

BUDDHIST STUDIES  
IN HONOUR OF  
WALPOLA RAHULA

---

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

SOMARATNA BALASOORIYA  
UNIVERSITY OF KELANIYA, SRI LANKA

ANDRE BAREAU  
COLLEGE DE FRANCE, PARIS


RICHARD GOMBRICH  
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, ENGLAND

SIRI GUNASINGHA  
UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA, CANADA

UDAYA MALLAWARACHCHI  
UNIVERSITY OF KELANIYA, SRI LANKA

EDMUND PERRY  
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, USA

---



DR WALPOLA RAHULA

GORDON FRASER · LONDON

VIMAMSA · SRI LANKA

1980

*Diṭṭhaṃ, Sutaṃ, Mutaṃ, Viññātaṃ*

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

*yassa n' atthi idaṃ me ti paresaṃ vā pi kiñcanaṃ/  
mamattaṃ so asaṃvindaṃ n' atthi me ti na socati||  
Suttanipāta 951*

The *Alagadd[ūpama]-Sutta* of the *Majjhima-Nikāya* has the following passage:

*cha-y-imāni, bhikkhave, diṭṭhiṭṭhānāni. katamāni cha? idha, bhikkhave, assutavā puthujjano ariyānaṃ adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinto sappurisānaṃ adassāvī sappurisdhammassa akovido sappurisdhamme avinto rūpaṃ "etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati; vedanaṃ "etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati; saññaṃ "etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati; saṃkhāre "etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati; yaṃ p' idaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicariṭaṃ manasā taṃ pi "etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati; yaṃ p' idaṃ diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ: so loko so attā so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo, sassatisamaṃ tath' eva ṭhassāmiti, taṃ pi "etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati.*

*sutavā ca kho, bhikkhave, ariyasāvako ariyānaṃ dassāvī ariyadhammassa kovido ariyadhamme suvinto sappurisānaṃ dassāvī sappurisdhammassa kovido sappurisdhamme suvinto rūpaṃ "n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā" ti samanupassati; vedanaṃ "n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā" ti samanupassati; saññaṃ "n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā" ti samanupassati; saṃkhāre "n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā" ti samanupassati; yaṃ p' idaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicariṭaṃ manasā taṃ pi "n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā" ti samanupassati; yaṃ p' idaṃ diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ: so loko so attā so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo, sassatisamaṃ tath' eva ṭhassāmiti, taṃ pi "n' etaṃ mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā" ti samanupassati.<sup>1</sup>*

The first five wrong theories about the Ātman/Attan, mentioned in this passage, concern an Ātman belonging to this world, while the sixth theory concerns an other-worldly Ātman which ignorant people aspire to attain after their death. All these theories are false because they make of the Ātman an 'object', while the Ātman, the Absolute, the Being in itself, can never be an object.<sup>2</sup> The wise people, therefore, reject them.

The first four theories wrongly identify the Ātman with the first four 'aggregates' (*khandha*). The fifth theory does not directly identify the Ātman

with the *viññānakhandha* — as we are generally told in the Pāli Canon — but rather with the 'objects' of different 'consciousnesses.'<sup>3</sup> Now the three words, *diṭṭhaṃ, sutaṃ, mutaṃ*, are repeatedly used in that old text, the *Suttanipāta*. The word *viññātaṃ* (as in the text quoted above) is sometimes added. The words *diṭṭhi-*, *suti-*, *muti-* or *ñāṇa-* also are used.<sup>4</sup> The four words, *diṭṭhaṃ, sutaṃ, mutaṃ, viññātaṃ*, to which is sometimes added (as in the *Majjhima* text quoted above) *pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicariṭaṃ manasā*, are also found elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> They are explained in *Samyutta-Nikāya* XXXV, 95, which was, no doubt, the starting point of the traditional interpretation.<sup>6</sup> *Diṭṭhaṃ*, of course, is explained as that which is 'seen' by the eye (*cakkhunā diṭṭhaṃ*, or *rūpāyatanam*), *sutaṃ* as that which is 'heard' by the ear (*sotena sutaṃ*, or *saddāyatanam*), and *viññātaṃ* as that which is 'known' by the mind (*manasā viññātaṃ*); but, surprisingly, *mutaṃ* is said to be that which is 'smelt' by the nose, 'tasted' by the tongue, and 'touched' by the body (*ghānena ghāyitaṃ, jivhāya sāyitaṃ, kāyena phuṭṭhaṃ*, or *gandhāyatanam, rasāyatanam, phoṭṭhabbāyatanam*) — an interpretation that will later be worked out in detail by Buddhaghosa in his different commentaries as well as in the *Visuddhimagga*.<sup>7</sup> The four words are thus understood to comprise the experiences brought about by all the six 'faculties.'<sup>8</sup> *Theragāthā* 1216 (= *Samyutta-Nikāya* I, p. 186) adds between *diṭṭha-sute* and *mute paṭighe*, which has been differently interpreted by Buddhaghosa and by Dhammapāla. While for Buddhaghosa *paṭighe*— means that which is smelt and tasted, and *muta*— that which is touched, Dhammapāla, who quotes the *Sāratthappakāsinī* in this connection, says just the reverse: *paṭighe ti ghaṭṭaniye phoṭṭhabbe. mute ti vuttāvasese mute; gandharasesū 'ti vuttaṃ hoti. Sāratthappakāsinīyaṃ* (cf. PTS edition, Vol. I, p. 270) "*paṭighe-saddena gandharasā gahitā, muta-saddena phoṭṭhabbāṃ gahitaṃ*" *ti vuttaṃ*.<sup>9</sup>

Be that as it may, I have the impression that *muta*— originally meant 'thought of', 'known' (cf. the parallelism between *muta*— or *muti*— and *ñāṇa*—: *Suttanipāta* 839-40 and 846, 1078 and 1082). But this is not the point that I wanted to make here. Before I come to my point I should like to draw attention to the fact that the empirical means of knowledge indicated by the four terms under consideration — let us say, 'seeing', 'hearing' 'thinking', 'understanding' — are regarded as useful in that they help us in attaining the Truth by paving the way for it; but, in the ultimate analysis, they are false and hence to be abandoned:

*na diṭṭhiyā na sutiyaṃ na ñāṇena*

*Māgandiyā 'ti Bhagavā  
sīlabbatenāpi na suddhim āha/  
adiṭṭhiyā assutiyaṃ aññāṇā  
asīlatā abbatā no pi tena/  
ete ca nissajja anuggahāya  
santo anissāya bhavaṃ na jappe|| (Suttanipāta 839). — sambhārā ime*

*dhammā honti ajjhattasantim pāpuṇiṭṭam adhigantam phusitum sacchikātam, Mahāniddeṣa, p. 189.*

Dr K. N. Jayatilleke, who discusses some of the passages quoted above in his remarkable work, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1963), observes (p. 60, § 72) that they 'criticise' 'Upaniṣadic doctrines of the ātman'. In the preceding paragraph Dr Jayatilleke cites quite a number of Upaniṣadic passages in which the doctrines in question occur. Speaking of the famous passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (II, 4, 5; IV, 5, 6): *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*, he writes: 'It is said that 'the ātman should be perceived (draṣṭavyaḥ), learnt of (śrotavyaḥ), conceived of (mantavyaḥ) and rationally understood (nididhyāsitavyaḥ)' (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6). This is put in the mouth of Yājñavalkya, who is soon going to prove by rational arguments that the ātman cannot be apprehended by any of these standard ways of knowing (Bṛh. 2.4.14, 4.5.15), but if we consider this passage in the light of other passages bearing on it in this stratum of thought, we see that there were thinkers at this time who believed that the ātman could be known by all these usual ways of knowing. The ātman could be seen or empirically perceived if it was a matter of seeing your figure in a pan of water (Ch. 8.8.1) or of perceiving the warmth of the body (Ch. 3.13.8). It could be heard or heard of, if it was a case of hearing the sound as of a fire blazing on closing one's ears (Ch. 3.13.8) or of hearing about it from a teacher when 'what was not heard of' (aśrutam) presumably in the sacred scriptures becomes heard (śrutam bhavati) (Ch. 6.1.3). It could likewise be metaphysically conceived of and rationally understood by thinking (e.g. vijajñau, Ch. 6.16.3). It is significant that even Śaṅkara's comment on 'mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ' (Bṛh. 4.5.6) is that it can be known through 'argument and reasoning' (tarkeṇopapattiyā). This was the ātman of the Early Upaniṣads, that could be known by the then accepted ways of knowing, that is by perceiving empirical instances, by instruction, or by metaphysical reasoning or rationally demonstrated to be unknowable in these ways'.<sup>10</sup>

Let us examine, first, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage. It is difficult. But the most sensible interpretation seems to be that given by the Indian tradition itself.<sup>11</sup> Thus Śaṅkara, commenting on the sentence, *ātmā vā are draṣṭavya śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*, writes (Commentary on II, 4, 5): *śrotavyaḥ pūrvam ācāryata āgamataś ca. paścān mantavyas tarkataḥ. tato nididhyāsitavyo niścayena dhyātavyaḥ. evaṃ hy asau dr̥ṣṭo bhavati śravaṇa-manānididhyāsanāśāhanair nirvartitaiḥ. yadaikatvam etāny upagatāni tadā samyagdarśanaṃ brahmaikatvaviśayaṃ prasīdati, nānyathā śravaṇamātreṇa*. In his comment on IV, 5, 6 (which is essentially identical with II, 4, 5), Śaṅkara interprets the next sentence, *ātmani dr̥ṣṭe śrute mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam*, as follows: *kathaṃ dr̥ṣṭa ātmanīti? ucyate: pūrvam ācāryāgamābhyāṃ śrute punas tarkeṇopapattiyā mate vicārite, — śravaṇam*

*tv āgamamātreṇa, — mata upapattiyā paścād vijñāta evam etan nānyatheti nirdhārite.*<sup>11</sup> *kiṃ bhavati? ucyate: idaṃ viditam bhavati. idaṃ sarvaṃ iti yad ātmano 'nyat. ātmavyatirekeṇābhāvāt.*

As will be seen, in the last passage, Śaṅkara's gloss *tarkeṇopapattiyā* refers only to *mate. nididhyāsitavyaḥ* is glossed in his comment on II, 4, 5: *niścayena dhyātavyaḥ*.

According to this interpretation, this passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* refers to the four stages of spiritual knowledge: *śravaṇa-*, i.e. 'hearing' from the teacher or from the scriptures, *manana-*, i.e. 'reflection' by reasoning, *nididhyāsana-*, i.e. continuous meditation,<sup>12</sup> and *darśana-* 'vision'. As Śaṅkara says in his comment on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 4, 5, it is only when the first three steps have been accomplished as one (*yadaikatvam etāny upagatāni*) that the 'right vision having for its object the unity of the *brahman-* (= *ātman-*) shines forth' (*tadā samyagdarśanaṃ brahmaikatvaviśayaṃ prasīdati*); this 'vision' cannot be attained by 'hearing' alone (*nānyathā śravaṇamātreṇa*).

This interpretation, therefore, suggests that the term *draṣṭavyaḥ*, in the series *draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*, represents not the beginning but rather the end of the process. The 'vision' is the goal to which lead the three preliminary stages of 'hearing', etc., conceived as one.

Now, as Dr Jayatilleke himself shows (pp. 431-2, § 742), 'If we take the words for 'seeing' we find that they are used in the Nikāyas to denote normal as well as extrasensory perception.' And stages of spiritual knowledge, similar to those just spoken of, are also mentioned in the Nikāyas. Thus in the *Caṅki-Sutta* we read:

*. . . dhammaṃ suṇāti, sutvā dhammaṃ dhāreti, dhāritānaṃ dhammānaṃ atthaṃ upaparikkhati, atthaṃ upaparikkhato dhammā nijjhānaṃ khamanti, dhammanijjhānakkhantiyā sati chando jāyati, chandaḥjāto ussahati, ussahitvā tuletī, tulayitvā padahati, pahitatto samāno kāyena c' eva paramasaccam sacchikaroti paññāya ca taṃ ativijjha passati.*<sup>13</sup>

The 'Vision' of which Yājñavalkya speaks in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is not an ordinary vision, but the Vision of the Truth, which is beyond the subject-object split, which, therefore, cannot even be properly called a 'vision'.<sup>14</sup> There is thus no contradiction between this statement and the one that follows, namely that the Ātman cannot be objectively 'known'.<sup>15</sup> Our ordinary 'seeing', 'hearing', 'reasoning', 'understanding', and so on, operate only in the empirical world of subjects and objects; but when this apparent duality (*dvaitam iva*) is transcended, these no longer exist:

*yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati . . . tad itara itaraṃ paśyati, tad itara itaraṃ śṛṇoti . . . tad itara itaraṃ manute, tad itara itaraṃ vijñāti. yatra vā asya sarvaṃ ātmaivābhūt . . . tat kena kaṃ paśyati, tat kena kaṃ śṛṇuyāt . . . tat kena kaṃ manvita, tat kena kaṃ vijñāyāt?*<sup>16</sup>

The three preliminary stages of spiritual knowledge, also, are transcended in the ultimate Vision, where there is neither a seeing subject nor an object to be seen.

From all this, therefore, we can conclude: The Pāli Canon admits an ultimate 'Vision' of Truth and denies an ultimate value to our empirical 'seeing', 'hearing', 'reasoning', 'understanding', just as Yājñavalkya does. In other words, there is not the slightest opposition between the Pāli Canon and the great Upaniṣadic thinker so far as this point is concerned.

Now about the other Upaniṣadic passages quoted by Dr Jayatilleke. No importance should evidently be attached to the *Chāndogya* passage, VIII, 8, 1; for the 'seeing' of the Ātman, mentioned in that passage, is rejected later as false, in the course of Prajāpati's higher and higher instruction to Indra. Nor should we, it seems to me, attach any importance to that figurative passage, *Chāndogya* III, 13, 8. *Chāndogya* VI, 1,3: *yenāśrutam śrutam bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātam vijñātam*, does not say anything about the 'hearing', 'reasoning' and 'understanding' in relation to the Ātman: it only means to say that when the Ātman — the One — is realised, even those things which lie beyond the realm of these ordinary 'ways of knowing' become in a way 'heard', 'thought of', 'understood' — because there is nothing apart from the Ātman, the One: *ātmavyatirekeṇābhāvāt*.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, the sentence (*Chāndogya* VI, 16, 3) that brings to a close the famous discourse on *tat tvam asi*: . . . *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvam, tat satyam, sa ātmā, tat tvam asi, Śvetaketo iti tad dhāsyā vijajñāv iti vijajñāv iti*, only means that Śvetaketu 'understood' the teaching of his father.

I shall be the last person to say that the Pāli Canon only restates the teachings of the Upaniṣads; but it seems to me that the difference between the two has too often been exaggerated.<sup>18</sup>

## NOTES

- 1 *Majjhima-Nikāya* (PTS edition) I, pp. 135-6.
- 2 Cf. K. Bhattacharya, *L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien*, Paris 1973 (*Publications de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient*, vol. XC). — The theory, *so loko so attā*. . . criticized here (cf. also *Samyutta-Nikāya* III, pp. 98, 182), has been discussed by the Venerable Rāhula in his wonderful book, *What the Buddha Taught* (second edition, Bedford 1967), p. 59 & n. 1. Cf. also *L'Ātman-Brahman* . . . , p. 9, n. 4; p. 14, n. 7; p. 15, n. 1; p. 67, n. 3. "La doctrine critiquée . . . nous fait plutôt penser à la fameuse doctrine de Śāṅḍilya, où l'on a reconnu l'influence des anciennes représentations ritualistes-théistes".
- 3 Cf. *Papañcasūdanī* II, p. 110: *desanāvilāsena h' ettha diṭṭhādīrammaṇavasena viññānaṃ dassitaṃ*.
- 4 See *Suttanipāta* (ed. by D. Andersen and H. Smith, PTS), vv. 250, 778, 790, 793, 797, 798, 802, 812, 813, 839-40, 846, 887, 897, 901, 914, 1078ff., 1086, 1122.
- 5 Here are some references, which may not be exhaustive: *Digha-Nikāya* III, p. 232 (= *Āṅguttara* II, p. 246; cf. IV, p. 307); *Majjhima* I, p. 3; III, pp. 29-30, 261; *Samyutta* III, pp. 203ff.; *Āṅguttara* II, pp. 23-4 (= *Itivuttaka*, p. 121), 25; *Udāna*, p. 8.
- 6 Cf. *Cullaniḍḍesa* 298 (on *Suttanipāta* 1086); *Suttavibhaṅga*, *Pācittiya*, I, 2, 1 (*Vinaya*, ed. Oldenberg, Vol. IV, p. 2); *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* 961; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 429.
- 7 XIV, 76; cf. 46 (ed. Warren-Kosambi, *Harvard Oriental Series* 41).

- 8 Cf. the discussion on this point in *Abhidharmakośa* IV, pp. 160ff. (La Vallée Poussin's translation). The Sanskrit original of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, published in Patna, is not available to me, but the relevant portion is reproduced by P. S. Jaini in his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (= *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series*, Vol. IV), Patna 1959, p. 161, n. 3. See also *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, pp. 161-2, where the Vaibhāṣika point of view is set forth. — In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* the *dharmāṇām dharmatā* is said to be *na dṛṣṭāśrutamatavijñātā*, where Hariḥhadra explains: *ghṛṇājihvākāyavijñānair anubhūtatvān matā* (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* with *Abhisamayālamkāra*, edited by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960, pp. 95 & 407).
- 9 Dhammapāla, *Paramatthadīpani: Theragāthā-Aṭṭhakathā*, Vol. III, p. 190.
- 10 It is also found outside Vedānta, Cf. Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacinātamaṇi, Mukti-vāda*, in *Gādādhari* (Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1970), p. 2055.
- 11 In his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* (III, 41, etc.), Śāṅkara interprets *jñāna*- as general theoretical knowledge, obtained from the scriptures and from the teacher (*śāstrata āgamataś cātmādinām avabodhaḥ*), and *vijñāna*- as 'particular experience' (*viśeṣataś tadānubhavaḥ*). But here, as well as in his comment on *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* VI, 1, 3 (discussed below), where Śāṅkara glosses *avijñātam vijñātam* by *anīcītam nīcītam bhavati*, it does not seem to me that he understands *vijñāta*- in the sense of 'une intuition simple et indifférenciée' (O. Lacombe, '*Jñānaṃ savijñānam*', in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris 1968, pp. 439-43). *Vijñāna*- in these Upaniṣadic passages means for Śāṅkara — so far as I can see — 'rational understanding' and nothing else (differently *L'Ātman-Brahman* . . . , p. 32 & n. 2, p. 33). Of course, this 'rational understanding' has to be transcended in the ultimate Vision (*darśana*-). I do not think that in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passages II, 4, 5 and IV, 5, 6, *vijñāna*-/*vijñāta*- 'correspond à *nididhyāsītavya* et vise, sinon l'intuition suprême, du moins ce qui s'en rapproche le plus, par-delà tout discours analytique' (Lacombe, *loc cit.*, p. 442). It is true that Swāmi Mādhavānanda also, in his translation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* (fourth edition, Calcutta 1965), renders *vijñāna*- in II, 4, 5 by 'meditation', and *vijñāta*- in IV, 5, 6 by 'meditated upon'. This may repose on some tradition of which I am not aware (Ānandajñāna, in his *Tikā*, says nothing on this point, and no other commentary is available to me at this moment).
- 12 'Anhaltende Meditation', O. Böhtlingk's translation of Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra* § 207 (*Sanskrit-Chrestomathie*<sup>3</sup> reprint: 1967, p. 320). — *Nididhyāsana*- (from the Desiderative *ni-didhyāsate*) does not seem to be the same as Pāli *nijjhāna*- in *diṭṭhi*- or *dhamma-nijjhānakkhanti*- (Jayatilleke, p. 275, § 440).
- 13 *Majjhima-Nikāya* II, p. 173 (cf. I, p. 480). Cf. *L'Ātman-Brahman* . . . , p. 120, n. 2. I have suggested that *kāyena paramasaccaṃ sacchikaroti*, in this series, corresponds to *nididhyāsana*-, which has been defined, e.g., as *mananopabṛmhitavākārthaviṣaye sthīribhāvah* (Padmapāda, *Pañcapādikā*, p. 353 [*Madras Government Oriental Series* No. CLV, Madras 1958]).
- 14 Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead*, V, 5, 6.
- 15 Cf. on this passage *L'Ātman-Brahman* . . . , p. 52.
- 16 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* II, 4, 14 (cf. IV, 5, 15). Cf. *Chāndogya* VII, 24, 1.
- 17 Śāṅkara, quoted p. 13 above. Cf. also *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* I, 1, 3. — *na tuyhaṃ adiṭṭham asutaṃ-mutaṃ vā atho avijñātaṃ kiñcanam atthi loke | Suttanipāta* 1122.
- 18 Professor Jaini also, in his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (cf. p. 15, n. 8 above), p. 162, n. 2, cites in connection with *dṛṣṭam, śrutam, matam, vijñātam*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage, *ātmā vā are dṛṣṭavyah* . . . , apparently to indicate an opposition between the Upaniṣad and Buddhism. He refers to P. V. Bapat: *Arthapada-sūtra*, Introduction, pp. 4-6 — a book which, unfortunately, is not available to me. There are other works which I have not been able to consult. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga (translated by the Venerable Rāhula) I find only a brief mention of *dṛṣṭa-śruta-mata-vijñāta*- (*saṃjñā nānādharmapratibimbodgrahaṇasvabhāvā, yayā dṛṣṭāśrutamatavijñātān arthān vyavaharati*, p. 2 in Pradhan's edition).

Note June 1979: In the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (p. 2), published in Patna in 1976, *matam* and *vijñātam* are thus interpreted — against the tradition recorded above: *matam yat svayam abhyūhitam evaṃ caivaṃ ca bhavitavyam iti, vijñātam yat pratyātmam anubhūtam iti*.