

THE TRANSACTIONS
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF ORIENTALISTS
IN JAPAN

No. III, 1958

國際東方學者會議紀要

第 三 冊

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The Ālaya-vijñāna in Early Yogācāra Buddhism —A Comparison of Its Meaning in the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra and the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi of Dharmapāla—

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I

The major doctrine of the Yogācāra School of Buddhism centers around the nature and workings of the Ālaya-vijñāna or Receptacle-consciousness. This consciousness, according to the sixth century Indian scholar Dharmapāla, is the eighth and ultimate consciousness in a series of eight different consciousnesses.¹⁾ The formulation of the Ālaya-vijñāna was accomplished by the scholars of the Yogācāra School in the second or third century of the Western era. Early Buddhism, Hīnayāna Buddhism, and even pre-Yogācāra Mahāyāna Buddhism did not recognize an Ālaya-vijñāna: they were aware of only six different forms of consciousness, the first five of which corresponded to the five senses, and the sixth to the mind as the organ of mental discrimination. These six consciousnesses were impermanent; they functioned only when certain conditions were fulfilled, i. e., when they could come into contact with their corresponding object (Skt. viśaya, Chin. ching 境)²⁾. Without sound there could be no Hearing-consciousness; without

1) According to the translations of Hsüan-tsang 玄奘, the Yogācāra School teaches the existence of the following eight consciousnesses: 1) Yen-shih 眼識, Sight-consciousness, 2) Êrh-shih 耳識, Hearing-con., 3) Pi-shih 鼻識, Smelling-con., 4) Shê-shih 舌識, Taste-con., 5) Shên-shih 身識, Body-(touch) con., 6) I-shih 意識, Mind-(thought) con., 7) Mo-na-shih 末那識, Illusion-root-con., and 8) A-lai-yeh-shih 阿賴耶識, the Ālaya-(receptacle) consciousness. Since the order of these consciousnesses is fixed, they are often referred to by their number alone, e. g., the First, the Second, etc.

2) The conditions which must be fulfilled for a consciousness to function (shêng-yüan 生緣) differ according to the particular consciousness: the First requires nine, the Second eight, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth each seven, the Sixth five, the Seventh three, and the Eighth four. For a detailed explanation see the Ch'êng-wei-shih-lun shu-chi 成唯識論述記 Fasc. 7 A, Taishō Daizōkyō 大正藏經 43.476 a, Lines 1-15.

light there could be no Sight-consciousness. These consciousnesses arose only when the sense organ came into contact with its corresponding object. Even the so-called Sixth or Mind-consciousness functioned only when there was some object upon which it could ponder. Thus when a person entered the higher stages of meditation in which there is no longer thought or when he fell into dreamless sleep, his Sixth or Mind-consciousness ceased functioning completely.³⁾ In Buddhism, it must be remembered, not to function is not to exist. Therefore, the Yogācāra argued, when a man emerges from thought-less meditation or dreamless sleep, the Mind-consciousness that then begins to function within him must be a newly arisen consciousness because when he entered the thought-less meditation or deep sleep, his Mind-consciousness ceased functioning, and hence passed out of existence. But in actual experience a man emerging from thought-less meditation or deep sleep still retained the memory of the experiences he had before entering the thought-less meditation or deep sleep. If he was a man of base character before falling into a deep sleep, he revealed the same character on emerging from the deep sleep. The man who had already realized the Bodhisattva-nature before entering thought-less meditation showed the same Bodhisattva-nature on coming out of his meditation.⁴⁾ Despite the interruption or, more precisely, the passing out of existence of the Mind-consciousness in these instances, the man of a Bodhisattva-nature actually retained this nature just as the man of base character retained his base character. For this reason the Yogācāra School asserted that although the Mind-consciousness may on occasion be interrupted and pass out of existence, there must be some subtle continuum of consciousness which flows on in an unbroken stream apart from the transitory Mind-consciousness. This uninterrupted stream of consciousness is functioning at all times beneath the layer of the Mind-consciousness, and serves as the receptacle or holder for the so-called "seeds" (Skt. bīja) of experience, thereby giving continuity to the life of the individual. This ever-flowing subtle consciousness bears a striking resemblance to the "unconscious" of modern psychology.

3) Strictly speaking, there are five occasions on which the Sixth Consciousness does not function. Cf. Verse No. 16 of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* (Lévi edition, Pg. 14).

4) This argument is advanced by Tz'ü-ên 慈恩 in his explanation of the meaning of the term Anuśaya (fundamental illusion) as taught by four sects of the Mahāsāṃghika branch of Hīnayāna. Cf. Ibushūrin-ron-jukki-hatsujin 異部宗輪論述記發軔, 卷中, 四十五丁左 and the valuable comments by KOYAMA Ken'ei 小山憲榮 on the same page.

In the Yogācāra School this subtle consciousness is usually called the *Ālaya-vijñāna*, literally "receptacle consciousness," for in it are held the impressions (the so-called seeds-bija, Chin. chung-tzu 種子) of all human experiences. This consciousness is the most essential part of the sentient being, and constitutes the transmigratory bond linking one rebirth to the next. Although the *Ālaya-vijñāna* at first glance seems to differ little from the *Ātman* or soul so vigorously denied by the Buddha, a careful examination will reveal that it is fundamentally different from the latter concept because its character is completely determined by the Bija held within. The designation *Ālaya*, as we have pointed out, means receptacle or holder, but this in the Yogācāra School does not imply a receptacle which is totally unconditioned by its contents as, for example, a cup which undergoes no change whether its contents be water or acid. The *Ālaya-vijñāna* and the Bija stored therein are not two separate elements brought into a temporary relation with each other, but are elements which act upon each other. Consequently Dharmapāla declares: "Bija and the *Ālaya-vijñāna* as well as what is produced by them are neither the same as nor different from one another."⁵⁾ The continuing transformation of the *Ālaya-vijñāna* by the infusion of new Bija clearly distinguishes it from the *Ātman* of orthodox Brahmanism which is not subject to change, and therefore incapable of either loss or gain.

II

The oldest extant Buddhist work to take up the question of the *Ālaya-vijñāna* is the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which unfortunately no longer survives in its Sanskrit original. There exist, however, one Tibetan translation⁶⁾ and two complete Chinese translations⁷⁾, the first of which was made by the Indian monk Bodhiruci in the year 514⁸⁾, and the second by the illustrious Chinese scholar-translator

5) [Shindō] Jōyūshiki-ron [新導] 成唯識論, Pg. 64. All references to the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* in this paper are based upon the edition by SAEKI Jōin 佐伯定胤, published 1940, and will henceforth be simply designated *Jōyūshiki-ron*. Also see Note 14.

6) A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons, No 106. The Tibetan text was published with French translation and annotation by É. Lamotte.

7) Taishō Daizōkyō Nos. 675 and 676. There are also three incomplete Chinese translations, Taishō Daizōkyō Nos. 677-679, none of which are useful for the purposes of this paper.

8) The Bodhiruci translation is titled *Shên-mi-chieh-t'o-ching* 深密解脫經. For date of translation see K'ai-yüan-lu 開元錄 Fasc. 6, Taishō Daizōkyō 55.540c.

Hsüan-tsang 玄奘 in 647⁹⁾. This latter translation has been commented on by the Chinese monk Ling-yin (令因) in eleven fascicles, the Korean scholars Yüan-ts'ê 圓測 in ten fascicles, Yüan-hsiao 元曉 in three fascicles, Hsüan-fan 玄範 in ten fascicles, and Ching-hsing (憬興) in an unknown number of fascicles¹⁰⁾. Of these only the commentary by Yüan-ts'ê is extant today. There are eight Japanese commentaries, the most exhaustive of which is the seven fascicle *Gejimmik-kyō-kō-san* 解深密經講贊 by the Jōdo-shin-shū scholar Tokuryū 徳龍.

It is difficult to state with certainty the date of any Indian Buddhist text. Neither Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 C. E.)¹¹⁾ nor his disciple Ārya-deva mention the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* in any of their numerous writings. Therefore it may be assumed that this Sūtra was not in existence during the lifetime of these two scholars, or if it was, it had not yet gained sufficient circulation or popularity to be cited in their writings. The first work to quote this Sūtra is the one hundred fascicle *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* of Maitreya. This latter work does not merely quote the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, but includes almost its entire text in Fasc. 75 to 78. The eminent Japanese scholar, Dr. UI Hakuju 宇井伯壽 assigns the dates 270-350 to the life of Maitreya.¹²⁾ If we accept these dates, we may conclude that the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* was compiled, or at least popularized, at the end of the third century or the beginning of the fourth.

After the appearance of this sūtra there was a steady flow of Yogācāra treatises emanating from such distinguished scholars as Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Sthiramati, Nanda, and Asvabhāva¹³⁾ which from the of the orthodox Fa-hsiang (Japanese: Hossō 法相宗) Sect transmission culminated in the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*¹⁴⁾ of Dharmapāla. This latter work was presented to the Chinese monk Hsüan-tsang during his stay at Nālandā by Śīlabhadra, the disciple of Dharmapāla. Hsüan-tsang returned with the text to China, where he translated it

9) The Hsüan-tsang version is titled *Chieh-shên-mi-ching* 解深密經. Date of translation is according to K'ai-yüan-lu Fasc. 8, Taishō Daizōkyō 55.555c.

10) The names of these commentaries brought to Japan are taken from Eichō's 永超 (1014-1095) catalog, Tōiki-dentō-mokuroku 東域傳燈目錄, Taishō Daizōkyō 55.1053a.

11) For the dates of Nāgārjuna I have followed here the theory of Dr. UI. Cf. the detailed discussion based on Chinese sources in his *Sanron Kaidai* 三論解題, Pp. 5-9. Vol. 5 of the *Kokuyaku Daizōkyō* Rombu 國譯大藏經論部.

12) Indo Tetsugaku-shi 印度哲學史 (History of Indian Philosophy), Pg. 336.

13) His Sanskrit name is reconstructed from the Chinese Wu-hsing 無性. The same applies to the name of Nanda (Chinese: Nan-t'o 難陀).

14) Chinese title: Ch'êng-wei-shih-lun 成唯識論 (Japanese: Jōyūshiki-ron)

in the year 659. Somewhat later Tz'ü-ên Ta-shih 慈恩大師,¹⁵⁾ a leading disciple of Hsüan-tsang who assisted him in the translation of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, wrote a definitive commentary called the *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun-shu-chi* (Japanese: *Jōyūshiki-ron-jukki*, 成唯識論述記) in twenty fascicles under the direct guidance of his master, Hsüan-tsang. In Japan the study of the *Yogācāra* branch of Buddhism has been carried on primarily through the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* and its commentary by Tz'ü-ên (Japanese: Jion).

The *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* bases itself upon six sūtras, the most important of which is the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. For this reason it is only natural that scholars of the orthodox transmission should have concerned themselves with elucidating the meaning of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, bringing it into relation with the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*. As we have already pointed out above, the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* was translated by Hsüan-tsang in 647, and the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* twelve years later in 659. It is not possible now to determine exactly when Yüan-ts'ê wrote his commentary on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, but there can be no doubt that it was written after the year 659, i. e., after Hsüan-tsang had already translated the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, because Yüan-ts'ê frequently quotes it in his commentary on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. Although scholars of the orthodox Fa-hsiang Sect in both China and Japan reject the interpretations of the school of Yüan-ts'ê as heretical, Japanese scholars could not help but utilize his commentary as it was the only surviving commentary from China. Generally speaking, Japanese studies of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* have, therefore, relied heavily upon Yüan-ts'ê for an explanation of unclear passages in the Sūtra. Still another method of treating obscurities has been to interpret them on the basis of similar ideas found in the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* and its orthodox commentary by Tz'ü-ên. Unfortunately, however, in these cases orthodox scholars usually failed to take cognizance of the fact that the Sūtra and the Siddhi are separated by a period of at least 250 years, in which time *Yogācāra* thought was greatly enriched by a host of distinguished scholars, each of whom contributed original ideas which

15) Although Tz'ü-ên Ta-shih is usually referred to in modern reference works as K'uei-chi 窥基 (Japanese: Kiki), he himself never used that name. He signed his works with the single character Chi 基, and occasionally prefixed this with the word Sha-mên 沙門 "monk." In Japan he is respectfully spoken of as Jion Daishi (Chin. Tz'ü-ên Ta-shih), i. e., the Great Master Jion, the name Jion being taken from the temple (the Ta-tz'ü-ên-ssü Temple 大慈恩寺, Japanese: Daijionji) in which he resided. In this paper I follow the Japanese custom of calling him by the name Tz'ü-ên.

were ultimately incorporated in Dharmapāla's *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*. Thus traditional studies of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* have not indicated the transition in thought from the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* to the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, nor did they necessarily convey the meaning of vital passages in the Sūtra as it was intended at the time of the compilation of the Sūtra. If we wish to gain an insight into the ideas of the *Yogācāra* School at the time of its inception, we must re-examine critically the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* free from the prepossessions of either Yüan-ts'ê's commentary or the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* and its commentary by Tz'ü-ên, which have heretofore prejudiced all interpretations.

III

The first appearance in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* of the term *Ālaya-vijñāna* occurs in Chapter III — Aspects of Consciousness (Hsin-i-shih-hsiang-p'in 心意識相品).¹⁶⁾ In this chapter the Buddha addresses the Bodhisattva Kuang-hui 廣慧¹⁷⁾ as follows:

"When a sentient being of one of the six worlds falls into rebirth among sentient beings, his rebirth will be from an egg (Skt. *aṇḍa-ja*) or from a womb (Skt. *jarāyu-ja*) or from moisture (Skt. *saṃsveda-ja*) or he will be self-produced (Skt. *upapāduka*). In one of these his consciousness which holds all *Bija* (i-ch'ieh-chung-tzū-hsin-shih 一切種子心識) begins to mature (成熟), develop (展轉), combine (和合), grow (增長), and expand (廣大). This (process) depends upon two upādi (Chin. *chih-shou* 執受,¹⁸⁾ literally, seizing and receiving), the first of which are the material organs (of the body) with their dependencies, and the second of which are the "perfumings" (Skt. *vāsanā*, Chin. *hsi-ch'i* 習氣, i. e., impressions or *Bija*) produced by forms, names, and mental discrimination.....This consciousness is also called the *Ādāna-vijñāna* (Chin. *a-t'o-na-shih* 阿陀那識) because it follows the physical body and is a holder (Chin. *chih-ch'ih* 執持, literally, holds). Another name for this consciousness is *Ālaya-vijñāna* because in its relation to the body it holds and receives (Chin. *shē-shou* 攝受). It is stored and concealed (Chin.

16) All references to the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, unless otherwise stated, indicate the Hsüan-tsang version.

17) The Sanskrit original of the name Kuang-hui is not certain.

18) There can be no doubt that the Sanskrit original of *chih-shou* is upādi because Hsüan-tsang chose *chih-shou* as the Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit upādi occurring in Verse 3 of the *Triṃśikā*.

ts'ang-yin 藏隱),¹⁹⁾ and passes through the cycle of favorable and unfavorable rebirths (together with the body). Still another name for this consciousness is Citta (Chin. hsin 心,²⁰⁾ literally, mind) because (the impressions of) form, sound, smell, taste, touch, etc. are accumulated and nurtured (Chin. tzū-ch'ang 滋長) therein."²¹⁾

This paragraph is the first reference to the existence of a subtle consciousness in Buddhism. Again at the close of Chapter III of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra we find the following concluding verse sung by the Buddha :

"Profound and subtle is the Ādāna-vijñāna ;

The Bīja are like a waterfall.

I do not reveal this doctrine (of the Ādāna-vijñāna) to the unenlightened or ignorant man

For I fear that he might mistake (this Ādāna-vijñāna) for an Ātman (soul)."²²⁾

This concluding stanza is undoubtedly inserted here to explain why no such subtle consciousness as the Ādāna-vijñāna is spoken of in earlier Buddhism. If we examine this passage critically from the standpoint of the orthodox Fa-hsiang Sect tradition, the first point to catch our attention is the reference to six worlds. These are, progressing from the lowest to the highest, 1) hell, 2) the world of hungry ghosts, 3) the world of animals, 4) the world of Asura, 5) the world of human beings, and 6) the heavens. The classification of sentient beings into six worlds is done chiefly by the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism, the Hīnayāna Āgamas speaking of five worlds (the world of Asura is not recognized). Therefore Nāgārjuna writes in Fasc. 10 of his Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Chin. Ta-chih-tu-lun 大智度論) : "The Buddha did not preach the doctrine of five paths (i. e., five worlds) This is the doctrine of Sarvāstivādin priests."²³⁾ In Fasc.

19) The Chinese here is not clear as to whether an active or passive meaning for the verbs is intended. I have decided on the passive for reasons I shall state latter.

20) The Chinese hsin literally means "mind." Hsin is used by Hsüan-tsang as the translation of the Sanskrit word citta which has a similar meaning. Citta is derived from the root cit, "to think, reflect," etc., but in the Yogācāra School is often identified with the root ci, "to gather" or "to accumulate." This relation in Sanskrit of the word "mind" to the idea of accumulation is completely lost when citta is translated into Chinese as hsin.

21) Taishō Daizōkyō 16.692 b Lines 8-18.

22) Taishō Daizōkyō 16.692 c Lines 22-23.

23) Taishō Daizōkyō 25.135 c Lines 22-23.

30 of the same work Nāgārjuna states : "As the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra shows, Mahāyāna teaches that living beings dwell in six worlds.....We must conclude that there are six worlds."²⁴⁾ Of course there is no contradiction here between Nāgārjuna's statement and the passage translated from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. However, the case is quite different with the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, which in Fasc. 3 quotes some unidentified sūtra as saying : "Living beings transmigrate through the five worlds and four kinds of rebirth."²⁵⁾ One cannot help but wonder why Dharmapāla, the author, chooses to quote some unidentified sūtra which speaks of five worlds, obviously a Hīnayāna concept, when he could have so easily quoted the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra upon which he supposedly bases the authority and legitimacy of his philosophy. His quoting an unidentified sūtra which is in conflict with the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra suggests that the relation between the later Sūtra and the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi is not as close as the orthodox tradition makes it appear.

Following this, the earliest reference to Bīja and their storing consciousness occurs :

".....(the) consciousness which holds all Bīja begins to mature, develop, combine, grow, and expand."

In the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang there is a series of five compound verbs, some of which resemble others so closely that it is impossible to determine the precise distinction between them. It is obvious from what follows that the term "consciousness which holds all Bīja" corresponds in a general sense to the Ālaya-vijñāna of Dharmapāla. The commentary by Yüan-ts'ê tells us that the word "mature" signifies that the vijñāna of the person to be reborn has already entered the body of a woman and is combined with the embryo.²⁶⁾ He does not attempt to explain the peculiar meanings of the words "develop," "combine," "grow" and "expand," although he does say that these words indicate the growth of the embryo in the womb. He presents a detailed explanation of the process of rebirth by lengthy quotations from the Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, Fasc. 1 and 2.

As Prof. YÜKI Reimon 結城令聞 pointed out in his painstaking *History of Vijñapti-mātra Thought*,²⁷⁾ if this passage in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra is

24) Taishō Daizōkyō 25.280 a, Lines 18-19

25) Jōyūshiki-ron, Pg. 127 Line 6

26) Chieh-shên-mi-ching-shu 解深密經疏, Fasc. 3. Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 大日本續藏經第一輯第三十四套第四冊三百六十四丁右上.

27) Shin-i-shiki-ron yori Mitaru Yuishiki Shisō-shi 心意識論より見たる唯識思想史, Pg 173 ff.

interpreted from the standpoint of the Twelve Linked Chain of Causation (Skt. dvādaśāṅga-pratītya-samutpāda), it will correspond to the so-called San-shih-liang-ch'ung Theory (Japanese: sanze-ryōjū 三世兩重説), namely, that the twelve links in the chain are spread out over three lives: the past, the present, and the future.²⁸⁾ This conflicts sharply with Dharmapāla's espousal of the opposing Er-shih-i-ch'ung Theory (Japanese: nise-ichijū 二世一重説), namely, that the twelve links cover only two lives: the present and the future.²⁹⁾ Here again we can see that Dharmapāla's standpoint is not identical with that of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra as traditionalists would have us believe.

Next the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra explains what makes the consciousness evolve as it does. We read:

"This (process) depends upon two upādi, the first of which are the material organs (of the body) with their dependencies, and the second of which are the "perfumings" produced by forms, names, and mental discrimination."

Upādi is a difficult term to render into English. MONIER-WILLIAMS does not include it in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. The term is found, however, in the recently published *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*.³⁰⁾ The compiler, Prof.

28) Limitations in space make it impossible to give a more balanced view of this rather complicated theory. Briefly stated, this theory views the twelve links in the well-known chain of causation from the standpoint of both the three worlds (past, present, and future) and the doctrine of cause and effect. The first two links (ignorance and action) are the cause in the past life for the next five links (consciousness, the external world, the sense organs, contact, and perception), their effect, which are reaped in the present life. Because of these man moves to the next three links (lust, seizing, and existence) which, like the preceding five links, are part of the present life, but, unlike them, are regarded as the cause for the next and final two links (birth and death) which are their effect to be reaped in the future. Links 1 and 2 are the cause belonging to the past life, Links 3 to 7 are the effect of 1 and 2 reaped in this life, Links 8 to 10 are the cause in this life for Links 11 and 12 which are their effect received in the future life. Thus, in this theory there are two sets of cause and effect in operation covering the so-called three worlds: the first cause belongs to the past, its effect and the next cause to the present, and the final effect to the future. This theory, common to both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, is not used by Dharmapāla.

29) According to Dharmapāla's view of the twelve links, the first ten constitute the cause, and the last two are its effect. If we view the cause as being in the present, then its effect belongs to the future life. Likewise if we regard the cause as belonging to the past life, the present life is its effect. In short Dharmapāla classifies the twelve links in only one cause and effect relationship.

30) Pg. 146.

Franklin EDGERTON, translates it as "clinging to existence" and cites only one instance of its use, a line from the Mahāvastu, the meaning of which, according to Prof. EDGERTON, is obscure. The term upādi, however, is frequently met with in Yogācāra writings. As Dr. UI Hakuju writes in his *Commentaries of Sthiramati and Dharmapāla on the Trīmśikā-vijñapti-kārikāḥ*,³¹⁾ upādi is often synonymous with the more familiar term upādāna. Both of these words are derived from the Sanskrit upā- dā, which means "to receive", "seize", or "cling to". The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra uses the term without providing any explanation of its meaning. Dharmapāla, however, neatly defines it in Fasc. 2 of his *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*: "There are two kinds of upādi, the first of which are Bija and the second of which is the physical body.....These two are held by the (Ālaya-) vijñāna and are its substance. They share favorable and unfavorable rebirth with it."³²⁾ This definition also seems to fit the meaning of upādi as it is used in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. The first kind of upādi is said in this Sūtra to consist of all of the physical organs of the body and their dependencies. Dependency here refers to the external organs of the body upon which the nervous system must depend to pick up sensations. The second kind of upādi, the Sūtra tells us, consists of the "perfumings" of forms, names, and mental discrimination. The word "perfuming" is frequently used in the Yogācāra School with the same meaning as Bija. In this passage we can discern an attempted classification of Bija into three broad categories. It should be remembered, however, that despite the classification of Bija into three groups in this Sūtra, all of these groups come under the heading of Tainted Phenomena (Skt. sāsrava-dharmāḥ, Chin. yu-lou-fa 有漏法), and as such cannot serve as a cause for Enlightenment. One of the failings of this Sūtra is that it speaks of Tainted Bija only, not making any provision for the Untainted Bija which in the later Yogācāra are the basis for Enlightenment.

As we have seen, the Bija-holding consciousness is identified in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra by three names: Ādāna-vijñāna, Ālaya-vijñāna and Citta. Of these three names the first two belong exclusively to the Yogācāra School; Citta on the other hand is found in the earliest Buddhist texts and is used by all Buddhists, although not necessarily with the same meaning. The noun Ādāna literally means "taking", "seizing", "receiving", or "fettering", and is etymologically related to the terms upādāna and upādi mentioned above. Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version of this Sūtra

31) Anne Gohō Yuishiki Sanjū-ju Shakuron 安慧護法唯識三十頌釋論, Pg. 288.

32) Jōyushiki-ron, Pg. 77 Lines 9-10, Pg. 78 Line 1.

explains the reason for the name *Ādāna* thus: "This consciousness is also called the *Ādāna-vijñāna* because it follows the physical body and is a holder (i. e., holds)". What it holds is not stated. However, in Fasc. 3 of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* Dharmapāla declares: "It is called *Ādāna-vijñāna* because it holds both the *Bīja* and the body with no loss."³³⁾ This interpretation is so firmly established now in the orthodox school of *Vijñapti-mātra* in Japan that in the two Japanese language versions of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* the translators insert the words "body and *Bīja*" in brackets after the verb "holds."³⁴⁾ Had we no other evidence to go by, we should let the matter rest with the assumption that Dharmapāla had adequately supplied the answer to the question, What is held by the *Ādāna-vijñāna*? But, fortunately, there is a way for us to push our investigation of the meaning of the term *Ādāna* further. As we have noted before, the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* exists in two Chinese translations, one by Hsüan-tsang and one by Bodhiruci. However, this particular passage, because of its importance, is quoted by Vasubandhu in his *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya*, for which we have three Chinese translations: one by Paramārtha, one by Dharmagupta, and one by Hsüan-tsang. Therefore, in all, we possess no fewer than four different translations of this passage.³⁵⁾ Unfortunately, lack of space prevents me from including here side by side the four different versions. Such a comparison clearly shows that a distinction should be made between the meaning of *Ādāna* as the ever-present, ever-functioning life-continuum in the body as it was understood by the compiler of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, and the *Ādāna* as used by Dharmapāla indicating the aspect of consciousness which retains impressions (*Bīja*). The verb "holds" in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* which describes the function of the *Ādāna* should be interpreted then as signifying that the *Ādāna* "holds" the body, i. e., it supports the body, and not that it holds impressions (*Bīja*), as the traditionalists state.

33) Jōyūshiki-ron, Pg. 111 Lines 5-6.

34) Kokuyaku Ge-jimmik-kyō 國譯解深密經, Pg. 27, Vol. 10 of the Kokuyaku Daizōkyō Kyōbu 國譯大藏經經部, Japanese translation by SAEKI Jōin, 1917. Also, (Kokuyaku) Ge-jimmik-kyō, Pg. 28, Vol. 3 of the Kokuyaku Issaikyō Kyōshūbu 國譯一切經經集部, Japanese translation by Prof. FUKAURA Shōmon 深浦正文, 1933.

35) The other three versions of this passage are as follows: 1) the Bodhiruci version, Taishō Daizōkyō 16.669 a, Lines 16-26, 2) the Paramārtha version, Taishō Daizōkyō 31.157 b, Lines 16-24, and 3) the Dharmagupta version, Taishō Daizōkyō 31.273 b, Lines 4-13.

A similar change of meaning can be detected in the second name that the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* assigns to this consciousness. The *Sūtra* reads: "Another name for this consciousness is *Ālaya-vijñāna* because in its relation to the body it holds and receives. It is stored and concealed, and passes through the cycle of favorable and unfavorable rebirths." Once again we are confronted with verbs that lack an object. Concerning the meaning of *Ālaya*, Dharmapāla writes in Fasc. 3 of his *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*: "It is also named *Ālaya* because it holds (the *Bīja* of) all Tainted Dharmas without any loss and is that to which illusion (of the mind) clings, mistaking it for a soul."³⁶⁾ Thus Dharmapāla attributes two meanings to the appellation *Ālaya*: the first is that it holds *Bīja* and the second is that it is clung to because of illusion and mistaken for a soul. Needless to say, Dharmapāla's interpretation is universally accepted by scholars of the orthodox Fa-hsiang Sect in China and Japan. However, if we examine the other three translations of the passage in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* which explains the meaning of the term *Ālaya*, we cannot help but entertain strong doubts as to whether Dharmapāla's explanation of the term *Ālaya* is in perfect agreement with its usage in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. With the exception of the Hsüan-tsang version no mention is made in the other translations of either receiving or holding in connection with the name *Ālaya*. All three versions agree in stating that the *Ālaya* is so named because it is stored (held) within the body. Thus, the term *Ālaya*, as it appears in the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* of Dharmapāla, has a decidedly different implication from that in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which does not allow *Ālaya* the meaning of storing *Bīja* but rather employs it in the sense that it (the *Ālaya*) is stored or held by the body.

The third name for this subtle consciousness, as we have seen, is *Citta*.³⁷⁾ This is the name given to the *Bīja*-holding aspect by the compiler of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, and not *Ādāna* or *Ālaya* as taught by the tradition-minded scholars of the Fa-hsiang transmission of *Vijñapti-mātra*.

In this summary I have attempted to demonstrate that Dharmapāla's view of the subtle consciousness as expounded in his *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* is not merely a fuller statement of ideas already found in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* as is often asserted, but, in reality, reveals a distinct and original development over the doctrines in the *Sūtra* and not infrequently contains contradictory ideas. Although it may be necessary to emphasize the complete agreement between the *Sūtra* and

36) Jōyūshiki-ron, Pg. 111 Lines 8-9.

37) Cf. Note 20.

the thought of Dharmapāla for sectarian or religious reasons, an unbiased examination of these texts will bring to light basic differences between them that have gone almost completely unnoticed by scholars of the orthodox tradition.

Summary of Other Reports Delivered

Studies on Indonesian History in Post-war Netherlands

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I stayed in the Netherlands since March of 1957 till February of 1958, studied and collected some materials of the history of the trade between China and the Dutch East India Company.

The studies of Indonesian history in the Netherlands have changed in many aspects since the end of the last war. Apart from the practical necessity of 'colonial history', it is known that most of the interests are concentrated not to the history itself, but to rather adjacent fields of science such as linguistics, ethnology and sociology, which, I think, have more 'objectiveness' than history in their very nature. We can easily perceive such trends in the well-known periodical "Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde" published by the Royal Institute for Linguistics, Geography and Ethnology. This periodical changed even its title since 1951, the centennial of the Institute, dropping off the phrase 'Nederlandsch Oost-Indië,' And recently prominent works of the Dutch sociologists before and during the last war are being published as 'Selected Studies on Indonesia by Dutch scholars', in which we can read quite suggestive opinions of J. C. van Leur, B. Schrieke and such others.

In the field of history, however, also many attempts have been made for publishing historical documents. For instance, 'Jan Pietersz. Coen, Bescheiden omtrent zijn Bedrijf in Indië', the excellent compilation of letters and documents concerning the famous Governor-General during 1614 and 1627, were completed in 1956 by Dr. W. Ph. Coolhaas, who was the successor to the last compiler, Dr. H. Colenbrander. It is said that the Dr. Coolhaas is also making effort to publish

ESSAYS
on the
HISTORY OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT

Presented to
PROFESSOR REIMON YŪKI

on his retirement from
The Institute of Oriental Culture
The University of Tokyo

1964
DAIZO SHUPPAN CO., TOKYO

- (Oxford, 1899). p. 6. For a fuller treatment of the origin of the *I Ching* and its Appendices, consult Fung, Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*; Vol. I, 2nd edition (Princeton, 1952). pp. 379-82.
3. For a critical analysis see H. G. Creel: *Confucius; the Man and the Myth* (London, 1951) pp. 214-18.
 4. Wilhelm, Hellmut, *Change; Eight Lectures on the I Ching*. Tr. from German by G. F. Baynes. Bollingen Series LXII, (N. Y., 1960) pp. 18-19
 5. Wilhelm, Richard, *The I Ching or Book of Changes*. Tr. from German by C. F. Baynes. Bollingen Series XIX; (N. Y., 1950). All quotes are from this superior translation.
 6. It is with the Neo-Confucian cosmologists that the probe into the source of the world becomes finalized. For example, the source of the Yin and Yang is traced to the Great (T'ai Chi) by such men as Chou Tung-yi (1017-73 A. D.) and Shao Yung (1011-77 A. D.). The concept of Ch'i ("ether") is also introduced to explain the concrete and abstract characters of the world by Chang Tsai (1020-77 A. D.).
 7. Op. cit., p. 1
 8. Reference is made to the Chinese idea of heavenly power which has natural characteristics, not to any Western concept of deity.
 9. Ibid. p. 307; Part I Chap. I, Sec. 5
 10. " p. 309; Part I Chap. II, Sec. 1
 11. " p. 326; Part I Chap. VII, Sec. 2
 12. Although this reminds one of the platonic distinction of the world of appearance and the world of reality the distinction should not be carried over uncritically into the *I Ching* philosophy.
 13. Op cit. p. 370; Part II Chap. VI, Sec. 3
 14. Ibid. p. 317; Part I Chap. IV, Sec. 3
 15. " p. 311; Part I Chap. II, Sec. 5
 16. " p. 312; Part I Chap. II, Sec. 6
 17. " p. 381; Part II Chap. XII, Sec. 6
 18. The Three Cardinal Principles are impermanence (anityā), non-self (anātman), and bliss (nirvāṇa). Sometimes suffering (duḥkha) is added.
 19. Relative to a whole mass of sūtras written from about 100 B. C. and extending on to about 1200 A. D., but all of which expressing Mahāyāna doctrines, such as, bodhisattva, anityā, anātman, śūnyatā, madhyamā pratipad, etc. For our discussion, however, it is well to bear in mind the fact that these sūtras or their contents were about the first to impress the Chinese.
 20. Chap. XXV; Verses 19 & 20

THE CONCEPT OF ĀLAYA-VIJÑĀNA IN PRE-T'ANG CHINESE BUDDHISM

Stanley WEINSTEIN

The first texts of the Yogācāra School to be translated into Chinese were the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the last two chapters of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, both of which were rendered into Chinese by Guṇabhadra sometime between his arrival in Kuang-chou 廣州 in 435 and his death in 468.¹ The two chapters of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, translated under the title *Hsiang-hsü chieh-t'o ching*, 相續解脫經, seem to have attracted no attention at all. Guṇabhadra's version of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, which appeared in four fascicles under the cumbersome title *Leng-ch'ieh o-pa-to-lo pao ching* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經, was used by Bodhidharma, the founder of the Ch'an (Zen) Sect, to instruct his disciples and subsequently became a popular text of this sect.²

A second translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* was made in the year 513 by Bodhiruci who had arrived in China five years earlier. This new version in ten fascicles, entitled simply *Ju leng-ch'ieh ching*, 入楞伽經 was more than double the actual length of the preceding version. Its extended length was not merely the result of literary embellishment which ordinarily occurs in the later recensions of sūtras. Rather it represented a doctrinal development over the Guṇabhadra version. In addition to his new translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* Bodhiruci also put into Chinese the entire text of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which he called *Shen-mi chieh-t'o*

ching 深密解脫經, and the *Shih-ti ching lun* (STCL) 十地經論, which shall be the starting point of our examination of the first Chinese attempt to understand the concept of *ālaya-vijñāna*.

The STCL is a commentary in twelve fascicles by Vasubandhu on the *Shih-ti ching* (STC) 十地經 (*Daśabhūmika-sūtra*) which elucidates the ten stages of the bodhisattva. It was first translated into Chinese by Fa-hu 法護 (Dharmarakṣa) in the year 291 under the title *Chien-pei i-ch'ieh chih-te ching* 漸備一切智德經. A second translation together with a commentary by Nāgārjuna was made by Kumārajīva in the year 408 under the title *Shih-chu ching* 十住經 and a third translation appeared as the twenty-second chapter of the *Ta fang-kuang fo hua-yen ching* 大方廣佛華嚴經 translated by Buddhābhaddra in the year 420. When, therefore, Vasubandhu's commentary to this sutra was translated at the beginning of the sixth century, the STC was already known to the Chinese in at least three different versions.³ The popularity of the STC in fifth century Chinese Buddhism can be seen from its frequent mention in the *Kao-seng chuan* 高僧傳. At least four priests wrote commentaries on it, and no less than eleven other priests lectured on it or were known as "reciters" of the text.

The preface of the STCL written by Ts'ui Kuang 崔光 (452-523) states that the translation was begun in the year 508 by Bodhiruci, Ratnamati, and Buddhaśānti, and was completed three years later. Since Ts'ui himself participated in the work, his account of the translation should be regarded as trustworthy.⁴ However, the *Li-tai san-pao chi* (SPC) 歷代三寶紀 compiled some eighty years after Ts'ui's preface was written, quotes an earlier catalogue which states that Bodhiruci at first helped Ratnamati to translate the text, but owing to their differing views the two men quarreled over interpretation, with the result that Bodhiruci withdrew and made his own translation

independently of the one by Ratnamati. Sometime later, the SPC continues, an unnamed person combined the two translations producing the version which has come down to us.⁵ The *Hsü kao-seng chuan* (HKSC) 續高僧傳, compiled in the middle of the seventh century, contains another version of the account: all three translators in Ts'ui's preface are said to have disagreed, which resulted in three different translations of the text.⁶ The HKSC identifies the person who combined the text as Hui-Kuang, 慧光 the most distinguished disciple of Ratnamati.⁷

Whether there were one, two or even three versions of the STCL at the beginning of the sixth century does not concern us in this paper. Rather we shall direct our attention to the possible reason for the disagreement among the translators of the STCL and their Chinese collaborators. The HKSC quotes an unidentified source as saying that Hui-Kuang was one of three disciples of Ratnamati, whereas Tao-ch'ung 道龍 was the only disciple of Bodhiruci.⁸ Tao-ch'ung, the account continues, lived to the north of the Tao⁹ 道 with his four disciples and Hui-Kuang lived to the south with his ten disciples. The unnamed source concludes that the Northern and Southern Schools which subsequently appeared in Lo-yang arose from this geographical division.

The most important new concept introduced to Buddhist scholars in China by the translation of the STCL was that of *ālaya-vijñāna*. Since the STCL was merely a commentary on the STC, a work which, as we have already noted, describes the ten stages of the bodhisattva, it does not contain a systematic presentation of the concept of *ālaya-vijñāna*. Having been composed by Vasubandhu, the STCL takes for granted on the part of the reader an understanding of this complex doctrine, and its references to it can best be described as casual. But if we recall the popularity that the STC

enjoyed in fifth century China, it is not difficult to imagine why it should attract so much attention and lead to a major dispute in the Buddhist world of the day.

According to the Fa-hsiang Sect 法相宗, which since the translation of its basic scripture, the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (CWSL) 成唯識論, in 659 has been considered the orthodox school of Yogācāra Buddhism in East Asia, sentient beings possess eight discrete *viññāna*¹⁰ (*shih* 識). The first five *viññāna* arise from the five sense organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body). The sixth *viññāna*, known as the *mano-viññāna* (*i-shih* 意識, "*viññāna* of the mind"), is the discriminating mind which besides evaluating the perceptions of the five sense *viññāna*, may also arise independently of them. Although the *mano-viññāna* is functioning most of the time, there are periods when it ceases to function,¹¹ which is also true in the case of the five sense *viññāna*. The seventh and eighth *viññāna*, respectively designated in Chinese *mo-na-shih* 末那識 (*manas*; *kliṣṭa-manas*) and *o-lai-yeh-shih* 阿賴耶識 (*ālaya-viññāna*), unlike the first six *viññāna* which are each liable to interruptions, function ceaselessly and serve as a continuum within the sentient being. The *mo-na-shih* is regarded as the source of all illusion for it is this *viññāna* which mistakenly regards the *ālaya-viññāna* as an eternal, unchanging soul (*ātman*), thereby entangling the sentient being in the web of fallacy. The key to this system is to be found in an understanding of the *ālaya-viññāna* which is interpreted in the Fa-hsiang Sect as *tsang-shih* 藏識 ("holding *viññāna*"). The word *tsang* is said to have three meanings: *neng-tsang* 能藏 ("holder"), *so-tsang* 所藏 ("that which is held"), and *chih-tsang* 執藏 ("that which is clung to").¹² *Neng-tsang* refers to the *ālaya* as the holder of the "seeds" (*chung-tzu* 種子, *bija*) from which the phenomenal world is produced. *So-tsang* points to its role as the receiver and holder of all experience (*hsün-hsi*¹³ 熏習; *vāsanā*),

while *chih-tsang* refers to its being the *viññāna* which is falsely clung to as a real *ātman* by unenlightened men. In its *neng-tsang* aspect the *ālaya* is the producer of the mental and physical elements which make up the phenomenal world. It is, therefore, also termed "basic *viññāna*" (*ken-pen-shih* 根本識) in contrast to the other seven *viññāna* which are called "evolved" *viññāna* (*tien-shih* 轉識) in reference to their having been evolved from the "seeds" held within the *ālaya-viññāna*. In the Fa-hsiang system another name for the *ālaya-viññāna* is *ādāna-viññāna*,¹⁴ *ādāna* being interpreted as *chih-ch'ih* 執持 ("holding") because it holds the "seeds" from which all phenomena are produced.¹⁵ The Fa-hsiang Sect makes a technical distinction in the usage of the terms *ālaya* and *ādāna*, the former referring to the eight *viññāna* of sentient beings on any level of religious attainment up to and including the seventh stage of the bodhisattva, whereas the latter refers to the eighth *viññāna* of sentient beings irrespective of their degree of religious attainment.¹⁶ Technically, then, according to this system, we may not speak of the *ālaya-viññāna* of a Buddha, although we may refer to the *ādāna-viññāna* of either a Buddha or an unenlightened man. Since the eighth *viññāna* of a Buddha holds only "seeds" of a pure nature (*wu-lou* 無漏; *anāsrava*), it is called *amala-viññāna* (*o-mo-lo-shih* 阿末羅識; "undefiled *viññāna*").¹⁷ Thus *ālaya*, *ādāna*, and *amala* are different names for what is essentially the same *viññāna*. The eight *viññāna* described above are arranged in three categories according to their attributes: the first is designated *citta* (*hsin* 心) and refers to the eighth *viññāna*; the second is designated *manas* (*i* 意) and refers to the seventh *viññāna* (*mo-na-shih*); the third is simply designated *viññāna* and refers to the five sense *viññāna* as well as the sixth "discriminating" *viññāna* (*i-shih*).¹⁸ Although all eight *viññāna* are described as conditioned (*yu-wei* 有爲; *saṃskṛta*), i. e., impermanent and everchanging, their

"true underlying substance" (*shih-hsing* 實性) is said to be unconditioned (*wu-wei* 無爲, *asaṃskṛta*), i. e., permanent, real, and ineffable. This "true substance" which underlies all phenomena is variously termed *chen-ju* 眞如 ("suchness", *tathatā*), *tathāgata-garbha*, *nirvāṇa*, *li* 理 ("underlying principle") as opposed to *shih* 事, ("phenomena"), etc., and direct insight into it constitutes the realm of enlightenment. The *tathatā* is the ineffable reality upon which all conditioned phenomena depend, but it is knowable only in the stage of Buddhahood.

This complex system of eight *viññāna* outlined above is based upon the description in the *CWSL* and has been regarded as orthodox in East Asia since the middle of the seventh century. But, as we have noted above, the concept of *ālaya-viññāna* was first introduced to the learned Buddhist world in China when Bodhiruci translated the *STCL* which contains five brief references to it. Since there was no systematic exposition available, disputes soon occurred between the two major disciples of the translators, largely owing to the ambiguous nature of the references to the *ālaya-viññāna* which we cite hereunder. On a passage in the *STC* stating that the mind and the foetus begin to develop in the womb simultaneously, Vasubandhu comments tersely that "mind" refers to the *ālaya-viññāna*,¹⁹ although he gives no explanation of what this might be. In another passage Vasubandhu lists four types of futile endeavors to attain release from worldly bondage, the second of which he describes thus: "Ordinary men, being ignorant and having false views, seek release [from suffering] in their [so-called] soul and its attributes, when, in fact, they ought to seek it in their *ālaya-viññāna* and *ādana-viññāna*."²⁰ Further on in the *STC* there is a list of ten types of meditation practiced by a sixth stage bodhisattva, the fourth of which is identified by Vasubandhu as "meditation on the *ālaya-viññāna*."²¹ Again, regarding the bodhisattva

of the eighth stage who can no longer be affected by illusion, Vasubandhu comments that this is so because he abides in the *tathatā* of the *ālaya-viññāna*.²² Lastly, Vasubandhu declares that the six *viññāna* and the perfuming of "seeds"²³ within the *ālaya viññāna* together constitute one of the ten categories of worldly bondage which a bodhisattva in the ninth stage must comprehend.²⁴

It is obvious that if we come to this text without any prior understanding of what the *ālaya-viññāna* is, these five references may well seem to represent two conflicting views: the first is that it is something impure belonging to the realm of illusion and the second is that it is the source of enlightenment. The understanding of the *ālaya-viññāna* was further complicated by repeated statements that the three categories of *citta*, *manas*, and *viññāna* (*hsin-i-shih* 心意識) must be eliminated by the bodhisattva in his progress toward enlightenment,²⁵ although an attempt was made to link these three categories to the terms *ālaya-viññāna* and *ādana-viññāna* occurring in the same text. In the first and last passages that we have cited above, the *ālaya-viññāna* is regarded as a cause of bondage, but in the fourth passage, it is mentioned in conjunction with the *chen-ju*, i. e., the "absolute reality" of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The important question, then, to the learned Buddhist priests at the beginning of the sixth century was, Is the *ālaya-viññāna* the same as *tathatā*, in which case it must be beyond defilement, or is it in some respect distinct from *tathatā*, which would allow it to be impure? Since the *STC* had already established that the phenomenal world is produced from the mind (*citta*; *hsin* 心),²⁶ the question could be put another way, Has the phenomenal world which is tainted with illusion evolved from an *ālaya-viññāna* which is likewise tainted or has the phenomenal world evolved in some manner from the *tathatā*, which, as absolute reality, cannot be regarded as tainted? The proposition is thus

reduced to the fundamental question of whether or not tainted phenomena (*yu-lou-fa* 有漏法) can be produced by something untainted (*wu-lou-fa* 無漏法). This question, first raised by the translation of the *STCL* at the beginning of the sixth century, has remained one of supreme importance in East Asian Buddhism to the present day.

The *HKSC*, as we have already seen, records that the differences over the interpretation of the *STCL* led to the emergence of a Northern School and a Southern School, but does not specify the nature of these differences. Chih-i 智顗 (538-597) likewise mentions the emergence of a Northern and a Southern School in his *Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i* 妙法蓮華經玄義, but it falls to his commentator Chan-jan 湛然 (716-782) to elucidate the point of difference between the two: "The Northern School regarded the *ālaya* as that upon which phenomena depend [for their production], whereas the Southern School held that it was the *tathatā* (*chen-ju*) which was the source. Both Schools followed the teachings of Vasubandhu. Yet their interpretations were as incompatible as fire and water."²⁷ Lack of material prevents us from examining further the disagreement between Hui-kuang, the exponent of the Southern School, and Tao-ch'ung, the exponent of the Northern School. All that we may say on the basis of Chan-jan's brief comment is that the Northern School viewed the *ālaya-vijñāna* as the source from which all phenomena emerged, whereas the Southern School held that it was the *tathatā* which was the source of all phenomena. The position of the Northern School, it will be noted, seems to coincide with that of the orthodox Fa-hsiang Sect introduced by Hsüan-tsang 玄奘.

Although we know the names of the disciples of Tao-ch'ung, it is not possible to trace the further development of his school. However, the subsequent development of the Southern School of Hui-kuang can be followed with some degree of clarity. The major

disciple of Hui-kuang was the learned priest Fa-shang 法上 (494-579). Two incomplete fascicles of Fa-shang's commentary on the *STCL* were found at Tun-huang and have been published in Volume 85 of the *Taishō daizōkyō*. From this commentary we can get an indication of how the three categories of *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* were regarded by the Southern School. On the passage in the *STCL*: "The *dharmakāya*²⁸ is free from *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*" Fa-shang comments: "*Citta* means the seventh *citta*, *manas* means the sixth *manas*, and *vijñāna* means the five *vijñāna*. Therefore the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* states: *Citta* is the collector [i. e., holder (?) of all types of experience], *manas* is that which collects broadly [these experiences], and *vijñāna* is that which perceives the five [types of sense data]. When one is free from these seven types of *vijñāna*, a transformation occurs which leads to the realization of the wisdom [of enlightenment]".²⁹ This passage is interesting for three reasons. First, it establishes that the early followers of the *STCL* school admitted only seven types of *vijñāna* and not the usual eight. Secondly, it shows that there was as yet no understanding of the concept of *mo-na-shih*. Thirdly, it reveals that *citta* was equated with the *ālaya-vijñāna*, *manas* with the *mano-vijñāna*, while *vijñāna* embraced only the five sense *vijñāna*. Since Fa-shang's system made no allowance for an independent *mo-na-shih*, it was inevitable that he should split the first six *vijñāna*, which in the orthodox Fa-hsiang tradition are all classified under the broad heading of *vijñāna*, into two distinct groups, the first consisting of *mano-vijñāna*, and the second consisting of the sense *vijñāna*. Thus, instead of *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* corresponding to the eighth, seventh, and first six *vijñāna* as they do in the Fa-hsiang Sect, they are made to correspond to the eighth, sixth, and five types respectively. Concerning the relation between the *tathatā* and the *ālaya-vijñāna*, Fa-shang writes: "[The three

categories of existence] are existence seen as dependent origination (*paratantra-svabhāva*), illusory existence (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), and existence seen as *tathatā* (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). The first category represents the seventh *viññāna* which is the *ālaya*. This is the source (*pen* 本) of birth and death. The second category comprises the six [other] *viññāna* which discriminate falsely and cling to their respective areas of perception. The third category is the Buddha-nature.... These three categories are not distinct from one another ...³⁰ This seemingly sharp cleavage between *tathatā* and the seven *viññāna* may be due to a curious statement found only in Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*: "Because the *tathāgata-garbha viññāna* is not situated in the *ālaya-viññāna*, the seven types of *viññāna* appear and disappear. The *tathāgata-garbha viññāna*, however, neither appears nor disappears (i. e., it is beyond change)."³¹ Yet, on the very same page of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* we also read: "The *ālaya-viññāna* is called *tathāgata-garbha* and functions with the seven illusory *viññāna*." Since the sutra which Fa-shang was using both affirms and denies the identity of the *tathāgata-garbha* and *ālaya-viññāna*, it is not surprising to discover, then, this dual attitude reflected in Fa-shang's own understanding of the *ālaya-viññāna*. We have already seen that, on the one hand, he considers it to be one of the seven impure *viññāna* which are transformed when enlightenment is realized. However, on the other hand, he declares: "...illusory existence does not arise without having its support. Illusion is dependent upon the *tathatā*.... Therefore the sutra says: 'Because of [the existence of] the *tathāgata-garbha* we may speak of birth and death.' Thus the *tathāgata-garbha* is the source of all phenomena."³² Fa-shang then goes on to state: "Of the eight *viññāna* seven lack substance of their own, being merely separate functions of the *tathatā*."³³ Fa-shang's view of the *ālaya-viññāna* may be

summarized in the following manner: the *citta*, *manas*, and *viññāna* correspond respectively to the seventh *viññāna* (*ālaya*), sixth *viññāna* (*mano-viññāna*), and five sense *viññāna*. The *ālaya-viññāna* from which the six other *viññāna* are produced is an entity existing in accordance with the laws of dependent origination (*paratantra-svabhāva*) and rests on a foundation of *tathatā* (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). The latter is seen as the real substance, the former as the function. Thus, the *ālaya*, as the producer of the six *viññāna* (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), is impure, but when regarded as the function of *tathatā* it may be considered pure. However, when the *tathatā* is conceived of as an entity distinct from the *ālaya* (which always carries the connotation of impurity), it may be regarded as an eighth *viññāna*.

The last great commentator on the *STCL* was Hui-yüan 慧遠 (523-592), who, as a disciple of Fa-shang, is traditionally thought of as belonging to the *STCL* school. But unlike Hui-kuang and Fa-shang who interpreted the *STCL* through the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Hui-yüan's understanding of the *STCL* is evidently based upon the doctrines of the Yogācāra School transmitted by Paramārtha, who had arrived in Kuang-chou in 546. The *HKSC* states that Hui-yüan studied Paramārtha's translation of the *She ta-ch'eng lun* (*STL*) 攝大乘論 (*Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*) under T'an-ch'ien 曇遷, the foremost exponent of the *STL* in north China.³⁴ Hui-yüan's writings reveal so strong an influence from the translations of Paramārtha that he can no longer be regarded simply as an orthodox exponent of the Ratnamati — Hui-kuang — Fa-shang tradition. Hui-yüan produced a fourteen fascicle commentary on the *STCL* known as the *STCL I-chi* 義記 of which the first nine fascicles survive. From this commentary as well as from his encyclopedia of Buddhist doctrine, the *Ta-ch'eng i-chang* (*TIC*) 大乘義章 we can get a rather clear

picture of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, which differs substantially from that of his teacher Fa-shang.

In his commentary on the *STCL* Hui-yüan writes: "The word *ālaya* is translated into Chinese as *wu-mo-shih* 無沒識 ("vijñāna without loss"). It is so called because it is the *tathāgata-garbha* mind (*hsin*) which, although passing through the cycle of birth and death as a result of external conditions, suffers no loss of its essential substance."³⁵ Hui-yüan here equates the *ālaya* with the *tathāgata-garbha*, i. e., the *tathatā*. This can be seen even more clearly in the discussion of the term *ālaya* in his *TIC*. "According to its attributes the word *ālaya* is given eight names. The first is *tsang-shih* 藏識 ("receptacle *vijñāna*"), because it is the *vijñāna* of the *tathāgata-garbha*. . . . It serves as the receptacle for the infinite elements of Buddhahood. . . . The second is *sheng-shih* 聖識 ("Sage *vijñāna*"), because from it emerge the functions of the Great Sages (Buddhas) The third is *ti-i-i-shih* 第一義識 ("vijñāna of the highest level of reality"). . . . The fourth is *ching-shih* 淨識 ("pure *vijñāna*"). . . . The fifth is *chen-shih* 真識 ("true *vijñāna*"). . . . The sixth is *chen-ju-shih* 真如識 ("*tathatā-vijñāna*"). . . . The seventh is *chia-shih* 家識 or *chai-shih* 宅識 ("abode *vijñāna*"), because it is that upon which illusory phenomena depend. The eighth is *pen-shih* 本識 ("source *vijñāna*"), because it is the source of the illusory mind."³⁶ According to Hui-yüan, the *ālaya-vijñāna* signifies, on the one side, the *tathatā*, as is indicated by its first six names, while, on the other, it is the source of illusory phenomena (seventh and eighth names). His view of the *ālaya* in this respect is similar to that of the *Ta-ch'eng ch'i hsin lun* (CHL) 大乘起信論 which speaks of the *ālaya* as being divided into *hsin-shen-ju* 心真如 and *hsin-sheng-mieh* 心生滅 (pure and defiled aspects of mind) and probably is attributable to the influence of this work.³⁷ Nevertheless, for Hui-yüan the *ālaya* is

primarily an undefiled entity which is obscured by ignorance and thus becomes the source from which tainted phenomena arise. When the *tathatā* is completely free of all defilement, Hui-yüan says that it is called the *amala-vijñāna* ("*vijñāna* without defilement") which may be regarded as a discrete ninth *vijñāna*. The nine *vijñāna*, he contends, can be divided into two groupings: in the first grouping the eighth and ninth *vijñāna* (*ālaya* and *amala*) are pure, while the remaining seven are impure; in the second grouping only the ninth *vijñāna* is pure.³⁸

We have observed above that one passage in the *STCL* juxtaposes *ādāna-vijñāna* and *ālaya-vijñāna*. Since Fa-shang regards the *ālaya-vijñāna* as the seventh *vijñāna*, it is safe to assume that he considered the term *ādāna-vijñāna* to be merely another name for the *ālaya-vijñāna*, as indeed it is in the Fa-hsiang Sect. His pupil Hui-yüan, having raised *ālaya* to the status of eighth *vijñāna*, declares that the seventh *vijñāna* is named *ādāna*, which he thereby distinguishes from *ālaya*. He writes in his *TIC*: "The word *ādāna* is translated into Chinese as *wu-chieh-shih* 無解識 ("the *vijñāna* of illusion"). It is so called because its substance is the ignorant and unknowing mind (*hsin*). According to its attributes *ādāna* is given eight names. The first is *wu-ming-shih* 無明識 ("*vijñāna* of ignorance"), because its substance is fundamental ignorance. The second is *yeh-shih* 業識 ("*vijñāna* of acts"), because it functions as a result of ignorance. . . . The third is *tien-shih* 轉識 ("*vijñāna* of evolution"), because, relying upon the *yeh-shih*, it evolves external forms which are discriminated. . . . The fourth is *hsien-shih* 現識 ("*vijñāna* of manifestation"). . . . The fifth is *chih-shih* 智識 ("*vijñāna* of judgment"). . . . The sixth is *hsiang-hsü-shih* 相續識 ("*vijñāna* of continuity"), because it perceives without interruption. . . . and holds the results of good and evil acts without loss. The seventh is *wang-shih* 妄識

("illusory *viñāna*"), because the preceding six aspects of it are unreal. The eighth is *chih-shih* 執識 ("*viñāna* of clinging"), because it clings to an imagined *ātman* as well as to all illusory forms."³⁹

From the foregoing passage we can see that the *ādāna-viñāna* in Hui-yüan's system is both the source of all illusion as well as the producer of the phenomenal world. As the source of illusion it agrees broadly with the *mo-na-shih* which is the seventh *viñāna* in the orthodox Fa-hsiang Sect. When Hui-yüan imputes to his seventh *viñāna* the function of producer of the sixth *viñāna*, he is actually assigning to it the role of the *ālaya-viñāna*. That he should do so is perhaps inevitable from his standpoint because, having declared the *ālaya-viñāna* and *tathatā* to be identical, he must assign the function of producer of the six illusory *viñāna* to another entity which is impure. It is interesting to note that five of the eight names which Hui-yüan attributes to the *ādāna-viñāna* occur in the same order in the *CHL*, but, as we might expect, these five names represent different functions of the *ālaya-viñāna*.⁴⁰ Hui-yüan's designation of the seventh *viñāna* as *ādāna* can probably be attributed to the influence of Paramārtha who likewise regards the *ādāna* as the seventh *viñāna*.

SUMMARY

The concept of *ālaya-viñāna* was first taken up seriously by Buddhist scholars in China after the translation of the *STCL* and *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. Owing to the obscure nature of the references to it in the *STCL*, opinion differed as to whether it was to be regarded as pure or impure: the Northern School represented by Tao-ch'ung held that *ālaya* was impure, whereas the Southern School represented by Hui-kuang held that it was pure. It is to be noted that the position of the Northern School seems to be parallel to that of the Fa-hsiang Sect.

Hui-kuang's disciple Fa-shang considered the *ālaya*, as the source of the phenomenal world, to be primarily impure. But since it was a function of the *tathatā* and depended upon the latter, it also had a pure aspect. He regarded it as the seventh of eight *viñāna*, the first six being the usual ones of sense and mind, while the eighth was the *tathatā*.

Hui-yüan, who in his youth had been a disciple of Fa-shang, likewise considered the *ālaya* to be a blend of both a pure and impure nature, although, probably as a result of the influence of the *CHL* which was widely read at this time, he regarded it as essentially pure. Illusion stemmed from the *ādāna-viñāna* which falsely clung to the *ālaya* as a soul. The *ādāna* in addition to being the source of illusion, was also regarded as the source from which the phenomenal world emerged. The *tathatā* in its absolute, undefiled state was called *amala-viñāna* by Hui-yüan and was designated the ninth in a system of nine *viñāna*, the *ālaya* being the eighth and the *ādāna*, the seventh. By calling the seventh *viñāna* the *ādāna-viñāna*, Hui-yüan reveals his indebtedness to the translations of Paramārtha. His system of nine *viñāna* has traditionally been said to have been taken from Paramārtha as well, but it may be questioned whether Paramārtha himself ever advocated a doctrine of nine *viñāna*.⁴¹

The theory of nine *viñāna* and the misconceptions about the nature of the *ādāna-viñāna* persisted until Hsüan-tsang and Tz'u-en 慈恩 established the Fa-hsiang Sect in the middle of the seventh century. The terms *ādāna-viñāna* and *amala-viñāna* were shown to represent different aspects of the *ālaya-viñāna*, which was the eighth in a series of eight *viñāna*, the seventh being the *mo-na-shih* (*kliṣṭa-manas*), which, by erroneously perceiving the *ālaya*, was the source of illusion. The *tathatā* was declared to be the reality upon which the phenomenal world rested, although it was characterized

as being neither the same as nor different from the eight *vijñāna*.

1. The *Li-tai san-pao chi* (SPC) 歷代三寶記 (*Taishō daizōkyō* (T) 大正藏經 49. 84b) mentions a four fascicle version of a *Leng-ch'ieh ching* translated by T'an-wu-ch'en 曇無讖 (Dharmarakṣa?) who was assassinated in the year 433. This entry must be regarded as doubtful since it is not confirmed by the earlier catalogue *Ch'u san-tsang chi-chi* (CSTCC) 出三藏記集. The T'an-wu-ch'en version was already listed as lost by the year 730 (*K'ai-yüan shih-chiao lu* 開元釋教錄, T. 55, 520a).
2. Matsumoto Bunsaburō 松本文三郎, *Daruma* 達磨 (Tokyo, 1916) pp. 128-155.
3. The SPC also mentions a translation in twelve fascicles by Nieh Tao-chen 聶道真 entitled *Shih-chu ching*, but this is not confirmed by the CSTCC. Cf. T. 49, 65c.
4. The authenticity of the preface has been questioned by Dr. Fuse Kōgaku 布施浩岳 on the following grounds: (1) The preface states that the translation was begun in the fourth month of the first year of Yung-p'ing 永平 (508), although the year-period Yung-p'ing was not inaugurated until the eighth month. If the translation actually did begin in the fourth month, the year should be designated "fifth year of Cheng-shih 正始." (2) In the preface Bodhiruci's name is transcribed 菩提留支 instead of 菩提流支 which is the form given in the SPC. (3) The SPC does not give any translations for Buddhaśānti before the year 525. The second and third arguments do not carry much weight in themselves: 留 is often substituted for 流 in transliterations of Sanskrit names, while the failure of the SPC to mention any translation activity by Buddhaśānti before 525 does not mean that he could not have collaborated with Bodhiruci in 508. The discrepancy in the date is a more plausible argument. It should be remembered, however, that since the preface is supposed to have been written at least four years after the translation was begun, an error in dating may have occurred. Cf. Fuse Kōgaku, "Jūjikyōron no den'yaku to namboku nidō no ranshō" 十地經論の傳譯と南北二道の濫觴 *Bukkyō kenkyū* 佛教研究1 (1937). 1. 126-138.
5. T. 49, 86b.
6. T. 50, 429a.
7. T. 50, 607c.
8. T. 50, 482c.
9. *Tao* here probably refers to one of the main thoroughfares of Lo-

- yang. For a detailed discussion of the various interpretations of this word see Fuse Kōgaku, "Jūjikyōron...", *Bukkyō* 1 (1937). 1. 138-142.
10. Usually translated as "consciousness," although this word does not cover its meaning adequately. *vijñāna* is interpreted in Chinese as *liao-pieh* 了別, "perceiving and discriminating."
 11. During deep sleep, certain types of meditation, etc. Cf. *Shindō jō-yuishiki-ron* (SJYR) 新導成唯識論 (Nara, 1941) p. 305 ff.
 12. SJYR, p. 63.
 13. Literally, "seed-perfuming." The process whereby "seeds" are planted within the *ālaya-vijñāna* is designated "perfuming."
 14. For a discussion of the meaning of *adāna-vijñāna* see Yūki Reimon 結城令聞 *Shin-i-shiki-ron yori mitaru yuishiki shisō-shi* 心意識論より見たる唯識思想 (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 185-194.
 15. SJYR, p. 111.
 16. Fukaura Seibun 深浦正文, *Yuishiki-gaku kenkyū* 唯識學研究 (Kyoto, 1954) vol. ii, p. 248.
 17. The text of the CWSL gives *wu-kou-shih* 無垢識, the Chinese equivalent of *o-mo-lo-shih*. The interlinear note taken from Tz'u-en's 慈恩 commentary gives the phonetic transcription. Cf. SJYR p. 112.
 18. SJYR, p. 157.
 19. T. 26, 142b.
 20. T. 26, 170c.
 21. T. 26, 172b.
 22. T. 26, 180a.
 23. Cf. Note 13.
 24. T. 26, 188b.
 25. T. 26, 125b, 179b, 179c.
 26. T. 26, 169a.
 27. Echō 慧澄, *Hokke gengi shakusen bōchū* 法華玄義釋籤傍註 (Kyōto, 1902) 9A.36a.
 28. The eternal body of a Buddha which is without spatial or temporal limitations.
 29. T. 85, 763c.
 30. T. 85, 764b.
 31. T. 16, 556c.
 32. T. 85, 771b, c.
 33. T. 85, 771c.
 34. T. 50, 572c.
 35. *Dainihon zokuzōkyō* 大日本續藏經 1. 71. 3. 218b.

36. T. 44, 524c.
37. T. 32, 576a.
38. T. 44, 530c.
39. T. 44, 524c.
40. T. 32, 577b.
41. Although T'ang scholars regularly speak of Paramārtha's "doctrine of nine *viññāna*," it is difficult to find convincing evidence in either his translations or his commentaries appended to them that he actually regarded the *amala-viññāna* as being totally distinct from the *alaya-viññāna*. A formidable argument has been advanced by Professor Yūki against Paramārtha's alleged authorship of a *Chiu-shih i-chi* 九識義記. Cf. Yūki Reimon, "Shina yuishikigaku-shi ni okeru ryōga-shi no chii" 支那唯識學史に於ける楞伽師の地位 *Shina bukk'yō-shigaku* 支那佛教史學 1 (1937). 1. 21-44.

THE DIMENSIONS OF PRACTICE IN HUA-YEN THOUGHT

Taitetsu UNNO

The *Fo-tsu t'ung-chi* 佛祖統記 contains the definitive criticism of Hua-yen 華嚴 Buddhism made by the Buddhist historian Chih-p'an 志磐 of the Sung Dynasty:

The (Hua-yen) Five Teachings fail to show the method of sundering defilements. Thus, whether it be the teaching 教 or the cultivation of insight 觀, they pointlessly exposit empty words. Truly, they lack the practical path to attainment. Furthermore, Hsien-shou, having established the Five Teachings, clarified the cultivation of insight in (his commentary on) the *Ch'i-hsin lun* by writing that the method of insight is to be found in T'ien-t'ai's *Mo-ho chih-kuan*.¹

This criticism of the Hua-yen neglect of the practical not only conceals the polemical assessment of T'ien-t'ai, its great rival school in the Sung, but expresses the popular view held by the general Buddhist world. While it is true that Fa-tsang 法藏, also titled Hsien-shou 賢首, granted to T'ien-t'ai the method of insight,² this evaluation alone precludes the comprehension of Hua-yen thought both as a historical phenomenon and as a creative achievement. In this paper I propose to show the dimensions of practice 行 underlying Hua-yen thought as conceived by Tu-shun 杜順 (557-640), Chih-yen 智儼 (602-688), and Fa-tsang (643-712).³ The scope will be limited to the first three Hua-yen patriarchs; the latter two, Ch'eng-kuan 澄觀 (738-839) and Tsung-mi 宗密 (780-841), come after the rebellion of An Lu-shan 安祿山, which wrought a great change upon the

THE MAHA BODHI

*A monthly Journal of International Buddhist Brotherhood
Founded by the Venerable Anagarika Dharmapala in 1892.*

Volume 72

May 1964

Number 5

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ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA (Store-Consciousness)

Original Conception found in Theravāda Pāli Canon

By

VENERABLE DR. WALPOLA RAHULA

In the *Yogācāra* (-*Vijñānavāda*) School of Buddhism, *ālayavijñāna* is one of the most important doctrines developed by Asaṅga (4th Century A.C.). He divides the *viññānaskandha* (Aggregate of Consciousness), the fifth of the five *skandhas*, into three different aspects or layers, namely, *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna*. In the Theravāda *Tipiṭaka* as well as in the Pali Commentaries, these three terms—*citta*, *manas*, *viññāna*—are considered as synonyms denoting the same thing¹. The Sarvāstivāda also takes them as synonyms². Even the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, which is purely a Mahāyāna text, calls them synonyms³ although their separate functions are mentioned elsewhere in the same sūtra.⁴ Vasubandhu too in his *Viṃśatikā*—

viññaptimātratāsiddhi considers them as synonyms.⁵ Since any one of these three terms *citta*, *manas*, *viññāna*—represents some aspect, even though not all aspects, of the fifth Aggregate *viññānaskandha*, they may roughly be considered as synonyms.

However, for Asaṅga, *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna* are three different and distinct aspects of the *viññānaskandha*. He defines this Aggregate as follows:

“What is the definition of the Aggregate of Consciousness (*viññānaskandha*)? It is mind (*citta*), mental organ (*manas*) and also consciousness (*viññāna*).

“And there what is mind (*citta*)? It is *ālayavijñāna* (Store-Consciousness) containing all seeds (*sarvabījaka*), impregnated with the traces (impressions) (*vāsanā-paribhāvita*) of Aggregates (*skandha*), Elements (*dhātu*) and Spheres (*āyatana*)...

“What is mental organ (*manas*)? It is the object of *ālaya-vijñāna*, always having the nature of self-notion (self-conceit) (*manyānātmaka*) associated with four defilements, viz., the false idea of self (*ātmadr̥ṣṭi*), self-love (*ātmasneha*), the conceit of ‘I am’ (*asmimāna*) and ignorance (*avidyā*)....

“What is consciousness (*viññāna*)? It consists of the six groups of consciousness (*ṣaḍ viññānakāyāḥ*), viz., visual conscious-

¹ In the Vbh (PTS) p. 403, to the question *katamāni satta cittāni* “What are the seven minds?” the answer is: *cakkuviññānaṃ, sotagghāna-jivhā-kāyaviññānaṃ, manodhātu, mano-viññānadhātu*. So *citta*, *mano* and *viññāna* are synonymous. Dhs. also (p. 209, § 1187) to the question *katame dhammā cittā?* gives the same answer as the above in Vbh. Vsm p. 452 says: *viññānaṃ cittam manoti atthato ekam*. See also D.I., p. 21; S II, pp. 94-95; Vbh. p. 87.

² *Cittam mano 'tha viññānam ekārtham*. Kośa, II, 34.

³ *Cittam vikalpo vijñaptir mano viññānam eva ca ālayam tribhavaśceṣṭā ete cittasya paryayāḥ*. *Lankā*, p. 322.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 46: *Cittena cīyate karma, manasā ca vicīyate, viññānena vijānāti, dṛśyaṃ kalpeti pañcabhiḥ*.

⁵ *Cittam mano viññānam vijñaptiś ceti paryayāḥ*. *Viṃśatikā*, p. 3.

ness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), auditory (*śrotra*)—olfactory (*ghrāṇa*)—gustatory (*jihvā*)—tactile (*kāya*)—and mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*)... ”⁶

Thus we can see that *vijñāna* represents the simple reaction or response of the sense-organs when they come in contact with the external objects. This is the uppermost or superficial aspect or layer of the *vijñānaskandha*. *Manas* represents the aspect of its mental functioning, thinking, reasoning, conceiving ideas etc. *Citta*, which is here called *ālayavijñāna*, represents the deepest, finest and subtlest aspect or layer of the Aggregate of Consciousness. It contains all the traces or impressions of the past actions and all good and bad future potentialities. The *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* also says that *ālayavijñāna* is called *citta* (Tibetan *sems*).⁷

It is generally believed that *ālayavijñāna* is purely a Mahāyāna doctrine and that nothing about it is found in the ‘Hīnayāna’. But in the *Mahāyānasāṅgraha*⁸ Asaṅga himself says that in the Śrāvakayāna (= Hīnayāna) it is mentioned by synonyms (*paryāya*) and refers to a passage in the *Ekottarāgama* which reads: “People (*prajā*) like the *ālaya* (*ālayarata*) are fond of the *ālaya* (*ālayārāma*), are delighted in the *ālaya* (*ālayasammudita*) are attached to the *ālaya* (*ālayābhirata*).

⁶ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Pradhan ed., Visva-Bharati, 1950) pp. 11-12. The same definitions of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are given briefly in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* p. 174 (XIX, 76) : *Cittam ālayavijñānam, manas tadāmbanam ātmadrstyādisamprayuktam, vijñānaṃ śaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*.

⁷ *Sandhinirmocanasūtra*, texte tibétain édité et traduit par Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935, pp. 55, 185.

⁸ *Mahāyānasāṅgraha*, traduction Lamotte, p. 26.

When the Dharma is preached for the destruction of the *ālaya*, they wish to listen (*śuśruṣṭi*) and lend their ears (*śrotram avadadhatī*), they put forth a will for the perfect knowledge (*ājñācittam upasthāpayati*) and follow the path of Truth (*dharmānudharmapratipanna*). When the Tathāgata appears in the world (*prādurbhāva*), this marvellous (*āścarya*) and extraordinary (*adbhuta*) Dharma appears in the world.”

Lamotte identifies this *Ekottarāgama* passage with the following passage in the Pali *Anguttaranikāya* (A II, p. 131) : *Ālayarāmā bhikkhave pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā, sā Tathāgatena anālaye dhamme desiyamāne sussūyati sotaṃ odahati aññācittam upaṭṭāpeti. Tathāgatassa bhikkhave arahato sammāsambuddhassa pātubhāvā ayaṃ paṭhamo acchariyo abbhuto dhammo pātubhavati.*

Besides this *Anguttara* passage, the term *ālaya* in the same sense is found in several other places of the Pali Canon.⁹ The Pali Commentaries explain this term as “attachment to the five sense-pleasures”,¹⁰ and do not go deeper than that. But this also is an aspect of the *ālayavijñāna*.

In the *Lankāvatārasūtra* the term *tathāgatagarbha* is used as a synonym for *ālayavijñāna*¹¹ and is described as ‘luminous by nature’ (*prakṛtiṣṭabhāsvara*) and “pure by nature” (*prakṛtiṣṭuddha*) but appearing as impure “because it is sullied by adventitious defilements” (*āgantuk-*

⁹ E.g. M I, p. 167; S I, p. 136; Vinaya I, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ālayarāmāti sattā pañcasu kāmāgūṇesu ālayanti*, MA II, p. 174. *Ālayarāmāti sattā pañcakāmāgūṇe alliyanti* (*Samantapāsādikā*, *Mahāvaggaṇṇanā*, Colombo, 1900, p. 153). *pañcakāmāgūṇālaya*, Vsm. p. 293.

¹¹ *Lankā*, pp. 221, 222.

leśopakliṣṭatayā).¹² In the *Anguttarani-kāya*¹³ *citta* is described as "luminous" (*pabhassara*), but it is "sullied by adventitious minor defilements" (*āgantukehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ*).¹⁴ One may notice here that *ālayavijñāna* (or *tathāgatgarbha*) and *citta* are described almost by the same terms. We have seen earlier that the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* says that *ālayavijñāna* is also called *citta*. Asanga too mentions that it is named *citta*.¹⁵

It is this *ālayavijñāna* or *citta* that is considered by men as their 'Soul', 'Self', 'Ego' or *Ātman*.¹⁶ Here we may remember, as a concrete example, that Sāti, one of the Buddha's disciples, took *viññāṇa* (*vijñāna*)¹⁷ in this sense and that the Buddha reprimanded him for this wrong view.¹⁸

The attainment of Nirvāṇa is achieved by "the revolution of *ālayavijñāna*" which

¹² *Ibid.* pp. 77, 222. Suzuki (*Studies in the Lankāvatārasūtra*, p. 182) says: "...The *Lankāvatāra* differs from the *Yogācāra* in one important point, i.e., that while the latter maintains that the *Ālaya* is absolutely pure and has nothing to do with defilements and evil passions, the *Lankāvatāra* and *Aśvaghosha* maintain the view that the *Tathāgata-garbha* or the *Ālaya* is the storage of the impure as well as the pure..." But this is not so. The *Yogācāra* also considers that the *Ālaya* is the storage of defilements. Cf. *Sarvasāṃkleśikadharmabījasthānavād ālayaḥ* "It is called *Ālaya* because it is the place for the seeds of all the defilements". *Triṃśikā*, p. 18. Cf. also *ālayavijñānāśritadauṣṭhulya*, *ibid.* p. 22.

¹³ A I p. 10.

¹⁴ The Commentary says that here "*citta* means *bhavaṅgacitta*" *cittanti bhavaṅgacittaṃ*.

¹⁵ *Mahāyāsangraha*, p. 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 14; *Triṃśikā*, pp. 16, 22; D I, p. 21.

¹⁷ Here it should be remembered that *ālayavijñāna* is one of the eight *vijñānas*.

¹⁸ M I, p. 256 ff. *Mahātaṇhāsāṃkhaya-sutta*.

is called *āśrayaparāvṛtti*.¹⁹ The same idea is conveyed by the expression *ālayasamugghāta* "uprooting of *ālaya*" which is used in the Pali Canon as a synonym for Nirvāṇa.²⁰ Here we should remember also that *anālaya* "no-*ālaya*" is another synonym for Nirvāṇa.²¹

The *ālayavijñānaparāvṛtti* is sometimes called *bijaparāvṛtti* "revolution of the seeds" as well.²² *Bīja* here signifies the "seeds" of defilements (*sāṃkleśikadharmabīja*) which cause the continuity of *saṃsāra*. By the "revolution of these seeds" one attains Nirvāṇa. Again the Pali term *khīṇabīja*,²³ which is used to denote an arahant whose "seeds of defilements are destroyed", expresses the same idea.

Thus one may see that, although not developed as in the *Mahāyāna*, the original idea of *ālayavijñāna* was already there in the Pali Canon of the Theravāda.

¹⁹ *āśrayasya parāvṛtṭir iti: āśrayotra sarva-bijakam ālayavijñānam.* (*Triṃśikā*, p. 44).

ālayavijñānāśritadauṣṭhulyaniravaśeṣaprahāṇād ālayavijñānaṃ vyāvṛttaṃ bhavati. Sai va ca arhad avasthā. (*ibid.* p. 22).

...vijñānānaṃ parāvṛtṭiḥ anāsravo dhātur vimuktiḥ. (*Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XI, 44).

āśrayasya parāvṛtṭim anutpādaṃ vadāmy aha āśrayasya parāvṛtṭim anutpādaṃ vadāmy aham. (*Lankā*, p. 202).

²⁰ E.g. A II, p. 34; III, p. 35: *...madanimma-dano pīpāsavinayo ālayasamugghāto vaṭṭupacched dano pīpāsavinayo ālayasamugghāto vaṭṭupacchedo taṇhakkhaya virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.*

²¹ S IV, p. 372; also: *yo tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāgaṇirodho paṇinissaggo mutti anālayo*, S V, p. 421 and *passim*.

²² *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XI, 44: *bijaparāvṛtṭer ity ālayavijñānaparāvṛtṭitap.*

²³ *Te khīṇabījā avirūḷhicchandā nibbanti dhīrā ...in the Ratanasutta, Sn. p. 41.*

The *bīja* theory of the *Yogācāra* should be compared with the *abhisaṃkṣhāravijñāna* (= *bīja*) of the Theravāda.

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
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Bulletin of Tibetology



VOL. IX

No. 1

15 FEBRUARY 1972
NAMGYAL INSTITUTE OF TIBETOLOGY
GANGTOK, SIKKIM.

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15 February 1972

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STORE-CONSCIOUSNESS

(Alaya-Vijnana)

A Grand Concept of the Yogacara Buddhists

N.A. Sastri.

Mind has three designations: citta, manas and vijnana, which indicate one and the same thing (v. Pancavastuka, p. 36). Some authors distinguish as follows: What is past is manas; what is to come is citta and what is present is vijnana. They are further explained. It is called citta considering its movement to a distant past; it is manas considering its previous movement and it is vijnana considering its tendency to rebirth (v. Ibid). A similar distinction is admitted by the Yogacaras: citta is Alayavijnana; Manas is klistam manas (defiled mind) as well as the mind of immediate past moment; vijnana is what cognizes the object in the present moment (Yogacarabhumi, p. 11). The Sarvastivadina too say that the immediate past moment of consciousness is manas, i.e. mana indriya, and vijnana is what cognizes its each object (विज्ञानं प्रतिविज्ञप्तिः, vijñānam prativijñaptih -Kosa. I. 16).

According to the Satadharmavidyamukha citta is classified into eight as follows: five sensuous consciousnesses as related to five senses: eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, the sixth: manovijnana, Seventh: Klistam manovijana and the eighth: Alayavijnana (v. Pancavastuka, Appendix. 49-50). The first six are admitted also by all early Buddhists. The last two are added by the Yogacarins. Takakusu explains the last three types thus: Sense-center, individualizing thought-center of Egotism, and store-center of ideation (Essentials, p. 37).

Alaya, store-consciousness is the seed-bed of all that exists. Every seed lies in the store-consciousness and when it sprouts out into object world a reflection returns as a new seed. This new seed lies latent in it and gets manifest when the seed becomes matured under favourable conditions (Ibid). The Yogacarabhumi comments: Defiled mind is always centre of delusion, egotism, arrogance and self-love (अविद्या आत्मदृष्टिरस्मिमाननुषणा, avidya atmadrsti asmimana trsna). The store-consciousness serves as seat of seeds, abode of all

ideations, and is counted resasultant and a new birth-taking factor (सर्वबीजगतमाश्रयभावनिष्मुपादातृविपाकसङ्गृहीतम्,)

Yo. ch. p. 11). Sarva-bijagam asrayabhavanistham upadatr vipaka-samgrhitam)

According to the Abhidharmasutra all elements are deposited (as seeds) in store-consciousness and the latter again in the former: thus they both go on as mutual causes and effects (M. Vibh. Tika, 28).

This means that the mind reaches out into outer world and perceiving the objects put new ideas into the mind-store. Again these new idea-seeds sprout out to reflect still newer seeds. Thus the seeds are accumulated and stored there. The old seeds and new ones are mutually depending and form ever-rotating cycle (cp. Takakusu, Essential, p. 37). This explanation comes into conflict with the established tenet of the school (Siddhanta), according to which store-consciousness is only productive cause of all other active consciousnesses (*pravrtti-vijnana*) which are called collectively 'enjoyable' (*upabhoga*). All the impure elements are stored in it by way of effects and the store-consciousness is related to them by way of efficient cause. It is indeterminate (*avyakṛta*) as either good or bad, because it is essentially resultant of acts of previous life (*vipaka*). It accumulates all impressions of the effects which result from the acts of previous life and are flowing spontaneously therefrom (*vipaka-nisyanadaphala*) because it serves as the final cause of the good and the bad elements (*Kusala-akusala-dharmadhipatyat*). Hence it is the efficient cause of all active impure elements as well as the final cause of all active consciousness-bodies (M. Vibh. Tika. p. 27-28).

Vasubandhu who pleads that the entire universe of the subjective and objective elements is mere transformation of one consciousness (*vijnana-parinama*) brings it under three heads: 1) one Resultant consciousness, 2) one thinking mind and 3) Six types of consciousness representing their respective objects, visible matter, etc. Commenting on the first, Resultant consciousness Vasubandhu says:

"It is the resultant and seat of all seeds" (विपाकः सर्वबीजकम् *Vipakah sarvabijakam*). It is abode of all seeds of defiling elements; hence it is termed storing centre (*alaya*). Or all elements are stored in it by way of effects (*karya-bhava*) and again the storing centre is stored in every element by way of cause (*karana-bhava*). It is a resultant effect since it is produced in the form of different sentient beings in different

realms of existence as a result of good and bad acts of previous life. (see Trimsika, ver. 2).

Vasubandhu in his Karmasiddhi (Et. lamotte's French Translation in Melanges Chinois Et. Buddhique. Vol. IV. further remarks: It is called Adana-vijnana as it assumes the body; it is Alaya-vijnana as all seeds of dharmas are stored in it; it is *Vipaka-vijnana* as it is a retribution of the acts of previous life (p. 103).

It is named *Bhavangavijnana* in the scripture of the Tamrasatiya school, *Mulavijnana* in the scripture of the Mahasanghika school and *Asamsarika-skandha* in the scripture of the Mahisasaka school. (p. 106). Note: Other two skandhas of the Mahisasaka are *Ksanika-skandha* and *ekajanmavadhi-skandha* from Masuda. p. 63. (Ibid. p. 106 n. 13). Asanga also considers *alaya* as *Bhavanga* (v. M. sutral. XI. 32).

Alayavijnana's object and aspect or form (*alambana-akara*) are imperceptible. In the cessation trance (*nirodha-samapatti*) there is one consciousness whose object and aspect are difficult to understand; likewise are the object and aspect of *Alaya* too. It comes under *Vijnano-padanaskandha*. But the sutra speaks of the six consciousness-bodies alone and not of the *Alayavijnana* (separately). Why so? The intention of Buddha is explained in the *Sandhinirmocana*: Believing that they (ignorant) would imagine that the *Alayavijnana* is the soul, I have not revealed it to the ignorant people (p. 106-7) *Sandhinirmocanasutra*, stanza cited, p. 103. n. 108:

आदानविज्ञान गभीर सूक्ष्मो ओघो यथा वर्तति सर्वबीजो ।
बालान एसो मयि न प्रकासि माहैव आत्मा परिकल्पयेयुः ॥

Adanavijnana gabhira suksmo ogho yatha vartati Sarvabijo/balana eso mayi an prakasi mahaiva atma parikalpayeyuh//cp. Trim. bhas. p. 34 with slight variation in the second line.

Why do they think so? Because this consciousness is beginningless (*anadikalika*) and continues to the end of Samsara; because it is very subtle in its aspect, it does not change. Six consciousness-bodies are gross in their support-object, aspect and model (*alambana, akara, visesa*) and easier to recognize; since they are associated with passions, *klesa* and *pratipaksamarga*, counteracting path and they are brought under *sanklesa* and *vyavadana*, "pollution" and "purification" they are in the nature of result-consciousness. By this reasoning one will understand

that there exists one causal consciousness (*hetu-vijnana*). The sutra does not speak of this consciousness because it is different from the six ones. That is the intention of the sutra for not speaking of the Alaya-consciousness. Thiswise we explain why the sutras of other schools speak of only six consciousness-bodies as Bhavangavijnana....etc.. (p. 108).

Vasubandhu pleads that there will be no harm in accepting one person having two consciousnesses together: (i) cause-consciousness and (ii) result-consciousness supporting each other. For, the retribution-consciousness (*hetuvijnana*) is perfumed by the active consciousness (*pravrttiti*). When they exist in two persons there is no such mutual relationship. Therefore we do not have any difficulty in this proposition (p. 109). Ref. also Trimsika, ver. 15.

We may note here that the position is quite different with the Satyasiddhi. According to this school one person can have only one mind at a time. The presence of two minds at a time involves two persons. This situation has been necessitated for the school on account of its refusing to support the Sarvastivadins' tenet of samprayoga, association of thoughts (v. chs. 65-76.)

We understand further that the problem of store-consciousness has also been discussed by Vasubandhu in his comment on the Dasabhumi-Sutra wherein this consciousness has ultimately been linked up with the Matrix of Tathagata as its interior source. The well-known Avatamsaka School of Buddhism (which is founded on the Gandavyuha Sutra) has sprung up absorbing much of the traditions and interpretations laid down in the Dasabhumi-Sutra and the comment thereon by Vasubandhu (Essentials, p. 110-11).

The Yogacara Idealists propounded the store-consciousness as repository of seeds of the active mind and mental states. We should remember that this parent consciousness itself a polluted and impermanent, and hence it cannot serve our urge for the spiritual goal which may act as a guiding principle in our life purpose. Some sort of this rational thinking must have led the later Idealists to postulate the theory of causation by Dharmadhatu, Foundation of Elements which is a universal principle present in every individual; it is also termed *Tathagata-garbha* (v. Discussion on this topic in my Bud. Idealism).

Let us take note of Takukusu's observation on the causation-theory of the later Idealists: The theory of causation by *Dharmadhatu* is the climax of all causation theories; it is actually the conclusion of the theory of causal origination as it is the universal causation and it is already within the theory of universal immanence, panophsim, cosmotheism or whatever it may be called. (Essentials, p. 113). The causation theory was first expressed by action-cause, since the action originates in ideation the theory was in the second stage expressed by the Ideation-store; the latter again was in the third stage expressed as originated in the Matrix of Tathagata, Tathagatagarbha (cp. Ibid).

The above process of thinking is truly a climax in the development of Buddhist thought. The theory of causation by the sole action-influence was pleaded by the early Buddhists with a view to saving an absurd situation arising out of their no-soul doctrine. The Brahmanical system pleads for the soul as a spark of divine power implying thereby the presence of God in every individual. Since God is dethroned in Buddhism the soul is also likewise dropped. Thus the doctrine of immanence (*antaryami-vada*) that has been emphasized in the Brahmanical and other religious scriptures was not favoured in the early stage of Buddhism. Now we find a revival in Mahayana Buddhism of the doctrine of immanence in the form of Dharmadhatu or Tathagata-garbha which is a reverse mode of store-consciousness (v. Ratnagotra for detailed elucidation of the Garbha-theory).

The transcendental knowledge which comes in the possession of a Yogin at the final stage of his spiritual endeavour has been designated by Vasubandhu as *Dharmakaya*, *Anasravadhatu*, *Asraya-paravrtti*. Vasubandhu speaks of it as *आश्रयपरावृत्ति*, *Asraya-paravrtti*, because a metamorphosis of *Asraya-store-consciousness* is effected into a non-dual knowledge (which is the same as *Dharmakaya*) as a result of dispelling the biotic forces of dualism which are active from immemorial days (his Trimsika, ver. 29-30 with Bhasya of Sthiramati).

Vajra-Samadhi calls it *Amala-jnana*, immaculate knowledge. Since this knowledge flashes up transplanting the polluted store-consciousness it has been considered a ninth pure knowledge in the Vajra-Samadhi (v. Lie benthal, Tung pao, XLIV.p.349). The relationship between these two knowledges, may either be identity or diversity. The identity view is perhaps favoured by Vasubandhu and his school because the transcendental knowledge is not counted as the ninth in the early

texts of the school whereas the diversity view is endorsed in the V. samadhi. There is possibly a third view², viz. the view of indescribability which may also be the opinion of Vasubandhu (v. his Trimsika, vr. 22.)

The nomenclature 'store-consciousness', 'Alaya-vijnana' is not quite popular with the logical school of Dignaga, though the school advocates strongly in favour of the idealistic outlook of the universe. Dignaga, for example, after proving the impossibility of external objects existing either in an atomic form or aggregate form elucidates in fine how to account for our manifold experiences of things in the outside world. He says : It is the object of our knowledge which exists internally in the knowledge itself as a knowable aspects and this knowable aspect appears to us as though it exists externally (v. Alam. pariksa, ver.6). Here in this context Dignaga is not enthusiast to speak of the nomenclature of Alaya-vijnana, though his commentator, Vinitadeva makes good the lapse' (v. the forthcoming publication of this comment from Tib. version). Dignaga's reluctance might be prompted by the adverse comment from the opposite camp like the Madhyamikas and others. A similar situation may also account for the Lankavatara Sutra's cautious approach to the Yogacatas' eight-fold division of consciousness. The Sutra, though grouped under the Yogacara classics is leaned towards the Prajnaparamita doctrine as is evident from its solemn declaration that the said eight types of consciousness are not at all transformations of one basic mind. They are indistinguishable like the ocean and its waves, hence they are of one and the same trait :

अभिन्नलक्षणान्यद्यो न लक्ष्या नापि लक्षणम् ।
उदधेश्च तरङ्गणां यथा नासि विशेषणम् ।
विज्ञानं तथा चित्तेः परिणामो न लक्ष्यते ॥

(cp. Tucci's paper, IHQ. IV. 545, f).

The great champion of the Madhyamaka school, Candrakirti comments: The advocate of the store-consciousness pleads that it is the seat of the seeds of all active consciousnesses and it produces the appearance of the world. This advocacy resembles the Brahmanical system pleading for God as a creator of the universe. One difference between them is that God is viewed permanent and the Alaya impermanent but in other respect they differ not much. (v. my Sanskrit text, Madhi. Avatara, Ch.VI, p.42).

The same accusation has been levelled by Acarya Bhavaviveka in his Karatala-rtna. : If Dharma-kaya, Norm-body which is characterized by the Yogacara as Asraya-paravrtti, metamorphosis of the store-consciousness be admitted in an existing self-being, then it is hardly distinguishable from the soul, Atman of the Brhmanical system because the soul also is described in their scripture as something existent, but beyond the reach by word and mind (v. My skt. text, p. 75-6).

Going back still earlier we have the Satyasiddhi hurling strictures on such theories thus : The concepts of Purusa (or Pudgala) and alaya are all wrong views. This tense remark reveals that this author is inclined to bring them under the category of a perverted notion (v. ch. 152).

It appears that the Alaya-doctrine does not appeal so much to the Tibetan mystics as the doctrine of Sunyata does. The Tibetan Yogin Milarepa bears witness to this own surmise.

The following statements about him may be noted here: "He was master architect, well-versed in the exposition of the science of the Clear Void Mind, wherein all forms and substances have their cause and origin" (Tibet's Great Yogi, Milarepa, W.Y. Evans-Wentz, p. 36). "He was a most learned professor in the Science of the Mind". (p.38, para.2)

It is reported that Milarepa himself uttered the following : As the mere name of food doth not satisfy the appetite of the hungry person, but he must eat food, so, also a man who would learn about the Voidness of Thought, must meditate so as to realize it In short, habituation to the contemplation of voidness of Equilibrium, of the Indescribable, of the Incognizable forms the four different stages of the Four Degrees of Initiation graduated steps in the ultimate goal of the mystic Vajra-yana. (pp.142-143).

To what particular doctrine of Mahayana Sect he belongs? Milarepa replied: It was the highest creed of Mahayana, it was called the Path of Total Self-Abnegation, for the purpose of attaining Buddhahood in one life-time (p. 186). I was perfectly convinced that the real source of both Samsara and Nirvana lay in the Voidness (of the Supra-mundane Mind). (p. 209). Noteworthy is the saying uttered on the occasion of his entering into Final Nirvana :

That which is of the nature of the uncreated, the Dharma-dhatu, the unborn, the Voidness, the Sunyata hath no beginning nor doth it ever cease to be, E'en birth and death are of the nature of the Voidness. Such being the Real Truth, avoid doubts and misgiving about it (p. 288).

Sunyata, Void or Voidness in the above passages conveys the idea of an absolute and unqualified voidness which approaches nearer to the Madhyamika's conception of the term than to the Yogacara's positive one, Cfr. Notes on pp. 37, n.5, 285,n.3, 288,n.3, etc.

Here we may incidentally take note of an interesting piece of truth a common creed of the Yogacara Buddhists that is vouchsafed by Milarepa in the saying : "I understand that all sentient beings possess a ray of the Eternal and that we must work for their salvation and development" (p. 85). This confession seems to be an echo of the Garbha theory of the Yogacaras.

Et. Lamotte has drawn our attention to the fact that the term alaya can be traced to Pali canonical sources in the passages : आलयारामा खो पनायं पजा आलयरता आलयमुदिता, alayarama kho panayam paja alayarata alayamditā, "people are delighted in alaya, engrossed in alaya and joyous in alaya" (Ref. Digh.II.p.36,3,37,25; Majjhima I, 167, 32, Samyutta I, p.136,11; Anguttara II, p.131,30; Mahavastu III, p.314,3). But its sense is *pancakamaguna*, five objects of five senses according to comment on Digh. later the Vijñānavādins found in the passage a justification of their theory of Alayavijñāna, psychological basis of the school. He further remarks that the Vimalakīrti still ignores the Vijñānavādin (Et. Lamotte op. cit. p. 246, n.4). Refer to Majh.I.190 speaking of the Alaya in parallel with *chanda* (wish), *anunaya* (pursuit) and so on. The renowned Buddhist poet Asvaghosa still ignores the later technical sense of the term in this line :

लोकेऽस्मिन् आलयारामे निवृत्तो दुर्लभा रतिः।

Loke, smin alayarama nivṛtta durlabha ratih.
The taste towards the retreat is very rare in this world which is engrossed in enjoying the sensual pleasures, alaya. Sundarananda, XII,22

Some Brahmanical Parallels

The advocate of transformation-theory (*parinamavada*) on the Brahmanical side is the Sankhya philosopher. His eight rudimentary elements are comparable with the Vijñānavādin's groups of eight consciousnesses. The Sankhya eight rudiments are: Pradhana or Avyakṛta, ahankara, buddhi and five great elements (v. Bud. carita, XII, 18, Caraka, Sarira, ch.1 and Gita, XIII, 5). The classical Sankhya replaced the five great elements by their corresponding five subtle ones a parallel development is also noticeable in the Satya-Siddhi (Ch. 36). The Bhagavat Gita in an earlier Chap. VII, 4 declares that the Nature, Prakṛti is distinguished into eight: Five great elements, mind, manas, intellect, buddhi and individuation, *ahankara*. The polluted mind of the Vijñānavādin may be compared with ahankara because both are sources of the I-notion, the Gita's mind with Alaya-consciousness and buddhi with *mano-vijñāna*. Caraka assigns to Buddhi the function of I-notion from which state are produced five great elements. The mind, manas as producer of the world has been stated in the Mundaka Up. (I.1,8) according to the interpretation of Sri Sankara (v. his bhāṣya). This is probably only the passage which mentions the mind as the source of other elements, earth, etc. Let it be noted however that the mind, in turn, is a product of the personal Brahman called Prana, breath.

It has been previously stated that citta, manas and vijñāna signify one and the same thing for the Buddhists. The Taittīviya Up. (II.4) mentions manas and vijñāna as distinct elements (cp. Katha. III, 1,3)g Sankara takes vijñāna for buddhi (v. his bhāṣya). The classical definition of manas and buddhi is that the former is characterized as designation (*sankalpa*) and the latter as deciding (*axhyavasaya*), (v. Sankhya-karika, 23, 27) and also accepted by Sankara (v. Taitt. bhāṣya, II, 3,4, and Gita II, 41,44). There are certain contexts where Sankara is obliged to identify vijñāna and manas (Taitt. II, 6 Bha.) and jñāna and buddhi as one element (v. Katha, III, 1,13, bha.).

The Prasnopanisad, while explaining "Sarva" "all" enumerates four distinct states: manas, mind, buddhi, intellect, ahankara, individuation and citta, spirit together with their respective objects: mantavya, boddhavya, ahankartavya and cetayitavya. The last element in this group of "all" is prana indicating thereby that it is the source as well as the binding factor of the entire group. Incidentally we may note here that this "Sarva" may correspond roughly with the Buddhist "Sarva" which covers the entire universe grouped into twelve bases

(*ayatana*). This apart, the Upanisads and the Gita speak prominently of the states: *manas* and *buddhi* probably as a result of the Sankhya speculation which perhaps serves as the nucleus of the early metaphysical reckonings in India. The Buddhists nowhere mention *buddhi* as a distinct mental state although other states like *dhi*, *mati* meaning *prajna* are stated (v. *Trimsika*, 10, Conception of Bud. p. 84).

According to the reformed school of Buddhism, viz. *Satyasiddhi* one mind element alone is substantial and all other mental phenomena are only its different moods and nominal but not substantial. This school thus brings under one element all other mental states counted into sixty by the Sarvastivadins as separate substantial elements. The *Vijnanavadins* do not dispute with the Sarvastivadins and accept their entire list (v. *Trimsika* and *Satadharma*, in my *Pancavastuka*, Appendix). They both differ each other, however in their ontological outlook, i.e. one is Idealist and the other Realist. Sri Sankara once is inclined to deny distinction between *manas* and *buddhi* (v. *Kena Up*, I, 1, 5: यन्मनसा न मनुते, *Yan manasa na manute*....*manas* includes also *buddhi*(; his authority for this opinion is the *Chandog-yopanisad* (I, 5, 3) which declares: कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धा अश्रद्धा धृतिः अधृतिः ह्रीः धीरित्येतत् सर्वमन एव । *Kamas sankalpo vicikitsa sraddha asraddha dhrtih adhrtih hrih dhirityetat sarvam mana eva* (v. his *bhasya*).

Antahkarana, inner organ is a collective term favoured by the Vedantins for different mental faculties: *citta*, *manas*, *vijnana* and *buddhi*, etc. Another collective term generally found in the Upanisads is *Sattva* having the same idea (v. *Sveta. Up.* III. 12). A favourite expression in the Upanisads is *Visuddhasattva* to convey the idea that the person of purified mind or some inner faculty becomes fit to realize his own self, *atman*, *Brahman* (v. *Mundaka III*, 1, 8, 10, and III, 2, 6, etc.). *Sattva* is a Sankhya terminology for *buddhi*, intellect according to *Caraka* (v. my paper on Sankhya, *Bharatiya Vidya*, 1952, p. 1905).

May we suggest therefore that this old idea of mind or intellect is intended in the term "Bodhi-Sattva", (Bodhi-minded) and "Mahasattva" (great-minded) ?

One more interesting topic I would like to discuss in this context. The early Buddhists conceive that each sensuous consciousness has its own basis, viz. the eye for the visual conscious, the ear for auditory one

and so on. What is the basis for the mind, a sixth organ? The Sarvastivadin assumes that mind's just previous moment serves as the basis for the subsequent thought moment. But the early Theravadin would not agree with this because a basis according to them ought to be of the material character. Hence they postulate *Hadayaavathu*, the heart-substance as the mind's basis. It is further claimed that this postulation has been made in accordance with a popular belief. (cp. *Compendium*. p. 279). Now wherefrom does this popular belief come? We have an interesting narrative in the Upanisad.

The *Aitareyopanisad* narrates the process of the world-creation as follows:- There was in the beginning one *Atman* alone; and no other thing there was active (*misat*). He thought: I shall create the world. He accordingly created these worlds: *Ambhas*, *Maricis*, *Mara* and *Ap*. *Ambhas* world is what is the above the heaven, *Dyuloka* and also a foundation of the latter. Beneath the heaven is *Antariksa*, that is the world of *Maricis* - *Rasmis* - rays of the Sun. beneath the *Maricis* is the earth known as *Mara*: beneath the earth is *Ap* - water.

Then the *Atman* thought: I shall create the *Lokapalas*, guardians of the world; then he drew out the *Purusa* from the waters and other great elements and shaped him (with head and other parts). He heated him (by his *tapas*); of the *Purusa* so heated the mouth burst like an egg; from the mouth (came out) speech and *Agni*, fire, noses bursting breaths and the wind came out; the eyeballs bursting came out *Cakus*, eye and therefrom *Aditya* (Sun), the ears bursting (came out) the ear organ and therefore quarters; the skin bursting hairs and therefrom plants and trees came out: the heart bursting *manas*; mind and therefrom the moon came out;.....

When the created gods requested the *Atman* to provide with their own dwelling places, the *Purusa* was finally presented before them. They being pleased entered into their places as per His Order:

Agni becoming speech entered in the mouth, the wind becoming breath entered in the noses, *Aditya* becoming the eye entered in the eye-balls. *Disas* becoming the ear entered in the ear-holes, *Osadhi* and *Vanaspati* becoming hairs entered in the skin. *Candramas* becoming *manas*, mind entered in the heart.....(v. I and II)

The above narrative makes obvious that each sense-organ has its own basis as well as its presiding diety and thus the mind has the heart as its basis and the moon as its presiding diety.

The same Upanisad declares on another occasion that the heart and the mind are identical: *Yad etat hrdayam tan mana eva.* (III, 1,2). It is further stated that all the mental states such as Samjnana, vijnana and prajna and others were all one and the same. This point goes quite in agreement with the Satyasiddhi's contention of one mind becoming into several mental states.

Note 1 (p.6). This interpretation is quite compatible with a transformation-theorist, *Parinama-vadin* who is generally counted as *Sat-karya-vadin*, an upholder of the imperceptible presence of the effect in the cause. Thus when the effect is present in the cause, *vice-verso* also may be the case, i.e. the cause may be present in the effect. So this interpretation of *Alaya* is very convincing.

Note 2 (p.10). For the transformation-theorist the relation between the cause and the effect may be both: identity and indescribability. Vasubandhu accordingly says *Paratantra* is neither different from nor identical with *Parinispanna* (ver.22). The Advaita-Vedantin would also countenance the same view, cfr my paper on Gaudapada in the *Bulletin*, Vol VIII, 1, p.33 f.

Note 3 (p.16). This world of men is termed here *Mara* (मर). The Buddhists call it *Maro* (मार), i.e. the world belonging to the god of death.

༄༅། །དམ་ཚུལ་གྱི་འབྲས་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་རྟེན་ནས་སྤྱད་པའི་འགྲོ་དང་ཐེག་ཆེན་
སེམས་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ཕན་ཡོན།

མཁན་པོ་ལྷོ་གྲོས་བཟང་པོ།

In this article Professor Lhodo Zangpo expounds the basic principles of Buddhism and the correct method of practising the Holy Dharma; a detailed explanation on the method of taking refuge in the three gems, the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha has been given. The nature of the three gems, their excellence and Supreme qualities have also been explained. There is besides a beautiful exposition on the Doctrine of Karma and the path followed to acquire Bodhisattavahood.

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

EDITOR: BIMAL K. MATILAL

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Note added in proof. After sending this paper to the press I read an unpublished manuscript by Professor M. Tachikawa, entitled 'On *pakṣa*', in which very similar conclusions are reached.

ASAṄGA'S DEFENSE OF ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

Of Catless Grins¹ and Sundry Related Matters

The nerve of the Yogācāra 'ideation only' position² seems to be the therapeutic reiteration and defense of what is scarcely more than a bare tautology, viz., 'What we mean by phenomenal world is merely the sum total of what is intended by consciousness'. (I.e., the world is a world for consciousness. The limits of the world are precisely the limits of cognizability.) And, since we obviously never have access to anything but our cognitions, the existence of a trans-cognitional correlate (and cause) for a given eidetic experience is at best a gratuitous hypothesis – at worst, perhaps a self-contradictory one.³ The above 'tautology' is, in the course of a piece of descriptive epistemological analysis underscored to counter a stubborn endemic human tendency to assent to its contrary.

And, in support of the foregoing, the Yogācāra philosophers marshal the following considerations.

(a) In the experiences of dreams, reveries and hallucinations, even opponents⁴ of the Yogācārins concede that there are no extra-mental 'objective' correlates accompanying and engendering the imagery. But since there is no foolproof criterion for universally distinguishing genuine sensory phenomena from the data of dreams,⁵ hallucinations, etc., it follows that veridical experiences are also not necessarily connected with any trans-mental sources.

(b) Moreover, all perceptions can be shown to be relative to some percipient subject,⁶ whence phenomena can be seen to be unpackable as the modes of minding of some mind or other. Consciousness is thus the horizon of all things.

(c) Finally, small wonder that the 'relation' between the phenomenal and the trans-phenomenal (or noumenal) turns out to be unintelligible. The very validity of the notion of relation is restricted to the domain of phenomena.⁷

What is warranted on the basis of (a), (b), and (c) is, strictly speaking, a purely *agnostic* attitude towards the noumenal realm. However, Asaṅga goes one step further and *flatly rejects* the existence of such a

realm.⁸ To arrive at a categorical assertion that there is *nothing but* mind, he has recourse to the evidence from meditational experiences and the testimony of Buddhas (as recorded in, for instance, the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*). Furthermore, there is a pragmatic justification for going on to a dogmatic idealism – it is more expedient so to believe, the better to leave off grasping.⁹

In the wake of the preceding purely negative critique and dismissal of realism, an alternative theory is needed – a positive and systematic accounting for the variegated texture of experience with its recurring patterns, its coherence and its continuity. Since, as the Yogācārins have shown, the ‘autonomous external object’ either stands otiose outside of the knower-known relationship or does not exist at all, a more promising approach to the problem is the positing of a *mental* foundation from which the everyday world derives. *Ālayavijñāna*, according to Asaṅga, provides the only solution; it is a veritable philosophical Alice’s Restaurant, where in all one’s most cherished epistemological and metaphysical desires attain to fulfillment:

If there were no *ālayavijñāna*, there would not be any appropriation of the locus (Tib. *gnas len pa* = Skt. *āśrayopādāna*), nor would there be the first functioning (Tib. *dang po hjug pa* = Skt. *ādī-pravṛtti*), nor the emergence of any illuminative clarity, nor the seed-essence (Tib. *sa bon nyid* = Skt. *bijatva*), nor any *karma*, nor any apprehension of the body, nor could one attain to the stage of *samāpatti* (Tib. *snayoms par hjug pa*) devoid of thought (Tib. *sems med* = Skt. *acittika*). Nor would there be any transmission of *vijñāna* at the time of death (Tib. *rnam par shes pa*).¹⁰

Re this eighth *vijñāna* (Tib., *rnam par brgyad pa*), a persuasive torrent of words purports to show why none of the five *skandhas*, including the first six *pravṛttivijñānas* can provide a suitable background for the play of everyday events.¹¹ All this seems to me to amount to a registering of Asaṅga’s high bred animadversion to a catless grin. He desperately needs a thread, an underpinning on which to hang the grins and grimaces of experience. And while many other thinkers¹² have, for similar reasons, succumbed to substantialist¹³ heresies, clutching at props is rather more unseemly for a Buddhist philosopher. Or perhaps it is merely my Mādhyamika stomach¹⁴ – unable to digest fully the fruits of Asaṅga’s ontological fecundity – which leads me to judge his views so harshly. In any case, while there may be a way of reading Asaṅga’s system as coherent even

while construing the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* as of final meaning (*nītārtha*)¹⁵ I can only assimilate the Sūtra by regarding the passages descriptive of the eighth *vijñāna* as of provisional meaning (*neyārtha*). I.e., if we are mere operationalists, deploying a quasi-myth as bait for the heretics – all well and good! Mythopoesis when recognized as such can have a great deal of utility as a heuristic and soterial device. But if it is a question of an ontological commitment to a mental substratum, then Nāgārjuna’s comments correctly characterize both *relata* in the cognitive relationship (*grāhya*-and-*grāhaka*)¹⁶, qua interdependent, as fabricated of the tissue of the same dream. Asaṅga’s own reasoning can be seen to be a two-edged sword, which excises *mental* as well as *material* substance.

I pass in quick review over some of the details of Asaṅga’s ‘definition’ of *ālayavijñāna*. I.e., it is said to be autonomous, enduring, (in a sense) non-defined,¹⁷ in close relationship with the *sāṃkleśika dharmas* which perfume it, that to which *manas* is attached, and that in which all the seeds (*bijas*)¹⁸ of the six *pravṛttivijñānas* are retained and kept from perishing. The remainder of my remarks will be directed chiefly to an explanation of this last and philosophically most intriguing function of *ālayavijñāna*.

Precisely by what mechanism, then, do the transformations (*pariṇāmas*) of *ālayavijñāna*, as root or matrix *vijñāna*, engender the phenomenal world? The perennial philosophical problem of the descent from the one to the many¹⁹ is here resolved in a way that is at least superficially similar to the Stoic solution. For the description of *ālayavijñāna* as big with the seeds or potential (*śakti* or *sāmarthya*)²⁰ of mutable existence immediately calls to mind the primordial progenitive fire of Heracleitus, said, in its Stoic adaptation, to contain the seeds or *spermatikoi logoi* of all things to come.²¹ Further parallels with Hellenistic philosophy are not hard to come by. For instance, the three-aspected transformational process in Yogācāra philosophy has as its Western correspondent the dialectical triad of stages of falling away from the One, the Neoplatonic leitmotif that – albeit in transmogrified form – runs through the thought of the Middle Ages. But beyond their surface resemblances, the differences between the Western and Eastern cosmogonies being considered are far more compelling and worthy of comment.

For one thing, there is a more positive tenor to most early Western speculations about emergence²² – a feeling of Spirit disporting with

itself, a divine play whose fruits are teleologically ordered toward the Good. Not until Schopenhauer²³ do we hear a *major* European voice writing off the whole phenomenal world as a mere blemish attaining to awareness of itself as such.

Too, the Stoic *spermatikoi* are sempiternal, while there is some disagreement among the Buddhist philosophers as to whether or not the *bijas* are all primitive (the opinion of Candrapāla), all born from *bhāvanā* or perfuming (as Nanda and Śrīsenā maintain), or comprise a mixed bag – some increate and some produced (Dharmapāla's theory).²⁴ Also, in contrast to their Stoic counterparts, the *bijas* of the Yogācāra theory are said to be *simultaneous* with their fruits.²⁵ And (it is emphasized), the *bijas* are determinate as to their moral species, able to engender, in some cases good, in others bad, and in still others undefined dharmas,²⁶ whereas the nodal points of the Western theory seem to be construed as primarily *mathematical*²⁷ (rather than *ethical*) prototypes.²⁸ In the pre-nineteenth century West, there is a virtual apotheosis of the noetic as such – rigorously predelineated conceptual structures insinuating into all parts of the everyday world the transcendent purity of their allegedly divine source.²⁹ In Yogācāra Buddhism, on the contrary, there are, at bottom, no regulae,³⁰ no strict arithmetic patternings. Rather, the picture is one of *manas*' primordial bulimia leaving in its wake the dregs of karmic energies (*vāsanās*).³¹ Under the brunt of the endlessly recurrent and symbiotically flowing cycle: (a) seed, (b) manifestation thereof, (c) perfume³² (the last comprising via *manas* a feedback which subsequently activates other seeds), *ālayavijñāna* can almost be heard to groan with an unendurable taedium vitae. But prelapsarian purity³³ reasserts itself when *prajñā* succeeds in revealing *ālayavijñāna* as non-different from *tathatā* itself.

One final remark. That the issue of solipsism³⁴ seems to arise in conjunction with discussions of Yogācāra philosophy is merely symptomatic of the extent to which *avidyā* is still operative. For the very ability to raise the question of whether there is one or a multiplicity of streams of psychic energy itself presupposes the activation of the *vāsanās* in *ālayavijñāna*. But, as we have seen above, both *ālayavijñāna* and its *vāsanās* ultimately dissolve under the impact of Mādhyamika dialectic.

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NOTES

¹ "Well, I've often seen a cat without a grin," thought Alice, "but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life." Lewis Carroll, *Alice in Wonderland*.

² As expressed in, e.g., Vasubandhu's well-known dictum, '*Idam sarvam vijñāptimātarakam*'.

³ Expressed in more technical jargon, the object-intentness (*viśayatā*) of consciousness needn't presuppose an autonomous mind-independent object. The really engaging question – one which we cannot now pause to consider – is why 'proofs' of the external world continue to be a fashionable philosophical endeavor. (N.B. Chomskyan deep syntactic structures would seem to provide a clue. See, for example, N. Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, MIT Press, 1965).

⁴ Their more obdurate adversaries, to be sure, insist that an external substratum of sorts is presupposed even in dream experiences. cf., for example, Kumārila, *Ślokavārttika* (transl. by G. Jha), Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1906. The *Nirālambanavāda*.

⁵ A more or less standard list of factors to be considered is advanced by philosophers Eastern and Western. It includes coherence, continuity, the presence of voluntary effort in the case of imaginary phenomena and its absence in the case of veridical sensations, and the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain kinaesthetic reactions.

⁶ This point is nowhere more charmingly driven home than in the discussion-demonstration of George Berkeley's first dialogue. Vide also *Mahāyānasamgraha* (transl. by E. Lamotte), volume 2, pp. 4–26.

⁷ See my *An Eleventh Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists'*, D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht-Holland, 1969, especially pp. 2 and 3.

⁸ This is what Kant would call the move from a critical to a dogmatic idealism. Clearly, ratiocination alone does not suffice to legitimize a leap of this sort. On the contrary, any attempt to infer from the fact that what is knowable is all that can be known, the conclusion that what is knowable is all that can *exist*, constitutes a glaringly obvious logical howler.

⁹ The same soterial concerns appear in Berkeley's writings, *mutatis mutandis*. One is made to understand that belief in material substance must be discarded, lest it seduce one into atheism.

¹⁰ *Kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med* ('med' is missing in the Peking ed., but seems to be supported by Chinese Translation) *na gnas len pa mi srid pa dang*.

dang po hjug pa mi srid pa dang.

gsal bar hjug pa mi srid pa dang.

sa bon nyid mi srid pa dang.

las mi srid pa dang.

lus kyi tshor ba mi srid pa dang.

sems med paḥi snyoms par hjug pa mi srid pa dang.

rnam par shes paḥi ḥchi hpho mi srid pa so (Peking ed., has 'pas so').

(Tibetan folios of Asaṅga's exegesis of his Yogācārabhūmi entitled *Viniścayasamgrahani*, 2. 3–2. 4.) Indeed, if there were no *ālayavijñāna*, Asaṅga's eloquent catalogue of its functions seems almost to be an exhortation to invent one. Compare Peking ed., Vol. 110, No. 5539 2b^{3a}.

¹¹ Asaṅga ticks off his desiderata (p. 7), applies them to the other proffered candidates for the role of backdrop, and finds each of them, in turn, lacking in the continuity re-

quired of a bearer of the seeds (*bījas*) which engender the phenomenal world. (See also p. 7, footnote.)

¹² E.g. Locke, Berkeley, various Naiyāyika philosophers.

¹³ To be sure, *ālayavijñāna* qua not really existent, originated, nor extinguished, is not quite a full-fledged substance. Its ontological status is problematic. But the very unclarity surrounding the conception of *ālayavijñāna* affords Asaṅga "all the advantages of theft over honest toil." For *ālayavijñāna* does, indeed provide more cohesiveness than is possessed intra se by the cinematographic analyses of the Sautrāntika theory. (For a critique of the Sautrāntika *vijñānājāti* doctrine, see de La Vallée Poussin's French translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 185–186.)

¹⁴ The allusion is to a story told by Averroes (in his 'The Decisive Treatise Determining the Nature of the Connection Between Religion and Philosophy', reprinted in Hyman and Walsh (eds.), *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York 1967, p. 291, about a man who, upon the instructions of the Prophet, gave honey to a diarrhoea patient. Thereupon the diarrhoea increased. In answer to the man's complaint the Prophet said, "God spoke the truth; it was the patient's stomach that lied."

¹⁵ Though space does not permit an examination of the issue of Asaṅga's supposed evolution from a Yogācāra to a Mādhyamika gnoseological position, this much is clear. His comments relating to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (some of which we are now scrutinizing) are made in a Yogācāra frame of mind. Thus, in the present context, Asaṅga himself surely would want to regard the assertion of the existence of *ālayavijñāna* as of certain or final meaning.

¹⁶ Tib., *gzung ba* and *hdzin pa*, respectively.

¹⁷ Vide pp. 96–99, 120–21 of de La Vallée Poussin's French translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. The characterization is thus far reminiscent of Plato's space, "the nurse or womb of becoming." Cf. *Timaeus* (54), an avowedly mythological account of the coming-into-being of the phenomenal world.

¹⁸ These *bījas* or virtualities are appropriated from Sautrāntika sources and modified by the Yogācārin. Because of its episodic flickerings, the sextet of *vijñānas* consisting of the five outer perceptions plus *manovijñāna* is inadequate to account for the seeming continuity of experience. I.e., *cihi phyir rnam par shes paḥi tshogs drug po dag gcig gi sa bon nyid gcig yin par mi srid ce na ḥdi ltar dge baḥi mjug thogs su mi dge ba dang mi dge baḥi mjug thogs su dge ba dang gnyi gaḥi mjug thogs su lung du ma bstan pa dang kham ngan paḥi mjug thogs su kham bar ma dang kham ngan paḥi mjug thogs su kham bzang po pa dang... hjiḡ rten paḥi mjug thogs su hjiḡ rten las ḥdas pa dang hjiḡ rten las ḥdas paḥi mjug thogs su hjiḡ rten paḥi sems ḥbyung la de dag ni da ltar sa bon nyid du mi rung baḥi phyir dang sems kyi rgyud yun ring por rgyun chad kyang yun ring pos ḥbyung bar ḥgyur bas deḥi phyir yang mi rung ngo.*

(Tibetan folios of Asaṅga's exegesis of his *Yogācārabhūmi*, 3, line 8; 4, lines 1–4.) As for *manas*, the seventh, the janusfaced *vijñāna*, its function is chiefly that of mediator from *ālayavijñāna* to the sextet of *vijñānas*. It is therefore a mere purveyor of a derived sense of continuity.

¹⁹ There being ultimately no real descent, of course. All *vijñānas* preceding *ālayavijñāna* are *parikalpita-svabhāva*; *ālayavijñāna* is *paratantra-svabhāva*; and only the *tathāgata-garbha* is *pariṇiṣpanna*.

²⁰ See, e.g. p. 4 of Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi*, part I (ed. by V. Bhattacharya), Calcutta 1957. "Sarvabījakamāśrayopādātrīpākasaṃgrhitamālayavijñānam bījāśrayaḥ."

²¹ "The original impulse of Providence gave the origin and first momentum to the cosmic ordering of things by selecting certain germs of future existences and assigning

to them their productive capacities of realization, change, and phenomenal succession." (M. Aurelius to himself, ixI.) Perhaps this doctrine is better known in its Augustinian version. Augustine's account of the genesis of creaturely being refers to so-called 'seminal reasons', said to be implanted by God at creation.

²² The underground whispers of the Gnostics and other dualist sects admittedly cannot be overlooked; and because of their influence, an undeniable aura of pessimism carries over even into the mainstream of Western thought *vis à vis* the subject of the coming into being of the world. Vide, e.g., Plotinus' ambivalence in this regard. He at times imbues the process of emanation from the One with a dark tone, alluding to it as a 'falling away'.

²³ "Comprehending the great drama of the *will-to-live* and the characterization of its true nature certainly demands a somewhat more accurate consideration and greater thoroughness than simply disposing of the world by attributing it to the name of God... Life by no means presents itself as a gift to be enjoyed, but as a task, a drudgery, to be worked through.... What is the ultimate aim of it all? To sustain ephemeral and harassed individuals through a short span of time in the most fortunate case with endurable want and comparative painlessness.... With this evident want of proportion between the effort and the reward, the *will-to-live*, taken objectively, appears to us from this point of view as a fool, or taken subjectively, as a delusion. Seized by this, every living thing works with the utmost exertion of its strength for something that has no value." A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Dover edition (transl. by E. J. Payne), Vol II, pp. 356–357. Schopenhauer was, of course, directly inspired by the model of Buddhism. After Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, even the West cannot return to the naive optimism of the Greeks.

²⁴ de La Vallée Poussin's French translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 102–108.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

²⁷ "The sower, the father, the mother do not count. God is still operating and making the seed evolve their latent forms according to the laws of numbers." St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 24.2. Aquinas' objection to the Augustinian position is that secondary causes are therein deprived of any real efficacy. The Buddhist *bīja* theory escapes criticism on this score.

²⁸ And where the ethical issue does arise, ever since Plato there has been a tendency to be evasive as to whether there are ethical exemplars for the grosser or more morally repugnant aspects of phenomenal reality.

²⁹ With some trepidation I venture to observe that the much touted 'Faustian' dynamism – the cultural hallmark of Western man – is nowhere in sight at this juncture. Instead one is confronted with an Eleatic cosmos of crystallized mathematical archetypes.

³⁰ *A fortiori*, no beneficent Donor of these.

³¹ The Yogācāra philosophy, it therefore seems to me, is more properly characterized as a 'mono-boulesis' (to use a term coined by P. Merlan, in his *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metacosmism: Problems of the Soul in the Neoplatonist and Neoplatonic Tradition*, Nijhoff 1963), if, e.g., Neoplatonism be correctly labelled 'monopsychism'.

³² Again, this is defensible if construed as an instrumentalism. If, however, it is alleged to correspond to 'what there is', the embarrassing question of what counts as evidence for *vāsanās*, etc. arises.

³³ It goes without saying, the 'lapse' or fall in this case is *not* due to the occurrence at any point in time of a *peccatum originale*. Rather, the pristine atemporal Buddha nature has a logical, not a temporal, precedence over the root evil of grasping.

³⁴ See Y. Kajiyama's 'Buddhist Solipsism. A Free Translation of Ratnakīrti's *Sam-tānāntaradūṣaṇa*', *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 13 (January, 1965), 435-420. See also T. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic II* (Dover republication of the 1930 Leningrad edition), p. 370. The word 'solipsism' is perhaps misleading in view of its currency in contemporary Western philosophical literature, where it has quite a different set of connotations. Cf. W. Todd, *Analytical Solipsism*, Nijhoff 1968.

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印度學佛教學研究

第二十三卷第二號

[通卷第46號]

昭和50年3月

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
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JOURNAL OF INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES

(INDOGAKU BUKKYŌGAKU KENKYŪ)

Vol. XXIII No. 1 December 1974

[45]



Edited by

JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF
INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES

(NIHON-INDOGAKU-BUKKYŌGAKU-KAI)

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In the later period, “*sac-cid-ananda*” has come into use as an epithet of Brahman by Advaitins³⁾.

As described above, Rāmānuja accentuated “*ananda*” as Brahman’s essence by prefixing “*anavadhika-atiśaya*”. The fact seems to be caused by his view of Brahman. According to Rāmānuja, Brahman is not a pure knowledge but Viṣṇu=Nārāyaṇa who has a personality and innumerable beautiful qualities. The emancipation (mokṣa) in the case of Rāmānuja is to unite to the Supreme Being, Viṣṇu=Nārāyaṇa, by ardent love (bhakti) to Him. Therefore Rāmānuja expressed Brahman’s essence as “*anavadhika-atiśaya-ānanda*”.

“*Anavadhika-atiśaya*” is one of Ramanuja’s phraseological characteristics, and an epithet of Brahman, “*anavadhika-atiśaya-ānanda*” shows clearly a difference of thought between Rāmānuja and the Vedantic scholars who preceded to him.

Abbreviations

- GBh. “*Śrībhagavadgītābhāṣyam*” (Sri Ramanuja’s Nine Valuable works, “*Sri Bhagavat Ramanuja Granthamala*”, ed. by Sri Kanchi P. B. Annangaracharya Swamy, Granthamala Office, Kancheepuram, 1956)
- ŚBh. “*Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja*” ed by R. D. Karmarkar (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. I) Part I, II, III. Poona, 1959–1964.
- Vs. “*Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasaṃgraha*”, ed. by J. A. B. van Buitenen (Deccan College Monograph series: 16), Poona 1956.

2) Cf. Paul Hacker, “*Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Namarūpa, Māya, Īśvara*”, Z. D. M. G. 100, 1950. S. 276.

3) Vetter, op cit., S. 68, (Num. 173, 1) Cf. *The Vedānta-sara* ed. with Introduction, Translation and Notes, by Hajime Nakamura, Heirakuji-shoten, Kyoto, 1962. p. 3, (1) note 2.

The Ālayavijñāna of the *Śraddhotpāda*

Gishin Tokiwa

I. The *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda śāstra* in Chinese, 『大乘起信論』, follows the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* in its interpretation of the term “ālayavijñāna” as being related to the tathāgatagarbha-dharmakāya:

A. On the phenomenal, defiled aspects and the original, non-defiled aspect of vijñāna:

There is no doubt that what the *Śraddhotpāda* calls 阿黎耶識 (*a-l-i-yeh-shih*) is the very ālayavijñāna of the Yogācāravijñānavāda. However, the Chinese text never explains whether it is the eighth vijñāna of that vāda. Nor does it refer to the tri-svabhāva. The *Laṅkāvatāra*, which also makes no explanation about the eight vijñānas, but which evidently presupposes them, divides the whole of them into two: (Skt. 1) The sūtra gives another, threefold division: (Skt. 2) In the sūtra, pravṛtti- and karma-lakṣaṇa in the second division respectively correspond to vastu-prativikalpa- and khyāti-vijñāna in the first division. The śāstra divides the whole vijñānas in defilement into two: the subtle (sūkṣma) aspect and the gross (sthūla) aspect. The subtle aspect includes karma (業)-, dṛṣṭi (? 転 ‘seeing’)-, and khyāti (現 ‘appearing as the seen’)-vijñāna; the gross aspect has buddhi (? 智 which, ‘relying on viśaya or external objects, discerns favor from disfavor’)-, saṃtāna (? 相統 ‘the smṛti, i. e. memory which vijñāna calls forth and which continues uninterruptedly’)-, and mano-vijñāna. The last is also called vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna (分別事識). Both the sūtra and the śāstra refer to the original, non-phenomenal aspect of vijñāna, which goes beyond its phenomenal aspects. The sūtra states: (Skt. 3) The śāstra states, “The so-called ce-

1) dvividham...vijñānaṃ saṃkṣepaṇa aṣṭa-lakṣaṇa-uktaṃ khyāti-vijñānaṃ vastu-prativikalpa-vijñānaṃ ca / (L 2, Vaidya 18, Nanjo 37)

2) trividham vijñānaṃ pravṛtti-lakṣaṇaṃ karma-lakṣaṇaṃ jāti-lakṣaṇaṃ ca / (ibid.)

3) na svajāti-lakṣaṇa-nirodho vijñānānāṃ kiṃ tu karma-lakṣaṇa-nirodhaḥ / (ibid. N 38)

ssation is only of the phenomenal, defiled aspects, not of the original, non-defiled aspect (唯心相滅非心体滅).”

Thus between these two texts we see evident correspondence as regards the twofold aspect of vijñāna, defilement and non-defilement.

Besides, the relationship between the subtle and the gross aspects is, in the sutra, that between khyāti- and vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna: (Skt. 4) That is, one causes the other reciprocally, but basically khyāti-vijñāna is the cause of vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna. Here one can see the vijñāna-pariṇāma of the Yog-ācāra vāda. In the śāstra, the subtle aspect is regarded as hetu (因), and the gross aspect as pratyaya (緣), externality. And when the subtle aspect as hetu ceases, the gross one which relies on it ceases. Then comes investigation in both texts into the problem: does cessation of defilement mean cessation of reality?

B. The phenomenal, karma aspect resting on the Original Self:

The answer to the question, as we have seen, is “No”. The reason is that the phenomenal, karma aspect of birth-and-death rests on the Original Self that is free from that. The sutra explains true continuity: (Skt. 5) The “yat (which)” in the passage indicates the sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa or the Original Self as the ultimate basis. Since it is free from either defilement or purification, it can be the ultimate basis upon which defilement comes to be purified. As regards the relationship between this svajāti-lakṣaṇa and ālayavijñāna, the sutra states: (Skt. 6) Although this might appear to confuse the karma-lakṣaṇa of ālayavijñāna with svajāti-lakṣaṇa, the true intention is quite clear in the short sentence quoted above (Skt. 3). Because of the true continuity of svajāti-lakṣaṇa which is free

4) dve 'py-ete 'bhinna-lakṣaṇe 'nyonya-hetuke / tatra khyāti-vijñānaṃ...acintya-vāsanā-pariṇāma-hetukam / vastu-prativikalpa-vijñānaṃ ca...viśaya-vikalpa-hetukam-anādi-kāla-prapañca-vāsanā-hetukam ca // (ibid. N 37-38)

5) prabandha-nirodhaḥ...yasmāc-ca pravartate/ yasmād-iti...yad-āśrayeṇa yad-ālam-banena ca/ tatra yad-āśrayam-anādi-kāla-prapañca-dausthulya-vāsanā yad-ālam-banāṃ sva-citta-dṛśya-vijñāna-viśaye vikalpāḥ/ (ibid. N 38)

6) pravṛtti-vijñānāny-ālaya-vijñāna-jāti-lakṣaṇād-anyāni syuḥ, anālaya-vijñāna-hetukāni syuḥ/ atha-ananyāni pravṛtti-vijñāna-nirodhe ālaya-vijñāna-nirodhaḥ syāt. sa ca na bhavati svajāti-lakṣaṇa-nirodhaḥ/ (ibid.)

from birth and death, there ceases false continuity of karma- and pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa.

To an unawakened person who should know about this defilement resting on non-defilement, it may well mean that this “I” of birth-and-death has found the (No-) direction in which he is to see ultimate stability, the whereabouts of true religious redemption. This point is well expressed in some verses of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*: (Skt. 7)

The *Śraddhotpada* states, “By birth-and-death in the hṛdaya (心生滅) I mean that because of its resting on the tathāgatagarbha (i. e. -hṛdaya) there is vijñāna of birth-and-death (依如来藏故有生滅心).”

C. Ālayavijñāna as unity:

The śāstra refers to the defilement resting on non-defilement as ālayavijñāna, and calls the vijñāna “vijñāna as unity (和合識)”, unity between non-defilement and defilement. The śāstra states, “No one can speak of the two which comprise the vijñāna as completely one or separate. This we call ālayavijñāna. This vijñāna has two meanings, and contains all the dharmas in itself and produces all the dharmas out of itself. One is Awakening, and the other non-awakening. The latter exists because it rests on Awakening (依本覺故而有不觉).”

The sutra has such expressions as: (Skt. 8, 9)

All this concerning “vijñāna as unity” represents the standpoint of non-defilement, which is free from unity of this kind, and which means to have the unawakened person realize the immediate presence of Awakening “directly be-

7) pṛthivy ambau jalam vāyau vāyur vyomni pratiṣṭhitāḥ/ apratiṣṭhitam ākāśam vāyav-ambu-kṣiti-dhātuṣu//55// skandha-dhātvi-indriyaṃ tadvat karma-kleśa-pratiṣṭhitam/ karma-kleśāḥ sadā-ayoni-manas-kāra-pratiṣṭhitāḥ//56// ayoniśo-manas-kāraś citta-sūddhi-pratiṣṭhitāḥ/ sarva-dharmeṣu cittasya prakṛtis tv apratiṣṭhitā//57// citta-prakṛtim ālīna-ayoniśo-manasaḥ kṛtiḥ/ ayoniśo-manas-kāra-prabhava kleśa-karmaṇi//60// na hetuḥ pratyayo na-api na sāmāgrī na ca-udayaḥ/ na vyayo na sthitir citta-prakṛter vyoma-dhātuvat//62// (Nakamura 83, 85)

8) garbhas-tathāgatānām hi vijñānāḥ saptabhir-yutaḥ/ pravartate dvayo grāhāt...// 1, abc// (L 6, V 91, N 223)

9) tathāgata-garbha ālaya-vijñāna-saṃśabditaḥ saptabhir-vijñānāḥ saha...śrīmālāṃ devīm-adhiṣṭhāya tathāgata-viśayo deśitaḥ.../ (ibid.)

low (直下 from 『伝心法要』) non-awakening. The unawakened are ignorant that defilement rests on non-defilement.

The sutra states complete freedom of the *svajāti-lakṣaṇa* from defilement: (Skt. 10, 11) The śāstra states, "We say, because of its resting on *ālayavijñāna* there exists *avidyā* (以依阿黎耶識說有無明)." It also states, "*Avidyā* is not separate from Awakening (無明之相不離覺性). It is not to be destroyed, nor is it not to be destroyed."

According to the śāstra, *ālayavijñāna* as unity is the very basis for sentient beings to have faith in the Original Self. It states, "By the perfuming of the Original Self (*svajāti-lakṣaṇa-vāsanā* 自体相熏習), I mean that since beginningless time the Self possesses undefiled virtue, and has the nature that its unthinkable, wondrous activity externalizes itself (不思議業作境界之性). Because of these two meanings it constantly continues its function of perfuming. Since it has powerful influences, it causes sentient beings to hate the suffering of birth and death, to yearn after *nirvāṇa*, to believe that they themselves have the virtue of Suchness, and thus to make up their mind and begin practice."

However, unless one is awakened to the Original Self, no mere faith will do. In other words, in so far as the "unity" of *ālayavijñāna* is not broken through, faith will remain defiled within the unity. The sutra states: (Skt. 12, 13)

The śāstra states: "By the purification of *jñāna* (智淨相) I mean that because, influenced by the perfuming force of the *dharma*, one practices properly and fulfills every necessary means, one breaks through the unity of *ālayavijñāna*, extinguishes the phenomenal, defiled aspects of false continuity (滅相統心相), and thus has the *dharmakāya* manifest itself."

D. How is the unity to be broken through?:

- 10) *udadhi-taraṃga-ālayavijñāna-gocaraṃ dharma-kāyam...* (L 2, V 20, N 44)
- 11) *tathāgata-garbho...ālayavijñāna-saṃśabdito'vidyā-bhūmi-jaiḥ saptabhir-vijñāna-iḥ saha mahā-udadhi-taraṃga-van-nityam-avyucchinna-śarīraḥ pravartate anityatā-doṣa-rahita ātma-vāda-vinivṛtto'tyanta-prakṛti-pariśuddhaḥ* (L 6, V 90, N 220-1)
- 12) *aparāvṛtte ca tathāgata-garbha-śabda-saṃśabdite ālayavijñāne na-asti saptānāṃ pravṛtti-vijñānānāṃ nirodhaḥ* (ibid. N 221)
- 13) *tathāgata-garbhaḥ ālayavijñāna-saṃśabdito viśodhayitavyo viśeṣa-arthibhir bodhisattvair-mahāsattvaiḥ* (ibid. N 222)

This important but difficult practical problem seems to have its solution suggested in the structure of *ālayavijñāna* itself. That is, first, the gross, *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa* relies on the subtle, *karma-lakṣaṇa*. This means that the "external" world as grasped-perceived by *manovijñāna*, together with the grasper-perceiver, constitutes the *vikalpa* (dilemma) of *sva-citta* (*vijñāna* itself). In so far as the external world remains as such, the perceiver may have either pain or pleasure or none. However, when the external world turns out to be the *vikalpa* or *karmalakṣaṇa* of *vijñāna*, there is only suffering (*duḥkha*). *Vijñāna* itself knows through suffering that the false *vikalpa* which makes itself appear as the external world, and which thirsts for the latter, is the very cause of suffering. When the *vijñāna* knows this, simultaneously the suffering ceases (*nirodha*). (Skt. 14) Thus from immediately below birth-and-death there awakes the Self that is free from birth-and-death. Or, rather, it is the Self free from birth-and-death that knows this. It is the Self not seeing in seeing and unseen in the seen, that knows that the non-real *vikalpa* makes its appearance as the seen as well as the seer. Because it is such a Self, it can most radically criticize the seer and the seen, and can be Self-abiding in seeing. In other words, phenomena stop seeking some non-phenomenon externally. Instead, they become the activities of the birth-death-free Self in the *saṃādhi* of Sport (*vikṛiḍa* 遊戲), the "external, helping occasions (外緣)" which will help the unawakened come to be awakened. Hence the śāstra's reference to the *acintya-karma-lakṣaṇa* (不思議業相).

Lastly, let us consider what the *ālayavijñāna* is. One cannot help concluding that it is the Original Self to which sentient beings have not yet been awakened.

II. Historical place of the *Śraddhotpada*'s *ālayavijñāna*:

In the śāstra the *tri-svabhāva* theory, which the sutra mentions, is apparently left unexpressed. However, one should not consider this to mean that the śāstra had nothing to do with this theory. This is because the śāstra seems to have considered *ālayavijñāna* on the basis of *trisvabhāva*. The way that *vastu-pratīvikalpa-vijñāna* relying on *khyātivijñāna*, discerns external from internal, is *parikalpita-svabhāva* (the way to have things unreal constructed as real). The way

14) --*parijñānān-nivartate*//1, d// (L 6, V 91, N 223) For 1, abc, see Skt. 8 above.

of unity of ālayavijñāna in which karma-lakṣaṇa, unawakened to the svajāti-lakṣaṇa upon which it rests, falsely discriminates and produces defilement, is paratantra-svabhāva (the way to rely on others). The way that the svajāti-lakṣaṇa of ālayavijñāna awakes to Itself is pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (the way that things are really accomplished).

As regards the term “khyāti-vijñāna”, one can find familiar expressions in the *Trisvabhāva-kārikā acārya-vasubandhu-kṛta* such as: (Skt. 15, 16, 17)

Thus we can conclude (1) that the ālayavijñāna of the *Śraddhotpāda* is genuinely Yogācāravijñānavāda's view, directly succeeding to the standpoint of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*. It most properly emphasizes āśraya-parāvṛtti and Awakening the Original Nature. (2) Through its assuming the Chinese expression, the *Śraddhotpāda* advocated to the people of China its view of “Not relying on words or letters (不依文字)” and “Awakening man's Original Nature (見性)”. These are really part of the basic expression of Zen in China, as well as that of the *Laṅkāvatāra*. The śāstra, since it regards the two terms “tathāgatagarbha-hṛdaya” (i. e. what precedes tathāgata as his marrow) of the sūtra and the “sattva-dhātu” (what precedes sentient beings as their source) of the *Anūratvāpārṇatva-nirdeśa* (Skt. 18) as identical, coined the expression “sattva-hṛdaya (衆生心 what precedes sentient beings as their marrow)”. This seems to have indicated the direction into Patriarchs' Zen, which the Chinese Zen actually took. Indeed, the rest of the Zen expression is. “Directly pointing to man's Heart (hṛdaya)” and “An independent Self-transmitting apart from any teaching”.

15) tatra kiṃ khyāty-asaṅkalpaḥ katham khyāti dvaya-ātmatā/ tasya sā na-astitā tena yā tatra-advaya-dharmatā//4//

16) yat khyāti paratantra'sau...//2, a//

17) asat-kalpas-tathā-khyāti mūla-cittād-dvaya-ātmanā// 29, ab// (Yamaguchi ed.)

18) na-anyaḥ sattva-dhātur na-anyo dharma-kāyaḥ/ sattva-dhātur eva dharma-kāyaḥ/ dharma-kāya eva sattva-dhātuḥ/ advayam etad arthena/ vyañjana-mātra-bheda iti/ (quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* N 81)

The sūtrapāṭha of the Vaiṣeṣikasūtra-vyākhyā

Masanobu Nozawa

Of the commentaries of the *Vaiṣeṣikasūtra* (abr. VS.), the *Upaskāra* (abr. U.)¹⁾ was formerly the most authoritative. But, as its explanation is separated from the ancient Vaiṣeṣika tradition, some scholars studied it critically to bring the thought of VS. to light. Thus Dr. Faddegon's and Dr. Ui's achievements were reached. Afterward the older commentaries, the *Vyākhyā* (abr. V.)²⁾ and the *Candrānanda's Vṛtti* (abr. C.)³⁾, the mūla of which was translated into Japanese by Dr. Kanakura, were published in 1957 and 1961 respectively, and opened a new problem that the sūtras of the above three commentaries are different from one another in a large number of cases, so that we are driven by the necessity of settling the original form of VS. Under this necessity, it must be done at first to determine the exact version of V. which is not yet settled.

V. was published as an anonymous commentary; subsequently the editor, Prof. A. Thakur, concluded in the article “*Bhaṭṭhavādinā—the Vaiṣeṣika*”, (*JOI*. vol. 10, 1960) that V. was a summary of Vādinā's *Kaṇādasūtranibandho* (abr. KSN.), prepared by Vādinā himself or some of his followers. It is not impossible to say reversely that KSN. is an enlarged version of V. but here we follow his conclusion. And it must be added that a quotation from the *Kiraṇāvali* (*BI*. 1911-12, pp. 20-6.) is found in V. (p. 1, ll. 6-12.) but not in KSN. given there. Vādinā served King Siṅghana (1210-47 A. D.) and King Çrikrṣṇa (1247-61 A. D.) of the Dynasty of the Yadavas of Devagiri, and KSN. is the

1) *Vaiṣeṣikadarṣana with Çaṅkaramiçra's Upaskāra & the Praçastapādabhāṣya*, ed. by Duṇḍhirājaçāstri, KSS. 3., Benares, 1923.

2) *Vaiṣeṣikadarṣana of Kaṇāda with an anonymous commentary*, ed. by A. Thakur, Darbhāṅga, 1957.

3) *Vaiṣeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Candrānanda*, ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya, GOS. 13f., Baroda, 1961.

JOURNAL
OF
INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES

Vol. XXVI No. 2 March 1978
[52]

PROCEEDINGS (2)
OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
HELD AT
NIHON UNIVERSITY

Edited by
JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF
INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES

(14) Heterodox Views on the Elements according (R. Duquenne)

21-861a2, 1552 viii, 936b16-22, 1553 i, 971b13-21, T XXIX 1558 i, 3a28-b13=1559 i, 163c22-164a2, 1562 i, 336b4 sq. which attributes to the four Elements the action of holding 持, of collecting 攝, of maturing 熟, and of raising 增長 the embryo (kalalam). This sūtra seems to be in relation with Puṅgalavāda and Vijñānavāda traditions.

Another version appears in T XXVII 1545 lxxv, 387a22-c13=T XXVIII 1546 xxxix, 290a16-b26.

Owing to their specific activities, the Elements are considered rather as forces (saṃskara) than as substances (dravya), cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, the Central Conception of Buddhism, London 1923, reed. Calcutta 1961, p. 18, Y. Karunadasa, art. cit., p. 28.

16) Distinction between the Elements and their counterparts in reality:

T XXVI 1543 xix, 859a17-20, 862a21-26=1544 xiii, 968c26-29, T XXVII 1545 cxxxiii, 689a13-b23, T XXVIII 1552 ix, 949b22-c2, T XXIX 1558 i, 3b17-22 1559 i, 164a3-6, 1562 ii, 336c23-337b8, 1563 ii, 782c15-783a9, TXLI 1821 ib, 23a29-b17=1882 ib, 483b28-c10, Kośa ed. Shastri p. 43 (ed. Pradhan, p. 9), td. La Vallée-Poussin I, p. 23. Cf. S. Aung-C, A. F. Rhys-Davids. Compendium, p. 268-271 (this distinction is not explicitly made in the Theravāda tradition). According to Kośa, it relies on a distinction made between common and higher sense: T XXIX 1558 xxii, 116b12=1559 XVI, 268c10, ed. Shastri, p. 889 (ed. Pradhan, p. 333), cf. T XXVIII 1553 i, 971b14-21. See different explanations in T XXVII 1545 cxxvii, 664c16-27 and T XXXII 1648 x, 446b3-4.

17) One theory considers each gross Element as composed by five subtler ones

in proportion of 1/2 for the predominant subtle one characterising its gross counterpart and 4/8 for each of the four others. Cf. A. B. Keith, the Sāṃkhya system, Calcutta-London 1924, p. 93, H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, New York 1951, reed. 1961, p. 327-328 n. 51, quoting Bhāratīrtha's Pañcadaśī I, 27.

The Buddhist view is that each "atom" (paramānu) is composed by four Elements in equal proportion, that the qualities of the Elements are all perceptible in that "atom," and exclusively tangible. Cf. Atthasalinī, 312-313, Visuddhimagga XIV, 444 contra T XXXIII 1648 x, 445c26-446a15, Ñānamoli. the path of Purification, p. 491 n. 16-18; T XVII 721 xxxiii, 191c12-15, whereas Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya consider an immediate relation between particular Elements and organs, see part II. of this article.

18) Frauwallner, op. cit. I p. 109, 122-123, 289-290, 335-358, II p. 32.

What is meant by destroying the *Ālayavijñāna*?

Akiko Osaki

"To destroy the *alayavijñāna*" (破壊阿賴耶識) is the phrase¹⁾ which appears in the passage of the *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* (決定藏論), Volume I, that explains the state of the *alayavijñāna*'s extinction. The *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* coincides with the "Vinīścaya-saṃgraha" (攝決分) in the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra* (瑜伽師地論, Volumes LI-LIV) and both are said to be translated from the same original: the former was translated by Paramārtha (真諦), while the latter by 玄奘. Having referred to the state of the *alayavijñāna*'s transmigration, the *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* continues to state thus:

The *alayavijñāna* is the very cause from which all afflictions (*kleśa*) arise, however, it extinguishes, if one exercises the good *dharma*s.....If one attains the eye of the *dharma*, perceiving the Four Noble Truths, the *alayavijñāna* is positively "destroyed."

In the Tibetan translation of the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra* the Tibetan *rtogs pa* is equivalent to Paramārtha's 破壞 and 玄奘's 通達. In this connection, in the Tibetan translation of the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra* the word *rtogs pa* is used four times in the passage which explains the state of the *alayavijñāna*'s extinction, and 玄奘's translations from Sanskrit are, in turn, 通達, 達, 通達 and 通達, while Paramārtha's are 破壞, 通達, 見 and 通達. The Sanskrit *gati*, *adhyavasti*, *avagati*, *avabuddhatva* and *avabodha*, each of which means perceive or grasp, may probably be synonymous with *rtogs pa*.

Then, what does the perception of the *alayavijñāna* mean? It is not to grasp, not to see, not to understand, not to cling to the object of cognition outside the Mind. The Vijñaptimātra vāda stands for "representations-only" (*vijñaptimatra*): it holds that the whole sphere of phenomenon, both non-mental and mental, arises from one's discrimination; and that any object discriminated

is void of reality. Here is an absolute denial of the idea that our cognition should be limited and controlled by and taken from transcendental objects aloof from our consciousness. However, this is not the final goal of achievement; there still exists the objectified recognition of the *vijñaptimātra* theory; the object is merely immanenciated in the representations (*vijñapti*) as long as the object is being grasped by the subject. When the subject-object-duality is sublated, the *ālayavijñāna*, which is the cause of all false phenomenal worlds, manifests itself. Then the *ālayavijñāna* sees not the object but the subject, the *ālayavijñāna* itself, and this means to perceive or grasp the *ālayavijñāna*.

The above mentioned short passage of the *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* is followed by the description which says:

By an increase in the wisdom to perceive the *tathata*, with the achievement of the *avinivartantya-bhūmi* (不退地), the *ālayavijñāna* is cut off; the quality and attribute of the unenlightened are transformed or cast aside, and thereby the *ālayavijñāna* is extinguished.

Judging from this assertion, the *ālayavijñāna* must not be destroyed before entering the *avinivartantya-bhūmi*. Therefore, "to destroy the *ālayavijñāna*" does not mean to destroy the *ālayavijñāna* itself; it means to destroy the seeds (*biṭṭa*, potentialities) of afflictions and false knowledge.

A question may occur here as to the state of one's consciousness when he cuts off the seeds of afflictions and false knowledge. Sthiramati (安慧), in his commentary on the *Trīṃśikā-vijñapti-kārikā* (唯識三十頌), states concerning this question: "His mind comes to abide in its own natural state (*svacitta dharma-tāyaṃ pratiṣṭhito bhavati*)."²⁾ The *Trīṃśikā-vijñapti-kārikā* itself says, with reference to the matter in question, that "It is the state which may be called *acitta* (the inconceivable), *anupalambha* (the unattainable) and *jñāna-lokottara* (the transcendental supramundane wisdom)." Again, Sthiramati comments, in the same commentary, that "It is the state of non-discrimination, because there is no more discriminating;" and that "It is the state of non-perception, because one does not recognize the object neither inside nor outside his mind;" and that "It is called the transcendental supramundane wisdom, because it does not conform to the world."³⁾

As previously stated, "to destroy the *ālayavijñāna*," in the stage of intensified discernment, means to cut off the two types of adherence (*grāhya*, *grahaka*, that which is grasped and that which grasps). Then, here follows another question as to how the *ālayavijñāna* is actually destroyed. The *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* reads, in this connection, as the following:

By the exercise to increase the wisdom to perceive the *tathata*, and as the result of the *bodhisattva*'s practice in self-cultivation, the *ālayavijñāna* is cut off; namely, the quality and attribute of the worldling are abandoned and the *ālayavijñāna* is uprooted. Hence the disappearance of all afflictions. With the *ālayavijñāna* being extinguished one is able to realize the *amala-vijñāna*.

The *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra*, however, reads in a different way thus:

If one practices hard continually to attain the knowledge which recognizes the *tathata*, he will experience the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* (the inner transformation). Immediately after acquiring the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* one is aware of the *ālayavijñāna* being abandoned. In consequence of its abandonment all afflictions will be completely ceased. The *āśraya-parāvṛtti* counteracts the *ālayavijñāna* to its extinction.⁴⁾

In the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra* the *ālayavijñāna* is uprooted immediately after the *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, while in the *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* the *amala-vijñāna* is attained after the destruction of the *ālayavijñāna*. This *amala-vijñāna* is regarded as 如来藏自性清淨心 and considered to be the ninth consciousness by the followers of Paramārtha.

The *āśraya-parāvṛtti* is the turning-up of one's basis; namely, it is the conversion of the *ālayavijñāna* which restores all seeds. The passage⁵⁾ of the Tibetan translation of the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra*, in which the difference between the *ālayavijñāna* and the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* is explained, defines the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* thus:

1. It is everlasting and has no more name-and-word-seeds, because it is acquired by the wisdom which grasps the *tathata*.
2. It abandons all afflictive seeds.
3. It is not the cause of producing all afflictions, but it is the cause of

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the Holy Path taking place.

4. It is absolutely free from all kinds of good and neutral (neither good nor evil) *dharma*s.

The interpretations, with reference to the above subject, of the *Yogacārya-bhūmi-śāstra* and the *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* are identical with the Tibetan translation except for Item One. The *Nirṇaya-saṃgraha-śāstra* says, in Item One, "to have an immediate perception of the *tathata*," which suggests the standpoint of non-dualism (the *tathata* and the wisdom are non-dual), while the *Yogacārya-bhūmi-śāstra* says, "to cognitively grasp the *tathata*." The *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, as long as it is understood to be a counteracting *dharma* to the *alayavijñāna*, does not merely mean the *alayavijñāna* turning up; it is required to be one *dharma* independent from the *alayavijñāna*. When the subject-object-duality is elevated, the *alayavijñāna* will see itself, not the object. In the beginning of the *Vimśatika-vijñaptimātrata-siddhi* (唯識二十論) the term *mātra* is defined as negation of the cognitive object, and the same treatise makes a proposition that one's own seeds should manifest themselves appearing just like the object. The object internalized in the manifestation and transformation of the consciousnesses is by all means an externalizing self; here still remains the subject-object-duality. To get rid of the two types of hindrance (hindrance of afflictions and hindrance that disturbs Absolute Knowledge) means not to grasp the object outside the Mind, but that the Mind sees itself, and that the Mind returns to its own source and abides in its natural state. At this stage one sees the object just as it is or in its suchness so that the recognition in action here is not false but real.

The Vijñaptimātra vāda does not agree itself in interpreting the nature of the *alayavijñāna*: the one says the *alayavijñāna* is a wholly defiled consciousness, while the other says it is a consciousness comprising pure and defiled seeds. The passage that explains the aspect of the *alayavijñāna*'s destruction gives us the idea that the *alayavijñāna* should be the defiled, and through attaining the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* the highest Reality reveals itself in individuals. In the fifty-fourth volume of the *Yogacārya-bhūmi-śāstra*, however, the word *pudgala*, which *saṃmatīya* (正量部) and *Vātsīputriya* (犢子部) set up as perpetual and

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immutable *Noesis*, appears, and further we read: "The counteracting consciousness to the *alayavijñāna* is a pure consciousness." Again, in the second volume of the said treatise the *alayavijñāna* is defined as the consciousness restoring all kinds of seeds including innate and primordial pure seeds.

Paramārtha may probably have rendered, influenced by the theory that the phenomenal world occurs from the *tathata* through the action of conditional causation, *āśraya-parāvṛtti* into 阿摩羅識 (*amalavijñāna*). This *amalavijñāna* is not mere intellect that recognizes the *tathata* but Absolute Wisdom. The *amalavijñāna* is explained to be equivalent to *Pariniṣpanna* (Ultimate Reality) in his translation of the *Triniṣvabhāva-śāstra*. It reads: "Where there is no more fallacious discrimination, there are no more occurrences from causes and conditions; there is only the *amalavijñāna* existing, clearing away all defiled attributes; therefore it is called suchness."⁶

It is said that Paramārtha introduced the *tathagata-garbha* theory into Vijñaptimātra vāda. Preceding Paramārtha, however, the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-śāstra* (攝大乘論) chooses the *Daśabhūmi-sūtra* (十地經) as its grounds of the theory. And Vasubandhu quotes, in the beginning of the *Vimśatika-vijñaptimātrata-siddhi*, the proposition from the *Daśabhūmi-sūtra*: "The three worlds are nothing but representations arising from the Mind."

The *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* (解深密經) defines the seeds as the perfuming act of form, name and discrimination; namely, the seeds are of impure *dharma*s. The *Yogacārya-bhūmi-śāstra* admits pure seeds inherently abiding in the *alayavijñāna*, and says that the relation between the *alayavijñāna* and pure seeds is that of the possessor and the possessable. The interpretation brings up the question of whether the *alayavijñāna*, which is of the impure, is capable of retaining pure seeds; or whether pure seeds, that have a nature counter to the *alayavijñāna*, can coexist with the *alayavijñāna*. The same treatise does not mention anything of it; it only says, as regards the Holy Path, that the *tathata* holds the Holy Path and makes it continuous and active in series, and succeeds by depending on the *tathata*. Again, the same treatise does not refer to the perfumable place that may receive pure seeds perfumed by the Holy Path. This became a solemn and difficult problem which the Vijñaptimātra vāda had to

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struggle to solve thereafter.

- 1) 正藏, vol. I, p. 1020b.
- 2) The *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, Lévi Sanskrit Text, p. 43. l. 15.
- 3) *Ibid.*, p. 44. ll. 2-5.
- 4) 正藏, vol. LI, p. 581c.
- 5) The Peking Edition., No. 5539. p. 238-1-4~7.
- 6) 正藏, vol. XXXI, p. 872a.

HARIVARMAN ON SARVĀSTIVĀDA

Shoryu Katsura

The aim of this paper is to present **H**(arivarman ca. 250-350)'s analysis of the *sarvāstivāda* (doctrine of 'all exists') recorded in his *T(attva) S(iddhi)* (Ch'eng-Shih Lun, Taisho 1646, Vol. 32) §§ 19-23. **H** begins his analysis with the following questions and answers:

DOCUMENT I Some people say that *dharma*s of the two time-epochs (*adhva*n) [viz. past and future] exist, while others say that they do not exist. Question [by **H**]: Why do they say that [those *dharma*s] exist or do not exist? Answer [by opponents]: Existence [may be explained as follows]: If something exists, a thought (*citta*) occurs with reference to it. Since a thought occurs with reference to *dharma*s of the two time-epochs, they [i. e., past and future *dharma*s] must be recognized as existing. Question [by **H**]: You must first give the definition of existence. Answer [by the opponents]: The definition of existence is to be an object (*gocara*) of knowledge (*jñāna*). (*TS* § 19, 253c²⁷-254a⁸)

Discussing the same subject, **V**(asubandhu ca. 400-480) summarizes four arguments set forth by the Sarvāstivādins in order to prove the *sarvāstivāda*. *A(bhidharma) K(ośa)*, ed. Swami D. Shastri, V. 25ab reads:

"[*Dharma*s] exist always [i. e., in all three time-epochs], for (i) it is said so [by the Buddha], (ii) [it is said by Him that consciousness (*viñāna*) arises] out of two [viz. sense-organ and an object], (iii) [consciousness] takes an existing thing as its object, and (iv) [past *karma*s should have] a result." (*sarvakalāstitā, uktatvād dvayāt sadviśayāt phalāt*; cf. *A(bhidharma) D(īpa)*, ed. P. S. Jaini, K. 305—Read *gocaravāc*.)


Since the first answer given in Document I corresponds to the argument (iii) of *AK*, the opponents of **H** must be Sarvāstivādins of his period. This is further confirmed by the fact that the Def. of existence given in the second answer exactly corresponds to **S**(aṅghabhadra ca. 430-490)'s celebrated Def.:

THE JOURNAL OF
ORIENTAL RESEARCH
MADRAS

THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SILVER JUBILEE VOLUME

Edited by
Dr. S. S. JANAKI

1970-71, 1971-72



Vols. XXXX - XXXXI

THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MADRAS-600 004.

1981

Price: Rs. 25
(India)

Foreign: £ 3/ \$ 4.

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

एकमेव यदाज्ञातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥

अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।
जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥

एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चैयमनेकधा ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगकार्येण च स्थितिः ॥

—वाक्यपदीयम् - ब्रह्मकाण्डम् १ - ४

ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA, TRANSMIGRATION AND ABSOLUTION*

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I. Introduction: 'pudgala':

The Brahminical idea of 'self' or 'soul' was rejected by the Buddha. This aspect of his teachings is too pronounced to be missed. But even at a very early stage of Buddhism, there arose within the tradition much controversy over the idea of a 'person' (*pudgala*). The *Kathāvatthu* supplies ample evidence of this fact. The 'Bhāra' dialogue of the *Samyutta-nikāya*¹, where the 'burden' (*bhāra*) is represented as *samsāra* and the carrier as the 'person', is often referred to as the Buddha's concession for some persisting entity through the cycles of transmigration. Of the early Buddhist schools, the Vātsīputriyas and the Sāmmitiyas maintained the notion of a persisting entity called 'pudgala'. This 'pudgala' comes very close to the doctrine of 'soul', which would naturally be regarded as a heresy in Buddhism. In fact, the Vātsīputriyas and the Sāmmitiyas were accused of such a heresy. But the Sāmmitiya's defence of 'pudgala', as K. Venkataramanam informs us, need not be regarded as a heresy. The pudgala here is not exactly the *ātman* of the Brahmanas. The argument is rather for an entity persisting through the ever fluctuating states of transmigration.²

* This is a revised and modified version of an earlier paper entitled "Ālayavijñāna and Transmigration," which was presented at a symposium *Ālayavijñāna* at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society in Cambridge, Mass., in April 1971.

1. This *sūtra* is alternatively referred to as *Bhārahāra-sutta* or *Bhāra-sutta*. See *Samyutta-nikāya*, Part III,² p. 25-26. Cf. the following lines:

Bhāra have pañcakkandhā
bhārahāro ca puggalo
bhārādānaṃ dukkhaṃ loke
bharanikkepanaṃ sukhaṃ 1 p. 26.

2. The word "transmigration" is, perhaps, an unfortunate translation to express the Buddhist sense of *samsāra*. Prof. A. K. Narayan drew our attention to this point at the symposium. I have, however, retained this translation in the absence of a better word that might be acceptable to most of us.

The Buddha accepted a highly complex notion of transmigration without a transmigrating soul.³ The analogy is that of a river or stream where there is a continuum but no persisting entity. Although transmigration can conceivably be explained without resorting to a persisting soul, the idea of an underlying 'link' running through the fluctuating states arose quite naturally in many systems which tried to explain the Buddhist notion of transmigration. The *pudgala* of the Sāṃmitiyas was no doubt posited as this 'link'. The Yogācāra's concept of *ālayavijñāna* was another, and perhaps a more sophisticated, approach to explain away this 'link' problem.

It is somewhat paradoxical to see that there was an important trend in Buddhism which recognized an absolute spiritual principle. This trend must have created an internal conflict in Buddhism because the 'no-soul' doctrine, the predominant trend in Buddhism, could not be easily reconciled to it. In Mahāyāna, this principle is usually called the *Tathāgatagarbha*. In Yogācāra system, this principle was attributed to *ālayavijñāna*.

II. *Vijñāna* in the 'five personality-aggregates':

The group of five personality aggregates' (*pañca skandhāḥ*) is usually substituted for 'self' or 'person' in Buddhist literature. In interpreting them I shall mainly follow Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya*. The 'aggregate of matter' refers to the visible forms of the material world. The 'aggregate of feeling' (*vedanā-skandha*) stands for the experiences of pleasure, pain and neutral feelings. The 'aggregate of knowings' (*saṃjñā-skandha*) is to be explained as the awareness (or the conceptual construction) of the 'specific' characters of objects (cf. *Abhidharmakośa* I/14). The 'aggregate of *saṃskāra*' includes all other mental acts (*citta-dharma*) as well as other acts and 'forces' which are not attendant upon an act of consciousness (*citta-viprayukta-dharma*).⁴

The 'aggregate of consciousness' is usually divided into seven items. They are: consciousness of five senses, 'mental' consciousness (*manovijñāna*) and mind. But in the Sarvāstivāda, although 'mind'

(*mano-dhātu*) is mentioned, it is not considered an additional entity.⁵ It is just any one of the six types of consciousness. The consciousness in the immediately preceding moment acts as the 'locus' (*āśraya*) of the consciousness in the next moment and is designated as 'mind'. This explanation is related to the Abhidharma concept of *samanantara-pratyaya*.⁶

In the Sthaviravāda school, however, 'mind' is distinguished from the six *vijñānas* (which include *mano-vijñāna*). In *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, three peculiar functions (*pañcadvārāvajjana*, or adverting of mind toward any of the five 'doors', i.e., senses, and two classes of *sampaṭicchana*, or mental 'acceptance' of impressions - S. Z. Aung's translation) are ascribed to *manodhātu* 'mind'.⁷ Some other functions like *santīraṇa* (investigating) and *voṭṭhāpana* (determining) are ascribed to *mano-vijñāna* 'mental consciousness'. Another entity, viz., *hadaya-vatthu* 'the heart essence', is sometimes posited by the Sthaviras as the seat or locus of consciousness, and as the locus it is distinct from consciousness.⁸ But the 'heart essence' is described as a subtle material form (*sūkṣma-rūpa*) and as such it is different from *citta-dharma* 'mental form'. The *Dhammsaṅgaṇi* omitted this 'heart-essence' from its list, so did the Sarvāstivādins as well as the later Yogācārins. But the Yogācārins speak of the 'mind' or the 'ego-shrunk mind' (*kliṣṭa-manas*) as different from the six *vijñānas*. And thus, surprisingly, the Yogācārins agree with the Sthaviras in this respect. Another 'subtle material form' in the list of the Sthaviras was *jīvitendriya* 'life' or 'life function'. In Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, it was included in the *citta-viprayukta-*

3. For the Sāṃmitiya explanation of *pudgala* see K. Venkataramanam's translation of the *Sāṃmitīyanikaya-sāstra*, *Visva-Bhārati Annals*, Vol. V, 1953, pp. 153-242.

4. For a good discussion of this item, see P. S. Jaini, pp. 88 - 98.

5. The usual trend in the *Āgamas* as well as in the *Abhidharma* is to analyse dharmas into *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* ('aggregates', 'bases' and 'basic elements'). Thus, 'mind' is included in the *vijñāna-skandha*. Among the *āyatanas*, there is one called *mana-āyatana*, and among the *dhātus*, there is one called *mano-dhātu* or *manovijñāna-dhātu*. But *mana-āyatana* and *mano-dhātu* are considered to be the same. And the Sarvāstivādins consider the *mano-vijñāna* and *mano-dhātu* to be the same. Cf. *Abhidharma-kośa*, I/16.

6. Cf. *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya*, I/16, 17; *Abhidharma-dīpa*, I/6, 7.

7. For the position of the Sthaviras, see S. Z. Aung's note on *dhātu* and *āyatana* in *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 254-259. See also Aung's note on pp. 108-109. 3.

8. See Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārtha* under *Abhidharma-kośa*, I/17. See also *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, Chap. III, p. 82: *vatthusāṅgahe vatthuni nāma - cakku - sota - ghāṇa - jīhvā - kaya - hadaya - vatthu ceri chabbidhani bhavanti* |

For the Sthaviras' position on the connection between the *mano-dhātu* (as well as the *vijñānas*) and the *hadaya-vatthu*, see, *ibid.*, p. 83.

saṃskāra 'non-material, abstract elements not concomitant with any consciousness'.⁹

More interesting is the concept of *bhavāṅga vijñāna* in the Sthaviravāda. It has been explained as the passive state or 'current' (*srota*) of consciousness linking the fluctuating and transmigrating stages. It is contrasted with the active stream of consciousness (cf. *vīthi-citta* in Sthaviravāda, and *pravṛtti-vijñāna* or *viśaya-vijñapti* in the Yogācāra). As S. Z. Aung has aptly put it, "it is, as it were, the background on which thought-pictures are drawn" (p. 11). This current is said to be bounded by birth (*pratisandhi*) and death (*cyuti*), but as death is but a prelude to another birth, according to the Indian theory of *saṃsāra*, this current flows from life to life, from existence to existence. It is also said to create the false notion of 'personal identity'.¹⁰

Consciousness moments or the flow of active thoughts are usually classified in Buddhism into 'good' (*kuśala*) and 'bad' or 'evil' (*a-kuśala*) types. Since good cannot spring from evil or *vice versa*, there arose a problem in the Buddhist explanation of the causal continuum of the flow of consciousness moments: How can a good *citta* 'thought' arise out of a bad one? The Sthaviras explained the causal process taking recourse to the notion of *bhavāṅga-vijñāna*, which is *a-vyākṛta* 'indeterminate' (i.e., neither good nor bad) and, therefore can very well intervene between the emergence of a good thought and a bad one.¹¹

The Vaibhāṣikas posit two additional entities called *prāpti* and *a-prāpti* (two *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*), which are merely two 'forces'—one controlling the collection of particular causal conditions and the other preventing such a collection. Thus, emergence of a bad *citta* can be succeeded by that of a good one through the operation of these two 'forces'—one preventing the bad while the other causing the good to arise and *vice versa*.¹²

The Sautrāntikas criticize both these views and posit their theory of 'seed' and 'maturity'. Seeds of evil are said to co-exist with seeds of good side by side, in the form of 'subtle' seeds. Only one of them operates at a given time—the one that has reached its *vipāka* i.e., 'maturity'.¹³

Now we can take a close look at the Yogācāra classification of *vijñāna*. Asaṅga, in his *Yogācārabhūmi*, studied the 'plane of mind' (*manobhūmi*) in its five aspects: its 'own nature' (*svabhāva*), its locus, its intentional reference, its accessories, and its action. Its 'own nature' has three forms: *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*. *Citta* is *ālaya-vijñāna*, *manas* is the 'ego-shrunk' or 'ego-centered' mind, and *vijñāna* is the 'consciousness of six senses'.¹⁴

The locus of consciousness can be of three types: a causal concomitant (cf. *sahabhū*), or a causal precedent (cf. *samanantara*), or a causal seed (cf. *bhījāśraya*). The causal concomitance of the five types of sensory consciousness are respectively the five senses themselves. The causal precedent is the 'mind', which is interpreted, following the Sarvāstivāda principle, as the immediately preceding consciousness moment.¹⁵ But the locus which is causal precedent to the 'mental' consciousness is distinguished as the 'ego-shrunk' mind (*kliṣṭaṃ manas*), which is attendant (*samprayukta*) with ego-sense, pride etc. (*asmimāna* etc.). The causal seed, however, for all types of consciousness is *ālayavijñāna*. Thus, it is clear that the idea of a causal seed of the Sautrāntikas and the idea of a subterranean current of consciousness continuum, which was vaguely present in the Sthaviras' talk about the *bhavāṅga-vijñāna*, contributed to the development of the notion of *ālayavijñāna* in the Yogācāra system.¹⁶

9. See note 4. For the Yogācāra notion of *jīvitendriya*, see Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: *jīvitendriyaṃ katamat/nikāyasabhāge pūrvakarmāviddhe śīhitikālaniyame āyur iti prajñapti* | p. 11.

10. The process of active thoughts arising out of the 'passive' mind is described in detail in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, Chap. IV. See also Aung's Introductory Essay, pp. 27-30.

11. See P. S. Jaini, *Introduction*, pp. 101-110.

12. For Vasubandhu's critique of *prāpti*, see *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* under verses II/35-36. Yaśomitra, explains in *Sphuṭārtha* why this notion is not exactly the same as the *saṃyoga* 'conjunction' of the Vaiśeṣikas.

13. For the Sautrāntika position, see Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* under verse II/36, p. 64, and verse V/2a, p. 278 (see also Yaśomitra's comment on this section). For the Vaibhāṣika critique of the 'seed' theory, see *Abhidharma-dīpa*, and the commentary, pp. 220-225.

14. See *Yogācārabhūmi*, p. 11. *Citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are usually taken to be synonymous in the Sarvāstivāda school. Compare Ghoṣaka's comment in *Abhidharmāṅgā*: *Cittaṃ mano vijñānam ity anarthāntaraṃ | niruktāv evāntaram* | p. 55.

15. See *Yogācārabhūmi*: *Manas katamat | yat saṃjñam api vijñānakāyānām anantaraniruddhaṃ kliṣṭaṃ ca mano yan nīyam avidyātmadr̥ṣṭyasmimāna-tṣṇālakṣaṇaiḥ caturbhiḥ kleṣaiḥ samprayuktam* || p. 11.

16. Cf. Vasubandhu's *Trimsikā*: *Tatrālayākhyam vijñānam vipākaḥ sarvabijakam* | verse 2cd.

III. The Sautrāntika school: *bīja* (seed) and *vipāka* (maturity)

A few historical comments on the origin of the Sautrāntika school and its relation to the Yogācāra school will be pertinent here. The Sautrāntika school could have originated some time in the second half of the first century A.D. (with Dharmatrāta). It was definitely an established school in the third century A.D. with such exponents as Śrīlata. Both the Pāli and the Sanskrit accounts agree that this school branched from the old Sarvāstivāda school and it was the last of the eighteen Nikāyas.¹⁷ The very name 'Sautrāntika' indicates that this school emphasized the authority of the Sūtras over the Abhidharma.¹⁸ Vasumitra noted the other name of this school as *samkrāntivāda*. And this name is explained with recourse to its special doctrine of transmigration. This doctrine holds that the *skandhas* transmigrate (i.e., are transferred) from one existence to the other.¹⁹ This special 'transmigration' doctrine was further developed into the doctrine of 'seed' *bīja*, and a discussion of this *bīja* doctrine is to be found in Vasubandhu's work and Yaśomitra's commentary.²⁰ It has been suggested (e.g., by J. Masuda, p. 66) that the above Sautrāntika doctrine was probably the outcome of the criticism of the *pudgala* doctrine (of the Vātsīputriyas) by the Sarvāstivādins and the early Mahīśāsakas. The Sarvāstivādins and the early Mahīśāsakas maintained the theory of perpetual flux of all *samskāras*. The Vātsīputriyas, on the other hand, held that some *samskāras* are momentary while others can persist for some time.²¹ And they also held that *dharma*s can transmigrate (cf. *samkānti*) from one existence to the other only along with the *pudgala*, not by themselves.

The Sarvāstivādins and the early Mahīśāsakas protested and claimed that no *dharma*s can, in fact, transmigrate since they are momentary. And, in this context, I think, the Sautrāntikas argued that the *skandhas* transmigrate. J. Masuda has conjectured that the 'skandha' here probably meant, as the Chinese commentator once interpreted, the 'seed' *bīja*, or perhaps, it meant what the Sautrāntikas called *ekarasa-skandha*. The Sautrāntika idea of the *ekarasa-skandha* was interpreted in the Chinese commentary as the "subtle

consciousness," and Masuda thinks that this might be due to an influence of the Mahāsamghikas.²² In any case, the idea of 'subtle consciousness' must have found its way in the Yogācāra idea of *ālayavijñāna*, as did the idea of 'seed' *bīja*.

The 'seed' theory, in plain language, means that the past passions leave behind their seeds in subtle forms which possess the power to produce new passions. In this way the causal chain is to be maintained. This theory was severely criticized by the Vaibhāṣikas.²³ But there were undoubtedly several 'unconscious' in *santāna* or consciousness series where the Buddhist faced the problem of explaining the causal continuity between the immediately preceding *vijñāna* 'consciousness moment' and the new 'waking' *vijñāna* following such a state. For example, there may be a (i) seizure or swoon (*mūrecca*) or (ii) a state of extreme inaction (*middha*); or, there may be (iii) meditational cessation of the 'ego-shrunk' mind-stream or (iv) some other 'higher order' meditational cessation (cf., *nirodha-samāpatti* etc.).

The Vaibhāṣikas explain that the causal precedent of the 'waking' *vijñāna* is the *vijñāna* immediately preceding such an 'unconscious' state. But this called for some modification in the usual definition of the 'causal precedent' (cf. *samanantara*). Ordinarily there should not be intervention of any moment between the causal precedent and its resultant *vijñāna*. But the Vaibhāṣikas interpreted 'non-intervention' in this context as the 'non-intervention by a *sajātīya* (similar) moment'. Since the 'unconscious' states described above do not involve any consciousness moment, the said problem is thus avoided.

In the Yogācāra system, however, with the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* it was easy to explain the causal sequence satisfactorily. The flow of *ālayavijñāna* continues in all the above-mentioned states. All *vijñānas* leave behind their residual 'seeds', which await their respective 'maturities' (*vipāka*) to generate further *vijñānas*. Thus, in the immediately preceding moment of any one of the 'unconscious' states described above, all *vijñānas* dissolve into *manovijñāna*, which in its turn dissolves into *ālayavijñāna* retaining the results (*phala*) in the form of 'seeds'. The 'waking' consciousness arises out of one of these maturing 'seeds'. Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* is called the locus of the 'seeds' of all *vijñānas*.²⁴

17. The Sanskrit source is supplied chiefly by Vasumitra's treatises. The Pāli sources are *Kathāvatthu*, *Dīpavaṇṇa* etc. See J. Masuda, p. 66.

18. Cf. Yaśomitra's comment in *Sphuṭārtha: kaṣ Sautrāntikārthaḥ | ye sūtra-prāmāṇikā na śāstraprāmāṇikās te Sautrāntikāḥ || p. 11.*

19. See J. Masuda, p. 66.

20. See Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra under *Abhidharmakośa*, verses II/36 and V/2a.

21. See J. Masuda, p. 54.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-69.

23. See note 13 above.

24. Cf. *Yogācārabhūmi: Sarvabijakam āśrayopādāt-vipākasamgrahitaṁ ālayavijñānam bhijāśrayaḥ | p. 4.*

IV. The causal continuum in *samsāra* 'transmigration'

In Asaṅga's Yogācāra system, *ālayavijñāna* became almost the central concept. Thus, Sthiramati asserted that because of the presence of *ālayavijñāna* transmigration (*samsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāṇa*) could become possible.²⁵ The implication is that without resorting to the notion of *ālayavijñāna* it would be difficult to explain the causal chain in birth and re-birth as well as the causal sequence in the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. In this way, *ālayavijñāna* rose to a unique prominence, which we will see in the next section.

The perpetuation of existence is usually explained in Buddhism by the causal chain with twelve members, which is known as the *dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda*. In this causal chain each succeeding member arises with the preceding member as its 'condition' (*pratyaya*). *Vijñāna* is the third member (in this chain) which comes after *samskāra*, i.e., 'traces' of action in the former birth, which in its turn depends upon *avidyā* (often wrongly translated as ignorance), i.e., wrong beliefs or wrong tendencies. After *vijñāna*, comes *nāmarūpa*, the formation of the mind-body complex, i.e., the five 'personality' aggregates, at the time of the conception in the womb. The *nāmarūpa* gives way to the six sense organs and so on until rebirth and old age and death in the next birth.²⁶

Sthiramati claims that the third member in this causal chain, *vijñāna*, is nothing but *ālayavijñāna*. The Vaibhāṣikas explain it as the *pratisandhi-vijñāna*, which is interpreted as the five 'personality' aggregates just at the moment of conception.²⁷ It is called *vijñāna* 'consciousness' only in a metaphorical sense. Even if we ignore the metaphorical sense and consider it simply as the 'consciousness aggregate' (*vijñāna-skandha*) at the moment of conception, it will be difficult to explain how 'traces' of the former birth (cf. *samskāra*) can give rise to such a consciousness aggregate at the time of conception. The 'traces' from a former birth are not stable and hence will cease long before the time of conception. And something which has ceased to exist becomes non-existent and hence cannot be a *pratyaya*, 'causal condition'.

Besides, at the moment of conception the mind-body complex is also to appear. If the 'traces' give rise to 'consciousness' *vijñāna* (at the time of conception) they should likewise give rise to the 'mind-body' complex at that time. If *nāmarūpa* is interpreted as the 'mind-body' complex of the succeeding stage arising after the *pratisandhi-vijñāna* (*vijñāna* belonging to the conception 'time'), how does this stage differ from its previous stage (i.e., the conception 'time') when the 'consciousness aggregate' is there along with the 'mind-body' complex (*pañca-skandha*-five aggregates)? In fact, if the initial 'mind-body' complex including the 'consciousness aggregate' arises depending upon the 'traces' we do not need to posit *vijñāna*, the third member in the causal chain, as intervening between *samskāra* 'traces' and the *nāmarūpa*. Thus, Sthiramati argues that to maintain consistency and retain the 'twelve-fold' causal chain of Buddhism, we need to assume *ālayavijñāna* as that subterranean stream of consciousness where the 'traces' or 'forces' leave their 'seeds'. The causal chain can now be explained as follows: 'Wrong belief' (*avidyā*) conditions the appearance of 'traces' or 'forces', and the 'traces' condition the stream of the 'seeded' *ālayavijñāna*, and when the 'seeds' reach maturity (*vipāka*) the 'mind-body' complex arises. The same flow of the seeded *ālayavijñāna* starts other continuous activities in a similar manner at the end of such 'unconscious' states as *nirodha-samāpatti* (described above).²⁸

Sthiramati further argues that without resorting to the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine it would be difficult to explain the process of cessation in *nirvāṇa*. His arguments can be briefly stated as follows. Perpetuation of existence (or *samsāra*) is due mainly to what is known as *kleśa* 'mental blemishes' or 'passions' such as attachment (*rāga*) and ego-sense, and secondarily to *karma* (action). Since action by itself cannot condition the future existence unless it is engineered by *kleśas*, we have to consider *kleśa* to be the root (*mūla*) of *samsāra*. Thus, only with the cessation of *kleśa* 'mental blemishes', the 'forces' leading to the future existence will cease to operate. Now, a *kleśa* may be in the process of taking its course, or it may exist in the form of a 'seed'. Only the 'seed' form of a *kleśa* can be destroyed by an opposite mental state (*pratipakṣa-citta*), other *kleśas* must take their courses in order to generate further *kleśas* and action. Now, the seed of a *kleśa* must be located in consciousness, and this locus must be the *ālayavijñāna*, the subter-

25. See Sthiramati under *Triṃśikā* pp. 37-39.

26. The twelve members in the causal chain of transmigration are the following: *avidyā*, *samskāra* | *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *spṛṣa*, *vedanā*, *tṛṣṇā*, *bhava* | *jāti*, *jarāmaraṇa*. For the Sarvāstivāda explanation of this chain, see Vasubandhu under *Abhidharmakośa* verses III/19-28, pp. 129-140.

27. Cf. Vasubandhu's remark: *mātuḥ kukṣau pratisandhikṣaṇe pañcaskandhā vijñānam* | p. 131 (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*).

28. See Sthiramati under *Triṃśikā* verse 16. Cf. *Evam āsaṃjñikādiṣu mano-vijñāne niruddhe tadapagame punaḥ kuta utpadyate yat tasya kālakriyā na bhavati | tat punar ālayavijñānād evotpadyate | tad hi sarvavijñānabijakam-iti* || p. 35.

anean consciousness. Otherwise, to make the destruction of the seed possible, we have to admit the impossible situation that the same 'mental' state or the state of consciousness (i.e., the *prati-pakṣa-citta*) acts as the locus of the seed and at the same time brings about its destruction. Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine solves the problem of the locus and explains the causal process in obtaining *nirvāṇa*. Sthiramati informs that a detailed discussion of transmigration and its cessation with the help of the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine can be found in the *Pañcaskandhaka*.²⁹

V. *Ālayavijñāna*, *Tathāgatagarbha* and *āśrayaparāvṛtti*

Apart from the *pudgala* controversy, there was another stream in early Buddhism which recognized an Absolute spiritual principle existing in every being. In Mahāyāna, this was usually called the *garbha* theory which we find expounded in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. An unidentified prakṛt verse³⁰ sums up the *garbha* as follows:

*Yathā pattharacūṇṇamhi jātarūpaṃ na dissati |
parikammaṇa tad dīṭṭhaṃ evaṃ loke tathāgata ||*

This means that the *Tathāgata* lives invisible in living beings like pure gold in stones and sands and by purification it becomes visible. Such numerous comparisons of the *Tathāgata* with pure gold, with an impenetrable diamond, and with the immutable gem, point to the positive aspect of this spiritual principle. In the Yogācāra school, the *Tathāgatagarbha* doctrine became connected with the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine in a very interesting manner, which we will presently see.

As a critique of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* doctrine of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* established the *tri-svabhāvatā* doctrine and the *ālayavijñāna*.³¹ The *Ratnagotravibhāga* expounded the *garbha* theory also as a criticism of the *śūnyatā* or *niḥsvabhāvatā* 'emptiness' doctrine. Thus, comparison between the *garbha* doctrine and the *ālayavijñāna* was obvious and natural. Besides, there was undoubtedly mutual influence in the development of both doctrines. J. Takasaki

29. *Ibid.* p. 39. This was probably a work of Vasubandhu translated by Hueng Tsang into Chinese, and Sthiramati probably summarized the book under the same title (Sylvain Levi).

30. E. H. Johnston described it as Prakṛt verse. J. Takasaki mentions it as in Pāli verse.

31. *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, Chap. VI, 4-6 (E. Lamotte's translation) pp. 60-65.

has collected important references to the confusion and the later amalgamation of these two doctrines.³² Special mention may be made of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, chap. VI, where the *Tathāgatagarbha* has been identified with the *ālayavijñāna*. I think that these two doctrines were connected even in their origin. Thus, in the *Mahāyānasūtrā-lāṅkāra*, chap. IX, we find an early fusion of the two. And this must have influenced the later Yogācārins like Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. The following verse from the (Mahāyāna) *Abhidharma-sūtra* is quoted in both places: in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* to justify the *garbha* doctrine and in the *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya* to justify the *ālayavijñāna*:

*Anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ |
tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo'pi vā ||*

"It is the beginningless *dhātu* and the locus of all dharmas, all causal sequence results from it, even realisation of *nirvāṇa* is due to it."³²

It should also be noted that the Sautrāntika 'seed' theory might have played some part in connecting the *ālaya* doctrine with the *garbha* doctrine. Some element of the 'good' is said to persist through the series of existence. This Sautrāntika idea of a subtle and incorruptible *kuśala-mūla* 'root of good action' is strikingly similar to the Mahāyāna *garbha* theory. The incorruptible element of the good to be found in every being corresponds, as P. Jaini rightly conjectures, to the 'seed of salvation', *mokṣa-bīja* which we find in later writings. Yaśomitra quotes the following significant verse where the Buddha compares the 'seed of freedom' with a seam of gold hidden in a mineral rock:³³

*Mokṣa-bījam ahaṃ hy asya susūkṣmam upalakṣaye |
dhātupāṣāṇavivare nilīnam iva kāñcanam ||*

"I notice the extremely subtle seed of freedom of this man hidden (in him) like gold in the vein of a mineral rock."

This saying is associated with one of the ten powers of the Buddha (for which he was called *daśabala*) viz., the power to realize the pure and indestructible element, the *dhātu* or the *gotra* or the *bīja*, of every being. Thus, in many contexts 'gotra', 'dhātu' and 'bīja' were interchangeably used. In Yogācāra, this pure ele-

32. See J. Takasaki, pp. 40-45.

33. Yaśomitra quotes the whole episode along with this verse. For P. S. Jaini's comment, see his *Introduction*, pp. 115-116.

ment was called the *prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta* 'mind which is essentially pure and translucent'. And this was further identified with the *tathatā*.³⁴

The flow of *ālayavijñāna* continues until *nirvāṇa*.³⁵ But, if the *ālaya* doctrine is to be brought closer to the Absolutism of the *tathatā*, we have to investigate the state of *ālayavijñāna* at the realization of *nirvāṇa*. The *Triṃśikā* says that in *nirvāṇa* this subterranean base (the *ālaya*) 'returns to itself', resulting in a transcendental (*lokottara*), non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) - *jñāna*. And this 'returning to itself' happens at the removal of the two types of *dauṣṭhulya* 'blemishes' ('turbulence' — S. Levi; 'Verderbtheit' — E. Frauwallner) or two types of coverings (cf. *vṛti* in *Mahāyānasūtrā-lāṅkāra*, p. 35)³⁶

The key terms to be investigated in this connection are *āśraya-parāvṛtti* and *āśraya-parivṛtti* (see Takasaki for references, pp. 40-45). In the *Mahāyānasūtrā-lāṅkāra*, they are often used interchangeably. E. H. Johnston noted (p. xii) a difference between the *garbha* and the *ālaya* doctrines reflected in this difference in terms: In the latter, the *āśraya* or *ālayavijñāna* returns to itself in *nirvāṇa*, while in the former, as the pure *tathatā* is freed from the sheaths of *kleśas* in *nirvāṇa* (compare Sthiramati's explanation of the process of *nirvāṇa* given above), a metamorphosis of the *āśraya* takes place. I would note that this kind of distinction was not always maintained in the literature. There is, indeed, an obvious and essential similarity between the two doctrines. Thus, in Sthiramati's explanation of *ālayavijñāna*, the notion *parivṛtti* 'metamorphosis' seems to have been assimilated with *parāvṛtti* 'returning to itself'. Thus, in short, at *nirvāṇa* the *vijñāna* becomes *jñāna*, and it is called the *anāsrava dhātu* 'incorruptible element' (cf. *Triṃśikā*, verse 30), and the *āsrava-kṣaya* or *vimalāśraya* (cf. *Ratnagotravibhāga*, I, 44).

It should also be noted that the above view is also consistent with the 'triple nature' doctrine of reality (cf. *tri-svabhāvatā*) of the Asaṅga school. The *Sandhinirmocana* speaks of the triple aspect of the reality as opposed to its emptiness: the dependent (*paratantra*) aspect, the imagined (*parikalpita*) aspect and the perfected aspect (*pariṇiṣpanna*). This doctrine is explained with the help of an illustration of a crystal ball appearing red due to its proximity to a red object. The red appearance is called the imagined aspect, and the red crystal ball is the dependent aspect. The perfected aspect

34. Cf. *Triṃśikā*, verses 29, 30.

35. *ibid.* verse 5a; *tasya vyāvṛttir arhatve*.

36. See Sthiramati under *Triṃśikā* verse 29.

is the crystal ball itself when considered independently of its red appearance, the imagined aspect. Thus, the doctrine says that the 'dependent' nature is empty of the imagined nature and it is the 'dependent' nature which turns into the 'perfected' nature when the 'imagined' nature wipes itself out.³⁷ Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* turns into the 'perfected' *jñāna* when the 'blemishes' wipe out themselves.

The *garbha* theory, despite obvious dissimilarities, was no doubt, influenced by the Upaniṣadic Absolutism, and it might have influenced in its turn the *ajātivāda* 'the doctrine of non-origination' of Gauḍapāda. The significant term '*ajāti*' occurs at least twice in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.³⁸ Now, if the *ālaya* doctrine is identified with the *garbha* doctrine, it will be easy to confuse the *ālaya* with the 'soul' of the Brāhmaṇas. This might have been the reason why the Diānāga school of Yogācāra ignored the *ālaya* doctrine.

In the Upaniṣads, the 'soul' is to be finally realized as the Brahman, the non-dual reality, the Absolute. The *Triṃśikā* says that when the *ālaya* returns to itself it becomes the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha, the 'non-dual' (*advaya*) principle, the Absolute.³⁹ But the important difference between the two principles (although both are called Absolute) should not be overlooked. The 'soul' is the static, unchanging and all-pervading substance; it is called *nitya* 'eternal'. The *ālaya*, on the other hand, is the ever-changing, dynamic 'link' like the subterranean current of water in the ocean; the *Triṃśikā* calls it *dhruva* 'an ever-changing constant' (verse 30). It is the ever-changing ever-lastingness. (Compare *kūṣasthanityatā* and *pariṇāmīnityatā* of the later philosophical literature). Thus, the warning comes from the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*:⁴⁰ (The Buddha says:)

*ādānavijñānagabhīrasūkṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo/
bālā eṣām api na prakāśite mohaiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ ||*

"the 'receptacle' consciousness is the locus of all seeds, deep and subtle like the ocean. I have not revealed this notion lest fools construe this as the 'soul' out of confusion."

37. See *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, Chap. IV. Cf. *Tatra guṇākara nimittasambaddha-nāmani niṣṛitya parikalpita-lakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate | paratantralakṣaṇaṃ parikalpita-lakṣaṇābhiniṣeṣaṃ niṣṛitya paratantralakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate || paratantralakṣaṇaṃ parikalpita-lakṣaṇābhiniṣeṣābhāvaṃ niṣṛitya pariṇiṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate ||* p. 63 (E. Lamotte's translation).

38. See pp. 12, 47.

39. The sense of 'Absolute' that I have in mind here is usually expressed in Sanskrit by such expressions as '*advaya-tattva*', '*anapekṣatva*', '*svatantratva*' and '*tathatā*'.

40. This verse is quoted in the commentary of Sthiramati on *Triṃśikā*; see p. 34.

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**JOURNAL
OF
INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES**

Vol. XXXV No. 1 December 1986
[69]

**PROCEEDINGS (1)
OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
HELD AT
TOKYO UNIVERSITY**

Edited by
**JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF
INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES**

(45) The Figurine of Maitreya with a Mirror (S. Manabe)

and he heard that Chinese Emperor and many others were conferred the Abhiṣeka ("Goshōrai-mokuroku"). Scholars regard this was the first affiliation-abhiṣeka in Japan. ("Kagen-4 nen-Kechiēn-Kanjōki" etc.)

The Court granted Kōyasan to Kōbō-daishi as a place of dhyāna (meditation) in July 816. Daishi ordered his disciples to clear the mountain. He climbed the mountain in November 818 for the first time. He cleared Danjō in the western part of the summit of Kōyasan and tried to establish temples there. He established the shrines of guardian divinities, and the Golden Temple. But the Great pagoda, the symbolic center of Kōyasan was not completed in the lifetime of Kōbōdaishi. The living room of Daishi was later venerated as "the temple of his sacred image".

昭和 45 年度文部省科学研究費 (奨励研究 A) による成果の一部
(The notes omitted)

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NEW PUBLICATION

New Paths in Buddhist Research

ed. by

A. K. Warder

The Acorn Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1985, x+137p

Jung's Collective Unconsciousness and the *Ālayavijñāna*

Akiko Ōsaki

There is a growing interest in a comparative study of Jungian analytical psychology and the *vijñaptimātra* theory, because both theories deal with man's psychic phenomena, and attach importance to one's transformation. Sometimes Jung's collective unconsciousness and the *ālayavijñāna* are easily regarded as the same thing. The collective unconscious and the *ālayavijñāna* are not perceptive, to be sure, and they are the source of man's psychic phenomena, but by these common features, can we expect any resemblance between the two? This paper intends to clarify the concepts of the two, along with the logical structure of self-realization of each: 'self'—the unconscious—ego, and the *pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*—the *ālayavijñāna*—the *manas* (the *mano-nāma-vijñāna*).

Ever since the period of Early Buddhism, which does not establish the *ātman* as an eternal, immutable principle of an individual existence, the argument about the subject of one's deeds and transmigration has become more heated and stronger, and some Buddhist schools have come to establish the *ātman* theory (the *pudgala*), so that the *Vijñānavāda* set up the *ālayavijñāna* to bring the long dispute to an end. The *ālayavijñāna* was, therefore, destined to include all the functions attributed to the *ātman*, from the time the *ālayavijñāna* was created. In the beginning of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Sthiramati mentions his intention of writing the commentary on the *Trīṃśikāvijñaptikārikā* as follows:

This commentary is written in order to teach it to those who do not understand or who misunderstand the non-*ātman* theory that the doctrine of non-selfness and non-substantiality is credible.....Some people (the Sarvāstivādins) believe in the real existence of the seen (the *vijñeya*) as well as the seer (the *vijñāna*), and the Mādhyamika school insists that the seer and the seen are temporal existences, so that they do not exist in the ultimate. This book is to be published to deny their

thoughts¹⁾.

The *Yogacārabhūmi-sāstra* testifies to the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* by one *sūtra*-proof and eight theory-proofs²⁾. According to these proofs, the *ālayavijñāna* may be defined as follows:

1. It occupies a person's body continuously.
2. It is the third link of the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination.
3. It controls the sense functions.
4. It stores the *bījas* (the seeds; potentialities).
5. It makes plural, complicated cognitions work together smoothly.
6. It is the cause of all psychic phenomena.
7. It is active even during meditation where the six consciousnesses cease to function.
8. When it parts from a person's body, he parts from this world.

It is then understood that the *ālayavijñāna* was set up as the spiritual body of transmigration, deeds and recognition, and as the source of life, as the place holding the *bījas*, and as the place where enlightenment and delusion take place. This *ālayavijñāna* is also subject to experiential phenomena; it is not the ultimate principle.

The collective unconscious can be, in the main, prescribed thus:

1. It is impersonal, historical and common in all mankind.
2. It has a great life force and is always in action.
3. It is an active existence whose function influences a person's conscious structure.
4. It holds all psychic elements including good and evil qualities of man.
5. It is pure natural phenomena with no intention.
6. It is not perceived by consciousness; it is known to us only through symbols appearing in dreams.

The above definition bring us to the conclusion that the collective unconscious is similar to the *bīja*, not to the *ālayavijñāna*. The theory of the *bīja* is indispensable to the *vijñaptimātra* theory. The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* defines the *bījas* as the potentialities which *pañca skandhas* are endowed with, and which engender their fruits (the *phala*)³⁾. The *bījas* are stored in the *ālayavijñāna*.

And further it reads:

The effect of man's deeds is produced from the *bījas* which are in a state of flux, being momentary, producing *bījas* similar to themselves, engendering actual *dharma*s and being permeated by actual *dharma*s. The active *dharma*s, at the moment of their birth, create and permeate *bījas*, and further maintain and increase *bījas*. The *bījas* thus have a superior power of producing actual *dharma*s. Hence the continuation (*saṃtati*), evolution (*pariṇāma*) and manifestation (*veśeṣa*) of the *bījas*⁴⁾.

This *bīja*, however, is personal, not collective, so that it coincides with the personal unconscious rather than the collective unconscious.

As mentioned above, the *ālayavijñāna* is the core of apperception, therefore, is considered to be ego. Only the *Vijñānavāda* differentiates ego from ego-sense. The consciousness named *manas* (the seventh consciousness) is ego-sense. It arises with the *ālayavijñāna*, and always clings to it and takes it for the *ātman*, or conceives it as its object. The *manas* is regarded as the source of man's attachment, because it is connected with the four basic illusions: the false belief that there is a real *ātman* where there is not; the ignorance of the theory of non-*ātman*; arrogance; attachment to self. Therefore, it is the aim of ascetic exercises to cast the *manas* aside. Thus the existence of the *manas* is negatively admitted, and even the *ālayavijñāna*, which is the only perceptive object of the *manas*, is to dissolve into the Absolute in the end. (Vasubandhu)

On the other hand, Jung's ego is positively approved as the place in which man's reason functions. Ego is the center of the system of conscious functions, and occupies a person consistently. It is supported by and included in 'self'. 'Self' is the basis of man's mental activities.

The True Self is, in the *vijñaptimātra* doctrine, attained through *śamatha* (absolute concentration) and *vipaśyanā* (wisdom or insight gained through equanimity). When the functions of consciousnesses are ceased through meditation, and the *manas* is exterminated, the habitual way of adhering to the *grāhya* (the perceiving the objects) and the *grāhaka* (the objects perceived) is cut off, and then the *ālayavijñāna* (the *paratantra-svabhāva*), departing from false discriminations, transforms into the highest state of consciousness (the *pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva*). The *Vijñaptimātrasiddhi* names this supreme state in another expression, the

cittadharmatā (the state of the true nature of a person's mentality). This mental state appears when one gets to the point where recognition functions independent of dualistic opposition; it is neither the seer nor the seen.

Jung's 'self' is said to be one of the archetypes. It is defined as the core of a person's psyche including the conscious and the unconscious and as the wholeness of one's personality. Jung thinks that one penetrates into a secret of personality when 'self' and ego gradually become purified and integrated into higher wholeness through reciprocal working of ego and the unconscious which are interrelated. This is called the individuation process, which is the main theme of Jungian psychology. In the individuation process Jung puts an emphasis on the reciprocal working of the conscious and the unconscious, and says that its process must be grasped consciously, and be conceptualized. This interpretation shows that Jung treats the unconscious as the object of cognition. It may be said, therefore, that in spite of his attaching importance to experience, he stands on a point of interpretative science (Hermeneutik). The 'self' that ought to be realized is a harmonized personality able to adapt to circumstances. Here the emphasis is put on daily living. 'Self' seems to be a relative concept established by psychological inquiry. Though Jung explains further that the supreme ego purified by individuation is independent of the object. Then are the supreme 'self' and ego identical with the *pariṇipanna-svabhāva*? Jung himself regards Buddha as the true 'self' and thinks that Zen practice and the individuation process are the same. This statement brings up the question of whether Jung's true 'self' and the Vijñānavāda's Pure Self are identical or not. And again is it possible to attain the state of true 'self' by conceptualizing the unconscious?

The Vijñānavāda aims at acquiring enlightenment and explains the mental structure with the *ālayavijñāna* as its basis. They do not interpret the mental phenomena (the *vijñapti*; representations); they only teach the reason why mental phenomena are defiled. In the Vijñānavāda, to cast aside the habitual way of conceptualizing and to destroy ego-sense are essential conditions to get to the state of the Real Self. When the *manas* is destroyed through meditation, the *ālayavijñāna* transforms and desolves into the Absolute, which means that the

ālayavijñāna is supported by the Absolute, as said in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, "The *pariṇipanna-svabhāva* is the real nature of the *paratantra-svabhāva* (the *ālayavijñāna*)⁵⁾." So the transformation seems to take place by the active work of the Absolute upon the *ālayavijñāna*. Among the three, the *pariṇipanna*, the *ālayavijñāna* and the *manas*, the emphasis is put on the *pariṇipanna*.

Jungian analytical psychology intends to cure mental diseases of patients and to make them suitable for social life. Individuation is the means. As mentioned before, the continuous confrontation of the two, ego and 'self', is very important in the individuation process, but ego is not independent within itself; it has to be supported by 'self', just as the *ālayavijñāna* is supported by the *pariṇipanna*. In the structure of a person's transformation, it might as well be said that Jung's theory and the *vijñaptimātra* theory have the same logic.

In the beginning of this paper, it was made clear that the collective unconscious and the *ālayavijñāna* are categorically different. Other differences, which came to light in this inquiry, may be stated thus:

1. The *manas* (eggo-sense) is the origin of man's fundamental attachment, while Jung's ego is the place in which man's reason works.
2. The Vijñānavāda approves the *manas* negatively; it must be destroyed. Jung lays stress on the dynamic reciprocal working between ego and 'self'. Ego is also purified, in the individuation process, within 'self'.
3. In the *vijñaptimātra* theory, conception is rejected because concept is illusionary. It stands at the point of contemplation. On the other hand, Jung's theory attaches importance to expression in words. It is scientific, positivistic and interpretative.
4. The Vijñānavāda explains the cause of defiled mental phenomena at the time of enlightenment, while Jung's theory intends to analyze and interpret psychic phenomena as its research object.

And the similarities are:

1. They both understand and place ego in dynamic structures.
2. The source of ego is not perceptible.
3. Ego is a part of these concepts and is controlled by them.
4. Both pursue a transformation of ego.

(51) Jung's Collective Unconsciousness and the *Ālayavijñāna* (A. Ōsaki)

We have examined, in this paper, only a part of Jungian psychology, which is quite complicated, and can see that in spite of differences in both theories, Jungian psychology and the *vijñaptamātra* theory provide room for fruitful research within interdisciplinary studies on mental phenomena.

1) The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (Lévi), p. 15. ll. 2-3 & 13-16.

2) Taisho, vol. 51, p. 579a.

3) The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (Pradhan), p. 64, ll. 4-6.

4) *Ibid.*, p. 477, ll. 14-18.

5) *Op. cit.*, p. 41, ll. 22-23.

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The Cosmogony of Hindu Pilgrimage

Masaaki Fukunaga

I. Introduction.

Hindu Pilgrimage practice in India takes many forms. It is very difficult to identify any common behaviour or ideas to all pilgrim who journeying to sacred places. Two significant features which do recur consistently are sacred places and the act of journeying itself.

A large number of Hindu pilgrims from whole of the country are visiting to Varanasi/ Kashi in everyday, where is one of the most famous Hindu sacred place in India. Varanasi is holy city and city of Śiva.

Śiva is considered as a god without any form or attributes, and further stands for all knowledge. His name Śambhu is derived from *Svayambhuva* which reflects the meaning of self-born. It has been realized in ancient past that he was at the bottom of everything that is moving, he was called *Īśvara* or *ī-chara* (*ī*=this, and *chara*=to move) [Pillai, 1959, p. 11]. It is the reason why various forms of Śiva are transposed in Varanasi as the form of *Īśvara* (as suffix to the various forms of Śiva), and a *lingam* has been installed there to honour that form.

It's a popular saying that every piece of stone has divinity of Śiva in Kashi. This proverb clearly indicates a large number of Śiva *lingams*, and also peoples' strong belief to worship Śiva as the patron deity of the city. In the processes of humanization and sanctification all human performances are added to Lord Śiva, therefore worship of various *lingams* is associated to different motives.

There are many legends and Puranic descriptions about the origin of worship of Śiva in anthropomorphic and ithyphallic form, usually as the stylized *lingam* [Morinis, 1984, pp. 27-30].

The Śiva *lingam* consists of three parts: a square at the bottom, an octagon

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Studies on Buddhism
in Honour of Professor A.K. Warder

edited by N.K. Wagle and F. Watanabe

University of Toronto
Centre for South Asian Studies
1993

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2. Edward Conze, *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 87.
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12. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.
13. Dharendra Mohan Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical Study of the Vedānta Theory of Knowledge* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), pp. 240-241.
14. Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction* (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1969), p. 71, note 8.
15. S. Radhakrishnan, *op.cit.*, p. 201 note 1; Ainslie T. Enbree ed., *Alberuni's India* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), pp. 55-56.
16. K. Satchidanand Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 136-137.
17. Modern Advaitin such as Ramaṇa Maharṣi also share this disinclination towards probing past lives. In *Talks with Sri Raman Maharṣi* (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramaasramam, 1984), "attempt to recall the past" is described as a "mere waste of time." (p. 215)

On upādāna (II)

Ālayavijñāna and its Two Kinds of upādāna

Jikido Takasaki

1.

At the 5th Conference of the IABS, held at Oxford in 1982, I read a paper entitled "On upādāna," referring mainly to the concept of 'upādāna' as used in the *Madhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna, and in its commentary, the *Prasannapadā* composed by Candrakīrti.¹ In that paper, I tentatively suggested that 'upādāna' has two meanings, namely, (1) "that which takes (something)" and (2) "that which is taken"; that the latter is otherwise termed 'upādeya'; and that this upādāna-upādeya relationship constitutes the core of the doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda* as symbolically expressed in the formulae 'upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ' and 'anupādāya nirvāṇam.'

I also suggested that Nāgārjuna, by identifying *pratītya-samutpāda* with *upādāya-prajñapti*, expanded the latter to the whole sphere of *dharma*s in contrast to the Abhidharmic understanding in which *upādāya-prajñapti* is applied only to *ātman*. In other words, in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, or Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, all *dharma*s are, like *ātman* deprived of their substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*, *śūnya*). In the present paper, I wish to examine how these concepts relating to upādāna developed after Nāgārjuna in the doctrine of the Yogācāras.

2.

Our observations will start with the following passage from the *Triṃśikā-kārikās*:²

tatrālayākhyam vijñānam vipākāḥ sarvabījakaṃ // 2 //
asamviditakopādīsthānavijñaptikaṃ ca tat /

These *pādas* belong to the passage describing the *ālayavijñāna* as the first of the three *vijñānapariṇāmas*, on the basis of which are produced various kinds of access (through verbal designation) to *ātman* and the *dharma*s (*ātmadharmopacāra*; *upcāra* = *prajñapti*). The first line gives the explanation of the 'body' of *ālayavijñāna*, and the second line its object, or basis (*ālambana*) and the feature or content of cognition (*ākāra*). The point in question is the meaning of the term 'upādi' in the compound '*asamviditakopādīsthānavijñaptikaṃ*' and how to resolve this compound.

In his *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya*³ Sthiramati begins the explanation of this line with the following introductory comments:

[Objection] If there be an *ālayavijñāna* which functions apart from the acting consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*), it should always have its own basis and feature in its capacity as consciousness.

[Answer] Indeed, it does have its own basis and feature as consciousness, but they are quite indistinct (*aparicchinnāsaṃviditaka*) because the *ālayavijñāna* acts in two ways:

- (1) internally, as cognition (*vijñapti*) of stuff (*upādāna*), and
- (2) externally, as cognition of the receptacle world of indistinct feature (*aparichinnākāra-bhājanavijñaptitah*).

Here, 'internal stuff' (*adhyātma-upādāna*) means:

- (a) residue of inclination towards things construed by thought (*parikal-pitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā*),
- (b) faculty stuff and the body as its foundation (*sādhiṣṭhānam indri-yarūpam*), and
- (b') mental stuff (*nāma ca*) (i.e. *vedanā, sañjñā, saṃskāra, vijñāna*).

In the explanation following the verse, however, Sthiramati interprets the compound in a different manner. Namely, he resolves it into 'that which has *asaṃviditakopādi* and *asaṃviditakasthānavijñapti*.'⁴ Furthermore, 'upādi' (= *upādāna*) in this verse is explained as being of two kinds, as in the introductory comment, but in a little more detail.

The first of these two, i.e., residue, is explained to be (a) the residue of cognition (discrimination or construction in thought) of *ātman*, etc. (*ātmādivikal-pavāsanā*), and (b) the residue of *dharma*s, material and other (*rūpādidharmavikalpavāsanā*). This residue is called 'upādāna' because owing to its existence *ātman* or form, etc., are taken (*upātta*) by *ālayavijñāna* as the result of construction. This means that residue is the stuff (*upādāna*) to be taken (*upādeya*) by the agent (*upādātṛ*), i.e. *ālayavijñāna*, for its act of *vikalpa*. Here 'vikalpa' is synonymous with 'vijñapti' or 'upacāra' (in *ātmadharmopacāra*, v. 1). The second kind of *upādi*, on the other hand, is explained to be 'āśrayopādāna,' i.e., the taking of the basis.⁵ Namely, *upādāna* is used here to denote the function of taking, while by *āśraya* is meant *upādāna* as in (b) and (b') of the foregoing passage, i.e., *sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpam nāma ca*. And the function of *upādāna* is further explained as 'ekayogakṣematvena upagamana,' i.e., to have access or become one through sharing bliss with one another. This is the orthodox definition of the function of *vijñāna* as sustaining the individual body throughout life. In addition, it is said that in the spheres of desire and the material, both mental and material bases are taken, but in the sphere of the non-material, mental stuff only. This does

not mean that there remains nothing material in the non-material world, but that the material remains there only in a state of residue.

3.

Sthiramati's interpretation is somewhat obscure, and contains some unique points in comparison with other Yogācāra texts. Firstly, Dharmapāla's *Vijñap-timātratāsiddhi*, available only in Chinese translation, interprets it in the following manner:⁶

Vijñapti in the verse signifies *ākāra*, while *sthāna* means *bhājanaloka* and together with *upādi* (= *upādāna*) represents *ālambana*. There are two kinds of *upādāna*, i.e. *bija* and **sendriyakāya*. Of these two, *bija* means **nim-itta-nāma-vikalpa-vāsanā*, while *sendriyakāya* means *rūpindriya* and *indriyādhiṣṭhāna*. These are both taken (*upātta*) by *vijñāna*, made as one with it, and 'share security and danger' with it. [This is the usual expression in Chinese, corresponding with *ekayogakṣetmatva*.] *Ālayavijñāna*, when it receives its body, transforms itself internally into *bija* and *sendriyakāya*, and externally into *bhājanaloka*, and making what is transformed its own basis, i.e. supported by them (as by sticks), obtains its feature of cognition (*ākāra*).

Here both *upādi* and *sthāna* are regarded as the objects of *vijñapti*. This agrees with Sthiramati's first interpretation. As for the interpretation of *bija* or *vāsanā*, as is well known, Dharmapāla's interpretation is based on *Sandhinirmocana*,⁷ while Sthiramati's is based upon the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁸ but both are fundamentally identical because both signify the sphere of thought construction impressed upon consciousness. The biggest difference is the addition of 'nāma ca' by Sthiramati to 'sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpam,' which is not observed in any other text. We shall consider this point later.

Another point in question is the ambiguity of the meaning of *upādāna* in relation to *vijñapti*. This we shall now examine by searching for the background to its use in the Abhidharmic tradition.

4.

The concept 'upādāna,' as equivalent to 'chih-shou' [chinese]⁹ in Chinese is used for denoting the function of sustaining the individual throughout life by collecting materials into the body. Its agency is sought in the mind, and the materials sustained in the body are called 'upātta' (*you-chih-shou [chinese]*). According to the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, 'upātta' is defined as follows:¹⁰

[What is called 'the material sustained in the body' is] That which is taken up (*udgrhīta*) by the mind and its associated mental functions as being the foundation [of their activity] (*adhiṣṭhāna*). It is because they (the *upātta*

and the mind) are conforming to each other (*anyonyānuvidhāna*) in both accepting [things good for them] and rejecting [things not good for them] (*udgraha-upaghātābhyām*). It is what is called sensual (*sacetana*) in the world.

Among all *dharma*s as classified into the eighteen elements,

(1) the seven mental elements (six *viññādhātu* and *manodhātu*), *dhar-madhātu* and *śabdadhātu* (sound) are always 'not taken' (*anupātta*);

(2) of the five elements beginning with the eyes, i.e. the five faculties, those existing in the present are 'upātta,' and those belonging to the future and the past are 'anupātta,' and

(3) of the remaining four elements, i.e. colour, smell, taste and the touch-able, those existing at present and connected with the five faculties (namely, materials constituting a living body) are 'upātta,' and all others (the outer world, including a corpse, excrement, most parts of the hair, etc., which are capable of being cut off) are 'anupātta.'

The same grouping of elements is accepted by the texts of the Yogācāras, such as the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Ch., fasc. 66),¹¹ *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,¹² and *Mahāyāna-pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*.¹³ Among the definitions given in these texts, the definition of 'upātta' as materials which offer the foundation for the origination of sense (*vedanotpattyāśrayarūpa*) in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is equivalent to 'sacetana' in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, while 'anyonyānuvidhāna' in the latter has the same import as 'ekayogakṣematva' mentioned previously.¹⁴ Notable is the fact that throughout these texts the mind and its associated functions (*citta-caitta*), i.e. the four *skandhas* beginning with *vedanā*, or *nāman* of *nāmarūpa*, are always excluded from the group of *upāttas*.

Now, in the doctrine of the *Abhidharmakośa* and other texts of the Sarvāstivāda and other similar schools, this function of *upādāna* or the *upādāna-upātta* relation exists between *citta-caitta* and *sādhiṣṭhāna-indriyarūpa*, and the former is denoted (if we apply it in the process of the present life according to the doctrine of dependent origination) by *viññāna* at the moment of conception, 'nāman' (of 'nāmarūpa'), and 'mana āyatana' (among the *ṣaḍ-āyatana*) in the following stages. To this a query is raised by the Yogācāras in view of the fact that even in a swoon life continues to be sustained, and thus they assumed the existence of a subconsciousness behind the acting mind and named it 'ālayavijñāna.'

For example, among the eightfold testimony concerning the *raison d'être* of the *ālayavijñāna* given at the beginning of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*,¹⁵ the first is called 'the impossibility of sustaining the basis (*āśrayopādānāsambhavatva*) without *ālayavijñāna* (*antareṇālayavijñānam*).'¹⁶ (The Sanskrit terms are taken from the quotations in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*.)¹⁶ This statement is made on account of five reasons, of which the first is as follows:¹⁷

The *ālayavijñāna* is caused by the formative forces of the previous life, while the eye-consciousness and other acting consciousnesses are caused by the conditions of the present life (*ālayavijñānam pūrvasaṃskārahetukam / cakṣurādipravṛttivijñānam punar vartamānapratyaya hetukam /*)

This means that the *viññāna* of the first moment in this life must be *ālayavijñāna* and not the acting consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*), and this characterisation of *ālayavijñāna* naturally leads to its being regarded as the substratum of formative forces since the time of death. Thus the eighth statement, 'the impossibility of the transmittance [of life] by consciousness without *ālayavijñāna*' (*viññānacyu-tyasambhavatva*) is explained in the following manner:¹⁸

In the case of the dying *viññāna* leaves the body from either above or below, gradually making it cool. This *viññāna* cannot be *manovijñāna* because it does not function sometimes even during life. Therefore it is observed that the body becomes cool or insentient (*dehāpratisaṃvedana*) when the *ālayavijñāna* that sustains the body (*dehopādānaka*) leaves it, not on account of the leaving of the *manovijñāna*.

A description of *ālayavijñāna* as the substratum of biotic forces in *saṃsāra* is found in the *Manobhūmi* section of the *Mūlabhūmika* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Namely, it is said in short that¹⁹

after *viññāna* has left its foundation (i.e. the body), making it cool, a new sort of foundation (*āśraya*) is produced out of the seed (*bīja*) [of *viññāna*] owing to the impressing force of frivolous discrimination and good or evil acts, and becomes an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). When the time has come, and it is conceived in the womb, *ālayavijñāna*, consisting of all seeds (*sarvabījaka*) and of the nature of the matured (*vipākasaṃgrhīta*), attaches to it (i.e. the foundation of *antarābhava*) (?) by sustaining it and congeals into a body (*sammūrcchati*). Thus, inside the womb there grows a *kalala* consisting of *kāya-indriya* only as its foundation for taking.

Because of this function of sustaining the individual throughout life or taking the foundation (*āśrayopādāna*), *ālayavijñāna* received its name of *ādānavijñāna* as observed in the *Sandhinirmocana* and other works.²⁰

In the passage following this in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, however, 'bīja' is explained to be synonymous with 'ālaya,' 'upādāna,' etc., besides 'satkāya-drṣṭyadhiṣṭhāna,' etc.²¹ Hence we learn that *upādāna* has the character of 'kleśa' or affection, which causes *saṃsāric* existence and that this function of 'taking' is involved in 'bīja' itself. In other words, (in the state of *antarābhava*) there exists nothing but *ālayavijñāna* in the form of *bījas*, and on the one hand it produces *upādāna* or the foundation out of itself, but at the same time it sustains the latter (*āśrayopādāna*). But how is it possible for *ālayavijñāna* to work in two ways simultaneously? This relates to another function of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e. the function of cognition.

In addition, mention should be made of a passage in the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra* referring to the momentariness of *dharmas* (MSA XVIII.83 & comm.),²² where the momentariness of 'sarvasaṃskārāḥ' is explained to be established among other things, through their relationship as cause and effect to the mind which is admitted to be momentary. Namely, for the mind *rūpa* and other *saṃskāras* are the cause – this is referring to 'saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam' – but they are also its effect because they are 'taken' (*upāta*) by the mind and governed (*adhipatya*) by the mind. As regards *upāttatva*, the text goes further on to say that all the formative forces, i.e. the mental faculties of the eye, etc., and their foundations are 'taken' (or sustained) by the mind and together with it congealed into a body as being in association with its benefit (*cittena hi sarve saṃskārāḥ cakṣurādayaḥ sādhiṣṭhānā upāttāḥ saha sammūrccanāḥ tadanugrahānuvṛttitāḥ*). For this passage an authority is given in quotation as 'vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam'. Thus we come to know that this passage is referring to the causal chain of co-origination around 'vijñāna,' the third limb, and that here lies the fundamental model of *ālayavijñāna* defined as 'vipākasamgrhita' and 'sarvabījaka' as well as 'ādāna.' This model may be illustrated by means of the following diagrams:




Diagram I




Diagram II

5.

Of the two kinds of *upādāna* what has remained unexplained is the *upādāna* as *vāsanā* of *ātma-dharma-vikalpa*. According to the *Sandhinirmocana*, it is termed '*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca- vāsanopadāna' (*upādāna* [characterised as] the residue of frivolous multiplicity in verbal expression about characteristics and names and discrimination; acc. to Tib.).²³ It is otherwise called '*nāma-vāsanā or '*nāma-bīja' in contrast to the '*karma-bīja' or '-vāsana' which causes *saṃsāra*. It is related to cognition as the proper function of *vijñāna*. Namely, it is a kind of impression stored within *ālayavijñāna* as a result of cognition. This impression is also waiting for a chance to be expressed, as in the case of *karma*, but

it is not of any long term as in the latter case, but of every moment. In this cognition of every moment, *ālayavijñāna* keeps the result of cognition and, making this the basis, creates the next cognition. In this respect Sthiramati designated *vāsanā* or *bīja* as '*upādāna* of *vikalpa*.' Hence *upādāna* means the stuff of cognition, being synonymous with '*ālambana*.'

What was termed the 'result of cognition' above is generally referred to in terms of '*ātman*' and the *dharmas*. It is a mere product of thought construction and of no reality. This is the fundamental standpoint of the *Vijñānavāda*. As for *ātman*, however, its non-reality is recognised even in the *Abhidharmic* doctrine, as observed in the *Abhidharmakośa*.²⁴ Namely, *ātman* is a verbal construction (*prajñapti*) on the basis of (*upādāya*) the five *skandhas* as stuff (*upādāna*). In the *Madhyamakakārikā*, however, besides *ātman*, all the *dharmas*, i.e. the five *skandhas*, too, are regarded as '*upādāya prajñapti*.'²⁵ The *Vijñānavāda* school took over this doctrine, but restored the reality of the stuff of *upādāna* in *upādāya prajñapti*. Thus they (hypothetically) established *ālayavijñāna* consisting of *vāsanā* or *bījas* as the basis (*upādāna*) of the cognition of *ātman* and the *dharmas*, i.e. *upādāna* of the verbal construction (*prajñapti* = *upācāra*) of *ātman* and the *dharmas*, and regarded it alone as real (*sad*), being dependently originated (*pratityasamutpanna*), with the name of *paratantra-svabhāva*. As *bīja* or *vāsanā* it is stuff (*upādāna* or *upātta*), but functionally it is the taking (*upādāna*) or taker (*upādātṛ*). In this sense 'taking' is synonymous with '*vikalpa*,' '*vijñāna*' and '*prajñapti*' (in the active sense of *prajñāpayati*).

6.

I have indicated above the two kinds of function of *upādāna*, namely (1) sustaining the individual body and (2) cognition or verbal construction. From the standpoint of the monism of *vijñāna*, however, these two are again reduced to the latter function. Namely, sustaining is a kind of function of *vijñāna*, and cognition of the outer world is also a kind of *upādāna* in the latter sense. Embracing these two, the function of *vijñāna* is technically called '*vijñapti*,' 'making known' or 'information.' Within this 'information' the whole world is divided into subject and object, or *ālambana* and *ākāra*, and while in that state, into impression and expression (*bīja* and '**abhinirhāra*'), standing in turn for cause and effect, and thus constituting the process of time. This whole is otherwise called '*vijñānapariṇāma*,' or 'the transformation of consciousness,' in which the 'cognition' of *ātman* and *dharmas* and the 'taking' of their residue are repeated alternatively.

If we divide the same process into internal and external, information of the outer world is nothing but the cognition of *dharmas*, and its result, i.e. the content of cognition, is impressed in the form of residue. But as far as it is cognised as the outer world, it is never taken (*upātta*) or made to constitute an individual body. On the other hand, internal *dharmas* are taken by *vijñāna* and continue to exist (in a continuity of momentary change: *santati*, *santatipariṇāma*) and at the same time

originate the cognition of *ātman*, while the physical elements 'taken' by *ālayavijñāna* put their residue of *karma* in *ālayavijñāna* and make themselves the stuff of *saṃsāra*.

Thus we learn that what are the same in cognition are divided into the internal and external in accordance with the function of 'taking.' It may also be said that in the direction from *bīja* to *abhinirhāra* there is the distinction of being internal or external, but in the direction from *abhinirhāra* to *bīja* both are simultaneously directed towards the internal.




Diagram III: Structure of *ālayavijñāna*

Now, lastly, we should solve the problem of the inclusion by Sthiramati of '*nāman*' in the internal *upādāna*. The answer may be found in the difference of scope in '*upātta*' and the cognition of *ātman*. In the traditional doctrine only the physical body and faculties are 'taken' for the sake of maintenance. But we usually include in individuality our consciousness which 'takes' the body. '*Nāman*,' or mental elements are not the 'taken,' but they are necessary for the cognition of *ātman*. Being internal to individuality they are well said to be at one with *ālayavijñāna* by sharing bliss with it. They are, namely, *manas* and the six *vijñānas*.

In order to show the position of these acting *vijñānas* within the whole process of *vijñāna-parināma*, the fourfold manifestation of *vijñāna* described in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (I.4)²⁶ is most helpful for our understanding. Namely, (a) manifestation as the object (*artha*) means the six objects (*ṣaḍviṣaya*), which corresponds to the cognition of the outer world; this is *anupātta*; (b) manifestation as sentient beings (*sattva*) means the five (physical) faculties (*pañcendriya*), which corresponds to '*sādhiṣṭhāna-indriyarūpa*;' while (c) manifestation as *ātman* (self) means *manas* or *manaindriya*; and (d) manifestation as making known (*vijñapti*) means the six acting *vijñānas* (*ṣaḍ vijñānāni*). These last two, i.e. (c) and (d) combined, constitute *nāman*, i.e. the internal four *skandhas*. Among these four manifestations, *vijñapti* and *artha*, and *ātman* (*manas*) and *sattva* represent the subject-object relationship. In other words, *manas* internally takes *sattva* and cognises *ātman*, while *vijñapti* externally cognises *dharmas*.

In these manifestations, however, the residue or *bīja* is naturally not included. It is merely an impression of the four manifestations, which in turn is worthy of

being called *vijñapti* or expression. The relationship of *ālayavijñāna* to this *vāsanā* or *bīja* is, on the other hand, not suitable for being called *vijñapti* or expression. Rather, it may be better called '*upādāna*' or 'taking.' It is also notable that this *upādāna*, i.e. the taking of *vāsanā* by *ālayavijñāna*, involves the sense of 'affection' or 'clinging' which causes *saṃsāric* existence (*bhava*) through the repetition of transformation between *bīja* and the manifestation, impression and expression within *vijñāna*.²⁷

This whole process is shown in the diagram below:




Diagram IV: *vijñaptin-mātra*

Notes

This paper was first read at the 8th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held at Berkeley in August, 1987. The original text of this paper was published in Japanese under the title "Ārayashiki to engi – shūju/upādāna to no kanren" (*Ālayavijñāna* and Dependent Origination: In Relation to the Concept of "*upādāna*") in *Bukkyo shisō no shomondai* (dedicated to Prof. A. Hirakawa on his 70th birthday, Tokyo, Shunjūsha, 1985), pp. 33-53.

1. J. Takasaki, "On *upādāna*, *upādāya prajñapti*" in *Orientalia Iosphi Tucci Memoriae Dicata* (Volume III, SOR LVI, 3, IsMEO, Roma, 1988, pp. 1451-1464.
2. Lévi, S., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Deux Traités de Vasubandhu ... Viṃśatikā et Trīṃśikā*, Paris, 1925, pp. 18.21 – 19.25 (vv. 7cd, 3ab, and commentary thereon).
3. *Ibid*, p. 19.2-8.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 19.10-16.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 19.16-25.
6. Taishō 31, p. 10a
7. Taishō 16, p. 692b (Tib: E. Lamotte, ed., 1935, p. 55).
8. Taishō 30, p. 580a
9. Not 'ts'ü' [chinese], which is used for denoting the ninth *bhavāṅga*.
10. Taishō 29, p. 8b; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna, 1975 (rev. ed.), p. 23.7-27, ad I.33
11. Taishō 30, p. 666a.
12. Taishō 31, p. 672a; *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, ed. by N. Tatia, Patna, 1976, p. 43 (§43).
13. Taishō 31, p. 850c.
14. Cf. *Yogācārabhūmi*, Ch. fasc. 100 (Taishō 30, p. 880a), where *ekayogakṣematva* is explained by *anyonyānuvidhānatva* in *udgraha-upaghāta* between *rūpa* and *citta-caittas*.
15. Taishō 30, p. 579a.
16. *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, p. 11. (§9B).
17. *Ibid.*, p. 12 (§9B, 1(a)).
18. *Ibid.*, p. 13 (§9B, viii); *Yogācārabhūmi*, Taishō 30, p. 579c.
19. *Yogācārabhūmi*, ed. by V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 15.7-25.1 (p. 24.3-5: ... *tatra sarva-bījakaṃ vipākasaṃgrhitam āśrayopādānād ālayavijñānaṃ sammūrcchati*); Taishō 30, pp. 281b-283a.
20. *Sandhinirmocana* (Taishō 16, p. 692b); *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Taishō 31, p. 701c); *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, p. 11 (§9A: *punaḥ punaḥ pratisaṃdhibandhe ātmabhāvopādānād ādānavijñānam*); *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Taishō 31, p. 133bc, Tib. sDe-dGe ed., p. 3b, 3-5 (Sanskrit reconstruction by Nagao: *kiṃ kāraṇam ādānavijñānam ity ucyate*/. (a) *sarvarūpendriyopādānatvena* (b) *sarvātmabhāvopādānāśrayatvena ca / tathā hi* (a) *tena pañcarūpindriyāny upādīyante vināśāya yāvad āyur anuvartate* / (b) *pratisaṃdhibandhe ca tadabhiniṣṭyupādānatvenātmabhāva upādīyate / evaṃ tad ādānavijñānam ity ucyate* / Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982, pp. 11-12); and *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Taishō 31, p. 14c.
21. *Yogācārabhūmi*, Skt., p. 26.17-18; Taishō, p. 284c.
22. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, ed. by Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1904, pp. 150.27-151.8
23. Taishō 16, p. 692b; Lamotte ed., p. 55.
24. Taishō 29, p. 152c; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, p. 461.20-21: *adhyātmikān upāttān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñapyate* /.
25. *Madhyamakakārikā*, XXIV.18. See Takasaki, *op. cit.* (note 1).
26. *Madhyāntavibhāga*, ed. by G.M. Nagao, Tokyo, 1964, v. I.3: *arthasattvātmavijñapti-pratibhāsaṃ prajāyate / vijñānaṃ nāsti cāsyārthas tadabhāvāt tad apy asat* //.
27. On this subject I consulted the following works:
G. Nagao, "Shoen gyōsōmon no ichimondai" (A Problem Concerning *ālambana* and *ākāra*), *Chūgan to yuishiki*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978, pp. 373-388.
S. Suguro, "Ārayashiki no gōgi" (The Meaning of the Term *ālayavijñāna*), *Bukkyō kyōri no kenkyū*, (Prof. Tamura Felicitation Volume), Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1982, pp. 52-56.

K. Yokoyama, *Yuishiki no tetsugaku* (The Philosophy of the Vijñānavāda) Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1979.

The same subject was discussed by S. Takeuchi in his article "Yuishikigaku ronsho ni okeru shūju no futatsu no imi" (On the Two Usages of *upādāna* in Vijñaptimātratā Treatises), *Bukkyō to ishūkyō* (Prof. Kumoi Felicitation Volume) Kyoto: Heirajiku Shoten, 1985, pp. 267-278.

Prof. L. Schmithausen's recent work, *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*, (2 parts, Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series IV, a, b, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), discusses the "*upādāna*" function of *ālayavijñāna* (pp. 69-73: §§4.3-4), and reference to and criticism of my article in Japanese (in Hirakawa Felicitation Volume, 1985) are given (notes 512, 513, 517, 518, 526 and 529).

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INSTITUT FÜR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS
DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN

INSTITUT FÜR INDOLOGIE DER UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

WIENER ZEITSCHRIFT

FÜR DIE

KUNDE SÜDASIENS

UND

ARCHIV FÜR INDISCHE PHILOSOPHIE

Herausgegeben von

ROQUE MESQUITA und CHLODWIG H. WERBA

Band XXXVIII
1994



VERLAG
DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
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VP

Bhartrhari, Vākyapadīya: Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya. Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften hrsg. und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen von W. RAU [AKM XLII]. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner – Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1977.

VS

Kaṇāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda, crit. ed. JAMBUVIJAYA. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961.

ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA AND KLIṢṬAMANAS IN THE PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA?

By Eli Franco, Melbourne*

In a seminal paper, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā"¹, L. SCHMITHAUSEN has pointed out a number of peculiar traits in Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā which set these works apart from other Yogācāra works attributed to Vasubandhu, notably the commentaries on works by Asaṅga and Maitreya-nātha. The most important of these traits is that the idealism in the Viṃśatikā (unlike in the Triṃśikā as well) is based on a single-layered series of cognition ("einschichtiger Erkenntnisstrom"²). In other words, unlike what one may call "mainstream" Yogācāra works, where up to eight cognitions can arise at the same time for one and the same living being, i. e. the five sense cognitions, the empirical or conscious mental cognition, and two subconscious mental cognitions: *ālayavijñāna* and *kliṣṭamanas*, the Viṃśatikā presupposes a series in which cognitions arise only one at the time, as is the case in the Sautrāntika and almost all other Hīnayāna schools, with the notable exception of the Mahāsaṅghika³. This important observation, which was presented and argued for with great care, had far-reaching consequences. It allowed SCHMITHAUSEN to link the author of the Abhidharmakośa and Karmasiddhi to the author of Vi and Tr, and by that to provide invaluable support for FRAUWALLNER's hypothesis of two Vasubandhus, which until that time had met with rather sceptical and incredulous reactions⁴. It also established a link between the Vi and the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and in doing so, it articulated for the first time a doctrinal difference between Yogācāra properly speaking and what is elsewhere called Sautrāntika-Yogācāra⁵. A further important consequence of

* I would like to thank Dr. Karin Preisendanz for reading the first draft of this paper and making some extremely helpful comments.

¹ WZKS 11 (1967) 109–136.

² L. SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit., p. 113ff.

³ Cf. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Tome I. Paris 1928, p. 184n.2, 186, 411n. 1, cited by L. SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit., p. 113n. 19.

⁴ Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit., p. 110 with n. 4–6.

⁵ As far as I know, this term does not appear in any Indian text. According to Professor Mimaki it may have been invented by ŚĀCERBATSKII.

that study was to show that there is a significant gap between the Vi and the Tr, and that there are important systematic differences between the two works⁶. Finally, the nature of the transformation of cognition in these works was explained differently than was done before by FRAUWALLNER, HACKER and RUEGG⁷.

Although the above paper has been often referred to and implicitly endorsed in the last twenty-five years, I am not aware of any attempt to evaluate its arguments⁸. My purpose here is to argue that Dharmakīrti accepted a multiple-layered series of cognition, and that consequently the often repeated claim that the *ālayavijñāna* (or for that matter the *kliṣṭamānas*) was not admitted by Dharmakīrti, is not very likely. I shall, therefore, review here only those arguments of SCHMITHAUSEN which are pertinent to our subject matter, i. e., I shall leave out the case of the Tr, since it is undisputed that this work advocates the *ālayavijñāna* and a multiple-layered series of cognition.

Four arguments are raised to support the claim that the Vi presupposes a single-layered series of cognition, but although they all point at the right direction, none of them, I think, is conclusive:

(1) The various usages of the term *saṃtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*, especially where one would expect the term *ālayavijñāna* to appear⁹. However, although this term is a typical Sautrāntika expression, it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a multiple-layered series, and as SCHMITHAUSEN pointed out, it is used in the Tr in this manner.

(2) The explanation of the six inner realms (*āyatana*), i. e., the five senses and the "mind", as seeds which undergo a special transformation (unlike in Yogācāra where the senses are conceived as pictures or images in the *ālayavijñāna*). But SCHMITHAUSEN himself notes the exception to his own argument: "Dort [i. e., in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* 19c12–27] wird zwar im Sinne des Yogācāra das *Ālayavijñāna* und das Modell des Erkenntnisstrom-Komplexes anerkannt, aber dennoch werden die Sinnesorgane im Sinne der Vś [= Vi] als die Samen der Sinneserkenntnisse interpretiert"¹⁰.

(3) Vasubandhu declares *citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*, and *vijñapti* to be synonymous. In Yogācāra texts, on the other hand, these terms are used

⁶ Op. cit., p. 130 with n. 67.

⁷ Ib., p. 130f. with n. 69.

⁸ For a possible exception cf. A. SINGH, *The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy* – Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti. Delhi 1984, p. 31ff., which, however, is not available to me. L. SCHMITHAUSEN (*Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*. Tokyo 1987, II/262n. 101) says that SINGH's "objections . . . misunderstand the purport of, and partly even misrepresent, my arguments".

⁹ Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit. (see n. 1), p. 114–116.

¹⁰ Ib., p. 118.

to differentiate different kinds of cognitions: *citta* is used for the *ālayavijñāna*, *manas* designates the *kliṣṭamānas*, *vijñāna* and *vijñapti* refer to the five sense cognitions and the *manovijñāna*. But here too there are exceptions to the rule as the term *ālayavijñāna* itself demonstrates, and SCHMITHAUSEN himself concedes that next to their special meanings, all these terms also have a general meaning¹¹.

(4) The relationship between perception and conceptual construction. In the final analysis this argument boils down to the fact that according to Vi 8,29f. the conceptual mental cognition comes after perception, whereas in other texts – as e.g. in the *Sandhinirmocanasūtra* – it is contemporary with it. But here again, although the discussion does not have any recourse to a multiple-layered series or to the *ālayavijñāna*, it does not contain a compelling rejection of them, especially as a great deal of the arguments relies on the opponent's presuppositions.

All this is not meant as a criticism of SCHMITHAUSEN's observations, but only as an additional clarification. Indeed, many passages in the Vi point at the Sautrāntika direction, but as far as I can see, Vasubandhu never crosses the line, beyond which we could positively affirm that he did not accept the multiple-layered series with the *ālayavijñāna* that it entails. Nor does SCHMITHAUSEN make any such claim, for his arguments only show that the Vi does not make use of a multiple-layered series, not that it rejects it¹².

Clearly, if we assume that the single-layered series is Vasubandhu's own doctrine in the Vi, and accepting the sequence Karmasiddhi – Vi – Tr, we will have to assume that Vasubandhu accepted the *ālayavijñāna* and the multiple-layered series in the Karmasiddhi¹³, rejected them in the Vi, and re-accepted them in the Tr. Such an assumption is not impossible, but is highly unlikely. On the other hand, why should Vasubandhu argue on the basis of a doctrine which is no longer acceptable to him? Seeing the Vi in the context of Vasubandhu's conversion from Sautrāntika to Yogācāra and the theory of two Vasubandhus, SCHMITHAUSEN did not raise the questions as to why the work was written, what its purport is, who its adversaries are.

It is quite clear that the Vi is a polemical work, that its purport, as the title says, is to prove *vijñaptimātratā*, that its opponents are the Sautrāntikas. It seems reasonable, therefore, that in trying to make his point, Vasubandhu would argue as much as possible from the Sautrāntika presuppositions, and that he saw no need to drag the

¹¹ Ib., p. 120.

¹² This point is perhaps worth emphasizing, for I misunderstood it. I would like to thank Professor Schmithausen for clarifying it to me.

¹³ Cf. KS 38f.

ālayavijñāna into the controversy; for in doing so he would have encumbered the subject matter unnecessarily.

To sum up, even though there is strong evidence for a single-layered series of cognitions in the Vi, this evidence is not conclusive in the sense that it should not be taken as Vasubandhu's own doctrine, and this may be due to the polemical nature of the work which was directed against the Sautrāntikas. And even if the more natural reading of the Vi presupposes a single-layered series of cognition, Vasubandhu still keeps the door open for a possible Yogācāra reading of the text.

Similarly, there is no need to assume that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti professed a single-layered series of cognition even in those passages of their work which were written from the Yogācāra point of view. For one thing, it would be difficult to explain why they should follow an implicit tradition of the Vi, which is clearly incompatible with the Tr. The case of Dignāga deserves a separate study, which I do not propose to undertake here. It seems to me, however, that we could explain the indicators of a single-layered series in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* as being due to its polemical vein above all against the Sautrāntikas. In the case of Dharmakīrti, however, there is actually some positive evidence for the acceptance of the *ālayavijñāna* and multiple-layered series of cognition.

As is well known, the term *ālaya(vijñāna)* appears in PV II 522, but so far the prevailing opinion among scholars was that Dharmakīrti did not really mean it, or at least did not mean it as its own doctrine. Thus, RUEGG refers to this stanza saying that it forms only an apparent exception to the fact that Dharmakīrti did not admit the *ālayavijñāna*¹⁴. Unfortunately, he does not explain why the exception is "apparent". Perhaps he means that the term *ālaya* in this stanza does not refer to the *ālayavijñāna*, but this is highly unlikely. In any case, as evidence for this statement he gives a reference to a late Tibetan *grub mtha'* text¹⁵, which can hardly be considered authoritative in a historical sense.

SCHMITHAUSEN makes a much stronger case in offering a translation of the stanza and a discussion of its context. The stanza (PV II 522) and the proposed translation read as follows:

*sakrd vijāṭīyajātāv apy ekena paṭīyasā /
cittanāhitavaiguṇyād ālayān nānyasambhavaḥ //*

¹⁴ Cf. D.S. RUEGG, *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra. Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme*. Paris 1969, p. 435: "Comme Dignāga dans son *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dharmakīrti ne semble pas avoir admis l'*ālayavijñāna* dans son *Pramāṇavārttika*" and n. 2 thereon: "Le vers 3.522 n'est qu'une exception apparente".

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 435n. 2.

„Obgleich verschiedenartige Erkenntnisse gleichzeitig entstehen (können), (kommt es doch vor, daß) aus dem *Ālayavijñāna* (nur eine Erkenntnis) entsteht, die übrigen (aber) nicht, weil (das *Ālayavijñāna*) durch eine besonders intensive Erkenntnis unfähig gemacht worden ist, (die übrigen zu erzeugen).“¹⁶

I would like to suggest a somewhat different translation for this stanza:

‘Even though cognitions of different kinds arise at the same time [from the *ālayavijñāna*], because the *ālaya(vijñāna)* is rendered ineffective by one intensive cognition [of a specific kind], another [cognition of that kind] does not (or: cannot) arise.’

In other words, there is no need to interpret the locative as expressing a potential condition and that actually only one cognition arises from the *ālayavijñāna*. For instance, if you constantly look at a blue object, a cognition of a red object cannot arise, i. e., the *ālayavijñāna* cannot produce it; but it can produce (at the same time!) cognitions of a different kind, such as of smell, touch, etc. Note also the different interpretation of *eka* and *anya* in the two translations.

Nevertheless, even if my interpretation of the stanza is accepted, it would not seriously affect SCHMITHAUSEN's thesis, because one could still follow his explanation that the argument only means to show that an actual or empirical *samanantarapratyaya* is also necessary from the Yogācāra point of view, and it does not commit Dharmakīrti to the Yogācāra presuppositions.¹⁷

Taken in itself, PV II 522 is, therefore, not conclusive one way or the other. PV II 133, on the other hand, presents a more clear-cut case:

*manaso*¹⁸ *yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpāvikalpayoh /
vimūḍho laghuvṛtter vā tayor aikyam vyavasyati //*

‘Because conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions evolve from the “mind” at the same time, or because they evolve quickly [one after the other], the confused [cognizer erroneously] determines the two as one.’

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* (see n.1), p. 127f.

¹⁷ Cf. *ib.*, p. 128: “Dieser Vers soll aber, wie aus dem Zusammenhang klar hervorgeht, lediglich zeigen, daß man auch auf der Basis des Yogācārasystems und seines Erkenntnisstrom-Komplexes nicht ohne die Kausalität der vorhergehenden (empirisch faßbaren) aktuellen Erkenntnis – des ‘*samanantara-pratyayaḥ*’ – auskommt. Daraus folgt aber keineswegs, daß Dharmakīrti selbst diese Voraussetzungen des Yogācāra billigt”. I agree wholeheartedly, but I would like to add that the opposite does not follow either, i. e., it does not follow that Dharmakīrti does not accept the Yogācāra presuppositions.

¹⁸ MIYASAKA conjectures *manasor* on the basis of the Tibetan translation *rlog bcas rlog pa med pa'i yid*. Even if the conjecture is accepted – the Tibetan translation being, on the whole, very reliable –, this would not affect the statement that two cognitions arise at the same time.

As far as I can see, Dharmakīrti does not argue here from somebody else's presuppositions, or if he does so, it is only in the second alternative. It seems, therefore, that Dharmakīrti did endorse, at least as an acceptable alternative, a multiple-layered series of cognition, and consequently he must have accepted the *ālayavijñāna* and the *kliṣṭamanas* as well. At least it would seem odd that he should accept a multiple-layered series constituted by *pravṛttivijñānas* alone, even though, of course, such a possibility cannot be absolutely excluded. In any case, a single-layered series is no longer tenable, and we may cite additional evidence from the TS(P) to that effect¹⁹.

But if this is the case, why is the *ālayavijñāna* mentioned only once, and even that under such dubious circumstances? Probably because Dharmakīrti has written his works both from the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika points of view. We do not know yet how this works out in detail, whether the entire work can be read from both points of view, as the well-known picture puzzle of a vase and two faces which can be seen alternatively, depending on one's focus; or, as Dharmottara claimed, at least for the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*²⁰, whether this cannot be done throughout the work. But then, his arguments seem to refer to other commentators who believed that this could be done indeed. And although we don't know how they interpreted *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, we can observe that the Yogācāra point of view appears only towards the end of the chapter, but in such a way that it reflects backwards on everything that was stated before, and transforms our perspective from external to internal object. In other cases, the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra points of view are presented next to each other with a disjunction, as above in PV II 133. And as far as I can see, the first alternative always represents the Yogācāra view, giving it in this way a certain primacy.

If the *ālayavijñāna* is accepted in the PV, we could safely assume that the *kliṣṭamanas* is accepted as well, for the two usually go as a pair. However, the only probable (not at all certain) reference to the *kliṣṭamanas* I was able to find so far is in PV I 41. Since this stanza forms a unity with 39f., we need to look at all three together:

pratyekam upaghāte 'pi nendriyāṇām manomateḥ |
upaghāto 'sti bhaṅge 'syās teṣām bhaṅgaś ca dr̥ṣyate ||39||

¹⁹ Cf. TS(P) 1246ff., notably TSP I/460,11–13: *yadaiva nartakīm utpaśyati tadaiva gītādiśabdām śṛṇoti karpūrādirasam āśvādayati nāsikāpatwinyastakusumāmodam jighrati vyajanānilādīsparsam ca spr̥śatīvastrābharaṇādīdānādi ca cintayati.*

²⁰ Cf. E. STEINKELLNER – H. KRASSER, Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Wien 1989, p. 92.

tasmāt sthityāśrayo buddher buddhim eva samāśritāḥ |
kaś cin nimittam akṣāṇām tasmād akṣāṇi buddhitāḥ ||40||
yādṛśy ākṣepikā sāsīt paścād apy astu tādr̥śī |
tajjñānair upakāryatvād uktam kāyāśritam manah ||41||

[Nor are the senses, or the body together with the senses, the cause of cognition, because] even when each/any one of the senses is damaged, the mental cognition is not damaged. But when the [mental cognition] is destroyed, their (i. e. the senses') destruction is observed.

'Therefore, the support of the continuity/subsistence of cognition is a certain [thing] which is supported [in its turn] by the cognition alone/itself; it is the efficient cause of the senses. Therefore, the senses [arise] from the cognition [and not vice versa].

'Of which sort the projecting/propelling [cognition] was [before], of that sort it would be later on as well. The "mind" is said to be supported by the body, because it is helped by the cognitions of the [body].'

The above illustrates nicely how rich and suggestive Dharmakīrti's verses can be, and at the same time, how difficult it is to pin them down as committed to a specific metaphysical doctrine. The fact that the mental cognition is said not to be damaged or destroyed (*upaghāta/bhaṅga* [39]) when the senses are damaged or destroyed could be taken as excluding the momentary mental cognitions of the Sautrāntika, but the stanza can also be read from the *vyavahāra* point of view, or as referring to a series of mental cognitions, and indeed the word *sthi* (40a) can refer to the successive continuity of a series.

The "mental" cognition which could be interpreted either as a conscious mental event, or as the *ālayavijñāna*, or as the *kliṣṭamanas*, is deliberately ambiguous. The support of the cognition which is supported in its turn by a cognition is left unspecified, and there is a certain disagreement among the commentators as to what this support is. Prajñākara Gupta says that it is *karman*, whereas Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin say that it is the previous cognition.

Equally ambiguous is the statement that the senses arise from the cognition (40d): It could refer to the *ālayavijñāna* which carries the seeds of the senses, but it could also be interpreted "innocently" or realistically, for after all this is also the order of things in the *pratītyasamutpāda*.

The adjective *ākṣepikā* (41a) is also very suggestive, for *ā+ksip* is usually employed in the sense of producing *karman* as well as being produced by *karman*²¹. More specifically, it may be used for a special

²¹ Cf. T. VETTER, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis *Pramāṇavārttika*. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Kapitel eingeleitet, ediert und übersetzt. Wien ²1990, p. 94 and n. 1.

kind of *karman* which entails (*ā+kṣip*) a new existence, as opposed to another type of *karman* which “supplements (*paripūrayati*) this [new] existence by special pleasant or unpleasant features”²². But here too, we cannot pin Dharmakīrti down, for elsewhere he uses *ā+kṣip* for production in general without any reference to *karman*²³. However, all three commentators take *ākṣepikā* in the special sense of entailing a new existence, and I think it would be unlikely to take it in any other sense. Note also that the formulation in st. 41 evokes st. 36 where the cognition is referred to as *pratisaṃdhānaśaktimat*, another term which is usually used in the special sense of linking to another life. Further, all three commentators identify the cognition which entails new existence, or which casts a beginningless and uninterrupted series of lives (*anādijanmaprabandha*), as the apprehension of the self (*ātmagraha*, *ahamkāralakṣaṇamanas*, *bdaḡ tu 'dzin pa*). And in the Yogācāra it is the *kliṣṭamanas* which apprehends mistakenly the *ālayavijñāna* as the Self²⁴.

Did the commentators understand *manomati* (39b), *buddhi* (40), or *manas* (41d) in these stanzas as referring to the *kliṣṭamanas*? I have no doubt that this is the case with Prajñākaragupta. The expression itself occurs only in PVA 66,4 (on 48): *na kliṣṭam manaḥ kāyāśritaṃ tataḥ*. But even without mentioning it by name, he clearly refers to it. Devendrabuddhi's case (followed by Manorathanandin [PVV 23,10–12]) is more ambiguous, and there is nothing to prevent us from taking his interpretation of the apprehension of the self as referring to a Sautrāntika type of *satkāyadrṣṭi* etc.²⁵.

But even though we cannot argue here for an absolutely certain reference to the *kliṣṭamanas*, I will certainly maintain that these stanzas have a strong and unmistakable Yogācāra “flavour”, and that the mental cognition here can and needs to be understood either as *ālayavijñāna* or as *kliṣṭamanas*. This claim is meant, of course, in the sense of an alternative which is acceptable to Dharmakīrti, not as the single possible interpretation.

This suggestion is further corroborated by the second half of 41, which is raised in order to avoid a contradiction with the Buddhist scriptures which say that the “mind” (or the cognition) is supported

²² L. SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit. (see n. 8), I/136.

²³ Cf. PV I 99b (*ākṣepāt*); cf. also AKBh IV 4cd (VP IV/27) and 10cd (VP IV/37).

²⁴ Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN, ib., I/147, 150ff.

²⁵ Cf. PVP 24a3: *bdaḡ tu 'dzin la sogs pa dan ldan pa can gyi skye ba yonś su len pa'i dus na* (**janmaparigrahakāle*; cf. PV I 35d *janmaparigrahe*). The fact that Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin mention the body and the senses in this context does not necessarily imply that they took this stanza as representing solely the Sautrāntika point of view, because the next two verses explain the body as the cognition of the body.

by the body. Which scriptures Dharmakīrti had in mind is unclear. Devendrabuddhi (PVP 24b1) quotes an unidentified *siddhānta*: *lus dan sems dag ni phan tshun rjes su byed pa can nid śes bya ba'i grub pa'i mthas* . . . The same is repeated by Prajñākaragupta (PVA 59,30–60,1): *anyonyānuvidhāyitvaṃ kāyacittayoḥ* ‘Body and mind conform to each other’.²⁶ Such statements, claims Dharmakīrti, do not contradict his position, because what is meant there by the word “body” is not the body, but the cognitions of the body. Here again, it is not impossible to interpret this statement from a realistic point of view. But it is equally possible, and in fact much more probable, to take this statement as a reference to the Yogācāra doctrine that the body is just an image in the *ālayavijñāna*²⁷. I would go even further and claim that this statement can be used as a key with which the entire Pramāṇasiddhi chapter could be read from an idealistic point of view.

Finally, the interpretation of 39–41 as representing a Yogācāra point of view is also strengthened by the fact that it appears only as the first of two alternatives. And the second alternative, which is formulated as a concession is clearly a realistic one (PV I 42):

yady apy akṣair vinā buddhir na tāny api tayā vinā /

tathāpy anyonyahetutvaṃ tato 'py anyonyahetuke //

‘Even if there is no cognition without the senses, they too [are not] without it. Even so [they] are causes of each other. Therefore, [these] two have mutual causes.’

It seems that the same structure as in II 133 is repeated here. A position is presented as two alternatives: the first, which seems preferable, represents the Yogācāra point of view, the second can be understood either as representing the Sautrāntika position, or as a concession to an opponent (a Cārvāka here, a Naiyāyika in II 133).

Dharmakīrti has recently been subject to revisionistic interpretations by distinguished scholars like SHIRASAKI and VETTER. SHIRASAKI's attempt to portray Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika, which is based on a late doxographical work by Jitāri, was discussed in some detail by STEINKELLNER, who convincingly demonstrated that Jitāri's affiliation of Dharmakīrti with the Madhyamaka is based on innocent or deliberate misunderstanding of PV quotations in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita²⁸.

²⁶ Manorathanandin (PVV 23,13f.) repeats the quotation with *manas* instead of *citta*.

²⁷ Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit. (see n. 8), I/81f. and II/407f., 415f.

²⁸ Cf. E. STEINKELLNER, Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?, in: Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka, edd. D.S. RUEGG – L. SCHMITHAUSEN. Leiden 1990, p. 72–90.

VETTER's interpretation of Dharmakīrti as a realist (not quite a Sautrāntika realist, but rather uniquely combining Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna elements) is more differentiated and is based on a close study of the text itself with a strong methodological commitment not to take the context (neither intra-textual nor extra-textual) into account. The conclusion he reached is that the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, unlike the Pratyakṣa chapter, was composed entirely from a realistic point of view, and that, therefore, Dharmakīrti must have changed his mind during the time between composing the two chapters. This suggestion, if accepted, will also shed a new light on the order of chapters in the PV. For unlike FRAUWALLNER, who saw a strong break between the Svārthānumāna chapter and the other three, VETTER's interpretation would put the Svārthānumāna and Pramāṇasiddhi chapters more or less together (as far as the commitment to realism goes) and insert a strong break between the Pramāṇasiddhi and the Pratyakṣa chapter. I have already argued shortly, and unsuccessfully²⁹, against this interpretation elsewhere³⁰. Whether the above discussion which is based on internal evidence, will prove more convincing, I cannot say. But we have, of course, external evidence as well.

The tradition about writing from the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra points of view is already well established for Dignāga. For Dharmakīrti, it is quasi unshakable; for it is already explicitly mentioned by Vinītadeva (NBṬ I 1.4), that is, a generation or so before Dharmot-tara. And even Vinītadeva refers to this fact as a matter of course, which means that the tradition has certainly not originated with him. This takes us very close to Dharmakīrti's lifetime. Such a tradition, which is also repeated by several other sources (e.g. DhPr 42,18 and 44,18–20, NBṬ 19,10f., etc.) can in no way be compared in its reliability with the bogus classification of Dharmakīrti as Mādhyamika by a late doxographer like Jitāri, or by Tibetan *grub mi* texts. For me at least, the interesting question is not whether Dharmakīrti wrote from both the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika points of view, but why he chose to do so. Presumably, he was following Dignāga on that matter; but then why did Dignāga adhere to two clearly contradicting points of view? And why these two? My tentative answer takes us back to Vasubandhu again. Perhaps after he "converted" from Sautrāntika to Yogācāra he declared that his previous works on public debate (*vāda*) can or should be used for both schools. And as is well known, the *pramāṇa* tradition which started with Dignāga rests heavily on works like the Vādaividhi and Vādaividhāna³¹. This suggestion is not meant as

²⁹ Cf. T. VETTER, op. cit. (see n. 21), preface to 2nd ed.

³⁰ Cf. E. FRANCO, Was the Buddha a Buddha?. JIP 17 (1989) 81–99.

³¹ Cf. E. FRAUWALLNER, Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam. WZKM 40 (1933) 281–304 and Vasubandhu's Vādaividhi.

a definite answer, of course, but only aims at opening up the issue which has been hitherto completely ignored.

Addendum

One more thing in this connection. If the assumption of a single-layered series of cognition is not to be accepted as the only definitive position for the works of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, should SCHMITHAUSEN's thesis of Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presuppositions be abandoned? I think the thesis is strong enough to survive even without the single-layered series. As a criterion to distinguish between the two types of Yogācāra we can use the different status of the mental *dharma*s.

In Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presuppositions (or *vijñaptimātratā*, or whatever name one chooses to designate this trend of thought) the mental *dharma*s, *cittas* and *caittas* are the absolute final reality; and unlike the single-layered series, this holds good for the Trīṃśikā as well. In other Yogācāra works such as those ascribed to Maitreya-nātha, even the mental *dharma*s are, in the final analysis, unreal, dissolved into the deeper monistic reality of *tathatā*.³²

This essential difference can also be seen in the different interpretations of the term *dharmanairātmya*. The usual Yogācāra interpretation of the term is that the *dharma*s (all of them, including the mental ones) are unreal. In the Viṃśatikā, on the other hand, *dharmanairātmya* is explained as the cognition being free from the plurality of apprehending, apprehended, etc. (Vi 6,9–11). Similarly, expressions like *abhūtaparikalpa* (TrBh 35,13 = 39,25) may be used as a criterion. If they are used in the sense of a conceptual construction of something unreal, they may indicate a Sautrāntika-Yogācāra; if they are used as unreal conceptual constructions, it must be a regular Yogācāra.

WZKS 1 (1957) 104–146, both reprinted in his Kleine Schriften, edd. G. OBERHAMMER – E. STEINKELLNER (Wiesbaden 1982), p. 460–483 and 716–758 respectively; cf. also E. FRANCO, Valid Reason, True Sign. WZKS 34 (1990) 199–208.

³² A possible reference to these two types may be found in Jayarāsi's analysis of *kalpanā*: Is *kalpanā* an apprehension of an unreal object, or is *kalpanā* itself unreal? Cf. E. FRANCO, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief. A Study of Jayarāsi's Scepticism. Stuttgart 1987, p. 192f. (4.18f.) and 447f. Professor Schmithausen tells me that he was arguing along similar lines in a lecture given in Calgary and Copenhagen more than ten years ago. Unfortunately this lecture remains unpublished (yet?).

Abbreviations

- AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. PRADHAN. [Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series VIII]. Patna 1975 (cf. VP).
- KS Le traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu. Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa. Traduction, Versions tibétaine et chinoise; avec une Introduction et, en appendice, la Traduction du chapitre XVII de la Madhyamakavṛtti par E. LAMOTTE. Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 4 (1936) 151–288. – English translation in: ST. ANACKER, Seven Works of Vasubandhu. [Religions of Asia Series, No. 4]. Delhi 1984, p. 83–156.
- Tr Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā (La Vingtaine) accompagné d'une explication en prose et Trīmśikā (La Trentaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, éd. par S. LÉVI. [Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Fasc. 245]. Paris 1925.
- TrBh Trīmśikāvijñaptibhāṣya of Sthiramati (cf. Tr)
- TS(P) Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita. With the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla crit. ed. DWARIKADAS SHASTRI. 2 vols. [Bauddha Bharati Series 1–2]. Varanasi 1968.
- DhPr Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu], ed. D. MALVANIA. Patna 1971.
- NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Vinītadeva, ed. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. [Bibliotheca Indica 171]. Calcutta 1908–1913.
- NBT'T Nyāyabinduṭīkātippanī, ed. F.I. ŠČERBATSĖKIĬ. [Bibliotheca Buddhica XI]. St. Pétersbourg 1909 (repr. Osnabrück 1970).
- PV Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan), ed. Y. MIYASAKA. [Acta Indologica II]. Narita 1971–1972.
- PVA Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaraḥ (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam), ed. R. SĀṆKRITYĀYANA. Patna 1953.
- PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā of Devendrabuddhi, Peking ed. No. 5717.
- PVV Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti. With the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin crit. ed. DWARIKADAS SHASTRI. [Bauddha Bharati Series 3]. Varanasi 1968.
- Vi Viṃśatikā of Vasubandhu (cf. Tr)
- VP I–VI L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté par L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. 6 vols. Paris – Louvain 1923–1931.

ŚĀKYABUDDHI'S COMMENTARY ON PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA I 3 AND ITS VṚTTI*

By Ernst Steinkellner, Vienna

After introducing the three kinds of logical reasons (PVSV 2,14–19) Dharmakīrti presents the essentials of the third kind, non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), in PV I 3 (=5 [PVSV 4,5–5,6]) for the first time. These brief formulaic statements are difficult and sometimes misunderstood¹. Although Dharmakīrti treats the topic in greater detail later on² and in subsequent works³, making the earliest commentary on this passage accessible may therefore be useful for a better assessment of its meaning. For here Dharmakīrti not only introduces his ideas on negative cognition, but also indicates many of its aspects that are elaborated only later.

It is unfortunate that the manuscript of the only commentary on this crucial first formulation of Dharmakīrti's theory extant in Sanskrit, namely that by Karṇakagomin, should be lacking a folio (PVSVT 30,11ff.). Thus, the original Sanskrit of Śākyabuddhi's⁴ commentary

* Dr. Ono Motoi read this paper and his good suggestions are gratefully acknowledged.


¹ They are translated in S. MOOKERJEE – H. NAGASAKI, The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments [Kārikās I–LI]. Patna 1964, p. 22f., and R.P. HAYES – B.S. GILLON, Introduction to Dharmakīrti's Theory of Inference as Presented in *Pramāṇavārttikavopajñāvṛtti* 1–10. JIP 19 (1991) 1–73, p. 6f. and p. 59ff. – For their interpretation cf. H. YAITA, Hōshō no hininshiki ["Dharmakīrti's *anupalabdhi*"], in: Makio Ryōkai hakushi shōju kinen ronshū Chūgoku no shūkyōshisō to kagaku. Tokyo 1984, p. 35–45, and T.J.F. TILLEMANS, Dharmakīrti and Tibetans on *adṛśyānupalabdhihetu*, in: Proceedings of the Vith Conference of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes 1982 (to be published).

² Cf. PV I 198–212 (= 200–214). PVSV 101,3–107,14 (translated in H. YAITA, On *anupalabdhi*. Annotated translation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikavavṛtti* I. Taishō Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyū Ronshū 9 [1985] 216–199 & II. Chizan Gakuhō 34 [1985] 1–14), and PV IV 260ff.

³ Cf. PVin II 11,12ff. and III 40ff., HB 21,18ff. and VN 4,20ff.

⁴ Following Prof. Frauwallner, I have hitherto used the form Śākyamati as the name of the author of the Pramāṇavārttikatīkā and pupil of Devendrabuddhi. FRAUWALLNER originally used the name Śākyabuddhi (Festschrift für Moriz Winternitz. Leipzig 1933, p. 238ff. = Kleine Schriften. Wiesbaden 1982.

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
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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION

March 2004

Volume 72

Number 1

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Storehouse Consciousness and the Unconscious: A Comparative Study of Xuan Zang and Freud on the Subliminal Mind


Tao Jiang

The postulation of storehouse consciousness, *ālayavijñāna*, is a major theoretical accomplishment of the Yogācāra School of Buddhism. It is formulated as a subliminal consciousness to account for our sense of self and the continuity of our experience without resorting to any form of reification, a taboo in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Its subliminal character has tempted some Buddhist scholars to compare it with the unconscious in modern psychoanalysis. However, *ālayavijñāna* was developed in a radically different cultural, historical, and philosophical milieu from the modern notion of the unconscious. Hence, before using the term *unconscious* to interpret *ālayavijñāna*, we should carefully investigate the two concepts and the larger theoretical paradigms within which they are respectively located. Through a comparative study this article addresses several fundamental differences between them and explores some possible reasons behind such differences by revealing certain basic operative presuppositions embedded in the two formulations of the subliminal consciousness.

THE YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL OF Buddhism is distinguished within the Buddhist tradition by its meticulous analysis of consciousness because of its theoretical preoccupation with the possibility of awakening. It has produced an elaborate theoretical framework designed to demonstrate how the deluded consciousness of sentient beings can be transformed into the awakened consciousness of the Buddha. One of the major

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Journal of the American Academy of Religion March 2004, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 119–139

DOI: 10.1093/jaarel/lfh006

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achievements of this school in the course of its theoretical pursuit is the postulation of the notion of storehouse consciousness, *ālayavijñāna*.¹ It is posited as a subliminal form of consciousness that grounds all other forms of consciousnesses. It provides the crucial continuity from delusion to awakening without resorting to any form of reification or substantialization. Because of the subliminal nature of *ālayavijñāna*, it is tempting to interpret it as the Buddhist equivalent of the unconscious known in western psychoanalysis. In fact, there are some Buddhist scholars who have resorted to the term *unconscious* in their discussions of *ālayavijñāna*, for example, Thomas Kochumuttom (137).² This article is aimed at comparing and contrasting these two concepts so as to examine the feasibility of using the concept of the unconscious to interpret *ālayavijñāna*.

Because the notion of the unconscious is closely associated with Freud, who made it widely known, I will try to engage Yogācāra with Freud in comparing and contrasting their conceptualizations of the subliminal consciousness. On the Yogācāra formulation of *ālayavijñāna*, I will use the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrim and translator Xuan Zang's explanation in his celebrated *Cheng Wei-Shi Lun (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra: The Treatise on the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only)*. In the case of Freud, we will focus on his structural theory of the mind presented in his later works, such as *The Ego and the Id* (1960), *Civilization and Its Discontent* (1961a), and so on—here we will concern ourselves only with his structural system under which the earlier topographical system is subsumed.³ Given the magnitude of this study, I have neither the ambition nor the ability to make this article exhaustive or definitive. Neither is it my intention to judge the validity of the theories involved. This inquiry is only meant to be a tentative step toward shedding light on the way our theoretical

¹ In this article I exempt myself from getting involved in the question of what Yogācāra is, for it will lead the article far astray. I am assuming that the postulation of storehouse consciousness, *ālayavijñāna*, is a Yogācāra contribution. Cf. Schmithausen: 1.

² William Waldron, in his dissertation, has produced a piece of solid scholarship in comparing *ālayavijñāna* with the concept of the unconscious developed by Freud and Jung. He has tried to show the similarities and the differences of the two concepts and, hence, the viability of *ālayavijñāna* as another formulation of the subliminal mentality. However, as meritorious and pioneering as it is in bringing the two together, his work does not deal with the different paradigms vis-à-vis personhood within which the two concepts emerge in the comparative study. I think the paradigms that situate the two theories need to be explicitly dealt with in a comparative study. Hence, my effort, which differs from Waldron's, is geared toward an understanding of the paradigms within which the two theories respectively emerge. I regard this as crucial in order to properly appreciate the integrity of the two theories.

³ The topographical system is laid out in his monumental work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, first published in late 1899 (see 1965), wherein the mind is stratified into unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. The structural system represents a major shift in Freud's theoretical endeavor in the 1920s; it is best summarized in his last major theoretical work, *The Ego and the Id*, published in 1923 (see 1960), wherein the mind is structured into id, ego, and superego.

efforts are colored by the interpretive objectives we have in mind. The comparative nature of this inquiry also enables us to gain better insights into some of the operative presuppositions of the two well-known theories, for those operative presuppositions are hard to expose when the theories are left to themselves. I will do so by examining the theoretical paradigms within which the two concepts respectively emerge. I argue that the paradigms that are operative in the two theories are their understandings of what a human being is or should be, namely, personhood.

Personhood has two dimensions, individual and collective, and consequently the study will concentrate on how individuality—understood here as qualities that belong to an individual person—and collectivity are dealt with in the two theories of the subliminal consciousness and will explore possible reasons for the differences between them. At the core of this comparative study are these two questions: What kinds of individuality and collectivity are schematized in the two systems? What is the relationship between individuality and collectivity in the two theories? These two questions crystallize what kinds of human beings are thematized in the respective schemes. That is, the formulations of the two theories are based on two different pictures of what a human being is taken to be. They would therefore throw light on what Xuan Zang and Freud set out to accomplish in their formulations of the subliminal consciousness. Based on the comparative study, we will come to the conclusion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to use the notion of the unconscious as is commonly associated with modern psychoanalysis to interpret the Yogācāra formulation of *ālayavijñāna* because of the different paradigms operative in them.

INDIVIDUALITY

Let us begin with the question concerning individuality in the two theories of the subliminal consciousness. First, what kinds of individuality are schematized by them? For Xuan Zang, it is the sense of self;⁴ for Freud, it is ego.

The early Buddhist model of consciousness consists of five senses, namely, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile, and the mind, whose objects are mental. The Yogācāra theory of consciousness significantly revises and expands this traditional model.⁵ What it has done is to

⁴ Here the term *self* is used in the most general sense.

⁵ Note: "Some *sūtras* say that there are six consciousnesses only. It should be understood that this is only an expedient way of expounding the truth to less qualified persons. Alternatively, the texts in question take into account only the six special *indriyas* or sense-organs upon which the six consciousnesses depend. In fact there are eight consciousnesses" (Xuan Zang: 337).

split the mind in the traditional model into two: *manovijñāna* and *manas*. *Manovijñāna* is called sense-centered consciousness, and it works in conjunction with the five senses. These six, namely, *manovijñāna* and the five senses, constitute one kind of consciousness that “perceives and discriminates between gross spheres of objects” (Xuan Zang: 97). This means that the objects of this group of consciousnesses are external objects. Any perception of external objects requires the copresence of “such factors as the act of attention (*manaskāra*) of *manovijñāna*, the sense-organs (*indriyas*) (whose attention is directed in accordance with *manovijñāna*), the external objects (*viṣaya*) towards which this attention is directed” (Xuan Zang: 479). In other words, the role of *manovijñāna* is to direct the attention of sense organs toward their objects in order to produce clear perceptions of those objects. *Manovijñāna* also has a cognitive or deliberative function, but such a function is crude and unstable, and it might be interrupted in certain states.⁶ The uninterrupted mind is called *manas*, which “is associated with the view of substantial existence of *pudgalas* [personhood]” (Xuan Zang: 315). This means that *manas* is responsible for the genesis of the idea of personhood, the essence of a person. Its function is intellection and cogitation: “It is called ‘cogitation’ or ‘deliberation’ because it cogitates or deliberates at all times without interruption in contradistinction to the sixth consciousness (*manovijñāna*), which is subject to interruption” (Xuan Zang: 97). Compared with *manovijñāna*, *manas* is fine and subtle in its activities (Xuan Zang: 479). Hence, the delusion it generates, namely, the idea of personhood, is much more resistant to being transformed in order to reach enlightenment. *Manovijñāna* works with the five senses in cognizing external physical objects; *manas* works with another consciousness, which is for the first time postulated by Yogācāra, storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) or the eighth consciousness, and *manas* attaches itself to *ālayavijñāna* as the inner self (Xuan Zang: 105).

Storehouse consciousness is also known as ripening consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) or root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*): “[It] is the consciousness in which fruits (retribution) ripen at varying times. It is called ‘retribution,’ *vipāka*, or literally, the ‘varyingly maturing consciousness,’ because it possesses in abundance the nature that matures at varying times and in varying categories, that is to say, it is *vipāka* in the largest number of cases” (Xuan Zang: 97). It is clear that this consciousness is meant to account for the karmic retribution within the doctrinal boundary of

⁶ Xuan Zang (481–493) lists five states in which *manovijñāna* is lacking: birth among *asaṃjñīdevas*, two meditation states (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti*), mindless stupor (*middha*), and unconsciousness (*mūrchā*).

Buddhism, in that it stores karmic seeds till their fruition. This is a subtle and subliminal kind of consciousness whose activities surface only when conditions allow, that is, when karmic retribution is fulfilled. It is a completely different form of consciousness from those in the traditional model, in that the traditional forms of consciousness are strictly causal, meaning that they are object-dependent in their cognitive activities. *Ālayavijñāna*, by contrast, does not depend on any specific object, and it grounds the other seven consciousnesses, which include *manas* as one group and *manovijñāna* and the five senses as the other: “These three kinds of consciousness are all called ‘consciousnesses that are capable of transformation and manifestation’ (*pariṇāmi vijñāna*). The manifestation (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness is of two kinds: manifestation with respect to cause (*hetūpariṇāma*) and manifestation with respect to effect (fruit) (*phalaparīṇāma*)” (Xuan Zang: 97). The manifestation as cause refers to the seeds, *bija*, stored in *ālayavijñāna*, and the manifestation as effect, to the eight consciousnesses. In other words, according to the Yogācāra theory, the eight consciousnesses are given birth to by the seeds.

Bija refers to the dispositional tendencies resulting from previous experiences. It is also called habit energy or perfuming energy (*vāsanā*), and Xuan Zang lists three kinds of *vāsanā*, namely, “image (*nimitta*), name (*nāma*), and discriminating influence (*vikalpavāsanā*)” (137). *Nimitta* and *vikalpavāsanā* refer to the objective and subjective poles of our cognitive activities, respectively, thus pointing to the inherently dualistic structure of our cognitive activities. *Nāma* refers to the linguistic activities that involve naming and conceptualizing.⁷ Xuan Zang (581) sums them up in explaining seeds as the potential proceeding from the two apprehensions, *grahas*, and the potential producing the two *grahas*. The two *grahas* refer to the two aspects of the discriminatory function of the mind, the grasping (*grahaka*) and the grasped (*grahya*). This means that all of our conscious activities, be they perceptual, conceptual, or linguistic, share the same dualistic structure, the grasping and the grasped. Such a discriminatory function of our mental activities is that which produces *bijas*, and the *bijas* thus produced also perpetuate this discriminatory function, dragging us back into the realm of transmigration. Therefore, we find Cheng Wei-Shi Lun declaring that “the wheel of *samsāra* turns by virtue of deeds and the two *grahas*; there is nothing here that is separable from

⁷ Cheng Wei-Shi Lun lists two kinds of *nāma*: “(1) That which expresses the meaning and makes it known to others; a certain kind of vocal sound that is capable of indicating the meaning. (2) That which reveals or causes the object to be present, that is, the *cittas-caittas* which perceive the object” (Xuan Zang: 583). Xuan Zang is very brief in his explanation and does not give any rationale as to why linguistic activity is singled out in the formulation of the seed theory.

consciousness (*cittas-caittas*), because the cause and the effect are, in their essential nature, *cittas-caittas*" (Xuan Zang: 583). In this way the realm of transmigration, that is, the karmic world, is encapsulated by consciousness rooted in *ālayavijñāna*.

According to Cheng Wei-Shi Lun, *ālayavijñāna* has three aspects: the perceiving (*darśanabhāga*), the perceived (*nimittabhāga*), and the self-corroboratory (*svasaṃvittibhāga*) divisions, which are manifested as the external receptacle world, on the one hand, and the internal sense organs possessed by the body, on the other (Xuan Zang: 141). It is the perceiving aspect, *darśanabhāga*, of the eighth consciousness that *manas* takes as its object and misidentifies as the self, but *darśanabhāga* is a homogeneous continuum even though it appears as eternal and one (Xuan Zang: 283).

In order to establish that *ālayavijñāna* is not a substratum of some sort, Cheng Wei-Shi Lun makes its activities abide by the rule of dependent origination: "To be neither impermanent nor permanent: this is the 'principle of conditional causation or dependent origination' (*pratityasamutpāda*). That is why it is said that this consciousness is in perpetual evolution like a torrent" (Xuan Zang: 173). It is not permanent, in the sense that it is itself an activity, not a substance; it is not impermanent, in the sense that the activity is a continuous and uninterrupted process. Obviously, Xuan Zang reinterprets the early Buddhist principle of dependent origination governing the empirical world as the law regulating the activities of consciousness. In this way he proves that *ālayavijñāna* is not some permanent dwelling place for *bijas* or permanent ground for our experiences but, rather, is itself a continuum of activities.

In delusion, sentient beings misconstrue *ālayavijñāna* as a substance, namely, the substantive self, whereas it is only a continuum of activities. In this way the orthodox Buddhist doctrine of no self, *anātman*, is upheld. That is, through the postulation of *ālayavijñāna*, the Yogācāra Buddhists can explain away the substance of the self and substitute for it the continuity of *ālayavijñāna*. The positing of *ālayavijñāna* is a Yogācāra attempt to explain continuity without substance. Indeed, it can be argued that prior to the postulation of *ālayavijñāna*, the Buddhists did not really have a convincing explanation of the apparent sense of a self we possess. We can clearly see the significance of *ālayavijñāna* in the Yogācāra system, given the "signature" doctrine of *anātman* in Buddhism.

To analyze self *qua* substance into the continuum of *ālayavijñāna* indicates that Xuan Zang shares with Freud (1960: 18) the view that individuality, or ego in Freud's terminology, is closely related to subliminal mental activities. In Freud's structural system the human mind is structured into three realms, namely, id, ego, and superego, and this is a revision of his earlier topographical system, which stratifies mental activities into

unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. The reason for such a revision does not have an immediate relevance to the current comparative study, hence, we will not go into it here.⁸ According to Freud, ego is a mental entity that "starts out . . . from the system *Pcpt.* [perception], which is its nucleus, and begins by embracing the *Pcs.* [preconscious], which is adjacent to the mnemonic residues" (1960: 16). Clearly, ego is intimately associated with the cognitive activities of the mind, which is externally oriented.

However, the ego is also intricately connected with the unconscious id:

It is easy to see that the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the *Pcpt.-Cs.*; in a sense it is an extension of the surface-differentiation. Moreover, the ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to instinct. (Freud 1960: 18–19)

The claim that the ego is part of the id is not only to emphasize the continuity between id and ego but also to claim that the ego grows out of the id or that the id is the ground of the ego. This marks a fundamental shift in Freud's conceptualization of the unconscious. In his earlier topographical system the unconscious is deemed an epiphenomenon of consciousness, for the genesis of the former is the result of the repressive function of the latter. However, to view the ego as an entity that grows out of the id means that the unconscious (the id here) is more than what was previously conscious and that the unconscious is not just the result of repression, forgetting, and neglecting, which are ego-centered activities.

Given their intricate connection, what, then, accounts for the difference between the ego and the id? According to Freud, "what distinguishes the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency to synthesis in its contents, to a combination and unification in its mental processes which are totally lacking in the id" (1964: 95). The ego's synthetic function is what brings about order and structure in consciousness. The most fundamental orders and structures are temporality and spatiality, both of which are forms of perception that are crucial in the birth of the ego, according to Freud. The synthetic function of the ego means that the ego is an organized and coherent substructure within the mind. This is what Freud (1960: 19)

⁸ Very briefly, according to Freud himself, his unhappiness with the topographical system was twofold: the ambiguity of the word *unconscious* and two new clinical discoveries—unconscious ego resistance and an unconscious need for punishment (Macmillan: 440).

means when he says that the ego follows the reality principle. By contrast, the id, ruled by instincts, follows the pleasure principle (Freud 1960: 19).

However, the similarity between Xuan Zang's and Freud's understandings of individuality is limited to the fact that in both systems the origin of individuality lies in subliminal mental activity. Significant differences remain. According to Freud, subliminal mental activity is chaotic, requiring that order be imposed from without, by the external world, which results in the birth of the ego. So, for Freud, the ego, despite its origin in the unconscious, is the result of the contact between the internal id and the external world. The influence of the external world is decisive in the genesis of the ego. Hence, it is the imposition of structures on the chaotic unconscious process by the external world that is determinative in the birth of the ego. Therefore, in Freud's formulation the conception of individuality or personal identity follows the reality principle. For Xuan Zang, however, subliminal mental activity is, rather, an orderly process. It is ordered succession or continuity, regulated by the law of dependent origination. Such a continuum of storehouse consciousness is mistaken and attached to by *manas* as the inner self. Henceforth, the conception of individuality or personal identity follows the principle of continuity in Xuan Zang's formulation.

To sum up, for Xuan Zang the self is nothing but the continuum of *ālayavijñāna*, misidentified by *manas* as substance; for Freud, however, the ego is fundamentally different from the unconscious id. For Xuan Zang, self *qua* substance is the result of misidentification, but for Freud, ego is the result of the modification of the unconscious id because of the decisive influence of the external world. Put differently, for Xuan Zang, personal identity, if there is to be one, is *ālayavijñāna*, the subliminal consciousness—*manas* is not the self, but it mistakes *ālayavijñāna* as the self *qua* substance; whereas for Freud, personal identity is not the unconscious *per se* but, in fact, its modification by the external world. It should be clear to us by now that the individual/personal dimension of personhood schematized in Xuan Zang's theory of the subliminal consciousness is vastly different from that in Freud's. After our discussion of this individual aspect of personhood, let us now turn to the other, collective aspect, and we will start with Freud.

COLLECTIVITY

Before dealing with Freud's conceptualization of collectivity in his theory of the unconscious, I need to clarify one common mischaracterization of Freud's theory:

A study of the theory of repression as developed by Freud should make it abundantly clear that Jung's repeated statement reducing Freud's repressed-unconscious to nothing other than "a subliminal appendix to the conscious mind" did not do justice to the theoretical concepts of Freud. Jung's remark that the unconscious as described by Freud represented "nothing but the gathering place of forgotten and repressed contents" likewise was not quite fair to Freud's basic concept. (Frey-Rohn: 120)

It is therefore misleading to equate Freud's unconscious with Jung's personal unconscious, which is a reservoir of the forgotten and repressed contents of an individual. Freud's concept of superego, being unconscious, is essentially collective. The conceptualization of the superego in Freud's structural system is a radical shift from his earlier topographical system, in that the superego represents a heightened awareness on Freud's part of the role of the collective in an individual's mental life. Let us have a closer look at Freud's conceptualization of the collective dimension of the unconscious.

What kind of collectivity is schematized in the formulation of the superego? In this connection, we are told that the formation of the superego is the result of the internalization of parental authority into the psyche. When the external restraint is internalized, "the super-ego takes the place of the parental agency and observes, directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way as earlier the parents did with the child" (Freud 1964: 77). Moreover, we are also told that "a child's super-ego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents' super-ego; the contents which fill it are the same and it becomes the *vehicle of tradition* and of all the time-resisting judgements of value which have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation" (Freud 1964: 84, emphasis added). Here Freud is explicit about what kind of collectivity the superego represents; it is the vehicle of tradition. *Tradition* in this context mainly refers to the moral values of a society and culture that are the achievement of human civilization.

As Freud sees it, there is an inherent conflict between the individual and the collective. The individual, driven by pleasure-seeking instinct, always finds him- or herself at odds with the social values that put a check on the pursuit of instinctual gratification. As Freud puts it bluntly, "Every individual is virtually an enemy of civilization" (1961b: 6) because of the instinctual renunciation that civilization demands of a person. As a child, such a demand is issued by the parental authority, especially in the face of the powerful Oedipus complex. The internalization of the parental authority into the psyche as the superego is the product of civilization. That is, civilization "obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire

for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city" (Freud 1961a: 84).

As the vehicle of tradition, the superego contains the germ of all religions (Freud 1960: 33)—it is needless to point out that what Freud had in mind are the Judeo-Christian religions: "Religion, morality, and a social sense—the chief elements in the higher side of man—were originally one and the same thing. . . . [T]hey were acquired phylogenetically out of the father-complex: religion and moral restraint through the process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social feeling through the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that then remained between the members of the younger generation" (1961a: 33–34). Freud is making a crucial observation here. That is, the higher forms of human spirituality, namely, religion and morality, originate from the father complex in the mastery of the Oedipus complex. This means that spirituality is the achievement of the collective unconscious of our psyche epitomized in the formation of the superego. In other words, human spirituality, represented by the superego, is a later acquisition in life, as the result of the internalization of an external authority, despite Freud's (1964: 77) claim of spirituality being within us. This is tantamount to saying that spirituality is forced on an individual from the outside. That is why, in his critique of Freud, Jung points out that for Freud the spiritual principle appears "only as an appendage, a by-product of the instincts" (55) and is therefore the source of restraint and suppression that works against an individual. As Freud sees it, human beings fail to recognize the true nature of religious ideas, the highest form of human spirituality, which just like all of the other achievements of civilization arise "from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior force of nature" (1961b: 26–27). Hence, Freud claims that religious ideas

are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes. As we already know, the terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection—for protection through love—which was provided by the father; and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. (1961b: 38)

Freud immediately clarifies what he means by illusion. He makes a distinction between illusions and delusions: "What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes. In this respect they come near to psychiatric delusions. But they differ from them, too, apart

from the more complicated structure of delusions. In the case of delusions, we emphasize as essential their being in contradiction with reality. Illusions need not necessarily be false—that is to say, unrealizable or in contradiction to reality" (1961b: 39). Put simply, even though both are expressions of human wishes, illusions are more collective, whereas delusions are more private. To claim that religious ideas are illusions is not the same as saying that they are wrong or in contradiction with reality. Delusions, on the other hand, are contradictory to reality.⁹ Nevertheless, Freud still maintains the view that religious ideas are illusory fulfillment of human wishes. They have their origins in the infantile longing for fatherly protection.

In a word, Freud's view of human spirituality, epitomized in his formulation of the collective unconscious—the superego—can be summarized in three aspects: it is derived from the sexual instinct, is acquired through the internalization of a protective and prohibitive external authority, and is essentially illusory, in that it represents the collective wish fulfillments of humanity. For Freud, a human being is primarily a sexual being, and spirituality is secondary. This is in sharp contrast to Xuan Zang.

There are three kinds of collectivity that Xuan Zang thematizes in *Cheng Wei-Shi Lun*: the physical world, other people's bodies, and people's minds. However, where does the spiritual dimension fit into Xuan Zang's theory of *ālayavijñāna*, for, after all, the Yogācārins are concerned, more than anything else, with the possibility of Buddhist awakening (*nirvāṇa*)? In light of our discussion of spirituality in Freud, one question naturally arises: Is Buddhist awakening addressed by Xuan Zang's theory of individuality or by his theory of collectivity? Let us make a closer examination of Xuan Zang's treatment of spiritual transformation in Yogācāra Buddhism.

The spiritual transformation in Yogācāra Buddhism is called *āśraya-parāvṛtti*. *Āśraya* means "ground" or "basis," and *parāvṛtti* means "revolving" or "transformation." Hence, the word as a whole means "the basis on which one relies, revolves, and turns into a different basis (or non-basis); the ground itself on which one stands, overturns, revealing a new world, illuminated by a new light" (Nagao: 115). This basis that needs to be transformed is *ālayavijñāna*, as Xuan Zang points out that the *āśraya* is that "which bears the *bījas*, i.e., the *mūlavijñāna* or the eighth consciousness, because it bears the *bījas* of defiled and pure *dharma*s and because, being always present, it is the supporting basis for defiled and pure *dharma*s" (755).

⁹ James DiCenso observes, "The psychoanalytic distinction between *illusion* and *delusion* is crucial, yet it is one that Freud does not consistently maintain. This inconsistency also reflects differentiations with Freud's object of inquiry; that is, religion actually falls into both categories. Thus Freud notes that religious forms often lapse into the realm of delusion. Religious statements concerning reality sometimes contradict what has been collectively and empirically established to be the case, especially by the culturally dominant methods and paradigms of science" (33–34).

Parāvṛtti “connotes a ‘rolling towards,’ a becoming intent upon, a reaching for, a happening or occurrence that will lead to a tendency, that will take on a projectorial trait” (Lusthaus: 306). This means that *āśraya-parāvṛtti* is the transformation of storehouse consciousness in reaching a goal, namely, *nirvāṇa* in the Buddhist context. Or, to use Akiko Osaki’s words: “The *āśraya-parāvṛtti* is the turning-up of one’s basis; namely, it is the conversion of the *ālayavijñāna* which stores all seeds” (1067).

For Xuan Zang, there are two kinds of psychic activities: *parāvṛtti* and *pariṇāma*. *Parāvṛtti* is a psychic activity geared toward awakening, but *pariṇāma* refers to the intrapsychic dynamics involving the eight consciousnesses in the Yogācāra scheme, and it “implies an aporia, a movement unsure of its direction” (Lusthaus: 306). What, then, makes it possible for the *pariṇāma* activity of the psyche, which characterizes our everyday mode, to be reoriented toward the *parāvṛtti* activity in order for the spiritual transformation to take place? According to Xuan Zang, two conditions are required in this regard—the pure *bījas* and the perfuming of the pure *bījas* by the pure *dharma*s, which allows for the pure *bījas* to increase: “The pure *dharma*s which are born when he [the ascetic] has entered the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth have these *bījas* as their cause. These pure *dharma*s perfume in turn and thus produce new pure *bījas*” (121). The pure *bījas* are the seeds of *nirvāṇa*, and the pure *dharma*s mean the Buddha’s teachings directly preached by the Buddha himself. As a supramundane reality, *nirvāṇa* cannot be contained in this world. Being unconditioned, it cannot be supported by the eighth consciousness. But Xuan Zang has to bring it into this mundane world in order for it to be reachable by deluded sentient beings. Hence, we find him (191) claiming that *ālayavijñāna* contains the seeds of awakening but not awakening itself. The pure seeds alone do not constitute a sufficient condition to achieve *nirvāṇa* because they still require the pure *dharma*s’ perfuming for their growth.

In order to establish the theoretical possibility of achieving *nirvāṇa* by way of increasing the pure seeds through perfuming, Xuan Zang has to postulate the inborn pure seeds carried in *ālayavijñāna*.¹⁰ If the *bījas* of pure *dharma*s—only the pure *bījas* are of concern here—were not inborn, then there would be no pure *bījas*, for the pure cannot be born out of the impure by the perfuming, thus rendering it impossible to achieve *nirvāṇa*.¹¹

¹⁰ However, there seems to be an implicit presupposition under this assertion, i.e., the pure *bījas* will never be destroyed by any power, whereas the defiled ones will be destroyed by the power of pure *dharma*s. This is necessary in order to accommodate the possibility of both *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.

¹¹ One of the characteristics of the *bījas* is that they must belong to a definite moral species. Therefore, it rules out the possibility that a cause of one species can engender a fruit of another species (Xuan Zang: 127).

The other indispensable aspect that makes *āśraya-parāvṛtti* possible is the perfuming of the pure *bījas* by pure *dharma*s. The rationale is based on the stipulation that *bījas* depend on a group of conditions in order to actualize their capacity to produce an actual *dharma* (Xuan Zang: 127–129). In other words, without proper conditions, the pure *bījas* cannot by themselves engender their fruit of *nirvāṇa*. In *Cheng Wei-Shi Lun* it is the pure *śrutavāsanā*, the hearing of Buddha’s teaching, that “perfumes” the pure *bījas* to grow: “When the ascetic listens to the Good Law [True *Dharma*], the innate pure *bījas* are perfumed in such a way that they increase and develop progressively until they engender a mind of supramundane order” (Xuan Zang: 123). The True *Dharma* here refers to “the efflux of the pure *dharmadhātu*” (Xuan Zang: 115) that is heard by the ascetic in meditation.¹²

Two different kinds of teaching are presented in *Cheng Wei-Shi Lun*: impure and pure (Xuan Zang: 123). Rujun Wu interprets the former as the good advice or instruction of any ordinary teachers or even of the vast majority of unenlightened Buddhist monks and nuns because of the fact that their knowledge is not grounded in enlightenment. The latter refers to the direct preaching of the Buddha, the enlightened one (Wu: 55–57). The former, being defiled in nature, is not able to perfume the pure *bījas* of the practitioner, whereas the latter, being pure, has such a capacity.¹³ This suggests that there is a transference of the Buddha’s power to the listener when she or he hears the preaching of the Buddha directly. Accordingly, listening to the True *Dharma*, which is the Buddha’s direct teaching, is far more than mere listening, for, according to Buddhism, it can drastically facilitate the spiritual transformation of the listener by increasing his or her pure *bījas*.¹⁴

¹² Wei Tat, in his translation of *Cheng Wei-Shi Lun*, defines this pure *dharmadhātu* as “free from the impurities of *kleśāvarṇa* and *jñeyāvarṇa*; the true and non-erroneous nature of all *dharma*s; the cause which brings to birth, nourishes and supports the *āryadharmas*; the true nature of all *Tathāgatas*; pure in itself from the beginningless past; possessed of diverse qualities more numerous than the atoms of the universes of the ten regions; without birth or destruction, like space; penetrating all *dharma*s and all beings; neither identical with *dharma*s, nor different from them; neither *bhava* nor *abhava*; free from all distinguishing marks, conceptions, cogitation; which is only realized by the pure *āryajñāna*; having as its nature the *tathatā* which the two voids reveal; which the *āryas* realize partially; which the Buddhas realize completely; that is what is called the pure *dharmadhātu*” (in Xuan Zang: 783–785).

¹³ Here the direct preaching of the Buddha from the pure *dharmadhātu* has a “mystical” element to it because it cannot refer to the teaching of the historical Buddha.

¹⁴ As Paul Williams points out with regard to the production of Mahāyāna *sūtras*, which were claimed to be the words of the Buddha himself, “In some cases the followers may have felt themselves in direct contact with a Buddha who inspired them in meditation or in dreams” (33). As a result, all the Mahāyāna *sūtras* have been traditionally attributed to the Buddha himself. The theme of listening to the Buddha’s direct teaching in meditation becomes especially important in esoteric Buddhism.

With the necessary and sufficient conditions, namely, inborn pure *bijas* and the increase of those pure *bijas* through the perfuming of the True *Dharma* preached by the Buddha himself, the possibility of *āśraya-parāvṛtti* has thus been established. Achieving *āśraya-parāvṛtti* is a gradual progression, and *Cheng Wei-Shi Lun* schematizes five stages. Because the actual process of *āśraya-parāvṛtti* does not have a direct bearing on this comparative study, I will leave it out here.

What is striking about Xuan Zang's theory of spirituality is that it is not located in the collective dimension of the psyche, as it is for Freud. Rather, it is schematized as that which transcends the mental realm, even though the possibility of achieving spiritual transformation vis-à-vis pure seeds is retained in the collective dimension of *ālayavijñāna*. This means that for the Yogācārins there is a path toward awakening, even though awakening itself is beyond the realm of the deluded mind, personal and collective.

Xuan Zang's positing of the inborn pure seeds, the necessary condition of *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, is indicative of his endorsement of the view that there is an inherent tendency of a human being toward spiritual transformation. In other words, the Buddhist spiritual transformation is not something that is imposed on a practitioner from without, as is the case in Freud's formulation. However, for Xuan Zang that tendency alone does not lead to spiritual transformation, in the Buddhist sense of the term. This means that spiritual transformation is by no means an automatic and natural process of life, as it requires both rigorous cultivation on the part of the practitioner and crucial assistance from an enlightened being. In a word, for Xuan Zang, spiritual transformation is an inherent possibility because of the existence of the inborn pure seeds that render spiritual transformation possible; for Freud, it is a forced necessity because it is necessary for human beings' very survival in society, even though it is against the wishes of the pleasure-seeking id.¹⁵

Let me sum up our discussion so far on individuality and collectivity schematized in the two theories. On the issue of individuality, we have

¹⁵ It can also be argued that for Freud spirituality is an inherent possibility in order for it to happen at all, and for Xuan Zang it is a forced necessity because it is not a natural course of human development. But this does not appear to be the way Xuan Zang and Freud theorize spirituality in their respective system. In other words, they have different concerns in their theorizations of spirituality: Freud emphasizes the aspect of it being forced on individuals—hence, civilization is deemed the enemy of individuals—whereas Xuan Zang stresses the aspect of its inherent possibility because of the religious orientation of his theory. Furthermore, Freud puts emphasis on the necessity of spiritual transformation simply because it is a necessary condition for our very survival in the social world, and Xuan Zang only talks about its possibility because, for him, spiritual transformation, in the Buddhist sense of the term, is not a necessary condition for everyday human living.

seen that in Xuan Zang's system, it is primarily the self resulting from the attachment of *manas* to the ever changing but homogeneous *ālayavijñāna*; in Freud's case, it is the ego, the genesis of which is the modification of the id by the external world. On the issue of collectivity, we have seen that in Xuan Zang's system it includes the receptacle physical world, other people's bodies, and other people's minds and that spirituality is not included in the collective dimension of the psyche, although its seeds are. In Freud's case, it is the superego, which represents tradition and moral values internalized in the course of the socialization of a human being.

Now that we have carried out a preliminary comparison of Xuan Zang's and Freud's theories of the subliminal consciousness with a focus on how individuality, collectivity, and their relationship are schematized in these two theories, one question is still left unanswered: Why are there such fundamental differences in these two formulations of the subliminal consciousness? Although there are many possible answers to this question, it is my observation that one of the major reasons for the differences lies in the fact that the objectives the two theories set out to accomplish and their assumptions of what a human being is are different. We now turn to these objectives and the underlying assumptions of the two theories.

PERSONHOOD: TWO PREMISES, TWO PARADIGMS

What are the objectives that Xuan Zang and Freud set out to achieve in their formulations of the subliminal consciousness? Let us look at this issue from the perspectives of individuality and collectivity in the two theories as outlined above.

On the issue of individuality or personal identity, Xuan Zang, as an orthodox Buddhist, has to defend the Buddhist notion of *anātman*, no self, against the Brahmanical notion of *ātman*, self. In other words, Xuan Zang's analysis of the self is, on the one hand, for the purpose of rejecting the substantive understanding of *ātman* as an obstacle to reaching *nirvāṇa* through meditative practices prescribed by the Yogācārins; meanwhile, on the other hand, it explains the reason for our having the sense of self. Consequently, continuity, following the rule of dependent origination, becomes crucial in Xuan Zang's conceptualization of *ālayavijñāna*, for continuity is misidentifiable as substance and, therefore, can be used both to dispute a substantive interpretation of the self and to explain such a misunderstanding as the result of misidentification. Hence, continuity becomes the principle of the subliminal

consciousness in Xuan Zang's theory. Accordingly, *manas*, whose attachment to *ālayavijñāna* gives rise to the sense of a substantive self, is characterized by four afflictions (*kleśa*): self-delusion or *ātman* ignorance, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love (Xuan Zang: 289), all of which point to the delusory nature of such a substantive self. But there is no sense of chaos in this formulation of *ālayavijñāna*. Rather, the subliminal consciousness in Xuan Zang's theory is an orderly process, governed by the law of dependent origination. *Manas* does not impose any order on *ālayavijñāna* but, rather, only attaches to it. As a result, there is no sense of conflict—as is prominent in Freud's formulation—between *manas* and *ālayavijñāna* in the genesis of the self in Xuan Zang's theory.

The orderly subliminal process of *ālayavijñāna* is in sharp contrast to Freud's version of the unconscious, which is chaotic, pleasure seeking, or suppressive. Freud's analysis of the ego is meant to find ways to fortify the poor ego against the assault of the unconscious world—be it the superego or the id—in addition to the external world; in doing so he sought to help his patients—mainly those who suffered from neurosis—restore and maintain sanity.¹⁶ Put differently, in Freud's case the unconscious—the chaotic id and the suppressive superego—is the culprit in human insanity, and the strengthening of the ego is essential to restore the psychic order in psychoanalytic practices. The issue of it being substantive or not does not arise at all in the context of psychoanalysis. For Xuan Zang, however, the attachment to a substantive self, *ātman*, is the hurdle that needs to be overcome through rigorous meditative

¹⁶ According to Britannica Online: "Neuroses are characterized by anxiety, depression, or other feelings of unhappiness or distress that are out of proportion to the circumstances of a person's life. They may impair a person's functioning in virtually any area of his life, relationships, or external affairs, but they are not severe enough to incapacitate the person. Neurotic patients generally do not suffer from the loss of the sense of reality seen in persons with psychoses. An influential view held by the psychoanalytic tradition is that neuroses arise from intrapsychic conflict (conflict between different drives, impulses, and motives held within various components of the mind). Central to psychoanalytic theory, which is based on the work of Sigmund Freud, is the postulated existence of an unconscious part of the mind which, among other functions, acts as a repository for repressed thoughts, feelings, and memories that are disturbing or otherwise unacceptable to the conscious mind. These repressed mental contents are typically sexual or aggressive urges or painful memories of an emotional loss or an unsatisfied longing dating from childhood. Anxiety arises when these unacceptable and repressed drives threaten to enter consciousness; prompted by anxiety, the conscious part of the mind (the ego) tries to deflect the emergence into consciousness of the repressed mental contents through the use of defense mechanisms such as repression, denial, or reaction formation. Neurotic symptoms often begin when a previously impermeable defense mechanism breaks down and a forbidden drive or impulse threatens to enter consciousness."

practices in order to reach awakening.¹⁷ The sense of an intense struggle of the ego we see in Freud's theory is completely missing in Xuan Zang's formulation. There is, instead, only attachment.

On the issue of collectivity, we have found that different kinds of collectivity are schematized in the two theories. As noted, Xuan Zang thematizes the external world, other people's bodies, and other people's minds; Freud thematizes the superego as the vehicle of tradition, including morality and religion. The differences in the kinds of collectivity that are schematized by the two are striking. In Xuan Zang's theory, the social, historical, and cultural aspect of the collective is nowhere to be found, whereas it looms large in Freud's theory. There are various possible explanations for such a difference between the two, one of which could be the very development of our theoretical effort in thematizing history, society, and culture in the history of philosophy.¹⁸ However, I would like to suggest that such a conspicuous missing element in Xuan Zang's theory of the subliminal consciousness can also be explained in terms of the objective of his theory, namely, to account for the possibility of awakening. A practitioner's meditative practice is regarded as essential, and the meditative experience is largely individualistic, so that history, society, and culture are not directly involved. In fact, to achieve awakening is to transcend the very conditionality of history, society, and culture, even though it can also be argued that the very possibility of such

¹⁷ Their different concerns also shape the way the body is schematized in regard to the ego. For Freud, "the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (1960: 20). The primary importance of body in the scheme of an ego for Freud is caused by the dual nature of the body: it is both internal and external; it is where the internal comes in contact with the external. Xuan Zang shares Freud's view that the body has a dual nature, internal and external or personal and collective. The collective nature of the body is the result of the manifestation of the common seeds as the bodily basis of other people (Xuan Zang: 149). As to its personal nature, it is the bodily sense of self that arises out of the attachment of the sixth consciousness's attachment to the five aggregates—form/body, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness (Xuan Zang: 21). For Xuan Zang, the bodily self is an interrupted self, and it is not as tenacious as the one that is born of *manas*'s attachment to storehouse consciousness. Xuan Zang's view is justified if we take into consideration the self in a dream, wherein the body is not directly involved, or the dreamless state, wherein the self does not appear at all. In the Yogācāra scheme dreams are a higher reality than the physical world. This is evident in the way the self is argued against. The self that is involved in the physical world is one that is subject to interruption—e.g., by a dream state. The highest sense of self is encountered in the dreamless state wherein the self that appears in a dream also disappears. Of course, for the Buddhists, even this highest sense of self is an illusion. Simply put, for Freud the concern in schematizing the body with regard to the ego is the issue of internality/externality, whereas for Xuan Zang it is the issue of continuity.

¹⁸ As J. N. Mohanty notes, "While the question of why the Indian thinkers were indifferent to history remains, one must, while doing comparative philosophy, also keep in mind that Western thought came to take history seriously only in modern times (despite the nascent historicity of Judaeo-Christian self-understanding)" (188). The observation is also applicable to Xuan Zang, for his theory is largely based on his Indian predecessors' work.

a meditative practice lies in a specific historical, social, and cultural ambiance. Nevertheless, this ambiance remains unthematized in Xuan Zang's theory.

For Freud, collectivity, as the vehicle of tradition, and individuality exist in a rather hostile relationship. This is because Freud, in locating the problem of the forced renunciation of an individual's sexual instincts in the collective, was trying to help his psychologically disturbed patients cope with the stifling challenges posed by the collective. Because for Freud collectivity is the source of both spirituality and suppression, spirituality takes on a suppressive character, being imposed from without and resulting in sexual frustration. This explains Freud's observation that the superego "seems to have made a one-sided choice and to have picked out only the parents' strictness and severity, their prohibiting and punitive function, whereas their loving care seems not to have been taken over and maintained" (1964: 78). Because the collective is deemed antagonistic to an individual, the spirituality that is located within the collective can only be strict and severe in the eyes of the individual.

It is conceivable that Freud in his theoretical endeavor proceeded from collectivity to spirituality. This leads to the confusion in his theory, for the two dimensions are not clearly differentiated: where spirituality and collectivity coincide and where they part. Xuan Zang's idea to differentiate spirituality from collectivity, on the one hand, and to place the seeds of spirituality in collectivity, on the other, offers one possible way to avoid the confusion we see in Freud's theory of subliminal consciousness.

There are two common denominators in the two theories of the subliminal consciousness, namely, that consciousness, in the narrow sense of the word, is not the totality of the psychic world and that the genesis of personal identity lies in the subliminal realm. However, their differences are unmistakable, and in my judgment they significantly outweigh their similarities. Clearly, two kinds of persons are schematized in the two theories. In Xuan Zang's theorization we see a lone meditator engrossed in rigorous practice to achieve awakening, and in Freud we find a desperate fighter trying to survive in an antagonistic social environment. Underlying such differences are two different premises about what a human being is and should be. That is, for Xuan Zang, a human being is a deluded being, and the way out of such a delusion is through meditative practices prescribed by the Yogācāra teachings; for Freud, a human being is essentially a sexual being who is trying to be spiritual in order to survive in society. Consequently, for Xuan Zang, as an orthodox Buddhist, sexual desires contribute to and perpetuate the delusory human existence—Xuan Zang does not make a clear distinction between

delusion and illusion the way Freud does—from which we may be liberated by following the practices prescribed in the Yogācāra teachings. For Freud it is the spiritual that is illusory, meaning that it is the illusory fulfillment of the collective human wishes. The differences between the two in terms of their underlying premises regarding what a human being is and should be cannot be any greater.

To conclude, it should become clear to us that Xuan Zang's *ālayavijñāna* is not the Freudian unconscious. To use Thomas Kuhn's term, Xuan Zang and Freud are working within two different paradigms. As such, their theories of the subliminal consciousness follow different rules and address different concerns to different audiences. Yogācāra addresses the problematic of the possibility of awakening, primarily to Buddhist practitioners, whereas Freud addresses the issue of depression, primarily to his neurotic patients. When the theories are stretched outside their applicable domains, problems are bound to arise.

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