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Edited by

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PREFACE

The essays collected here were read and discussed in a seminar organized by the Department of Buddhist studies of the University of Delhi in 1967. As the Director of the seminar I was fortunate in receiving full cooperation not only from those who contributed their papers but also from those who participated in discussions. I acknowledge my indebtedness to them all.

I had to drop my original plan of publishing complete proceedings of the seminar because printing arrangements took extraordinarily long time to come through. Instead I thought of making this a volume representative of the areas of Buddhist studies where Indian scholars are interested at present. Hence the last chapter has been included here which did not form a part of the seminar.

Since I have moved from the Department of Buddhist studies which I headed from 1966 to 1973 to the Department of Philosophy, I take this opportunity of thanking those colleagues of my former Department who cooperated with me in my academic and administrative functioning. This volume will always remind me of pleasant and fruitful experiences I had in that Department.

R. C. Pandeya

VIII

On Svabhāvavāda

by

Ryotai Fukuhara

Chandrakīrti says in his Prasannapadā : "We are not nāstikas. We, rejecting both the theories of asti and nāsti, point out the non-dual path leading to the Castle of Nirvāṇa. We do not say that action, doer, reward, etc., do not exist. We simply set out a temporary statement that these things do not have svabhāva." (p. 329).

To refute both āstikas and nāstikas was the aim of Mādhyamikas. And not only āstikas but also nāstikas were regarded as svabhāvavādins (note 1). Chandrakīrti refers by name to eleven opponent schools outside and inside Buddhism. But the main opponent supposed by the author of Mādhyamika-kārikās, was Vāibhāṣikas (note 2). So, here I would like to discuss about svabhāvavāda as meant by Vāibhāṣikas and that as refuted by Mādhyamikas, mainly

1. In Chap. XVIII of PP. Chandrakīrti enumerates three differences between Nāstikas and Mādhyamikas (p. 368. l. 4, p. 369. l. 7). There he says, "Mādhyamikas who are Pratītyasamutpādvādins, talk about non-existence of all things belonging to this life and the other life with the reason that they are produced depending on hetu and pratyayas, but (we do) not (tell) in the same manner in which Nāstikas who are Svarūpavādins do. For, it is not from the point of Pratītyasamutpāda and voidness of substance of things that Nāstikas understand non-existence of other lives. What they do is, that they, having recognized a thing of this life as substantial, do not see the thing coming from another life to this life or going from this life to another life. In other words, Nāstikas wrongly deny existence of things in other lives which are similar to things perceived in this life." From this it is clear that Nāstikas are also regarded as svabhāvavādins.
2. This is known from the fact that topics dealt with in all chapters are the traditional subject-matters of Vāibhāṣikas' Abhidharma books, and that opponent's theories quoted in chapters I (four pratyaya), XVII (karma theory), XXIV (98 anuśaya), etc. are apparently Vāibhāṣikas'.

on the ground of Abhidharma-Mahā-Vibhāṣā (AMV) and Prasannapadā (PP) (note 3).

First of all, we must pay attention to the fact that in PP, the word 'svabhāva' is used in two meanings. (1) Svabhāva discussed on in Chapter XV means 'a special quality of a thing unshared by any other things', such as auṣṇya of agni. It is defined as "yo dharmo yaṃ padārthaṃ na vyabhicarati sa tasya svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate, apara-prati-baddhatvāt", or as "ātmīyaṃ rūpaṃ", or as "nijaṃ rūpaṃ". (note 4). Svabhāva used in this meaning is synonymous with svalakṣaṇa, svarūpa and prakṛiti, and its antonyms are sāmānya-lakṣaṇa and parabhāva (note 5). (2) In some other cases, svabhāva means 'a self-established entity', and when it is used in its adverbial forms (svabhāvena or svabhāvatas), it is to be translated with such phrases as 'by itself' and 'as a self-established entity'. For example : yadi hi svabhāvato duḥkhaṃ syāt tadā svabhāvasyānapāyivāt kuto'sya nirodhatvam (If there is pain as a self-established entity, how can it vanish ? Because the self-established entity will never vanish. PP chap. 24. p. 507). Svabhāvatas of this meaning is synonymous with svātmanā in a passage like : na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ, svātmanā vidyamānānām punar utpādavaiyarthyaṭ (Things are not born from themselves, because to be born again is unnecessary for the things which are already existent by themselves. PP. chap. 1 .p. 21). Antonym of this svabhāva is not sāmānya-lakṣaṇa or parabhāva, but parasparāpekṣa (note 6).

In AMV also, the word 'zī-XING' ('nature of oneself', a fixed translation word for 'svabhāva' in Chinese) is sometimes

3. It may seem improper to discuss on the subject comparing a text in Skt. and a text in Chinese. But authenticity of AMV can not be doubted, though its authorships and date is uncertain. I shall use Abhidharmakośa in order to embody my discussion by Skt. source.
4. Cf. PP. chap. XIII. p. 241. 7-9; XV. p. 260. l. 4-8; XV. p. 262. l. 12 p. 264. l. 2
5. This is clear from the statement in PP. chap. XV.
6. We find a passage, "(for these two things), parasparāpekṣikī siddhi is possible but not svābhāvikī siddhi" at three places of PP. (chap. I. p. 75. l. 10-11; chap. VIII. p. 189. l. 14-15; chap. IX p. 200. l. 2-3). This proves that svabhāva and Parasparāpekṣā are antonymous.

identified with 'zī-XIĀNG, ('appearance of oneself'-svalakṣaṇa or svarūpa), and sometimes identified with 'zī-TI' ('entity or body of oneself'—svātman) (note 7).

Here we must consider whether svalakṣaṇa and svātman are the same or not, since both of them are synonymous with svabhāva. In other words, whether svabhāva can mean svalakṣaṇa and svātman, simultaneously or it can mean only one of them in one context. In other words, again, whether svabhāva is a word of broader denotation which covers both svalakṣaṇa and svātman, or it is totally equal to svalakṣaṇa in one context and totally equal to svātman in another.

If the former is the case, we must prove that svalakṣaṇa and svātman are identical. If the latter is the case we must ask why authors of PP and AMV used such a confusing word as svabhāva which means nothing but svalakṣaṇa here and nothing but svātman there.

In PP, nowhere svalakṣaṇa is identified directly with svātman. But in AMV, we often find a stereotyped phrase, i.e., "This is the svabhāva, ātmabhāva, lakṣaṇāṅga, svātman and prakṛiti of such and such a dharma" (note 8). Enumeration of these words in such a manner suggests us that these are almost synonymous, though not synonyms in the strict meaning of the term.

Svalakṣaṇa and svātman are originally quite different ideas and there is a strict distinction in the usage of the two words in PP. For example, svalakṣaṇa is never used in its adverbial form (svalakṣaṇeṇa) while svātman takes that form (svātmanā), and svātman can be a reflexive pronoun as in 'tadeva darśanaṃ svātmānaṃ na paśyati' while svalakṣaṇa cannot.

But it is not too much or too wrong to say that svalakṣaṇa and svātman are *virtually* synonymous, with the reason that substantial existence (svātmanā vidyamāna, svātmanā siddha) naturally implies possession of svalakṣaṇa and possession of svalakṣaṇa naturally implies substantial existence. I hereby set a hypothesis that the concept of svabhāva covers

7. Cf. Taishō vol. 27. p. 243. c; p. 680. c; p. 420. c; p. 249. b; p. 179. b.

8. Cf. ib. p. 237. c, etc.

both svalakṣaṇa and svātman and that through svabhāva, the latter two can be identified.

There is another fact to prove that svabhāva is a loosely defined word, in other words, a word used in wide sense. It is one of the conventionalities of AMV that whenever the author gives a definition to something, he indicates, almost without exception, what is its svabhāva, sometimes with reason. So we can find out the relation between a thing and its svabhāva by surveying the text. There in AMV, A is set down as svabhāva of B, sometimes because (1) A is the cause of B (e.g. manas for dream), sometimes because (2) A is the object of B (whole existing things for dream) sometimes because (3) A includes B (citta-viprayukta-sams-, kāra for nirodha-samāpatti), sometime because (4) A is included in B (98 anuśayas classified crossed with three dhātus, darśana-mārga and bhāvanā-mārga for sapta-anuśaya) and sometimes even because (5) pronunciation of A is similar to that of B (māna for mada). Moreover, sometimes one and the same thing is regarded as the svabhāva of several dharmas (prajñā for daśabala, catur-vaiśāradya and mahākaruṇā-citta). Here we cannot apply the definition of svabhāva as 'an essential character' or 'an entity'. Probably distribution of svabhāva to each dharma to be defined in AMV, was a measure to help make the definition clearer, showing cause, object, larger category, components, etc., of the dharma. And this is also one usage of 'svabhāva'.

Chandrakīrti attributes the following five characters to svabhāva. (1) Svabhāva is inseparable from its possessor. (2) It is unchangeable. (3) It is not something created. (4) It does not depend on hetu and pratyaya in order to come into existence. (5) It exists throughout the three times, future, present and past (note 9).

Exactly the same description of svabhāva is found in AMV also. (1) "There is no occasion when dharmas do not hold svabhāva, for dharmas never abandon their own

9. (1) Cf. PP. p. 241. (2) Cf. PP. p. 324, 424, 471, 507, 509, 510, 511, 513, 521. Kārikās, XV. 8, XXIV. 26. (3) Cf. PP. p. 260, 453, 513. Kārikās XV. 1, 2. (4) Cf. PP. p. 259, 453, 502, 513. Kārikās XV. 1, 2. (5) Cf. PP. p. 262—264.

body" (Taisho vol. 27 p. 307a). (2) "Svabhāva in itself neither increases nor decreases. Hence it has got its name" (ibid. p. 308 a, 761 c, 844 b). "All the dharmas dwell in their own body, own self, own matter, own nature and own character. There is no pariṇāma" (ibid. p. 200a). (3) "All the dharmas originally possess svabhāva, for originally they dwell in their bodies and their own characters" (ibid p. 394 b). (4) "Dharmas possess svabhāva without any cause, for they possess their own body without depending on cause, and assistant causes." (ibid. p. 307 a). (5) "Svabhāva of created existences are even-existent." (ibid. p. 161 a).

Therefore when, either of these schools says, "This dharma exists as svabhāva" or "This dharma possess svabhāva, it is meant that the dharma is not changed, not created, not dependent on hetu and pratyaya, and is permanent. In this respect, the two schools stand on the same starting point, whence one develops svabhāvavāda and the other declines to rejection of it.

Now mādhyamikas say that if one admits existence of such svabhāva in each dharma, he will comit many mistakes. They point out many faults of svabhāvavāda. But we can summarize them into two major points.

Criticism I :

If a dharma possesses a permanent svabhāva, (1) it is not necessary for the dharma to be born again by hetu-pratyaya, because it is already existent, (2) and so the dharma will never perish, and (3) we cannot obtain anything new which did not exist before, because nothing is born newly, and so (4) the world will become motionless (kūṭastha), and thus (5) the svabhāvavādins will fall in nityavāda (note 10).

This criticism, though done triumphantly, is not proper, for it does not take into consideration the basic doctrine of 'kriyā' of Vaibhāṣika, which was often propounded in AMV and was brought under minute examination by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośa (AK. Chapter of Anuśaya-nirdeśa, kārikās No. 25—27). The doctrine of Vaibhāṣikas which

10. (1) Cf. Kārikās XXIV. 20, 24. (2) Cf. Kārikās XV. 8; XX. 17; XXI. 17; XXIII. 24; XXIV. 23, 39; XXV. 2; PP. p. 522. (3) Cf. Kārikās XXIV. 26, 27, 28. (4) Cf. Kārikās XV. 9; XXIV. 38. (5) Cf. Kārikās XV. 11; XVII. 22.

may be formulated as "sarve dharmā trikāle santi", seems to be a nityavāda. But by introducing the concept of impermanent kriyā, they avoided the danger of nityavāda. The following passage of AMV shows it clearly.

"Pariṇāma (change, transformation) is two-fold. One is the pariṇāma of entity and the second is the pariṇāma of kriyā. If we are to talk in the sense of pariṇāma of entity, we should say that saṃskāras have no pariṇāma, because their entities are not something created (akṛitrimatvāt). If we are to talk in the meaning of pariṇāma of kriyā, we should say that saṃskāras have pariṇāma. Dharmas in the future time have not yet gotten kriyā. When they come into the present time, they get kriyā. And when they enter into the past, the kriyā perishes. In this sense, there is pariṇāma (of saṃskāras)" (Taisho vol. 27., p. 200. a—b).

Thus the ontology of Vaibhāṣikas is two-sided. But Mādhyamikas' criticism as seen above is not based on due understanding of this dual theory. Though kriyā is examined in several chapters of Mādhyamika-kārikā and PP, it is only to point out faults inevitable when we assume kriyā as an entity and is not discussed in connection with ontology (note 11). Only at one place in PP, Chandrakīrti refers to the ontology of Vaibhāṣika (he quotes Vasumitra's theory which is accepted as authentic by the author of AMV cf. Taisho Vol. —27. P. 393 a—396 a; AK. Peking Edition Vol. 115. 228-1-5 to—230-2-4). But there also, his refutation is very simple (cf. PP. chap. 20. P. 395 l. 11—p. 396. l. 6).

Criticism II :

The second criticism consists in a point that if something exists by itself (svabhāvatas), it must exist separately and independently from any other things, but that every thing exists in either (1) cause-effect relation; (2) mutual relativity, or (3) doing-done relation. Almost all the chapter of Mādhyamika śāstra is devoted for demonstrating this fact. The cause-effect relation is discussed in chapters 1, 4, 17, 20 and 23; mutual relativity in chapters 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 25; doing-done relation in chapters 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 18 and 22.

11. Cf. PP. p. 79-81, p. 115, p. 118, etc.

The method of refutation is, as for doing-done relation for example, (1) to replace names of two things under examination with another two nouns derived from the same verb-root (*e.g.* agni is replaced with dāhaka and indhana with dahaniya, both being derived from the same root dah), and then (2) to set a disjunctive : A is equal to B, A is different from B, A includes B, A is included in B, A possesses B, etc. and then (3) to demonstrate that every such case results in dilemma, and then finally (4) to conclude that single member of the pair does not exist as an entity. (note 12).

This looks like a vital attack to Vaibhāṣikas. But we must notice two points here. (1) Vaibhāṣikas were not ignorant of relativity of notions. In AMV, existence is classified into two, three and five kinds. In them, the last classification is : nominal existence such as horns of a rabbit; real existence such as skandha, āyatana, etc.; temporary existence such as army; existence as a collection of other things such as pudgala; relative existence such as longness and shortness (note 13). (2) Vaibhāṣikas never rejected causality. Simply they maintained that even if two things are in causal relation or in doing-done relation, each member can exist by itself. They may say, "Think of a piece of wood which is not now burning. This is a fuel (indhana), and existing separately from fire. Think of an eye covered by an eye-lid. This is a 'seer' or 'seeing instrument' (darśana) and existing independently from objects of eye-perception." Thus, to Vaibhāṣikas,

12. As for the first stage, Mādhyāmikās replace mahābhūta and rūpa-skandha with kāraṇa and kārya (chap. 4), anāvaraṇa and ākāśa-dhātu with lakṣaṇa and lakṣya (chap. 5), kleśa and pudgala with rāga and rakta (chap. 6), pudgala and indriya and skandha with upādātri and upādāna (chap. 9), rāgādi and saṃskāra or pudgala with bandhana and bandhya (chap. 16), tathāgata and his pañca-skandha with upādātri and upādāna (chap. 22), etc. As for the second stage, Nāgārjuna established five-fold disjunction, i.e. (1) tattva (or ekatva), (2) anyatva (or prithaktva), (3) ādhāra, (4) ādheya and (5) tad-vat, and used it in chap. X. kārikā No 14, XX. No. 1. 'Pañcadhā' in XXII. No. 8 and XXIII. No. 5 means these five-fold disjunction. Chandrakīrti called it 'pañca-pakṣa' (chap. XX. p. 435. l. 3). The fifth, 'tad-vat' is again divided into two, i.e. vyatirekeṇa and avyā-tirekeṇa by Chandrakīrti (chap. X. p. 212. l. 9-14). Chandrakīrti says that the latter 3 limbs are nothing but sub-divisions of anyatva (chap. XX. p. 435. l. 3). Chandrakīrti established seven-fold disjunction in his Mādhyamakāvātāra, chap. 6, kārikā No. 151, adding samūhatva and saṃsthānatva to Nāgārjuna's five limbs.

13. Cf. Taishō Vol. 27. p. 42 a.

dependence does not necessarily imply denial of substantial existence of each member of the pair (note 14).

Against this, to Mādhyāmikās, a piece of wood which is not burning now is not a fuel, because a thing which is not now being burnt by fire cannot claim to be a fuel (agninirapekṣasya anidhyamānasya indhanatva-abhāvāt. PP. chap. X. p. 207. l. 6). Similarly, an eye which is not now seeing things is not an eye : "Nothing can be a seer if it is not seeing something now" (apaśyan na kiṃ cid darśanaṃ bhavati. PP. chap. III, p. 115. Also see kārikās III. 4, XXIV. 24, 33, 37). Mādhyāmikās' discussion is always based on this premises. Only on this premise, they can assert that dependence of two things naturally leads to denial of substantial existence of single member of the pair.

But this premise is never admitted by Vaibhāṣikas. It is a premise forced to them by Mādhyāmikās.

In short, both schools admit causality and dependence of things, but Vaibhāṣikas say that this fact does not deny independence and substantiality of things, while Mādhyāmikās say that causality and dependence necessarily signifies non-substantiality (niḥsvabhāva, śūnyatā) of things. And to prove the latter, Mādhyāmikās had to presume a wishful and forcible premise as mentioned above.

Thus both in the first and the second criticism, Mādhyāmikās' refutation does not just meet the point of Vaibhāṣikas' assertion.

Vaibhāṣikas admitted substantial existence of things in future and past as well as present time, in order to fulfil the following three necessities. (1) Buddha taught existence of future and past dharmas. (2) We can perceive future and past dharmas in imagination and memory, and things percei-

14. Chapter X, kārikās No. 8 to 12, are set to refute an assertion of opponents that agni and indhana are dependent on each other and yet they are self-established entities separately. This opponent's view represents Vaibhāṣika's assertion. As for the view that eye is eye even if it is not seeing anything now, the following passage of AMV will give clear evidence. "What is eye? that which has already seen rūpa, that which is now seeing rūpa, that which will see rūpa, and the rest are called eye.....the rest means tat-sabhāga" (Taishō Vol. 27. p. 732. b). Tat-sabhāga means an eye which though being born and existing now, does not see rūpa because of lack of condition, such as in darkness, eye-lid being closed, etc.

vable must have existence. (3) Karmas which we made in the past must continue existing as substance so as to produce their effect, otherwise moral law will not be established. But since they had to make this theory compatible with the iron principle of anityavāda of Buddhism, they added, "But kriyā of dharmas are non-permanent" (note 15).

Though this theory of Vaibhāṣikas contains many defects as pointed out by Vasubandhu, we should acknowledge that it was such a purposeful, religious theory. If the theory can be replaced with another faultless theory which fulfills the above necessities as done by Vasubandhu (note 16), it is better. But simple rejection of the theory without giving any counter-theory, as done by Mādhyamikas, is not proper.

This is not to minimize the significance of Mādhyamika's philosophy. Mādhyamikas' devotion in rejection of svabhāvavāda was also a purposeful one. Vaibhāṣikas say, "There is no method other than examining existing things (dharmāṇaṃ pravīcayam) to tranquilize evil desires because of which people of this world are wondering about in the ocean of life (bhava-samsāra). Therefore the Master (Śāstṛ—Buddha) preached this (abhidharma)." (AK. chap. 1. kārīkā No. 3). This examination of existing things (pravīcaya) was the way of approach to Buddhism adopted by Vaibhāṣikas. Therefore they devoted themselves in defining, classifying and systematizing dharmas. This way of approach is all right if they are well aware that it is only a means to obtain nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa-adhigama-upāyatva, cf. PP. chap. XXIV. p. 494. l. 14). But otherwise they are always exposed to a dangerous assumption, "This is the very truth" (idaṃ satya-abhiniveśa, cf. PP. chap. 1. p. 45. l. 5—7). And to see svabhāva in each dharma is the very cause of prapañca which successively causes vikalpa, abhiniveśa, kleśa, karma and samsāra (cf. PP. chap. XVIII. p. 350 l. 13—p. 351. l. 11). To warn against this danger was the motive of Mādhyamikas.

From this view-point of motive and purpose, Mādhyamika philosophy can be highly appreciated. But their actual method of refutation of Vaibhāṣika's svabhāvavāda was indeed full of defects as shown above.

15. 15 and 16. Cf. Abhidharmakośa chap. V. kārīkā No. 25 27 and commentary on the kārīkās.

IX

The Satya—Siddhi and its Exposition of Buddhism

Prof. N. Aiyaswami Sastri

During the period (253 A.D.) when Harivarman composed his *Satyasiddhi*, Buddhist church was divided into different schools of interpretations. The most important amongst them were Sarvāstivādin, Dharmagupta, Mahīśāsaka, Kāśyapīya, Vātsīputrīya and others who were contending mutually and drifting from the original spirit of the Master's teachings. There was also the Mahāsāṅghika following a Mahāyānic form of Buddhism. It was Kātyāyanīputra who started a perverted interpretation of the scripture on the pattern of the Brahmanical systems of thought. Harivarman cites an instance (in Ch. 92). The Sarvāstivādin accepts as a separate element dharma like *prthakjanatva* on the model of *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva*, etc. of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The author felt sorry for such state of affairs that the true import of the scripture was misrepresented as a result of wrong interpretation by other masters. This fact led the author to make an attempt to reassess the value of the master's teachings and thus rectify the blunders committed by his previous teachers. In his opinion a good treatise founded on the exegetic principle is a source of inspirations and right knowledge.

In the introductory part of the treatise the author says: there are ten points of dispute in Buddhism. They are:

- (1) Everything exists or not exists.
- (2) The past and future are real or unreal.
- (3) Intermediary life exists or not exists.
- (4) Induction of four noble truths is gradual or of one moment.
- (5) Arhan falls or never falls.
- (6) *Anuśayas*, residual forces, are mind's associate or dissociate.