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What is Meant by *Svabhāvaṃ Bhūtacintakāḥ*?*

The hemistich *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* occurs twice in the *Mahābhārata* (*Mbh.*), first in the *Śāntiparvan* (224.50d) and again in the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* (48.24d).¹ The *Śāntiparvan* verse runs as follows:

kecit puruṣakāraṃ tu prāhuḥ karmavido janāḥ |
daivam ity apare viprāḥ svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ ||.

Some who know what activity is say that (everything is due to) human effort, other sages say it is destiny; those who think (in terms) of the elements (speak of) *svabhāva*.

A variant of this verse which is found a little later in the *Śāntiparvan* (*Śānti*) (230.4) does not, however, refer to the *bhūtacintakas*:

pauruṣaṃ karaṇaṃ kecid āhuḥ karmasu mānavāḥ |
daivam eke praśaṃsanti svabhāvaṃ cāpare janāḥ ||.

With respect to activity some say that human effort is the cause (of success), others praise destiny; still others (speak of) *svabhāva*.

The *Āśvamedhikaparvan* (*Āśvamedhika*) passage (48.23-24) expresses the bewilderment of the sages confronted with so many contradictory views on what is to be cherished:

yajñam ity apare dhīrāḥ pradānam iti cāpare |
sarvam eke praśaṃsanti na sarvam iti cāpare ||23||
tapas tv anye praśaṃsanti svādhyāyam apare janāḥ |
jñānaṃ saṃnyāsam ity eke svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ ||24||.

Some sober men praise the sacrifice; others praise the gift. Some praise all, some do not praise all. Some others praise asceticism, others praise Vedic studies. Some praise knowledge [and] renunciation; those who think (in terms) of the elements praise *svabhāva*.

What does *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* signify? E. Washburn Hopkins thought that the *bhūtacintakas* “are perhaps materialists.”² E.H. Johnston also thought so,³ and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya was absolutely convinced of it. “That the word *bhūtacintakāḥ* here referred to the materialist will not be doubted.”⁴ Torn out of context and considered by itself, the expression may be explained in that way. But there is a problem. A *bhūtacintaka* is one who is supposed to think (in terms) of the *bhūtas*, the elements, viz., earth, air, fire, water and ether. Why should he speak of *svabhāva* which is a rival doctrine of *bhūtāni* (elements) as the first cause

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¹ All references are to the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al., Poona 1927-1966.

² Cf. E.W. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, London / New York 1901 (repr. Delhi 1993), p. 89, referring presumably to the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* verse.

³ Cf. E.H. Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya: An Essay on its Historical Development According to the Texts*, London 1937 (repr. Delhi 1974), p. 67.

⁴ Cf. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, *Indian Atheism: A Marxist Analysis*, Calcutta 1969, p. 64, referring to the *Śāntiparvan* verse. The passage has been reproduced *verbatim* in his *History of Science and Technology in Ancient India*, Vol. II, Calcutta 1991, p. 62.

mentioned in the enumerative verse *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (*Śv.Up.*) 1.2?⁵ *svabhāva* in the *Mbh.* then must mean something different from what it means in the *Śv.Up.*

The word *bhūtacintaka* is also found in *Śānti* 267.4:

*yebhyaḥ srjati bhūtāni kālo bhāvapracoditaḥ |
mahābhūtāni pañceti tāny āhur bhūtacintakāḥ ||.*

Those from which Time, moved by the desire to produce physical forms, creates (all) beings, are called “the five great elements” by those who think (in terms) of the elements.

There are also some parallel expressions in the *Mbh.* itself, such as *muhūrtacintaka* (12.267.4d) “those who think (in terms) of the moment” (i.e., Time), *kālacintaka* (12.295.12d) “those who think (in terms) of Time,” *jñeya-* and *jñānacintaka* (12.294.33f and 295.12d) “those who think (in terms) of what is to be known” and “... of knowledge.”

The word *bhūtacintā* also occurs in the *Suśrutasaṃhitā*.⁶ Vātsyāyana mentions the *arthacintakas*, “those who think (in terms) of wealth (alone).” Their views are quoted in *Kāmasūtra* 1.2. 40-45 and refuted in 1.2.46-47.⁷

Why should then the *bhūtacintakas* speak in terms of *svabhāva*, instead of *bhūta*? In order to unravel this knot, we have to see whether the word *svabhāva* in these contexts signifies anything other than what it literally means, viz., “own being,” and, if so, in which context or domain it is found in ancient texts. No standard Sanskrit dictionary, whether the monumental *Śabdakalpadruma* or *Vācaspatyam*, the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* or the Sanskrit-English lexicons compiled by Wilson, Monier-Williams or Apte, records any special sense of *svabhāva*, and the word *bhūtacintā* is merely literally glossed.⁸

As to the commentators on the *Mbh.*, Nīlakaṇṭha, as in many other philosophical contexts, is a poor guide. Failing to understand the implication of the word in *Śānti* 224.50, he associates *karman/puruṣakāra* with the Mīmāṃsakas, *daiva* with the astrologers and *svabhāva* with the *svabhāvavādins*, without explaining what *svabhāva* means.⁹ He then quotes *Sv.Up.* 1.2ab and, in explaining the words *svabhāva*, *niyati*, *yadṛcchā* and *bhūtāni*, associates them with the doctrines of the transformationist (*pariṇāmavādin*) Sāṃkhyas, ritualist (*karmāvadin*) Mīmāṃsakas, accidentalists (*anīyamavādin*), and the Arhatas (Jains) and Lokāyatās respectively. In his glosses on *Śānti* 183.5 (176.5 in the critical edition), however, in connection with the same line of the *Śv.Up.*, he associates *svabhāva* with the Buddhists and Laukāyatikas.

⁵ Cf. *Eighteen Principal Upanisads*, ed. V.P. Limaye and R.D. Vadekar, Vol. I, Poona 1958, p. 283:

*kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam |
saṃyoga eṣāṃ na tv ātmabhāvād ātmāpy aniśaḥ sukhaduḥkhaheṭoḥ ||.*

⁶ Cf. *The Suśruta Saṃhitā with Dalhaṇa's Commentary*, ed. Vaidya Jadavji Trikamji Acarya, Varanasi 1980, *Sūtrasthāna* 3.15 and *Śārīrasthāna* 1.1. Kunjalal Bhisagratna translates *bhūtacintā* as “cosmology” and “the science of Being” respectively (*The Sushruta Samhita*, Varanasi 1963, Vol. 1, p. 24 and Vol. 2, p. 115). Apparently he follows Dalhaṇa who explains *bhūta* as *sarvāṇi bhūtāni sthavirajaṅgamāni, mahābhūtāni pṛthivīvyādīni vā* (p. 338).

⁷ *Kāmasūtra* (KS), n.d. (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares). The word *kālacintaka* also occurs in Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* v. 8 (ed. Jivananda Vidyasagara, Calcutta 1892).

⁸ There is no entry for *bhūtacintā* in the major Sanskrit-Sanskrit lexicons; the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* refers to the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* only (not to the *Mbh.*), glossing the word as “Untersuchung der Elemente” (examination of the elements) as does Monier Monier-Williams (“investigation into the elements”) in *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford 1899.

⁹ *Mahābhārata* with Nīlakaṇṭha's Commentary, ed. Pancanana Tarkaratna, Vol. 2, Kalikata 1826 (*śaka*) (= vulgate), p. 1635.

While commenting on *Śānti* 230.4 (237.4 in the vulgate¹⁰), the above-quoted variant of *Śānti* 224.50, he writes: *svabhāva* is mere *svarūpa*, i.e., own form or shape, or character, condition or peculiarity. Then again (in his glosses on *Śānti* 231.51) he attributes the doctrine of *karma* and *puruṣakāra* to the Mīmāṃsaka, of fate, planets and Time to the astrologer (*daivajña*), and of *svabhāva* to the *śūnyavādin* (i.e., a branch of the Buddhists or the Buddhists in general) as well as the Lokāyatās. Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara (c. 1350), a Vedāntin commentator of the Mokṣadharmā section of the *Mbh.*, identifies the *bhūtacintakas* with the Lokāyatikas.¹¹

What all these commentators and explicators failed to note is that the word *svabhāva* is also used in a quite different context or domain, other than the determination of the first cause. Take the following verse that is found in some mss. of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (1.349):

kecid daivāt svabhāvād vā kālāt puruṣakārataḥ |
*saṃyoge kecid icchanti phalaṃ kuśalabuddhayaḥ ||*¹²

Some (say that success is) due to destiny, (some that it is) due to *svabhāva*, (some that it is) due to Time, (some that it is) due to human effort. But some competent people recognize the result in the combination (of all these).

A variant version of the same verse found in the text followed by Aparārka as well as by Viśvarūpa in his *Bālakṛīḍā* runs as follows:

kecid daivād dhaṭhāt kecit kecit puruṣakārataḥ |
*sidhyanty arthā manuṣyāṅām teṣāṃ yoniṣu pauruṣam ||*¹³

Some (expect success) from fate, some from accident, some from human effort. (In whichever way) man's objects are achieved, their origin is resoluteness.

Here, instead of the four claims, we have three: *kāla* (Time) is omitted and *svabhāva* is replaced by *haṭha*, "accident" or "chance." Elsewhere in the *Mbh.* (e.g., *Śānti* 172.10ab: *bhūtānām utpattim animittataḥ*), and in *Āśvamedhika* 50.11cd (which will be discussed below), *svabhāva* also stands for "accident," barely distinguishable from *yadṛcchā*.¹⁴

Thus there are two domains in which *kāla*, *svabhāva* and *niyati* are found to appear. The first domain relates to the question of the first cause while the second is concerned with ascertaining what causes success in human life. In the first domain, *svabhāva* in the course of time came to suggest accidentalism and thereby became synonymous with *yadṛcchā*.¹⁵ In the second domain, too, *svabhāva* came to signify accidentalism and consequently *akriyāvāda*, inactivism, a philosophy of life that considers all human efforts to be vain. One is reminded of the concept of *týchē* (chance, fortune) as expressed in Jocasta's speech in *Oedipus Tyrannus* vv. 977-979:

No. No, mortals have no need to fear when chance reigns supreme. The knowledge of the future is denied to us. It is better to live as you will, live as you can.¹⁶

¹⁰ Cf. n. 9.

¹¹ Cf. the Critical Notes on *Mbh.*, *Śānti* 224.50, p. 1257.

¹² *The Mītākṣarā with Viśvarūpa and Commentaries of Subodhini and Bālambhaṭṭi*, ed. S.S. Setlur, Madras 1912, pp. 213-214.

¹³ *The Yājñavalkyasmṛti with the Commentary Bālakṛīḍā of Viśvarūpācārya*, ed. T. Ganapati Sastri, Part I, Trivandrum 1921 (repr. New Delhi 1982), pp. 195-196.

¹⁴ Cf. V.M. Bedekar, "The Doctrines of Svabhāva and Kāla in the Mahābhārata and Other Old Sanskrit Works," *Journal of the University of Poona* (Humanities Section) 13 (1961): 1-16.

¹⁵ Cf., for instance, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* vv. 110-112 (ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968, pp. 78-79).

¹⁶ Translation by Luci Berkowitz and Theodore F. Brunner, New York 1966, p. 22.

In most of its occurrences in the *Mbh.*, the term *svabhāva* relates to the second domain and appears as a member of a triad or tetrad. The dyad of fate and human effort is well known. Manu and many others (particularly poets and dramatists) normally speak of *two* contending forces: fate on the one hand and human effort on the other.¹⁷ Those who uphold the former declare all human effort to be utterly futile: what is destined to happen is bound to happen, *bhavitavyaṃ bhavaty eva, qué será será*. It thus leads to inactivism because of the acceptance of predeterminism.

Those who uphold human effort, however, deny the very existence of fate. To them, there is neither any planetary effect nor any divine dispensation. What is called destiny (*daiva*) is merely the sum total of one's activities in one's former births. In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha(-Rāmāyaṇa)*, *Mumukṣuprakaraṇa* 7.22 we read:

na daivam dr̥syate dr̥ṣṭyā na ca lokāntare sthitam |
*uktam daivābhīdhānena svarloke karmaṇaḥ phalam ||*¹⁸

Of course, true to the Indian tradition, there was also a reconciling approach, in this case of those who declared that both fate and human effort are necessary for achieving success – the typical syncretism (*samuccayavāda*) also found in connection with knowledge (*jñāna*) *vis-à-vis* activity (*karman*).¹⁹

What is often overlooked or ignored is that, side by side with this dyad of fate and human effort, there was also a doctrine of *svabhāva* or *haṭha* which denied both predeterminism and its opposite (i.e., that man can determine his own fate). This third doctrine preaches inactivism that logically follows from the denial of causality in the affairs of human life (cf. *Mbh.*, *Śānti* 172.10-11 in which Ajagara speaks of *svabhāva* and the origin of all beings *animittataḥ*). It is rather strange that the word *svabhāva* instead of the more appropriate *yadṛcchā* was employed to designate this doctrine. But it is in this sense that the Buddhists right from Aśvaghōṣa (first century CE) and other philosophers used this term.²⁰ In the Nyāya tradition, too, the example of the sharpness of the thorn suggests *nirnimittatā*, the de-

¹⁷ *Manusmṛti (Manu)* 7.205 (ed. J.H. Dave, Vol. 4/1, Bombay 1985, pp. 159-160). See J. Jolly, "Fate (Hindu)," in: James Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 5, Edinburgh 1915, pp. 790-792, at p. 792. Many more instances could be cited from the Epics, gnomic poetry and plays, e.g., Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's *Veṇiśaṃhāra* 3.37 which is quoted in *Hitopadeśa* p. 7, v. 31 (ed. Narayana Rama Acarya, Bombay 1949).

¹⁸ *Yogavāsiṣṭha (Rāmāyaṇa)*, ed. with Hindi translation by Mahāprabhulal Goswami, Part 1, Varanasi 1988, p. 133. Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Cambridge 1931 (repr. Delhi 1975), p. 256, favourably impressed by such a strong denial of *daiva* and the exaltation of free will, declares: "This view of *puruṣa-kāra* and *karma* seems to be rather unique in Indian literature." The view, however, is not that unique. One may mention *Mbh.*, *Anuśāsanaparvan* 6.12-28 and 7.23; *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1.349: *tatra daivam abhivyaktaṃ pauruṣam paurvadehikam*; Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on this verse explains *daiva* as *pūrvadehārjitaṃ pauruṣam* (ed. S.S. Setlur, Madras 1912, p. 216); and *Matsyapurāṇa* 220.2. (ed. Brahmadatta Trivedi, Calcutta 1954) Vātsyāyana (*KS* 1.2) also upholds *puruṣakāra* and denounces (as his commentator says) *daivamātravāda* (see also *Hitopadeśa* p. 8, v. 33).

¹⁹ See, e.g., *Mbh.*, *Sauptikaparvan* 2.3: "Our acts do not become successful in consequence of destiny alone, nor of exertion alone, O best of men! Success springs from the union of these two" (translation by K.M. Ganguli, Calcutta 1890, p. 8). Medhātīthi in his commentary on *Manu* 7.205 (pp. 159-160) also quotes some similar verses. See also *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1.350 which has been quoted in *Hitopadeśa* p. 7, v. 32.

²⁰ Aśvaghōṣa, *Buddhacarita* 9.57cd-62 (ed. E.H. Johnston, Lahore 1936, repr. Delhi 1978); Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.117 (ed. Jyotipala Sthavira, Dhaka 1977, p. 251), and Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 110-112. Dharmakīrti refers to the doctrine but does not connect it with *svabhāva*, which Manorathanandin, his commentator, does (cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968, p. 64, vv. 162cd-163ab); Manorathanandin explains *kecit* as *svabhāvavādinah* (ibid.).

nial of any efficient cause in the world (though not of the material cause), or even denial of any cause whatsoever (*ahetu*).²¹

We have spoken of a tetrad. The fourth claim in this domain concerned with ascertaining what determines success and failure in life centers on *kāla* (Time). Now, *svabhāva* and *kāla* are also at the center of two rival doctrines in the first domain (i.e., the debate concerning the first cause). It is possible that the meaning which *svabhāva* acquired in the second domain, viz., “chance, accident,” came to penetrate the first domain as well (also *vice versa*, see below), and, pushing *yadr̥cchā* out of the ring, *svabhāva* came to suggest “accident” instead of what it originally stood for, viz., that there is no creator, without the world being lawless: the nature of every object is its own determinant. Such an interpenetration of the two domains is evident in the commentatorial works. Most of the commentators on the *Mbh.* try to make sense of *svabhāva* (in whichever context it may have occurred) in relation to its use in the first domain. However, *svabhāva* in the *Mbh.* is mostly related to the second domain.

We first come across the triad associated with the second domain not in the *Śāntiparvan*, but much earlier, in the *Āraṇyakaparvan*. In 33.11 (32.19 in the vulgate) Draupadī tells Yudhiṣṭhira:

yaś ca diṣṭaparo loke yaś cāyaṃ haṭhavādakah |
*ubhāv apasadāv etau karmabuddhiḥ praśasyate ||.*²²

Those in the world who rely on destiny and those who speak of chance are both wretched. He who minds activity is praiseworthy.

In the given context, as also in others, *haṭha* can mean nothing but “chance.” Strangely enough, Nīlakaṇṭha associates *haṭhavādika* (his reading in 32.13, vulgate) with *cārvāka* and repeats this in his comments on 32.32 (33.14 in the critical edition). However, in his glosses on 32.16 (33.4 in the critical edition) he explains *haṭha* rightly as “suddenly” (*akasmāt*), gaining anything without premeditation (*acintitasyātarkitasya ca lābho haṭhaḥ*). He provides an apt example of what *haṭha* means in his gloss on 32.19 (33.17 in the critical edition): gaining a gem while searching for a lost penny (*naṣṭakapardikānveṣaṇapravṛttasya ratnalābhaḥ*).²³

This, and not the earlier interpretation (viz., *haṭhavādika* referring to the Cārvāka or a person similar to a Cārvāka), truly fits the context. In the light of this *Āraṇyaka* verse, *svabhāva* in *Śānti* 224.50d may very well be taken to mean “chance.” This meaning of *svabhāva*, although unnoticed by the lexicographers as well as the commentators on and translators of the *Mbh.*, is encountered in *Āśvamedhika* 50.11. In one of the many accounts of cosmogony, it is said:

devā manuṣyā gandharvāḥ piśācāsurarākṣasāḥ |
sarve svabhāvataḥ sṛṣṭā na kriyābhyo na kāraṇāt ||.

²¹ *Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.22-24 (= 4a.22-24, ed. Walter Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, Leipzig 1928). For a survey of this section, see *Nyāya Philosophy*, Part IV: *Fourth Adhyāya, First Āhnika, a Free and Abridged Translation of the Elucidation of Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa's Bengali Commentary by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya*, Calcutta 1973, pp. 27-31.

²² In this chapter Draupadī refers to *Bṛhaspatinīti* as well (v. 57). But the teachings expounded by her are, as Jacobi says, “at any rate as orthodox as one can wish!” (cf. “Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie” [1911], in: *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Bernhard Kölver, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 737 [552], n. 1; English translation by V.A. Sukthankar in *The Indian Antiquary* 47 [1918]: 104, n. 1). Perhaps the very mention of *Bṛhaspati* made Nīlakaṇṭha think of Cārvāka, although this *Bṛhaspati* must be a different person altogether.

²³ Haricarana Vandyopadhyaya in his Bengali-Bengali dictionary *Vaṅgīya Śabdakoṣa* (New Delhi 1966, originally published in 1340-1353 Bengali Sāla), records this sense of *haṭha* (3) and refers to Nīlakaṇṭha.

Gods, men, celestial beings, goblins, demons and monsters – all are produced by *svabhāva*, not by any actions, nor by any [other] cause.

It is also to be noted that this account of cosmogony begins and ends with five elements (50.10). Apparently there were some elementalists (*bhūtavādins*, or rather *mahābhūtavādins*) who were accidentalists as well as inactivists. The word *bhūtacintaka* most probably refers to them, not to the Cārvākas or their predecessors who were to arrive much later on the philosophical scene and who spoke of only *four* elements instead of *five* (as the *bhūtacintakas* did).²⁴

The question that automatically arises at this juncture is how *svabhāva*, which was originally quite distinct from *yadṛcchā*, could become synonymous with it. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to offer any definite solution. But it may be suggested that from at least the first century CE, *svabhāva* had come to refer to both accidentalism and inactivism, distinguishing the doctrine both from theism (*īśvaravāda*) and fatalism (*niyatīvāda*). The concept of *svabhāva* was employed by the later Buddhist philosophers as well as by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (although the latter did not employ the term *svabhāva* but *ākasmikatva*²⁵ when they spoke of a doctrine identical with it). This change of meaning in the first domain (related to the first-cause controversy) seems to have penetrated into the second domain (related to what determines success in man's life) and thus *svabhāva* became synonymous with *haṭha*. In any case, in both the domains *svabhāva* came to stand for the denial of causality. The two passages in the *Mbh.* in which the hemistich *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* occurs belong to the second domain.

svabhāva has other meanings in other contexts in the *Mbh.* itself as also elsewhere. In the *Bhagavadgītā* (17.2) and *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (10.21.13-30), for instance, *svabhāva* stands for the traits inherited from former births.²⁶ A study of these other meanings, however, is better postponed because it will lead us into areas far away from the one under discussion. We propose to conclude with the following observation: *svabhāva* is a polysemous word, and in the context of *Śānti* 224.50 and *Āśvamedhika* 48.24 it means "chance" and nothing else. The word *bhūtacintaka*, both in these contexts and elsewhere, merely refers to those who thought in terms of the five elements and were inactivists to boot. So, *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* should be rendered as "The elementalists (speak in terms) of chance."

²⁴ Only the Jains speak of the *tajjīva-taccharīravādins* as believing in the existence of five elements. Cf. *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* 1.1.1.7-9 and Śīlānka's commentary, p. 10ff. (ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji, Delhi 1978); *Jain Sūtras*, Part 2, pp. 236-237 (translated by H. Jacobi, Sacred Books of the East 45, Oxford 1895). See also Śīlānka, p. 185ff. and Jinabhadra Gaṇi, *Gaṇadharavāda* 3.101-103 (1649-1651) (ed. Muni Ratnaprabha Vijaya, Ahmedabad 1942). An oft-quoted Cārvāka aphorism, however, specifically declares: "Earth, air, fire, and water are the only principles" (for its sources see Mamoru Namai, "A Survey of Bārhaspatya Philosophy," *Indological Review* [Kyoto] 2 [1976]: 38-39 and n. 12). The opponents of the Cārvākas also refer to them as *bhūtacatuṣṭaya-vādins*. Guṇaratna (*Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, ed. L. Suali, Calcutta 1905-1914, p. 300) also admits this but adds that there was another group of Cārvākas who believed in the existence of *five* elements. This view is not attested by any source known to me. The *Maṇimēkalai*, in fact, makes a distinction between the *bhūta(pañcaka)vādins* and the Lokāyatikas (retold by L. Holmström, Hyderabad 1996, Ch. 20, p. 170).

²⁵ The term *ākasmikatvaparakarāṇa* is used by Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimīśra and Viśvanātha, to designate NS 4.1.22-24. See *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṅkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, Vol. 2, ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha, Calcutta 1944.

²⁶ *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (crit. ed.) 10.21.13-30 (*Śrībhāgavatam*, ed. K.K. Shastree, Ahmedabad 1997, Vol. 4/1) = 10.24.13ff. in the vulgate.

Any definite association of the doctrine of *svabhāva* (relating to the first domain) with the Cārvākas or Lokāyata is not encountered before the tenth century CE.²⁷ However, a hint may be found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* translated into Chinese by Paramārtha in the sixth century CE.²⁸ Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century CE), too, associates *svabhāva* with the Bārhaspatyas.²⁹ But nowhere is the Cārvāka made to deny causality or preach inactivism. To Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (fourteenth century CE) the Cārvākas are not accidentalists: they rather admit *svabhāva*, “inherent nature,” to be the determinant:

But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow adriṣṭa, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we (*sc.* the Cārvākas) cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.³⁰

Somadevasūri (tenth century CE) presents the Cārvāka as positively championing human effort against fatalism and inactivism.³¹ However, commentators on the *Mbh.*, like Ānanda-pūrṇa Vidyāsāgara and Nīlakaṇṭha, must have been influenced by the later concept that sought to associate *svabhāva* (relating to the first domain) with the Cārvākas. Accordingly, they interpreted the verses under discussion in different ways. In short, the *bhūtacintakas* are not to be identified with the Cārvāka materialists, but with some elementalists who may have preached both accidentalism and inactivism and, due to this, incurred the wrath of Vyāsa in *Śānti* 229.3-10.³²

²⁷ Bhaṭṭotpala in his commentary on Varāhamihira's *Brhatsaṃhitā* 1.7 (ed. Avadha Vihari Tripathi, Varanasi 1968, Part 1, p. 9) writes: ... *laukāyatikāḥ svabhāvaṃ jagataḥ kāraṇam āhuḥ*, “The Laukāyatikas call *svabhāva* the first cause (lit. the cause of the world).”

²⁸ J. Takukusu, *The Sāṃkhya Kārikā: Studied in the Light of the Chinese Version*. Translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, n.d., p. 36, on v. 27. Referring to the verse “What produces the white colour of the *haṃsas*,” etc., the commentator says: “This verse is found in the work of the Lokāyatas.”

²⁹ *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, pp. 210-211 (ed. R. Tailanga, Benares 1893).

³⁰ *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Ch. 1, p. 11 (ed. K.L. Joshi, Ahmedabad/Delhi 1981; translation by E.B. Cowell).

³¹ *Yasastilakacampū*, Ch. 3, vv. 60-66 (ed. Sivadatta and V.L. Panasikar, Part 1, Bombay 1916, p. 382). See also Krishna Kanta Handiqui, *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture*, Sholapur 1949, p. 146.

³² Cf. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, “*Svabhāvavāda vis-à-vis Materialism: A Review in the Light of Some Mahābhārata Passages*,” *Anvikṣā* 18 (1999): 92-101, particularly pp. 98-99. – For two further recent contributions by the present author dealing with materialism in ancient India, cf. “Cārvāka Fragments: A New Connection,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30/6 (2002): 597-640, and “Jain Sources for the Study of Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas in India,” *Jain Journal* 38/3 (2004): 145-160.