dravya*).<sup>89</sup>

And neither is the *Sautrāntika* concept of seed (*bīja*), representing both the potential for karmic result and the latent dispositions within the mind-stream, since it too is only nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*).<sup>90</sup> It is related, rather, to solely *diachronic* terms, such as *citta-santāna*, *vijñāna*,<sup>91</sup> *saṃskāra*, *āśraya*, *nāma-rūpa* (or, as above, the even more nebulous *ātmabhāva*), an explicit admission of its incompatibility with, or rather *untransposability* into, synchronic, *dharmic* discourse:

What is called a 'seed'?

Any psycho-physical organism (*nāma-rūpa*) that is capable of producing a fruit either mediately or immediately through a specific modification of the mental stream (*santatiparināma-viśeṣajāt*).

What is called a 'modification'?

It is the mental stream being in a different state.

What is called the 'mental stream'?

It is the motivating complexes (*saṃskārā*) of the three times existing as cause and effect.<sup>92</sup>

It is only in reference to the mental stream (*santāna*) that the concept of seed has relevance. But it is just the mass of accumulated karma (*karmopacitam*) and the inertia of the predispositions that constitute individual *saṃsāric* existence and the habitual energy patterns that perpetuate the whole cycle. This mass and inertia exist, in a sense, at a *subliminal* level wholly independent of the *dharma* system, constantly informing and driving the *supraliminal* functions of mind, which in turn create further karma and stronger affliction-complexes,<sup>93</sup> just as a current of water creates and deepens its own stream bed, which then governs its overall course and rate of flow.

*Vijñāna* then in the *Sautrāntika* parts of the *Abhidharmakośa* in particular, and in *Abhidharma* in general, plays the same dual role as in the early Pāli materials. First, *vijñāna* as cognition plays a central role within the momentary processes of mind which the *citta/caitta dharmic* analysis explicates. Second, the persistence and stationing of *vijñāna* as a principle of animate life is a requisite of *saṃsāric* existence<sup>94</sup> and a bodily support throughout life, since it is the common element (*sādhāraṇabhūtāḥ*) from the moment of conception (*pratisandhi-citta*) at rebirth until the time of death,<sup>95</sup> when it finally

leaves the body altogether.<sup>96</sup> The stream of mind (*citta-santāna*), corresponding roughly to these latter aspects of *viññāna*, is also explicitly infused by karma and the afflictions, thus perpetuating the cycle of rebirth.

In the Abhidharma, however, these two dimensions or contexts of meaning are radically differentiated and one of them, that of the momentary *dharmic* analysis, is given priority and ultimate status, while the other, the *santāna* discourse explicitly championed by the *Sautrāntikas* in the *AKBh*, is considered merely conventional or nominal; since it remained for all of them, however, the indispensable soteriological framework within which *dharmic* analysis is ultimately made meaningful and, in the end, intelligible,<sup>97</sup> problems arose.

#### 'Sarvāstivādin' Doctrines

The *Sarvāstivādins*<sup>98</sup> attempt to reconcile the *dharmic* analysis of mind with the diachronic phenomena of karma, *kleśa*, and their gradual removal along the path presents an interesting contrast to the *Sautrāntika* concept of seeds, since it avoids involving *viññāna* altogether. Rather than resorting to a metaphor denoting the continuous potential of such phenomena, they proposed an ontology in which *dharmas* exist throughout the three times (past, present and future).<sup>99</sup> This was argued on the grounds that if past causes did not exist, then no longer being present, they could not lead to future results. In one of the *Sarvāstivādin* interpretations, what distinguishes a *dharma* as present is its 'activity' (*karitra*), that is, whether or not it has the capacity to condition the occurrence of another *dharma*.<sup>100</sup>

An additional *dharma* called 'possession' (*prāpti*) was also proposed, which would determine when a certain mental factor would occur at a given moment, that is, when it falls into *one's*, or rather *its own mental stream* (*santāna*).<sup>101</sup> This 'possession' itself, however, is unassociated with mind (*citta-viprayukta*) and so may co-exist with either a wholesome or unwholesome nature of mind,<sup>102</sup> thereby also allowing for heterogeneous succession.<sup>103</sup>

And since it is the 'possession' of a *dharma* that determines its presence or absence within the mental stream, the need to distinguish between active (*paryavasthāna*) and latent (*anuśaya*) afflictions is

obviated. The *Sarvāstivādins* therefore simply conflate the two and assert that they are associated with mind (*citta-samprayukta*),<sup>104</sup> claiming that the latent dispositions mentioned in the *suttas* actually refer to 'possession' by another name.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, what distinguishes an *Aryan* in a mundane moment from an ordinary being (*prthagjana*) is just the 'possession' (*prāpti*) of the appropriate *dharmas*.<sup>106</sup> Thus, the *Sarvāstivādins* as well as the *Sautrāntikas* distinguished abandonment of the afflictions independently of the actual *present* state of mind<sup>107</sup> with the concepts of 'possession' and 'seeds', respectively.

The *dharma* of 'possession', however, was not systematically worked into the complex scheme of cause, condition, and result (*hetu, pratyaya, phala*). As the final mechanism of the nature of karmic actions, the afflictions which instigate them, and the ultimate indicator of progress along the path, *prāpti* itself is remarkably vague and indeterminate, betraying its *ad hoc* nature and inviting Vasubandhu's open disdain.<sup>108</sup>

#### The Medium of Seeds, Body/Mind Relations and Meditative Cessation

The idea that the accumulation of karma and the continuity of the afflicted dispositions were transmitted through the stream of mind raised, however, further questions regarding the two aspects of *viññāna* delineated above: how does this mental series relate, if at all, to the traditional six cognitive modes? Is the series merely one moment of cognition after another? If so, then is there sufficient homogeneity between succeeding moments of the six cognitive modes, with their attendant and divergent mental factors and physiological bases, so as to allow for the transmission of such karmic potential and afflictive potency? And if not, would the stream of mind that transmits such potential refer to a heretofore unspecified kind of mind?

These questions were brought to a head in the context of body/mind issues in which the continuous presence of mind was essential: what kind of *viññāna* (or *citta*)<sup>109</sup> is it that, as in the canonical doctrines, takes up or appropriates (*upatta* or *upādāna*) the body and its sense organs at birth and is thereafter its support or basis (*āśraya*)<sup>110</sup> until its departure from the body at death? And what kind of mind keeps the body alive during the absorption of cessation in

which all mental activities come to a halt (*nirodha-samāpatti*)?<sup>111</sup> Either mind is present, in which case what type of mind would it be without any mental activities whatsoever? Or, if mind were completely absent and its continuity cut, then what would ensure the transmission of karma and afflictive potential,<sup>112</sup> and why would the practitioner not simply die? And what would serve as the homogeneous and immediately antecedent condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) for the moment of mind which emerges from this absorption,<sup>113</sup> since its 'mind support' (*manāśrayaḥ*), an immediately antecedent mental cognition,<sup>114</sup> would necessarily have been absent?

It is clear that no single one of the six cognitive modes is fully capable of all of the various functions attributed to *viññāna* in both canonical and Abhidharma sources, since each of them depends upon their respective sense organs and specific sense objects, is intermittent and always accompanied by associated mental factors. The various approaches to these questions evince a similar search for a different type of mind, one subsisting in some fashion independently of the traditional six cognitive modes.

The *Sautrāntikas* suggested that the *citta* which emerges from the absorption of cessation arises from seeds continuously preserved in the body, since they held that mind and body are mutual seeds of one another;<sup>115</sup> others, however, criticized this for abrogating the condition of homogeneity, that the effect must be similar to the cause.<sup>116</sup> The *Sarvāstivādins* held that the emerging *citta* is directly conditioned by the last moment of *citta* preceding the absorption, since for them those past *dharmas* actually exist.<sup>117</sup> Others maintained, however, that a subtle form of mind (*sūkṣma-citta*) subsists without apparent functioning during the absorption, since otherwise the complete withdrawal of *viññāna* would result in death.<sup>118</sup> The *Yogācārin*s combined these characteristics into a continuous and subtle type of mind that carries the seeds of both body and mind together, viz. the *ālaya-viññāna*.<sup>119</sup>

### *Bhavaṅga-citta*

The transition from one body to another at rebirth is an interruption in the material series, over which the transmission of accumulated

karma and the ingrained *kleśa* traverses until one has achieved liberation. Most Abhidharma schools considered the mind which reconnects (*pratisandhi-citta*) at rebirth (*upapatti*), and thereupon joins with the fetal materials, to be a moment of mental cognition (*manovijñāna*).<sup>120</sup> The *Theravādins*, however, amended this position with the new concept of the life-element or life continuum (*bhavaṅga-citta*),<sup>121</sup> which addresses a variety of problems and so bears comparison with the *ālayaviññāna*.

The *bhavaṅga-citta* is a resultant (*vipāka*), and thus *karmically* neutral, mind of homogeneous nature which takes its particular character at rebirth and to which the mind naturally reverts in the absence of cognitive objects.<sup>122</sup> As a neutral 'buffer-state' between moments of cognition, it serves, along with the object itself and attention, as one of the immediate conditions upon which specific cognitions arise, thus also resolving the problem of heterogeneous succession.<sup>123</sup> It is not, however, a continuous stream since it is constantly interrupted by these cognitions, nor is it simultaneous with them.<sup>124</sup> Neither is the *bhavaṅga-citta* in its classical formulation connected to the acute functions of karma or *kleśa*, since it is concerned primarily with continuity and perception. Karmic continuities in the *Theravāda*, rather, in Collins' words (1982: 248), have no "underlying connecting thread, save the overall force of *karma* which creates them," transmitted through the unbroken succession of either mental moments, some subliminal and some supraliminal, or, during the mindless absorptions, the material life faculty — in sum, a conception not too dissimilar from the *Sautrāntikas*' mental stream (*citta-santāna*), where it is the stream of *citta* or *viññāna per se* that insures the continuity of karma except during the absorption of cessation.

It is with its metaphysical functions, however, that the *bhavaṅga-citta* bears the closest resemblance to the *ālayaviññāna*. Commenting on these Collins (1982: 239) remarks:

It is a condition of existence in two senses: first, in the sense of its mere occurrence as a phenomenon of the samsāric, temporally extended sphere, as a necessary part of any individual name-and-form . . . it is both a causal, 'construct-ive' and a resultant, 'construct-ed' factor . . . Secondly, it is itself a conditioning factor of existence, in the particular sense of being a necessary condition for any *conscious* experience of life. It is only on the basis of *bhavaṅga* that any mental processes can arise.<sup>125</sup>

And it is precisely upon this dual nature of a continuous, constructed aspect of mind necessary for *samsāric* existence and of an active, conditioning aspect serving as a precondition for all cognitive processes that the complex notion of the *ālayavijñāna* was built.<sup>126</sup>

### *Index of Controverted Issues*

We have seen that the Abhidharma tradition laid ultimate validity upon the momentary factors (*dharmas*) wholly constitutive of the individual and whose (mostly) unbroken succession is conventionally designated the mental stream (*citta-santāna*).<sup>127</sup> The discernment of these factors as they inform, indeed constitute, one's thoughts and actions provided a powerful analytic in service of the higher religious aims of purification of the mind, the cessation of karmic accumulation, and the gradual progress toward these goals. This newer Abhidharmic analytic, however, became increasingly problematic when contextualized within the larger soteriological framework in which it was ultimately meaningful. For when it came time to describe the accepted workings of *karma* and *kleśa*, and their gradual eradication, in terms of the analysis of momentary processes of mind and its concomitant mental factors (*citta-caitta*), the dogmatic, systemic and empirical inadequacies became glaring indeed. And this inability to adequately contextualize the *dharmic* analytic undermines the very purpose of discerning these momentary processes and overcoming their pernicious influences for which it was conceived in the first place.

The totality of the problems created by the Abhidharmic analytic suggests they are of a systemic nature, elicited by the disjunction between the two temporal dimensions of *vijñāna* which we first discerned within the early Pāli materials. The common thread connecting them is that they refer to, rely upon or seem to require aspects of mind which persist in some fashion beyond, or more precisely, *independently* of the momentary cognitive processes.<sup>128</sup> And while these continuous elements must be, for the most part, *potentially* present, they must also be strictly *neutral* in their karmic influences.<sup>129</sup> A short summary of these issues, most of them discussed above, bears this out.<sup>130</sup>

### *Karma:*

- (1) is there a distinct factor of karmic accumulation (*karma-upacaya*)?<sup>131</sup>
- (2) is karmic accumulation (*karma-upacaya*) related to mind (*vijñāna*)?<sup>132</sup>

### *Kleśa/anuśaya:*

- (3) are the outbursts (*pariyavasthāna*) of afflictions (*kleśa*) distinct from their latent dispositions (*anuśaya*)?<sup>133</sup>
- (4) are the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) dissociated from the mind (*citta-viprayukta*), and thus karmically neutral?<sup>134</sup>
- (5) are the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) simultaneous or compatible with wholesome states (*kuśala-citta*)?<sup>135</sup>
- (6) are there innate, but karmically neutral afflictions (*kleśa*)?<sup>136</sup>
- (7) are there seeds (*bīja*) that represent the latent dispositions, their 'impressions' (*vāsanā*), the potential for *karmic* result, and/or subtle forms of *vijñāna*?<sup>137</sup>

### *Attainments:*

- (8) do Aryans harbor afflictions or latent dispositions (*anuśaya*)?<sup>138</sup>
- (9) is there a distinct attainment which distinguishes those who are or will be Aryans from the non-liberated?<sup>139</sup>

### *Continuity of Consciousness:*

- (10) are there subtle (*sūkṣma*) and enduring forms of mind?<sup>140</sup>
- (11) is a subtle form of mind (*vijñāna*) present during the absorption of cessation or unconscious states?<sup>141</sup>
- (12) is there a distinct type of *vijñāna* that transists at rebirth?<sup>142</sup>
- (13) is there a neutral type of mind which can mediate between two heterogeneous states?

### *Simultaneity of Consciousness:*

- (14) can ordinary mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*) contain or accept the seeds (*bīja*) or 'impressions' (*vāsanā*)?<sup>143</sup>
- (15) is there a type of mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*) underlying the cognitive modes as their basis (*āśraya*) or root (*mūla*)?<sup>144</sup>

- (16) do the different cognitive modes (*viññāna*) function simultaneously?<sup>145</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

Collins' (1982: 224) remark on the use of seed imagery in *Theravāda* — "the imagery of seeds and fruit is never regularized to the extent of becoming technical terminology built into the ultimate account of continuity" — can, I believe, be extrapolated to the problem of the individual mind stream within Abhidharma as a whole. Since all *dharmas* are momentary, Abhidharma does not attribute ultimate validity to *any* factor which continues independently of the analyzable, momentary processes of mind. All the doctrines referring to the continuity of *karma* and *kleśa* examined above, however, (with the exception of *viññāna* in its momentary, cognitive aspect), depend upon their relation to elements (*citta-santāna*, *āśraya*, *nāma-rūpa*, *ātma-bhāva*, *bīja*) considered extraneous to *dharmic* discourse.<sup>146</sup> The fact that this juxtaposition of doctrinally technical language with naturalistic metaphors, analogies and conventional usages was necessary in order to give a full account of the continuity of *karma*, *kleśa*, and the acknowledgement of stages in their eradication, demonstrates the limitations of purely *dharmic* discourse, a conclusion supported by all the above-mentioned 'pseudo-permanencies' and 'pseudo-selves' (Conze, 1973: 132, 138). The seeds, for example, were never intended to be part of that discourse since they were not real existents (*dravya*) at all, but simply metaphors for the underlying capacities (*śakti* or *sāmarthyam*),<sup>147</sup> potentials and developments of mind in terms of the life-processes of insemination (*paribhāvita*), growth (*vrddha*) and eventual fructification (*vipāka-phala*; 'ripened fruit').

Central to these tensions lay, again, the concept of *viññāna*, with its two temporal aspects from canonical times, as momentary 'cognition' and as a continuous, conscious factor essential for life, corresponding, respectively, to the synchronic analysis of mind (*citta/caitta*) and the diachronic discourse of the mental stream (*santāna*) which grows and develops. To the extent that Abhidharma represents the exclusive validity of the synchronic analysis over diachronic discourse, it is so removed from any greater temporal context as to be nearly ahistorical,

for anything more than the immediate succession of momentary *dharmas* was indescribable, i.e. only nominally or figuratively true (and even this was problematic, as the issues involving heterogeneous succession demonstrate, for these were ultimately inseparable from problems surrounding the fruition of past *karma*, the persistence of latent dispositions, the emergence from the absorption of cessation, etc.<sup>148</sup>). The Abhidharma analysis thus undermined its own encompassing soteriological context in which alone it was made meaningful and coherent.

The entire Abhidharma project, in short, of a soteriology based upon a systematic analysis of momentary mental processes in terms of discrete elements or factors, is at stake here. And it is at stake because the Abhidharma, as it stands, cannot accommodate dispositional or conditioning factors outside of, but still very much influencing, those processes most amenable to their probing investigation, in other words, those unmanifest factors clinging to the mental stream, the continuity of individual existence within *saṃsāra*.

And it was the tension, at least in part, between these two levels of doctrinal analysis and discourse, focused upon the momentary and continuous processes of mind, respectively, that foreshadowed if not stimulated the conceptualization of the *ālayavijñāna*. For it is the series that, if anything, 'carries' the seeds and so insures doctrinal and empirical meaning and coherence. If the Abhidharma project as a whole was to be salvaged, the series and its seeds must be *systematically* worked into *dharmic* discourse, so that it may adequately describe the continuing persistence and influence of the afflicting passions, the accumulation of karmic potential, the presence of bodily vitality, and the marked stages along the path, yet at the same time preserve the developed system of analysis of one's actions in terms of the momentary and discrete psychology worked out over the centuries by generations of scholars and adepts. But for this a wholly new model of mind was called for, one that could articulate the simultaneous existence of both of these temporal dimensions, of momentary, manifest activities and of the persisting influences of the past. Of all the notions proffered, only the *ālayavijñāna* attempted to systematically integrate, or rather reintegrate in the context of the sophisticated



Abhidharma doctrine, these two distinct aspects of mind first found undifferentiated in the early discourses.

# NOTES

\* I wish to thank Dr. David Patt and Nobuyoshi Yamabe for many helpful suggestions regarding both the form and content of this essay.

<sup>1</sup> For example, *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* ch. VIII.37.1. states that understanding the appropriating consciousness' (*ādāna-vijñāna*) dim cognition of the constant external world (*asamvidiṭṭa-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti*) is being "skilled in the arising of *citta* (*cittōtpāda-kuśala*) in accordance with the way things truly are (*yathābhūtam*)."  
(*ji lta na sems kyi skye ba la mkhas pa yin zhe na / sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug shes na sems kyi skye ba la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mkhas pa yin te / de la sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug ni bstan pa dang snod rnam par rig pa (mi rig pa) 'ni 'di lta ste / len pa'i rnam par shes pa'i o.*) See Schmithausen (1987: 385, n. 629) for emendation, *(mi rig pa)* and Sanskrit reconstruction, based upon *TBh kārikā* 21.11 (*asamvidiṭṭa-upādi-sthāna-vijñāptikam ca tat*); *Nivṛtti Portion* 6. states that its description of the *ālayavijñāna* is "the correct way (*samyaknyāya*) of establishing *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*." (*de lta na 'di ni sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa rnam par gzhaḡ pa'i tshul yang dag pa yin te /*); *MSg* I.1—4 adduces several *Māhāyāna sūtras*, viz. the *Abhidharma-māhāyāna-sūtra* and the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, that teach the *ālaya/ādāna-vijñāna*, while *MSg* I.11 cites the *āgamas* of contemporary non-*Māhāyāna* schools where the *ālayavijñāna* had purportedly been taught by synonymous terms (*paryāya*).

<sup>2</sup> Walpole Rahula (1978: 99).

<sup>3</sup> By 'canonical' I refer to the authoritative scriptures generally cited under the rubric 'āgama' or 'sūtra' in the Abhidharma and *Yogācāra* texts, as well as the "nikāyas" of the *Theravādins*. (For such citations found within the *AKBh* see Pāsādika, Bhikkhu. 1989 *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.) This use implies mainly the first of two senses of 'canon' described by Collins (1990: 90f):

The word 'canon', in relation to textual materials, can usefully be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, as an equivalent to 'scripture' (oral or written). Used in this way, the term does not specify that the collection of texts so designated constitutes a closed list; it merely assigns a certain authority to them, without excluding the possibility that others could be, or may come to be included in the collection. In the second sense, however, the idea of a 'canon' contains precisely such an exclusivist specification that it is *this* closed list of texts, *and no others*, which are the 'foundational documents' . . . When compared with other extant collections of scriptures in Buddhism, I think the Pali Canon is unique in being an exclusive, closed list.

(Emphasis in original).

<sup>4</sup> The Pali-English Dictionary (PED: 618) entry testifies to the extreme multivalence of the term *viññāna*:

(as a special term in Buddhist metaphysics) a mental quality as a constituent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life-force (as extending also over rebirths), principle of conscious life, general consciousness (as function of mind *and* matter), regenerative force, animation, mind as transmigrant, as transforming (according to individual kamma) one individual life (after death) into the next. In this (fundamental) application it may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by 'mind.' It is difficult to give any one word for *v.*, because there is much difference between the old Buddhist and our modern points of view, and there is a varying use of the term in the Canon itself . . . Ecclesiastical scholastic dogmatic considers *v.* under the categories of (a) *khandha*; (b) *dhātu*; (c) *pañicca-samuppāda*; (d) *āhāra*; (e) *kāya*.

For this section of this essay, I have benefitted most from the works of Johansson (1965; 1970; 1979), even when disagreeing on points of translation and interpretation. The translations are based upon those of the Pali Text Society, except where noted; they have frequently been altered, however, for the sake of terminological consistency. For the same reason, I will use the more familiar Sanskrit terms *viññāna*, *saṃskāra*, *nirvāṇa*, *saṃsāra*, etc., throughout the text.

<sup>5</sup> S III 143. "When, then, the three factors of life, heat, and consciousness abandon this body, it lies cast away and forsaken like an inanimate stick of wood." (*yadā kho āvuso imaṃ kāyaṃ tayo dhammā jahanti: āyu usmā ca viññāṇaṃ, athāyaṃ kāyo ujjhito avakkhiṭṭo seti, yathā kaṭṭhaṃ acetanaṃ*). Cf. M I 296 and *AKBh* II 45a—b. Schmithausen (1987: 285, n. 165).

<sup>6</sup> D II 62. "I have said that consciousness (*viññāṇa*) conditions name-and-form. Were, Ananda, consciousness not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form coagulate there?" "No, Lord."

"Were consciousness, having descended into the mother's womb, to depart, would name-and-form come to birth in this life." "No, Lord." (*viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ . . . viññāṇaṃ va hi ānanda mātu kucchim na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu kucchimim samucchissathāti. no h'etaṃ bhante. viññāṇaṃ va hi ānanda mātu kucchim okkamivā vakkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathāti. no h'etaṃ bhante*).

Also S II 101. "When consciousness is established and increases, then name-and-form descends [into the mother's womb]." (*yattha paṭiṭṭhitam viññāṇam virūḷham atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti*).

<sup>7</sup> S I 38 specifically states that it is mind (*citta*) that passes over (*vidhāvati*) at the time of death. As Collins (1982: 214) points out, *citta* and *viññāna* here are functionally equivalent.

<sup>8</sup> S II 65. "Consciousness being established and growing, there comes to be renewed existence in the future." (*tasmim paṭiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe āyatim punabbhavābhiniḃbati hoti*). D II 68, S III 54 also describes the persistence of *viññāna* from life to life; *viññāna* passes over into another body in S I 122 and S III 124 (PED: 618).

<sup>9</sup> This is not to say that *viññāna*, as a self-subsistent entity, continues unchangingly from life to life. In M I 258 the Buddha specifically denies the thesis of his interlocutor, Sāti: "Even so do I, Lord, understand *dhamma* taught by the Lord: it is this consciousness itself that runs on, fares on, not another . . . it is this [consciousness] that speaks, that feels, that experiences now here, now there, the fruition of deeds that

are lovely and that are depraved," (*evaṃ byā kho 'haṃ bhante Bhagavatā dhammam desitāṃ ājānāmi yathā tad — ev' idam viññānaṃ sandhāvati saṃsaratī, anaññaṃ — ti . . . yvāyaṃ bhante vado vedāyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākāṃ paṭisaṃvedetīti*). The Buddha responds stating that "apart from conditions there is no origination of consciousness" (*aññatra paccayā natthi viññānassa sambhavo ti*). Rather it is that the *stream* of *viññāna* continues *unbroken*, as in the context of rebirth. (See also S III 58).

Though the term 'stream of consciousness' (*viññānasotam*) belongs more properly to the later literature, it does appear in the Pāli texts in D III 105: "He understands a man's stream of *viññāna* which is uninterrupted at both ends is established in both this world and the next." (*purisassa ca viññānasotam pajānāti ubhayato abbocchinnam idhaloke paṭṭhitaṃ ca paraloke paṭṭhitaṃ ca*). See Johansson (1965: 192) and Jayatillike (1949: 216, as cited in Matthews 1983: 63) for differing interpretations of this passage.

<sup>10</sup> There is no passage in the Pāli Canon to my knowledge which *explicitly* states that *viññāna* receives or maintains impressions of karma. Nevertheless, Johansson calls *viññāna* the "transmitter of *kamma*" (1965: 195f), or the "collector of *kamma* effects" (1979: 61), citing, however, only passages which are fairly ambiguous. This conclusion is, with some qualifications, defensible, I believe, and can be deduced by the passages that do discuss *karma*, while taking into account the overall characteristics of *viññāna* as the only possible medium of *karmic* continuity, particularly across lifetimes. Such a question was not, however, explicitly discussed at length until the Abhidharma period. The supporting texts may be summarized as follows:

First of all karma is accumulated (*upacita*) and passed on: A V 292. "I declare that the intentional actions performed and accumulated will not be destroyed without being experienced;" M I 390: "beings are heirs" to their actions (*kammadāyādā sattā ti vadāmi*); M III 202: *kammasakā sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu . . . Nāham . . . saṇcetanikam kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā vyantibhāvaṃ vadāmi. yaṃ kammaṃ karonti kalyāṇaṃ vā pāpakaṃ vā tassa dāyādā bhavanti*. Numerous such passages are found throughout the Pāli Canon.

*Viññāna* itself, moreover, is directly effected by the quality of a karmic action: S II 82. "If an ignorant man undertakes meritorious actions [his] consciousness (*viññānaṃ*) will go to merit, and [if he] undertakes demeritorious actions, [his] consciousness will go to demerit." (*avijjāgato yaṃ . . . purisapuggalo puññaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisankharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti viññānaṃ. apuññaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisankharoti, apuññūpagaṃ hoti viññānaṃ*). See Johansson (1979: 61; 1965: 195f).

These two characteristics together nearly suffice: *viññāna* takes the quality of *karmic* activity, which itself accumulates until it comes to fruition; and *viññāna* is virtually the only factor which is described as departing at death and re-emerging at the time of conception. For the *karmic* potential to accrue to an individual lifestream and pass along through the series of rebirths, then it must do so, at least at that time, in conjunction with *viññāna*. Thus Johansson (1965: 191) declares, with some license:

The continuity in the material diversity of the series of rebirths must be something that can transmit ethical resultants just as a wave of energy can run through different types of matter and on its way change its form because of the momentary matter and itself cause changes in the matter. This 'wave of energy' is called *viññāna*.

<sup>11</sup> S III 53. "By means of the body [feeling, etc.] . . . consciousness would persist, if it is to persist. With body [etc.] for its object, with body [etc.] for its support, seeking a means of enjoyment, it would attain growth, increase, abundance." (*rūpupāyaṃ . . . viññānaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpapaṭiṭṭhaṃ nanadupasevanam virūlhaṃ vuddhiṃ veppulam āpajeyya*). D III 228 is nearly identical. See Johansson (1979: 128).

These exact terms for propagation are also used in an analogy between seeds and consciousness in S III 54. "Now would these five kinds of seeds come to growth, increase and abundance? . . . As the five kinds of seeds, so should consciousness with its sustenance be considered." (*api nu imāni . . . pañcabijājātānti vuddhiṃ virūlhaṃ veppulam āpajeyyunti . . . pañcabijājātānti evaṃ viññānaṃ sāhāram datṭhabbam*). Elsewhere consciousness is declared the seed for further *samsāric* existence. (A I 223. *viññānaṃ bijaṃ . . . hināya dhātuyā viññānaṃ paṭiṭṭhitaṃ*.)

As we shall see, these vegetative analogies will also be used to describe the *ālayaviññāna*: the "mind possessed of all the seeds matures, congeals, grows, develops and increases" (*Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* (V. 2): \**sarvabijakam cittam vipacyate saṃmūrcchati vṛddhiṃ virūddhiṃ vipulatām āpadyate; sa bon thams cad pa'i sems ram par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro*) Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 356, n. 508).

<sup>12</sup> Passages equating the cessation of *viññāna* with liberation (*vimutta*) are not uncommon in the Pāli Canon. S III 61. "By the disgust, the dispassion, the cessation of *viññāna* [monks] are liberated without grasping — they are truly liberated." (*viññānassa nibbidā virāgā nirodhā anupādā vimuttā e suvimuttā*). Johansson (1965: 200). M II 265. "As he does not delight in that equanimity, welcome or cleave to it, *viññāna* does not depend on it, nor grasp it. A monk without grasping (*anupādāna*), Ananda, attains *nibbāna*." (*tassa taṃ upekkhā anabhinandato anabhivadato anajjhosaṃyo tiṭṭhato na taṃ nissitaṃ hoti viññānaṃ na tad upādānaṃ. anupādāno, ānanda, bhikkhu parinibbāyati*). S III 61. "This eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of consciousness (*viññāna*)." (*ayaṃ . . . atṭhangiko maggo viññānanirodhagāmiṇi paṭipadā*). (Johansson, 1970: 101). D I 223. "When mind and body are completely destroyed, it is destroyed by the cessation of *viññāna*." (*ettha nāmaṃ ca rūpaṃ ca asesam uparujjhati, viññānassa nirodhena etth'etaṃ uparujjhati*).

There are, however, other views found within the same texts, further expressing the rich and complex polysemy of *viññāna* and suggesting that it continues in some form beyond *samsāric* existence. A passage in SN 734 in fact describes the cessation of *viññāna* and its calming in the same breath: "By the cessation of *viññāna*, there will be no origin of suffering; through the calming of *viññāna* a monk is without craving and completely free." (*viññānassa nirodhena n'atthi dukkhassa sambhavo . . . viññānūpasamā bhikkhu nicchāto parinibbuto*).

The 'survival' of *viññāna* after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* is supported by many textual passages. M I 329: "*Viññāna* is without attribute, endless and radiating all round." (*viññānaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabham*). A *viññāna* without 'support' or 'resting place' neither increases nor performs karmic activities, and is liberated (S III 53. *tad apatiṭṭhitaṃ viññānaṃ avirūlhaṃ anabhisankhāraṇa vimuttaṃ*); thus the *viññāna* of a Buddha or Arhat is said to be without a resting place or support (*apatiṭṭhita-viññāna*). (Cf. D III 105; S I 122; S II 66; S III 54.)

It is surely more than coincidental that a nearly equivalent expression is central to the *Yogācāra* conception of liberation, viz., *apratisthita-nirvāṇa*, in which the impure

or defiled portions of the *ālayavijñāna* are removed and its support or basis (*āśraya*) within *samsāric* life utterly transformed, leaving the Bodhisattva with no fixed abode (*apratisthita*). On various *Yogācāra* treatments of this concept, see Griffiths *et al.* (1989: 244f) for commentaries on *MSg* X.34; Nagao (1990: 23–34); and Sponberg (1979).

These two conflicting conceptions of the fate of a post-*samsāric* *vijñāna*, in whatever form, are central to many of the later controversies concerning *nirvāṇa* and Buddhahood. The complex and often contradictory passages preserved in these early texts serve to remind us both of the antecedents and origins of the many controverted issues raised within the history of Indian Buddhist thought and of the relevance these texts still hold for the study of virtually every phase of Indian Buddhism.

<sup>13</sup> M I 292. "It is called 'cognition' because it cognizes." (*vijānāti ti kho tasmā viññānaṃ ti vuccati*.)

<sup>14</sup> D III 243. "There are six cognition-groups: visual cognition, auditory cognition, olfactory cognition, gustatory cognition, tactile cognition, mental cognition." (*cha viññāna-kāyā, cakkhu-viññānaṃ, sota-viññānaṃ, ghāna-viññānaṃ, jivhā-viññānaṃ, kāya-viññānaṃ, mano-viññānaṃ*.) There is also the famous simile in M I 259 where the Buddha declares that in just the same way that a fire is named by the type of material which is burning, such as a brush fire, etc., so also each type of cognition is named after its respective conditions, that is, after its perceiving organ.

<sup>15</sup> Similar formulas, for example M I 190, include an unimpaired internal sense-organ of sight, external visible forms entering into the field of vision, and an appropriate act of attention on the part of the mind, at which time a visual mode of cognition manifests. (*ajjhattikam . . . cakkhu aparibhinnaṃ hoti . . . bāhirā ca rūpā āpātham āgacchanti . . . tājjo ca samannāhāro hoti . . . viññāna-bhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti*.) Jayatilleke (1963: 433f).

<sup>16</sup> It is not at all clear that this distinction always applies, or when it does, which 'aspect' predominates. Citing a number of passages, for example M III 260, in which both senses of *vijñāna* may be seen ("I will not grasp after *viññāna* and so will have no *viññāna* dependent on *viññāna*." *na viññānaṃ upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññānanis-sitam viññānaṃ bhavissati*.) Johansson (1965: 198f) vacillates: "there is a form of *viññāna* dependent on cognitive processes, and probably *viññāna* in its rebirth-aspect is intended," while he states at the same time that "rebirth-*viññāna* probably also simply is ordinary consciousness," and that "there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual and the rebirth-*viññāna*." The point is that these two divergent contexts of meaning form part of a complex, with all its attendant tensions, whose essential unity as well as its differentiation calls for explication — a call answered, in fact, by the majority of subsequent exegetes, traditional and modern.

<sup>17</sup> I am referring here to the widespread view within Indian religion of an ultimate homology between what we would call the psychological and metaphysical realms, what Maryla Falk (1943: 49) considers a "conception of a fundamental identity of the facts and events on both the scales, which are considered as only twin projections of one common complex of facts and events."

<sup>18</sup> The *pratītya-samutpāda* series, delineating patterns or complexes of conditioned co-arising, often occurs with a number of factors different than the traditional twelve. All of them, however, are based upon the following formula: "When this is, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this is not, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases." (*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti; imass' uppāda*

*idaṃ uppajjati. imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti; imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjati*.) M II 32, etc.

<sup>19</sup> The *Mahānidāna-sutta* (D II 63) describes the reciprocal conditionality of *vijñāna* and name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), which is itself composed of the five *skandhas*, including *vijñāna*. It states that the descent of *vijñāna* into the mother's womb is a necessary condition for the development of the name-and-form (along with its variegated faculties including *vijñāna*), while the name-and-form is a necessary condition for *vijñāna* to find support in this world, facilitating the arising of birth, old age, death and the mass of suffering. (*viññāna-paccayā nāmarūpan ti iti kho pan' etaṃ vuttam . . . viññānaṃ va hi ānanda mātu kucchim na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāma-rūpaṃ mātu kucchismim samucchissathāti? no h'etaṃ bhante . . . tasmāt ih' ānanda es' eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa, yadidaṃ viññānaṃ . . . nāmarūpa-paccayā viññānaṃ ti iti kho pan' etaṃ vuttam . . . viññānaṃ va hi ānanda nāmarūpe patiṭṭham nālabhissatha, api nu kho āyati jāti-jarā-marana-dukkha-samudaya sambhavo paññāyethāti? no h'etaṃ bhante. tasmāt ih' ānanda es' eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo viññānassa, yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ*.)

The Sheaf of Reeds *sutta* (S II 114) has a similar passage, but the subsequent members of the twelve-fold series follow directly upon name-and-form: "It is just as if, friend, two sheaves of reeds stood leaning against each other, so also, friend, *viññāna* arises conditioned by name-and-form, name-and-form conditioned by *viññāna*, the six sense-spheres conditioned by name-and-form, contact conditioned by the six sense-spheres, and so on; thus is the arising of the entire mass of suffering." (*seyathāpi āvuso dve nalakalāpiyo aññam aññam nissāya tittheyyum. evam eva kho āvuso nāmarūpapaccayā viññānaṃ viññānapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. nāmarūpapaccayā salāyatanaṃ salāyatana-paccayā phasso . . . pe . . . evam etassa kevalassa dukkhak-handhassa samudayo hoti*.) We shall see that the *MSg* specifically claims that the *ālayavijñāna* is the *vijñāna* which is reciprocally conditioned by *nāma-rūpa*. See n. 13 above.

<sup>20</sup> As do the other essential prerequisites to life mentioned above, life and heat (*āyu, usmā*), as well as the five groups of grasping (*pañcupādānakkhandhā*).

<sup>21</sup> *Saṃskāra* are closely allied with the intentional activities defined as karma, and inexorably associated with the perpetuation of *samsāric* existence through the medium of *vijñāna*. S II 39,360, III 60, A II 157 define *saṃskāra* as "intention" (*sañcetanā*). M I 53 relates *saṃskāra* with *vijñāna*: "From the arising of *saṅkhāra*, there is the arising of *viññāna*; from the cessation of *saṅkhāra*, there is the cessation of *viññāna*. The way leading to the cessation of *viññāna* is just this noble eight-fold path." (*saṅkhārasamudayā viññānasamudayo, saṅkhāranirodhā viññānanirodho, ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo viññāna-nirodha gāminī paṭipadā*.)

<sup>22</sup> Plus the sense-object, of course. M I 111. "Dependent on the eye and [visual] forms, a visual cognition occurs, the concomitance of the three is sense-impression; conditioned by sense-impression feeling [occurs], what one feels one apperceives, what one apperceives one reflects upon." (*cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānaṃ, tinnaṃ sañgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi*.)

<sup>23</sup> M I 293. "Your reverence, whatever one feels, that one apperceives; whatever one apperceives, that one cognizes; therefore these states (*dharma*) are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to recognize a difference between these states (*dharma*), having analyzed them again and again." (*yaṃ h' āvuso vedeti taṃ sañjānāti,*

yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti, tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no viṣaṃsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ.)

<sup>24</sup> One *pratītya-samupāda sūtra* in fact begins with the cognitive processes:

"Dependent on the eye organ and visual form, visual cognition arises; the concomitance of the three is sense-impression. Depending on sense-impression is feeling, depending on feeling is craving, depending on craving is grasping, depending on grasping is becoming, depending on becoming is birth, depending on birth old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and despair come about. This is the arising of the world." S II 73. *Cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānaṃ; tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā; vedanāpaccayā tanhā; tanhāpaccayā upādānaṃ; upādānapaccayā bhavo; bhavapaccayā jāti; jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsa sambhavanti. ayaṃ lokassa samudayo.* See also Johansson (1979: 80f).

<sup>25</sup> I prefer 'appropriation', with its verbal sense of 'seizing, taking', and 'taking as one's own' (*ad-proprius*), as well as the nominal 'that which is taken, seized, appropriated'. This is etymologically closer to 'upādāna', which is comprised of the prefix 'upa', "towards, near, together with," plus the noun 'ādāna', "receiving, taking to oneself" (SED), or even "the material out of which anything is made" (Apte: 471), thus meaning "grasping, attachment, drawing upon, finding one's support by, nourished by, taking up." (PED: 149) It also conveys within the Pāli materials the more concrete meanings of "fuel, supply," and thus "substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going." It is thus formally akin to *saṃskāra*, in that it may mean both an active process and a passive product, a conditioning and a conditioned state. See Schmithausen (1987: 72).

*Upādāna*, with its related and suggestive sense of 'fuel', is closely connected with the process of rebirth. One *sutta* states that just as a fire will burn only with fuel (*upādāna*), but not without it, so too will rebirth occur only with appropriation (*upādāna*), but not without it. Here craving (*tanhā*) becomes the fuel or substratum (*upādāna*) for one who has laid aside the body, but not yet taken up another. (S IV 399. *seyyathāpi vaccha aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno. evam eva khvāham vaccha sa-upādānassa upapattim paññāpemi no anupādānassa ti . . . yasmim kho . . . samaye imaṃ ca kāyaṃ nikkhipati satto ca aññataraṃ kāyaṃ anuppanno hoti, tam ahaṃ tanhupādānaṃ vadāmi. tanhā hissa . . . tasmim samaye upādānaṃ hoti.*) (See Johansson 1979: 65 and Matthews 1983: 33).

Without such a substratum, however, one becomes liberated. S IV 102. "If a monk is enamored of them [visible forms (*rūpā*)], if he welcomes them, if he persist in clinging to them . . . he will have *viññāna* resting on them, appropriation of them . . . [but] without appropriation . . . the monk will be liberated." (*taṃ ca bhikkhu abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tūṭṭhati; tassa . . . tannissitaṃ viññānaṃ hoti tadupādānaṃ . . . anupādāno . . . bhikkhu parinibbāyati.*) M III 16. "These five aggregates of appropriation have desire as a root; that which is desire and passion toward these five aggregates of appropriation is the appropriation/fuel of them." (*ime kho . . . pañc' upādānakkhandhā chandamūlakā . . . yo kho . . . pañc' upādānakkhandhesu chandarāgo, taṃ tattha upādānaṃ*) Johansson (1979: 66, 68). Translation altered. See also M II 265.

<sup>26</sup> Passages relating desire, craving, grasping, etc. to rebirth are too numerous to relate. Of particular interest is S II 101 which states that when there is passion, delight, and craving for any of the four sustenances (*āhāra*) of life, edible food,

sensation, mental impulses or intentions, and *viññāna*, then *viññāna* persists and increases. When *viññāna* persists and increases, then name-and-form descends [into the mother's womb], the *saṃskāra* increase, and there is renewed existence in the future, and thus old age and death, etc. (*kabalimkāre . . . phasse . . . manosañcetanāya . . . viññāne ce . . . āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandi atthi tanha patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānaṃ virūḷham. yattha patiṭṭhitam viññānaṃ virūḷham atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti. yattha atthi nāmarūpassa avakkanti atthi tattha saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi. yattha atthi saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi atthi tattha āyatim punabbhavābhiniḍatti atthi tattha āyatim jātijāramaraṇaṃ*). Again, the MSg I.37 will claim that the *ālayavijñāna*, as opposed to any of the six momentary cognitions, is just this consciousness-food (*viññānāhāra*). <sup>27</sup> Johansson (1979: 63f) delineates these two distinct functions of mind: "*Viññāna* refers mainly to the stream of conscious processes which characterizes the human mind, but it is also . . . responsible for the continuity both within this life and beyond. . . . Since *viññāna* is used in two different contexts, the *paṭiccasamuppāda* series and the *khandhā*, one may expect different shades of meaning, although they are not clearly kept apart. In the former type of context, it is more of an inner functional unit, inner space, store-room; in the latter, more of concrete, conscious processes which are the inhabitants of this inner room."

<sup>28</sup> Johansson (1979: 92f), commenting on a passage where *viññāna* results from feeling rather than the more usual opposite order (M III 260. "*viññāna* rests upon feeling born from visual contact." *cakkhusamphassaṃ vedanānissitaṃ viññānaṃ*), remarks: "Perception is produced through the confrontation of a neural message with memories stored in the nervous system. The information supplied through the senses can be interpreted only by being compared with this stored information; this information can from a Buddhist point of view be envisaged as provided by *viññāna* and therefore present before the stimulus; it is activated only through the contact, *phassa*. *Viññāna* is . . . a precondition of perception . . . The *dimension* of consciousness is the condition of sensation, and the concrete *content* is the result of it." In the same vein, Wijesekera (1964: 254f) suggests that we take the verb '*uppajjati*', usually rendered 'arise', to mean rather that *viññāna* "begins to function" in relation to a specific sense organ, while Thomas (1935: 104) also suggests simply that *viññāna* "manifests itself through the six sense organs."

<sup>29</sup> There is the danger, of course, of *anachronistically* reading into the texts distinctions only subsequently made by the later commentators. But, in agreement with the later exegetes, the texts cited here support, indeed call for, just such an analysis. It is not, however, strictly necessary to claim two distinct *aspects* of *viññāna* in these early texts (let alone in the intentions of their author[s]); it is sufficient merely to delineate two consistently distinct *contexts* of meaning. In any case, my primary purpose is to present and examine the materials by which the conclusions of the later writers were supported, and thereby contextualize their claims.

<sup>30</sup> The most well-known concept relating to dispositional tendencies is *āśrava* (Pāli: *āsava*) variously translated as 'outflows', 'inflows', even 'cankers'. The Sanskrit root '*sru*' means "to flow, stream, issue, come from, come in" etc. (SED; 1274); the PED (115) records the metaphorical meanings of intoxicating extract or plant secretion, or discharge from a sore; hence the translation favored one hundred years ago: 'canker'.

The *āśrava* are directly connected to the perpetuation of *samsāra* (for example M I 54f: *āsavasamudayā avijjāsamudayo; āsavanirodhā avijjānirodho . . . avijjāsamudayā āsavasamudayo; avijjānirodhā āsavanirodho*), and present in all states prior to the

attainment of liberation. We will not examine them more deeply as they are not closely related to the concepts under discussion here in any systematic fashion. See Cox (1992: 66f, 92f) for a summary of the overall role of this concept, particularly as found in the *Sarvāstivādin* Abhidharma literature in Chinese translation.

<sup>31</sup> The term is composed of the prefix 'anu-', "along, follow behind," and the Sanskrit root 'śī', meaning "to lie down, to sleep, to dwell." The verbal form 'anuseti' (Pāli: *anuseti*), thus means "to lie down with, to dwell upon," but when referring to ideas, the PED (44) defines it as "to fill the mind persistently, to lie dormant and be continually cropping up," while the nominal form, 'anusaya', is glossed as: "bent, bias, proclivity, the persistence of a dormant or latent disposition, predisposition, tendency. Always in bad sense."

Although the *anusaya* merited an entire chapter in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa*, their role within the early Pāli texts was more peripheral. Recent English language scholarship based upon the Pāli materials includes the works of Johansson, Padmasiri de Silva (1972; 1979), and Matthews (1983). Collet Cox (1992: 68f) has also discussed the *anusaya* and its treatment by the *Sarvāstivādin*.

<sup>32</sup> M III 285. *cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso; phassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitā sukham vā dukkham vā adukkhamasukkhā vā. so sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati; tassa rāgānusaya anuseti.*

<sup>33</sup> M I 303. "A disposition to passion lies latent in pleasant feeling; a disposition to aversion lies latent in unpleasant feeling; a disposition to ignorance lies latent in neutral feeling." (*sukkhāya . . . vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhāya . . . vedanāya paṭighānusayo anuseti, adukkhamasukkhāya . . . vedanāya avijjānusayo anuseti.*)

These three form the basis of an early classification of the *anusaya* into seven different types, the first three corresponding to the three unwholesome roots of greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), with the additional dispositions towards speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*), sceptical doubt (*vicikicchā*), pride (*māna*), and craving for existence (*bhavarāga*): S V 60; A IV 9; PED (44) warns, however, that "these lists govern the connotation of the word; but it would be wrong to put that connotation back into the earlier passages." There are several other types of *anusaya* mentioned in the early texts to which we shall return shortly: 'dispositions to a view of personal existence' (*sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya*), 'attachment to rules and rituals' (*śīlabbataparāmāsānusaya*), 'desire for sensual pleasure' (*kāmarāgānusaya*), and the 'disposition toward the pride that creates 'I' and 'mine' (*ahankāra-mamankāra-māna-anusaya*).

<sup>34</sup> One *sutta* (S II 66) has the *anusaya* initiate the entire *pratītya-samutpāda* series: "If one does not will, O monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant, this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support of consciousness. Consciousness being supported and growing, there come to be the descent of mind-and-body; conditioned by mind-and-body, the six sense-spheres, and so on; such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering." S II 66. (*no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa thitīyā; ārammaṇe sati paṭiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti. tasmim paṭiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe nāmarūpassa avakkanti hoti. nāmarūpapaccayā salāyatanam; pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.*)

<sup>35</sup> S II 65. *no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa thitīyā; ārammaṇe sati paṭiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti. tasmim paṭiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe āyatim punabbhavābhiniḍḍati hoti. āyatim punabbhavābhiniḍḍatiyā*

*sati āyatim jātijarāmarāṇam sokaparidevadukkhā-domanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.*

<sup>36</sup> M I 433. *Daharassa hi malunīkyāputta kumārassa mandassa uttāgaseyyakassa sakkāyo (dhammā . . . silā . . . kāmā . . . sattā) ti pi na hoti, kuto pan' assa uppajjissati sakkāyadiṭṭhi (dhammesu vicikicchā . . . sīlesu śīlabbataparāmāso . . . kāmesu kāmaccchando . . . sattesu byāpādo); anuseti tv'ev' assa sakkāyadiṭṭhānusayo (vicikicchānusaya . . . śīlabbataparāmāsānusayo . . . kāmarāgānusayo . . . byāpādānusayo).*

<sup>37</sup> M I 434. *na sakkāyadiṭṭhi-pariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati na sakkāyadiṭṭhiparetena, uppannāya ca sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā nissaraṇam yathābhūtam pajānāti; tassa sakkāyadiṭṭhi sānusaya pahiyati.* The interpretation of this last phrase, "eliminated along with the *anusaya*" (*sānusaya pahiyati*) became the source of exegetical disagreements, together with their important doctrinal ramifications, between the various Abhidharmic schools. See note 86, below.

<sup>38</sup> An interesting question here is not so much the continuous subsistence of these dispositions, for that seems unquestioned; the real question is whether or not they are in any sense *karmically* effective in their latent state. The texts, however, are ambivalent; for while the *anusaya* are not portrayed as active in every mental process, as the difference between the innocent babe and the beleaguered adult illustrates, they are, nevertheless, held to be generally effective within the wider context of *saṃsāric* continuity, as in S II 65 above. See Johansson (1979: 109). These will become important issues surrounding the *ālayavijñāna*.

<sup>39</sup> An *Aryan* who has destroyed only the five lower fetters (*saṃyojanani*), for example, may still have a subtle remnant (*anusahagato*) of the pride, desire and disposition toward 'I am'. (S III 131. *evam eva kho āvuso kiñcāpi ariyasāvakaṃ pañc' orambhāgiyāni saññojanāni\* pahināni bhavanti. atha khvassa hoti yo ca pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato asmīti māno asmīti chando asmīti anusayo asamūhato.*) Schmithausen (1987: 437, n. 918) reads "*saṃyojanāni*" here, based upon a parallel passage on the preceding page, S III 130.

A more advanced *Aryan*, however, is free of these dispositions and so does not react to unpleasant, pleasant and neutral sensations with the habituated responses of aversion, attachment, and ignorance, respectively. (S IV 209. *tam enam dukkhāya vedanāya apaṭighavantam yo dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo so nānuseti . . . tassa kāmāsukhaṃ nābhinandato yo sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo so nānuseti . . . adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo so nānuseti.*)

<sup>40</sup> Liberation (*vimukti*) and the perfect comprehension of pride (*mānābhisamaya*) are closely related to the absence of any disposition (*anusaya*) toward the pride which produces 'I' or 'mine'. A I 133. "Because, indeed Śāriputta, in so far as a monk . . . has no disposition to the pride that produces 'I' or 'mine' regarding this body endowed with consciousness, has no disposition to the pride that produces 'I' or 'mine' regarding all external phenomena (*nimitta*), and who abides accomplishing liberation of the mind and liberation through insight, he abides accomplishing liberation of the mind and liberation through insight without a disposition to the pride that produces 'I' or 'mine' — such a monk, Śāriputta, has cut off craving, has broken the bonds, has through perfect comprehension of pride made an end of suffering." (*yato kho sārīputta bhikkhuno imasmim saviññāṇake kāye ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti, bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti, yañ ca cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim upasampajja viharato ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti tañ ca cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim upasampajja*)

*viharati. ayam vuccati sārīputta bhikkhu acchecchi taṇhaṃ vāvattayi saṃyojanam sammā mānābhisamayā antam akāsi dukkhassa.)*

Eliminating the *anusaya*, along with ignorance, is an essential part in bringing an end to suffering and coming to have perfect view. M I 47. "When, friends, a noble disciple understands unwholesomeness thus, understands the roots of unwholesomeness thus, understands wholesomeness thus, understands the roots of wholesomeness thus, having eliminated all disposition towards passion, having dispelled the disposition to anger, having removed the disposition to pride which is the view 'I am', having eliminated ignorance, having obtained knowledge, he has in the present brought an end to suffering. To that extent also, friends, does a noble disciple come to have perfect view, whose views are upright, who possesses unwavering confidence in the *dhmma*, who has come into the true *dhmma*." (*yato kho āvuso ariyasāvako evam akusalam pajānāti evam akusalamūlam pajānāti, evam kusalam pajānāti evam kusalamūlam pajānāti, so sabbaso rāgānusayam pahāya paṭighānusayam paṭivinodetvā asmiṃ dūthimānānusayam samūhanitvā avijjam pahāya vijjam uppādetvā dīṭṭhe va dhamme dukkhass' antakaro hoti. ettāvata pi kho āvuso ariyasāvako sammādiṭṭhi hoti, ujugatā 'ssa dīṭṭhi, dhamme aveccappasādena samannāgato. āgato imaṃ saddhamman-ti.*)

<sup>41</sup> The distinction between these two temporal dimensions may well be universal categories based in evolutionary biology. For example, the great Russian neurologist A. R. Luria (1987; xvi) was, Jerome Bruner states in the forward,

convinced that the aim of mental functioning was to construct two complementary versions of the same world . . . that the human nervous system is structured in a manner to help us achieve this dual representation and to help us put the two representations together. One is a simultaneous world in which, as in a panorama, we catch "on the fly" what is needed of what is there. The other is a temporally organized world that is structured around plans and intentions, a world made possible by the frontal cortical system. Frontal lesions disrupt intentionality and planfulness; occipital and parieto-temporal ones produce such anomalies as "simultanagnosia," in which elements and features can be isolated, but a "whole" or meaningful picture cannot be put together.

Though immediate cognition and the long-term continuity of consciousness correspond roughly to these two temporal dimensions, Abhidharma doctrine emphasizes the validity of the former over that of the latter.

<sup>42</sup> Indeed, *Yogācāra* must be considered as one of the Abhidharma schools. See, for example, Guenther (1959) and Mizuno (1978). Nevertheless, since this essay focuses upon distinctions between *Yogācāra* and the other Abhidharma schools, I shall follow the traditionally accepted sectarian affiliations of the works associated with Asanga and Vasubandhu and their commentators.

<sup>43</sup> Much of the following has been discussed at length elsewhere; see especially Stcherbatsky (1956), La Vallée Poussin (1937a), Conze (1973: 138f), Jaini (1959), also Collins (1982), Chaudhuri (1983), Griffiths (1986), Cox (1992).

<sup>44</sup> A word about the prominence of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (AKBh) is in order. We shall be utilizing the AKBh as the primary, though by no means sole, source of Abhidharma doctrine in this section. Though its historical relation to the contem-

poraneous *Yogācāra* literature is far from clear, and thus its contents cannot be used to support arguments of historical priority or causality, it can be used as an adequate contemporary source for presenting the *general context* of Abhidharma doctrine. This choice is made on the grounds that, despite the clear sectarian nature of many of its own positions, the AKBh preserves doctrines of indubitably older origins which were largely shared by other schools, despite differences in specific details. It is its inclusion of these disputed issues and its presentation of the differing approaches of two schools, the *Sautrāntikas*, 'those following the *Sūtras*', and *Sarvāstivādins*, 'those who assert that all exists (*sarva asti*)', that further recommends the AKBh; to oversimplify a bit, they represent allegiance to the *Sūtras* and the Abhidharma, respectively. (See note 86 below). Vasubandhu was, moreover, also a key figure in the *Yogācāra* school and considerable doctrinal overlapping exists between the AKBh and such *Yogācāra* texts of his as the *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* (see Muroji, 1985, for corresponding passages).

<sup>45</sup> AKBh ad I.2b; Shastri: 12; Poussin: 4. *tadayam paramārthadharmāḥ vā nirvāṇam dharmalakṣaṇam vā pratyabhimukho dharma ity abhidharmāḥ.*

<sup>46</sup> AKBh ad I.2b; Shastri: 12; Poussin: 4. *svalakṣaṇadhārāṇāḍ dharmāḥ.* The concept of *dharma* retained, however, the ambiguity, suggesting a tenuous unity, between its sheer existence (*svabhāva*) and its distinguishing characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), what Western scholastics termed *existentia* and *essentia*, respectively. (Guenther 1989: 11); see also Griffiths (1986: 166f, n. 15). The relative emphasis of one side or the other of these two aspects of *dharma* may have been central to certain divergent tendencies in Buddhist thought, one leading toward an ontological realism and the other toward nominalism, as evident in, for example, the *Sarvāstivādins* and the *Sautrāntikas*, respectively.

<sup>47</sup> AKBh ad I.2b, above; Buddhaghosa's *Aṭṭhasālinī*, III 488, concurs: *abhidhammo nāmo paramatthadesanā*. Cited in Guenther (1958: 2). Jayatilke (1963: 361–8) discusses the canonical meanings of ultimate (*paramatta*) and conventional (*sammuti*) discourse and their relation to definitive teachings (*nītattha*) and those in need of interpretation, that is, indirect teachings (*neyyattha*). While both the terms 'conventional' and 'ultimate' are found in the canon (S I 135: "just as much as the word 'chariot' is used when the parts are put together, there is the use [*sammuti*] of the term 'being' [*satto*] when the [psycho-physical] constituents are present;" *yathā pi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti evam khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti*) they are "nowhere contrasted in the Canon" (*ibid.*: 366), and when they are used they refer rather to a "distinction of subject matter and not a distinction of two kinds of truth" (*ibid.*: 368), which, apparently, was left to the commentarial tradition to elaborate. The *Kathāvatthu* I.1.1–146, for example, disputes at great length the contention that the *pudgala*, the 'person', exists ultimately and in truth (*saccikāttaparamatṭhena*). The commentary to the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (AA.I.94, cited in *ibid.*: 363) states that 'person' is conventional teaching, as is 'being', while such things as 'the impermanent', 'the suffering', 'selfless', and 'the aggregates' are ultimate teachings (*puggalo ti sammutikathā, na paramatthakathā . . . tattha puggalo satto . . . ti evarūpā sammuti-desanā. aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ anattā khandhā . . . ti evarūpā paramatthadesanā*). See also *Kathāvatthu*, V. 6; *Miln.* i 45; *Visuddhimagga* XVIII; Compendium, 6, 11, 81 n. 1, 200 n. 1.

<sup>48</sup> This statement needs some qualification. The *Theravādins* and the *Sarvāstivādins*, for example, held that each moment of mind (*citta*) lasted for only an instant (Cf.



*Kathāvatthu* XXII.8, for example, only denies that *all* phenomena last merely a single mind-moment; *eka-citta-kkhanikā sabbe dhamma*), but they divided this instant into three and four parts of arising, abiding and passing away, and impermanence, respectively. (See also Kalupahana (1992: 206–216), who argues that it was only with Buddhaghosa that the theory of momentariness was introduced into Theravādin Abhidhamma and thereafter at variance with earlier doctrine.)

Though this division of a single instant was elsewhere criticized for not being strictly instantaneous (AKBh *ad* II 46a–b; Shastri: 259; Poussin: 228), this does not directly affect the issues under discussion here; I shall use “momentary” and “momentariness” with these qualifications in mind. The AKBh IV *ad* 2b–3b (Shastri: 568; Poussin: 4), for example defines as momentary (*kṣaṇikāḥ*) that which is destroyed immediately after it attains its existence (*ko 'yam kṣaṇo nām? ātmalābho 'nantara vināśī, so 'sya asti iti kṣaṇikāḥ*), while Yaśomitra (*ibid.* in Shastri's edition) glosses ‘*kṣaṇa*’ simply as the limit or boundary of time (*kālaparyantaḥ kṣaṇaḥ*).

<sup>49</sup> AKBh I.3; Shastri: 14; Poussin: 5. *dharmāṇāṃ pravacayam antarena nāsti kleśānām yata upaśāntaye 'bhyupāyah . . . na hi vinā abhidharmopadeśena śīsyāḥ śakto dharmāṇāṃ pravacetum iti*. See Bareau (1955: 137f, 188, 197) for the doctrines that the *dharmas* are entirely knowable (*jñeya*), perceptible (*viñjeya*) and comprehensible (*abhijñeya*). (citing *Sarvāstivāda* thesis #3, the later *Mahīśāsaka* thesis #3, and *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* thesis #31.)

<sup>50</sup> For the same reason, the question of at least conventional identity became problematic, since the *dharmic* factors had to be related closely enough to be considered those of an “individual” mind-stream, if not an actual “person,” for otherwise the boundaries between individual minds would blur and karmic cause and effect would diffuse indiscriminately, unattributable to any particular mind-stream.

<sup>51</sup> And skirting the boundaries of incoherence as well. The inconceivability of purely momentary experience devoid of a larger interpretive framework has been pointed out by Thomas Luckmann (1967: 45) in a context not altogether incompatible with basic Buddhist tenets:

Subjective experience considered in isolation is restricted to mere actuality and is void of meaning. Meaning is not an inherent quality of subjective processes but is bestowed on it in interpretive acts. In such acts a subjective process is grasped retrospectively and located in an interpretive scheme . . . The interpretive scheme is necessarily distinct from [and] . . . “transcends” ongoing experience . . .

The meaning of experience is derived from the relation of ongoing processes to the scheme of interpretation [which] . . . rests upon a certain degree of detachment. Such detachment cannot originate in a simple succession of isolated subjective processes . . . a genuinely isolated subjective process is inconceivable.

One may, however, in agreement with its *Mahāyāna* critics, question the Abhidharmikas' claim to ultimate truth and consider Abhidharma as simply another interpretive scheme, preserving ‘inconceivability’ for higher concerns. See Piatigorsky (1984) for the most extensive, and sympathetic, treatment of this approach and Daye (1975). Derrida (1973: esp. 60–69) also discusses the relation between temporality

and ‘pure experience’ in reference to Husserl's concepts, particularly in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness*.

<sup>52</sup> The PED (266f) entry for this term indicates, once again, the common indivisibility between the *process* and the *agent* of the process in so many key Buddhist terms; *citta* is “the centre and focus of man's emotional nature as well as that intellectual element which inheres in and accompanies its manifestations: thought. In this wise *citta* denotes both the agent and that which is enacted.” See Guenther (1989: 1f) for similar remarks on the meaning and translation of *citta*.

In the early discourses it was frequently grouped with *viññāna* and *manas*, cognition and mentation, respectively. S II 95. *yam ca kho etaṃ . . . vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññānaṃ iti pi*. AKBh II 34a–b; Shastri: 28; Poussin: 176f: *cittaṃ mano 'tha viññānam ekāṇṭham*. These terms are distinguished, however, by their characteristic functions and nuances: *citta*, in Vasubandhu's usual double etymology, accumulates (*cinoti*), and refers to a variety (*citraṃ*) of pure and impure elements; *manas* mentates and refers to a previous state of mind inasmuch as it supports the succeeding one; and *viññāna* discerns objects and arises supported by two conditions, i.e. the organ and object. (*ibid.*: *cinoti iti cittaṃ. manuta iti manaḥ. viññānāni iti viññānam. cittaṃ śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittaṃ. tad eva āśrayabhūtaṃ manaḥ. āśritabhūtaṃ viññānam iti apare*). The *Yogācārins* will subsequently, and significantly, designate the *ālayavijñāna* as *citta*, while the *manas* will be equated with ‘afflictive mentation’ (*kliṣṭa-manas*), and *viññāna* with the ‘functioning cognitions’ (*pravṛtti-viññāna*).

<sup>53</sup> A I 8. *pañihiteṇa cittena . . . nibbānam sacchikarissati*. D II 81. “*Citta*, when thoroughly infused with wisdom, is set quite free from the maleficent influences (*āsava*), namely the maleficent influences of sensual pleasure, existence, views and ignorance.” (*paññā-paribhāvitam cittaṃ sammād eva āsavehi vimuccati seyyathidaṃ kāmāsavā bhavāsavā diṭṭhāsavā avijjāsavā*). The verb “*paribhāvita*” is used with the seeds (*bīja*) in the AKBh, and when used with *citta* will have important implications for *Yogācāra ālayavijñāna* theory. See also Johansson 1965: 176 and 1970: 23.

<sup>54</sup> Though the general scheme of *dharmas* is common to most Abhidharma schools, the exact list differs from one school to the next. For example the *Yogācārins* considered five *caittas* as ‘omnipresent’ (*sarvatraga*) factors essential for mental functioning at every moment (*sparśa*, sensation; *manaskāra*, attention; *vedanā*, feeling; *saṃjñā*, apperception; and *cetanā*, motivation), in addition to which the *Theravādins* reckoned two, *ekaggatā* (individuality of object) and *jīvitindriya* (life faculty), and the *Sarvāstivādins* five others: *chanda*, desire; *matī*, discernment; *prajñā*, discriminatory awareness; *smṛti*, recollection or mindfulness; *adhimokṣa*, determination; and *samādhi*, concentration.

There are further categorizations and distributions of *caittas*, with the exact members differing from school to school, in terms of wholesome mental factors (*kuśala-caitta*) occurring in each wholesome *citta*, unwholesome factors in unwholesome *cittas* associated with universal affliction factors (*kleśa-mahābhūmika*) or simply with the afflictions (*kleśa*) themselves. AKBh *ad* II 24–29; Shastri: 186; Poussin: 153–6, 161–169; Hirakawa (1973: Vol. I. xii–xxiv); Compendium: 94–96; Chaudhuri (1983: 105–108).

<sup>55</sup> *Vijñāna* (or *viññāna-skandha*), sometimes together with *mano*, constitutes the category of *citta* in many Abhidharma texts, as, for example, the *Prakaraṇapāda*



(T.26.627a13, 692b28), as well as throughout the *Yogācāra* corpus. See Hirakawa (1973, Vol. I. xii–xxiv). *Citta*, *viññāna* and *mano* are equated in *AKBh* II 34a–d; see note 52 above.

<sup>56</sup> *AKBh ad* II 50c–d/51; Shastri: 283–291; Poussin: 248–255. When considered as causal factors, they are called the ‘simultaneous-’ or ‘co-existent causes’ (*sahabhū-hetu*). Although the *Sarvāstivādins* maintained this type of cause, the *Sautrāntikas* rejected it on the grounds that it contradicts the accepted principle that cause and effect necessarily follow one another. As Tanaka (1985) points out, however, this misses the point, since this refers rather to the conditions supporting a phenomenon at any given time, as, for example, a tripod, each of whose legs must be simultaneously present for the others to function. Although this causal factor does not seem particularly emphasized within the Abhidharma, the *Yogācārins* will thoroughly exploit it in relation to *ālayavijñāna* theory. It corresponds closely to the co-nascent condition (*sahajāta-paccaya*), the sixth condition of the *Paṭṭhāna* of *Theravādin* Abhidhamma.

Yāsomitra seems to agree: since mind (*citta*) and its concomitant mental factors (*caitta*) are the mutual effect of one another they are simultaneous causes. (*AKBh ad* II 53; Poussin: 288; Shastri: 307: *anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ*. Yāsomitra comments: *cittam caittasya phalam, caitto 'pi cittasya itī anyonyaphalam itī tenārthena sahabhūhetuḥ*.) Yāsomitra defends this causal condition by citing the accepted scriptural formula that sensation is the concomitance of feeling, apperception and intention born together (*AKBh ad* II 49; Shastri: 279; Poussin: 245. *taiḥ saha jātā vedanā samjñā cetanā ca itī sahabhūhetuḥ*). *Theravādin* Abhidhamma commentaries holds a similar concept in *MA* II 77: *tam phassam paticca sahajātādivasena phassapaccayā vedanā uppajjati*. Quoted in Jayatilike (1963: 435f).

<sup>57</sup> Mental factors are associated with *citta* when they share five specific commonalities (*samānā*): (1) the same physical basis (*āśraya*), i.e. the five sense-faculties and the mental-faculty (*mano-indriya*); (2) the same object (*ālambana*), i.e. the same respective sense-fields (*viśaya*); (3) the same aspect (*ākāra*), i.e. they both conform to the character of the object; (4) the same time of occurrence (*kāla*); and (5) the same number of *dharma*s at a time, i.e. one. (*AKBh* II 34b–d; Shastri: 201f; Poussin: 177f.)

This schema seems to have begun at an early date, for much the same formula is found in *Kathāvatthu* VII.2, where *sampayutta* seems to be defined as having the same physical basis (*ekavāṭhuka*) and the same object (*ekārammaṇa*), arising and ceasing together (*ekappāda*, *ekanirodha*), and being concomitant, co-existent and compounded (*sahagata*, *sahajāta*, *samsattha*). The Pāli Abhidhamma text, the *Paṭṭhāna*, gives the same three commonalities for the *sampayutta-paccaya*, the nineteenth condition, though the whole system of conditions found in this work is altogether more complex and thoroughgoing than that found in the *Sarvāstivādin* or *Yogācārin* works. See Nyanatiloka (1983: 125).

<sup>58</sup> *AKBh* IV 1b. (Shastri: 567; Poussin: 1) quoting a *sūtra*, defines *karma* as intention and performing an action having intended. (*kim punas tat karma? itī āha cetanā tatkrītam ca tat. sūtra uktam "dve karmanī cetanā karma cetayitvā ca" itī.*)

For example, the mental factors of anger or lust being conjoined (*samprayukta*) with mind (*citta*), constitutes or instigates ‘unskillful’ or ‘unwholesome’ (*akuśala*) actions, which eventually produce unpleasant or undesirable results; similarly ‘skillful’

or ‘wholesome’ (*kuśala*) actions produce pleasant or desirable results. *AKBh* IV 45; Shastri: 652; Poussin: 106; *kṣemākṣemetarat karma kuśalākuśaletarat / . . . kṣemaṃ karma kuśalam, yadistāvīpākam . . . akṣemakuśalam . . . yasyāniṣṭo vipākaḥ / punyāpunyamanīñjam ca sukhavedyādi ca trayam / . . . punaḥ triṇi — sukhavedaniyam karma, duḥkhavedaniyam, aduḥkhāsukhavedaniyam ca*. This last set of terms, “karma leading to happiness or suffering,” etc. (*sukhavedaniyam karma, duḥkhavedaniyam*) are also found in the Pāli texts *A* IV 382, *S* V 211.

<sup>59</sup> *AKBh ad* II 35–46; Poussin: 178–244; Chaudhuri: 108–109. See also Jaini (1959c).

<sup>60</sup> Stcherbatsky (1956: 31) describes this brave new *dharmaic* world as follows: “Just as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so are they disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (*kṣaṇa*). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (*dharma*), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space . . . A cause for the Buddhists was not a real cause but a preceeding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing.”

<sup>61</sup> For the *Sarvāstivādins* the six causes are the main or efficient cause (*kāraṇa-hetu*), the simultaneous cause (*sahabhū-hetu*), the cause by association (*samprayukta-hetu*), the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*), the omnipresent cause (*sarvatraga-hetu*), and last but certainly not least, the maturational cause (*vipāka-hetu*). *AKBh ad* II 49–73; Poussin: 244–331. Verdu (1985: 66–128) and Chaudhuri (1983: 108–115) treat these causes, conditions and results at some length. For corresponding *Yogācārin* views of this system of *hetu*, *pratyaya*, and *phala*, see *ASBh*: 35–43.

<sup>62</sup> We need not describe each cause, condition and fruit. We have already mentioned the ‘simultaneous or co-existent cause’ (*sahabhū-hetu*), and the ‘associated cause’ (*samprayukta-hetu*) (referring to the relationship between the *citta* and *caittas* mentioned above which share the five commonalities. *AKBh ad* II 51).

The first cause, the *kāraṇa-hetu*, is the ‘efficient cause’, the most essential and general cause, such as when an eye-cognition arises due to a visual form and the unimpaired eye-organ (*AKBh ad* II 49: *Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed.: 279: *caḥṣuḥ pratiya rūpāni ca upadyate caḥṣurvijñānam itī kāraṇāhetuḥ*).

Two other major causes which only seldom arise in the debates under consideration here are (1) the ‘homogeneous cause’ (*sabhāga-hetu*), from which *dharma*s follow uniformly and automatically (*niṣyanda-phala*), which is to say, their fruit is of the same nature as its cause, wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral (*AKBh* II 54a–b; Shastri: 306; Poussin: 268) and (2) the ‘all-pervading cause’ (*sarvatraga-hetu*), which usually refers to ignorance (*avidyā*) inasmuch as it has not been eradicated and thus influences all actions. *AKBh* II 57c; Shastri: 330–332; Poussin: 291; Sakurabe (1981: 98); Stcherbatsky (1956: 28f); Verdu (1985: 75).

Stcherbatsky (1956: 67) has well illustrated this system of causes, conditions and fruits with the example of the process of visual cognition:

The *Sarvāstivādins* establish several kinds of causal relations between the elements. If, e.g., a moment of the sense of vision produces in the next moment a visual sensation, it is termed *kāraṇa-hetu* and its result

*adhipatiphala* [predominate result] . . . When the next moment is just the same as the foregoing one, thus evoking in the observer the idea of duration, this relation is termed *sabhāga-hetu* [homogeneous cause] as to a *niṣyanda-phala* [uniform fruit]. If this moment appears in a stream (*santāna*) which is defiled by the presence of passions (*kleśa*), this defiling character is inherited by the next moments, if no stopping of it is produced. Such a relation is called *sarvatraga-hetu* as to *niṣyanda-phala*. Finally every moment in a stream is under the influence of former deeds (*karma*) and many, in its turn, have an influence on future events. This relation is termed *vipāka-phala*.

<sup>63</sup> *Vipāka*, more literally 'maturation', is derived from the root verb 'pac', 'to mature or ripen', or 'to come to perfection', while the prefix 'vi-' carries the weight of English 'dis-', roughly 'difference'. It refers to a ripened or matured fruit different from its cause, in that it is an indeterminate *dharma* (*avyākṛta-dharma*) resulting from a *dharma* which is either unwholesome (*akuśala*) or wholesome with contaminants (*kuśala-sāsrava*) and reaching maturation at a later time neither simultaneously nor immediately afterwards. (AKBh ad II 57a–b; Shastri: 330; Poussin: 288. *vipāko vyākṛto dharmah anivṛtāvyaṁkṛto hi dharmah vipākaḥ . . . ya uttarakālaṁ bhavati na yugapad na api āntaram sa vipākaḥ*). This contrasts with the 'homogeneous cause' (*sabhāga-hetu*) and 'all-pervading cause' (*sarvatraga-hetu*) and their uniform fruition (*niṣyanda-phala*).

Guenther (1959: 19–20) calls *vipāka* an "energetic process" intimately related to *karma*, such that "in its potential stage energy is 'heaped up' (*upacita*), while in its kinetic state it develops (*vipacyate*) toward a certain effect."

<sup>64</sup> For Vasubandhu, the *adhipati-pratyaya*, the 'predominant condition', and the *hetu-pratyaya*, the 'root condition', comprise the *kāraṇa-hetu* and other *hetus*, respectfully, while the 'object condition' (*ālambana-pratyaya*) refers to the epistemic object. (AKBh ad II 61c–64c; Shastri: 381–392; Poussin: 299–311). *Theravādin* doctrine differs here from that found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, for the system preserved in the *Paṭṭhāna* of the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* lists a series of twenty-four conditions (*paccaya*). (Nyanatiloka 1983: 117–127). These are, however, reduced in the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* (VIII.12; p. 197) to four main conditions: object condition (*ārammaṇa-paccaya*), sufficing condition (*upanissaya-paccaya*), the action condition (*kamma-paccaya*) and the presence condition (*atthi-paccaya*).

<sup>65</sup> AKBh II 62a–b; Shastri: 342; Poussin: 300: *cittacaitā acaramā utpannāḥ samanantarāḥ . . . samas ca ayam anantaraś ca pratyaya iti samanantarapratyayah*.

<sup>66</sup> Thus most Abhidharma schools attempted to mitigate the immediately antecedent and homogeneous condition by positing factors that would allow for heterogeneous succession between *dharmas* of different types. As Jaini (1959b: 244) sums up Yaśomitra's (ad II 35–6) comments:

Even the Vaibhāṣikas, he says, must resort to some such theory [as the seeds] to explain the phenomena of the succession of two heterogeneous *cittas*. They also believe that an *akuśala* can be succeeded by a *kuśala*. Do the Vaibhāṣikas here agree that the *kuśala* is produced by an *akuśala*? If they do not agree then they deny *samanantara-pratyaya*. If

they agree then they must explain what kind of power (*śakti*) it is that produces a *kuśala-citta*. If this power is *akuśala* it cannot produce *kuśala*. If it is *kuśala* then it cannot on their terms remain in an *akuśala-citta*.

<sup>67</sup> AKBh ad V 25b; Shastri: 805; Poussin: 51; "If the past would not exist, how would there be the future fruit of pure and impure karma, since at the time the fruit arises the cause of maturation (*vipākahetu*) is not present?" (*yadi ca atītaṁ na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmanāḥ phalamāyatyām katham syāt? na hi phalotpattikāle vartamānāṁ vipākahetur asti iti*). See also Poussin (1937a: 77).

<sup>68</sup> As Piatigorsky (1984: 50) note regarding *karma*, "the only thing it really does is that it connects cause with effect." [Emphasis in original.]

<sup>69</sup> AKBh ad VI 26a; Poussin: 180f. "It is called 'entering into assurance' because it is entering into the assuredness of perfection. In the *sūtra* it is called 'the perfection which is *nirvāṇa*', obtaining which is 'entering', and from whose production one is called an Āryan person. The state of being a worldling is destroyed by the future state." (*saiva ca niyāmavakrāntir ity ucyate; samyaktvaniyāmāvakraṇāt. 'samyaktvaṁ nirvāṇam' ity uktam sūtre . . . tasyābhiḡamanam avakraṇam. tasyāṁ cōtpannāyām āryapudgala ucyate. anāgatayā prthagjanatvaṁ vyāvartyate.*)

The Appendix of the English translation of the *Kathāvatthu* (383, re: XXI 7, 8) discusses *niyāma* as follows: "*Niyāma* means 'fixity', but *niyāma* is 'that which fixes'. The former is derived from *ni-yam-ati*, to fix; the latter from the causative: *niyāmeti*, to cause to be fixed. When the Path — i.e., a certain direction, course, tendency, profession, progressive system of a person's life — is called *sammatta*, or, contrariwise, *micchatta-niyāma*, both forms are understood in the causal sense. Thus the former 'path' inevitably establishes the state of exemption from *apāyas* (rebirth in misery), and the latter inevitably establishes purgatorial retribution after the next death. *Niyāma*, then, is that by which the *Niyama* (the fixed, or inevitable order to things) is established, or that by which fixity is brought about, or marked out in the order of things. . . .

"The orthodox view is that, in the whole causal flux of 'happenings' — and these comprise all *dhammas*, all *kammās* — there are only two rigid successions, or orders of specifically fixed kinds of cause-and-effect. These are — (1) The *sammatta-niyāma*; (2) the *micchatta-niyāma*. By or in the latter, certain deeds, such as matricide, result in purgatorial retribution immediately after the doer's next death. By or in the former, the Path-graduate will win eventually the highest 'fruit' and Nibbāna." See also *Kathāvatthu* V, 4; VI, 1; XII, 5; XIII, 4; on *sammatta-niyāma* (Skt.: *samyaktva-niyāma*) see S I 96; S III 225, A I 121f. *Suttanipāta* 55, 371.

Conze (1973: 137f) has succinctly summarized these issues:

Saints are credited with a number of possessions and achievements which are lasting in the sense that they are not lost as soon as the present moment has passed. A Streamwinner need never again be reborn in a state of woe, and thus has won a quality which he will always have. The Arhat, according to some, can never fall away . . . Even while he does not actually realize it, a saint has the power to realize at his will this or that attainment, and thus possesses it potentially. The fact that a

mental state is definitely abandoned or definitely established lies outside the momentary series of states, and so does permanent ownership or potential ownership of a spiritual skill. One speaks of a person being 'destined' (*niyata*) for some future condition, and asserts that he will certainly obtain it. For instance people are said to be 'destined for Nirvana', or 'to be destined' either for salvation (*samyaktva*) or perdition (*mithyātva*).

<sup>70</sup> AKBh ad V 1a; Shastri: 759; Poussin: 106; *karmajaṃ lokavaicitrayaṃ iti uktam. tāni ca karmāṇi anuśayavāśād upacayaṃ gacchanti, antareṇa ca anuśayān bhavābhinirvartane na samarthāni bhavanti. ato vedīṭavyāḥ mūlaṃ bhavasya anuśayāḥ*. Yaśomitra (Shastri: 760) explains that existence or becoming (*bhava*) refers here, as with so many of the concepts we are examining, to both resultant (*vipāka*) and active aspects, i.e. the resultant aspect of renewed existence (*punarbhava*) and existence inasmuch as it consists of further life-creating activities (*karma-bhava*). *Theravāda* Abhidhamma similarly divides *bhava* into resultant, renewed becoming (*upapatti-bhava*) and activities that create existence (*kamma-bhava*); *Vibhanga*, 137; *Compendium*, VIII 5: 89f, 262; *Visuddhi-magga* XVII 250f.

<sup>71</sup> AKBh III 19a—d; Shastri: 433f; Poussin: 57—9; *yathā ākṣepaṃ kramād vṛddhaḥ santānaḥ kleśakarmabhiḥ. paralokaṃ punar yāti . . . iti anādi bhavacakrakam*.

This latter statement means both that *kleśa* and *karma* are due to birth and that birth is due to *kleśa* and *karma*. (AKBh III 19a—d; Shastri: 433f; Poussin: 57—9; *etena prakāreṇa kleśakarmahetukaṃ janma tad hetukāni punaḥ kleśakarmāṇi tebhyaḥ punar janma iti anādi bhavacakrakam vedīṭavyam*.)

<sup>72</sup> Accumulation (*upacaya*) of karma is defined as the accumulation until their fruit ripens of intentional actions which necessarily give a result. (AKBh ad IV 120; Shastri: 746f; Poussin: 242f; *sañcetanā . . . vipākā ca karmopacitaṃ . . . kathaṃ sañcetanataḥ? sañcintya kṛtaṃ bhavati . . . kathaṃ vipākataḥ? vipākādāne niyataṃ bhavati*.)

The AKBh differentiates the action (*karma*) which creates such potential from the accumulation (*upacaya*) of that potential itself. (AKBh ad IV 120; Shastri: 746; Poussin: 242f. "What is done and what is accumulated is called karma." *kṛtaṃ ca, upacitaṃ ca karmocyate*.)

This is derived from canonical passages treating karma, as cited previously; A V 292: "I declare that the intentional actions performed and accumulated will not be destroyed without being experienced." It is not, however, universally accepted, as *Kathāvatthu* XV. 11 (*kammūpacayakathā*) demonstrates. This debate concerns the same issues as does the persistence of the dispositions: how can there be a distinct type of karmic accumulation that is not simultaneously related to the mind in a causally effective manner?

The interlocutors, the *Andhakas* and the *Sammatīyas* according to the commentary, suggest that, in contrast to *kamma* itself, its accumulation (*upacaya*, or more suggestively, 'conservation' according to the English translators, p. 300, though in later Abhidhamma *upacaya* typically also means 'growth, development', *Compendium*: 252) is simultaneous (*sahajā*) with otherwise incompatible states, since its nature is not determined by the nature of the actions with which it co-exists; nor is it associated with the same mental factors as the mind; that the accumulation takes no object

(*anārammaṇo*) and, unlike action itself (*kamma*) which is bound to the momentary states of *citta*, the accumulation does not cease with the *citta* with which it is simultaneous. (*kusalena kammaṇa saha jāto kammūpacayo kusalo ti? na h'evaṃ vattabbe . . . sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena kammaṇa saha jāto kammūpacayo sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto ti? na h'evaṃ vattabbe . . . kammaṇa cittena saha jātaṃ, cittaṃ bhijjāmānaṃ, kammaṇa bhijjātīti? āmantā. kammūpacayo cittena saha jātaṃ, cittaṃ bhijjāmānaṃ, kammūpacayo bhijjātīti? na h'evaṃ vattabbe*). The English translators, interestingly, translated '*kamma*' as "karma as conscious process" and '*kammūpacayo*' as "continuation of karmic accumulation as product." The last paragraph of this *kathā* discusses the distinction between *kamma*, its accumulation and its maturation (*vipāka*).

According to the commentary *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, 156, the heterodox interlocutors held that the accumulation of *kamma*, like that of the latent dispositions (*Kathāvatthu* IX.4; XI.1), is neutral (*abyākata*), unassociated with mind (*citta-vippayukta*) and without an epistemic object (*anārammaṇa*) Dube (1980: 336).

As with many issues presented in the *Kathāvatthu*, however, the later *Theravāda* position is rather more complex, for the Pāli writer Dhammapāla's commentary the *Paramatthamañjūsā* or *Visuddhimagga-mahāṭikā*, comments on a standard *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi* passage ("it is only when it is past that *kamma* is a condition for *kamma*-originated materiality,"), stating:

If the fruit were to arise from present *kamma*, the fruit would have arisen in the same moment in which the *kamma* was being accumulated; and that is not seen . . . *kamma* has never been shown to give fruit while it is actually being effected; nor is there any text to that effect. — But is it not also the fact that no fruit has ever been shown to come from a vanished cause either? . . . when the fruit arises from *kamma* that is actually past it does so because of *kamma* having been performed and because of storage.

(Pm. 768) as quoted in *Visuddhimagga* (p. 695)

<sup>73</sup> AKBh III 41c—d; Shastri: 496; Poussin: 125f; *manasañcetanāya punarbhavasya ākṣepaḥ. ākṣiptasya punaḥ karmaparibhāvitād vijñānabijād abhinirvṛtīti ity anyor anuṭpannasya bhavasya ākarane prādhānyam*.

Here intentions (*manasañcetanā*), that is, mental actions (*manas karma*), correspond to the *saṃskāra*, which in the series of dependent co-arising directly condition the arising of consciousness (*vijñāna*). Interestingly, *Theravādin* commentaries give an Abhidhammic interpretation of passages describing seeds and their relation to consciousness (*viññāna*) as examples of a "construction-consciousness" (*abhisamkhāra-viññāna*) (Collins, 1982: 223; SnA. 257, AA.II. 334), and use a term to convey the consciousness conditioned by such *saṃskāra*, that is, "construction-consciousness born together with *karma*" (SnA. 505—6: *kammasahajātibhi-samkhāraviññāna*) (Collins: 206). See notes 125, 165.

Also: AKBh III 21a—c; Shastri: 436; Poussin: 62f. *pūrvakleśā daśa 'vidyā saṃskārāḥ pūrvakarmanāḥ / sandhiskandhāstu vijñānam*.

<sup>74</sup> See note 11 above, for passages in the early Pāli texts (S III 54; A I 223) that relate *bija* with *vijñāna* in reference to continued *saṃsāric* existence.

<sup>75</sup> AKBh ad V 34; Shastri: 829f; Poussin: 72f; "The *kleśa* with complete causes [arises] from non-abandoned latent dispositions (*anusāya*), from the presence of an object and from incorrect comprehension." (*aprahinād anusāyāt viṣayāt pratyupasthitā ayoniśo manaskārāt kleśaḥ . . . , sampūrnākāraṇaḥ*.)

For example, sensual desire arises when a *dharma* which provokes an outburst of sensual desire (*kāmarāgāparavasthāniya-dharma*) appears in the sense fields and the latent disposition toward it (*rāgānuśaya*) has not been abandoned or correctly understood, while there is incorrect comprehension thereto. (AKBh ad V 34; Shastri: 829; Poussin: 72f; *tat yathā rāgānuśayo 'prahīno bhavati aparijñātaḥ kāmarāgāparavasthāniyās ca dharmā ābhāsagatā bhavanti. tatra ca ayoniśo manaskāra evaṃ kāmarāga utpadyate*.) Ignorance is thus the root of them all. (AKBh ad V 36c—d; Shastri: 831; Poussin: 74; *sarveśam teṣām mūlam avidyā*)

<sup>76</sup> AKBh ad V 22; Shastri: 801; Poussin: 48; "The latent disposition of a certain person is disposed toward a certain object; he is bound to it by that [disposition]." (*yasya pudgalasya yo 'nuśayo yasmin ālambane 'nuśete sa tena tasmin samprayuktah*.)

<sup>77</sup> This is true in the *sutta* materials (M I 101, etc.) examined above and as quoted both in the *Kathāvatthu*, XIII.8, and in the *Abhidharmakośa*: "Passion lies latent (*anuśete*) in pleasurable feeling, aversion lies latent in unpleasant feeling, and ignorance lies latent in neutral feelings." (AKBh V 45; ad II 3; Shastri: 843; Poussin: 88; *sukkhāyām vedanāyām rāgo 'nuśete, duḥkhāyām pratighaḥ, \*aduḥkhāsukkhāyām avidyā iti uktam sūtre*. \*Emended from "*aduḥkhāduḥkhāyām*.")

<sup>78</sup> AKBh ad IV 55c—d; Shastri: 664; Poussin: 106. *vipākaḥ punar vedanāpradhānaḥ*.

<sup>79</sup> See note on AKBh ad V 34, above.

<sup>80</sup> The AKBh states this clearly and, in agreement with canonical teachings while still hinting at newer, *Saurāntika* concepts, equates the eradication of the afflictions with seeds rendered infertile by fire:

The basis (*āśraya*) of the *Arya* has been transformed due to the force of the Path of Seeing so the destroyed afflictions (*kleśa*) will not be able to sprout again. It is said that the basis is without seeds, having destroyed the afflictions, like [seeds] burned by fire, whereas the seeds are [merely] damaged by the mundane path.

(AKBh ad II 36c—d; Shastri: 215f; Poussin: 183; *āśrayo hi sa āryānaṃ darśanabhāva-nāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā paravṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tat praheyānām kleśānām prarohasamartho bhavati. ato 'gnidagdhavrihivadabijībhūta āśrayaḥ kleśānām prahīnakleśa iti ucyate. upahatabijabhāve vā laukikena mārgena*.)

Pāli *suttas* mentioning similar doctrines: M I 47; A I 133; S IV 208f. Collins (1982: 222f) cites references in the *Theravādin* Abhidhamma literature depicting those who have progressed along the path as having "rendered consciousness seedless" (Miln. 146; *abijam viññānaṃ katam*) and having "destroyed seeds" (Sn. 235; *khīṇabīja*).

<sup>81</sup> The *Kathāvatthu* presents several debates on this issue, demonstrating the antiquity and ubiquity of the distinction between the manifest outbursts and the latent counterparts of the afflictions, to be discussed in more detail below.

In a discussion on the possibility of an *Arhat* falling away (I.2.61, *parihānikathā*) the *Sammatīyas*, *Vajjiputtīyas*, *Sabbatthivādins*, and some of the *Mahāsanghikas*,

according to the commentary, claim that this occurs due to an outburst of passion (*rāgaparyuṭṭhito*) which arises conditioned by its latent disposition (*anusayam paticca uppajjati*); but *arahats* are not said to have these dispositions. Even more to the point is the discussion in III.5 (*aṭṭhamakakathā*) concerning whether or not the eradication of the outbursts on the first stage of entering the path also entails the eradication of their latent dispositions. According to the commentary, it is the *Andhakas* and the *Sammatīyas* who hold that it does not; the *Theravādins* disagree.

*Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa, XXII.45 correlates the successive eradication of afflictions and their latent tendencies with gradual progress upon the path: the Once-returned eliminates gross fetters, the gross inherent tendencies of greed for sense desires and resentment; the Non-returned, the residual fetters and the residual inherent tendencies of the same; the *Arahat*, greed for existence, conceit, agitation and ignorance, and the inherent tendencies toward conceit, greed for becoming and ignorance. XXII.73 correlates their elimination with the knowledges: "the inherent tendencies to [false] view and to uncertainty are eliminated by the first knowledge. The inherent tendencies to greed for sense desire and to resentment are eliminated by the third knowledge. The inherent tendencies to conceit (pride), to greed for becoming, and to ignorance, are eliminated by the fourth knowledge." XXII.60 explains the term *anusaya*: "For it is owing to their inveteracy that they are called inherent tendencies (*anusaya*) since they inhere (*anusenti*) as cause for the arising of greed for sense desires, etc., again and again."

<sup>82</sup> The *Kathāvatthu* preserves disputes about this issue as well. IX.4 (*anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā*) portrays the opponents (the *Andhakas* and some of the *Uttarāpathakas*) asking if one who has not fully eradicated the afflictions does not still have their *latent* form even when his mind is otherwise wholesome or indeterminate (*puthujjano kusalābyākate citta vattamāne "sānusayo ti" vattabbo ti? āmantā*). XI.1 (*tiṣso pi anusayakathā*) carries the argument the next logical step and asks if therefore wholesome and unwholesome states could not co-exist together, which would entail that the dispositions are karmically neutral, a position that the *Theravādins* however do not concede to their interlocutors, here the *Sammatīyas* and the *Mahāsanghikas*. (*puthujjano kusalābyākate citta vattamāne "sānusayo ti" vattabbo ti? āmantā. kusalākusalā dhammā sammukhibhāvaṃ āgacchanti? ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe- tena hi anusayā abyakatā ti*.)

<sup>83</sup> As Jaini (1959b: 240) succinctly outlines the problem:

even an infant is in possession of *kleśa*, because the latter are present in him in their dormant state (*anusāya*) and become active when there arise suitable conditions for their operation (*pariyuṭṭhāna*). This implies that when the passions are not operating they always remain in a dormant state. If they are always present in the mind then the latter is always *akuśala*, for a *kuśala* can neither co-exist nor operate simultaneously with an *akuśala*. Consequently, there will be no *kuśala-citta* as long as the latent passions are not removed, and they will not be removed without a *kuśala-citta*.

<sup>84</sup> There is a further complication here as well, because some of these factors are, in

the AKBh at any rate, considered to be karmically neutral at times. Vasubandhu differentiates between holding to a view of self-existence and extreme views (common to birds and other animals) which are innate and neutral (*sahajā satkāyadrṣṭir avyākṛtā*), and thus not in contradiction with virtuous actions such as giving, and those views which are deliberated (*vikalpita*) and thus unwholesome. (AKBh ad V 19; Shastri: 794; Poussin: 40. *kāmadhātāu satkāyāntagrāhadrṣṭi tat samprayuktā ca avidyā avyākṛtaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam? dānādibhir aviruddhātvāt. ahaṃ pretya sukhī bhaviṣyāmi iti dānam dadāti śīlam rakṣati . . . sahajā satkāyadrṣṭir avyākṛtā. yā mrgapakṣiṇām api vartate. vikalpita tu akuśala iti pūrvācāryāḥ*). This idea of innate, yet neutral, wrong views will also have larger ramifications within the *Yogācāra* system, as is perhaps hinted by the term '*pūrvācārya*', which frequently alludes to *Yogācāra*-like ideas within the AKBh. See note 201 below.

<sup>85</sup> AKBh ad V 1d—2a; Shastri: 763f; Poussin: 6f; *katham ca sautrāntikānām? . . . prasupto hi kleśa 'nuśaya ucyate, prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam. ka ca tasya prasuptiḥ? asammukhibhūtaṣya bijabhāvānubandhaḥ. kaḥ prabodhaḥ? sammukhibhūtaḥ. ko 'yam bijabhāvo nāma? ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ. yathā anubhāvajñānājā smṛyupādanaśaktiḥ, yathā ca ankurādīnām śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir iti.*

Chapter Nine of the AKBh (Shastri: 1230; Poussin: 295; Stcherbatsky, 1976: 72; Pradhan: 477 or 478) defines the mental stream (*santāna*) as the "continued production of *citta* from earlier action (*karma*)" (*yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottara cittaprasavaḥ sā santatiḥ*) and states that the last moment of the specific modification or transformation (*pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ*) is specially characterized by the "capacity to immediately produce a result." (*sa punaryo 'nantaram phalotpādanasamarthaḥ so 'ntyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ*.)

Another passage states that the conclusion of the result (*phalaparyanta*) of maturation (*pāka*) is engendered by this specific modification (*pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ*) of the mental stream and not by either the simultaneous (*sahabhū-*), associated (*samprayukta-*), or homogeneous causes (*sabhāga-hetu*). (AKBh ad II 54c—d; Shastri: 312; Poussin: 272. *pāko hi nāma santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajā phalaparyantaḥ. na ca sahabhūsamprayuktahetvoḥ santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajam phalam asti. na ca api sabhāgaheivādīnām phalaparyanto 'sti*.)

<sup>86</sup> The AKBh ad V 1d—2a (Shastri: 761; Poussin: 3—4) preserves a debate between the *Sautrāntikas* and the *Sarvāstivādins* over the relationship between the latent dispositions and their manifest counterparts. The text begins by asking if one should interpret the compound 'sensual desire-latent disposition', (*kāmarāga-anuśaya*) as the *anuśaya* which is itself sensual desire (*kāmarāga eva anuśayaḥ*), or as the *anuśaya* of sensual desire (*kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ*). If the two were simply equated, then this would contradict the *sūtra* (*sūtravirodhaḥ*) which states that the outburst of sensual desire is eliminated along with its *anuśaya* (*kāmarāgaparyavasthānam . . . sānuśayam prahiyate*). If, on the other hand, the two were distinguished, this would entail that the *anuśaya* be disjoined (*viprayukta*), which contradicts an *Abhidharma* passage stating the *anuśaya* is associated (*samprayukta*) with the three feelings. (*katham idam jñātavyam — kāmarāga eva anuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśayaḥ, ahoṣvit kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśayaḥ? kiṃ cātaḥ? kāmarāga eva anuśayaś cet sūtravirodhaḥ . . . "atkāmarāgaparyavasthānam . . . sānuśayam prahiyate." it / kāmarāgasya anuśayaś ced viprayuktānuśayaprasaṅgād abhidharmavirodhaḥ — "kāmarāgānuśayas tribhir indriyair samprayuktaḥ iti. The Vyākhyā glosses indriya as: "sukha-saumanasya-upekṣendriyair samprayuktaḥ iti," upon which our translation of 'indriya' as 'feeling' is based.)*

The *Sarvāstivādin* position is that they are simply the same, since in the *Abhidharma* the word *anuśaya* means the afflictions due to its characteristic, i.e. it is what makes the mind afflicted, it obstructs wholesome states from occurring and eliminates them once they have occurred; thus the *anuśaya* cannot be dissociated. (AKBh V ad 1d—2a; Shastri: 762; Poussin: 5; *kāmarāga eva anuśaya iti vaibhāṣikāḥ . . . lakṣaṇikas tu abhidharme kleśa eva anuśayaśabdah / tasmāt samprayukta eva anuśayaḥ . . . yasmāt anuśayaḥ kliṣṭam cittam bhavaty apūrvam kuśalam na utpadyate, utpannac ca parihyate, tasmān na viprayuktaḥ*.)

The *Sautrāntika* position is that the latent dispositions are different from the their manifest afflictions, but that they are neither associated nor dissociated, since they are not separate entities (AKBh ad V 1d—2a; Shastri: 763f; Poussin: 6f; *katham ca sautrāntikānām? kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśaya iti / na ca anuśayaḥ samprayukto na viprayuktaḥ, tasya adravyāntaratvāt*. This statement serves to introduce the *Sautrāntika* description of the latent or dormant dispositions as seed-states (*bijabhāva*).

Jaini (1959b: 242) concurs with Yaśomitra's comments that the *Sautrāntikas*, as their name suggests, rely upon the scriptures (*sūtra*) as authoritative and not upon the scholastic treatises (*śāstra*) (*Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed.: 15: *ye sūtraprāmāṇikāḥ na tu śāstraprāmāṇikāḥ te sautrāntikāḥ*) when he concludes that in contrast with the *Sautrāntikas*, "it is clear from these discussions that the Theravādin as well as the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the term *sānuśaya*, and the subsequent identification of the *anuśayas* with *paryavasthāna*, are contrary to the *sūtra* quoted above [The *Mahā-Māluṅkyasutta*, M I 433]. They show a determined effort to uphold the *Abhidharma* in preference to the *sūtra*."

<sup>87</sup> *Kathāvatthu* XIV.5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart (*añño anusayo ti kathā*) discusses this point explicitly. The opponent here, the *Andhakas* according to the Commentary, maintain the distinction on the reasoning that an ordinary person whose mind is wholesome or neutral must still have the latent form of the affliction. The Theravādins dissent here, as elsewhere, on the grounds that the dispositions should be treated no differently than other afflictions, such as sensual desire (*rāga*). (*puthujano kusālābyākatē citta vattamāne "sānusayo ti" vattabbo ti? āmantā. "pariyutthito ti" vattabbo ti? ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi añño anusayo aññam pariyutthānan ti. puthujano kusālābyākatē citta vattamāne "sārāgo ti" vattabbo ti? amantā. "pariyutthito ti" vattabbo ti? ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi rāgo aññam pariyutthānan ti.*)

<sup>88</sup> Again *Kathāvatthu* XI.1 (*tisso pi anusayakathā*) preserves disputes over this topic as well, with the *Sammātiyas* and the *Mahāsaṅghikas* asserting that it is because the dispositions are unassociated with *citta* that they are able to co-exist with wholesome or neutral type of *citta*, but the *Theravādin* press them on this, implying that the dispositions are no different from the manifest afflictions and that therefore they too must be unassociated with mind, which is of course unacceptable (*puthujano kusālābyākatē citta vattamāne "sārāgo ti" vattabbo ti? āmantā. rāgo tena citta sampayuttā ti. ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe-tena hi rāgo cittavippayuttā ti*). The *Theravādin* orthodoxy, however, is not presenting their opponents position in full, for they are misconstruing, or at least conflating, the term '*sārāgo*' 'possessed of or having passion', which in the context of the this discussion seems to mean rather 'not having fully eliminated passion', with the simple occurrence or manifestation of that passion itself. In that case, of course, one must say that passion is associated with mind; but if everyone were possessed of such passion until reaching the state of an Arhat, the

problem would still remain as to how any wholesome states could ever occur.

<sup>89</sup> See note 86, above.

<sup>90</sup> *AKBh-Vyākhyā* ad II 36c—d; Shastri: 219; *na bijam nāma kiñcid asti; prajñapti-sattvāt*. Nominal entities are established merely by designation, convention, or established usage (*Vyākhyā*, *ibid.*: *prajñapti-sattvāt vyavahāreṇa dharmāḥ prajñaptidharmāḥ*), whereas the analysis into *dharmas* which carry their own characteristics, we shall remember, is that which indicates the ultimate truth in the *Abhidharma* (*Vyākhyā*: 12, *ad AKBh* I.2b: *svalakṣaṇadharanātvena niruktaḥ pāramārthikasāmketikābhidharmaḥ*).

The metaphor of seeds was commonly used in “conventional” descriptions. Although the *Theravādins*, for instance, rejected the seed as a real *dharma*, and thus employable within ultimately valid discourse, they readily resorted to its use in conventional speech. The metaphor is prominent in the early discourses, for which the *Theravādin* commentarial tradition regularly glosses with a more *dharmic* term, *abhisankhāra-viññāna*, “construction-consciousness,” while an *Arhat* is frequently referred to as one who has made his *viññāna* seedless (*abijam viññānam katam*) (Collins 1982: 218–224).

<sup>91</sup> Excluding *viññāna*’s role within the immediate cognitive processes, of course. *Viññāna* is at least once said to be merely a figurative term for the mental stream with nothing but itself as its antecedent cause. *AKBh* IX; Shastri: 1219f; Poussin: 281; Stcherbatsky (1979: 57); Pradhan: 473 or 474; *viññānasantānasya viññāne kāraṇa-bhāvā viññānam viññāti iti vacanān nirdeśam . . . evaṃ viññānam api cittānām santāna upacaryate*.

<sup>92</sup> *AKBh* ad II 36d; Shastri: 217; Poussin: 185; *kim punar idam bijam nāma? yan nāmanīpam phalotpattau samartham sāksāt pāramparyeṇa vā; santatipariṇāma-viśeṣajāt. ko ’yam parināmo? santater anyathāivam. ke ca iyaṃ santatīḥ? hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ*. The circular nature of this definition borders on tautology: a seed is what produces a result through the mental stream, which is itself just the *saṃskāra* existing as cause and effect.

<sup>93</sup> The seed is the capacity (*śakti*) for an affliction to arise born from a [previous] affliction, as is the capacity for memory to arise born from experiential knowledge, etc. (See *AKBh* ad V 1d–2a, cited above.)

<sup>94</sup> *AKBh* III 5–8a (Poussin: 16–26) discusses the manifold possibilities of the ‘*viññāna-sthitī*’, the ‘stations of consciousness’.

<sup>95</sup> *AKBh* I 28c–d; Shastri: 78; Poussin: 50; *viññānadhātur viññānam sāsravam . . . janmanīrayāḥ. ete hi janmanāḥ pratisandhicittād yāvāt cyuticittasādhāraṇabhūtāḥ*. La Vallée Poussin (49, n. 2) identifies the *sūtra* cited as *Dhātuvibhaṅgasuttā*, M III 239.

<sup>96</sup> *AKBh* II 45a–b; Shastri: 248; Poussin: 215; *āyurūṣmātha viññānam yadā kāyam jahatyamī. apavidhas tadā śete yathā kṣāṭhamacetanaḥ*. La Vallée Poussin cites parallels in S III 143; M I 296.

<sup>97</sup> This necessary reference to and reliance upon conventional terminology on the part of so many commentators seems to belie *Abhidharma* claims to ultimate discourse, leading Conze (1973: 122–134), for one, to refer the compensatory ‘pseudo-selves’ (132), i.e. the *citta-santāna*, *saṃskārā*, *āśraya*, *nāma-rūpa*, and *ātmabhāva*, as the subjective referent of the *dharmic* analysis.

<sup>98</sup> There is, in addition to the *Abhidharmakośa* which frequently presents the *Sarvāstivādin* or *Vaibhāṣika* positions from a polemical perspective, an orthodox

*Vaibhāṣika* work extant in its original Sanskrit which responds to Vasubandhu’s criticisms, the *Abhidharma-dīpa* (edited by P. S. Jaini, 1977); also La Vallée Poussin (1937), *Documents d’Abhidharma*, translates from the Chinese some of the key texts of the *Sarvāstivādin*. See Collet Cox (1992) for a succinct discussion of the *Vaibhāṣika* treatment of many of these issues; also Paul Williams (1981) on *Vaibhāṣika* ontology.

<sup>99</sup> *AKBh* ad V 25b; Shastri: 805; Poussin: 50f; *yadi ca atītam na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmanāḥ phalam ātyāyāṃ katham syat. na hi phalōtpattikālē varttamānām vipākaḥetur asti iti. tasmād asti eva atītanāgatam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ*. See also La Vallée Poussin (1937: 77f) on a passage from the *Abhidharma-nyāyānūsāra* of Sanghabadra (T.29.1562.629a28f).

<sup>100</sup> Poussin (1937: esp. 93–95); T. 29.631b20f; 409c22f. This is Vasumitra’s view, in any case, one of four *Sarvāstivādin* views presented in *AKBh* V 24–26. See Stcherbatsky (1956: 76–91).

<sup>101</sup> *AKBh* II 36c–d; Shastri: 211; Poussin: 179; *prāptya-prāpti svasantānapatitānām*. Note the need here again for a non-*dharmic* referent, *santāna*.

<sup>102</sup> *AKBh* II 35a–b; Shastri: 209; Poussin: 178; *viprayuktās tu saṃskārāḥ prāptya-prāpti*. Jaini (1959b: 240, 245).

<sup>103</sup> *AKBh* ad II 36c–d; Shastri: 214; Poussin: 182; *utpattihetudharmāṇām prāptir . . . saḥajaprāptihetukā*. Jaini (1959b: 245).

<sup>104</sup> See note 86, above.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid. aupacārika vā sūtre ’nuśayaśabdah prāptau*.

<sup>106</sup> *AKBh* ad II 36c–d; Shastri: 214f; Poussin: 183; *vyavasthāhetuḥ prāptiḥ. asatyāyāṃ hi prāptau lokikamānasānām āyapṛthagjanānām ’āryā ime, ’pṛthagjanā ime’ iti na syād vyavasthānam. prahīṇāprahīṇakleśatā viśeṣād etad bhavitum arhati*.

<sup>107</sup> As Conze (1973: 141) warns, “The term *prāpti* obviously sails very near the concept of a ‘person’ or ‘self’. ‘Possession’ is a relation which keeps together the elements of one stream of thought, or which binds a *dharma* to one ‘stream of consciousness’, which is just an evasive term for an underlying ‘person’. . . ‘Possession’ implies a support which is more than the momentary state from moment to moment, and in fact a kind of lasting personality, i.e. the stream as identical with itself, in a personal identity, which is here interpreted as ‘continuity’.”

<sup>108</sup> At the end of a long exchange, Vasubandhu asked why ‘possession’ is in fact a real entity (*dravyadharmā*) instead of merely a conventional one (*prajñapti-dharma*), as the *Sautrāntikas* charge, to which the *Sarvāstivādin* (the *Vaibhāṣikas*) answer simplistically “because that’s our doctrine” (*AKBh* ad II 36c–d; Shastri: 218; Poussin: 186; *prajñaptidharmāḥ, na tu dravyadharmāḥ . . . dravyam eva tu vaibhāṣikāḥ ubhayaṃ varṇayanti. kim kāraṇam? eva hi naḥ siddhāntaḥ*).

<sup>109</sup> *AKBh* ad II 5–6; Shastri: 142f; Poussin: 110f; *tatra cittāśrayaḥ ṣaḍindriyāṇi. etac ca ṣaḍāyatanam maulam sattvadravayam*.

<sup>110</sup> As mind is also its basis; *AKBh* ad I 34; Shastri: 91; Poussin: 63; *upāttam iti ko ’riḥ? yac cittacaitair adhiṣṭhānabhāveno upagrhitam; anugraho ’paghātābhyām anyonyānuvidhānāt*.

<sup>111</sup> Vasubandhu’s *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Lamotte 1935: 234–247; Pruden 1988: 58–65) most succinctly presents this debate and the positions taken by various schools. *AKBh* treats it in II ad 42–44; Poussin: 200–214. On the whole topic of the absorptions and their problematics within *Abhidharma* doctrine see Griffiths

(1986), in particular pp. 122–128 and Appendix B. Schmithausen (1987: 18ff) considers the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) the originating context for the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

<sup>112</sup> *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Lamotte 1935: 233; Pruden 1988: 57, para. 21); “If the fruit arises afterwards from the mental stream (*citta-santāna*) which has been infused by the power of karma, then how can the fruit of an earlier action arise afterwards from the interrupted mental stream of those in the two mindless attainments and unconscious existence?” (paraphrase from the Tibetan, P. mDo # 58 sems-tsam Si, 161b3f; D.4062, 139b3f: *gal te las nus kyang des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu 'byung na / sems med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa gnyis dang / 'du shes med pa pa sems kyi rgyud chad pa dag gi las snga ma'i 'bras bu tshe phyi ma la ji ltar 'byung bar 'gyur.*)

<sup>113</sup> *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Lamotte 1935: 235; Pruden 1988: 58): “But the mind of entry into the absorption has been destroyed (*vināṣṭa*) for a long time. How could it constitute an equal and immediate antecedent?”

<sup>114</sup> Since a single moment of mind has in addition a phenomenologically similar and immediately antecedent condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*), a moment of mind or cognition (*vijñāna*) has (at least in the human realm) two types of support: the simultaneous support (*sahaja āśraya*) of its respective sense organ (*indriya*), and the immediately antecedent mental cognition as its ‘mind support’ (*manāśraya*). (AKBh I 44c–d; Shastri: 125f; Poussin: 95f; *caramasyāśrayo 'tītaḥ pañcānām sahajaś ca taiḥ. manovijñānadhātoḥ samanantarāniruddhaṁ mana āśrayaḥ . . . tatra cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānasya kāyaḥ. atītaḥ punar eṣām āśrayo mano iti api ete pañca vijñānakāyā indriyadvayāśrayaḥ.*)

<sup>115</sup> AKBh ad II 44d; Shastri: 246; Poussin: 212; Griffiths (1986: 124); *cittam api asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāt jāyate, na cittāt. anyonyabijakam hi etad ubhayaṁ yad uta cittam ca sendriyaś ca kāya iti pūrvācaryāḥ.* See also *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 23.

<sup>116</sup> See Stihramati's strong criticism of this position in Griffiths (1986: 125).

<sup>117</sup> AKBh II ad II 44d; Shastri: 245; Poussin: 211; Griffiths (1986: 123); *katham idānim bahukālāṁ niruddhāc cittāt punar api cittam jāyate? atītasya api astitvād isyate vaibhāṣikāḥ samanantarapratyayatvam.*

<sup>118</sup> *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (para. 24) quotes Vasumitra as positing a subtle mind that does not leave the body during the absorption of cessation (Pruden: 59): “But I maintain that this absorption of extinction is endowed with a subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*).” An almost identical passage (Muroji 1985: 27) appears in AKBh ad II 44d (Shastri: 245ff; Poussin: 211, 212, n. 2.) and AKBh ad VIII 33b (Poussin: 207f) and is discussed in Griffiths (1986: 125f). This “subtle mind” is considered an “unmanifesting mental-cognition” (*aparispṛṣṭa-manovijñāna*) by the *Vyākhyā* on this passage.

Bareau (1955: 164f, 172) cites the *Dārṣṭānikas* (theses 40, 58) and the *Vibhajyavādins* (theses 5, 6) as also asserting a subtle form of mind during the absorption. He also states (240) that the *Theravādins* (thesis 217) agree with this, citing the *Siddhi* (142, 202–3, 207) as his source. Collins (1982: 245f, 304), however, demonstrates the opposite, citing the orthodox *Theravādin* texts, the *Visuddhimagga* (XXIII.43, 47), which reads “without mind” (*acittako*), and the later *Abhidhammattha-sangaha* (Compendium, IX.9), which states that “mental continuity is suspended” (*cittasantati vocchijjati*); he concludes that “personal continuity spanning a period of cessation, then, is guaranteed by the continued existence of the

body, or rather the material life-faculty, and not by the continued occurrence of *bhavanga*-moments.” This then would accord closely with the *Sautrāntika* position.

Schmithausen (1987: 19f; ns. 149–167) discusses all the passages pertinent to a subtle form of mind.

<sup>119</sup> AKBh *Vyākhyā* ad 44c; Shastri: 245; Muroji 1985: 27; *tatra acittakāni eva nirodhāsaṃjñi-samāpatti-āsaṃjñikāni iti vaibhāṣikādayaḥ. aparispṛṣṭa-manovijñāna-sacittakāni iti sthavira-vasumitrādayaḥ. ālayavijñāna-sacittakāni iti yogācārāḥ iti siddhānta-bhedaḥ.*

<sup>120</sup> The canonical doctrines (D II 63, etc.), as we observed above, held that *vijñāna* descended into the mother's womb and coagulated, wherein *nāma-rūpa* developed. The question here is exactly *which type of vijñāna* it is that coagulates.

The *Sarvāstivādin* position (AKBh III 42b–c; Shastri: 500; Poussin: 131; *cyutyupapattayaḥ manovijñāna evaṣṭaḥ*. “Death and birth are considered to be [moments of] mental cognition.”) is that it is a mental cognition which transits at rebirth and coagulates in the womb, with which the *Sautrāntikas* are in substantial agreement (Schmithausen: 301, n. 232 cites VGPVy 416b1–4; PSVy 20b7: *mdo sde pas smras pa — yid kyi rnam par shes pa ma'i mngal du mishams sbyor ba.*)

<sup>121</sup> Vibh. 414: *manovijñāna-dhātu* is the only *vijñāna* at the time of rebirth (*upapatti*). See also *Miln.* 299; *Visuddhimagga* XIV 111–114, 124; in *Visuddhimagga* XIV.98 *bhavanga-citta* is classified along with rebirth-mind as a ‘neutral resultant mind-consciousness element’ (*vipākāhetuka-manovijñānadhātu*). See also the *Aṭṭhasālini* III 581–3 (Guenther 1959: 25f). For a more lengthy description of the *bhavanga-citta*, including some comparison with the *ālayavijñāna*, see Collins (1982: 255–261), Mizuno (1978: 853f), also Cousins (1981).

<sup>122</sup> *Visuddhimagga* XIV 115. “When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, then, following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same kinds, being the result of the same kamma whatever it may be, occur a *life-continuum* consciousness with that same object; and again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising of consciousness to interrupt the continuity they also go on occurring endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a river.”

See also *Abhidhammatṭha-sangaha*, (*Compendium*) 1979: 266–7.

<sup>123</sup> For example, a mental cognition has a *dhamma* (that is, the usual object of a mental cognition), attention and the *bhavanga-citta* as its conditions. (*Visuddhimagga* XV.39: *bhavangamana-dhamma-manasikāre paṭicca uppajjati manovijñānaṁ*. Cited in Collins (1982: 241).

The translator of the *Compendium* (268) also explains this last function of the *bhavanga-citta*: “The passage from a state of anger to one of joy would be too abrupt without the mediation of a *hedonically indifferent* element, which acts as a sort of buffer between two opposing natures.”

<sup>124</sup> *Visuddhimagga* XIV.115

With the life-continuum continuously occurring thus, when living beings' faculties have become capable of apprehending an object, then when a visible datum has come into the eye's focus, there is impinging upon the eye-sensitivity due to the visible datum. Thereupon, owing to the impact's influence, there comes to be a disturbance in [the continuity of] the life-continuum. Then, when the life-continuum has ceased, the



functional mind-element arises making that same visible datum its object, as it were, cutting off the life-continuum, and accomplishing the function of *adverting*. So too in the case of the ear door and so on."

<sup>125</sup> This twofold nature as both 'constructed' and 'constructive' is widely predicated of many key Buddhist terms in the Abhidharma, such as the *samskāra*, *viññāna*, and *upādāna* (appropriation), and is not infrequently described in terms of an active/passive dichotomy, a causal/resultant bifurcation drawn out of terms (frequently participial forms) which were used more simply in the early canon. *Upādāna*, as we have seen, refers both to the *act* of grasping or appropriating and *that which* is so appropriated. Schmithausen (1987: 356, n. 516) describes the same distinctions about *prapañca*: "'*Prapañca*' is used both in the sense of the *process* of proliferation . . . or even of (emotionally involved) proliferating or diversifying conceptual *activity*, as also in that of what is the *result* of such an activity." (Emphasis in original.)

Collins (1982: 202) has also stressed that *samkhāra* has a similar dual role as constructing and as constructed: "Both the activity which constructs temporal reality, and the temporal reality thus constructed, are *samkhāra*." The *Theravādins* articulate the relationship of *samkhāra* to *viññāna*, with a concept remarkably similar to the *ālayaviññāna*: "When used in the eschatological context, then, the term *abhisamkhāra* denotes a karmically forceful, 'constructive' act, which determines a specific length of *samsāric* continuity . . . The idea of such constructions, such acts, as being conditions for the future occurrence of an appropriate form of consciousness, which is itself the 'dependently originated' condition for psycho-physical individuality . . . and so on, is expressed also by the use of the term 'construction-consciousness' (*abhisamkhāra-viññāna*)" (202). Therefore, "the concept of *abhisamkhāra-viññāna*, then, refers to that consciousness which continues throughout *samsāra*, both constructing future temporal existence, and itself constituting the medium for the temporal reality thus constructed" (208). As such, reiterating the canonical *viññāna* and resonating with the *ālayaviññāna*, the *abhisamkhāra-viññāna* is used to explain the destruction and non-persistence of *viññāna* in the context of *nirvāṇa* as the "reversal and cessation of *samsāra*" (207). The PED (70), moreover, glosses '*abhisamkhāra*' as 'store, accumulation (of karma, merit or demerit), substratum', etc. and refers to C. Rhys-Davids' translation of '*abhisamkhāra-viññāna*' as a 'constructing, storing intellect' in *Dhammasaṅgani* translation (*A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, p. 262). We noted above (n. 90) that the notion of *abhisamkhāra-viññāna* is regularly used to gloss *bīja* in the Abhidhamma commentaries.

<sup>126</sup> With the important elaboration of the seeds representing the influence of past karma and afflictive mentality (*kliṣṭa-manas*) representing the persistence of an innate yet subliminal craving and self-grasping.

<sup>127</sup> In addition to the material factors, of course; they are, however, less important for our present discussion.

<sup>128</sup> As Conze (1973: 138) so well summed it up: "It looks as if not only actualities but also potentialities must be accepted as real. People not only do things but have the 'power' to do or not to do them. A person can call upon such powers, in the same way in which one is said to 'know' French, although no French word may occur in the present moment of consciousness. It is very hard to maintain the view that a person should at any given time be identified with just the one dharma which is in him from

moment to moment . . . the dogmatic assertion of instantaneousness could be made credible only by introducing a number of pseudo-permanencies."

<sup>129</sup> Otherwise, a strict determinism and an infinite regress would follow. For example, *Kathāvatthu* XVII.3 rejects the thesis that everything, even karma itself, is due to karma (*sabbam idam kammato ti kathā*), while VII.10 rejects that idea that *vipāka* itself entails further *vipāka* (*vipāko vipākadhammadhammo ti*). Dube (1980: 334) aptly concludes: "If everything is due to *karman*, everything becomes a *vipāka*. The same thing is *vipāka* with respect to the past and a cause (*hetu*) with respect to the future. In fact taken together these two theses constitute complete determinism where there is only a distinction of relative position of the sequence but hardly of any qualitative difference between *karman* and *vipāka*."

<sup>130</sup> The diversity of positions taken by the various schools testifies to the universal recognition of these questions, as well as the relative inability to radically address them within the prevailing presuppositions.

Many of these issues appear in rudimentary form in such early texts as the *Kathāvatthu* and Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*; the most thorough edition of the latter is that of Teramoto and Hiramatsu (1935), which includes three Chinese and one Tibetan text, Japanese translations of the commentaries by Bhavya and Vinitadeva, and indices and comparative charts. Much of the material from Vasumitra's text is found in Masuda (1925). They reached more developed form by the time of the *Sarvāstivādin* literature and the *AKBh*, roughly contemporaneous with the *Yogācāra* school.

Again, the extreme similarity in terminology used in discussing these issues illustrates the deep commonality between the *Yogācāra* and other schools of the period, justifying our continued reference to, and contextualization within, Abhidharma sources. No one has demonstrated this doctrinal and terminological commonality in *minutiae* between the Abhidharma schools of this early formative period better than Bareau (1955), who has collected and collated references to the doctrinal positions of all the traditional eighteen schools, including their subsects and splinter groups. He draws chiefly upon the *Kathāvatthu*, the above-mentioned texts of Vasumitra *et al.*, the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* (La Vallée Poussin, 1928) and several Chinese commentaries. Since the materials he has collected, however, differ greatly in time, source, and sectarian viewpoint, and thus historical reliability, we use them with due caution. The sectarian affiliations of the views disputed in the *Kathāvatthu*, for example, derive only from the much later commentary. Dube (1980) has also compiled and discussed many of these issues, based upon much the same sources, in a thematic and narrative form. Due to limitations of space we will confine the sectarian positions of each issue to the notes.

<sup>131</sup> *Kathāvatthu* XV.11.: *Andhakas* and *Sammatīyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent.

<sup>132</sup> *Kathāvatthu* XV.11.: *Andhakas* and *Sammatīyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent.

<sup>133</sup> *Kathāvatthu* XIV.5.: *Andhakas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent. Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (70, thesis 63), *Vibhajyavādins* (177, thesis 38) and *Mahīśāsakas* (183, thesis 3) assent; *Theravādins* dissent (230, thesis 139).

<sup>134</sup> *Kathāvatthu* IX.4; XI.1.; XIV.5.: *Mahāsāṃghikas* and *Sammatīyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent. Bareau (1955): *Bahuśrūtiyas* reject either alternative (83, thesis 11); *Andhakas* (95, thesis 47), *Sammatīyas* (125, thesis 17), *Vibhajyavādins* (177, thesis 39), *Mahīśāsakas* (183, thesis 4), *Dharmaguptakas* (194, thesis 5: both *anuśāya*

and *kleśa* are *viprayukta*), *Uttarāpathakas* (249, thesis 13), and *Vātsīputrīyas* assent, but the latter claim that *anuśaya* pertain to the *pudgala* (120, 118, theses 37, 18); *Sarvāstivādins* (142, theses 26, 27) and *Theravādins* (226, 230, theses 108, 140) dissent.

*Kathāvatthu* XIV.6 relates the position of the *Andhakas* that even the outbursts of the afflictions (*pariyuṭṭhāna*) are disjoined from mind (*cittavippayutta*).

<sup>135</sup> *Kathāvatthu* IX 4.; XI.1.: *Andhakas*, *Mahāsāṃghikas* and *Sammattīyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent.

<sup>136</sup> Bareau (1955): *Sarvāstivādins* assent (148, thesis 85). See AKBh ad V 19, cited above.

<sup>137</sup> Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (68, thesis 46), *Sautrāntikas* (157, thesis 12), *Vibhajyavādins* (177, thesis 38) and a *Mahīśāsaka* subsect (188, thesis 10) assent; *Theravādins* dissent (240, thesis 222).

<sup>138</sup> *Kathāvatthu* I.2.; III.5: *Theravādins* dissent.

<sup>139</sup> This controversy surrounds the attainment, or predicted future attainment of fruits of the path either in the present or in future lifetimes. It is discussed in various regards in *Kathāvatthu* I.5; V.2, 4, 10; IX.7; XII.5; XIX.7. Dube (1980: 180–183). Assurance of entering the path (*sammattaniyāmāvakanti*) is mentioned in S I 196; S III 225; SN 55, 371; A I 121; and *Kathāvatthu* V.5, VI.1, XIII.4. AKBh ad VI 26a. See note 69, above.

<sup>140</sup> Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (72, thesis 78) posit a root-consciousness (*mūla-vijñāna*) which underlies and supports (*āśraya*) the discrete sensory cognitions; *Mahāsāṃghika* subsect (74, thesis 8) asserts a subtle mental-consciousness (*sūkṣma-manovijñāna*) that pervades the entire body; *Mahīśāsakas* posit an aggregate which lasts as long as *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāra-koṭiṇiṣṭha-skandha*) (187, thesis 37); *Theravādins* posit a *bhavaṅga-citta*, a mind (*citta*) which is an element (*anga*) of existence (*bhava*), that is, the cause of existence and the unity of diverse successive existences (240, thesis 219). See note 214, below.

<sup>141</sup> Bareau (1955): *Sautrāntikas* (158, thesis 29), *Dārṣṭāntikas* (164, thesis 58) and *Vibhajyavādins* (172, theses 5, 6) assent. Bareau states the *Theravādins* (240, thesis 217) assert a subtle mental-consciousness (*sūkṣma-manovijñāna*) present in the attainment of cessation; this is countered by Collins (1982: 245f). See n. 118 above.

<sup>142</sup> The *Theravādins* (Bareau 1955: 240, thesis 218) assert a subtle mental-consciousness that exists at the moment of rebirth. The *Sautrāntikas* and *Sarvāstivādins* also consider it to be a mental-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) (AKBh III 42b–c).

<sup>143</sup> Bareau (1955): *Sautrāntikas* assent, and claim mind (*citta*) and body (*kāya*) can seed each other (156, thesis 18) and that ordinary *vijñāna* arise from seeds (156, thesis 28); *Mahāsāṃghika* dissent (72, thesis 79).

<sup>144</sup> Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (72, thesis 78) assent; *Sautrāntikas* dissent (159, thesis 30); a *Mahīśāsaka* subsect asserts that *anuśaya* and *bija* reside perpetually in the present from where they exclusively may produce other *dharma*s (188, theses 9, 10).

<sup>145</sup> *Kathāvatthu* XVI.4.: *Theravādins* dissent. Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* assent (72, thesis 79).

<sup>146</sup> Silburn's remark (1955: 249), though in a slightly different context, is particularly *apropos*: "ils posent à nouveau le problème du point de vue de l'être plutôt que du point de vue de l'act."

<sup>147</sup> AKBh ad V 1d–2a; ad II 36d; *Vyākhyā* ad II 36c–d: *śaktiviśeṣa eva bījam*;

AKBh IX: *phalotpādana-samarthaḥ*. The *Sarvāstivādin* concept of "activity" (*kāritra*) falls into much the same category.

<sup>148</sup> Nyanaponika Thera (1965: 28f), perhaps unwittingly, concurs to a substantial degree with this contention, when, in addition to 'breadth', the simultaneous relations (*sahajāta-paccaya*) between elements, and 'length', the "sequence of observed, consecutive changes stretching forward in time" (*anantara-paccaya*), he speaks of 'depth', the 'third dimension': "The spatial world of qualified analysis is limited to the two dimensions of breadth and length. Bare or qualified analysis dare not admit those conditioning and conditioned phenomena which are bound up with the third dimension, that of depth . . . by 'depth' we understand that subterranean flow of energies (a wide and intricate net of streams, rivers and rivulets) originating in past actions (*kamma*) and coming to the surface unexpectedly at a time determined by their inherent life rhythm (time required for growth, maturing, etc.) and by the influence of favourable or obstructive circumstances. The analytical method, we said, will admit only such relational energies as are transmitted by immediate impact (the dimension of breadth) or by the linear 'wire' of immediate sequence (the dimension of length). But relational energies may also arise from unknown depths opening under the very feet of the individual or the object; or they may be transmitted, not by that linear 'wire' of immediate sequence in time-space, but by way of 'wireless' communication, travelling vast distances in space and time . . ."

The point here is not whether this 'third dimension' that 'bare analysis dare not admit' is eloquently, or even adequately, expressed in terms of such common metaphors as depth, flow, growth or even energy, but rather if and to what extent they are compatible with the stated aim, and circumscribed range, of Abhidharma discourse, which was roughly defined earlier in the same work by Nyanaponika Thera (5,3) himself as "the systematisation of the . . . Sutta doctrines in strictly philosophical (*paramattha*) or truly realistic (*yathā-bhūta*) language that as far as possible employs terms of a function or process without any of the conventional (*voḥāra*) and unrealistic concepts assuming a personality, an agent (as different from the act), a soul or a substance . . . In the Abhidhamma, this Sutta terminology is turned into correct functional forms of thought, which accord with the true 'impersonal' and everchanging nature of actuality; and in that strict, or highest, sense (*paramattha*) the main tenets of the Dhamma are explained."

If the Abhidhamma is an adequate and truly realistic (*yathā-bhūta*), account of things, then it is asked (by all its contemporary disputants) how such a philosophic language expresses the 'subterranean flow of energies' from whose 'unknown depths' they arise through 'wireless' transmission? If such conventional metaphors (as opposed to truly real *dharma*s), used in or at least in conjunction with the Abhidhamma, as 'flow', 'depth', 'growth' and 'energy', are necessary in order to account for this 'transmission' of karmic energy, as well as the afflicted dispositions, then we must ask if it has successfully fulfilled its stated aims. For either these are necessary elements of reality, in which case they should be truly real, albeit momentary, *dharma*s, or they are unnecessary, in which case they are not actually real and this range of issues is therefore, at the very least, extraneous or superfluous to Abhidhamma discourse. Thus, a contemporary commentator like Nyanaponika concurs in every sense and on nearly every point with the criticisms leveled by the *Sautrāntikas* and raised by the *Yogācārins* in terms of the context of the *ālayavijñāna*.

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- AA *Āṅguttara Nikāya-aṭṭhakathā*.
- Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha See Compendium.
- Abhidharmadīpa *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (1959). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977.
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Shastri, S. D., ed. (1981). Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati Series; de La Vallée Poussin, trans. (1971). *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises. Cited by chapter, verse and page no.
- Apte Apte, V. S. (1986). *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.
- Aṭṭhasālinī *Aṭṭhasālinī* of Buddhaghosa (1987). London: Pali Text Society.
- ASBh *Abhidharmasammucaya-bhāṣyam*. Tatia, N., ed. (1976). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
- Bh *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya*, Chinese translation of Hsüan Tsang, T. 1597.
- bh *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya*, Tibetan translation. P. # 5551; D. # 4050.
- Compendium *Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha)*. Aung, S. Z., trans. (1910). London: Pāli Text Society, 1979.
- D *Dīgha Nikāya* (1890–1911). London: Pali Text Society. Rhys-Davids, T. W. and C. A. F., trans. 1899–1921. *Dialogues of the Buddha*. London: Pali Text Society.
- D. Derge edition of the Tibetan *Tripiṭaka*.
- Dhamma-saṅgaṇī *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*. trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1914. New Delhi: Oriental Books, 1975.
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- M *Majjhima Nikāya* (1948–51). London: Pali Text Society. Horner, I. B., trans. (1954–59). *Middle Length Sayings*; London: Pali Text Society. Cited by page no. in Pāli.
- MSg *Mahāyānasamgraha*, T.1594; P.5549; D.4048. Cited by chapter numbers in MSg-L. Tibetan text in MSg-N referred to.

- MSg-L Lamotte, É., trans., ed. (1973). *La Somme du Grande Véhicule d'Asanga*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain Institut Orientaliste.
- MSg-N Nagao, G. (1982). *Shōdaijōron: Wayaku to Chūkai*. Tokyo: Kodansha.
- Miln. *Milinda's Questions*. Horner, I. B., trans. (1963–64). London: Pali Text Society.
- Nivṛtti Portion See *Pravṛtti Portion*.
- P. Peking edition of the Tibetan *Tripiṭaka*.
- PED *Pāli-English Dictionary*, Rhys-Davids, T. W. and Stede, W., ed. (1921). London: Pali Text Society, 1979.
- Poussin See AKBh.
- Pravṛtti Portion *Pravṛtti Portion* and the *Nivṛtti Portion* are found within the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. T.30.1579.579c23–582a28 (Hsüan Tsang's trans.); T.30.1584.1019a25–1020c22 (Paramārtha's trans.); P.5539 Zi.4a5–11a8; D.4038 Shi.3b4–9b3. Critical edition and Japanese translation are found in Hakamaya, N. (1979). *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī ni okeru āraya-shiki no kitei. Tōyōbunka kenkyūjo-kiyō* 79: 1–79. Cited by page, line, and outline as found in Hakamaya (1979); Tibetan text edited by Hakamaya.
- Proof Portion A section of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* which immediately precedes the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions*, the Sanskrit equivalent of which is found in ASBh 11, 9–13, 20; T.31.1606.701b4–702a5; P.5554 Si.12a2–13b5; D.4053 Li.9b7–11a5. Japanese translation is found in Hakamaya, N. (1978). *Āraya-shiki sonzai no hachi-ronshō ni kansuru shobunken. Kamazawa Daigaku Bukkyō-gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 16: 1–26; English translation found in Griffiths (1986: 129–138). Cited by page and line, and proof number.
- PSkPBh *Pañcaskandha-prakarana-vibhāṣā*. Sthiramati. P.5567. (D.4066).
- PSVy *Pratīyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*. Vasubandhu. P.5496 chi.
- S *Samyutta Nikāya* (1894–1904). London: Pali Text Society. Rhys-Davids, C. A. F. and Woodward, F. L., trans. (1917–30). *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*. London: Pali Text Society.
- Samdhinirmocana Sūtra Lamotte, É., ed. and trans. (1935). *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra. L'Explication des Mystères*. Louvain. Cited by chapter and section.
- SED *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Monier-Williams (1986). Reprint: Tokyo: Meicho Fukyukai.
- Shastri See AKBh.
- Siddhi *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. La Vallée Poussin trans. (1928). Paris: Librairie Orientaliste.
- SN *Suttanipāta* (1948). London: Pali Text Society.
- SNA *Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā*.
- T *Taishō* edition of the Chinese *Tripiṭaka*.
- TBh *Trimśikābhāṣya* of Sthiramati, in Levi, ed. (1925). *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. Paris.

- U *Upanibandhana* of *Asvabhāva*. Chinese translation of Hsüan Tsang, T. 1598.
- u *Upanibandhana* of *Asvabhāva*. Tibetan translation, P. # 5552; D. # 4051.
- VGPVy \**Vivṛtagūdhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*. P.5553; D.4051. Commentary on MSg I.1—49.
- Vibh. *Vibhanga* ed. Rhys Davids (1904). Pali Text Society.
- Visuddhimagga *The Path of Purification*. Buddhaghosa. Ñāṇamoli trans. (1976). Berkeley: Shambala. Cited by chapter and paragraph.
- Vyākhyā *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*. Yaśomitra. Shastri, ed. In AKBh.
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# THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DHARMAKĀYA CHAPTER OF THE ABHISAMAYĀLAṂKĀRA BY INDIAN COMMENTATORS: THE THREEFOLD AND THE FOURFOLD BUDDHAKĀYA THEORIES<sup>1</sup>

## 1. INTRODUCTION

It was in 1964 that H. Amano<sup>2</sup> dealt with the theme of the Buddhakāya theory of Haribhadra in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. Subsequently other scholars, mainly Japanese, have undertaken further studies on this theme, and in 1985 H. Isoda<sup>3</sup> published his paper on the threefold and fourfold Buddhakāya theories in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. Then in 1986, about half a year later than Isoda's paper, I presented a short paper on the same theme entitled 'The Classification of the Commentaries on the Dharmakāya Chapter of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*' at the ICANAS Conference in Hamburg<sup>4</sup> and also published a study in which I translated the commentary by Go ram pa into Japanese and showed on the basis of the Buddhakāya system that there are two groups of commentators.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately these papers have either been written in Japanese or, as in the case of the proceedings of the ICANAS Conference, have not yet been published, and so they have not been able to contribute to studies in America, Europe and elsewhere. In 1989 and 1992, John J. Makransky published papers on this theme in which he presented substantial evidence that *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* chapter 8 is in fact a 3 kāya text by analyzing its sources and form of its composition.<sup>6</sup> He also promised a future article which will related his analysis of AA 8 to the disagreements over its meaning in many of its Indian commentaries.<sup>7</sup> I refer the reader to those articles for detailed argumentation on those matters. At the same time, I would be very glad if this article as well could contribute something for scholars abroad, and so I have ventured to present this paper in English.

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ISSN 0022-1791

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Printed in the Netherlands

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Volume 23 No. 1 March 1995

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harmatvani pakṣatvam. saṁdeho hi na viśeṣaṇam. parāmarśapūrmaṇi liṅgadarśana-vyāptismaraṇādinaṁ tasya nāśāt. na upalakṣaṇaṁ, avyāvarttikātāpatteh.

(b) nāpi sādha- bādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ, ubhayābhāvasya pratyekasattve api sattvāt. nāpi abhāvadvayaṇi tathā, bādhakapramāṇābhāvasya vyarthatvāt, hradādeh, pakṣatve api bādha-hetvasiddhyāderāśyakatve anumityanutpādāt, nāpi sādha- bādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ śrotavyonmantavya iti śrutyā samānaviśayaka śravaṇānantaraṇi manana bodhanāt. pratyakṣadrṣṭe apy anumānadarśanāt. eka liṅgāvagatē api liṅgāntareṇa tad anumānāt ca mantavyaḥ ca upapattibhiḥ iti smaraṇāt.

(c) atha siśādhayīṣitasādhya dharmādharmī pakṣaḥ. tathā hi mumukṣoḥ śābdādātmāva- game api mananasya mokṣopāyatvena siddhiviśeṣānumitichayā ātmānumānam. Ata eva 'pratyakṣaparikalitamapi arthamanumānena bubhutsante tarkarasikāḥ. na hi karaṇi drṣṭe citkāreṇa tamanumimate anumātārah', iti vācaspativacanayoḥ avirodhaḥ anumit- sātadvirahābhayaṁ tadupapattēḥ iti cet na. sandehavatparāmarśapūrvaṁ siśādhayīṣyā api abhāvāt yogyatāyāśca anirūpaṇāt, siśādhayīṣāvirahe api ghanagarjiteṇa meghānu- mānāt svakāraṇa-dhīnatṛtīyaliṅgaparāmarśabalena anpekṣitānumānadarśanāt ca

(d) ucyate-siśādhayīṣādhayīṣāviraahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo yatra asti sa pakṣaḥ. tena siśādhayīṣāviraahasahakṛtām sādha- bādhakapramāṇaṁ yatrāsti sa na pakṣaḥ. yatra sādha- bādhakapramāṇe sati asati vā siśādhayīṣā yatra vā ubhayābhāvataḥ tatra viśiṣṭābhāvāt pakṣatvam, yadyapi pakṣatvasya kevalānvayitvāt nāsyā bhedakatvaṁ tathāpi pakṣapada-pravṛttinimittamuktam. (See *Gādādhari*) (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office Varanasi India 1970) pp. 1079–1088.

<sup>5</sup> Prameyakāryaṁ hi pramāṇam. See *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* by Dharmottara ed. by Sastri, S. N. (Meratha, India 1975) p. 184.

<sup>6</sup> There is another type of negation in the Navya-nyāya which functions like the *dagger function* of symbolic logic. This is known as anyatārābhāva, if we symbolize the 'presence' by 1 and the absence 'o' then the truth-table of any anyatārābhāva would be as follows:

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	Absence of <i>a-anyatara-b</i>
1	1	0
1	0	0
0	1	0
0	0	1

It is clear that *anyatārābhāva* is nothing but the *dagger-function*.

*Dept. of Philosophy*

*B.H.U., Varanasi, India.*

WILLIAM S. WALDRON\*

## HOW INNOVATIVE IS THE *ĀLAYA VIJÑĀNA*?

*The ālayavijñāna in the context of  
canonical and Abhidharma vijñāna theory*

### PART II

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### III. THE *ĀLAYA VIJÑĀNA*

#### *Excursus on the 'Ālayavijñāna' as a 'Systematic' Innovation*

It is clear that the issues which became problematic within Abhidharma discourse were of a *systemic* nature, i.e. they entailed aspects of experience which lay *outside* of the *dharmic* analysis of momentary mental processes, yet which were, for exegetical, doctrinal and empirical reasons, necessary for preserving the continuous *potential* for conditioning those very processes. When a whole series of related problems arises in this fashion predicated upon the same presuppositions, it suggests that they are entailed by those very presuppositions, which piece-meal solutions alone cannot fully resolve. The various concepts proffered by the various Abhidharma schools were simply *ad hoc*, since they addressed these issues separately, without either challenging their underlying presuppositions nor contextualizing them within a larger, more encompassing conceptual framework.

This was only accomplished when the *Yogācārins* fundamentally



restructured the theory of mind with the *ālayavijñāna* at its center, resulting in a bifurcated model of mind which depicted distinct, simultaneous and wholly interdependent types of mental processes: those of discrete, momentary cognition and an abiding, maturing and accumulating, yet subliminal, level of basal consciousness. This represents a systematic development of those aspects of *vijñāna* which had become marginalized within *dharmic* discourse, which at the same time explicates the relationship between the manifold functions and contextual nuances originally found commingled in the early notion of *vijñāna*.

The systemic nature of these problems and of the new theory of mind which addresses them suggests that what has taken place is nothing less than a ‘paradigm shift’ in Kuhn’s sense of the word. These developments correspond closely to Kuhn’s analysis of the dynamics of paradigm shifts in many respects: the model of mind centered on the *ālayavijñāna* represents a transformation of “some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations” through a “reconstruction . . . from new fundamentals” (Kuhn, 1970: 84f); this shift was instigated by a ‘crisis’ in the previous paradigm due to the number of “recognized anomalies whose characteristic feature is their stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigms” (97); the Abhidharmists’ initial response to these anomalies was to devise “numerous articulations and *ad hoc* modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict,” (78) each variation of which might express “some minor or not so minor articulation of the paradigm, no two of them quite alike, each partially successful, but none sufficiently so to be accepted as [a new] paradigm” (83); the “proliferation of versions of a theory,” Kuhn observes, “is a very usual symptom of crisis” (71).

The various ‘demonstrations’ of the *ālayavijñāna* discussed below, which typically describe and defend the *ālayavijñāna* while demonstrating the inadequacy of alternative theories, also suggest Kuhn’s description of a paradigm shift: since “paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” (23), he says, “the decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms

with nature *and* with each other” (77). Hence the formal ‘proofs’ of the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* with their insistent critique of the traditional six *vijñāna* theory and its presupposition of serial functioning.

Having demonstrated a ‘family resemblance’ between the problems elicited by the presuppositions of Abhidharma, and their systemic nature stemming from exclusive reliance upon the *dharmic* discourse, it remains to outline exactly how the complex of notions surrounding the *ālayavijñāna* actually addresses these issues within a larger systematic framework, which at the same time harks back to the earlier constellation of features surrounding the canonical *vijñāna*. That is, we must describe the characteristics of this new paradigm of mind in some supporting detail.

But before we examine the *ālayavijñāna* in this fashion, the aim of this essay must be reiterated. Since I am attempting to understand the import of the *ālayavijñāna* system within the larger context of Buddhist *vijñāna* theory, I focus more upon its structural similarities with early *vijñāna* and its schematic relationship with contemporary Abhidharma than on the discrete rationales for its *initial* introduction (and for each step of its long development and systematization), which Schmithausen (1987) has recently addressed in painstaking detail.

These rationales are, of course, indispensable to any complete understanding of its long development<sup>149</sup> and we shall readily follow Schmithausen’s basic chronological reconstruction. I would argue, however, that in the light of the systemic problems provoked by the *dharmic* theory as a whole, these rationales represent more the *occasions* for the origination and continual development of a new system of mind — as gradual refinements of a new paradigm — than its *overall significance* and *justification*; but just such an inquiry is, I believe, still a *desideratum*. Thus, I focus upon the disjunction, centering on *vijñāna*, between the synchronic *dharmic* analysis and diachronic *santāna* discourse on the grounds that when a number of hypotheses (of which the *ālayavijñāna* was only one) are put forth addressing similar concerns, their individual origins are overshadowed by the overall problematics to which they are all addressed; for such concepts may well be (and indeed often are) conscripted for purposes quite

remote from their originating context. Since the “proliferation of versions of a theory is a very usual symptom of crisis,” it is the exact nature of this crisis and the *Yogācārin* response<sup>150</sup> to it which are under consideration here.

*The ‘Yogācārabhūmi’, the ‘Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra’, and the Origins of the ‘Ālayavijñāna’*<sup>151</sup>

The *Yogācāra* conception of the *ālayavijñāna* developed considerably from one text to the next (following Schmithausen’s chronology) through an increasing systematization, along largely *Abhidharmic* lines, and with the continuous accretion of related functions, most of which were originally associated with the canonical notion of *vijñāna* and had become topics of controversy amongst the Abhidharma schools. It is this profusion of associated concepts and the detail of its systematic argumentation that now warrants our attention.

Although the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* is traditionally regarded as the first major *Yogācāra* text, the beginnings of the *ālayavijñāna* seem rather to be found within the voluminous *Yogācārabhūmi*, closely associated with the name of Asaṅga.<sup>152</sup> In what Schmithausen takes to be its initial occurrence, and thus titles the ‘*Initial Passage*’,<sup>153</sup> the *ālayavijñāna* is portrayed as a kind of basal consciousness which remains uninterruptedly within the material sense-faculties during the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) and possesses in seed-like form the causal conditions for the future occurrence of cognitive processes in the traditional six modalities. These latter are now collectively designated as “arising” or “functioning” cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) inasmuch as they intermittently arise, come forth, issue, occur, etc., in contrast to their more steady counterpart, the abiding, uninterrupted *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>154</sup> The *ālayavijñāna* here is closely aligned with bodily existence: it is that consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is necessary, along with heat (*uṣma*) and life-force (*āyus*), for maintaining bodily life and preventing death.<sup>155</sup> Nevertheless, this conception of the *ālayavijñāna* does little more than replace the *Sautrāntika* notion that the body is the carrier of the seeds during the absorption of cessation with a new and indeterminate form of mind, still unrelated

to the traditional six cognitive modes.<sup>156</sup> Nor is its status outside of the absorption of cessation clearly defined.

It is the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* that addresses these latter issues and, in few short passages, outlines the key developments in the *Yogācāra* model of mind, largely through explicating those *santāna*-related characteristics first found in the canonical notions of *vijñāna*. In a significant departure from its earlier role as a basal consciousness (*vijñāna*) that sticks closely to the body, what had been primarily a “physiological” *vijñāna* now assumes a distinctly “psychological” character: the *ālayavijñāna* not only functions in tandem with the six modes of cognition, but, more importantly, it underlies and supports them as their basis. All of them, moreover, may occur together simultaneously rather than serially.

First, the *sūtra* describes the *ālayavijñāna* as the mind that possesses all the seeds and which, as *vijñāna* in the early Pāli doctrines and *santāna* in the *AKBh* were portrayed, enters into the mother’s womb, appropriates the body, and increases and develops within *saṃsāric* existence:

In *saṃsāra* with its six destinies (*gati*), such and such beings are born as such and such a type of being. They come into existence (*abhinirvṛtti*) and arise (*utpadyante*) in the womb of beings. . . . There at first, the mind which has all the seeds (*sarvabījakam cittam*) matures, congeals, grows, develops and increases<sup>157</sup> based upon the two-fold appropriation (*upādāna*), that is, (1) the appropriation of the material sense-faculties along with their supports (*sādhiṣṭāna-rūpindriya-upādāna*) and (2) the appropriation which consists of the predispositions toward profuse imaginings in terms of conventional usage of images, names and conceptualizations (*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā-upādāna*). Of these, both of the appropriations exist within the realms with form, but the appropriation is not two-fold within the Formless realm.<sup>158</sup>

In the form of the two appropriations, the *ālayavijñāna* maintains an intimate and essential relationship with the animate body, while at the same time it transmits the predispositions or impressions stemming from past cognitive and conceptual experience. It is an ongoing basal consciousness which, like the organic processes used to describe it, is both produced by and preserves the impressions of its own past developmental processes. These twin appropriations (*upādāna*) reflect as well the double functions that appropriation (*upādāna*) played in

the early discourses and in the series of dependent origination which we observed above: “fuel, supply, substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going,” and so derivatively, “finding one’s support for, nourished by, taking up.” It represents a key link in one of the rebirth sequences within that series, as well as the active, affective sense of “attachment,” or “grasping,” a key psychological factor in perpetuating *saṃsāric* life. This dual character, as we shall see, is implicit in most of the important synonyms of the *ālayavijñāna*.

The *sūtra* continues:

This consciousness (*vijñāna*) is also called the appropriating consciousness (*ādāna-vijñāna*) because the body is grasped (*grhīta*) and appropriated (*upātta*, or *āta*) by it. It is also called the “*ālaya*” *vijñāna* because it dwells in and attaches to this body in a common destiny (*ekayogakṣema-arthena*). It is also called mind (*citta*) because it is heaped up (*ācita*) and accumulated (*upacita*) by [the six cognitive objects, i.e.:] visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles and *dharma*s.<sup>159</sup>

Although they also contain distinct affective implications, these synonyms reflect the primarily somatic nature of the type of basal consciousness which the early descriptions of the *ālayavijñāna* suggest. As such, they refer to functions traditionally attributed to *vijñāna* of preserving the continuity of (mostly embodied) individual existence throughout a lifetime and over many lives, as well as allowing for the continuous transmission of karma and *kleśa*, in the guise of the “mind which possesses all the seeds.”

But it is through its relationship with the traditional six cognitive processes that the *ālayavijñāna* is ‘heaped up’, signifying the important role that the *ālayavijñāna* plays within the momentary processes of mind and initiating its eventual integration into the synchronic Abhidharma analytic. In perhaps its most significant departure from the traditional psychology, these cognitive modes no longer occur conditioned solely by the concomitance of their respective sense organs and epistemic objects, but they occur supported by and depending upon the *ālayavijñāna* as well, with which they occur simultaneously:

The six groups of cognition (*ṣaḍvijñānakāya*) . . . occur supported by and depending upon (*saṃnīśrīya pratiṣṭhāya*) the appropriating consciousness (*ādāna-vijñāna*). Of these, the visual cognition occurs supported by (*nīśrīya*) visual forms (*rūpa*) and the eye furnished with consciousness (*savijñānaka cakṣus*). A discriminating mental

cognition (*vikalpaka manovijñāna*) with the same sense field occurs at the same time (*samakāla*) along with the visual cognition. . . .

If the conditions for a single visual cognition occurring simultaneously are present, then supported by and depending upon the appropriating consciousness only a single visual cognition occurs simultaneously. If the conditions for up to all five groups of cognition occurring simultaneously are present, then all five groups of cognition occur simultaneously.<sup>160</sup>

In a further move away from the ‘somatic’ mind (*vijñāna*) of the *Initial Passage*, the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* also states that the *ādāna/ālayavijñāna* has its own epistemic object: the *ādānavijñāna* occurs with an imperceptible or unrecognizable cognition of the stable external world (*asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti*).<sup>161</sup> Motivated perhaps by the usual cognitive definition of *vijñāna*, in which an object is a requisite condition for the occurrence of *vijñāna*, the object of the *ālayavijñāna* must be constantly present, but not so strong as to contradict its inactive nature within the absorption of cessation.

In sum, by redrawing the model of mind in this fashion, the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* initiates the reintegration of the diachronic dimension of *vijñāna* pertaining to *saṃsāric* continuity — rebirth, the maintainance of the animated body, and the perpetuation of karma in the form of seeds — with the synchronic analysis of mind focusing upon momentary cognitive processes. Though the details have yet to be filled in, the broad outline is clear. The two distinct dimensions of *vijñāna* occur simultaneously and mutually dependent upon each other: the continuous *ālayavijñāna* provides the constant support and basis for the supraliminal cognitive modes, while they in turn ‘heap up’ (*ācita*) and ‘accumulate’ (*upacita*) in the newly fashioned *citta*, the “mind with all the seeds” (*sarva-bījakam cittam*). The affective connotations of ‘attachment’ and ‘clinging’, implicit in the terms ‘*ādāna*’ and ‘*ālaya*’, and which will become the basis for yet further development, is only hinted at in the famous verse closing Chapter V:

The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,  
Like a violent current, flows with all the seeds;  
I have not taught it to the ignorant,  
Lest they should imagine [it] as a self.<sup>162</sup>

*The Ālaya Treatise of the 'Yogācārabhūmi': the 'Proof Portion'*

The *Ālaya Treatise* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which consists of the *Proof Portion* and the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions*,<sup>163</sup> further develops the concept of the *ālayavijñāna*, describing it in systematic Abhidharmic terms and elaborating in specific detail the mutually interactive relationship between these distinct levels of simultaneous mental processes. The systematization of the *ālayavijñāna* found in these chapters essentially completes the integration of the diachronic and synchronic articulations of *vijñāna* along the lines found in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, and in addition develops a conception of subliminal afflictive mentation as a continuous, separate and discernable function of mind.

The conception of the *ālayavijñāna* in the *Proof Portion* is less detailed than in the later sections of the *Ālaya Treatise*, but displays marked development over that found in the *Initial Passage* and the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*.<sup>164</sup> It offers 'proofs' for the dimension or type of mental processes such as the *ālayavijñāna*, chiefly on the grounds that (1) the diachronic functions traditionally attributed to *vijñāna*, in particular the appropriation of the body at rebirth, throughout life, and during the absorption of cessation and the process of death, cannot be carried out by the six cognitive modes, and that (2) even such synchronic processes as immediate cognition are not fully tenable without the simultaneous functioning admitted by the new system centered upon the *ālayavijñāna*.

As for the diachronic functions of mind, the *ālayavijñāna* and the functioning cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) are dichotomized on the basis of their originating conditions and along lines quite similar to those we first analyzed in the early Pāli materials: the *ālayavijñāna* is constant, because it occurs conditioned by past *saṃskāras* and is therefore also a karmically indeterminate resultant state (*avyākṛta-vipāka*), and it pervades the entire body; the functioning cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), on the other hand, are momentary and intermittent, since they occur due to present conditions (the sense faculties, sense fields and attention), are experienced as wholesome or unwholesome and thus karmically determinant, and they are related to only their own respective sense bases.<sup>165</sup> For these reasons, none of the momentarily occurring

types of cognition can be the *vijñāna* which appropriates the entire body at birth or throughout life.

Much the same reasons are implicit<sup>166</sup> in the question of mutual seeding (*bījatvam . . . anyonyam*), which addresses the immediate infusion and continual transmission of the seeds from moment to moment. Since the cognitive processes which succeed each other are of such diverse qualities and may belong to radically divergent realms of existence, there is insufficient homogeneity between them for the seeds to be properly received or transmitted through the arising cognitions alone; thus, a continuous and neutral type of mentality capable of receiving all types of seeds such as the *ālayavijñāna* was deemed necessary.<sup>167</sup> This point implicitly raises the difficulties surrounding heterogeneous succession as discussed in the Abhidharma literature.

The *Proof Portion* advocates the simultaneous functioning of the *ālayavijñāna* and six arising cognitions on the grounds that the multifaceted nature of common cognitive and physical experience cannot be adequately explained either (1) without an underlying and simultaneous sentient basis such as provided by the *ālayavijñāna*, or (2) solely by the serial functioning of the arising cognitions, as in the traditional scheme.<sup>168</sup>

The cognitive functions of the *ālayavijñāna* are also expanded and expressed in terms of the complex nature of conscious experience in general. Its functions are four-fold:

the perception of the world, the perception of this basis [i.e. the body], the perception "[This is] I," and the perception of the sense-fields. These perceptions are experienced as occurring simultaneously moment to moment. It is not tenable for there to be diverse functions like this within a single moment of a single cognition.<sup>169</sup>

The *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* VIII 37.1 had already declared that the *ādāna-vijñāna* has an (implicitly) continuous, though all but imperceptible, perception of the enduring external world (*asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti*). To this is now added the constant sensations stemming from the *ālayavijñāna*'s bodily basis. Together with the normal perception of the sense-fields and a distinct sense of self-identity, of "[This is] I," we have the first glint of the full *Yogācāra*

model of mind, to be elaborated still further in succeeding texts. This last item, the sense of self-identity, alludes to a continuous but subliminal level of self-view which subsists until the later stages on the path. This was clearly adumbrated in the early Pāli materials, became problematic in the *AKBh*, and was then fully systematized only in the *Pravṛtti/nivṛtti Portions* and, more especially, in the *MSg*.<sup>170</sup>

The subsistence of the impressions of (*vāsānā*) or dispositions toward (*anuśaya*) these afflictions became problematic, we shall remember, within the strictures of the *dharmic* analysis and the *Sautrāntikas* used the metaphor of seeds to refer to their continuing yet unobstructing presence (in addition to potential for karmic fruition). The conception of the *ālayavijñāna* has heretofore concerned primarily the seeds of *karma* without directly addressing the question of the latent dispositions. But once the 'somatic' emphasis of the *ālayavijñāna* is superseded by its psychological functions the whole perspective is changed, for the afflictive dispositions are much more psychologically active than the simple storage of the seeds of karma. This is because, however important the genesis of the supraliminal forms of mind may be, it is the presence of the afflictions themselves that most directly affect the *activity* of those forms, making them karmically unwholesome.<sup>171</sup> Thus the presence of afflictive tendencies plays an essential role in the continual karmic activities that perpetuate *saṃsāric* existence as a whole. In terms of dependent origination, it is just the *saṃskāras*, represented by the afflictive activities, that lead to the fruit, a resultant *vijñāna*, here denoted the "*ālaya*" *vijñāna*.

While the closing verse of *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* V. had only hinted at the affective nuances of the term '*ālaya*' as 'clinging' and 'attachment', the *ASBh* (11.1, just prior to the *Proof Portion*) includes them in its 'etymological' explanation: "Because *dharma*s dwell (*ālīyante*) there as seeds, or because beings grasp [it] as a self, [it is] the *ālayavijñāna*."<sup>172</sup> Since the *ālayavijñāna* refers to *citta* in the *Yogācāra* view, this accords with traditional views that *citta* is often (mis)taken as a self.<sup>173</sup>

This important aspect of the *ālayavijñāna* system will be further elaborated in the next important sections treating the *ālayavijñāna*, the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions*, which constitute the remainder of the *Ālaya Treatise*.

### *The 'Ālaya Treatise': the 'Pravṛtti' and 'Nivṛtti Portions'*

These portions of the *Ālaya Treatise* present the *ālayavijñāna* within a more systematic Abhidharmic framework, while at the same time portraying the metaphysical aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* much as *vijñāna* was portrayed in the early Pāli materials and in the *AKBh*: the continuity and cessation (or ultimate transformation) of the *ālayavijñāna* is virtually equated with the perpetuation and cessation of individual *saṃsāric* existence. The conception of the *ālayavijñāna* here represents the nearly complete systematic integration of the diachronic aspects of *vijñāna* with the synchronic *dharmic* analysis of mind focusing upon the momentary arising cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*). As such, it articulates within the more sophisticated Abhidharma milieu the relationship between those two distinct dimensions of *vijñāna* first discernable in the early Pāli materials.

In the *Nivṛtti Portion* the *ālayavijñāna* is virtually equated with the mass of accumulated karma, defilements (*saṃkleśa*), appropriations (*upādāna*) and spiritual corruptions (*dauṣṭhulya*) which keep beings entrapped in *saṃsāra*. Since it possesses all the seeds, the *ālayavijñāna* is the root of the defilements in this world: it is the "root of the coming-about (*nirvṛtti*) of the animate world (*sattva-loka*) because it is what brings forth (*utpādaka*) the sense faculties with [their material] bases and the arising cognitions."<sup>174</sup> It is likewise the root of the inanimate world (*bhājana-loka*)<sup>175</sup> and the cause of the continuance of the afflictions (*kleśa-pravṛtti-hetu*).<sup>176</sup> The *ālayavijñāna* thus comprises those very elements which constitute and perpetuate *saṃsāric* existence.

When wholesome *dharma*s are cultivated, however, the *ālayavijñāna* comes to an end.<sup>177</sup> As the basis is revolved or transformed (*āśrayaṃ parivartate*) the *ālayavijñāna* is eliminated (*prahīṇa*), and thus so are all the defilements, appropriations, and spiritual corruptions, and with them the cause of future rebirth.<sup>178</sup> In sum, the perpetuation and cessation of the *ālayavijñāna* is that of individual *saṃsāric* life itself, much as *vijñāna* was portrayed in the early Pāli texts.

The somatic and metaphysical aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* outlined so far are in basic agreement with traditional understandings of *vijñāna* and, although presented in more descriptive detail, represent little

substantive development over earlier *Yogācāra* treatments. What distinguishes the *Ālaya Treatise*'s conception of the *ālayavijñāna*, above all, is its systematic description in terms of the major categories of Abhidharma metapsychology. The *ālayavijñāna* functions (1) in terms of its cognitive objects (*ālambana*) and associated mental factors (*saṃprayukta-caitta*), making it a veritable *vijñāna* in the traditional epistemic sense;<sup>179</sup> and (2) in terms of the processes of mind with which it is simultaneous (*sahabhāva*) and reciprocally conditioning (*anyonya-pratyayatā*), i.e. the six arising cognitions and a new level of afflictive mentation, the *manas*. These developments elaborate in Abhidharmic terms the basic structure first presented in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*.

The *ālayavijñāna*'s epistemic objects consist of the external world and the so-called "inner appropriations" (*adhyātman upādāna*), much as in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. The implications which these objects, and their mutual relationship, carry for the *Yogācāra* theory of mind can hardly be overstated. The inner appropriation comprises the sense faculties and "the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated,"<sup>180</sup> the latter representing the cognitive and affective patterns, the dispositions and complexes built up over time from previous errant and afflicted experience and upon which the continual perpetuation of *saṃsāric* existence chiefly depends. These subtly influence the *ālayavijñāna*'s perception of the external world:

'the outward perception of the receptacle world whose aspects are undiscerned' (*bahirdhā-aparicchinākāra-bhājana-vijñapti*) refers to a continuous, uninterrupted perception of the continuity of the receptacle world based upon that very *ālayavijñāna* which has the inner appropriation as its object.<sup>181</sup>

This subliminal perception of the external world depends upon the sense faculties which directly sense the world as they are informed by the predispositions accumulated from the past (a process, in fact, which is not dissimilar to that of normal perception). In other words, this subliminal perception is based upon the *ālayavijñāna*'s inner sources of knowledge or information, as it were, which consist of the sedimented impressions or propensities instilled by past experience and by which the *ālayavijñāna* itself is ultimately formed. This is

illustrated by the analogy of the flame of a lamp which illuminates the external objects surrounding it on the basis of its wick and oil;<sup>182</sup> that is to say, cognition depends upon the material body and its mental or psychic fuel or substratum (*upādāna*).<sup>183</sup>

Both the cognitive processes and the epistemic objects of the *ālayavijñāna* are barely perceptible,<sup>184</sup> and thus do not overwhelm or obstruct those of the surface, functioning cognitions. In the *Pravṛtti Portion*, these processes are carried out by the five omnipresent mental factors associated with mind, which are also subtle and hard to perceive, entail no further karmic result and are of neutral feeling tone.<sup>185</sup> The *ālayavijñāna* is, therefore, compatible with all types of supraliminal processes,<sup>186</sup> since their respective epistemic objects, feeling tones and karmic nature are quite distinct;<sup>187</sup> it constitutes, in effect, a second, relatively independent stream of mind.<sup>188</sup> It is important to note, however, that even though the *ālayavijñāna* always has an object and functions homogeneously (*ekarasatva*) from birth to death,<sup>189</sup> it is not considered a singular entity<sup>190</sup> since it cognizes its objects from instant to instant and so flows in a continuous stream of moments (*kṣaṇika-srotaḥ-santāna-vartin*).<sup>191</sup>

The *ālayavijñāna* as portrayed here is a distinct *genre* of truly cognitive processes with three specific types of perceptual objects: (1) as a basal consciousness, it is deeply connected to bodily sensation and the material sense faculties; (2) as an evolving mind which grows and develops, built upon past experience, it retains various affective and cognitive dispositions and impressions; and, (3) based upon these first two, it dimly perceives the external world. This model of perception does not, in the main, deviate from widely accepted Buddhist formulas. All of it, though, takes place beneath the threshold of conscious awareness.

It is, however, the articulation of a fully interdependent relationship between the *ālayavijñāna* and the supraliminal arising cognitions that accomplishes the final reintegration of the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of *vijñāna*. This is achieved through extrapolating the Abhidharmic relations of simultaneity and mutual conditionality, previously reserved for *citta* and its mental factors (*caitta*), to the relationship between the two distinct processes of *vijñāna*, the

*ālayavijñāna* and the *pravṛtti-vijñāna*.<sup>192</sup> Elaborating on the model first presented in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the *Pravṛtti Portion* articulates both the simultaneous functioning (*sahabhāva-pravṛtti*) of and mutually conditioning interaction (*anyonya-pratyayatā-pravṛtti*) between the *supraliminal* and the *subliminal* processes of mind — a conceptual development necessary in order to describe both the distinctive diachronic and synchronic phenomena of mind and their inseparable interaction. It is also deeply congruent with the early notions expressed in the formula of dependent origination.

As we first observed in the formula of dependent origination, the presence of consciousness (*vijñāna*) animating the body is a prerequisite for any cognitive processes whatsoever; in more developed Abhidharma terms, *vijñāna* has appropriated (*upātta*) the body. In the same way, the *ālayavijñāna* “provides a support” (*āśraya-kara*) for the momentary sense cognitions inasmuch as it too appropriates the sense faculties upon which the first five sense cognitions are based, while it directly supports both the mental cognition (*manovijñāna*), the sixth, and the new level of afflictive mentation, the *manas*.<sup>193</sup> This underlying dimension of mind, the *ālayavijñāna*, conditions the supraliminal processes of cognition, moreover, by bearing the specific causal conditions, the seeds, for them to occur at all — for without the conditioning provided by past experience and actions and transmitted within the deep structure of mind (i.e. the *ālayavijñāna*), there would be no *saṃsāric* life in the first place, endowed with these specific modes of cognition and the affective dispositions which accompany them.

As also depicted in the formula of dependent origination, the momentary cognitive activities are themselves instrumental in conditioning future rebirth and the perpetuation of *saṃsāric* life. Similarly, in the *Yogācāra* scheme the momentary processes of mind instill the generative causal conditions, the seeds and predispositions, for further existence through increasing and fattening the seeds for their own future arising,<sup>194</sup> and, even more importantly, by creating the conditions for the continued reproduction of the *ālayavijñāna*, the virtual medium of individual *saṃsāric* existence, in the future.<sup>195</sup> The *ālayavijñāna* grows and matures conditioned by just these supraliminal

activities of mind and so bears not just the simple imprint of the formative influences of its own generative history, but the structures of mind created thereby, that is, the “seeds” and “impressions” or “pre-dispositions,” which are then capable of reproducing those same active processes.<sup>196</sup> The *ālayavijñāna* is thus depicted in terms of organic processes of growth and maturation constantly interacting with its environment by means of the diverse cognitive structures which have been built up (“heaped up”) or accumulated in the course of its own protracted development, and ultimately capable of producing the diverse fruits conditioned by these very processes — all reflecting the vegetative metaphors and analogies with which the whole system is largely described.

But this is not all. As we observed above, it is the afflictions accompanying actions which build up karmic potential and thus perpetuate the cycle of rebirth. And accounting for the persistence of these afflictions in a latent state until their final eradication far along the path also troubled Abhidharma thinkers. The *Pravṛtti Portion* develops upon the notion found in the *Proof Portion* of a distinct type of mind (*manas*) representing the subsistence of certain afflictions. It states that the *manas* which conceives “I-making” (*ahaṃkāra*) and the conceit “I am” (*asmimāna*) always occurs and functions simultaneously with the *ālayavijñāna*, which it takes as its object, thinking “[this is] I” (*aham iti*) and “I am [this]” (*asmīti*).<sup>197</sup> This type of mentation, moreover, is subliminal, since it occurs in higher meditative states without contradicting their wholesome karmic nature and it persists (until finally eradicated) accompanied at all times by the four afflictions which occur innately (*sahaja*): the view of self-existence (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*), the conceit “I am” (*asmimāna*), self-love (*ātmasneha*) and ignorance (*avidyā*).<sup>198</sup>

This new level of subliminal mentation is clearly conceived along the same lines, and for much the same reasons, as the *ālayavijñāna* itself. It addresses the incompatibility between the subsistence of latent dispositions until far along the path with the momentary occurrence of wholesome states. And, as with the *ālayavijñāna*, it describes an enduring, distinct, yet subliminal, locus of afflictive mentation capable of co-existing with the entire range of divergent supraliminal processes,



as a kind of continuous, unconscious self-centeredness. Like the *ālayavijñāna*, it represents not so much a departure from, as an explication of earlier notions.

*The 'kliṣṭa-manas' in the 'Mahāyānasamgraha' (MSg)*

It is the MSg, however, that fully systematizes the *kliṣṭa-manas* into the new model of mind, relying upon the same kinds of arguments adduced for the *ālayavijñāna*, a mixture of exegetical, systemic and logical reasonings. As discussed above in the *AKBh*, the MSg argues that there must be unobtrusive, subliminal afflictive mentation (*kliṣṭa-manas*),

because it is held that grasping to self (*ātmagrāha*) is present at all times, even in wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate states of mind. Otherwise, the affliction of the conceit "I am" (*asmimānakleśa*) would be present [only in unwholesome states] because it is associated only with unwholesome states of mind, but not in wholesome (*kuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) ones. Therefore, since [it] is present simultaneously but not present associated (*samprayukta*) [with *citta*], this fault is avoided.<sup>199</sup>

If there were not such unobtrusive mentation, Vasubandhu asks in his commentary to the MSg, "how would wholesome states such as giving, etc., occur since it is always associated with that [affliction]?"<sup>200</sup> Therefore, there must be some locus of afflictive mentation unassociated with *citta*, but which nonetheless subsists until higher stages upon the path<sup>201</sup> and allows for the compatibility between momentarily wholesome states and the continued subsistence of the afflictive dispositions.

The stages of its eradication also serves to differentiate the temporary wholesome states of ordinary wordlings from those who are more advanced on the path.<sup>202</sup> It is whether or not this level of afflictive mentation is present that the absorption of non-apperception is distinguished from that of cessation.<sup>203</sup> And without mentation like this, life in the realm of existence which corresponds to the absorption of non-apperception would be totally without the afflictions of self-view, etc., which would be tantamount to becoming an Aryan being.<sup>204</sup> Therefore, there must be a locus of afflictive mentation which is not associated with mind and thus karmically indeterminate, yet which

continuously subsists and serves as the ever-present basis or source for the occurrence of the afflictions themselves.

With this final level of subliminal afflictive mentation, the system of mind centered upon the *ālayavijñāna* is now complete. What this systematic description of mind delineates is a simultaneous and symbiotic relationship between the relatively unchanging, *subliminal* and the strictly momentary, *supraliminal* processes of mind. They are constantly interacting and conditioning each other in an internally dynamically structured mind which as a whole increases, develops and matures, explicating the energetic inertia and generative power of *saṃsāric*, habitual behavior patterns, together with all of their attendant metaphysical ramifications. We have at last fully redrawn the map of the mind, without, however, changing the territory. For all of this was ultimately developed upon, though much more explicitly delineated than, the earliest functions of *vijñāna* within the early discourses and the formula of dependent origination.

*Returning to the Source: The Defense of 'Ālayavijñāna' in the MSg*

Whereas the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions* are primarily descriptive, the MSg, like the *Proof Portion*, is largely a defense; it explicitly relates the *ālayavijñāna* to themes articulated within the older strata of Buddhist thought by adducing various *sūtra* and Abhidharmic texts and doctrines in support of both the *ālayavijñāna* and its accompanying level of afflictive mentation, the newly styled *kliṣṭa-manas*. The MSg thus serves as the capstone for the themes taken up in this essay, having provided the inspiration, the seed if you will, of its themes and structure.

The MSg discusses the role of the *ālayavijñāna* in the formula of dependent origination in two different fashions. It interprets the formula both as descriptive of simultaneous origination and as determinative of the various destinies in which sentient beings are born, that is, simultaneous conditioning and that which takes place sequentially.<sup>205</sup> The second refers to the more usual twelve-membered formula. The first distinguishes the *dharmas'* various characteristics (*svabhāva-vibhāgika*) inasmuch as they occur depending upon the

*ālayavijñāna*, since (according to the commentary) it is the *ālayavijñāna* that differentiates the natures of those defiled *dharmas*.<sup>206</sup> Within this momentary dependent origination the two kinds of *vijñāna*, the *ālayavijñāna* and the *pravṛtti-vijñānas*, are said to be reciprocally causal conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) of each other,<sup>207</sup> precisely articulating the major theme of this essay: the causal relations between these different aspects of *vijñāna*, especially as found in the formula of dependent origination.

The *MSg* and its commentaries also defend the *ālayavijñāna* by demonstrating how the various roles that *vijñāna* plays within the series of dependent origination cannot be accounted for by the intermittent and temporary functioning cognitions alone. First, none of the six transient types of cognition could serve as the *vijñāna* which is conditioned by the *saṃskāra* (*saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam*), and which in turn gives rise to name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), since they arise only momentarily and are intermittent.<sup>208</sup> The point is that the *saṃskārā*, virtually all intentional activities, condition *vijñāna*, according to the *Yogācāra*, by infusing it with the impressions and seeds of those actions;<sup>209</sup> the functioning cognitions cannot receive, retain or transmit such impressions or seeds. Similarly, existence conditioned by appropriation (*upādāna-pratyayo bhavaḥ*) would also be impossible without that same type of subsisting *vijñāna*.<sup>210</sup>

The doctrine found in the early *sūtras* that *vijñāna* and name-and-form are mutually conditioning would also be impossible without the *ālayavijñāna*, according to the *MSg* and its commentaries. Assuming that this implies a constant, simultaneous interdependence, the *Upanibandhana* states that since “name” comprises the four non-material aggregates and “form” the embryo (*kalala*), the *vijñāna* which is the condition and support of these in a constant stream from moment to moment must be none other than the *ālayavijñāna*, for if the *vijñāna* found within the “name” elements refers to the functioning cognitions, what then, the commentary asks, would the *vijñāna* which conditions it stand for?<sup>211</sup> Though this is not a likely rationale for the introduction of the *ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen warns, it does provide, he says (176, very suggestive of Kuhn), “a more elegant solution” to the relationship between the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of

*vijñāna* within the formula of dependent origination, represented by *vijñāna* and name-and-form, respectively.<sup>212</sup>

The further notion, found throughout the early discourses, of *vijñāna* as a sustenance or nourishment (*vijñānāhāra*) of life also lends credence to a type of mind such as the *ālayavijñāna*, since, according to Vasubandhu, this *vijñāna*-sustenance is what appropriates the body and thus prevents it from decaying and putrifying.<sup>213</sup>

The *MSg* also cites several concepts proffered by various Abhidharma schools, which we have mentioned briefly above, claiming that these schools are in fact teaching the *ālayavijñāna* by different names (*pariyāya*), i.e., the root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) of the *Mahāsaṃghikas*, the aggregate that lasts as long as *saṃsāra* (*āsaṃsārikaskandha*) of the *Mahīśāsakas*, and the *bhavaṅga* of the *Sthaviravādins*, the present-day Theravādins.<sup>214</sup> Except for the *bhavaṅga-citta*, we lack sufficient historical materials to make any extended systematic comparison. Suffice to say that, as we have discussed at some length above, these concepts respond to the same general problematics within which the *ālayavijñāna* is also largely situated.

Finally, the *MSg* argues for a multi-layered model of mind on the grounds that the gradual process of purification, in which some of the causal conditions, the seeds, of defiled *dharmas* remain even after their purification has begun, would otherwise be unintelligible:

When the mind which counteracts the afflictions (*kleśa-pratipakṣa-vijñāna*) has arisen, all the other mundane cognitions (*laukika-vijñāna*) have ceased. It is not possible that the counteracting mind could, without the *ālayavijñāna*, possess the seeds of the afflictions and the secondary afflictions because it is liberated by nature (*svabhāva-vimukta*) and does not arise and cease simultaneously with the afflictions \*and secondary afflictions. If there were no *ālayavijñāna*, then when a mundane cognition arises later, it would arise from what is without seeds, since the impression together with its support (*sāśrayam*) is non-existent, having long since passed away.<sup>215</sup>

If there were no mind with all the seeds, this would entail the further consequence that when a supramundane moment of mind occurs in the Formless Realm, the other mundane *cittas* would be non-existent, that is, as the commentary points out, “when the counteractant (*pratipakṣa*) is present, then since all of the counteracted

(*vipakṣa*) have ceased, *nirvāṇa* without remainder (*nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa*) would be attained naturally and without effort."<sup>216</sup>

But when the concept of the *ālayavijñāna* which contains all the seeds is accepted, the gradual process of purification and eradication of the accumulated results of karma and the embedded dispositions is coherent; and eventually the resultant consciousness is made absolutely seedless,<sup>217</sup> like the *vijñāna* found in the early Pāli texts. This process, however, takes place at a level far deeper and more profound than that of the momentary and intermittent cognitive modes.

### CONCLUSION

The mass of materials, often mutually contradictory, treating the *ālayavijñāna* and its related concepts is weltering indeed, as Schmithausen's work (1987) has so radically demonstrated. One hesitates to make general statements about the *ālayavijñāna* without qualifying each one "in this text," or even "in this section of this text." In the wake of this well-advised circumspection,<sup>218</sup> however, the significance and import of such a complex concept as the *ālayavijñāna* remains elusive. This essay, as indicated in the introduction, is an attempt to interpret the *ālayavijñāna* through contextualizing it in relation to its canonical antecedents and Abhidharma contemporaries.<sup>219</sup>

The fully elaborated *ālayavijñāna* system, (i.e. the eight modes of *vijñāna*, their respective functions, interrelations and various synonyms) accomplished what the other Abhidharma innovations failed to do: it provided in one fell swoop the keystone *dharma* capable of addressing the numerous conundrums created by the doctrine of momentariness through explicitly delineating and ultimately reuniting the diverse and disparate functions of the canonical notion of *vijñāna* within the context of the new Abhidharmic analytic. Throughout the corpus of texts describing the *ālayavijñāna*, it is explicitly argued that, in contrast to the six modes of intermittent and discrete 'cognitive' *vijñāna*, only the constant and relatively homogeneous "*ālaya*" *vijñāna* is able to perform the following roles either traditionally associated with *vijñāna* or newly distinguished within the Abhidharma milieu:

(1) It is the "*ālaya*" *vijñāna* that stations itself and grows and develops within *saṃsāric* existence;

(2) and conversely, whose purification, destruction and cessation is coterminous with the end of *saṃsāra*.

(3) The *ālayavijñāna* is the principle of animate existence conditioned by the past *saṃskāras*,

(4) which brings about rebirth through developing within the mother's womb,<sup>220</sup>

(5) and thereafter sustains the body throughout one's lifetime by continuously appropriating it,<sup>221</sup>

(6) even during states otherwise devoid of conscious activity.<sup>222</sup>

(7) As the product of such *saṃskāras*, the *ālayavijñāna* is a resultant state (*vipākā*), and so *karmically* neutral and compatible with any of the supraliminal states of mind and all kinds of seeds, permitting heterogeneous succession between them.<sup>223</sup>

(8) The *ālayavijñāna* constitutes a distinctive, continuous<sup>224</sup> and subliminal<sup>225</sup>

(9) nexus of karmic potential<sup>226</sup> (*bīja*) and, in the closely related concept of "afflictive mentation" (*kliṣṭa-manas*), of persisting latent afflictions.

(10) Similar to that discernable within the early series of dependent origination, the *ālayavijñāna* and the supraliminal, cognitive activities of mind are mutually the cause and effect of each other,

(11) for the *ālayavijñāna* *simultaneously* supports, influences and interacts with, the active cognitive modes,

(12) while they in turn simultaneously infuse "seeds" and "impressions" (*vāsanā*) upon or into it.

(13) And last, its various functions and its relations with the supraliminal arising cognitions is described in terms of the momentary *citta/caitta dharma* analysis and thus significantly integrated into the Abhidharma system of causes, conditions and fruits.<sup>227</sup>

In short, the *ālayavijñāna* brings together and articulates within a single, unifying, synthetic conception of mind<sup>228</sup> those diverse aspects of *vijñāna* first found commingled in the canonical doctrines and later bifurcated, and thus rendered problematic, within Abhidharma doctrine.<sup>229</sup>

The *ālayavijñāna* complex delineates a continuous, interactive and dynamic relationship between the subliminal level of mind, with all its

accumulated habits, experiences and knowledge, and the supraliminal level of ordinary perceptual and cognitive processes. Seen within the context of the problematics between continuity and momentariness *as a whole*, the *ālayavijñāna* is simply the most comprehensive attempt of all the concepts proffered<sup>230</sup> to articulate a fully multi-tiered model of mind systematically integrated into and expressed in terms of the *Abhidharmic* analytic.

What was synthesized, in short, was the diachronic karmic relationship of cause and effect (*hetu-phala*) (represented by the seeds and, more indirectly, by the latent dispositions) with the notion of simultaneity. Karma now has a niche carved out for itself within the synchronic analysis of momentary processes of mind and is no longer bedeviled by questions of temporality, because the seed-support (*bijāśraya*) as the *hetu-pratyaya*, the causal condition,<sup>231</sup> exists simultaneously with the supraliminal active states of mind. The mind which has all the seeds represents then the totality of karma, of causal conditioning, subsisting within, indeed virtually constituting, the mental stream, and thereby supporting all of its intermittent and momentary cognitive and affective processes. In this fashion, the *ālayavijñāna* system provided for a more coherent theory of knowledge, memory, and apperception based upon the continuing influence of past experience symbolized by the seeds of karma and the growth and persistence of the latent afflictions. For the ingrained habits, inborn dispositions and accumulated experiences of the past may now play their essential role in influencing and informing the momentary functions of mind, without which ordinary knowledge, memory, even perception, would all be simply unintelligible.

Every moment of purposeful activity creates impressions which are indelibly imprinted upon the receptive, subliminal level of mind; likewise, the accumulated results of these experiences and impressions in turn provide, through the medium of such a constructed and impressed mind, the basis and support for the continued re-production of these very activities, influencing and conditioning them in what is, at bottom, a continuous feedback process. Fattening the seeds<sup>232</sup> until they reach fruition, increasing the impressions or propensities (lit. perfumations; *vāsanā*), the growth and development of *vijñāna* — all these vegetative metaphors point to a dynamic relationship in which

the two distinct dimensions of *vijñāna* are inseparably interactive, expressing a constructive synergy that supercedes and animates the simple metaphors of seeds, storage, and substratum, upon which it is all based. This is just to say that the living processes of body and mind occur under the sway of karma.

Articulating such a “dual layered” model of mind, the *ālayavijñāna* also represents probably the first systematic concept of an unconscious realm of mental activity radically differentiated from conscious mind, expressing and articulating the deep and ancient Indian insight that, as Eliade (1973: xvii) states,

the great obstacles to the ascetic and contemplative life arose from the activity of the unconscious, from the *saṃskāras* and the *vāsanās* — ‘impregnations,’ ‘residues,’ ‘latencies,’ — that constitutes what depth psychology calls the contents and structures of the unconscious.

By synthesizing the traditional, canonical conceptions of *vijñāna* with the newer *Abhidharmic* framework, the *ālayavijñāna* system generated a powerful new conception of mind, in all of its depth and diversity, for the *ālayavijñāna* expresses deep truths about the human condition, about our capacity to understand and to work with what we are — and what we are not. It indicates that the real obstacles to self-understanding and self-control, and the concerted efforts to develop them within our deeply implicated relationships with others, depends upon an appreciation of the continuing influence of past experiences without reference to which even the most mundane activity is ultimately unintelligible. Any attempt to direct our energies in such a deliberate fashion must take into account not only the effects of past cognitive and affective conditioning, but must also recognize this conditioning as a self-perpetuating energy actualizing in each instant. It is this understanding of what and who we are and do, moment to moment, that the *ālayavijñāna* attempts to conceptualize and articulate; and this is the unfathomable ground of being.

And it is unfathomable because ultimately the *ālayavijñāna* is built around or upon the metaphor of the seeds, of containing or storing the seeds, and even though it superseded these metaphors in its dynamic depth psychology, yet the ambiguity, the resonance, of its initiating metaphor remains. For the seeds are hard to get at; they are

not experiential data. They represent a temporal relation between cause and effect, a *karmic* relation, and as such are not real existents; yet they continue to exert causal influences through the conditioned structures of knowing and feeling, the propensities and dispositions built up by beginningless past experience. The seeds and the dispositions represent relationships and tendencies which cannot be expressed *Adhidharmically*, but only through metaphors or merely conventional or nominal expressions. Seeds then are simply ciphers, empty significations for unfathomable relations, in place of whose explication Vasubandhu constantly evokes secret “special powers” (*śakti-viśeṣa*).<sup>233</sup>

But a cipher is just a place holder whose main function is to be empty, a mathematical “zero” (*śūnya* in Sanskrit). But this zero, this cipher in the place of, or rather signifying, an in-principle specifiable cause and effect relation,<sup>234</sup> is neither ontological nor logical, but primarily psychological. The seeds are part and parcel of the mental stream, where the unfathomable realm of karma functions moment to moment within the manifold processes of mind.

But if the seeds are merely ciphers, place-holders for the unknowable relations of cause and effect, what then is the *ālayavijñāna* inasmuch as it preserves all the seeds? It too then represents everything that goes on outside of the conscious mind, inaccessible to introspective analysis, but without whose basis, or at least the inference of such, no mental processes make any sense whatsoever.

So at another level, the *Yogācāra* interpretation of emptiness is that of the ultimate interdependence of mental processes, in flux between the known and the knower, conditioned by all past knowing. And this entire process is unthinkable without the basis of unknown knowing, which is the cipher of knowledge, the basis containing seeds, a mere metaphor of causal relation.

In this way, the epistemological inquiry of the *Yogācārins* led to an understanding of emptiness, of dependent origination, within the direct psychological processes of knowing, for actual knowing is itself based upon unknown relationships, on metaphorical, invisible, inferential yet inescapable, causal relations. But by saving this place for the preunderstandings of knowledge and experience, the *Yogācārins* have saved the explanatory project as a whole. The mind, knowing, and causal

relations in the world, can all be treated just as common sense dictates, just as the doctrinal tradition evolved with all its complexities requires, only now the whole project is based, epistemologically as well as ontologically, on emptiness, on utterly interdependent phenomena whose bottom line, which is the completely contingent and unfathomable basis of knowledge and being, cannot be got at. As the verse at the tail end of the *AKBh* IX warns: “Nobody but the Buddha understands in its entirety action (*karma*), its infusion, its activity and the fruit that is obtained.”<sup>235</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>149</sup> As is, of course, its integration with *citta-mātra* and the rest of the *Yogācāra* tradition, which is beyond the scope of this essay. It seems, however, that the *genesis* of the *ālayavijñāna* has no intrinsic relationship with *viññapti-mātra* thought and that it is as equally compatible with the more traditional ontology as with that of the *Yogācāra* (Schmithausen, 1987: 32–3). This is certainly so for the *Yogācārabhūmi*: “Most parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* . . . presuppose, more or less explicitly, the traditional ontology according to which dharmas (including material ones) are really existent, though impermanent and devoid of Self or Person,” *ibid.*, n. 221, p. 297; see also 64, 89, 99, 203f. Moreover, while the *ālayavijñāna* is cited in support of *citta-mātra*, the reverse is not found, i.e. *citta-mātra* is not, to my knowledge, called upon in any of the standard “proofs” or demonstrations asserting the *ālayavijñāna*.

<sup>150</sup> “The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis” (Kuhn, 1970: 75).

<sup>151</sup> The possible textual references to this section are much too numerous to cite fully and would in any case, given the *ālayavijñāna*’s long development, always inevitably be only partial. My aim here is only to outline the general development and central aspects of the *ālayavijñāna*. In addition to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the treatises most extensively discussing the *ālayavijñāna* include the following: the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of which several key portions found in the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*, the so-called (following Schmithausen’s nomenclature) *Proof Portion* (see Hakamaya, 1978, and Griffiths, 1986) and the *Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti Portions* (see Hakamaya, 1979); the *MSg* (*MSg-L*, *MSg-N*); *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*; the *Triṃśikā-bhāṣyam*; the later compilation of Hsüan Tsang, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, (*Siddhi*) also treats the *ālayavijñāna* extensively and more systematically from a slightly later, more developed, period.

Where the Sanskrit texts are no longer extant and thus absent in the notes, we have relied upon their Tibetan and Chinese translations. Since the Sanskrit terms found therein are all reconstructions, the usual asterisk has been dispensed with. I have utilized the most plausible suggestions for these terms found in the relevant studies, viz. in Hakamaya (1978, 1979); Lamotte (1935, *MSg-L*); Nagao (*MSg-N*); and Schmithausen (1978).

<sup>152</sup> Schmithausen has stratified this text primarily according to its doctrinal content, dividing it into “pre-*ālayavijñāna*” sections, sections that sporadically refer to the *ālayavijñāna*, and those which quote from and thus post-date the *Samdhinirmocana*

*Sūtra*. Schmithausen (1987: 12–14); on *Asaṅga*'s relationship to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as author, editor or redactor, see Schmithausen (1987: 183f).

<sup>153</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi* manuscript 78b5 (Y-T dži 172a6–8; Y-C 240c27ff): *nirodhaṃ samāpannasya cittacaitasikā niruddhā bhavanti / kathaṃ vijñānaṃ kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavati / tasya hi rūpīśv indriye <sv a> parīṇateṣu pravṛttivijñāna-bijaparigrhītaṃ ālayavijñānaṃ anuparataṃ bhavati āyatyāṃ tadutpattidharmatāya*. Schmithausen (1987: 18, n. 146).

<sup>154</sup> These terms clearly distinguish between *vijñāna* as an abiding, indeterminate sentience and an active cognitive process, a distinction that several observant scholars of the Pāli materials have noted: Wijesekera (1964: 254f), interprets '*uppajjati*', 'to arise', and when used with '*vijñāna*' to mean 'begin to function' in relation to a specific sense-organ, and Thomas (1935: 104) suggests that *vijñāna* "manifests itself through the six sense organs."

The term '*ālaya*' has two basic meanings, which fortuitously combine in this concept: *ālaya* is a nominal form composed of the prefix '*ā*' 'near to, towards' with the verbal root '*li*', 'to cling or press closely, stick or adhere to, to lie, recline, alight or settle upon, hide or cower down in, disappear, vanish'. '*Ālaya*' thus means 'that which is clung to, adhered to, dwelled in, etc.', thus 'dwelling, receptacle, house, etc.' as well as an older meaning found within the early Pāli materials of 'clinging, attachment or grasping' (SED: 154, PED: 109). See also Schmithausen (1987: 24; 275, n. 137; 294, ns. 202–3). See *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, V. 3; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 33; *ASBh*, 11, 9; *MSg* I.3, I.11a; *TRBh* 18, 24–26; *Siddhi* 92; Schmithausen (1987: 275, n. 137; 294, n. 202g).

<sup>155</sup> S III 143; M I 296; *AKBh* I 28c–d; II 45a–b; Schmithausen (1987: 20f).

<sup>156</sup> As Schmithausen (1987: 30) observes, what this concept does here is "hypostatize the Seeds of mind lying hidden in corporeal matter to a new form of mind proper." See Schmithausen (18–33) for more extensive treatment of this necessarily greatly abbreviated account.

<sup>157</sup> *sarvabījakam cittam vipacyate sammūreccati vṛddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vipulatām āpadyate*. Tib.: *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems nram par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro*. Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 356, n. 508). This closely parallels passages found in canonical texts examined above; S III 53, D III 228: *viññānaṃ . . . viddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vepullam āpajjeyya*. Also noted above (n. 11), this expression is used in an analogy between seeds and *vijñāna* in S III 54. See also notes 73, 80, 90.

The use of '*sarvabījakam cittam*' as a synonym of the *ālayavijñāna* is also found in *MSg* I.2: "The consciousness (*vijñāna*) containing all the seeds in the receptacle (*ālaya*) of all *dharma*s. Therefore it is called the *ālayavijñāna*." Also *ASBh*: 11.

<sup>158</sup> *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, V.2. '*gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gang dang gang dag sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du . . . mngal nas skye ba . . . 'i skye gnas su lus mngon par 'grub cing 'byung bar 'gyur ba der dang por 'di ltar len pa nram pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang / mshan ma dang ming dang nram par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags len pa la rten nas / sa bon thams cad pa'i sems nram par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro // de la gzugs can gyi kham na ni len pa gnyi ga yod la / gzugs can ma yin pa'i kham na ni len pa gnyis su med do* / This notion of a two-fold appropriation is elaborated in later parts of the *Pravṛtti Portion* (I.b A.1) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and in the *Trīṃśikābhāṣya*, 19.7f, 18f., where it is styled the 'inner appropriation' (*ādhyātman upādānam*).

<sup>159</sup> *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, V.3. *nram par shes pa de ni len pa'i nram par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / 'di ltar des lus 'di bzung zhing blangs pa'i phyir ro // kun gzhi nram par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / 'di ltar de lus 'di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis kun tu shyor ba dang rab tu shyor bar byed pa'i phyir ro // sems zhes kyang bya ste / 'di ltar de ni gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg bya dung chos [rnam kyis] kun tu bsags pa dang nye bar bsags yin pa'i phyir ro /* (Emendation by Lamotte).

We observed the 'etymology' of the term '*ālaya*' above. The other attribute of this type of *vijñāna*, '*ādāna*', is virtually synonymous with '*upādāna*', whose functions it clearly performs.

The etymology for '*citta*' is based upon the similarity of the term '*cita*', 'accumulated', with '*citta*', 'thought, mind', derived from the verbal root, '*ci*', 'to observe, understand, think'. The terms '*ācita*' and '*cita*', deriving from the verbal root '*ci*' and '*āci*', 'to accumulate, to heap up', simply mean 'heaped up, accumulated'. This explanation is found in the *AKBh* as well (*AKBh* II 34a): "It is *citta* because it accumulates . . . because it is heaped up with pure and impure elements" (*cinoti iti cittam . . . citam śubhāśubhair dhātubhair iti cittam*). Yaśomitra adds that the *Sautrāntikas* or the *Yogācāras* consider it *citta* because it is imbued with the impressions (*vāsanā*) (*Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed., 208: *vāsanāsanniveśayogena sautrāntikamatena, yogācāramatena vā*). Also *AKBh* I 16a; *MSg* I.6, 9; *TRBh* 3.2; Pāli passages touching on the meaning of *citta* include: D I 21, S II 95; *Visuddhimagga* II 452; see also *MSg*-L 4; *MSg*-N 92. Nagao (*MSg*-N 110) rightfully calls this a 'folk etymology'.

<sup>160</sup> *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* V.4–5. *len pa'i nram par shes pa de la rien cing gnas nas nram par shes pa'i tshogs drug po 'di . . . 'byung ngo // de la nram par shes pa dang bcas pa'i mig dang gzugs rnam la rien nas / mig gi nram par shes pa 'byung ste / mig gi nram par shes pa [de dang lhan cig rjes su 'jug pa dus mshungs pa spyod yul mshungs pa nram par rtog pa'i yid kyi nram par shes pa 'ang 'byung ngo] // . . . len pa'i nram par shes pa de la rien cing gnas mas / gal te mig gi nram par shes pa gcig lan cig 'byung ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na 'ang mig gi nram par shes pa gcig kho na lan cig 'byung ngo // gal te nram par shes pa'i tshogs lnga car gyi bar dag lan cig 'byung ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na 'ang nram par shes pa'i tshogs lnga car lan cig 'byung ngo //* (Emendations by Lamotte). The Sanskrit for much of this passage appears in a quote from this *sūtra* at *TRBh* 33.25–34.

<sup>161</sup> Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 385, n. 629) based upon the Chinese and Tibetan versions and consistent with *TBh* 21.11, *kārika* 3a: *asaṃviditaka-upādhi-sthāna-vijñaptikam ca tat*.

<sup>162</sup> *ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūksmo ogho yathā varuṇī sarvabījo / bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśī mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ* // Also found in *MSg* I.4; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 32; *TBh* 34; *Siddhi* 173.

<sup>163</sup> We shall follow Schmithausen's (1987: 299, n. 226) terminology here, except that I have emended his "*VinSg ālay. Treatise*" to simply "*Ālaya Treatise*." Although the section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which these texts are found are no longer extant in their original Sanskrit, a nearly identical version of the *Proof Portion* is found in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (*ASBh*). It has been studied and translated into Japanese in Hakamaya (1978) and English in Griffiths (1986).

<sup>164</sup> Consistent with the aim and method of Schmithausen's major work he has analyzed the eight arguments or 'proofs' into four distinct strata based upon the conceptual development of and *ālayavijñāna* relative to other texts, specifically the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (within which the *Initial Passage* is found), the

*Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, and the *Ālaya Treatise* within the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. (1987: 194–6). The first strata comprises the 'somatic functions' in Proofs #1 (appropriation of the basis), #6 (the multiplicity of bodily experience), #7 (the mindless, *ācittaka*, absorptions), and #8 (the gradual exiting of *viññāna* from the body at death) and substantially agrees with the conception of the *ālayavijñāna* found in the *Basic Section*, prior to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. Likewise for the second strata, consisting of Proof #4, the possibility of mutual seeding. In these sections, the continuity of the *ālayavijñāna* is "not expressly stated, but it is unequivocally presupposed." (45). The third layer, Proof #2 on simultaneous functioning of the arising cognitions and Proof #3 on clear functioning of *manovijñāna*, presupposes the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* and is "decisively advanced over the situation met with in *Basic Section*" (195). The fourth layer is simply the fifth proof, the various functions (*karma*) of cognition, where "the concept of the *ālayavijñāna* as an actual perception goes not only beyond the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* but even beyond *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* V and, as regards preception of one's corporeal basis, even beyond the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* as a whole. Hence, and also in view of the fact that it obviously presupposes the new *manas* . . . proof V represents rather a stage of development quite close to the *Pravṛtti Portion*" (196).

<sup>165</sup> *Proof Portion*, 1a. "the *ālayavijñāna* has past *saṃskāras* as its cause, while the arising cognitions, visual, etc., have present conditions as their cause. As it is taught in detail: 'the arising of the cognitions comes about due to the sense-faculties, the sense-fields and attention'. This is the first reason. (b) Moreover, the six cognition groups are experienced as wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c) Also, none of the kinds of the six cognition groups are considered to be included in indeterminate resultant states. This is the third reason. (d) Also, the six cognition groups occur each possessing a specific basis. Of these, it is not right to say that whatever cognition occurs with such and such a basis would appropriate only that [basis] while the remaining ones are unappropriated; nor is it right [that they are] appropriated, being without an [appropriating] cognition. This is the fourth reason. And there follows the fault of appropriating the basis again and again. For instance, sometimes a visual cognition occurs and sometimes it does not occur; similarly for the remaining [cognitions]. This is the fifth reason." (ASBh: 12, 2f: *ālayavijñānam pūrva-saṃskāra-hetukam / cakṣur-ādi-pravṛtti-vijñānam punar vartamāna-pratyaya-hetukam / yathôktam — indriya-viśaya-manaskāra-vaśād vijñānānam pravṛtti bhavati iti vistareṇa / idam prathamam kāraṇam / (b) api ca kuśālakuśalāḥ śaḍ vijñāna-kāya upalabhyante / idam dvitīyam kāraṇam / (c) api ca saṇṇam vijñāna-kāyānam sū jātir nōpalabhyante yā 'vyākṛta-vipāka-saṃgrhīṭā syāt / idam tṛtīyam kāraṇam / (d) api ca pratīyatiśrayāḥ śaḍ vijñāna-kāyāḥ pravartante, tatra yena yena āśrayeṇa yad vijñānam pravartate tad eva tenōpāttaṃ syād avaśiṣṭasya anupātata iti na yujyate, upātata api na yujyate vijñāna-virahitayā / idam caturtham kāraṇam / (e) api ca punaḥ punar āśrayōpādāna-doṣaḥ prasajyate / tathā hi cakṣur-vijñānam ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate evam avaśiṣṭāni / idam pañcamam kāraṇam /*)

<sup>166</sup> MSg I.23 discusses this point in more detail: "There is infusing in what is stable, indeterminate, infusable and connected with infusing, not in another. This is the characteristic of impression (*vāsanā-lakṣaṇa*). [The *vāsanā* are infused in the *ālayavijñāna* and not in the six cognitive modes] because the six cognitions are not connected (*sambandha*) [to each other] and there is dissimilarity between their three distinctive aspects [i.e. their supports (*āśraya*), objects (*ālambana*) and attention

(*manaskāra*)] because two [succeeding] moments [of cognition] are not simultaneous [and so cannot infuse each other]." (*bṛtan lung ma bstan bsgo bya ba / sgo bar byed dang 'brel pa la / sgo byed de las gzhan ni min / de ni bag chags mshan nyid do / drug po dag la 'brel med de / tha dad gsum dang 'gal ba'i phyir / skad cig lhan cig med pa'i phyir /*)

<sup>167</sup> Proof #4. "For what reason is it impossible for the six cognition groups to be each other's seeds? Because an unwholesome [*dharmā*] occurs immediately after a wholesome one, a wholesome one immediately after an unwholesome one, an indeterminate one immediately after both of these. . . . These [six cognitions] cannot properly be seeds [of each other] in this way. Moreover, the mental stream occurs after a long time, having long been cut; for this reason too [the mutual seeding of the six cognitions] is not tenable." (*kena kāraṇeṇa bijatvaṃ na sambhavati saṇṇam vijñānakāyānam anyonyam / tathā hi kuśālānantaram akuśalam utpadyate, akuśālānantaram kuśalam, tadubhayānantaram avyākṛtam . . . na ca teṣāṃ tathā bijatvaṃ yujyate / dirghakāla samucchinna api ca saṇṭāṭiṣ cireṇa kālena pravartate, tasmād api na yujyate /*)

<sup>168</sup> ASBh Proof 2a: "because two cognitions actually do function simultaneously. Why is that? Because it is not correct that the cognitions of one who simultaneously desires to see [etc.], up to desires to know, occur one after the other from the beginning, because in that case [there would be] no distinction between attention, the sense faculties and the sense-fields [of each respective cognition]. (*tathā hi bhavaty eva dvayor vijñānayor yugapat pravṛtīḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hy ekatyasya yugapat draṣṭu-kāmasya yāvad vijñātu-kāmasya ādita itaretara-vijñāna-pravṛtīr na yujyate tathā hi tatra manaskāro 'pi nirviśiṣṭā indriyam api viśayo 'pi /*)

Proof 6: For what reason would bodily experience be impossible if there were no *ālayavijñāna*? . . . the bodily experiences which occur in the body could not be manifold. But [they] are experienced [as manifold]. For this reason too there is an *ālayavijñāna*. (*kena kāraṇeṇasaty ālayavijñāne kāyiko 'nubhavo na yujyate / . . . kāye kāyānubhavā utpadyante 'nekavidhā bahunānaprakārās te na bhavyur upalabhyante ca / tasmād apy asty ālayavijñānam /*)

Nor, in fact, can the *manovijñāna*, the mental cognition which 'perceives' *dharmas* and the other cognitive processes, function clearly if it were not simultaneous with them (ASBh Proof 3): "For what reason is clarity of the mental cognition which follows upon visual cognition, etc., not possible if there is no simultaneous functioning of the cognitions? Because, when one remembers an object which has been perceived in the past, then the mental cognition which takes place is unclear, but the mind which takes place in regard to a present object is not unclear in this way. Thus, either the simultaneous occurrence [of the cognitions] is correct of [there is] lack of clarity of the mental cognition." (*kena kāraṇeṇa astyāṃ yugapat vijñānapravṛtau manovijñānasya cakṣurādīvijñāna-sahānucarasya spāṣṭatvaṃ na sambhavati / tathāhi yasmin samaye 'tītam anubhūtam viśayam samanūsmarati tasmin samaye 'vispaṣṭo manovijñāna-pracāro bhavati na tu tathā vartamāna-viśayo manah-pracāro 'vispaṣṭo bhavati / ato 'pi yugapat pravṛtīr vā yujyate 'vispaṣṭatvaṃ vā manovijñānasya /*) Proof #5 below also rests upon the multi-faceted nature of experience as an argument for the *ālayavijñāna*.

<sup>169</sup> ASBh Proof 5. *caturvidham karma — bhājana-vijñaptir āśraya-vijñaptir aham iti vijñaptir viśaya-vijñaptiḥ ca iti / etā vijñaptayah kṣane kṣane yugapat pravartamānā upalabhyante / na ca ekasya vijñānasya ekasmin kṣane idam evam-rūpaṃ vyatibhinnaṃ karma yujyate /*

<sup>170</sup> S III 131 speaks of the "subtle remnant of the conceit 'I am', of the desire 'I am',



of the disposition toward 'I am', still not removed [from the Ariyan disciple]."  
(*anusahagato asmīti māno asmīti chando asmīti anusayo usamūhato*). A I 133 and M I 47 describes the final eradication of these tendencies in those who are liberated and have acquired perfect view. See notes 10, 11, 39, above.

<sup>171</sup> *Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa-vaibhāṣya*, by Sthiramati: "The causes of *samsāra* are karma and *kleśa*; of these two, the *kleśa* are foremost . . . even the action (*karma*) which has projected rebirth (*punar-bhava*) will not produce rebirth if there is no *kleśa* . . . because they are foremost the *kleśas* are the root of origination." (Tib. Peking # 5567 Hi 52b3—6: 'khor ba'i rgyu ni las dang nyon mongs pa rnam so // de gnyis las kyang nyon mongs pa ni gtso bo ste / . . . yang srid ba 'phangs pa'i las kyang nyon mongs pa med na yang srid pa 'byung bar mi 'gyur te / . . . de ltar na gtso bo yin pa'i phyir nyon mongs nyid mgon par 'jug pa'i rtsa ba ste /)

<sup>172</sup> ASBh 11.1. *āliyaṇte tasmin dharmā bijataḥ, sattvā vā āmagrāheṇa iti ālayavijñānam*.

<sup>173</sup> AKBh ad I 39a—b: *ahanākāra sannīśrayatvāc cūttam 'ātmā' ity upacaryate*. See Schmithausen (1987: 55, n. 386).

<sup>174</sup> 5.b) A.1. *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni / mdor na kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin no // 'di ltar de ni sems can gyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yin te / dbang po rten dang bcas pa rnam dang / 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam skyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro // D.7a2f; P.8a4f; T.30.581a25f, 1010a13f.*

<sup>175</sup> 5.b) A.2. *snod kyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yang yin te / snod kyi 'jig rten skyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro // ibid. D.7a2f; P.8a4f; T.30.581a25f, 1020a13f.*

<sup>176</sup> 5.b) C.2.(c) *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnam kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu. D.8a5f; P.9b5f; T.30.581c12f, 1020b15f.*

Therefore it is also the nature of the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkha-satya*) and what brings about the Truth of the Origin (of suffering) (*samudaya-satya*) in this life, and it is also what brings about the Truth of Suffering in the future. 5.b) A.4 *de ltar na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de nyid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir da ltar gyi dus na sdug bsngal gyi bden pa'i rang bzhin dang / ma 'ongs pa'i dus na sdug bsngal gyi bden pa skyed par byed pa dang / da ltar gyi dus nyid ni kun 'byung ba'i bden pa skyed par byed pa'ang yin no // D.7a5f; P.8a6f; T.30.581b5f, 1020a20f.*

<sup>177</sup> *Nivṛtti Portion* 5.b) B.1: "One should understand that the *ālayavijñāna* which is the root of the defilements (*samkleśamūla*) ceases (*vinivṛtta*) through the cultivation of wholesome *dharmas* like this." (*kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rtsa ba kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de ni 'di ltar dge ba'i chos bsgoms pas rnam par ldog par rig par bya'o*.) D.7b5; P.9a4; T.30.581b22f, 1020a28f.

<sup>178</sup> 5.b) C.1. "As soon as the basis is revolved, the *ālayavijñāna* must be said to have been abandoned (*prahīṇa*); because it has been abandoned, it must be said that all the defilements have also been abandoned. (5.b) C.2.) One should know that the revolution of the basis conflicts with and so counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) the *ālayavijñāna*. [From Chinese (T.30.581c8); Tib. reads: "one should know that the basis, which is the *ālayavijñāna*, is revolved by [its] enemy."] (a) The *ālayavijñāna* is impermanent and accompanied by appropriation (*sopādāna*), while the resolved basis is permanent and without appropriation because it is transformed by the path which takes true reality as its object. (b) the *ālayavijñāna* is accompanied by spiritual corruption (*dausthulya*), while the revolved basis is forever removed from all corruption. (c) The *ālayavijñāna* is the cause of the continuance of the afflictions (*kleśa-pravṛtti-hetu*) . . . while the revolved basis is not the cause of the continuance of the afflictions . . . (5.b) C.3.) As for the characteristic of the elimination (*prahāṇa*) of the *ālayavijñāna*, as soon as it is

eliminated the two aspects of appropriation are abandoned and the body remains like an apparition (*nirmāṇa*). [Ch. adds: Why is that?] Because the cause which makes suffering occur again in the future has been abandoned, the appropriation which creates rebirth (*punarbhava*) in the future is eliminated. Because all the causes of defilements (*samkleśa*) in this life have been abandoned, the appropriation of the basis of all the defilements in this life is eliminated. [From Ch. (T.581c21); Tib. reads: "all the spiritual corruptions of the defilements in this life are eliminated.] Free from all the spiritual corruption (*dausthulya*), only the mere conditions of physical life remain. If this occurs, one experiences the feeling of the end of the body and the end of life." (5.b) C.1. *gnas 'gyur ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste / de spangs pa'i phyir kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyang spangs par brjod par bya'o // (2) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i gnas ni / gnyen po dang / dgra bos bsgyur par rig par bya'o // (a) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni mi rtag pa dang / len pa dang bcas pa yin la / gnas gyur pa ni rtag pa dang len pa med pa yin te / de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam gyis bsgyur ba'i phyir ro // (b) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas ngan len dang ldan pa yin la gnas gyur pa ni gnas ngan len thams cad dang gran bral ba yin no // (c) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnam kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu . . . gnas gyur pa ni nyon mongs pa rnam kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin . . . (5.b C.3.) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i spangs pa'i mshan nyid ni de spangs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gnyis spong ba dang / sprul pa la bu'i lus kun tu gnas pa ste / phyi ma la sdug bsngal yang 'byung bar byed pa'i rgyu spangs pa'i phyir / phyi ma la yang 'byung bar byed pa'i len pa spong ba dang / tshe 'di la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rgyu thams cad spangs pa'i phyir / tshe 'di kun nas nyon mongs pa'i gnas ngan len \*thams cad spong ba dang / gnas ngan len thams cas dang bral zhing srog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun tu gnas so // de yod na lus kyi mha' pa dang / srog gi mha'\*\* pa'i tshor ba myong bar byed de / [\* Schmithausen (366) amends to: 'gnas len pa' following Ch.] D.8a3—b2; P.9b1—10a4; T.30.581c6—23, 1020b10-25. [\*\*P.; D. reads: 'mhar']*

<sup>179</sup> I.e. M I 292: *vijānāti . . . vijñānaṁ ti*. AKBh II 34a: *vijānāti iti vijñānam*. See also note # 225 below.

<sup>180</sup> They are quite similar to those found in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. The inner appropriations differ in that the *Sūtra*'s "predispositions towards profuse imaginings in terms of conventional usage of images, names and conceptualizations" (*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā*; *mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chag len pa*) is replaced with "the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated" (*parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniṣeṣa-vāsanā*).

*Pravṛtti Portion* 1.b) A.1. "The inner appropriation (*adhyātman upādāna*) means the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated and the material sense faculties along with their bases (*sādhīṣṭhānam indriya-rūpam*)." (*de la nang gi len pa ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mgon par zhen pa'i bag chags dang rten dbang po'i gzugs so*) D.3b7f; P.4a8f; T.30.580a4f, 1019b1f.

<sup>181</sup> 1.b) A.2. *de la phyi rol gyi snod rnam pa yongs su ma bcad pa rnam par rig pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nang gi len pa'i dmigs pa gang yin pa de nyid la brien nas / rtag tu rgyun mi 'chad par 'jig rten dang snod kyi rgyun rnam par rig pa ste / D.4a1f; P.4b1f; T.30.580a7f, 1010b4f.*

<sup>182</sup> 1.b) A.3. "Thus, one should know that the way the *ālayavijñāna* [occurs] in regard to the object of inner appropriation and the external object is similar to a burning flame which occurs inwardly while it emits light outwardly on the basis of the wick and oil." *'di lta ste / dper na mar me 'bar ba ni snying po dang snum gyi rgyus ni nang*

du 'jug par 'gyur la / phyi rol du ni 'od 'byung bar byed pa bzhin du nang gi len pa'i dmigs pa dang / phyi rol gyi dmigs pa 'di la yang kun gzhi nram par shes pa'i tshul de dang 'dra bar lta bar bya'o // D.4a2f; P.4b2f; T.30.580a9f, 1019b5f.

<sup>183</sup> We shall remember that "upādāna" also means "fuel, supply, substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going." PED: 149. See note 25, above.

<sup>184</sup> 1.b) B.1. "Because it is difficult to discern (*duśpariccheda*) even by the wise ones of the world, the object [of the *ālayavijñāna*] is subtle (*sūkṣma*)."  
(*dmigs pa de ni 'jig rten gyi mkhas pa rnam kyis kyang yongs su gcad par dga' ba'i phyir phra ba yin no*). D.4a3f; P.4b3f; T.30.580a13f, 1019b7f.

<sup>185</sup> a.b) A. "What is establishing the arising [of the *ālayavijñāna*] by association (*samprayoga-pravṛtti-vyavasthāna*)? This means that the *ālayavijñāna* is associated by association with the five omnipresent factors conjoined to mind (*citta-samprayukta-sarvatra*): attention (*manaskāra*), sense-impression (*sparsa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volitional impulse (*cetanā*). (B) These *dharma*s then are (1) included within [the category of] resultant states (*vipāka*); (2) are subtle (*sūkṣma*) because they are hard to perceive (*durvijñānatva*) even for the wise ones in the world; (3) are always functioning in the same manner regarding a single object (*ekāmbāna*). Moreover, among those mental factors (*caitta*) the feeling (*vedanā*) which is associated with the *ālayavijñāna* is: (4) neither exclusively pain or pleasure (*aduhkhāsukha*); (5) and is [karmically] indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). The other mental factors (*caitta-dharma*) are also explained in just this way." (2.a) *de la mtshungs par ldan pas 'jug pa nram par gzhaq pa gang zhe na /* (2.b) A.) 'di la kun gzhi nram par shes pa mtshungs par ldan pas na sems dang mtshungs par ldan pa kun tu 'gro ba lnga po yid la byed pa dang / reg pa dang / tshor ba dang / 'du shes dang / sems pa nram dang mtshungs par ldan no // (B) *chos de dag kyang* (1) *nram par smin par bsdus pa dang /* (2) 'jig rten gyi mkhas pa rnam kyis kyang rtogs par dka' ba'i phyir phra ba dang / (3) *gtan du dmigs pa gcig la mtshungs par 'jug pa yin no // sems las byung ba de dag las kyang kun gzhi nram par shes pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i tshor ba gang yin pa de ni* (4) *gcig tu sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa dang /* (5) *lung du ma bstan pa yin no // de nyid kyis de las gzhan pa'i sems las byung ba'i chos rnam kyang nram par bshad pa yin no //* \*P.; D. omits 'pa'i.' D.4b2f; P.5a5f; T.30.580a29f, 1019b16f. See also the treatment of this in TBh 19.3, note # 225 below.

<sup>186</sup> 4.b) A.3. "the *ālayavijñāna* also occurs sometimes intermingled with the feelings of suffering (*duḥkha*), pleasure (*sukha*), and neither pain nor pleasure (*aduhkhāsukha*), because, depending on the arising cognitions, [the *ālayavijñāna*] occurs depending on whatever feeling they are. Of these, amongst human beings, the gods of the Desire Realm, animals and some of the hungry ghosts, the stream of those feelings (*vedanā-santāna*) of the arising cognitions, either suffering, pleasure, or neither suffering nor pleasure, simultaneously occurs and functions intermingled with the innate (*sahaja*) feeling [of the *ālayavijñāna*], which is neither suffering nor pleasure. . . ." 4.b) A.4. "Sometimes the *ālayavijñāna* occurs simultaneously with wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate mental factors (*caittasika-dharma*) which belong to the arising cognitions." 4.b) A.3. *kun gzhi nram par shes pa de yang res 'ga' ni bde ba dang / sdug bsngal ba dang / sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa'i tshor ba rnam dang 'dren mar 'jug ste / 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa la bsten nas / tshor ba gang dag yin pa de dag de la bsten nas 'byung ba'i phyir ro // de la mi rnam dang 'dod pa na spyod pa'i lha rnam dang / dud 'gro dang / yi dwags kha cig gi nang na ni lhan cig skyes pa'i*

*tshor ba sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang na yin pa de dang / 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa'i tshogs kyi tshor ba bde ba'am / sdug bsngal ba'am / sdug bsngal yang ma yin / bde ba yang ma yin pa\* de dag gi rgyun 'dren mar lhan cig tu 'byung zhing 'jug go // . . .* (4.b) A.4) *kun gzhi nram par shes pa res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes par gtogs pa'i sems las byung ba'i chos dge ba dang mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa rnam dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / \*P.; D. reverses the order: "bde ba yang ma yin / sdug bsngal yang ma yin." D.5b6f; P.6b5f; T.30.580c14f, 1019c17.*

<sup>187</sup> 4.b) B.1. *de lta na kun gzhi nram par shes pa ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa nram dang yang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug go // glo bur gyi tshor ba rnam dang / glo bur gyi chos dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa rnam dang yang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / de ni de dag dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin par ni mi brjod do // de ci'i phyir zhe na / dmigs pa mi mtshungs pa la 'jug pa'i phyir te /* D6a4f; P.7a4f; T.30.580c26f, 1019c24.

<sup>188</sup> The *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, paras. 38–9, explicitly defends the idea of two distinct types of mental stream within a single individual on the grounds that the two occur inseparably as cause and effect and because the stream of the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*) is infused (*paribhāvita*) by the arising cognitions. (*de gnyis ni rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po dang tha dad pa ma yin par 'jug pa nyid kyi phyir dang / nram par smin pa'i nram par shes pa'i rgyud la cig shos kyis kyang yongs su sgo bar byed pa'i phyir ro /*)

<sup>189</sup> We shall remember that the *bhavaṅga-citta* of the *Theravādins* is a neutral, resultant state and therefore capable of conditioning the occurrence of *dharma*s of all natures. See note 123 above.

<sup>190</sup> The following applies to the *Yogācāra* model of mind as well: "Just because they have different names does not mean that they are separate entities. The names, id, ego and superego, actually signify nothing in themselves. they are merely a shorthand way of designating different processes, functions, mechanisms, and dynamisms within the total personality." Hall, C., *A Primer of Freudian Psychology* (1961: 34f).

<sup>191</sup> 1.b) B.2. *dmigs pa de ni rag tu yod pa yin te / lan 'ga' gzhan du 'gyur la / lan 'ga' gzhan du 'gyur ba ma yin no // 'on kyang dang po pa'i len pa'i skad cig la bsten nas / ji srid 'tsho'i bar du nram par rig pa\* ro gcig pas 'jug par 'gyur ro //* (3) *kun gzhi nram par shes pa de ni dmigs pa la skad cig pa yin par blta bar bya ste / skad cig pa'i rgyun gyi rgyud kyis 'jug pa yin gyi / gcig pa nyid ni ma yin no //* \*P.; D. reads 'shes par rig'. D.4a4f; P.4b5f; T.30.580a15f, 1019b8f.

<sup>192</sup> *AKBh ad II 53Z: anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ. Vyākhyā* (Shastri ed. 307): *cittam caittasya phalam, caitto 'pi cittasya ity anyonyaphalam iti tena arthena sahabhūhetuḥ*. See note 56, above. The *Sautrāntikas* also considered body and mind interdependent. The *ASBh* also states that the concomitant cause is the necessary concomitance of anything, specifically of the *citta* and *caitta*, which cannot exist separately. (*ASBh* 37.6f: *sahāyānaiyam yena sahabhūhetur vyavasthāpitāḥ / bhūtāni bhautikam ca ity udāharaṇamātram etad veditavyam, cittacaitāsikānām anyonyam avinābhāva niyamāt /*)

<sup>193</sup> 3.b) A.2. *de la rten byed pa ni kun gzhi nram par shes pas zin pa'i dbang po gzugs can rnam la bsten nas / nram par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag 'byung bar 'gyur gyi ma zin pa dag las ni ma yin no // nram par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag gi gnas mig la sogs pa dang 'dra ba yid dang yid kyi nram par shes pa'i gnas kun gzhi nram par shes pa yod na / yid dang yid kyi nram par shes pa yang 'byung bar 'gyur gyi med na ni ma yin*

no // D.5a1f; P.5b4f; T.30.580b12f, 1019b26. This is in some contradiction with *MSg* 1.7a.2) which states that the *kliṣṭa-manas* is the simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya*) of the *mano-vijñāna*.

<sup>194</sup> *ASBh* 11.9: "Increasing [or "fattening"] their seeds when the aggregates, etc. are present is called "impression." (*skandhādinām samudācāre tadbijaparipustir vāsānā iti ucyate*.)

<sup>195</sup> 3.b) b. de la 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa ni rnam pa gnyis kyis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i rkyen gyi bya ba byed de / tshe 'di la sa bon yongs su brtas par byed pa dang / tshe phyi ma la de mngon par 'grub pa'i sa bon yongs su 'dzin pa skyed par byed pas so // (B.1.) de la tshe 'di la sa bon yongs su brtas par byed pa ni / ji lta ji lta kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la bten pa 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa 'byung bar 'gyur ba de lta de lta rang gi rten la rten de dang lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pas bag chags sgo bar byed do // rgyu de dang rkyen des na 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam kyang phyir zhing phyir dge ba la sogs pa'i dngos pos shin tu brtas pa dang / shin tu sbyangs pa dang / shin tu 'od gsal ba dag tu 'byung bar 'gyur ro // (B.2.) de'i bag chags kyi rigs gzhan ni phyi ma la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de dag nyid kyi rnam par smin pa yongs su 'dzin pa'i phyir 'jug par 'gyur ro // D.5a3f; P.5b7; T.30.580b17f, 1019b27f.

<sup>196</sup> Except for the explicit idea of rebirth, there is nothing unusual or mysterious about this process, nor even necessarily profound. Character traits, dispositions, memory, mental and physical skills, etc. (not to mention the stages of normal growth and development) are all processes of acquisition and learning that develop over extended periods of time, building up a repertoire of subroutines which exercise those very skills and dispositions, and form the basis upon which further skills and habits are practiced and acquired. And all of these subsist, moreover, relatively independently of, though continually conditioned by, the moment to moment processes of conscious perception. Merleau-Ponty (*The Structure of Behavior*: 13, as quoted in Varela, 1991: 174) puts it in much the same fashion.

Since all the movements of the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat behavior as an effect of the milieu. But in the same way, since all the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only by its preceding movements which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could also say the behavior is the first cause of all the stimulations.

<sup>197</sup> 4.b) A.1.(a). kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni (a) res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa gcig kho na dang lhan gcig tu 'jug ste / 'di lta ste yid dang ngo // 'di lta ngar 'dzin pa dang / nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal dang / rlom pa'i rnam pa can gyi yid gang yin pa de ni sems yod pa dang / sems med pa'i gnas skabs dag na yang dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nga'o snyam pa dang / bdag go snyam du dmigs shing rlom pa'i rnam pa can yin no // D.5a7f; P.6a5f; T.30.580b29f, 1019c6f.

<sup>198</sup> 4.b)B.4. gang sngar bstan pa'i yid gang yin pa de ni dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / de ni yang dag par ma bcom gyi bar du dus rtag pa kho nar lhan cig skyes pa'i rang bzhin 'dra ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa bzhi po 'jig tshogs la lta ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / nga's snyam pa'i nga rgyal gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / bdag la chags pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa

dang / ma rig pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin par blta bar bya'o // kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa bzhi po de dag kyang mnyam par bzhang pa dang / mnyam par ma bzhang pa'i sa la dge ba la sogs pa dag la 'gal ba med par 'jug pa dang / bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa yin par blta bar bya'o // D.6b5f; P.7b7f; T.30.581a17f, 1020a8f. See Schmithausen (1987: 325, n. 357) for the "intrusive" character of this section.

<sup>199</sup> *MSg* 1.7a.6 (T.31.133c19–134a1; D.4048.4a4–b1: dge ba dang dang mi dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa'i sems rnam la yang ngar 'dzin pa dus thams cad du kun tu 'byung bar dmigs pa'i yang phyir ro // gzhan du na ni mi dge ba'i sems kho no dang de mtshungs par ldan pas nga's snyam pa'i nyon mongs pa kun tu 'byung gi / dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa dag la ni ma yin no // de'i phyir lhan cig 'byung bar kun tu 'byung ba dang / mtshung par ldan par <ma yin par> kun tu 'byung bas skyon 'di dag tu mi 'gyur to /). This emendation, <ma yin par>, follows Lamotte (*MSg-L*: 21) based upon the three Chinese translations.

<sup>200</sup> *Bh* 326a2–3; bh: 151b1f: (ji lta sbyin ba la sogs pa dge ba'i sems 'byung bar 'gyur / de dang mtshungs par ldan pa las te). This passage actually comments on ignorance unaccompanied by other afflictions (*avidyā-āveṇekī*), but the point still applies since it too "always obstructs the *citta* which attends the true object and is present at all times" (*MSg* 1.7b: yang dag don la 'jug pa yi // sems kyi bgegs su rtag gyur dang / dus rnam kun tu 'byung ba de // ma 'dres pa yi ma rig 'dod).

The second major commentary to the *MSg*, the *Upanibandhana*, also comments on the ubiquity of self-grasping: "Wholesome states, too, are endowed with self-grasping, because one thinks 'I am practicing giving'. Self-grasping does not occur without ignorance. Since ignorance is a mental factor (*caitta*) too, it does not occur without a support (*āśraya*). But there is no other support except the afflictive mentation (*kliṣṭa-manas*). A wholesome *citta* cannot be the support of ignorance." (U 384c24–28; u 242b8–243a3: dge ba'i gnas skabs ni sbyin pa la sogs pa la ngar 'dzin pa dang ldan te / nga sbyin pa byed do snyam du ngar sems pa'i phyir ro / ngar 'dzin pa dang ldan pa ni ma rig pa med na mi 'byung ngo // ma rig pa yang sems las byung ba yin bas gnas med par mi 'byung ste / nyon mongs pa can gyi yid ma gogs par gnas gzhan med do // dge ba'i sems ni ma rig pa'i gnas su mi rung ngo /)

<sup>201</sup> Similar ideas, as discussed above, are found in S III 29 where a subtle remnant (*anusahagata*) of the conceit and latent disposition to "I am" remains even in advanced disciples. *AKBh* V 19 (note 84, above) describes an innate and indeterminate view of self-existence both in the Desire Realm and in birds and beasts, in contrast to that which is deliberated and thus unwholesome.

Similar ideas are found in *Yogācāra* literature. "The innate (*sahaja*) view of self-existence (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) in the Desire Realm is indeterminate, because it always occurs again and again and because it is not a support for harm to self or to others. That which is attachment through deliberation, however, is unwholesome." (Y Tib. Derge #4038, Shi 110b3–4: 'dod pa na sbyod pa'i 'jig tshogs la lta ba lhan cig skyes pa gang yin pa de ni lung du ma bstan pa yin te / yang dang yang kun tu 'byung ba'i phyir dang / bdag dang gzhan la shin tu gnod pa'i gnas na ma yin pa'i phyir ro / rtag pas mngon par zhen pa gang yin pa de ni mi dge ba yin no /) The corresponding Chinese for this passage also mentions that birds and animals have this innate view of self-existence, in contrast to that which is deliberate. Y Ch. T.30.621c7. Schmithausen (1987: 440, n. 931).

<sup>202</sup> The *ASBh* states that the view of self-existence is also present even in Aryans and

Disciples who have reached the Path of Seeing (*ASBh* 62.3ff: *yām adhiṣṭāya utpanna darśanamārgasya api āryaśrāvakaṣya asmimāṇaḥ samudācarati*). Cf. *Pravṛtti* Portion, 4.b) B.4, cited above.

The *Upanibandhana* asks where the latent afflictions which are to be eliminated by the path of cultivation would reside, if there were no *ālayavijñāna*, when the manifest afflictions are suppressed by one who has engendered the counteractant (*kleśa-pratipakṣa-vijñāna*) to them upon gaining the fruit of a stream-winner at the first moment in the Path of Seeing (*darśana-marga*), especially considering that they are in contradiction with the *pratipakṣa*, the counteracting mind. (U 391c26–29; u 256b3–5: *gal te kun gzhi nram par shes pa med na gang gyi tshes thog ma nyid du rkyun du zhugs pa'i 'bras bu la 'jug pa la mthong pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa'i gnyen bo la ma skyes pa de'i tshes 'jig rten pa'i shes pa thams cad ni 'gags na bsgom pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa'i bag la nyal gang du gnas par 'gyur / gnyen bo nyid mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi sa bon dang 'brel par ni mi rung /*)<sup>203</sup> MSg 1.7a.4) “[If afflictive mentation did not exist] there would also be the fault that there would be no distinction between the absorptions of non-apprehension (*asamjñi-samāpatti*) and of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), because one who is in the absorption of non-apprehension is characterized by afflictive mentation while one who is entered into the absorption of cessation is not. Otherwise these two would not be distinguished.” (Tib: *Inyon mongs pa can gyi yid de . . . med du zin nal 'du shes med pa dang / 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa bye brug med pa'i skyon du yang 'gyur te / 'di liar 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa ni nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyiis rab tu phyag ba yin gyis / 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa ni ma yin te / gzhan du na 'di gnyis bye brag med pa nyid du 'gyur ro /*) The commentary (U 384c4) states that it is the presence of afflictive mentation within the mental stream that differentiates an ordinary worlding from an Arya. Cf. *AKBh ad II 44d* (Poussin, 210; Shastri, 244): *evam enayoh samāpattyor . . . viśeṣaḥ . . . santānato 'pi, prajñānāryasantānatvāt.*)<sup>204</sup> MSg 1.8a.5) *gal te 'du shes med pa pa de na ngar 'dzin pa dang / nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal med na 'du shes med par skye ba thog thag tu nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i skyon du yang 'gyur ro /* Vasubandhu's commentary (Bh 326b7–11; Lamotte, 1935: 194) elaborates: “If there were no *kliṣṭa-manas*, then it properly follows that there would be no self-grasping (*ātmagrāha*) amongst beings belonging to [the realm of] non-apprehension (*āsamjñika*); [they] would no [longer] be ordinary worldings (*prthagjana*), [that is, they would be Aryans] and their mental stream (*santāna*) would be temporarily free of self-grasping.”

The *Pravṛtti* Portion, I.4.b) A.1.(a), mentioned *manas* in connection with the absorption of cessation, stating that the *manas* “always occurs and functions with the *ālayavijñāna* in conscious states (*acittaka*).” See Schmithausen (1987: 481, n. 1232).

<sup>205</sup> MSg 1.19. The *Madhyāntavibhāgatikā*, by *Sthiramati*, calls these the *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa* and the *samkleśa-lakṣaṇa*, respectively, viz. the momentary, simultaneous causality, such as pertains between the *ālayavijñāna* and the functioning cognitions, and the temporal, sequential causality, as depicted in the twelve-member formula. *ad MV* 1.9–11. D. # 4032. 205a2f: *'dir ni skad cig brgyud mar 'jug pa 'jug pa'i tshan nyid du bshad ba'o // tshes rabs bzhan du 'jug pa'i jug pa ni kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mshan nyid du 'og nas 'chad do / . . . gcig ni rkyen gyi nram par shes / . . . kun gzhi nram par shes pa ste / nram par shes pa lhag ma bdun nrams kyi rgyu'i rkyen gyi dngos pa'i rgyu yin pas rkyen gyi nram par shes pa'o* As cited in MSg-N, 149f.

The *AKBh ad III 24d* discusses dependent origination as both momentary (*kṣanikah*) and relating to the twelve members as distinct temporal states (*āvasthikah*).<sup>206</sup> The *Upanibandhana* relates these two types of dependent origination. The *ālayavijñāna* corresponds to the first, because it differentiates the nature of all defiled *dharma*s which are originated, while the second is the traditional twelve-limbed formula, ignorance, etc. which distinguishes the destinies through being the principle condition (*pradhāna-pratyaya*); this is because when the *samskāras*, etc. arise from the *ālayavijñāna*, they differ as to being meritorious, non-meritorious, or neutral because of ignorance, etc. (U 388c3–8; u 250b5–8: *kun gzhi nram par shes pas kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos kyi rang bzhin skye ba can thams cad nram bar 'byed par byed pa'i phyir ro / . . . lus sna tshogs 'grub pa la gtso bo'i rkyen gyis rab tu phyed ba'i ma rig pa la sogs pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis te / kun gzhi nram par shes pa las 'du byed la sogs pa 'byung ba na ma rig pa la sogs pa'i dbang gis bsod nams dang / bsod nams ma yin pa dang / mi gyo ba tha dad pa'i phyir ro /*)

<sup>207</sup> MSg 1.27 explains that “these two cognitions (*vijñāna*) are mutually conditions of each other . . . through being always mutually the fruit and cause of each other.” (T.31.135b13–16; D.4048.7b5f: *nram par shes pa de gnyis ni gcig gi rkyen gcig yin te / . . . phan tshun 'bras bu'i dngos po dang / rgyu yi dngos por rtag tu sbyor*). MSg 1.28: “In the first Dependent Co-arising these two cognitions are mutually causal conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) of each other.” (T.31.135b17; D.4048.7b6f: *rien cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po la nram par shes pa dag phan tshun du rgyu'i rkyen yin*). Hsüan Tsang's Chinese (T.31.135b17) explicitly states “two *vijñānas*,” while the Tib. indicates only the plural: “*nram par shes pa dag*.”

<sup>208</sup> MSg 1.33. U 392a12–16; u 257a2–5: *'du byed kyi rkyen gyis nram par shes pa mi rung ba'i phyir ro // zhes bya ba ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa nams la las kyi kun nas nyon mongs ba mi srid bar ston to / kun gzhi nram par shes pa med na* (Der. 209b3) *mig la sogs pa'i nram par shes pa 'dod chags la sogs pa dang lhan cig skyes pa 'du byed kyi rkyen las byung par 'dod na de yang mi rung ste / nram par shes pa'i rkyen gyis ming dang gzugs zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro // mig la sogs pa'i nram par shes pa ni skad cig gyis 'jig pa'i tshul can yin pas 'gags nas yun ring ba'i phyir ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen du mi rung ste / nyes pa mang du 'gyur ro /*

<sup>209</sup> *MVBh*, ad I. 10, states that the *samskāra* place the *karma-vāsanā* within the *vijñāna* (*samskārair vijñāna karma-vāsanāyāḥ pratiṣṭhāt*). The passages in *Yogācāra* texts which describe the *ālayavijñāna* as conditioned by the *samskāra* are legion: for example, in the *Proof Portion*, Proof # 1.a., note 165, above.

<sup>210</sup> MSg 1.33. The *Bhāṣya* states that this is because in the case of the *vijñāna* which is infused by *samskāras*, it is by the force of attachment or appropriation (*upādāna-bala*), that the predispositions (*vāsanā*) increase and existence arises. Bh 331b24–27; bh 159a4f: *len pa'i rkyen gyis srid pa yang mi rung ste / gang gi phyir 'du byed kyi yongs su bsgos pa'i nram par she pa len pa'i dbang gyis bag chags rgyas pas srid pa 'byung bas so /*

<sup>211</sup> U393a29–b9; u 259b2–7: *de la ming ni gzugs can ma yin pa'i phung bo bzhi'o // gzugs ni nur nur bo'o // 'di gnyis kyi rkyen nram par shes pa gang yin pa skad cig gcig nas gcig du brgyud de gnas nyid du gyur ba de yang kun gzhi nram par shes pa las gzhan ma yin no // ming smos pas ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa bzung na nram par shes pa smos pas ci zhig gtso bor bstan par bgyur /*

<sup>212</sup> Schmithausen (1987: 169–177, ns. 1075–1145) discusses this “doubling” of

*vijñāna* and dismisses it as compelling reason for introducing a new type of *vijñāna* called “*ālaya*,” since the *ālayavijñāna* is not mentioned in this context in earlier discussions on dependent origination in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and is not found problematic by other contemporary writers.

<sup>213</sup> The *Bhāṣya* further correlates the other non-material *āhāras* with the basic dimensions of mind within the *Yogācāra* scheme: the sensation-sustenance (*sparsāhāra*) with the six cognitive modes, and the sustenance which consists of mental volitions or motivational impulses (*manahsaṃcetanāhāra*) with mentation (*manas*). (Bh 332b14–20; bh 160b2–6: *nam par shes pa'i zas ni nye bar len ba dang ldan ba na ste / gang gis de blangs pa nyid kyis rten gnas pa ste / de las gzhan du na shi ba'i ro bzhin du rul bar 'gyur ro // de lta bas na rten la phan 'dogs par byed pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa'i zas nyid ni kha blang bar bya'o // de la reg pa'i zas ni rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug gang yin ba'i'o / yid la sems ba'i zas ni yid kyis bsams pa'i'o // gzhan ba rnam par shes pa'i zas nyid du bstan pa gang yin ba ni sems med pa'i gnyid dang / brgyal ba dang / 'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa na rnam par shes pa drug ni 'gags par gyur na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na lus blangs pa ni 'drul bar byed pa gzhan gang yin /*)

<sup>214</sup> MSg 1.11b. *dge 'dun phal chen sde'i lung las kyang rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa zhes 'byung ste / rnam grangs des kyang de nyid bstan te / rtsa ba de la brten pa'i shing ljon pa bzhin no / (11.c) sa ston gyi sde'i lung las kyang 'khor ba ji srid pa'i phung po rnam zhes 'byung ste / rnam grangs des kyang de nyid bstan te / la lar res 'ga' gzugs dang sems rgyun chad par snang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la de'i sa bon ni rgyun mi 'chad pa'i phyir ro / (11.d) 'phags pa gnas brtan pa rnam kyi lung las kyang / srid pa'i yan lag lta ba dang / shes pa dang ni gtod pa dang / gyo ba dang ni rtogs pa dang / bdun pa 'jug par byed pa yi / zhes 'byung ngo / (12.) de'i phyir gang shes bya'i gnas la len pa'i rnam par shes pa nyid dang / sems nyid dang / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nyid dang / rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa nyid dang / 'khor ba ji srid pa'i phung po dang / srid pa'i yan lag tu bstan pa de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ste / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i lam chen po btod pa kho na yin no /*

<sup>215</sup> MSg 1.31.\* “And secondary afflictions” in Ch. (T.31.135c19) only. (*nyon mongs pa'i gnyen po'i rnam par shes pa byung na de ma yin pa gzhan 'jig rten pa'i rnam par shes pa thams cad ni 'gags na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med par gnyen po'i rnam par shes pa de ni nyon mongs pa dang nye ba'i nyon mongs pa'i sa bon dang bcas par mi rung ste / ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par grol ba dang nyon mongs pa rnam dang lhan cig 'byung ba dang 'gags pa med pa'i phyir ro // kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na / de'i 'og tu yang 'jig rten pa'i rnam par shes pa 'byung ba na bag chags de gnas dang bcas te 'das nas yun ring ste / med pa'i phyir sa bon med pa las skye bar 'gyur ro /*

<sup>216</sup> MSg 1.40. U 393c11–16; u 260b1–4: *de nyid na zhes hya ba la sogs pa ni gzugs med pa rnam su 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems zag ba med pa de mngon du byed de de skyes ba na gang zag pa med pa de las gzhan pa'i sems 'jig rten pa 'byung ba de med par 'gyur te / 'gags pa na 'gro bas bsdus pa'i rnam par smin pa med pas 'gro ba de ldog pa nyid du 'gyur te / gnyen po mngon (D.212b3 and Ch.) sum du gyur na mi mthun pa'i phyogs thams cad spangs pa'i phyir sgrim mi dgos par phung po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob par 'gyur ro /*

<sup>217</sup> MSg 1.48. “Inasmuch as the weak, medium and strong [impression from having heard the *Dharma*] gradually increase (*vardhate*), so much does the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*) diminish and the basis is revolved (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*). When the basis is revolved in all aspects the resultant consciousness which possesses

all the seeds (*sarvabijaka-vipākavijñāna*) also becomes without seeds and is also eliminated in all aspects.” (T.31.136c24f; D.4048.11a4: *chung ngu dang 'bring po dang chen po ji lta ji lta bur rim gyis 'phel ba de lta de lta bur rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa yang 'bri zhin gnas kyang 'gyur ro // gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang sa bon med par gyur pa dang rnam pa thams cad du spangs pa yang yin no*). MSg 1.49. “When one is freed from the mundane passions (*laukikavītarāga*), the impressions of the unconcentrated stages (*asamāhitabhūmika-vāsanā*) gradually diminish, the impressions of the concentrated stages (*samāhitabhūmika-vāsanā*) gradually increase and the basis is revolved (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*).” (*'jig rten pa'i dod chags dang bral ba na / mnyam par bzhas pa ma yin pa'i sa'i bag chags 'grib ste / mnyam par bzhas pa'i sa'i bag chags 'phel nas gnas gyur pa bzhin no /*)

<sup>218</sup> Schmithausen (1987: 184): “from the historical point of view, scepticism seems to be justified as a matter of principle.”

<sup>219</sup> A more extended interpretation of the *ālayavijñāna* in comparison with modern psychology has been attempted by this author elsewhere and so will not be discussed further here. (See the Waldron 1988, A Comparison of the *Ālayavijñāna* with Freud's and Jung's Theories of the Unconscious. *Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute*, 6: 109–150.)

<sup>220</sup> There is a long passage describing the process of rebirth in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which the resultant *ālayavijñāna* which possesses all the seeds is portrayed as merging with the newly congealed egg and sperm and, being thus established in the body, brings about actual reconnection of birth. (24, 1–10: *yatra tat sarvabijakam vipāka-saṃgrhitam āśrayōpādāt ālayavijñānam saṃmūrcchati . . . tasyām ca avasthāyām pratīṣṭhitam vijñānam baddhah pratisandhir ity ucyate*). Schmithausen (1987: 127f). MSg 1.34 argues that it must be the *ālayavijñāna* and not a mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) that coagulates in the womb, carrying with it all the seeds.

<sup>221</sup> *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 34; MSg 1.5. “the five material sense-faculties are appropriated by this [cognition] without perishing for as long as life continues.” (T.31.133c1f; D.4048.3b4: *tshe ji srid par rjes su 'jug gi bar du des dbang po gzugs can lnga po dag ma zhig par nye bar gzung pa*). MSg 1.35: no *vijñāna* other than the resultant *vijñāna* (*vipāka-vijñāna*, i.e. *ālayavijñāna*) can appropriate the material sense-faculties, because the other cognitions have individual, specific bases and are not constant. (T.31.136a13f; D.9a6: *dbang po gzugs can 'dzin par byed pa yang de las gzhan rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes par mi 'thad de / de ma yin pa'i rnam par shes pa gzhan rnam ni gnas so sor nges pa dang mi brtan pa'i phyir ro*).

<sup>222</sup> *Proof Portion*, Proof 7 on the impossibility of *nirodha-samāpatti* without the *ālayavijñāna* (ASBh: 13, 13f); MSg 1.50 “because it is also taught that ‘even for those in the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) consciousness does not leave the body’, it is correct that it is the resultant consciousness which does not leave the body.” (T.31.137a2f; D.4048.11a6f: *'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa rnam kyang rnam par shes pa dang mi 'bral lo zhes gsungs pa'i yang phyir de ni rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa dang / mi bral bar rigs te*); MSg 1.51–54 discusses reasons that it cannot be a mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) that occurs during this absorption; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, paras. 22–32.

<sup>223</sup> *Proof Portion*, Proof 1.c.; *Pravṛtti Portion* (2.b) B.1), 3) and 4.b) A.); MSg 1.32 defends the *ālayavijñāna* in the context of purification on the grounds that it allows

for the coexistence of diverse seeds and states. It is said, for example, in *MSg* I.46, that supramundane *dharmas* can co-exist with mundane *dharmas* within the *ālayavijñāna* like milk and water. *MSg* I.62 succinctly states the general principle that “being indeterminate and unobscured (*anivṛtāvākrta*) is not in contradiction with being wholesome or unwholesome, while being wholesome and unwholesome are mutually contradictory.” (T.31.137c15f; D.4048.13a1: *ma bsgrigs la lung du ma bstan pa ni dge ba dang mi dge ba dang gal ba med de / dge ba dang mi dge ba ni phan tshun mi mthun no*).

Generally speaking, the *ālayavijñāna*, together with all of the seeds, facilitates the immediate succession of many kinds of diverse states, whether between those of different karmic nature, wholesome, etc., or those between different realms of existence. This is the *Yogācāra* response, built upon the *Sautrāntika* notion of seeds, to the tension between heterogeneous fruition (*vipāka-phala*) and homogeneous succession (*samanantara-pratyaya*).

<sup>224</sup> *MSg* I.14. “it is present at all times” (T.31.134b28; D.4048.6a2: *dus thams cad du nye bar gnas pa yin no*).

<sup>225</sup> *TBg* 19, 5f parallels sections of the *Pravṛtti Portion*: *ālayavijñānam dvidhā pravartate / adhyātam upādānavijñāpito bahirdhā 'paricchinākāra-bhājana-vijñaptitāś ca*. Also *ASBh*: 21, 9f. *TBh*: 19, 14f explains “unperceived.” The cognitive nature and functions of the *ālayavijñāna* are also outlined: *TBh*: 18, 26: “it is a cognition since it cognizes,” (*vijñānāti iti vijñānam*) which has aspects and an object since (19, 3f) “there ought not to be a cognition (*vijñāna*) without an aspect or an object” (*na hi nirālambanam nirākāram vā vijñānam yujyate*). *TBh*: 19, 5–10 (3a–b) then describes much the same objects for the *ālayavijñāna* as the *Pravṛtti Portion* does, which are also subtle and unperceived, and concludes that indeed the *ālayavijñāna* is a type of cognition (*TBh*: 19, 26: *tatra ālayākhyam vijñānam ity uktam*), since it has the requisite associated mental factors (*vijñānam ca avaśyam caittaiḥ samprayuktam ity ato vakṛtyam katamaiḥ katibhiś ca taccaittaiḥ sadā samprayujyate*), the five omnipresent ones (*sarvatraga*), as in the *Pravṛtti Portion*. They too have a neutral feeling tone and are karmically indeterminate (*TBh*: 21, verse 4a–b: *upekṣa vedanā tatra anivṛtāvākrta ca tat*), being resultant (*vipākatvāt*). See also *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 36.

<sup>226</sup> *ASBh*: 11: *sarvabījakaṃ cittam*. *MSg* I.2. “the cognition containing all the seeds is the receptacle (*ālaya*) of all *dharmas*,” (*chos kun sa bon thams cad pa'i / rnam par shes pa jun gzhi ste /*) etc. This is probably the most common synonym of the *ālayavijñāna*.

<sup>227</sup> This is particularly so for such texts as the *Pravṛtti Portion* in which the *ālayavijñāna* is explained in terms of its objects (*ālambana*), associated factors (*samprayukta*), its reciprocal conditionality (*anyonya-pratyayatā*) and simultaneity (*sahabhāva*) with the six momentary cognitions. *MSg* I.28 describes the relationship between the *ālayavijñāna* and the ordinary cognitive modes in terms of the causal-condition (*hetu-pratyaya*) and the predominant condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*). The *ālayavijñāna*, together with all the seeds, is the causal condition of the momentary types of mind, while the appropriate sense-organs, etc., which directly condition the momentary cognitions themselves, comprise the predominant condition, etc. See note # 207 above.

<sup>228</sup> Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* is not merely *ad hoc*, in the sense that it does not address only the single issue for which it was initially devised (the literal meaning of “*ad*

*hoc*”), i.e. the continuity of mind within the absorption of cessation, if Schmithausen’s analysis is well-founded, since it also (1) addressed many of the other problems that vexed Abhidharma theory; and (2) is at the center of a *systematic* innovation in the theory of mind, resulting in a complete paradigm shift; and moreover, (3) it expresses a self-conscious return to, or at least rearticulation of, authoritative canonical doctrines which had become marginalized by Abhidharma doctrine. It may perhaps be just old wine in new bottles, but this too argues against a *purely ad hoc* nature, since the “dogmatical and exegetical factors” (Schmithausen, 1987: 182) leading to its articulation, in addition to appeals to empirical experience, constitute multiple and overlapping grounds for just such an innovative structure of mind, the very opposite of *ad hoc*.

<sup>229</sup> Only from this perspective can one approach such doctrinally dense passages as that in the *ASBh*, “Fattening the seeds when the aggregates, etc. are present is called “impression” (*vāsanā*). It is called “having all the seeds” (*sarvabījakaṃ*) because it is endowed with the seeds for the arising of just those aggregates, etc. Since *dharmas* dwell (*āliyan*) there as seeds, or since beings grasp [to it] as a self, [it is called] the *ālaya-vijñāna*. Because it is formed by past action [it is] the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*). Because it appropriates personal existence (*ātmabhāva*) again and again during the rebirth-connection, [it is] the appropriating consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*). Furthermore, it is called mind (*citta*) since it has accumulated (\**cita*) the impressions of all *dharmas*.” *ASBh* 11, 9–14 (T.31.701a26–b3; D.4053.9b4–6): *skandhādinām samudācāre tadbijaparipuṣṭir vāsanā ity ucyate. sarvabījakaṃ teṣām eva skandhādinām utpattibijair yuktatvāt. āliyan* *tasmin dharmā bhijataḥ, sūtvā vā ātmagrāheṇa ity ālayavijñānam. pūrvakarma nirmitatvāt vipākavijñānam. punaḥ punaḥ pratisandhibandhe ātmabhāvōpādānād ādānavijñānam. tat punar etac cittam ity ucyate, sarvadharmavāsanā\*cittatvāt*. This last \**citta* is read as ‘*cita*’, ‘accumulated’ on the basis of Hsüan Tsang’s Chinese (“*chi chi*,” T.31.701b2f) and the Tibetan (*hsags pa*, D.4053.9b6).

<sup>230</sup> The Yoga school of Patañjali also discussed various issues and concepts similar to those presented herein. None of these schools, however, fully differentiated a distinct, simultaneous and interactive type of mind on the level of complexity of the *ālayavijñāna*. See Eliade (1973: 36–46) and La Vallée Poussin (1937b) for similarities and comparisons.

As for the other, mostly minor or unfortunately insufficiently preserved schools who proposed such concepts, the *MSg* I.11 asserts the following concepts are synonyms (*paryāya*) of the *ālayavijñāna*: the ‘root-consciousness’ (*mūlavijñāna*) of the *Mahāsāṃghikas*; the ‘*skandha*’ which lasts for as long as *samsāra*’ (*āsamsārika-skandha*) of the *Mahīśāsakas*; the *bhavaṇi-ga-citta* of the *Sthavira* (the *Theravādins*). See notes 140, 214, above; also *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, paras. 18–20, 35.

Of these, *Theravādin* Abhidhamma, at least in its commentarial stage, offers the most comparable concepts to those found affiliated with the *ālayavijñāna* complex, as we have noted above. The *bhavaṇi-ga-citta*, though intermittent and not simultaneous with the supraliminal cognitive modes, functions as a neutral ‘buffer-state’ allowing the succession of heterogeneous elements and serving as an immediate condition for cognitive processes. There is also the *abhisankhāra-viññāna*, with the dual characteristics of cause and effect, i.e. as a constructive and a constructed type of consciousness conditioned by the *sankhāra*, whose reversal and cessation is the end of *samsāra*. It is

also used to interpret canonical passages referring to seeds, thus bearing some resemblance to the *ālayavijñāna*, although Collins (1982: 208) specifically warns that “one should not think that this construction-consciousness refers to some special type or level of consciousness which is different from the ordinary element *viññānā*. It is, rather, a means of describing that ordinary element.” These concepts, however, unlike in the *Yogācāra*, remain relatively unrelated to each other. See note 125, above.

<sup>231</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi* 61, 17 (T.30.292a1; D.4035, 31a5; P.5536.35a3): *bijam hetupratyayaḥ*; 110 (T.302a19f; D.4035.57a2f; P.5536.66b8): *bijam pratyayādhiṣṭhānam ādhiṣṭāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate*; *Yogācārabhūmi-viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (T.30.583b21f; D.4038.13b1f; P.15b5f): “What is the causal condition? The two, the material sense faculties together with their bases and *vijñāna*, are called, in short, ‘that which possesses all the seeds’.” (*de la rgyu'i rkyen gang zhe na / dbang po gzugs can rten dang bcas pa gang yin pa dang / rnam par shes pa gang yin pa 'di gnyis ni mngon nas sa bon thams cad pa zhes bya'o.*)

The *ASBh*: 35 (D.4053.26a4–6), in explaining *hetupratyaya*, states that the *ālayavijñāna* has two aspects, the resultant and the constructive. The first is the causal condition of that which has taken birth. The second should be seen as the causal condition of that which arrives through effort and of the other *ālayavijñāna* in the future. The constructive *ālayavijñāna* is, moreover, impressed (“perfumed,” *vāsita*) by the arising cognitions which are present in this life. (*ālayavijñānam punar dvividham — vaipākikam ābhisamskārikam ca / tatra (a) vaipākikam upapattiprātilambhikānam hetupratyayaḥ / (b) ābhisamskārikam prāyogikānam āyātum ca ālayavijñānāntarasya hetupratyayo drṣṭavyaḥ / ābhisamskārikam punar ālayavijñānam tajjānmika pravṛttivijñāna-samudācāravāsitaṃ veditavyam*) This is a very similar to the dual nature of the *abhisamkhāra-viññāna* of the *Theravādin* Abhidhamma, as discussed above.

*PSkPBh*, P.5567.45b5: “The causal condition is the impressions which abide in the *ālayavijñāna*.” (*rgyu'i rkyen ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la gnas pa'i bag chags te.*) *Sthiramati*, the author of the *PSkPBh*, after explaining the other conditions, the objective condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*), the predominate condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*), and the homogeneous antecedent condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*), comments on the traditional conditions for the occurrence of a sense-cognition, i.e. the object, an unimpaired sense-organ and appropriate attention, adding that “the causal condition is not mentioned since it always exists and is hard to discern.” (45b8: *rgyu'i rkyen rtag tu gnas pa dang / shes par dka' ba'i phyir ma smos so*). This bears comparison to the *Theravādin* Abhidhamma doctrine, mentioned above (note 123, *Visuddhimagga* XV.39), that the *bhavaṅga-citta* is also one of the conditions for the arising of a cognition.

<sup>232</sup> *ASBh* above. *Pravṛtti Portion* (3.b) B.1). Mizuno (1978: 403) cites a passage from the *Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun* (T.1602.31.481a) in which *saṃjñā* arises dependent on the seeds of the *ālayavijñāna*.

<sup>233</sup> In addition to its central place in describing the seeds and perfumations within the *AKBh*, such expressions (along with *sāmarthya*) are used throughout the *Yogācāra* literature. To cite a few: (1) *MSg* I.16: “the *ālayavijñāna* which is arisen in such a way that it has the special capacity for the [defiled *dharma*s] to arise (*utpāda-śakti-viśeṣaka*) is called “having all the seeds” (*sarvabijakam*)” (*gang de 'byung ba'i mthu'i khyad par can kun gzhi rnam par zhes pa de / de bzhin du 'byung ba la sa bon thams cad pa zhes hya'o*); (2) *ad MSg* I.16, u 249b1: “‘Propensity’ means ‘special power’”

(*bag chags zhes bya ba ni nus pa'i khyad par te*); (3) *ad MSg* I.16, bh 154a3f: “‘Having the special power for them to arise’ means being connected with having the special power for producing those defiled *dharma*s. ‘Having the power to produce them’ also means ‘having all the seeds’. . . . Since [the *ālayavijñāna*] has the power for producing all the *dharma*s, it is called ‘having all the seeds’” (*de 'byung ba'i mthu'i khyad par can zhes bya ba ni kun nas nyon mong pa'i chos de dag nams bskyed pa'i nus pa khyad par can gyi sbyor ba dang ldan pa ste / de bskyed ba'i nus pa dang ldan pa yang sa bon thams cad pa zhes brjod do / . . . kun gzhi rnam par shes pas chos thams cad skyed pa'i nus pa yod ba'i phyir / des na nus ba dang ldan las sa bon thams cad pa zhes brjod do /*); (4) Vasubandhu defines the *ālayavijñāna* as “a consciousness having the special power (*sāmarthya* or *śakti viśeṣa*) to produce those [*dharma*s]” (*ad MSg* I.14, bh 153a5f: *de skyed pa'i nus pa'i khyad par can gyi rnam par shes pa*).

<sup>234</sup> *MSg* I.11 “All the seeds are considered to have six characteristics: [they are] momentary (*kṣaṇika*), simultaneous (*sahabhūka*), they continue in an uninterrupted stream (*saṃtānāvṛt*, or *saṃtānapravṛtta*), are determinate (*niyata*), require conditions (*pratyayāpekṣa*) and are completed by their own fruit (*svaphala*).” (*sa bon rnam pa drug tu 'dod / skad cig pa dang lhan cig 'byung / de ni rgyun chags 'byung bar 'dod / nges dang rkyen la ltos pa dang / rang gi 'bras bus bsgrubs pa'o /*)

<sup>235</sup> *AKBh* IX (Poussin, 300; Shastri, 1232): *karma tadbhāvanām tasyā vṛtilābham phalam / niyameṇa prajānāti buddhādanyo na sarvathā* // Also, Stcherbatsky, 1976: 76. *Visuddhimagga* XIX.17: “The succession of kamma and its result . . . is clear in its true nature only to the Buddha’s Knowledge of Kamma and Its Result.” See also A II 80 and the *Milindapañha* (*Miln.* 267; 189 in Pāli) where the fruition of karma (*kammavipāka*) is considered incomprehensible (*acintiyā*).